# R1 vs. Stanford AY

## 1

#### Primacy solves arms races, land grabs, rogue states, and great power war – reject old defense that ignores emerging instability and compounding risk

Brands 18 [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 129-133]

Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6

From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep.

This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance.

Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate.

American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap.

Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled.

THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors.

First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment.

Second, the international outlaws are no longer so weak. North Korea’s conventional forces have atrophied, but it has amassed a growing nuclear arsenal and is developing an intercontinental delivery capability that will soon allow it to threaten not just America’s regional allies but also the continental United States.12 Iran remains a nuclear threshold state, one that continues to develop ballistic missiles and A2/AD capabilities while employing sectarian and proxy forces across the Middle East. The Islamic State, for its part, is headed for defeat, but has displayed military capabilities unprecedented for any terrorist group, and shown that counterterrorism will continue to place significant operational demands on U.S. forces whether in this context or in others. Rogue actors have long preoccupied American planners, but the rogues are now more capable than at any time in decades.

Third, the democratization of technology has allowed more actors to contest American superiority in dangerous ways. The spread of antisatellite and cyberwarfare capabilities; the proliferation of man-portable air defense systems and ballistic missiles; the increasing availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex— these phenomena have had a military leveling effect by giving weaker actors capabilities which were formerly unique to technologically advanced states. As such technologies “proliferate worldwide,” Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein commented in 2016, “the technology and capability gaps between America and our adversaries are closing dangerously fast.”13 Indeed, as these capabilities spread, fourth-generation systems (such as F-15s and F-16s) may provide decreasing utility against even non-great-power competitors, and far more fifth-generation capabilities may be needed to perpetuate American overmatch.

Finally, the number of challenges has multiplied. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Washington faced rogue states and jihadist extremism—but not intense great-power rivalry. America faced conflicts in the Middle East—but East Asia and Europe were comparatively secure. Now, the old threats still exist—but the more permissive conditions have vanished. The United States confronts rogue states, lethal jihadist organizations, and great-power competition; there are severe challenges in all three Eurasian theaters. “I don’t recall a time when we have been confronted with a more diverse array of threats, whether it’s the nation state threats posed by Russia and China and particularly their substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation states of the likes of ISIL, Al Qaida, etc.,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper commented in 2016. Trends in the strategic landscape constituted a veritable “litany of doom.”14 The United States thus faces not just more significant, but also more numerous, challenges to its military dominance than it has for at least a quarter century.

#### Even if every arg they make about fear is right its irrelevant- it's not changeable

Stein, PhD, 13

(Janice Gross THREAT PERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, 2nd ed. Edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. http://www.surrey.ac.uk/politics/research/researchareasofstaff/isppsummeracademy/instructors%20/Stein%20-%20Threat%20Perception%20in%20International%20Relations.pdf )

Neuropsychologists and behavioral economists treat fear very differently. Fear is conditioned in part by our evolutionary makeup and is frequently evoked by crude or subliminal cues. Fear typically peaks just before a threat is experienced and is highly dependent on mental imagery and vividness. It is, of course, highly adaptive; fear heightens attention and vigilance, and prepares people to respond to what they perceive as imminent danger. Neuroscientists have now demonstrated that fear conditioning, however, may be permanent, or at least far longer lasting than other kinds of learning. “To the extent that these differences exist between the calculus of objective risk and the determinants of fear, and to the extent that fear does play an important part in risk-related behaviors,” argues Loewenstein and his colleagues, “behavior in the face of risk is unlikely to be well-described by traditional consequentialist models” (2008: 280). Fear, in other words, last longer than the threat and can become a learned response that is embedded over time. It is not surprising then that a decade after 9/11, leaders and publics in the United States still identify the threat of a terrorist attack as one of their primary concerns. Threat perception remains high and shapes foreign and domestic policy even though no major attack has succeeded in the decade that followed. That several attacks have been aborted is undoubtedly a part of the continuing public and political focus on terrorism. But fear conditioning is also part of the explanation. Through repeated practice and institutionalization, a self-sustaining climate of fear was created in the United States by the Bush administration (Crawford, 2009; Meyer and Miskimmon, 2009). Once a threat is perceived and institutionalized, it becomes self-perpetuating and it consequently becomes far more difficult to wind down the well-established embedded threat perceptions that drive conflict.

#### Extinction is the only coherent and egalitarian framework – prefer it

Khan 18 (Risalat, activist and entrepreneur from Bangladesh passionate about addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and other existential challenges. He was featured by The Guardian as one of the “young climate campaigners to watch” (2015). As a campaigner with the global civic movement Avaaz (2014-17), Risalat was part of a small core team that spearheaded the largest climate marches in history with a turnout of over 800,000 across 2,000 cities. After fighting for the Paris Agreement, Risalat led a campaign joined by over a million people to stop the Rampal coal plant in Bangladesh to protect the Sundarbans World Heritage forest, and elicited criticism of the plant from Crédit Agricolé through targeted advocacy. Currently, Risalat is pursuing an MPA in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University as a SIPA Environmental Fellow, “5 reasons why we need to start talking about existential risks,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/5-reasons-start-talking-existential-risks-extinction-moriori/)

Infinite future possibilities I find the story of the Moriori profound. It teaches me two lessons. Firstly, that human culture is far from immutable. That we can struggle against our baser instincts. That we can master them and rise to unprecedented challenges. Secondly, that even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. This is a humbling realization. Because faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare for possibilities. Standing at the launch pad of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the possibilities seem endless. They range from an era of abundance to the end of humanity, and everything in between. How do we navigate such a wide and divergent spectrum? I am an optimist. From my bubble of privilege, life feels like a rollercoaster ride full of ever more impressive wonders, even as I try to fight the many social injustices that still blight us. However, the accelerating pace of change amid uncertainty elicits one fundamental observation. Among the infinite future possibilities, only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction. Concerns about extinction are often dismissed as apocalyptic alarmism. Sometimes, they are. But repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a straw man argument. The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility. And there have been far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy. As the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos discusses how to create a shared future in a fractured world, here are five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: 1. Extinction is the rule, not the exception More than 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone. Deep time is unfathomable to the human brain. But if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. And we have only discovered a mere fraction of the extinct species that once roamed the planet. In the speck of time since the first humans evolved, more than 99.9% of all the distinct human cultures that have ever existed are extinct. Each hunter-gatherer tribe had its own mythologies, traditions and norms. They wiped each other out, or coalesced into larger formations following the agricultural revolution. However, as major civilizations emerged, even those that reached incredible heights, such as the Egyptians and the Romans, eventually collapsed. It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization. Our interconnectedness continues to grow rapidly. “Stand or fall, we are the last civilization”, as Ricken Patel, the founder of the global civic movement Avaaz, put it. 2. Environmental pressures can drive extinction More than 15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’. They called on us to reduce our impact on the biosphere, 25 years after their first such appeal. The warning notes that we are far outstripping the capacity of our planet in all but one measure of ozone depletion, including emissions, biodiversity, freshwater availability and more. The scientists, not a crowd known to overstate facts, conclude: “soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out”. In his 2005 book Collapse, Jared Diamond charts the history of past societies. He makes the case that overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, if not the only, drivers of collapse. Even though we are making important incremental progress in battles such as climate change, we must still achieve tremendous step changes in our response to several major environmental crises. We must do this even while the world’s population continues to grow. These pressures are bound to exert great stress on our global civilization. 3. Superintelligence: unplanned obsolescence? Imagine a monkey society that foresaw the ascendance of humans. Fearing a loss of status and power, it decided to kill the proverbial Adam and Eve. It crafted the most ingenious plan it could: starve the humans by taking away all their bananas. Foolproof plan, right? This story describes the fundamental difficulty with superintelligence. A superintelligent being may always do something entirely different from what we, with our mere mortal intelligence, can foresee. In his 2014 book Superintelligence, Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom presents the challenge in thought-provoking detail, and advises caution. Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050, and a 90% chance by 2075. The latter date is within the life expectancy of many alive today. Visionaries like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. Their opposite camp includes Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg. But on an issue that concerns the future of humanity, is it really wise to ignore the guy who explained the nature of space to us and another guy who just put a reusable rocket in it? 4. Technology: known knowns and unknown unknowns Many fundamentally disruptive technologies are coming of age, from bioengineering to quantum computing, 3-D printing, robotics, nanotechnology and more. Lord Martin Rees describes potential existential challenges from some of these technologies, such as a bioengineered pandemic, in his book Our Final Century. Imagine if North Korea, feeling secure in its isolation, could release a virulent strain of Ebola, engineered to be airborne. Would it do it? Would ISIS? Projecting decades forward, we will likely develop capabilities that are unthinkable even now. The unknown unknowns of our technological path are profoundly humbling. 5. 'The Trump Factor' Despite our scientific ingenuity, we are still a confused and confusing species. Think back to two years ago, and how you thought the world worked then. Has that not been upended by the election of Donald Trump as US President, and everything that has happened since? The mix of billions of messy humans will forever be unpredictable. When the combustible forces described above are added to this melee, we find ourselves on a tightrope. What choices must we now make now to create a shared future, in which we are not at perpetual risk of destroying ourselves? Common enemy to common cause Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’. Tribes have overpowered tribes, empires have conquered rivals. Even today, our fiercest displays of unity typically happen at wartime. We give our lives for our motherland and defend nationalistic pride like a wounded lion. But like the early Morioris, we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an increasingly unstable island. We may have a violent past, but we have no more dangerous enemy than ourselves. Our task is to find our own Nunuku’s Law. Our own shared contract, based on equity, would help us navigate safely. It would ensure a future that unleashes the full potential of our still-budding human civilization, in all its diversity. We cannot do this unless we are humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction. Survival is life’s primal instinct. In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival. Our future may depend on whether we realize this.

## 2

#### Interpretation: Must only defend the topic.

**Violation- they didn’t.**

**Reasons to prefer-**

#### Fairness-

#### 1. Debate is a game: forced winner/loser, competitive norms, and the tournament invite prove. Alternative impacts like activism or education can be pursued in other forums. This makes fairness the most important impact

#### 2. Not defending the topic is not fair

#### A. Preparation- repacking the topic gives the aff a huge edge, they can prepare for 6 months on an issue that catches us by surprise. Preparation is better than thinking on your feet- research demonstrates pedagogical humility and research skills are the only portable debate training

#### B. Limits- there area finite amount of government restrictions, but an infinite number of non topical affirmatives. Consider this our “library disad”- not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months.

#### C. Causality- debating the resolution forces the affirmative to defend a cause and effect relationship, the state doing x results in y. Non topical affs establish their own barometer “I think x is good for me” that aren’t negateable. Only the neg promotes switch side debate

#### D. Exclusionary rule- you can’t vote on the case outweighs T because lack of preparation prevents rigorous testing of the AC claims. If we win fairness we don’t have to “outweigh” other impacts

**E. Cede the Political**

#### 1. The state isn’t monolithic or fixed- it’s a contingent site of political struggle. Blanket rejection empowers right wing policies, while strategic resistance can use cracks in the state as a focal point of transformation Khachaturian 17

Khachaturian, PhD candidate, 17

(Rafael, PoliSci@Indiana Bloomington, 2-20, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/deep-state-michael-flynn-leaks-federal-bureaucracy-trump/)

The Trump administration had a rough first month. On top of mass protests, historically low approval ratings, and staffing disorganization, the various bureaucracies of the federal civil service are riven with conflict and openly resisting the administration’s agenda. Last week, Michael Flynn resigned as national security adviser following leaked reports that he’d met with Russian intelligence prior to the presidential election. If anything, the rebellion within the intelligence community is only escalating. The mounting discord has led many to comment on the persistence of the “deep state” — shorthand for the nexus of corporate power and political and administrative institutions, including the branches of the armed forces, the federal bureaucracy, and the FBI, CIA, NSA, and other secretive intelligence agencies — and its ability to act as a check on the Trump presidency. According to critics — and until recently, references to the “deep state” were rarely positive — these subterranean networks exercise disproportionate influence over public policy. While parts of the Left have long been concerned about the deep state, lately the Right has taken up the term, using it to decry a purported fifth column of Obama loyalists. From Glenn Greenwald to Bill Kristol, Breitbart to Foreign Policy, it seems everyone now accepts the reality of the deep state, even if they disagree about its role in the present controversy. The term’s surge in popularity is understandable. The “deep state” appears to be an appropriate way to describe the complex networks tying together the various state apparatuses. In particular, it can easily be invoked to explain the seemingly invisible, drawn out, and arcane processes by which public policy is actually negotiated and made. Yet for the same reason, references to the deep state obscure more than they clarify. They shed hardly any light on the nature of the power struggle currently roiling the federal government. If we want to fight Trump, we’ll need conceptual and theoretical frameworks with more explanatory power than the “deep state” can provide. The Concept on Everyone’s Mind The notion of the deep state has a long history in American politics. While emanating from different ends of the political spectrum, President Eisenhower’s warnings in 1961 about the “military-industrial complex” and C. Wright Mills’s famous 1956 study of “the power elite” can both be seen as indictments of the deep state as an undemocratic distortion of policymaking. After Vietnam and Watergate, the concept embedded itself even more deeply in the political discourse, as the notion of a pluralistic distribution of power in American society appeared increasingly farcical in the face of structural inequalities. The regulatory state and the entrenched network of intelligence agencies came to be viewed as political actors just like the visible branches of government. With Trump’s ascendance to the White House, the “deep state” is once again on everyone’s mind. Trump — in keeping with his managerial style, which mirrors that of many authoritarian leaders — has attempted to sow discord among rival factions of his cabinet to ensure their direct loyalty. Likewise, he has sought to appoint outsiders to bureaucratic leadership positions, in part to prevent them from identifying with their appointed agencies, and in part to weaken the agencies traditionally favored by Democrats and progressives. A highly mobilized public has slowed down the latter. But so too has the civil service’s active disobedience (including, in the case of the intelligence bureaucracy, leaking highly damaging information). On one level, these sectors are hostile to Trump’s agenda because it seeks, at least in part, to upset the stability of the American political order and thus, of their institutional autonomy. But even if we grant that state agencies have their own interests and domains of authority that they jealously defend against encroachment, it’s unwise to think of the mounting internal opposition to Trump as a “deep state” giant now awake and attempting to restore things to normal. The Problem With the “Deep State” The deep state concept is harmful in two key ways. First, invoking the deep state implies a misleading view of the state as a monolithic, unitary actor. While the deep state is usually said to be a network of individuals and agencies, it is assumed that these component parts are held together by a common will or mission (in this case, something like defending the “national interest” against Trumpism). This leads to a reification of the state as an autonomous and internally coherent force. Yet modern capitalist states are more fragmented than they appear. First, they are composed of class fractions and coalitions that have frequently clashing interests and are motivated by short-term considerations. Often, these internal differences arise from the pressure exerted by various economic interests (such as the competition between the financial, manufacturing, and small business sectors). In addition, these class forces are intersected by other factors, including the different social bases of support behind the major political parties (including voter cleavages based on urban versus rural interests, racial and gender attitudes, and “populist” appeal), the mass media’s role in shaping certain ideological narratives, and competing visions of foreign policy and geopolitical strategy. As the Greek sociologist Nicos Poulantzas wrote in State, Power, Socialism, we need to “discard once and for all the view of the State as a completely united mechanism, founded on a homogeneous and hierarchical distribution of the centers of power moving from top to bottom of a uniform ladder or pyramid.” The state is better understood as a temporary and historically contingent crystallization of social forces, a formation whose institutions are as liable to come into conflict with each other in times of political duress as they are to align seamlessly in times of stability. It is not at all clear, then, that the leaks are a power play by a unified deep state. The rivalry within the White House between the Bannon and Priebus camps, and Trump’s intent to govern by executive order (with little consultation from Congress, the Justice Department, or the federal agencies responsible for implementing these orders) have disturbed the normal functioning of the bureaucracy. As state personnel develop ways of coping with the unpredictable and ad hoc nature of this administration, the dissent within their ranks is a sign of the uncertainty that they have been thrown into since the election, rather than a well-coordinated, conspiratorial effort. Second, to talk of the deep state is to suggest that political power is sealed off from broader social struggles. The state–civil society binary is one of the fundamental bases of liberal political theory. But this distinction is largely a byproduct of the way that political power has represented itself, rather than a social fact. Where the state ends and civil society begins has always been permeable and contested — in other words, subject to politics and political struggle. The state is not an entity standing over and above society, but instead one premised upon the social forces that bring it into being. Loose talk of the “deep state” misses this crucial point, advancing instead a facile vision of institutionalized power that constitutes its own foundation, and is therefore opaque, mysterious, and beyond the reach of citizens. The State and the Struggle Rejecting the deep state framework is not an academic exercise. The way we think about the state shapes how we, as democratic agents, conceive of and relate to organized political power. It affects how we organize and participate in the growing movement against the Trump administration and the GOP’s agenda. Treating the state as a nebulous substratum of bureaucratic networks and institutions — ones that really call the shots behind visible electoral politics — overlooks its potential as a terrain for political struggle. To again quote Poulantzas, “the State is not a monolithic bloc but a strategic field.” Through concerted struggles inside and outside of political institutions, the opposition can displace and alter the state’s internal dynamics. They can attack the hegemonic coalition (currently headed by Trump) at the core. What would this look in practice? What would it entail for the movement against Trumpism to analyze, leverage, and exploit for its own ends the various coalitions, fractions, and hegemonic blocs within the state that are now publicly clashing? First, it would mean embracing the plurality of political resistance, from legislative pressure to marches and public demonstrations, economic boycotts, and civil disobedience. Since the election we have seen a new politicization of civil society, and the proliferation of local initiatives seeking to stem the new administration’s onslaught. Among these are the rapid growth of the Democratic Socialists of America, and the movements for sanctuary cities and campuses. These struggles in civil society always reverberate within the state, turning the latter into a contested ground where these new movements can push back, both directly within and outside of state institutions, against the Trump agenda. Second, it would mean deepening the existing ties between the various popular struggles fighting Trump and the GOP, including the movements for women’s and reproductive rights, immigrant rights, workers’ rights, and environmental justice. In the short term, cultivating a broad coalition around overlapping interests (and seeking to fragment the support behind the Trump coalition, where possible) could encourage a further de-legitimization of the Trump administration’s far-right agenda, and thereby spur more refusals and defections from within the ranks of the civil service. Eventually, this movement building would go a long way in creating a positive common agenda for an already-revitalizing left. In sum, it would mean challenging the state’s ability to establish the new normal envisioned in Trump’s campaign agenda, and to inject popular struggles into the heart of the ruling coalition, which cannot act without the ongoing support of both major parties and the bureaucracy. But for any of this to happen, we first have to abandon the idea of a coherent, unitary deep state that is dictating politics behind the scenes. Relying on an illusory deep state to save us indulges in a fantasy at a time when we can ill afford to do so.

#### 2. Filter aff framework offense through the lens of #Drumpf- there is a fragile resistance movement that is expanding up now. Totalizing critique of institutional politics crushes it Aruzza 17

Aruzza, PhD Rome Tor Vergata, 17

(Cinzia, MA/PhD Philosophy, Philosophy @New School, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/womens-march-washington-trump-inauguration-protest/)

Every single analysis of what happened on January 21 and of what will come next should start with the insight that hundreds of thousands of people with no previous political experience and even with no previous participation in any demonstration whatsoever decided to take to the streets against the Trump administration. January 21 has created the potential for a new mass movement. Granted, it is a very fragile possibility, and the way we handle it will be crucial for its actualization or its irremediable loss. Whatever criticisms we may have of the limitations of this event should be articulated with a sense of political responsibility because the stakes are high. The main criticisms of the women’s march have emphasized that the march was too white, that it was hegemonized by liberals, and that it was an “interest group” or an “identity based” march, when what we really need is a universalistic mobilization involving everybody. The first two criticisms have a point: the march was indeed too white and it was hegemonized by liberals in mainstream media (although this liberal self-representation in the media did not exactly reflect the much more articulated composition of the marches). But the relevant question, here, is the one asked by Alicia Garza: More than a moral question, it is a practical one. Can we build a movement of millions with the people who may not grasp our black, queer, feminist, intersectional, anticapitalist, anti-imperialist ideology but know that we deserve a better life and who are willing to fight for it and win? . . . Hundreds of thousands of people are trying to figure out what it means to join a movement. If we demonstrate that to be a part of a movement, you must believe that people cannot change, that transformation is not possible, that it’s more important to be right than to be connected and interdependent, we will not win. The third criticism, on the contrary, entirely misses the point. It’s useful to recall that women’s marches have started a number of rather important revolutions like the French Revolution and the February revolution in Russia. In Western Europe students and the radicalized youth started the ’68 movement. In the United States the Civil Rights Movement began a wave of struggles that then expanded to campuses and to the 1960s antiwar movement. The connection between the events that triggered or prepared the grounds for subsequent struggles and the struggles themselves is not necessarily a politically coherent one; contingent — and often unpredictable facts — coalesced to determine the specific dynamic of each wave of movements over the course of many years. The relevant question, then, is not “when will we stop mobilizing on the basis of identity or interest groups and start the serious revolutionary mobilization?” It is rather: “Can this mobilization function as a catalyst for a larger struggle and open a new political space that can be inhabited by a number of different political and social subjectivities in solidarity with each other?” We have good reason to believe that this may be the case in the United States today. Indeed, women’s marches around the country have already worked as a catalyst for the convergence of other struggles. For example, Fight for $15 took part in women’s rallies in a number of cities on January 21. Moreover, the women’s march in the United States is part of a global process that has seen women mobilizing in a number of countries — from the women’s strikes in Argentina, Poland, and Ireland to the massive women’s demonstration in Italy last November. What next, then? An international coalition regrouping feminist and women’s groups from around thirty countries has called for an international women’s strike on March 8 against heterosexist violence. Women, trans women, and all the people who support their struggle will strike, march, and protest in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Germany, Italy, Poland, Russia, Turkey, South Korea, and other countries. In this vein, it wouldn’t be absurd to suggest that the first step for women and LGBTQ people after January 21, in the United States, could be the creation of grassroots coalitions and possibly a national coalition to join the international women’s strike on March 8. This would expand the scope of the mobilization beyond opposition to Trump’s administration and would contribute to making the movement less white. It would also help us rethink what a strike means, and how we can include diverse populations, including those outside the formal labor market, in our struggles.

#### F. Drop the debater on T – the round is already skewed from the beginning because their advocacy excluded by ability to generate NC offense– letting them sever doesn’t solve any of the abuse

#### G. Theory is an issue of competing interpretations because reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters will exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

## 3

#### Zero empirical correlation between innate drives or social institutions and war – the only way to prevent conflict empirically is to look at the specific decision calculus of national leaders

Sharp, 8 – adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center (Gary, “Democracy and Deterrence. Foundations for an Enduring World Peace,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA493031&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

While classical liberals focused on political structures, socialists analyzed the socioeconomic system of states as the primary factor in determining the propensity of states to engage in war. Socialists such as Karl Marx attributed war to the class structure of society; Marx believed that war resulted from a clash of social forces created by a capitalist mode of production that develops two antagonistic classes, rather than being an instrument of state policy. Thus capitalist states would engage in war because of their growing needs for raw materials, markets, and cheap labor. Socialists believed replacing capitalism with socialism could prevent war, but world events have proven socialists wrong as well. 32

These two schools of thought—war is caused by innate biological drives or social institutions—do not demonstrate any meaningful correlation with the occurrence or nonoccurrence of war. There are many variables not considered by these two schools: for example, the influence of national special interest groups such as the military or defense contractors that may seek glory through victory, greater resources, greater domestic political power, or justification for their existence.

Legal scholar Quincy Wright has conducted one of the “most thorough studies of the nature of war” 33 and concludes that there “is no single cause of war.” 34 In A Study of War, he concludes that peace is an equilibrium of four complex factors: military and industrial technology, international law governing the resort to war, social and political organization at the domestic and international level, and the distribution of attitudes and opinions concerning basic values. War is likely when controls on any one level are disturbed or changed. 35 Similarly, the 1997 US National Military Strategy identifies the root causes of conflict as political, economic, social, and legal conditions. 36

Moore has compiled the following list of conventional explanations for war: specific disputes; absence of dispute settlement mechanisms; ideological disputes; ethnic and religious differences; communication failures; proliferation of weapons and arms races; social and economic injustice; imbalance of power; competition for resources; incidents, accidents, and miscalculation; violence in the nature of man; aggressive national leaders; and economic determination. He has concluded, however, that these causes or motives for war explain specific conflicts but fail to serve as a central paradigm for explaining the cause of war. 37

In the final analysis, Wright is unequivocally correct—there is no single cause or explanation for war. However, there is one clear consistency in all wars: wars always begin through the calculated decisions of men or women, regardless of any cause, motive, or explanation. As the UNESCO constitution asserts, “wars begin in the minds of men.” 38 People—national leaders— are always at the core of any decision to wage war, and any strategy for preventing war must address these individuals.

#### Infinite root causes means the aff is the best way to deal with short term problems

Moore 4 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-2

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice,and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come.

#### Evolution doesn’t tolerate the death drive or repression – psychoanalysis isn’t credible

Kemp 18 Simon, Somerville College, Oxford, “L’Après-Œdipe: The Future of Psychoanalytic Criticism in an Era of Cognitive and Evolutionary Psychology” AJFS 55.3 2018

Both psychoanalysis and cognitive or evolutionary approaches have vulnerabilities as models of the mind and as methods of critical analysis, vulnerabilities which are rarely juxtaposed for comparison. Critiques of psychoanalysis largely stem from its incompatibilities with Darwinian theory and discrepancies with evidence from clinical psychology or neurology. Evolutionary theory rules it unlikely that humans would have developed innate psychological faculties that harmed their fitness to survive and produce viable offspring. Freud’s theory of the death drive is one idea to have difficulty in being reconciled with Darwin on these grounds; another, more seriously for psychoanalysis as a discipline, is the “cornerstone” of Freudian theory, the Œdipus complex as an explanation for parent-offspring conflict. The existence of “Œdipal” tensions within families, in the sense of a son’s possessiveness towards his mother and coolness towards her partner, is widely accepted, and included among the list of human universals proposed by the anthropologist Donald Brown.8 However, the interpretation of these attitudes as repressed incestuous desire for the mother and patricidal feelings towards the father runs into conflict with evolutionary theory. Firstly, any such fundamental elements of the human psyche ought to be at least partly shared with some of our close primate cousins, with whom we hold in common many of our most fundamental sexual and familial instincts. Without our more advanced cognition, or, in the psychoanalytic view, our inhibiting super-ego, these species might be expected to exhibit some evidence of father-son conflict over sexual access to the mother, which is not the case. Secondly, and more importantly, Darwinian theory predicts that any propensity towards Œdipal urges would be swiftly removed from the gene pool long before human civilization appeared. A gene combination that gives sons an innate desire to initiate fatal combat with their father risks wiping itself out through the death or maiming of one or other of them, plus the loss of the father’s potential future offspring, while genes predisposing the bearer towards incest would be unlikely to thrive, given the increased risk of recessive genetic disorders in the progeny of such unions.

#### Psychoanalysis requires consent – this is a procedural reason to reject the team

APA No date (American Psychoanalytic Association Principles and Standards of Ethics for Psychoanalysts No Date. Founded in 1911, the American Psychoanalytic Association (APsaA) is the oldest national psychoanalytic organization in the nation. APsaA as a professional organization for psychoanalysts, focuses on education, research and membership development. In addition to the national organization, APsaA’s membership includes 32 approved training institutes and 40 affiliate societies throughout the United States. Since its founding, APsaA has been a component of the International Psychoanalytical Association, the largest worldwide psychoanalytic organization. Accessed online 6/27/2018 at <http://www.apsa.org/About_APsaA/Ethics_Code.aspx>) EG

III. Mutuality and Informed Consent. The treatment relationship between the patient and the psychoanalyst is founded upon trust and informed mutual agreement or consent. At the outset of treatment, the patient should be made aware of the nature of psychoanalysis and relevant alternative therapies. The psychoanalyst should make agreements pertaining to scheduling, fees, and other rules and obligations of treatment tactfully and humanely, with adequate regard for the realistic and therapeutic aspects of the relationship. Promises made should be honored. When the patient is a minor these same general principles pertain but the patient's age and stage of development should guide how specific arrangements will be handled and with whom.

#### Lacan & Freud both have ahistorical conceptions of drives and power – they both fall into the trap of the ‘repressive’ hypothesis -

Huffer 16 Lynn, Prof at Emory, “Freudo-Foucauldian politics and the problem of history” Contemporary Political Theory (2016) 15, 119–138. doi:10.1057/cpt.2014.64; published online 3 February 2015

I am sympathetic to these questions but want to insist: something has been lost in queer bricolage. That something, I argue, is history. By history I do not mean the project in which most historians see themselves engaged: to offer the truth of the past as an anchor to shore up the stability of today. Rather, by history I mean a destabilizing movement of temporal dispersion that Foucault variously called the historical a priori, the genealogical method or historical ontology. Both in its Freudian and, importantly, Lacanian poststructuralist modes, queer psychoanalysis has missed history in this specifically Foucauldian sense. I will focus here on Freudo-Foucauldianism’s poststructuralist iterations in Foucauldo-Lacanian mixtures to argue that this question of history produces an unbridgeable gap between the genealogical and psycholinguistic perspectives the Foucault–Lacan opposition names. Space does not permit me to elaborate on the implications of this rift at the heart of queer theory. Let it suffice to say here that the transhistorical drive that is Lacanian queer negativity2 shatters subjectivity at the expense of history.3 For Foucault, conversely, it is history that undoes us. That difference – history – between Foucauldian and Lacanian modes of self-undoing provides a frame for broader questions I want to pursue in this critical exchange: Is psychoanalytic thinking necessarily ahistorical? Why should it matter if we historicize anyway? Why, specifically, should it matter for politics and political theory? I approach these questions by arguing, in three parts, why history should matter not only for queer theory but for antifoundationalist politics and political theory more generally. Given space constraints, I will assume for my argument that antifoundationalism and politics are not incommensurable; indeed, one of my aims is to reopen a conversation about how to think politically without a subject and its attributes – free will, agency, autonomy, choice – in a world that in fact undoes us and our attributes on every scale, from the everyday disruptions of extreme weather events to the ubiquitous evidence of mass species extinction and predictions of human finitude. To act politically as we see our own face literally dissolving at the edge of a rising sea requires a willingness to think hard about the ethical question – how are we to live? – even as we bear witness to the disappearance of that we and that living.4 Foucault’s other-than-psychoanalytic5 historical approach to desubjectivation provides resources for confronting these challenges. With that in mind, I begin by describing, contra psycholinguistic desubjectivation, how Foucault’s historical a priori dissolves the subject and the stability of its claims. Second, I return to Gender Trouble as a paradigmatic queer Freudo-Foucauldian origin story whose psycholinguistic, primarily Lacanian juridical frame exposes its conception of power as both ahistorical and out of sync with power in Foucault. Finally, I return to my opening questions – is psychoanalysis necessarily ahistorical, why historicize? and why political theory? – with some concrete examples of how psychoanalytic practice might be fruitfully combined with Foucauldian history as a way to rethink our political present. Foucault’s Historical a priori Despite scholarly habits of dividing Foucault into vastly different early, middle and late periods, it is undeniable that one of the through-lines in his work is history. What Foucault called in 1984 the critical task of doing a ‘historical ontology of ourselves’ (Foucault, 2002, p. 318) links the historical a priori of Foucault’s archeological period to the methods he later called genealogy and problematization.6 The most well-known of these terms, genealogy, is often misunderstood as trajectories of influence or lines of filiation; along similar lines, the historical a priori is often misperceived as a framing historical context. But as Foucault insists in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ (1971), his approach to the past refuses ‘the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies’ (Foucault, 1998, p. 370) that characterize common conceptions of history as causal connections or grounding frames. History in Foucault is radically disconnecting and ungrounding. Unlike ideology or Kantian transcendental conditions for the possibility of thinking, the historical a priori names the materiality of what Foucault calls the archive: a ‘complex volume’ of ‘different types of positivity’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 128), which is not simply the sum of documents preserved by a culture, but the ‘operating system’ (Nealon, 2014, p. 203) that allows some statements and events to appear while others fade. Most important, the material and epistemic limits of the archive both bind and unbind us in relation to our own time. ‘Not a condition of possibility but a law of coexistence’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 107), the historical a priori frames the genealogical method, a method whose purpose is to describe our own time from the perspective of ‘the border of time that surrounds our presence, which overhangs it, and which indicates it in its otherness’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 130). The temporal border that touches our time both establishes the limit between us and what we are not and, at the same time, makes us coextensive with the otherness that delimits us. Contact with the archive is thus the touch of a temporal otherness that ‘deprives us of our continuities’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 131): it ‘bursts open the other, and the outside’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 131).7 This is what it means to historicize: to ‘dissipate[] that temporal identity in which we are pleased to look at ourselves when we wish to exorcise the discontinuities of history’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 131). What is at stake, then, in Foucault’s well-known doubts about psychoanalysis? Some, like Didier Eribon (2005), have argued that psychoanalysis is inherently homophobic and therefore to be dismissed out of hand. Given the complexity and diversity of various psychoanalytic schools, to say nothing of their capacity to acknowledge and even embrace sexual perversions, this critique seems reductive and unconvincing. At stake in Foucault’s doubts about psychoanalysis is not homophobia but history. Among the countless interpretations of History of Sexuality Volume One, very few bring out its challenges to Lacan.8 Most have read its explicit doubts about the repressive hypothesis as a critique of Freudian biologism and of the Marcusian uptake of that biologism as a timeless, emancipatory sexual drive in need of expression. But Foucault’s doubts go deeper than suspicions about biological essentialism. Foucault’s critique of repression also targets Lacan’s radically denaturalizing discursification of Freud. Specifically, in History of Sexuality Volume One, Foucault contrasts a ‘thematics of repression’ with what he calls a ‘theory of the law as constitutive of desire’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 82) clearly referring, albeit elliptically, to the contrast between Freud and Lacan. Foucault argues that while their theories differ in how ‘they conceive of the nature and dynamics of the drives’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 83), they do not differ in how ‘they conceive of power’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 83). This, then, is Foucault’s claim: that in denaturalizing Freud – and, in so doing, making the symbolic constitutive of a nonself-identical, decentered subjectivity – Lacan nevertheless clings to an ahistorical, specifically juridical conception of power in his ‘theory of the law as constitutive of desire’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 83). Wendy Grace argues that in replacing repression with the law, Lacan does not escape the trap of the repressive hypothesis; rather he implicitly collapses psychoanalytic refoulement, or primary repression, with political repression as suppression (Grace, 2013, p. 239). Put simply, Lacan’s drive-based theory of power is juridical. Thus, when Foucault warns that ‘in political thought we still have not cut off the head of the king’ (Foucault, 1978, pp. 88–89), he is addressing not only Hobbesian thinkers but also, implicitly, Lacanian and post-Lacanian theorists whose insistence on the law misperceives modern biopower as sovereign. Why does this matter for queer bricolage and, specifically, for its modeling in Gender Trouble? Butler opens the book that many claim as a founding Foucauldian queer text by reinscribing ‘women’ as ‘juridical subjects’ who are ‘invariably produced through certain exclusionary practices’ and ‘political operations’ that are both ‘concealed and naturalized’ (Butler, 1990, p. 3). To be sure, Butler’s picture of juridical power is not simply repressive in a negative sense. Rather, in her theory of ‘subjects ... produced’ (Butler, 1990, p. 3, emphasis added) by a law that also excludes them Butler borrows from Foucault his description of power as both repressive and productive. But in that borrowing she misses Foucault’s challenge to juridical representations of modern power and his shift away from productive power as the flip side of sovereign repression toward productive power as the biopolitical intensification of life. Most important, in its poststructuralist conception of gender within a psycholinguistic model of law as constitutive of desire, Gender Trouble implicitly adopts a non-Foucauldian conception of power as drive. Correspondingly, in its post-structuralist exposure of the political subject’s ‘discursive foundation’ (Butler, 1990, p. 3), Gender Trouble occludes Foucault’s insistence on history. And again, by history, I mean a historical ontology that includes the othering contingency of a temporal dispersion to which we are bound by the epistemic and material – discursive and non-discursive – limits of the archive. Thus Gender Trouble’s performative disruption of coherent subjectivity is based in a Lacanian theory of law directly at odds with Foucauldian history. When Butler writes that ‘the juridical structures of language and politics constitute the contemporary field of power’ (Butler, 1990, p. 7), she directly contradicts Foucault’s claim that contemporary power is not juridical but biopolitical. Butler’s performative claim to resignify political agency is bound to the law by its ahistorical, psycholinguistic frame; it works directly in opposition to Foucault’s historical ontology, requiring us to ignore Foucault’s call to free our analytics of power from representations he calls ‘juridico-discursive’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 82). In other words, in the paradigmatic political thought of queer bricolage, we have still not cut off the head of the king. of a temporal dispersion to which we are bound by the epistemic and material – discursive and non-discursive – limits of the archive. Thus Gender Trouble’s performative disruption of coherent subjectivity is based in a Lacanian theory of law directly at odds with Foucauldian history. 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I have engaged here with one strand of psychoanalytic thinking that has been especially salient in queer theory. One of my reasons for doing so has been to clearly expose how the queer undoing of subjectivity happens in many modes that may be philosophically at odds with each other. Although often lumped together with poststructuralist thinkers, Foucault’s lifelong practice of historical ontology separates him from both anthropological and psycholinguistic structuralisms. With regard to psychoanalysis generally, the matter of history that separates Foucault’s desubjectivations from Lacanian ones does not mean, necessarily, that all psychoanalytic thinking is ahistorical. To make such a sweeping claim would be to refute the material specificities of the very histories the claim purports to defend. Histories of the present require contact with archives; if our present has shifted from queer gender trouble to Kleinian affect, let us do a genealogy of that affect. That said, to the extent that we moderns remain Freudian, even as we embrace the Kleinian breast, we remain the inheritors of a violence History of Madness (Foucault, 2006) describes: the erection of psyche-logos through a Great Confinement that excluded and objectified madness as the other of ourselves, then interiorized that otherness as a timeless unconscious. If we take history seriously, in the Foucauldian sense, the unconscious cannot be timeless, and we cannot be simply or only Freudian. Put somewhat differently, the historical a priori calls us to attend to that which delimits us: to that other-than-Freudian ‘border of time’ that surrounds our Freudian ‘presence’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 130). I have argued elsewhere that this contact with an otherness that delimits us describes an ethics of alterity in Foucault. Unlike the response ethics of Butler’s later work, Foucault’s ethics of alterity stems from his attention to the temporal dispersion of the historical a priori. Foucault’s other is not ethical in a Levinasian, humanist sense; rather, the dispersion of ourselves in our coextension with that which historically delimits us constitutes the ethical call of a non-human otherness, of our temporal border. In this sense, to ask the Foucauldian diagnostic question – what is this today in which we live? – is to ask, again, the Socratic ethical question – how are we to live? But to ask it again – as a question for today – is to ask it in a recoiling movement of dispersion9 that renders today strange. With Foucault, David Webb writes, ‘we are thrown into a present that is fractured, complex, and about which we can know something, but not everything’ (Webb, 2013, p. 119). It is precisely the fractured, complex strangeness of our present that impels us to revisit the archive in a contact that transforms us, again, in our presence. In that transformative recoil, Webb argues, ‘one can see the outline of a practice of freedom’ (Webb, 2013, p. 119). This is why history matters: the strange ethics of alterity of Foucault’s historical a priori grounds Foucault’s better-known conception of ethics as a practice of freedom in relation to others as historical ontology. Further, because Foucault views politics as an ethics (Foucault, 1984, p. 375), how we historicize matters for politics. Defending a Foucauldian view, Wendy Brown has argued that ahistorical assumptions and transcendent ideals ‘constitute repudiations of politics, even as they masquerade as its source of redemption’ (Brown, 2001, p. 94). Contrasting what she calls the ‘relatively ahistorical figure of a system’ with ‘political rationalities’ that are ‘orders of practice and orders of discourse, not systems of rule’ (Brown, 2001, p. 115), Brown makes a case for Foucauldian genealogy as a way to rebuild ‘the stage for potential political invention and intervention’ (Brown, 2001, p. 117).

# 2NR

## 1

### 1NC Debate is a Game

#### Debate is a game- forced winner/loser and rules to guide competition prove. Other impacts like activism or education can be BETTER pursued in other forums, you can only win competitive debates at a debate tournament. Game recognition makes fairness the most important impact- we can’t defeat the substance of their affirmative if we can’t predict and prepare for it. Allowing the affirmative a research advantage guarantees they will rig the debate by only offering the negative a narrow, limited amount of ground and heavily preparing for it.

### 1NC Truth Testing

#### Filter their impacts through predictable testability and model comparison---debate inherently judges relative truth value by whether or not it gets answered---a combination of a less predictable case neg, the burden of rejoinder, and them starting a speech ahead will always inflate the value of their impacts, which makes non-arbitrarily weighing whether they should have read the 1ac in the first place impossible within the structure of a debate round so even if we lose framework, vote neg on presumption. They also create a moral hazard that leads to affs only about individual self-care so even if you think this aff is answerable, the ones they incentivize are not, so assume the worst possible affirmative when weighing our impacts.

### Limits > engagement (prereq)

#### Limits outweigh---bounded debate is the only way to guarantee preparation and defense against a well-prepared opponent---that’s a prerequisite to using the form of debate effectively, no matter what for. Disruption alone isn’t justification for an aff ballot, they need an interpretation that guarantees pre-round relationality, genuine argumentative challenges and an agreed-upon end-point

Hansen, PhD, 18

(Ejvind, PoliSci@Danish School of Media and Journalism, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 44.1)

In a certain sense this aporia embodies a common experience that communicative exchanges are best if they carry a certain amount of disagreement between the participants (otherwise they cannot challenge each other), but without the disagreements becoming overwhelming (because then exchanges turn into quarrels – elaborated in Hansen, 2009, 2011, 2015b). When we analyse or assess actual public spheres it is thus important not only to focus upon the plurality of voices (because of our limited bandwidth of attention). Plurality needs to be supplemented with quests for radical courage that is moderated. We will return to this in sections VI and VII. However, Derrida’s point is opposite to Aristotle’s: the mean challenge is not the right solution to the aporia. In some cases we may have to settle on some kind of mean between radicality and moderation; however, at other points compromise-communication may in itself have become part of the established normativity. In such cases courage calls for more radical expressions. To take an example: discussions of the freedom of expressions are often summarized with the quote attributed to Voltaire: ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it’ (actually it was written by Evelyn Beatrice Hall in Tallentyre, 1906: 199 – however, as a summary of Voltaire’s general attitude at a certain moment). Articulated as a statement in France in the 18th century it is fair to consider it as a radical moderation: to allow a public existence of unethical, dangerous or false statements was quite radical at the peak of Enlightenment cultures in which censorship was not all that uncommon. In some situations it probably still is. At the same time, however, in other situations the quest for tolerance can itself become a public dogma used to de-legitimize or at least reduce voices of critique. Hardt and Negri have argued that power-holders in modern societies increasingly use the ability of cultures to contain critique as a mechanism to fortify the existing power structures (Hardt and Negri, 2000: ch. 2.4; Hardt and Negri, 2009: ch. 2.3). So, even though the saying attributed to Voltaire at first sight makes room for disagreement and critique, in a second step it actually also reduces the relevance of the other: ‘I disagree with you, but I don’t have to respond to your critique, because our culture is strong enough to be able to carry and contain differences.’ Furthermore, it may be argued that certain interpretations of the quest for tolerance, on the other hand, leave room open for recent public developments of ‘post-truth’ and ‘fake news’ (which means the use of expressions with very vague, alternative or even false references to truth claims are used to de-rail public discussions) because they need to be tolerated too. In Hansen (2015a) I thus argue that it is important that public expressions too are evaluated as to their commitment to some shareable account of truth. To summarize: even though we grant that the Voltaire/Hall statement in a previous historical situation was an important radical challenge (if we cannot reach an agreement, then we must settle on agreeing to disagree) tolerance in historical situations coming after it and influenced by it may become a way to escape challenges put forward in the public sphere by shifting the focus to the issue of tolerance instead of the content of the disagreement. The saying embodies a compromise – but a compromise that should itself continuously be challenged by new radical challenges in order not to lose its public relevance. VI Derrida’s voice in the previous section certainly embodies a disruptive impulse in public cultures. In his reading, the aporia of courage calls for continuous challenges of existing structures. He is, however, on the other hand quite aware that this impulse leads to both responsibility and irresponsibility (cf. the quote above), and according to the deconstructive approach no destruction is possible without a construction. Justice is not possible without the laws and norms of right; challenges to existing rules and norms are not courageous in themselves. In the public spheres there are numerous examples of expressions that challenge prevailing norms and rules, trolls that obstruct ongoing communicative expressions without necessarily being courageous. We will in this section seek to explain the moral status of the notion of courage by looking at two ways courage can be said to operate in the public spheres. On the one hand, the mere challenge is not enough to establish the courageousness of the interlocutor. Second, the aims or goals of the acts are constituent of the degree to which a gesture is courageous. In order to see that the mere challenge is not enough for an act to be courageous we can think of the recent emergence of trolls in Internet communication (Hardaker, 2010; Binns, 2012). Trolls specialize in disruptive and non-constructive interferences in discussions through expressions of outrageous views. Their practices should not, however, be called courageous because they do not actually risk any reputational capital (at least to the extent that the anonymity measures are effective). Second, however, the notion of courage, as Aristotle noticed, is more than mere challenge and the risking of life – the notion of courage also carries an implication of fighting for something. Aristotle distinguished foolhardiness from courage. For instance, to go to war unarmed against an armed enemy is foolhardy. There are many instances where lack of preparation or foresight, or emotional acting out, vitiate the bravery of the action. In order for a practice to be courageous there needs to be some kind of goal, and, furthermore, some kind of connection between the goal and the practice. This is admittedly still pretty vague. Insofar as we define courage as a challenging practice in which we risk our lives in order to reasonably further some kind of goal, we have reached a definition with elements (‘risk’, ‘lives’, ‘reasonably’ ‘further’, ‘some kind of goal’) that are very open to differing views. On the one hand, this is certainly as it has to be. If we are to articulate a positive supplement to the negative definitions of the freedom of expression, it must be very open, because it should be open to the improvisational and disruptive impulses of courage. As soon as we start to define the goals and the ways of reaching them too strictly, these very definitions might themselves become objects of challenge through the aporias of courage. On the other hand, even though the positive freedom we are seeking to instantiate is open to differing views, this does not mean that we might as well do without it – especially not when we are talking about communicative expressions. It draws on the intuition that life at the outset is the prime value, and if you risk your life you are thus expected to be able to say something about why this sacrifice is necessary. The agent who risks her or his life always has the burden of proof. Certainly, what is taken to be necessary may vary almost endlessly. That cannot be determined in advance, once and for all. But an agent who risks her or his life without being able to give some account of why, is foolhardy – and the chances that she or he in some sense will be taken seriously is minimal. With this last move, we are, as premised above, closing in on a deliberative approach (as articulated in Cohen, 1989, 1997; Habermas, 1981, 1992, 1996; Rawls, 1999[1971]), something that may seem surprising given the French inspiration of the previous sections. Knowing Habermas’ hostility towards the anti-rational impulses in these positions (Habermas, 1985) on the one hand, and Derrida’s hesitation on linguistic generality (cf. the previous sections) on the other hand, this calls for some comments. We are not going to claim that the Habermasian and Derridean approaches could be reconciled. In previous writings we have, however, argued that Habermas’ deliberative approach and the world-disclosing approaches (in this article: Foucault and Derrida) articulate two different (and to some extent opposing) impulses in our social, political and communicative practices: the impulses of systematicity (attempting to bring together seemingly disparate phenomena) and the quest for adequacy (attempting to understand phenomena in their entire diversity) (e.g. in Hansen, 2005a, 2005b, 2013). As shown above, Derrida’s deconstructive approach can certainly be seen as an attempt to reveal the necessary gaps and aporias embodied in the generalizing aspects in argumentative deliberation. At the same time, however, the findings of his analyses do not lead to a refusal of the generalizing approaches as such: The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or the tension between two decisions; it is the experience of that which, though heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the calculable and the rule, is still obliged – it is of obligation that we must speak – to give itself up to the impossible decision, while taking account of law and rules. (Derrida, 1994: 539; emphases added) Even though Derrida in the above quote is reflecting upon the undecidable and the moment of freedom he still acknowledges that the resulting decision needs to take account of laws and rules. Derrida is very clear that true decisions are not determined by existing rules and laws, but at the same time, however, neither are they entirely independent of rules and laws. Habermas and Derrida certainly disagree in their analyses of how rules and laws are (should be) established – Derrida focusing on emergence through continuous challenges, Habermas focusing on the deliberative and argumentative trying to overcome mutual disagreements. Habermas’ account has its limits when it comes to articulating reasonable resentments towards existing discursive structures (this is an often raised criticism of Habermas’ approach – see, for example, in Thomassen, 2007), Derrida’s approach is lacking in reflections on the forces or mechanisms that bring back new accounts of the general: how and why do new rules, laws and accounts of courage come about? Both positions are (if not in their full articulations then at least in their founding intuitions) in fact right. In order for deconstruction not to become merely destructive, we need to understand how reason in communication plays the role of helping agents to reach reasonably towards each other. Otherwise public discussions will tend to dissolve into an infinite ocean of unconnected conversations; any point of view will appear as equally valid; any decision will be prevented by the persistent possibility of raising counter-voices by minority groups. Deliberation is the responsibility of trying to reach common understandings in spite of initial disagreements. This is where Habermas is right. On the other hand, in order for such reasonable accounts not to freeze into dogma, we need (courageous) challenges of the very accounts of reasonability. This is where world-disclosing approaches as suggested by Foucault and Derrida are at their strongest. However, having seen that every human practice is embedded in aporetic paradoxes, it should not come as a surprise that even reason is aporetically structured: seeking deliberative consensus is a legitimate aim only insofar as the exchanged arguments seek to include courageous challenges (possible disturbances of consensus) of the discursive horizons, just as we have seen that notions of courage make sense only through some deliberative reflections of our means and goals. VII The quest for a reasonable account of the necessity of change does not imply that (1) an act without such accounts is by itself illegitimate – sometimes we do things without any reason or clear ideas of what we try to accomplish that turn out to be of value nevertheless. But in public exchanges where we want to affect others, the others should in some way come to understand why change is necessary. Neither do we want to imply that (2) changes may never come about without agents being able themselves to give an account of why this is necessary. Quite often actions and events are conceived in ways that the initiators did not foresee. What we are trying to argue here is thus not that the suggested reflections on positive freedom of expression should replace prevailing accounts of negative freedom. It may be argued that a freedom of expression that is only thought through negative accounts of freedom is problematic, but that is quite another argument and it is not implied by the above reflections. The reflections merely suggest that in evaluations of actual public spheres it is inadequate merely to consider the plurality of voices (as suggested in the negatively conceived accounts of the freedom of expression). This is where we suggest turning our attention towards notions of courage. If our bandwidth of attention is limited, it is important that we in our engagements in the public spheres are not overwhelmed by insignificant utterances that merely affirm existing states of affairs. For public deliberation to become democratically fruitful it is important that we are attentive to courageously challenging statements; challenges that are, certainly, made comprehensible to us by the speakers’ attempts to convince us of the underlying goals and means. Certainly, if these reflections are to gain any real relevance they will need to be further articulated, and in such articulations it will be necessary to substantiate notions of ‘life’, ‘reasonably’, ‘some kind of goal’, etc. And these substantiations might narrow the plurality of voices heard in the public. As demonstrated in the previous sections the alternative to doing this is, however, not to make every voice visible in the public spheres. Even though they may exist in the public sphere, it is not certain that the limited bandwidth of attention leaves room for their actually being heard by any critical mass. Insofar as we consider the public spheres not merely as spheres in which voices should be uttered but also as spheres in which voices should be heard, we need some way to select out those voices from the chorus that are significant in relation to some given context. Unlimited plurality is not an option. The question thus becomes how plurality should be limited. Should plurality be limited according to explicitly articulated rules and norms, rules and norms that can, due to their explicit articulations, themselves become subjects of dispute? Or should plurality be limited according to unconscious power structures, the rules of the strongest?

#### Un-limited discussions create oversaturation and disengagement---those are far more arbitrary ‘frameworks’ because of unconscious filtering. Only a mandated controversy can narrow to meaningful discussion. Any critique of our interpretation can’t win without a clearly-defined method for assessing the relative worth of proposals under theirs

Hansen, PhD, 18

(Ejvind, PoliSci@Danish School of Media and Journalism, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 44.1)

In the following we will pursue the idea that current discussions of the (negative) freedom of expression should be supplemented with discussions of how we achieve making the public spheres more open to courageous truth-tellers. The main argument for going this way is a worry that with the enormous growth in the number of those projecting their expressions into the public spheres, without a similar growth in the span of attention, we may end in a situation in which the public exchanges become as ineffectual as in the pre-Enlightenment times. It is thus necessary that we evaluate the public spheres not only in terms of their permission for an unlimited number of voices, but also in terms of the mechanisms in place that allow attention to be attached to courageous expressions. The relationship between the number of active participants in public sphere discourses and the span of our attention entails that a certain screening of information and expressions will happen whether we do it actively or not. The traditional idea of the freedom of expression as just the absence of external constraints is thus in a certain sense a naïve approach to achieve diverse public spheres inasmuch as expression does not necessarily translate into discussion or any larger social focus. The same applies to our suggestion based on both negative and positive notions of freedom. Even though we argue that public spheres that favour courageous truth-telling are democratically preferable to those that do not, to think of our argument as a framework to articulate some clearly defined criteria that must be met by discourse participants misunderstands its nature. Such scenarios, as we know, put the political order on a path that does not evoke pleasant historical memories. On the one hand, our proposal is mainly a suggestion of how to assess the democratic worth of expressions – certainly there are other legitimate reasons to participate in public discussions. Second, even for the evaluation of the democratic value, we will argue that the quest for courageous truth-telling functions as a critical, counterfactual ideal – an ideal that is itself open for public discussions. This is not to say that a counterfactual ideal is without actual relevance in society. If the suggested account of a positive freedom of expression is credible, it can serve as an implicit reference or standard from which to judge, on the one hand, deliberative discussions of actual expressions in the public spheres and, second, deliberations of the relationship between concrete, prevailing interpretations of the ideal and the actual society. The main aim with the ideal is thus not to suggest a norm that unequivocally determines whether or not actual expressions are of democratic worth in the public sphere. In order to have practical worth the ideal must, admittedly, be able to serve as a paradigm for the articulation of rules and values against which actual expressions can be evaluated. More importantly, however, the ideal is something that we can, and should, argue about. If a speaker is criticized for not being a courageous truth-teller, she or he [they] can either respond to the critique by showing that the expression is actually courageous according to the existing norms for courage, or can challenge the norms as being inadequate. This definitely opens the way to a certain amount of unavoidable relativism, since the articulated ideals could otherwise serve repressive interests by preventing expressions of views. The relativism is, however, conditional. In the challenge of existing norms of courage it will still be necessary, in order to be counted as a relevant voice in the democratic public sphere, to substantiate an alternative suggestion as to how the notion of courage should be conceived. In doing this, one will partake in a democracy-enhancing discussion.

#### Exclusion is inevitable- norms like framework at least make exclusion visible and manageable

Hansen, PhD, 15

(Ejvind, PoliSci@Danish School of Media and Journalism, “THE POSITIVE FREEDOM OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE,” Journalism Studies, 16.6)

This is not to say that the explications are inconsequential. Fallible explications are of value because they may serve as a starting point for a necessary and continuous critique of prevailing power structures in existing public spheres. The alternative to fallible explications is not an unlimited public sphere. Public spheres are always limited, and not only due to technological inadequacies. In ongoing communicative relationships (like those that inhabit the public sphere), there are embedded limitations which are based on power structures combined with our collective attention span. Any public sphere will thus need to carry limitations as to which expressions gain prominence. Our choice is thus not whether we should have explicit norms for courageous truthtelling or an unlimited public sphere. The main choice is whether or not the limitations of the public sphere should be implicit (based on unregulated, perhaps even unacknowledged, power structures) or whether they should be explicitly articulated. The advantage of explicit norms is that they are more accessible for focused critique than unacknowledged norms.12 In order to wrap up the argument, it is fair to say that Dawes’ criticism of a liberal approach towards the freedom of the public sphere is well put. To base the freedom of the public on market-driven institutions certainly liberates the public sphere from the logic and powers of public and political institutions, but the private sphere does not adequately mirror the interests of the public. We thus need a public sphere that is not determined by private market logic, either.

### #Drumpf

#### Filter aff framework offense through the lens of #Drumpf- there is a fragile resistance movement that is expanding up now. Totalizing critique of institutional politics crushes it

Aruzza, PhD Rome Tor Vergata, 17

(Cinzia, MA/PhD Philosophy, Philosophy @New School, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/womens-march-washington-trump-inauguration-protest/)

Every single analysis of what happened on January 21 and of what will come next should start with the insight that hundreds of thousands of people with no previous political experience and even with no previous participation in any demonstration whatsoever decided to take to the streets against the Trump administration. January 21 has created the potential for a new mass movement. Granted, it is a very fragile possibility, and the way we handle it will be crucial for its actualization or its irremediable loss. Whatever criticisms we may have of the limitations of this event should be articulated with a sense of political responsibility because the stakes are high. The main criticisms of the women’s march have emphasized that the march was too white, that it was hegemonized by liberals, and that it was an “interest group” or an “identity based” march, when what we really need is a universalistic mobilization involving everybody. The first two criticisms have a point: the march was indeed too white and it was hegemonized by liberals in mainstream media (although this liberal self-representation in the media did not exactly reflect the much more articulated composition of the marches). But the relevant question, here, is the one asked by Alicia Garza: More than a moral question, it is a practical one. Can we build a movement of millions with the people who may not grasp our black, queer, feminist, intersectional, anticapitalist, anti-imperialist ideology but know that we deserve a better life and who are willing to fight for it and win? . . . Hundreds of thousands of people are trying to figure out what it means to join a movement. If we demonstrate that to be a part of a movement, you must believe that people cannot change, that transformation is not possible, that it’s more important to be right than to be connected and interdependent, we will not win. The third criticism, on the contrary, entirely misses the point. It’s useful to recall that women’s marches have started a number of rather important revolutions like the French Revolution and the February revolution in Russia. In Western Europe students and the radicalized youth started the ’68 movement. In the United States the Civil Rights Movement began a wave of struggles that then expanded to campuses and to the 1960s antiwar movement. The connection between the events that triggered or prepared the grounds for subsequent struggles and the struggles themselves is not necessarily a politically coherent one; contingent — and often unpredictable facts — coalesced to determine the specific dynamic of each wave of movements over the course of many years. The relevant question, then, is not “when will we stop mobilizing on the basis of identity or interest groups and start the serious revolutionary mobilization?” It is rather: “Can this mobilization function as a catalyst for a larger struggle and open a new political space that can be inhabited by a number of different political and social subjectivities in solidarity with each other?” We have good reason to believe that this may be the case in the United States today. Indeed, women’s marches around the country have already worked as a catalyst for the convergence of other struggles. For example, Fight for $15 took part in women’s rallies in a number of cities on January 21. Moreover, the women’s march in the United States is part of a global process that has seen women mobilizing in a number of countries — from the women’s strikes in Argentina, Poland, and Ireland to the massive women’s demonstration in Italy last November. What next, then? An international coalition regrouping feminist and women’s groups from around thirty countries has called for an international women’s strike on March 8 against heterosexist violence. Women, trans women, and all the people who support their struggle will strike, march, and protest in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Germany, Italy, Poland, Russia, Turkey, South Korea, and other countries. In this vein, it wouldn’t be absurd to suggest that the first step for women and LGBTQ people after January 21, in the United States, could be the creation of grassroots coalitions and possibly a national coalition to join the international women’s strike on March 8. This would expand the scope of the mobilization beyond opposition to Trump’s administration and would contribute to making the movement less white. It would also help us rethink what a strike means, and how we can include diverse populations, including those outside the formal labor market, in our struggles.

### A2 psychologically harmful

#### 1. Our interp doesn’t require a defense of the actor which would be saying the state is good, rather it’s just an defense of an ACTION – you don’t have to pretend to be the government to say the government should do something just like you don’t have to pretend to be the police to say the police shouldn’t shoot black people.

#### 2. Discussing policy doesn’t mean identifying with or defending the state, it means attacking it

Saul Newman 10, Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, U of London, Theory & Event Volume 13, Issue 2

There are two aspects that I would like to address here. Firstly, the notion of demand: making certain demands on the state – say for higher wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war, or an end to draconian policing – is one of the basic strategies of social movements and radical groups. Making such demands does not necessarily mean working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy. On the contrary, demands are made from a position outside the political order, and they often exceed the question of the implementation of this or that specific measure. They implicitly call into question the legitimacy and even the sovereignty of the state by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between, for instance, a formal constitutional order which guarantees certain rights and equalities, and state practices which in reality violate and deny them.

#### 3. Defending a plan doesn’t require role playing – it’s only about forming opinions and defending them. Harris 13

Scott Harris, Director of Debate, Kansas University, 2013, This Ballot, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4762.0 CC

While this ballot has meandered off on a tangent I’ll take this opportunity to comment on an unrelated argument in the debate. Emporia argued that oppressed people should not be forced to role play being the oppressor. This idea that debate is about role playing being a part of the government puzzles me greatly. While I have been in debate for 40 years now never once have I role played being part of the government. When I debated and when I have judged debates I have never pretended to be anyone but Scott Harris. Pretending to be Scott Harris is burden enough for me. Scott Harris has formed many opinions about what the government and other institutions should or should not do without ever role playing being part of those institutions. I would form opinions about things the government does if I had never debated. I cannot imagine a world in which people don’t form opinions about the things their government does. I don’t know where this vision of debate comes from. I have no idea at all why it would be oppressive for someone to form an opinion about whether or not they think the government should or should not do something. I do not role play being the owner of the Chiefs when I argue with my friends about who they should take with the first pick in this year’s NFL draft. I do not role play coaching the basketball team or being a player if I argue with friends about coaching decisions or player decisions made during the NCAA tournament. If I argue with someone about whether or not the government should use torture or drone strikes I can do that and form opinions without ever role playing that I am part of the government. Sometimes the things that debaters argue is happening in debates puzzle me because they seem to be based on a vision of debate that is foreign to what I think happens in a debate round.

### A2 Shouldn’t DB8 Bad Topics

#### 1. This isn’t that bad topic though – if it were that topic their interp would be justified but defending free speech or restrictions on free speech doesn’t deny history or the identity of people.

#### 2. Not realistic – the probability of the topic committee choosing something so blatantly offensive is definitely outweighed by the abuse of this round.

### Other

#### \*also did not respond to author indicts which means if the author is questioned then their entire argument should also be\*

#### Drop the debater because it deters against future violations of the neg and if they don’t win on T then they shouldn’t win this debate