# WL – Capitalism Aff

## 1AC

### Contention 1: A Space Monopoly

#### 1. 2022 is the crucial year for private space activity to prove it is profitable

Kramer 1-4

(Miriam Kramer is the space reporter for Axios. She is the author of the weekly Axios Space newsletter and covers the science and business of space. “Private space companies’ 2022 promises to keep.” Axios. January 4, 2022. <https://www.axios.com/private-human-spaceflight-2022-8ec6082a-e3ae-4d6b-8073-3f8af3e7e2a5.html>)

The private human spaceflight industry delivered on long-held promises in 2021, but 2022 is the year where it will need to prove itself to the public. Why it matters: The space industry is predicted to be worth more than $1 trillion within the next 10 years. But for that to happen, companies will need to turn the extraordinary feats of the last year into routine operations. What's happening: Last year, Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic both launched their founders — Jeff Bezos and Richard Branson respectively — to space for the first time. Blue Origin followed that up with two more suborbital human flights in 2021. Those missions marked the culmination of decades of work for the two companies and delivered on a promise of sending more non-professionals to space. SpaceX also consistently launched crewed missions to the International Space Station for NASA, a major customer that will influence the continued growth of the company, and had a huge success with four non-professionals flying to orbit without a pro-astronaut onboard on the Inspiration4 mission. What to watch: Now, those companies are trying to demonstrate they can consistently deliver these services — and turn a profit from them. That means flying more. Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic and SpaceX are expected by space watchers to fly people to space consistently and safely this year. That will be key to determining whether the successes of the last year are one-offs or if they can get into "some sort of rhythm and make some money," Carissa Christensen, founder and CEO of BryceTech, told Axios. SpaceX is planning to launch the Axiom Mission-1 mission to the International Space Station early in 2022, which will act as a followup to the Inspiration4 mission and could be an indicator of the market for more amateur orbital flights. It's hard to gauge whether private companies like Blue Origin are profitable — because their finances aren't open to the public — but routinely launching, which is expensive, can act as a proxy for it, Christensen said. Yes, but: Transforming these missions into routine services won't be easy. It will require companies to increase launch cadence, which is challenging because they're working with relatively newly-developed technology and within complicated regulatory frameworks. The big picture: The public demand for these types of services could also become more clear this year. Studies indicate there is "substantial demand" for suborbital spaceflight, Christensen says. "You have a larger pool of people that can afford it now." According to a May 2021 note sent to investors by analysts Ken Herbert and Austin Moeller, of Canaccord Genuity, the suborbital tourism market could reach $8 billion by 2030 with 1 million potential customers. Between the lines: Demonstrating they can turn a profit will be important for the companies working to make consistent, private human spaceflight a reality, but it's likely a small portion of the revenue for the space industry overall. However, human spaceflight will be one of the most important public-facing elements of the overall industry. Major failures and successes will shift the way the public sees the industry, adding to its support or detracting from it. The bottom line: Last year, the private spaceflight industry showed what it can do, but this year, these companies will need to capitalize on it.

#### 2. Private space enterprise *stems from* inequality and a flawed system- capitalist space “geniuses” only hustle for *dominance* and *profit* as they gatekeep the stars

Penny 20

(ELEANOR PENNY is a writer, poet and essayist based in London. She is a senior editor at Novara Media, <https://inthesetimes.com/article/space-privatization-future-technology-silicon-valley-elon-musk-jeff-bezos>, 12-17)

The eye-watering upfront costs of these exploratory, high-risk, high-reward endeavors can be absorbed by Silicon Valley venture capitalists and the personal fortunes of its aristocracy. A concentration of capital stands ready to risk big money to secure a stake in future markets (which will double down on its power in existing ones). The point is to ensure a slice of the territory everyone else will be clamoring for. This form of ​“creative destruction”—an idea developed by economist Joseph Schumpeter, understood in neoliberalism to describe the boom-bust cycle of innovation — is often packaged in the mythology of moonshot genius that drives human progress. But Schumpeter’s theory has a less discussed underbelly: Such creative destruction is usually twinned with market capture. As competitors are tossed onto the scrap heap of history by their own sudden irrelevance, oligarchies and monopolies flourish. The riches of the asteroids belt make earthly mining look positively parochial. The problem is that a sudden, vast supply of (formerly) precious metals would make market prices plummet. Journalist Aaron Bastani, author of Fully Automated Luxury Communism, notes that satellite-delivered digital information has the potential to replace our earthbound Internet networks with ​“space-based global Internet” — the way music streaming has replaced CDs and CDs replaced cassettes and vinyl — or to at least render them much cheaper (through, for example, open-access 3D printing). SpaceX and Blue Origin surely share a goal to make space transport cheaper. The question is, for whom? These ventures train their sights on infinite excess, with dwindling marginal costs as the supply of key materials and digital resources expands. This paradigm is great for those interested in the advancement of human civilization, but not so much for a grinning billionaire’s fixation on the bottom line. At first glance, expanding industry beyond Earth sounds like a pragmatic fix to the earth-shatteringly simple dilemma faced by capitalism: that it must grow to survive, but the planet it grows upon is finite. But to maintain profit margins in conditions of plenty (a demand of industry), legal and political fixes are required. If you exclusively own mining rights to asteroids rich in platinum — and precious little platinum is left on Earth — you can charge whatever you like for platinum. The diamond industry perfected this technique decades ago. (Elon Musk’s family fortune comes partially from a Zambian emerald mine.) Hence, the focus of the new space race is not on the production of goods or their most efficient sourcing, but on ownership of land and transport networks. In this latest phase of capitalism, as national growth slows, productive industries dwindle and wealth concentrates in fewer hands. As economist Thomas Piketty has observed, this phase is accompanied by a pivot toward rent-seeking as a profit mechanism. In other words, the scramble for space is the scramble to own satellites and ​“starways,” gatekeep the riches of the solar system and charge rent on the moon. Against this backdrop, Space Force might seem retrograde, a warped nostalgia for a time when the space race was [to be] about petty terrestrial wars rather than Musk’s supposedly enlightened vision to colonize Mars. In reality, the two visions go hand in hand. Military might physically captures and secures territory, enforces the American political and legal apparatus and ensures business can function (even on the moon). The darlings of this new space age paint their vision as daring futurism, a wild-eyed libertarian dream of human elevation. But history repeats and the story is old. Like Bezos and Musk, Cecil Rhodes — mining magnate and premier villain of the British Empire — also succumbed to dreams of wealth in the night sky. ​“Expansion is everything,” Rhodes said. ​“I would annex the planets if I could.” Where technology opens up the yawning unknown of new territory glittering with potential profit, private enterprises hustle for dominance — backed by the military and legal capacities of earthbound nations. Colonialism in space is not some post-humanist utopia, but the age-old dominion of land barons and mining magnates, billionaires sloughing off the wreckage of one planet and setting out for the stars.

#### 3. Capitalism is not natural or inevitable, extending it to space is a political choice that empirics prove will be disastrous

Penny 20

(ELEANOR PENNY is a writer, poet and essayist based in London. She is a senior editor at Novara Media, <https://inthesetimes.com/article/space-privatization-future-technology-silicon-valley-elon-musk-jeff-bezos>, 12-17)

Space is our birthright. ​“Americans should have the right to engage in commercial exploration, recovery and use of resources in outer space,” President Donald Trump wrote April 6, 2020, issuing the ​“Executive Order on Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources.” In the stroke of a pen, Trump planted the U.S. flag on ​“the Moon, Mars and other celestial bodies.” As Trump declared these space lands and resources open for business, you could hear the cheers — mostly from ​“moonshot” corporations that have clamored to sweep away the patchy, unregularized Cold War-era space law in favor of new, unregulated corporate plunder of the solar system. While the institution of private land ownership is now widely taken for granted, it was — like many so-called natural things — invented. Before the muddied, grueling transition from feudalism to capitalism, peasants in Britain and much of Western Europe depended on their right to farm, forage and harvest on common, community lands. The land was controlled by local lords, but it belonged (in a loose, de facto sense) to the communities living on it and dependent upon it. Eventually, common lands were ​“enclosed” and became the private property of aristocrats. This exclusive right to land use (to own and profit from land) was the contrivance that established the new economic order. No longer held in common, the planet’s resources were parceled off to strictly private hands. No longer could peasants scrape by, subsisting on the commons. Instead, they depended on the grace and favor of a wage. Life in feudal times was no bucolic idyll, but enclosure was synonymous with disaster, destitution and death for many people. This model was mirrored in the capture, theft and enclosure of colony lands, the people (and resources) of which fueled the early capitalist transition and later the industrial revolution. Capitalism must grow to persist, and as it grows it must transform ripe, unregularized commons into private fiefdoms — at home and afar. So it seems only ​“natural” to carve up the moon into stretches of valuable real estate, just like Manhattan and the metal mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. After all, Earth’s resources dwindle by the day, and boundless resources beyond the stratosphere could be a backstop for planetary scarcity. Never mind that our crisis of resources is, in part, the result of this system of private ownership that rewards ruthless, short-term profiteering at the expense of the long-term survival of the natural commons. This future access to a new natural commons is now a stress test on governmental priorities. As Trump proclaimed, ​“Outer space is a legally and physically unique domain of human activity, and the United States does not view it as a global commons.” Trump’s executive order to ​“encourage international support for the public and private recovery and use of resources in outer space” heralds yet another public-private boondoggle, where nominally public institutions thrash out fresh boundaries of corporate activity. As an example, look no further than SpaceX’s Crew Dragon capsule, which successfully transported NASA astronauts Bob Behnken and Doug Hurley to the International Space Station on May 31, 2020. The NASA-SpaceX crossover branding leaves no room for misinterpretation: The **next** small steps for mankind will be giant leaps for corporate America. Elon Musk, who founded SpaceX in 2002, talks misty-eyed about a relatively near future when humanity will have risen out of the mud, setting its sights on colonizing Mars — with SpaceX transportation rocketing there. In 2020, Musk began launching a cavalcade of thousands of satellites into low-Earth orbit to form the Starlink satellite system. As of November 2020, nearly 900 satellites had been launched (42,000 are planned in total). This network will potentially seed an extraplanetary monopoly for key economic infrastructure, such as domestic internet access. Fellow billionaire escapist Jeff Bezos, Amazon CEO, has been romanced by the wealth among the stars as well, founding his own aerospace company, Blue Origin, back in 2000. ​“We are going to build a road to space,” Bezos said in 2019. ​“And then, amazing things will happen.” Bezos has invited us all to cosplay his daydreams with the Amazon-funded, interplanetary sci-fi thriller The Expanse, in which a roll call of stock anti-heroes (the rogue policeman, the war-beleaguered pilot, etc.) tumble through a far future when only wise plutocratic innovators can plumb interstellar riches and deliver the solar system from interstellar war. Microsoft, too, has its fingers in the intergalactic pie, launching Azure Orbital in September 2020 to enable satellite operators on its cloud computing platform, along with a SpaceX partnership the following month. According to Forbes, 2019 was a record year for private space investments, with ​“venture capitalists [investing] $5.8 billion in 178 commercial space startups worldwide.” As Earth’s billionaires burnish the power of new stratospheric tech, Trump launched Space Force, the first new branch of the U.S. military in more than seven decades. ​“Space is the world’s newest war-fighting domain,” Trump said. ​“Amid grave threats to our national security, American superiority in space is absolutely vital.” Space exploration has long been tied to military ambition. From its Cold War founding, NASA’s task was to advance the practical interests of the American state as it squared off against the Soviet behemoth. The new field of battle included space-guided missiles and satellite technology. Astronauts are still generally selected from the ranks of the military. Grumman (now better known as half of Northrop Grumman) made parts for both the NASA spacecraft that leapt into the great unknown and the military machines that waged war in Vietnam. As the shadow of nuclear war retreats in the bright light of a digital dawn, the mission of Space Force is to protect the economic and military infrastructure (communications and surveillance technology) seemingly threatened by rival global powers (namely, Russia and China) gearing up their own military space operations. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, signed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, attempted to guard against the militarization and the privatization of our shared stratosphere. The treaty limited governmental (and non-governmental) bodies from sending nuclear weapons into space and prohibited the annexation of the moon and temptingly mineral-rich asteroids. As the treaty outlined, any country could use and explore outer space but there could be no ​“appropriation” of astral territory. It was, at heart, a disarmament treaty — one whose ropey legalities were enforced by the now-defunct Cold War brinkmanship between its main two signatories. The treaty never foresaw the dizzying rise of private enterprise clamoring for a slice of the sky. Nor did it foresee the slow shelving of publicly funded U.S. space exploration (especially the manned variety) that would allow venture capitalists to stake their claim in a new space scramble.

#### 4. Risks of private space activity vastly outweigh- corporations turn space into a Pandora’s box waiting to be opened- but government space programs are regulated, equitable, not motivated by monopolistic dominance

Kaminska 14

(Izabella is an FT Alphaville reporter <https://www.ft.com/content/02aac296-a920-11e3-bf0c-00144feab7de> 3-14)

For a long time the idea of commercial space was an eccentric billionaire’s pipe dream. A fanciful desire of those with a penchant for Isaac Asimov novels. Not so any more. Elon Musk’s SpaceX has been sending payloads to space on a commercially viable basis since 2010. Sir Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic is on track to take its first fully paid-up customers into near-space by the end of this year, all of which was revealed by my colleague John Sunyer’s recent piece on property space wars. And a company called Planetary Resources is making serious attempts to identify asteroids for commercial mining missions in the not too distant future. Small surprise then that the issue of extraplanetary property rights has been raised by the likes of Robert Bigelow, founder of Bigelow Aerospace, a company hoping to put private living quarters in space. Above all, Bigelow is worried that if the capitalist west doesn’t go about annexing celestial bodies in the name of private enterprise, some other nation will go empire-building in its own name instead. The argument pro property rights is simple. What we’re approaching is a new Wild West period for humanity. A time when anyone ingenious or intrepid enough to get themselves into space should rightfully be rewarded with ownership and autocracy over the land masses they discover or forge. Especially since this time around there are no native inhabitants, or at least none that we humans can divine, to be displaced in the process. Call it the classic expansionist approach to property allocation. Or as comedian Eddie Izzard once joked, stealing countries with the cunning use of flags. If you can claim it and defend it, it becomes yours. The problem with this way of thinking is that the Wild West is a poor analogy for space exploration. First there’s the access issue. Getting to the New World may have been harsh and costly, but it was still exponentially easier – and thus more equitable – than getting to space. Second, when the pilgrims set sail for America, they never looked back. Yes, they still depended on trade, but they did so on an equal footing with their trade partners because they had just as many valuable resources, if not more, to exchange. The American war of independence was about shedding the yoke of the old land, which still desired to rule the colonies despite their self-sufficiency. The same clearly does not apply to the hostile territory of space. The chance that any colonist on Mars, the Moon or an asteroid will be self-sufficient enough to break their dependence on Earth is infinitely small. To the contrary, private missions are likely to remain dependent on national jurisdictions for launches and life support for decades if not centuries. Is it a risk, then, that nation-states will see this as an invitation to go empire-building in space instead? Unlikely. Article II of the UN Outer Space Treaty already sets out the parameters clearly: “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” It is a treaty we should be thankful for, not least because it paved the way to a truly unprecedented era of international co-operation, resulting in, among other things, the International Space Station. If any sovereign state dared to break it, say by invading the Moon, they would, without a shadow of a doubt, find themselves testing the international community, and consequently the established nuclear power balance here on Earth. That means, for as long as a space colony depends on Earth-based ties, the incentive for a nation-state to abide by Earth-based rules remains. It’s game theory. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for private enterprise. A power-hungry space baron could feasibly argue that the UN treaty does not apply to them since they are not a sovereign state. Then there is also the caveat that the treaty only refers to celestial rather than man-made bodies. This is what you could call the dark side of space commercialisation. The point at which open access to space creates a Pandora’s box effect that in the name of competition compromises space co-operation and disrupts the power balance we’ve achieved both in space and on Earth. The point when a power-hungry billionaire could find a legal path to building his own Death Star. Elon Musk’s testimony to the Senate appropriations hearing on March 5 speaks of the potential power play in hand. As he argued, US national security is being undermined by the country’s dependence on Russian parts and launches, especially in light of the latter’s de facto annexation of the Crimea region. It would be much better, says Musk, if the US transferred more of its business to private enterprises like SpaceX. To Musk, access to space should be treated the same way access to commodities is treated on Earth. The only problem with this analogy is that private corporations competing for commodities still have to abide by national rules. Commercial space enterprises, it seems, would prefer it if sovereign states became dependent on private enterprise instead – the surest way of exposing Earth to the risk of a megalomaniac that wants to rename Mars one day.

#### 5. Corporations’ utopian space fantasies will never happen- their underlying purpose is to distract the public from a new age of capital accumulation

Marx 21

(Paris Marx is a socialist writer and host of the Tech Won't Save Us podcast. <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/07/billionaires-space-richard-branson-jeff-bezos-elon-musk> , 7-13)

But as these billionaires had their eyes turned to the stars and the media showered them with the headlines they craved, the evidence that the climate of our planet is rapidly changing in a way that is hostile to life — both human and otherwise — was escalating. Near the end of June, Jacobabad, a city of 200,000 people in Pakistan, experienced “wet bulb” conditions where high humidity and scorching temperatures combine to reach a level where the human body can no longer cool itself down. Meanwhile, half a world away, on the West Coast of North America, a heat dome that was made much worse by climate change sent temperatures soaring so high that the town of Lytton, British Columbia, hit 49.6ºC, beating Canada’s previous temperature record by 4.6ºC, then burned to the ground when a wildfire tore through the town. The contrast between those stories is striking. On one hand, billionaires are engaging in a dick-measuring contest to see who can exit the atmosphere first, while on the other, the billions of us who will never make any such journey are increasingly dealing with the consequences of capitalism’s effects on the climate — and the decades its most powerful adherents have spent stifling action to curb them. At a moment when we should be throwing everything we have into ensuring the planet remains habitable, billionaires are treating us to a spectacle to distract us from their quest for continued capitalist accumulation and the disastrous effects it is already having. The Spectacle of Billionaires in Space Last May, we were treated to a similar display of billionaire space ambition. As people across the United States were marching in the streets after the murder of George Floyd and the government was doing little to stop COVID-19 from sweeping the country, Elon Musk and President Donald Trump met in Florida to celebrate SpaceX’s first time launching astronauts to the International Space Station. As regular people were fighting for their lives, it felt like the elite were living in a completely separate world and had no qualms about showing it. They didn’t have to make it to another planet. Over the past few years, as the billionaire space race has escalated, the public has become increasingly familiar with its grand visions for our future. SpaceX’s Elon Musk wants us to colonize Mars and claims the mission of his space company is to lay the infrastructure to do just that. He wants humanity to be a “multiplanetary” species, and he claims a Martian colony would be a backup plan in case Earth becomes uninhabitable. Meanwhile, Bezos doesn’t have much time for Mars colonization. Instead, he believes we should build large structures in Earth’s orbit where the human population can grow to a trillion people without further harming the planet’s environment. As we live out our lives in O’Neill cylinders, as they’re called, we’ll take occasional vacations down to the surface to experience the wonder of the world we once called home. Neither of these futures are appealing if you look past the billionaires’ rosy pitch decks. Life on Mars would be horrendous for hundreds of years, at least, and would likely kill many of the people who made the journey, while the technology for massive space colonies doesn’t exist and similarly won’t be feasible for a long time to come. So, what’s the point of promoting these futures in the face of an unprecedented threat to our species here on Earth? It is to get the public on board for a new phase of capitalist accumulation whose benefits will be reaped by those billionaires. To be clear, that does not even mean anything as grand as asteroid mining. Rather, its form can be seen in the event last May: as Musk and even Trump continued to push the spectacle of Mars for the public, SpaceX was becoming not just a key player in a privatized space industry but also in enabling a military buildup through billions of dollars in government contracts. The grand visions, rocket launches, and spectacles of billionaires leaving the atmosphere are all cover for the real space economy.

#### 6. Assumptions on capitalism make it easier to imagine *the end of the world* than the *end of capitalism*. We need a progressive series of steps that redefine political economy and space is a crucial starting point- it’s where neoliberalism’s ultimate *spacial fix* will occur- *.* The end of capitalism is necessary

Robinson and O’Keefe 20

(ABOUT THE AUTHOR Kim Stanley Robinson is the author of more than twenty books, including New York 2140, Red Moon, and the Mars trilogy. ABOUT THE INTERVIEWER Derrick O’Keefe is a cofounder and editor of Ricochet Media and is the author of Michael Ignatieff: The Lesser Evil? and A Woman Among Warlords, coauthored with Afghanistan’s Malalai Joya. Derrick is a longtime political organizer in Vancouver, BC. <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/10/kim-stanley-robinson-ministry-future-science-fiction>, 10-22)

DOK I wanted to ask you about the now-famous quote attributed to Jameson, which is actually a bit of a paraphrase: “It is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism.” It strikes me this book is coming out in a year when it’s become pretty easy to imagine the end of things, and that the real challenge is to imagine the beginnings of some kind of socialist system. As much as The Ministry is about the future, it suggests that those beginnings we need are already here with us now and that it’s really a matter of scaling up some of those alternatives. KSR I’m a novelist, I’m a literature major. I’m not thinking up these ideas, I’m listening to the world and grasping — sometimes at straws, sometimes just grasping at new ideas and seeing what everybody is seeing. If we could institute some of these good ideas, we could quickly shift from a capitalism to a post-capitalism that is more sustainable and more socialist, because so many of the obvious solutions are contained in the socialist program. And if we treated the biosphere as part of our extended body that needs to be attended to and taken care of, then things could get better fast, and there are already precursors that demonstrate this possibility. I don’t think it’s possible to postulate a breakdown, or a revolution, to an entirely different system that would work without mass disruption and perhaps blowback failures, so it’s better to try to imagine a stepwise progression from what we’ve got now to a better system. And by the time we’re done — I mean, “done” is the wrong word — but by the end of the century, we might have a radically different system than the one we’ve got now. And this is kind of necessary if we’re going to survive without disaster. So, since it’s necessary, it might happen. And I’m always looking for the plausible models that already exist and imagining that they get ramped up. DOK The cooperative economy of Mondragon, in the Basque region, comes up as one such model in a number of your books. And in The Ministry, there is the example of Kerala, because India is so central to the book’s action as a leader of the transition to dramatic climate action. KSR I’m very interested in both these examples. I’ve actually never been to either region, but I’ve got contacts in both. In Mondragon, they are aware of me as an American science fiction writer who likes them, because my Mars trilogy books are translated into Spanish and do quite well in Spain. With Kerala, I’ve been studying it for twenty, twenty-five years. Like, why is it different and how is it different? Could it be a tail-wagging-dog situation for the rest of India? And so on. I did put places that I’ve been in the novel, because I needed some anchoring points — principally Zurich [where the titular ministry is headquartered]. My wife and I lived in Zurich for years, and I finally managed to put that into fiction, which was a great pleasure. But as for the rest of the world, and for these kinds of leftist precursors, or already existing leftist states that are at a regional or town level, I’ve often thought to myself, “Is there any reason that these can’t be taken as models?” Is there any real reason — since obviously there are ideological reasons; if you’re a defender of capitalism per se, then you would say these are outliers of sorts or too small to be relevant — but if you’re a leftist, you look at them and see the public support for what they’re doing, and you ask, “Why couldn’t that work at a larger scale?” Especially if you’re trying to imagine futures that are working better, which is what a utopian science fiction writer does, then you’re kind of desperate for real world-models. DOK When I originally heard the synopsis for this book, it struck me immediately as something like an ecosocialist Looking Backward 2000–1887. The main character in that work by Edward Bellamy had fallen asleep for over a century and then woke up in a sort of post-capitalist utopia in the year 2000. In contrast, The Ministry is more about the journey to 2050 or so, a world that is very different from today both economically and politically. How do you situate this work, and your work more broadly, within the utopian tradition? KSR Well, Bellamy’s is a good book to think about, because it had an impact in the real world. There were Bellamy clubs, and the whole progressive movement was energized by Looking Backward. I’ve steeped myself in the utopian tradition. It’s not a big body of literature, it’s easy to read the best hits of the utopian tradition. You could make a list, I mean roughly twenty or twenty-five books would be the highlights of the entire four hundred years, which is a little shocking. And maybe there’s more out there that hasn’t stayed in the canon. But if you talk about the utopian canon, it’s quite small — it’s interesting, it has its habits, its problems, its gaps. Famously, from Thomas More (Utopia) on, there’s been a gap in the history — the utopia is separated by space or time, by a disjunction. They call it the Great Trench. In Utopia, they dug a great trench across the peninsula so that their peninsula became an island. And the Great Trench is endemic in utopian literature. There’s almost always a break that allows the utopian society to be implemented and to run successfully. I’ve never liked that because one connotation of the word “utopian” is unreality, in the sense that it’s “never going to happen.” So we have to fill in this trench. When Jameson said it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism, I think what he was talking about is that missing bridge from here to there. It’s hard to imagine a positive history, but it’s not impossible. And now, yes, it’s easy to imagine the end of the world because we are at the start of a mass extinction event. But he’s talking about hegemony, and a kind of Marxist reading of history, and the kind of Gramscian notion that everybody’s in the mindset that capitalism is reality itself and that there can never be any other way — so it’s hard to imagine the end of capitalism. But I would just flip it and say, it’s hard to imagine how we get to a better system. Imagining the better system isn’t that hard; you just make up some rules about how things should work. You could even say socialism is that kind of utopian imaginary. Let’s just do it this way, a kind of society of mutual aid. And I would agree with anyone who says, “Well, that’s a good system.” The interesting thing, and also the new stories to tell if you’re a science fiction novelist, if you’re any kind of novelist — almost every story’s been told a few times — but the story of getting to a new and better social system, that’s almost an empty niche in our mental ecology. So I’ve been throwing myself into that attempt. It’s hard, but it’s interesting. Homo Economicus Is a Fraud DOK Amidst and between all the action of The Ministry, there are some polemics carried out, is that fair to say? One recurrent polemic is against mainstream economics, a theme running throughout the book that there’s a need for new metrics and new indices both to quantify the biosphere and to express what we truly value rather than just GDP and the stock market. KSR There is a polemic for sure. First, I would want to make a distinction between economics and political economy, because by and large, economics as it’s practiced now is the study of capitalism. It takes the axioms of capitalism as givens and then tries to work from those to various ameliorations and tweaks to the system that would make for a better capitalism, but they doesn’t question the fundamental axioms: everybody’s in it for themselves, everybody pursues their own self-interest, which will produce the best possible outcomes for everybody. These axioms are highly questionable, and they come out of the eighteenth century or are even older, and they don’t match with modern social science or history itself in terms of how we behave, and they don’t value the natural biosphere properly, and they tend to encourage short-term extractive gain and short-term interests. These are philosophical positions that are expressed as though they are fixed or are nature itself, when in reality they are made by culture. Political economy is a kind of nineteenth-century thing, a more open-ended idea where we could have different systems. And that accounts for a lot of the struggles of the twentieth century. But capitalism likes to pretend that it’s nature itself, and that’s what economics is today, largely. Take the term “efficiency.” In capitalist economics, that’s just regarded as almost a synonym for “good,” but it completely depends on what the efficiency is being aimed at. You know, machine guns are efficient, gas chambers are efficient. So, “efficiency” as such does not mean “good.” It is a measure of the least amount of effort put in for the most amount gotten out. One of the things you’re seeing during the pandemic is that the global system of creating masks is efficient, but it is also fragile, brittle, and unreliable because redundancy, robustness, and resilience are all relatively inefficient, if the only rubric of efficiency is profit. Capitalist economics misunderstands and misjudges the world badly, and that’s why we’re in the mess we’re in — caught between biosphere degradation and radical social inequality. These are both natural results of capitalism as such, a result of the economic calculations we make under capitalist axioms. Distinctions have to be made here. Quantification is really part of science. Social science has some tools for understanding and generalizing from the particulars of individuals to what the group might want. Twenty-five years ago, I might have said, “Economics, we have to throw it out.” That doesn’t hold for me anymore. Economics has a set of tools. And social science tools, working with the right axioms, could make for a socialist economics. There could be a post-capitalist economic system. But what you’re then talking about is a different political economy. That’s one of the things The Ministry is about. Can you morph, by stages, from the political economy that we’re in now, which is neoliberal capitalism, to what you might call anti-austerity, to a return to Keynesianism, and then beyond that to social democracy, and then beyond that to democratic socialism, and then beyond that to a post-capitalist system that might be a completely new invention that we don’t have a name for? Right-wing thinking is supremely hypocritical and convoluted and self-contradictory, and that needs to be pushed on and pointed out at every chance. This is why I hold myself to calling it “post-capitalism,” so as not to try and define it by any of the nineteenth-century political economies. I think many of the solutions can be found in socialism, but I don’t call myself a socialist. I would want to keep it a little more open to the idea that we have to morph capitalism as such, and that we might shove it to the margins, where we might have a market for the non-necessities. I think the market itself has to be reexamined, and this is so fundamental to the way that modern society works that it’s frightening, and, for me, it’s better to think in a stepwise fashion and to imagine society from where we are now transforming to an undefined better political economy. Planetary Heat Death or the End of Capitalism — We Can Choose DOK One of the axioms of that better political economy is expressed in The Ministry as “Public ownership of the necessities, and real political representation” — two things together that we are far from having, by greater or lesser degrees, really almost everywhere today. A key part of getting from here to there, to a new political economy, involves the question of finance. In New York 2140, one of your characters is a Wall Street trader speculating on intertidal markets, and much of the action concerns finance and the banks. In The Ministry, even more radical measures are contemplated for putting finance at the service of a livable, non-submerged future. Where did you get the inspiration for Carbon Quantitative Easing and the rest of the transformation of finance imagined in this book? KSR Carbon Quantitative Easing is not my idea. I really am just a listening facility here, trying to amplify ideas. That one is out there. Recently, even Lawrence Summers — who was the treasury secretary for Bill Clinton and a neoliberal of the first order — and his think tank have been putting out stuff about some kind of CQE. So it’s been spreading quickly as an idea, and I’m glad. But in the years since I wrote New York 2140, I learned more about the central banks and realized that nationalizing the banks, which happens in 2140, wouldn’t be going far enough. It would be great if all banks were owned by the people, and if banks were not private profit-making enterprises, that would be great — but it would only be one step along the way; it would not be enough. Because, at this point, central banks are only concerned with stabilizing money and maybe helping employment levels, and they will not do anything else unless they are under enormous pressure. They need to be changed, and that’s a lot of what this novel’s about. Changing the way we regard money, that would be a step toward post-capitalism right there. If money was created from scratch but not given to the banks to loan to whatever they wanted but given to decarbonization projects first, then flowing out into the general economy — the first spending money by governments, which make money in the first place, would be targeted toward decarbonization efforts. This strikes me as a good idea, a necessary idea. Because saving the biosphere doesn’t make a profit in the capitalist order, we will never do it, and we are therefore doomed. So a very fundamental reform of how we regard money itself is absolutely necessary. I’m saying that a post-capitalist political economy that regards money as created for the public good and is spent on that first — and then trickles into the general economy — is a fundamental shift, and without it, we’re in terrible trouble. DOK A lot of the action takes place in Switzerland, as you mentioned, because many of the main characters are members of the Ministry of the Future headquartered in Zurich. Do you worry that your story could evoke right-wing tropes like the globalist, world government bogeyman that nationalists talk about to avoid action on climate change? KSR Well, maybe so, but I would say the Left has to fight fire with fire. Right-wing ideas are also conceptions of globalization, in terribly poor disguises as being nationalist. But the nationalist system is embedded in capitalism; it’s just completely international and global. These right-wingers, if they could make an extra dime an hour by selling out national citizens by sending their industries to China or India — they’d do it in a second, and they already have. So they need to be called out for being completely inconsistent and hypocritical. And the Left needs to be much more aggressive on that, and say the problem is not globalization per se; the problem is bad globalization, which is capitalism, as opposed to good globalization, which is mutual aid and cooperation among the nation states by way of international treaties and things like the UN. The Paris Agreement is crucial. It’s a major event in world history. It could turn into the League of Nations, in which case we’re screwed. Or it could turn into something new in history, a way to decarbonize without playing the zero-sum game of nation against nation. So all this needs to be fought at the level of the discursive battle, and no concessions can be made on that point. I mean, right-wing thinking is supremely hypocritical and convoluted and self-contradictory, and that needs to be pushed on and pointed out at every chance — these supposed nationalists are also going to sell you out. This discursive battle, it’s very important. DOK You talked about the Great Trench, of how we get from here to there, and it strikes me that this book is very grounded. There’s no reference to a lunar colony, let alone to any Elon Musk Inc. version of Mars, and there’s no mention of off-planet gated communities like in the film Elysium. Does this absence imply that saving the earth, or transitioning to a livable system, requires stopping the capitalist colonization of space? I kept waiting for an Elon Musk character. KSR Well, since there are 106 chapters — I guess that I could have made it 107, and I could have talked about that. But maybe the absence does speak louder than words. All of those things are fantasies, and billionaire fantasy trips are not going anywhere. In Red Moon and Aurora, I’ve made my statement about what’s possible and what isn’t. Because in the capitalist world, you have to make a profit, and even the billionaires don’t have enough money to properly fund these ventures on their own. So they talk about asteroid mining — that’s bullshit. They talk about Helium-3 mining on the moon — that’s bullshit. There is no profit in space. It’s just a fantasy of our culture right now, because everybody’s been convinced by science fiction writers [laughs], and they’re not paying attention to the numbers game, I guess. I believe in space science. I’m totally in love with NASA, and with public space science, as part of government. There’s this saying of NASA’s, “space science is Earth science,” and I totally believe that.

#### 7. Neoliberalism is rooted from *global inequality* and ignoring *planetary limits* in search for profit—bringing capitalism’s complications beyond our atmosphere creates the same atrocities space exploration seeks to solve

Gillespie 17 – Paul, Dr Paul Gillespie is a former foreign policy editor with The Irish Times. He currently writes a regular column for the newspaper entitled 'World View'. 8/19/17 https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/paul-gillespie-the-west-must-wean-itself-off-unsustainable-growth-1.3190914

On August 2nd the Earth reached its sustainability overshoot date for 2017. This indicator measures how through over-fishing, over-harvesting forests, over-grazing land and mostly by carbon releases we have used more than the planet can renew in a single year. The date was September 17th in 2000. The indicator is produced by the Global Footprint Network which calculates how many planets we would need to sustain the lifestyles of different countries, groups and individuals. This year we would need 1.7 planets and they reckon, on present trends, two would be needed by 2030. If everyone was to live like the average US citizen we would need five planets, like Ireland four, but like Chad, Afghanistan or Cambodia less than one. If all countries were to grow to the point of consuming as much as the wealthiest we would need 3.4 Earths to sustain us. Earth Overshoot Day is calculated by dividing the planet’s biocapacity (the estimated amount of ecological resources Earth is able to generate that year) by humanity’s ecological footprint (humanity’s estimated demand for that year). This ratio is multiplied by 365 to get the date when Earth Overshoot Day is reached. Sustainability they define as the condition in which all human beings can lead fulfilling lives without degrading the planet. Planetary ecology This is a graphic and compelling way to document and publicise the dangerous pressures on planetary ecology arising from present trends. Central to them is the pursuit of endless economic growth and insatiable consumption. There is a contradiction between these imperatives and sustainability since we only have one planet available. How then can the contradiction be resolved? A radical and original approach to these questions is offered by Jason Hickel, an anthropologist at the London School of Economics in his recent book The Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and its Solutions. He uses the footprint analyses to illustrate not only the urgent need to act but the grossly unequal impact of these trends, their deep historical roots and how they can be effectively tackled. That can only be done if the capitalist economics which makes such growth and consumption an inescapable part of our lives is challenged and superseded. Along the way he notes that in the last century we have lost 50 per cent of the world’s forests, up to 80 per cent of fish stocks and have seen 40 per cent of soil depleted by chemicals and over-cultivation. He challenges United Nations figures and claims rates of wealth rises and reductions of poverty are grossly exaggerated if environmental and social impacts are included in gross domestic product and if real living costs are also factored in. That shows the world is more unequal than normally assumed, a trend reinforced by neoliberal economics from the 1980s. Eight individuals now control more wealth than the poorest half of humanity. Sixty per cent of our species (4.3 billion people) lives on less than five dollars a day, his definition of poverty compared to the UN figures of one quarter that amount yielding an improving one billion people. The historical roots of these inequalities come from the expansion and imperial conquests associated with early European and later American capitalism from the 16th century. That reversed Indian and Chinese domination of world living standards and life expectancy up to the early 1800s. In the last century a skilful management of decolonisation alongside strategic interventions against radical reformist regimes like those in Iran, Ghana, Egypt and Chile from the 1950s to the 1970s ensured continuing Western control of world rules and power. Bracing alternative This is a well-argued and bracing alternative account of world development and sustainability. It adopts Edward Said’s notion of “contrapuntal thinking” to link the metropolitan core to the post-colonial periphery in thinking about power, political priorities and agency. Hickel supports degrowth strategies for the richest societies and shows there are sustainable ways to find wellbeing while abandoning unsustainable growth and consumption imperatives. Shorter working weeks, universal basic incomes, a global minimum wage and Tobin taxes on financial transactions could wean populations off them. This would not be another round of austerity but a step towards a more equal world, capable of overcoming the scarcity assumptions driving current economic orthodoxy and the capitalist power structures and legal dynamics built into them. They threaten to destroy the planet if not challenged and stopped soon.

### Contention 2: A New Hope

#### 1. Big-space corporations owe much of their success to decades of public-sector R&D- relying on private space guts progress and dives to neoliberalism’s impacts

Aronoff 18

(KATE ARONOFF is a staff writer at The New Republic and author of Overheated: How Capitalism Broke the Planet — And How We Fight Back. <https://inthesetimes.com/article/elon-musk-spacex-tesla-falcon-heavy-launch> , 2-8)

Scientific American gawked, ​“Elon Musk Does It Again,” praising the ​“bold technological innovations and newfound operational efficiencies that allow SpaceX to not only build its rockets for less money, but also reuse them.” That view — shared by several other outlets — fits comfortably with the Tony Stark-like image Musk has crafted for himself over the years: a quirky and slightly off-kilter playboy genius inventor capable of conquering everything from outer space to the climate crisis with the sheer force of his imagination. One of Musk’s long-term goals is to create a self-sustaining colony on Mars, and make humanity an interplanetary species. He hopes to shoot two very wealthy people around the moon at some point this year. Musk has invested an awful lot of public money into making those dreams a reality. But why should Americans keep footing the bill for projects where only Musk and his wealthy friends can reap the rewards? Enter: the case for nationalizing Elon Musk, and making the U.S. government a major stakeholder in his companies. The common logic now holds that the private sector — and prodigies like Musk, in particular — are better at coming up with world-changing ideas than the public sector, which is allegedly bloated and allergic to new, outside-the-box thinking. Corporations’ hunt for profits and lack of bureaucratic constraints, it’s said, compel cutting-edge research and development in a way that the government is simply incapable of. With any hope, more of these billionaires’ breakthroughs than not will be in the public interest. The reality, as economist Mariana Mazzucato argues in her 2013 book The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths, is very different. Many of the companies that are today considered to be headed by brilliant savants — people like Steve Jobs and, yes, Elon Musk — owe much of their success to decades of public sector innovation, through repackaging technologies developed over the course of several decades into new products. Take the iPhone, essentially a collection of Defense Department research and National Science Foundation-grant projects packed into one shiny machine. “The prospect of the State owning a stake in a private corporation may be anathema to many parts of the capitalist world,” Mazzucato writes, ​“but given that governments are already investing in the private sector, they may as well earn a return on those investments.” As she notes, Musk’s future-oriented empire — Tesla Motors, SolarCity and SpaceX — has benefitted from around $5 billion in local, state and federal government support, not to mention many years of foundational public research into programs like rocket technology. SpaceX itself exists largely for the sake of competing for government contracts, like its $5.5 billion partnership with NASA and the U.S. Air Force. The U.S. Department of Energy invested directly in that company, as well as in Tesla’s work on battery technology and solar panels. The latter is perhaps the biggest success story of the Department of Energy stimulus grant that also supported Solyndra, a solar energy company reliably held up by the Right as an example of the government’s failure to make wise investment decisions. ​“Taxpayers footed the bill for Solyndra’s losses — yet got hardly any of Tesla’s profits,” Mazzucato notes. As Mazzucato finds, the private sector hasn’t done much to earn its reputation as a risk-taker. Corporations and venture capitalists often adopt conservative thinking and fall into ​“path dependency,” and are generally reluctant to invest in important early-stage research that won’t necessarily turn a profit in the short-run. This kind of research is inherently risky, and the vast majority of this kind of protean R&D (research and development) fails. For every internet — birthed in the Defense Department — there are a well over a dozen Solyndras, but it’s virtually impossible to have one without the other. The problem runs deeper still. Whereas in the past public sector research has been able to attract top-tier talent, the myth that the private sector can do what the State can’t has created a negative feedback loop whereby bright young scientists and engineers flock toward a private sector that goes on to further its reputation for being the place where the real innovation is happening. The alternative Mazzucato suggests is to socialize risk and reward alike, rather than simply allowing companies that enjoy the benefits of public innovation to funnel their profits into things like stock buybacks and tax havens — or, for that matter, flamethrowers. When companies like SpaceX make it big, they’d be obligated to return some portion of their gains to the public infrastructure that helped them succeed, expanding the government’s capacity to facilitate more innovative development. All this is not to say that there isn’t a critical role to play for people like Jobs and Musk in bringing new technology to the market. In all likelihood, Tesla’s Powerwall and SolarCity panels will play a key role in our transition off of fossil fuels. But lionizing Musk as the sole creator of the Powerwall and this week’s space launch stands to perpetuate a dangerous series of myths about who’s responsible for such cutting-edge development. Through smart supply-and-demand-side policy, states can play a crucial role in shaping and creating markets for the technologies we’ll need to navigate the 21st century. This can happen not just through R&D but also through developments like fuel efficiency standards, which encourage carmakers to prioritize vehicles that run off of renewable energy. Given the mounting reality of climate change and the necessity to rapidly switch over to a clean energy economy, there’s also a bigger question about how actively the state should be encouraging certain kinds of research and manufacturing. During World War II, the United States essentially had a planned economy: By 1945, around a quarter of manufacturing in the country was under state control. The reason for that was simple — the U.S. government saw an existential threat, and directed some of its biggest corporations to pitch in to stop it or else risk getting taken over by the state. There’s some Cold War nostalgia to hoisting shiny objects into orbit — a telegenic show of America’s technological supremacy. But it may not be much solace to coastal residents forced to flee in the coming decades, whose homes are rendered unlivable by a mixture of extreme weather and crumbling, antiquated infrastructure. And if you’ve watched any number of big-budget sci-fi productions over the last several years, it’s not hard to imagine Musk’s Martian colony spinning off into some Elysium-style eco-apartheid, where the rich — for the right price — can escape to new worlds while the rest of us make do on a planet of dystopian slums, swamps and deserts. Today, the risk posed by climate change is greater still than that posed by fascism on the eve of World War II, threatening to bring about a planet that’s uninhabitable for humans, and plenty hostile to them in the meantime. In such a context, do we need to launch cars into space? Maybe not. If the public sector is going to continue footing the bill for Elon Musk’s fantasies, though, he should at least have to give back some credit, and a cut of the profits.

#### 2. A progressive vision of space would tax Billionaires to solve terrestrial problems first

Oxfam 7-19-21 https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/billionaires-blast-space-billions-suffer-planet-earth

In response to Jeff Bezos’ space flight scheduled for Tuesday, Deepak Xavier, Oxfam International's Global Head of Inequality Campaign, said: “We’ve now reached stratospheric inequality. Billionaires burning into space, away from a world of pandemic, climate change and starvation. 11 people are likely now dying of hunger each minute while Bezos prepares for an 11-minute personal space flight. This is human folly, not human achievement. "The ultra-rich are being propped up by unfair tax systems and pitiful labor protections. US billionaires got around $1.8 trillion richer since the beginning of the pandemic and nine new billionaires were created by Big Pharma’s monopoly on the COVID-19 vaccines. Bezos pays next to no US income tax but can spend $7.5 billion on his own aerospace adventure. Bezos' fortune has almost doubled during the COVID-19 pandemic. He could afford to pay for everyone on Earth to be vaccinated against COVID-19 and still be richer than he was when the pandemic began. "Billionaires should pay their fair share of taxes for our hospitals, schools, roads and social care, too. Governments must adopt a much stronger global minimum tax on multinational corporations and look at new revenues. A wealth tax, for example of just 3 percent, would generate $6 billion a year from Bezos’ $200 billion fortune alone ―a sixth of what the US spends on foreign aid. A COVID-19 profits tax on Amazon would yield $11 billion, enough to vaccinate nearly 600 million people. "What we need is a fair tax system that allows more investment into ending hunger and poverty, into education and healthcare, and into saving the planet from the growing climate crisis ―rather than leaving it.”

#### 3. There is no such thing as “space philanthropy”- private actors are interested in self promotion, not saving humanity- their efforts directly gut government programs to allow market capture and “saving the world” is just a facade

Riederer 18

(RACHEL <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/07/space-barons-review-elon-musk-bezos-thai-cave>, 7-19)

It is impossible for any reader living through the ravages of global warming to scan these sentiments without skepticism. If someone is going to invest enormous amounts of wealth and time in an engineering project, gathering together some of the smartest scientists on the planet to develop and test creative solutions to an intractable problem, in the interest of saving the future of humanity, how could you choose any focus but climate change? Davenport doesn’t ask, taking at face value the space barons’ declarations that they are motivated by planetary rescue. For those interested in the movement to privatize space exploration and space itself, The Space Barons does serve as a useful primer, laying out the timelines and geneses of these companies. But it stops short of posing critical questions about what it means for such enterprises to be privately held — a line of questioning that, given the history of labor problems and tendencies toward monopolization at the barons’ non-space companies Amazon and Tesla, might be very good questions to ask indeed. It instead leans heavily on colorful anecdotes about the companies’ founders and their philosophies. Bezos, obsessed with the accomplishments of NASA ever since he watched the moon landing at the age of five, commissions an underwater search party to recover the Apollo-era Saturn V rocket engines from the floor of the Atlantic. Branson evangelizes about the “life-changing” effects of experiencing space and trains for spaceflight in a spinning centrifuge, declaring the adventure “rather fun.” A young Musk floats an idea for a Martian greenhouse project straight out of the sci-fi of Kim Stanley Robinson, “a P.T. Barnum-like stunt” in which he would launch a greenhouse full of seeds and growing medium onto the surface of Mars and make the red planet bloom. A more seasoned Musk sues the US Air Force for the right to compete for national-security launches alongside established aerospace contractors like Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Running through all of these engineering and business adventures is the rivalry between Bezos and Musk. Both are working toward the same goal: developing and producing rockets that can be reused on multiple flights, making regular spaceflight more efficient. When SpaceX successfully launched — and then re-landed — the Falcon 9 for the first time, in December of 2015, Musk was ecstatic. Until he saw a tweet from Bezos offering his congratulations and saying “Welcome to the club!” Bezos had done the same, with his rocket, the New Shepard, the month before. Musk took the success of the Falcon 9 as validation of his long-term goals. “It really quite dramatically improves my confidence that a city on Mars is possible,” he said. “That’s what this is all about.” Well, it’s part of what this is all about. The desire to be beloved, to be seen as a great visionary rescuer, is what’s so grating about Musk’s recent public announcements of altruism, and it’s present throughout the history of all of the companies profiled in The Space Barons. In addition to amassing billions of dollars in personal wealth and living out their rocket-launching boyhood dreams, the space barons insist on framing their pursuits as inspirational and civic-minded. The tension in the recent dust-up over Musk’s unused Thai-cave rescue pods isn’t about whether Musk and his engineers created the rescue pods, but why. Was it a good-faith effort to help a group of desperate kids, or a megalomaniacal attempt to place himself and his companies at the center of a giant news story? Musk wants the answer to be simple, defending his behavior by insisting that “something’s messed up if this is not a good thing.” The space barons are fond of metaphors of exploration and frontiers. They compare themselves to Shackleton and Magellan. “The thing that actually gets me the most excited about it,” Musk says, “is that I just think it’s the grandest adventure I could possibly imagine. It’s the most exciting thing — I couldn’t think of anything more exciting, more fun, more inspiring than to have a base on Mars.” This enthusiasm is fine, of course. But it also shatters the notion that Musk and companies are trying to thrust humanity into space to save us all from planetary disaster. Outer space, a flooded network of caves — anywhere dangerous and sparsely visited will draw to it both adventurers and rescuers. But their work proceeds differently, and someone who’s out for a grand adventure shouldn’t pretend to be a planetary EMT. Perhaps the worst thing about the space barons is that they’re burnishing their reputation by rushing into areas vacated by state divestment — divestment that in many cases, they themselves have helped promote. Witness Musk’s recent pledge to “fund fixing the water in any house in Flint that has water contamination” while lavishly contributing to the Republican Party. Musk and his brethren have hoovered up billions of dollars, funded plutocratic causes — and then balk when anyone raises a peep about their narcissistic antics. “They were driven by the business opportunities in space, by adventure, and by ego,” Davenport writes of the group he profiles. “[I]magine the Promethean legacies they’d leave after opening up the Final Frontier.” Yet Promethean legacy is a double-edge sword: the trickster who stole fire from the gods and gave it to mankind is as much a symbol of tragic consequences as of human progress.

#### Thus I affirm the resolution: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

### Contention 3: Framing

#### My criterion is the elimination of structural violence.

#### The impact of structural violence cumulatively outweighs – challenging the structures that facilitate inequality is necessary

Ansell 17- David A. Ansell, Senior Vice President, Associate Provost for Community Health Equity, and Michael E. Kelly Professor of Medicine at Rush University Medical Center (The Death Gap: How Inequality Kills, p. 7-10)

There are many different kinds of violence. Some are obvious: punches, attacks, gunshots, explosions. These are the kinds of inter- personal violence that we tend to hear about in the news. Other kinds of violence are intimate and emotional. But the deadliest and most thoroughgoing kind of violence is woven into the fabric of American society. It exists when some groups have more access to goods, resources, and opportunities than other groups, including health and life itself. This violence delivers specific blows against particular bodies in particular neighborhoods. This unequal advantage and violence is built into the very rules that govern our society. In the absence of this violence, large numbers of Americans would be able to live fuller and longer lives. This kind of violence is called structural violence, because it is embedded in the very laws, policies, and rules that govern day-to- day life.8 It is the cumulative impact of laws and social and economic policies and practices that render some Americans less able to access resources and opportunities than others. This inequity of advantage is not a result of the individuals personal abilities but is built into the systems that govern society. Often it is a product of racism, gender, and income inequality. The diseases and premature mortality that Windora and many of my patients experienced were, in the words of Dr. Paul Farmer, "biological reflections of social fault lines."9 As a result of these fault lines, a disproportional burden of illness, suffering, and premature mortality falls on certain neighborhoods, like Windora's. Structural violence can overwhelm an individual's ability to live a free, unfettered, healthy life. As I ran to evaluate Windora, I knew that her stroke was caused in part by lifelong exposure to suffering, racism, and economic deprivation. Worse, the poverty of West Humboldt Park that contributed to her illness is directly and inextricably related to the massive concentration of wealth and power in other neighborhoods just miles away in Chicago's Gold Coast and suburbs. That concentration of wealth could not have occurred without laws, policies, and practices that favored some at the expense of others. Those laws, policies, and practices could not have been passed or enforced if access to political and economic power had not been concentrated in the hands of a few. Yet these political and economic structures have become so firmly entrenched (in habits, social relations, economic arrangements, institutional practices, law, and policy) that they have become part of the matrix of American society. The rules that govern day-to-day life were written to benefit a small elite at the expense of people like Windora and her family. These rules and structures are powerful destructive forces. The same structures that render life predictable, secure, comfortable, and pleasant for many destroy the lives of others like Windora through suffering, poverty, ill health, and violence. These structures are neither natural nor neutral. The results of structural violence can be very specific. In Windora's case, stroke precursors like chronic stress, poverty, and uncontrolled hypertension run rampant in neighborhoods like hers. Windora's ill- ness was caused by neither her cultural traits nor the failure of her will. Her stroke was caused in part by inequity. She is one of the lucky ones, though, because even while structural violence ravages her neighbor- hood, it also abets the concentration of expensive stroke-intervention services in certain wealthy teaching hospitals like mine. If I can get to her in time, we can still help her. Income Inequality and Life Inequality Of course, Windora is not the only person struggling on account of structural violence. Countless neighborhoods nationwide are suffering from it, and people are dying needlessly young as a result. The mag- nitude of this excess mortality is mind-boggling. In 2009 my friend Dr. Steve Whitman asked a simple question, "How many extra black people died in Chicago each year, just because they do not have the same health outcomes as white Chicagoans?" When the Chicago Sun- Times got wind of his results, it ran them on the front page in bold white letters on a black background: "health care gap kills 3200 Black Chicagoans and the Gap is Growing." The paper styled the head- line to look like the declaration of war that it should have been. In fact, we did find ourselves at war not long ago, when almost 3,000 Americans were killed. That was September 11,2001. That tragedy propelled the country to war. Yet when it comes to the premature deaths of urban Americans, no disaster area has been declared. No federal troops have been called up. No acts of Congress have been passed. Yet this disaster is even worse: those 3,200 black people were in Chicago alone, in just one year. Nationwide each year, more than 60,000 black people die prematurely because of inequality.10 While blacks suffer the most from this, it is not just an issue of racism, though racism has been a unique and powerful transmitter of violence in America for over four hundred years.11 Beyond racism, poverty and income inequality perpetuated by exploitative market capitalism are singular agents of transmission of disease and early death. As a result, there is a new and alarming pattern of declining life expectancy among white Americans as well. Deaths from drug overdoses in young white Americans ages 25 to 34 have exploded to levels not seen since the AIDS epidemic. This generation is the first since the Vietnam War era to experience higher death rates than the prior generation.12 White Americans ages 45 to 54 have experienced skyrocketing premature death rates as well, something not seen in any other developed na- tion.13 White men in some Appalachian towns live on average twenty years less than white men a half-day's drive away in the suburbs of Washington, DC. Men in McDowell County, West Virginia, can look forward to a life expectancy only slightly better than that of Haitians.14 But those statistics reflect averages, and every death from structural violence is a person. When these illnesses and deaths are occurring one at a time in neighborhoods that society has decided not to care about—neighborhoods populated by poor, black, or brown people— they seem easy to overlook, especially if you are among the fortunate few who are doing incredibly well. The tide of prosperity in America has lifted some boats while others have swamped. Paul Farmer, the physician-anthropologist who founded Partners in Health, an inter- national human rights agency, reflects on the juxtaposition of "unprecedented bounty and untold penury": "It stands to reason that as beneficiaries of growing inequality, we do not like to be reminded of misery of squalor and failure. Our popular culture provides us with no shortage of anesthesia."15 That people suffer and die prematurely because of inequality is wrong. It is wrong from an ethical perspective. It is wrong from a fair- ness perspective. And it is wrong because we have the means to fix it.

#### Vote aff to prioritize the slow violence and everyday war against disenfranchised populations. You are conditioned to discount structural violence because it occurs outside of traditional risk frames, which normalizes state-sanctioned violence.

Hunt 18

(Dallas Hunt, PhD Candidate, University of British Columbia, Canada., Chapter 10 “Of course they count, but not right now”: Regulating precarity in Lee Maracle’s Ravensong and Celia’s Song, in Biopolitical Disaster Edited by Jennifer L. Lawrence and Sarah Marie Wiebe, 2018 Routledge, JKS)

“There is a hierarchy to care”: theoretical concerns and applications

In Frames of War (an extension and preoccupation with similar issues she outlines in her text Precarious Life), Judith Butler focuses on the ways in which particular, violent perceptions of everyday life are normalized and propagated as legible or granted “intelligibility” (through numbers, statistics, etc.). According to Butler, Frames of War follows on from Precarious Life ... especially its suggestion that specific lives cannot be apprehended as living. If certain lives do not qualify as lives or are, from the start, not conceivable as lives within certain epistemological frames, then these lives are never lived nor lost in the full sense. (2010: 1) For Butler, then, a primary concern is how these intelligibilities allow “a state to wage its wars without instigating a popular revolt” (xvi). Although Butler is writing within the context of the Iraq War and the “War on Terror,” her insights on precarity and modes of state violence exceed their immediate rele- vance. Indeed, as is clear below, the notions of war and settler-colonialism and the biopolitical rationalities they allow are eminently applicable to a local, Canadian context. The frames of war, Butler argues, are not circumscribed to combat zones with the mobilization of weapons. Instead, to Butler, “perceptual weapons” are acting on populations consistently to naturalize violences and enlist citizens to tacitly consent to (and, in some cases, actively participate in) violent forms that authorize dehumanization: “[w]aging war ... begins with the assault on the senses; the senses are the first target of war” (xvi). These perceptual violences resonate with Rob Nixon’s formulation of “slow violence” as well. To Nixon, slow violence is “a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all” (2011: 3). Further, and “[c]rucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded” (4). Conditioning the senses or what is intelligible, then, functions as the way in which state violences are legitimized, as the frames of war dictate the “sensuous parameters of reality itself” (ix). According to Butler, the task at hand is not only to “understand ... these frames, where they come from and what kind of action they perform” (2010: 83), but also to find and articulate “those modes of representation and appearance that allow the claim of life to be made and heard” (81). While Butler is exam- ining conditions of precarity, (in)security, and disposability in the context of “the War on Terror,” and Palestine–Israel, her examination of an imperial/ colonial power exerting force and enacting violence on vulnerable and racialized populations (and in the process producing and reproducing these vulnerable populations) can be fruitfully employed in the Canadian context, though not without some alteration. Although we may not perceive the more mundane, i.e. non-military, violences visited upon Indigenous communities as “war” strictly speaking, Sora Han’s oft-cited phrase that we must think of the United States (and settler-colonial nations more broadly) not “at war” but “as war” is useful here (cited in Simpson 2014: 153, emphasis in original). If we view the biopolitical man- agement of Indigenous populations and Indigenous territories as rationalities rooted in the organizing frame of settler-colonialism, then the states of emer- gency putatively thought to be produced through war are “structural, not eventful” – that is to say, war is the very condition of settler-colonialism and not a by-product of it (154). Indeed, the largest ever domestic deployment of military forces in North America took place within Canada, in the context of the so-called “Oka crisis.” As Audra Simpson writes, the “highest number of troops in the history of Indigenous-settler relations in North America was deployed to Kanehsatà:ke, as this was the most unambiguous form of exceptional relations, that of warfare. There were 2,650 soldiers deployed...” (2014: 152). And, as Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz and others have noted, Western imperial powers still refer to “enemy territories” abroad as “Indian Country” and to “wanted terrorists” as “Geronimo” (2014: 56). I follow the lineages of these Indigenous theorists who view settler-colonialism as a kind of permanent war, drawing parallels between the so-called everyday violences (displacement, sexual violence) inflicted upon Indigenous peoples in the US and Canada and the death-delivering reaches of empire embodied by the West more globally. Or, to echo Mink, the transformer/shapeshifter narrating the events in Mara- cle’s Celia’s Song: “This is war” (2014: 9). For Butler, there are varying tactics for distributing “precarity” differently, or what she describes as “that politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of support,” producing a “maximized precariousness for populations ... who often have no other option than to appeal to the very state from which they need protec- tion” (2010: 26). In the depictions provided in her writing, as well as that of Maracle, violence is deployed not only as “an effort to minimize precarious- ness for some and to maximize it for others,” but also as a mode of shaping the perceptions of citizens in order to make such acts legible, and hence, in a sense justifiable (Butler 2010: 54). Ultimately what Butler is advocating for is a new ethico-political orientation, one with the potential to disrupt the violent regimes of the sensible, as well as the ways in which precarity is currently allocated and distributed. Paraphrasing Jacques Rancière, Jeff Derksen also advocates for political movements that disrupt “regimes of the sensible”: “a politics of the aesthetic could ... redistribute and rethink the possibility of the subject (potentially an isolated figure) within the present and within a com- munity to come” (2009: 73). In sum, Butler’s text illustrates the ways in which State-sanctioned (and induced) precarity “perpetuate[s] a way of dividing lives into those that are worth defending, valuing, and grieving when they are lost, and those that are not quite lives” (2010: 42), as well as the resistive practices that might disrupt the naturalization of “differential distribution[s] of pre- carity” (xxv). The remainder of the chapter considers to what extent Mara- cle’s texts offer such a disruption of the mundane frames of settler-colonial war within the context of an exceptional moment (an epidemic), and asks how her work gestures toward the alternatives that might be offered by Indigenous frames.