# HarWes R2 vs Immaculate Heart

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### Contention 1: A Space Monopoly

#### 1. 2022 is the crucial year for private space activity to prove it is profitable

Kramer 1-4

(Miriam Kramer is the space reporter for Axios. She is the author of the weekly Axios Space newsletter and covers the science and business of space. “Private space companies’ 2022 promises to keep.” Axios. January 4, 2022. <https://www.axios.com/private-human-spaceflight-2022-8ec6082a-e3ae-4d6b-8073-3f8af3e7e2a5.html>)

The private human spaceflight industry delivered on long-held promises in 2021, but 2022 is the year where it will need to prove itself to the public. Why it matters: The space industry is predicted to be worth more than $1 trillion within the next 10 years. But for that to happen, companies will need to turn the extraordinary feats of the last year into routine operations. What's happening: Last year, Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic both launched their founders — Jeff Bezos and Richard Branson respectively — to space for the first time. Blue Origin followed that up with two more suborbital human flights in 2021. Those missions marked the culmination of decades of work for the two companies and delivered on a promise of sending more non-professionals to space. SpaceX also consistently launched crewed missions to the International Space Station for NASA, a major customer that will influence the continued growth of the company, and had a huge success with four non-professionals flying to orbit without a pro-astronaut onboard on the Inspiration4 mission. What to watch: Now, those companies are trying to demonstrate they can consistently deliver these services — and turn a profit from them. That means flying more. Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic and SpaceX are expected by space watchers to fly people to space consistently and safely this year. That will be key to determining whether the successes of the last year are one-offs or if they can get into "some sort of rhythm and make some money," Carissa Christensen, founder and CEO of BryceTech, told Axios. SpaceX is planning to launch the Axiom Mission-1 mission to the International Space Station early in 2022, which will act as a followup to the Inspiration4 mission and could be an indicator of the market for more amateur orbital flights. It's hard to gauge whether private companies like Blue Origin are profitable — because their finances aren't open to the public — but routinely launching, which is expensive, can act as a proxy for it, Christensen said. Yes, but: Transforming these missions into routine services won't be easy. It will require companies to increase launch cadence, which is challenging because they're working with relatively newly-developed technology and within complicated regulatory frameworks. The big picture: The public demand for these types of services could also become more clear this year. Studies indicate there is "substantial demand" for suborbital spaceflight, Christensen says. "You have a larger pool of people that can afford it now." According to a May 2021 note sent to investors by analysts Ken Herbert and Austin Moeller, of Canaccord Genuity, the suborbital tourism market could reach $8 billion by 2030 with 1 million potential customers. Between the lines: Demonstrating they can turn a profit will be important for the companies working to make consistent, private human spaceflight a reality, but it's likely a small portion of the revenue for the space industry overall. However, human spaceflight will be one of the most important public-facing elements of the overall industry. Major failures and successes will shift the way the public sees the industry, adding to its support or detracting from it. The bottom line: Last year, the private spaceflight industry showed what it can do, but this year, these companies will need to capitalize on it.

#### 2. Private space enterprise *stems from* inequality and a flawed system- capitalist space “geniuses” only hustle for *dominance* and *profit* as they gatekeep the stars

Penny 20

(ELEANOR PENNY is a writer, poet and essayist based in London. She is a senior editor at Novara Media, <https://inthesetimes.com/article/space-privatization-future-technology-silicon-valley-elon-musk-jeff-bezos>, 12-17)

The eye-watering upfront costs of these exploratory, high-risk, high-reward endeavors can be absorbed by Silicon Valley venture capitalists and the personal fortunes of its aristocracy. A concentration of capital stands ready to risk big money to secure a stake in future markets (which will double down on its power in existing ones). The point is to ensure a slice of the territory everyone else will be clamoring for. This form of ​“creative destruction”—an idea developed by economist Joseph Schumpeter, understood in neoliberalism to describe the boom-bust cycle of innovation — is often packaged in the mythology of moonshot genius that drives human progress. But Schumpeter’s theory has a less discussed underbelly: Such creative destruction is usually twinned with market capture. As competitors are tossed onto the scrap heap of history by their own sudden irrelevance, oligarchies and monopolies flourish. The riches of the asteroids belt make earthly mining look positively parochial. The problem is that a sudden, vast supply of (formerly) precious metals would make market prices plummet. Journalist Aaron Bastani, author of Fully Automated Luxury Communism, notes that satellite-delivered digital information has the potential to replace our earthbound Internet networks with ​“space-based global Internet” — the way music streaming has replaced CDs and CDs replaced cassettes and vinyl — or to at least render them much cheaper (through, for example, open-access 3D printing). SpaceX and Blue Origin surely share a goal to make space transport cheaper. The question is, for whom? These ventures train their sights on infinite excess, with dwindling marginal costs as the supply of key materials and digital resources expands. This paradigm is great for those interested in the advancement of human civilization, but not so much for a grinning billionaire’s fixation on the bottom line. At first glance, expanding industry beyond Earth sounds like a pragmatic fix to the earth-shatteringly simple dilemma faced by capitalism: that it must grow to survive, but the planet it grows upon is finite. But to maintain profit margins in conditions of plenty (a demand of industry), legal and political fixes are required. If you exclusively own mining rights to asteroids rich in platinum — and precious little platinum is left on Earth — you can charge whatever you like for platinum. The diamond industry perfected this technique decades ago. (Elon Musk’s family fortune comes partially from a Zambian emerald mine.) Hence, the focus of the new space race is not on the production of goods or their most efficient sourcing, but on ownership of land and transport networks. In this latest phase of capitalism, as national growth slows, productive industries dwindle and wealth concentrates in fewer hands. As economist Thomas Piketty has observed, this phase is accompanied by a pivot toward rent-seeking as a profit mechanism. In other words, the scramble for space is the scramble to own satellites and ​“starways,” gatekeep the riches of the solar system and charge rent on the moon. Against this backdrop, Space Force might seem retrograde, a warped nostalgia for a time when the space race was [to be] about petty terrestrial wars rather than Musk’s supposedly enlightened vision to colonize Mars. In reality, the two visions go hand in hand. Military might physically captures and secures territory, enforces the American political and legal apparatus and ensures business can function (even on the moon). The darlings of this new space age paint their vision as daring futurism, a wild-eyed libertarian dream of human elevation. But history repeats and the story is old. Like Bezos and Musk, Cecil Rhodes — mining magnate and premier villain of the British Empire — also succumbed to dreams of wealth in the night sky. ​“Expansion is everything,” Rhodes said. ​“I would annex the planets if I could.” Where technology opens up the yawning unknown of new territory glittering with potential profit, private enterprises hustle for dominance — backed by the military and legal capacities of earthbound nations. Colonialism in space is not some post-humanist utopia, but the age-old dominion of land barons and mining magnates, billionaires sloughing off the wreckage of one planet and setting out for the stars.

#### 3. Capitalism is not natural or inevitable, extending it to space is a political choice that empirics prove will be disastrous

Penny 20

(ELEANOR PENNY is a writer, poet and essayist based in London. She is a senior editor at Novara Media, <https://inthesetimes.com/article/space-privatization-future-technology-silicon-valley-elon-musk-jeff-bezos>, 12-17)

Space is our birthright. ​“Americans should have the right to engage in commercial exploration, recovery and use of resources in outer space,” President Donald Trump wrote April 6, 2020, issuing the ​“Executive Order on Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources.” In the stroke of a pen, Trump planted the U.S. flag on ​“the Moon, Mars and other celestial bodies.” As Trump declared these space lands and resources open for business, you could hear the cheers — mostly from ​“moonshot” corporations that have clamored to sweep away the patchy, unregularized Cold War-era space law in favor of new, unregulated corporate plunder of the solar system. While the institution of private land ownership is now widely taken for granted, it was — like many so-called natural things — invented. Before the muddied, grueling transition from feudalism to capitalism, peasants in Britain and much of Western Europe depended on their right to farm, forage and harvest on common, community lands. The land was controlled by local lords, but it belonged (in a loose, de facto sense) to the communities living on it and dependent upon it. Eventually, common lands were ​“enclosed” and became the private property of aristocrats. This exclusive right to land use (to own and profit from land) was the contrivance that established the new economic order. No longer held in common, the planet’s resources were parceled off to strictly private hands. No longer could peasants scrape by, subsisting on the commons. Instead, they depended on the grace and favor of a wage. Life in feudal times was no bucolic idyll, but enclosure was synonymous with disaster, destitution and death for many people. This model was mirrored in the capture, theft and enclosure of colony lands, the people (and resources) of which fueled the early capitalist transition and later the industrial revolution. Capitalism must grow to persist, and as it grows it must transform ripe, unregularized commons into private fiefdoms — at home and afar. So it seems only ​“natural” to carve up the moon into stretches of valuable real estate, just like Manhattan and the metal mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. After all, Earth’s resources dwindle by the day, and boundless resources beyond the stratosphere could be a backstop for planetary scarcity. Never mind that our crisis of resources is, in part, the result of this system of private ownership that rewards ruthless, short-term profiteering at the expense of the long-term survival of the natural commons. This future access to a new natural commons is now a stress test on governmental priorities. As Trump proclaimed, ​“Outer space is a legally and physically unique domain of human activity, and the United States does not view it as a global commons.” Trump’s executive order to ​“encourage international support for the public and private recovery and use of resources in outer space” heralds yet another public-private boondoggle, where nominally public institutions thrash out fresh boundaries of corporate activity. As an example, look no further than SpaceX’s Crew Dragon capsule, which successfully transported NASA astronauts Bob Behnken and Doug Hurley to the International Space Station on May 31, 2020. The NASA-SpaceX crossover branding leaves no room for misinterpretation: The next small steps for mankind will be giant leaps for corporate America. Elon Musk, who founded SpaceX in 2002, talks misty-eyed about a relatively near future when humanity will have risen out of the mud, setting its sights on colonizing Mars — with SpaceX transportation rocketing there. In 2020, Musk began launching a cavalcade of thousands of satellites into low-Earth orbit to form the Starlink satellite system. As of November 2020, nearly 900 satellites had been launched (42,000 are planned in total). This network will potentially seed an extraplanetary monopoly for key economic infrastructure, such as domestic internet access. Fellow billionaire escapist Jeff Bezos, Amazon CEO, has been romanced by the wealth among the stars as well, founding his own aerospace company, Blue Origin, back in 2000. ​“We are going to build a road to space,” Bezos said in 2019. ​“And then, amazing things will happen.” Bezos has invited us all to cosplay his daydreams with the Amazon-funded, interplanetary sci-fi thriller The Expanse, in which a roll call of stock anti-heroes (the rogue policeman, the war-beleaguered pilot, etc.) tumble through a far future when only wise plutocratic innovators can plumb interstellar riches and deliver the solar system from interstellar war. Microsoft, too, has its fingers in the intergalactic pie, launching Azure Orbital in September 2020 to enable satellite operators on its cloud computing platform, along with a SpaceX partnership the following month. According to Forbes, 2019 was a record year for private space investments, with ​“venture capitalists [investing] $5.8 billion in 178 commercial space startups worldwide.” As Earth’s billionaires burnish the power of new stratospheric tech, Trump launched Space Force, the first new branch of the U.S. military in more than seven decades. ​“Space is the world’s newest war-fighting domain,” Trump said. ​“Amid grave threats to our national security, American superiority in space is absolutely vital.” Space exploration has long been tied to military ambition. From its Cold War founding, NASA’s task was to advance the practical interests of the American state as it squared off against the Soviet behemoth. The new field of battle included space-guided missiles and satellite technology. Astronauts are still generally selected from the ranks of the military. Grumman (now better known as half of Northrop Grumman) made parts for both the NASA spacecraft that leapt into the great unknown and the military machines that waged war in Vietnam. As the shadow of nuclear war retreats in the bright light of a digital dawn, the mission of Space Force is to protect the economic and military infrastructure (communications and surveillance technology) seemingly threatened by rival global powers (namely, Russia and China) gearing up their own military space operations. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, signed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, attempted to guard against the militarization and the privatization of our shared stratosphere. The treaty limited governmental (and non-governmental) bodies from sending nuclear weapons into space and prohibited the annexation of the moon and temptingly mineral-rich asteroids. As the treaty outlined, any country could use and explore outer space but there could be no ​“appropriation” of astral territory. It was, at heart, a disarmament treaty — one whose ropey legalities were enforced by the now-defunct Cold War brinkmanship between its main two signatories. The treaty never foresaw the dizzying rise of private enterprise clamoring for a slice of the sky. Nor did it foresee the slow shelving of publicly funded U.S. space exploration (especially the manned variety) that would allow venture capitalists to stake their claim in a new space scramble.

#### 4. Risks of private space activity vastly outweigh- corporations turn space into a Pandora’s box waiting to be opened- but government space programs are regulated, equitable, not motivated by monopolistic dominance

Kaminska 14

(Izabella is an FT Alphaville reporter <https://www.ft.com/content/02aac296-a920-11e3-bf0c-00144feab7de> 3-14)

For a long time the idea of commercial space was an eccentric billionaire’s pipe dream. A fanciful desire of those with a penchant for Isaac Asimov novels. Not so any more. Elon Musk’s SpaceX has been sending payloads to space on a commercially viable basis since 2010. Sir Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic is on track to take its first fully paid-up customers into near-space by the end of this year, all of which was revealed by my colleague John Sunyer’s recent piece on property space wars. And a company called Planetary Resources is making serious attempts to identify asteroids for commercial mining missions in the not too distant future. Small surprise then that the issue of extraplanetary property rights has been raised by the likes of Robert Bigelow, founder of Bigelow Aerospace, a company hoping to put private living quarters in space. Above all, Bigelow is worried that if the capitalist west doesn’t go about annexing celestial bodies in the name of private enterprise, some other nation will go empire-building in its own name instead. The argument pro property rights is simple. What we’re approaching is a new Wild West period for humanity. A time when anyone ingenious or intrepid enough to get themselves into space should rightfully be rewarded with ownership and autocracy over the land masses they discover or forge. Especially since this time around there are no native inhabitants, or at least none that we humans can divine, to be displaced in the process. Call it the classic expansionist approach to property allocation. Or as comedian Eddie Izzard once joked, stealing countries with the cunning use of flags. If you can claim it and defend it, it becomes yours. The problem with this way of thinking is that the Wild West is a poor analogy for space exploration. First there’s the access issue. Getting to the New World may have been harsh and costly, but it was still exponentially easier – and thus more equitable – than getting to space. Second, when the pilgrims set sail for America, they never looked back. Yes, they still depended on trade, but they did so on an equal footing with their trade partners because they had just as many valuable resources, if not more, to exchange. The American war of independence was about shedding the yoke of the old land, which still desired to rule the colonies despite their self-sufficiency. The same clearly does not apply to the hostile territory of space. The chance that any colonist on Mars, the Moon or an asteroid will be self-sufficient enough to break their dependence on Earth is infinitely small. To the contrary, private missions are likely to remain dependent on national jurisdictions for launches and life support for decades if not centuries. Is it a risk, then, that nation-states will see this as an invitation to go empire-building in space instead? Unlikely. Article II of the UN Outer Space Treaty already sets out the parameters clearly: “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” It is a treaty we should be thankful for, not least because it paved the way to a truly unprecedented era of international co-operation, resulting in, among other things, the International Space Station. If any sovereign state dared to break it, say by invading the Moon, they would, without a shadow of a doubt, find themselves testing the international community, and consequently the established nuclear power balance here on Earth. That means, for as long as a space colony depends on Earth-based ties, the incentive for a nation-state to abide by Earth-based rules remains. It’s game theory. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for private enterprise. A power-hungry space baron could feasibly argue that the UN treaty does not apply to them since they are not a sovereign state. Then there is also the caveat that the treaty only refers to celestial rather than man-made bodies. This is what you could call the dark side of space commercialisation. The point at which open access to space creates a Pandora’s box effect that in the name of competition compromises space co-operation and disrupts the power balance we’ve achieved both in space and on Earth. The point when a power-hungry billionaire could find a legal path to building his own Death Star. Elon Musk’s testimony to the Senate appropriations hearing on March 5 speaks of the potential power play in hand. As he argued, US national security is being undermined by the country’s dependence on Russian parts and launches, especially in light of the latter’s de facto annexation of the Crimea region. It would be much better, says Musk, if the US transferred more of its business to private enterprises like SpaceX. To Musk, access to space should be treated the same way access to commodities is treated on Earth. The only problem with this analogy is that private corporations competing for commodities still have to abide by national rules. Commercial space enterprises, it seems, would prefer it if sovereign states became dependent on private enterprise instead – the surest way of exposing Earth to the risk of a megalomaniac that wants to rename Mars one day.

#### 5. Corporations’ utopian space fantasies will never happen- their underlying purpose is to distract the public from a new age of capital accumulation

Marx 21

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But as these billionaires had their eyes turned to the stars and the media showered them with the headlines they craved, the evidence that the climate of our planet is rapidly changing in a way that is hostile to life — both human and otherwise — was escalating. Near the end of June, Jacobabad, a city of 200,000 people in Pakistan, experienced “wet bulb” conditions where high humidity and scorching temperatures combine to reach a level where the human body can no longer cool itself down. Meanwhile, half a world away, on the West Coast of North America, a heat dome that was made much worse by climate change sent temperatures soaring so high that the town of Lytton, British Columbia, hit 49.6ºC, beating Canada’s previous temperature record by 4.6ºC, then burned to the ground when a wildfire tore through the town. The contrast between those stories is striking. On one hand, billionaires are engaging in a dick-measuring contest to see who can exit the atmosphere first, while on the other, the billions of us who will never make any such journey are increasingly dealing with the consequences of capitalism’s effects on the climate — and the decades its most powerful adherents have spent stifling action to curb them. At a moment when we should be throwing everything we have into ensuring the planet remains habitable, billionaires are treating us to a spectacle to distract us from their quest for continued capitalist accumulation and the disastrous effects it is already having. The Spectacle of Billionaires in Space Last May, we were treated to a similar display of billionaire space ambition. As people across the United States were marching in the streets after the murder of George Floyd and the government was doing little to stop COVID-19 from sweeping the country, Elon Musk and President Donald Trump met in Florida to celebrate SpaceX’s first time launching astronauts to the International Space Station. As regular people were fighting for their lives, it felt like the elite were living in a completely separate world and had no qualms about showing it. They didn’t have to make it to another planet. Over the past few years, as the billionaire space race has escalated, the public has become increasingly familiar with its grand visions for our future. SpaceX’s Elon Musk wants us to colonize Mars and claims the mission of his space company is to lay the infrastructure to do just that. He wants humanity to be a “multiplanetary” species, and he claims a Martian colony would be a backup plan in case Earth becomes uninhabitable. Meanwhile, Bezos doesn’t have much time for Mars colonization. Instead, he believes we should build large structures in Earth’s orbit where the human population can grow to a trillion people without further harming the planet’s environment. As we live out our lives in O’Neill cylinders, as they’re called, we’ll take occasional vacations down to the surface to experience the wonder of the world we once called home. Neither of these futures are appealing if you look past the billionaires’ rosy pitch decks. Life on Mars would be horrendous for hundreds of years, at least, and would likely kill many of the people who made the journey, while the technology for massive space colonies doesn’t exist and similarly won’t be feasible for a long time to come. So, what’s the point of promoting these futures in the face of an unprecedented threat to our species here on Earth? It is to get the public on board for a new phase of capitalist accumulation whose benefits will be reaped by those billionaires. To be clear, that does not even mean anything as grand as asteroid mining. Rather, its form can be seen in the event last May: as Musk and even Trump continued to push the spectacle of Mars for the public, SpaceX was becoming not just a key player in a privatized space industry but also in enabling a military buildup through billions of dollars in government contracts. The grand visions, rocket launches, and spectacles of billionaires leaving the atmosphere are all cover for the real space economy.

#### 6. Neoliberalism is rooted from *global inequality* and ignoring *planetary limits* in search for profit—bringing capitalism’s complications beyond our atmosphere creates the same atrocities space exploration seeks to solve

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On August 2nd the Earth reached its sustainability overshoot date for 2017. This indicator measures how through over-fishing, over-harvesting forests, over-grazing land and mostly by carbon releases we have used more than the planet can renew in a single year. The date was September 17th in 2000. The indicator is produced by the Global Footprint Network which calculates how many planets we would need to sustain the lifestyles of different countries, groups and individuals. This year we would need 1.7 planets and they reckon, on present trends, two would be needed by 2030. If everyone was to live like the average US citizen we would need five planets, like Ireland four, but like Chad, Afghanistan or Cambodia less than one. If all countries were to grow to the point of consuming as much as the wealthiest we would need 3.4 Earths to sustain us. Earth Overshoot Day is calculated by dividing the planet’s biocapacity (the estimated amount of ecological resources Earth is able to generate that year) by humanity’s ecological footprint (humanity’s estimated demand for that year). This ratio is multiplied by 365 to get the date when Earth Overshoot Day is reached. Sustainability they define as the condition in which all human beings can lead fulfilling lives without degrading the planet. Planetary ecology This is a graphic and compelling way to document and publicise the dangerous pressures on planetary ecology arising from present trends. Central to them is the pursuit of endless economic growth and insatiable consumption. There is a contradiction between these imperatives and sustainability since we only have one planet available. How then can the contradiction be resolved? A radical and original approach to these questions is offered by Jason Hickel, an anthropologist at the London School of Economics in his recent book The Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and its Solutions. He uses the footprint analyses to illustrate not only the urgent need to act but the grossly unequal impact of these trends, their deep historical roots and how they can be effectively tackled. That can only be done if the capitalist economics which makes such growth and consumption an inescapable part of our lives is challenged and superseded. Along the way he notes that in the last century we have lost 50 per cent of the world’s forests, up to 80 per cent of fish stocks and have seen 40 per cent of soil depleted by chemicals and over-cultivation. He challenges United Nations figures and claims rates of wealth rises and reductions of poverty are grossly exaggerated if environmental and social impacts are included in gross domestic product and if real living costs are also factored in. That shows the world is more unequal than normally assumed, a trend reinforced by neoliberal economics from the 1980s. Eight individuals now control more wealth than the poorest half of humanity. Sixty per cent of our species (4.3 billion people) lives on less than five dollars a day, his definition of poverty compared to the UN figures of one quarter that amount yielding an improving one billion people. The historical roots of these inequalities come from the expansion and imperial conquests associated with early European and later American capitalism from the 16th century. That reversed Indian and Chinese domination of world living standards and life expectancy up to the early 1800s. In the last century a skilful management of decolonisation alongside strategic interventions against radical reformist regimes like those in Iran, Ghana, Egypt and Chile from the 1950s to the 1970s ensured continuing Western control of world rules and power. Bracing alternative This is a well-argued and bracing alternative account of world development and sustainability. It adopts Edward Said’s notion of “contrapuntal thinking” to link the metropolitan core to the post-colonial periphery in thinking about power, political priorities and agency. Hickel supports degrowth strategies for the richest societies and shows there are sustainable ways to find wellbeing while abandoning unsustainable growth and consumption imperatives. Shorter working weeks, universal basic incomes, a global minimum wage and Tobin taxes on financial transactions could wean populations off them. This would not be another round of austerity but a step towards a more equal world, capable of overcoming the scarcity assumptions driving current economic orthodoxy and the capitalist power structures and legal dynamics built into them. They threaten to destroy the planet if not challenged and stopped soon.

#### 7. Their push into space via private corporations *requires* and *enforces* economic inequality, which drives neoliberalism’s dark powers- that statistically outweighs war

Richter, PhD/EMT, 15

(Roxane, *Disaster Types and their Consequences for Women* in Medical Outcasts: Gendered and Institutionalized Xenophobia in Undocumented Forced Migrant’s Emergency Health Care)

As we see above in Galtung’s “Typology of Violence" from 1969 (Table 2.1), the “need groups” may be disadvantaged to such an extent that they starve, become terminally ill from the result of illness or disease, or die. The second category. Exploitation B, leaves the underprivileged in a constant involuntary state of poverty, usually comprising malnutrition and illness. These effects all occur within and at the culmination of multifaceted social and economic structures, and obscured legislative cycles. A noted successor of Galtung’s benchmark work in structural violence, James Gilligan began a quest to look closely at the ties between structural violence and its effects on individuals' health, violent behavior, and society. As a prison psychiatrist and director of the Center for the Study of Violence at Harvard Medical School. Gilligan observed that structural violence differs from behavioral violence in three major respects: In addition to its virtual invisibility, structural violence functions more or less independently of individual behaviors: further, its problematic effects operate continuously, not just sporadically (1996). In his book Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic. James Gilligan defines structural violence as “the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted with the relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are above them” (1996, 192). Gilligan largely describes these “excess deaths” as “non-natural" and attributes them to the stress, shame, discrimination, and denigration that results from lower status. Gilligan paralleled the worldwide summations of structural violence to direct (armed conflict, military or political wars) violence thusly: Every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would he killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths: and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is. in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war. or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. .. . The question as to which of the two forms of violence—structural or behavioral—is more important, dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect. (Gilligan 1996. 195-96) When we fix and focus our view on structural violence through the lens of healthcare, we see that every country is marked by suffering, illnesses, and death, to one extent of another. But it is the distribution of the preventable and manageable illnesses and diseases in underprivileged countries that tip the scales of parity in suffering. It is these “social conditions"—these imbalances of influence—if you will, that affect and influence social justice in healthcare, and creates a poverty of lifesaving access to medication, supplies, treatment, training, and equipment to stave off human suffering from avoidable and unnecessary illness and disease. Didier Fassin in his book Humanitarian Reason quotes Margaret Lock concerning social sentiment on human suffering: “Efforts to reduce suffering have habitually focused on control and repair of individual bodies. The social origins of suffering and distress, including poverty and discrimination, even if fleetingly recognized, are set aside” (2012, 21). (24-5)

### Contention 2: A New Hope

#### 1. Big-space corporations owe much of their success to decades of public-sector R&D- relying on private space guts progress and dives to neoliberalism’s impacts

Aronoff 18

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Scientific American gawked, ​“Elon Musk Does It Again,” praising the ​“bold technological innovations and newfound operational efficiencies that allow SpaceX to not only build its rockets for less money, but also reuse them.” That view — shared by several other outlets — fits comfortably with the Tony Stark-like image Musk has crafted for himself over the years: a quirky and slightly off-kilter playboy genius inventor capable of conquering everything from outer space to the climate crisis with the sheer force of his imagination. One of Musk’s long-term goals is to create a self-sustaining colony on Mars, and make humanity an interplanetary species. He hopes to shoot two very wealthy people around the moon at some point this year. Musk has invested an awful lot of public money into making those dreams a reality. But why should Americans keep footing the bill for projects where only Musk and his wealthy friends can reap the rewards? Enter: the case for nationalizing Elon Musk, and making the U.S. government a major stakeholder in his companies. The common logic now holds that the private sector — and prodigies like Musk, in particular — are better at coming up with world-changing ideas than the public sector, which is allegedly bloated and allergic to new, outside-the-box thinking. Corporations’ hunt for profits and lack of bureaucratic constraints, it’s said, compel cutting-edge research and development in a way that the government is simply incapable of. With any hope, more of these billionaires’ breakthroughs than not will be in the public interest. The reality, as economist Mariana Mazzucato argues in her 2013 book The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths, is very different. Many of the companies that are today considered to be headed by brilliant savants — people like Steve Jobs and, yes, Elon Musk — owe much of their success to decades of public sector innovation, through repackaging technologies developed over the course of several decades into new products. Take the iPhone, essentially a collection of Defense Department research and National Science Foundation-grant projects packed into one shiny machine. “The prospect of the State owning a stake in a private corporation may be anathema to many parts of the capitalist world,” Mazzucato writes, ​“but given that governments are already investing in the private sector, they may as well earn a return on those investments.” As she notes, Musk’s future-oriented empire — Tesla Motors, SolarCity and SpaceX — has benefitted from around $5 billion in local, state and federal government support, not to mention many years of foundational public research into programs like rocket technology. SpaceX itself exists largely for the sake of competing for government contracts, like its $5.5 billion partnership with NASA and the U.S. Air Force. The U.S. Department of Energy invested directly in that company, as well as in Tesla’s work on battery technology and solar panels. The latter is perhaps the biggest success story of the Department of Energy stimulus grant that also supported Solyndra, a solar energy company reliably held up by the Right as an example of the government’s failure to make wise investment decisions. ​“Taxpayers footed the bill for Solyndra’s losses — yet got hardly any of Tesla’s profits,” Mazzucato notes. As Mazzucato finds, the private sector hasn’t done much to earn its reputation as a risk-taker. Corporations and venture capitalists often adopt conservative thinking and fall into ​“path dependency,” and are generally reluctant to invest in important early-stage research that won’t necessarily turn a profit in the short-run. This kind of research is inherently risky, and the vast majority of this kind of protean R&D (research and development) fails. For every internet — birthed in the Defense Department — there are a well over a dozen Solyndras, but it’s virtually impossible to have one without the other. The problem runs deeper still. Whereas in the past public sector research has been able to attract top-tier talent, the myth that the private sector can do what the State can’t has created a negative feedback loop whereby bright young scientists and engineers flock toward a private sector that goes on to further its reputation for being the place where the real innovation is happening. The alternative Mazzucato suggests is to socialize risk and reward alike, rather than simply allowing companies that enjoy the benefits of public innovation to funnel their profits into things like stock buybacks and tax havens — or, for that matter, flamethrowers. When companies like SpaceX make it big, they’d be obligated to return some portion of their gains to the public infrastructure that helped them succeed, expanding the government’s capacity to facilitate more innovative development. All this is not to say that there isn’t a critical role to play for people like Jobs and Musk in bringing new technology to the market. In all likelihood, Tesla’s Powerwall and SolarCity panels will play a key role in our transition off of fossil fuels. But lionizing Musk as the sole creator of the Powerwall and this week’s space launch stands to perpetuate a dangerous series of myths about who’s responsible for such cutting-edge development. Through smart supply-and-demand-side policy, states can play a crucial role in shaping and creating markets for the technologies we’ll need to navigate the 21st century. This can happen not just through R&D but also through developments like fuel efficiency standards, which encourage carmakers to prioritize vehicles that run off of renewable energy. Given the mounting reality of climate change and the necessity to rapidly switch over to a clean energy economy, there’s also a bigger question about how actively the state should be encouraging certain kinds of research and manufacturing. During World War II, the United States essentially had a planned economy: By 1945, around a quarter of manufacturing in the country was under state control. The reason for that was simple — the U.S. government saw an existential threat, and directed some of its biggest corporations to pitch in to stop it or else risk getting taken over by the state. There’s some Cold War nostalgia to hoisting shiny objects into orbit — a telegenic show of America’s technological supremacy. But it may not be much solace to coastal residents forced to flee in the coming decades, whose homes are rendered unlivable by a mixture of extreme weather and crumbling, antiquated infrastructure. And if you’ve watched any number of big-budget sci-fi productions over the last several years, it’s not hard to imagine Musk’s Martian colony spinning off into some Elysium-style eco-apartheid, where the rich — for the right price — can escape to new worlds while the rest of us make do on a planet of dystopian slums, swamps and deserts. Today, the risk posed by climate change is greater still than that posed by fascism on the eve of World War II, threatening to bring about a planet that’s uninhabitable for humans, and plenty hostile to them in the meantime. In such a context, do we need to launch cars into space? Maybe not. If the public sector is going to continue footing the bill for Elon Musk’s fantasies, though, he should at least have to give back some credit, and a cut of the profits.

#### 2. Assumptions on capitalism make it easier to imagine *the end of the world* than the *end of capitalism*. We need a progressive series of steps that redefine political economy and space is a crucial starting point- it’s where neoliberalism’s ultimate *spacial fix* will occur- *.* The end of capitalism is necessary

Robinson and O’Keefe 20

(ABOUT THE AUTHOR Kim Stanley Robinson is the author of more than twenty books, including New York 2140, Red Moon, and the Mars trilogy. ABOUT THE INTERVIEWER Derrick O’Keefe is a cofounder and editor of Ricochet Media and is the author of Michael Ignatieff: The Lesser Evil? and A Woman Among Warlords, coauthored with Afghanistan’s Malalai Joya. Derrick is a longtime political organizer in Vancouver, BC. <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/10/kim-stanley-robinson-ministry-future-science-fiction>, 10-22)

DOK I wanted to ask you about the now-famous quote attributed to Jameson, which is actually a bit of a paraphrase: “It is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism.” It strikes me this book is coming out in a year when it’s become pretty easy to imagine the end of things, and that the real challenge is to imagine the beginnings of some kind of socialist system. As much as The Ministry is about the future, it suggests that those beginnings we need are already here with us now and that it’s really a matter of scaling up some of those alternatives. KSR I’m a novelist, I’m a literature major. I’m not thinking up these ideas, I’m listening to the world and grasping — sometimes at straws, sometimes just grasping at new ideas and seeing what everybody is seeing. If we could institute some of these good ideas, we could quickly shift from a capitalism to a post-capitalism that is more sustainable and more socialist, because so many of the obvious solutions are contained in the socialist program. And if we treated the biosphere as part of our extended body that needs to be attended to and taken care of, then things could get better fast, and there are already precursors that demonstrate this possibility. I don’t think it’s possible to postulate a breakdown, or a revolution, to an entirely different system that would work without mass disruption and perhaps blowback failures, so it’s better to try to imagine a stepwise progression from what we’ve got now to a better system. And by the time we’re done — I mean, “done” is the wrong word — but by the end of the century, we might have a radically different system than the one we’ve got now. And this is kind of necessary if we’re going to survive without disaster. So, since it’s necessary, it might happen. And I’m always looking for the plausible models that already exist and imagining that they get ramped up. DOK The cooperative economy of Mondragon, in the Basque region, comes up as one such model in a number of your books. And in The Ministry, there is the example of Kerala, because India is so central to the book’s action as a leader of the transition to dramatic climate action. KSR I’m very interested in both these examples. I’ve actually never been to either region, but I’ve got contacts in both. In Mondragon, they are aware of me as an American science fiction writer who likes them, because my Mars trilogy books are translated into Spanish and do quite well in Spain. With Kerala, I’ve been studying it for twenty, twenty-five years. Like, why is it different and how is it different? Could it be a tail-wagging-dog situation for the rest of India? And so on. I did put places that I’ve been in the novel, because I needed some anchoring points — principally Zurich [where the titular ministry is headquartered]. My wife and I lived in Zurich for years, and I finally managed to put that into fiction, which was a great pleasure. But as for the rest of the world, and for these kinds of leftist precursors, or already existing leftist states that are at a regional or town level, I’ve often thought to myself, “Is there any reason that these can’t be taken as models?” Is there any real reason — since obviously there are ideological reasons; if you’re a defender of capitalism per se, then you would say these are outliers of sorts or too small to be relevant — but if you’re a leftist, you look at them and see the public support for what they’re doing, and you ask, “Why couldn’t that work at a larger scale?” Especially if you’re trying to imagine futures that are working better, which is what a utopian science fiction writer does, then you’re kind of desperate for real world-models. DOK When I originally heard the synopsis for this book, it struck me immediately as something like an ecosocialist Looking Backward 2000–1887. The main character in that work by Edward Bellamy had fallen asleep for over a century and then woke up in a sort of post-capitalist utopia in the year 2000. In contrast, The Ministry is more about the journey to 2050 or so, a world that is very different from today both economically and politically. How do you situate this work, and your work more broadly, within the utopian tradition? KSR Well, Bellamy’s is a good book to think about, because it had an impact in the real world. There were Bellamy clubs, and the whole progressive movement was energized by Looking Backward. I’ve steeped myself in the utopian tradition. It’s not a big body of literature, it’s easy to read the best hits of the utopian tradition. You could make a list, I mean roughly twenty or twenty-five books would be the highlights of the entire four hundred years, which is a little shocking. And maybe there’s more out there that hasn’t stayed in the canon. But if you talk about the utopian canon, it’s quite small — it’s interesting, it has its habits, its problems, its gaps. Famously, from Thomas More (Utopia) on, there’s been a gap in the history — the utopia is separated by space or time, by a disjunction. They call it the Great Trench. In Utopia, they dug a great trench across the peninsula so that their peninsula became an island. And the Great Trench is endemic in utopian literature. There’s almost always a break that allows the utopian society to be implemented and to run successfully. I’ve never liked that because one connotation of the word “utopian” is unreality, in the sense that it’s “never going to happen.” So we have to fill in this trench. When Jameson said it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism, I think what he was talking about is that missing bridge from here to there. It’s hard to imagine a positive history, but it’s not impossible. And now, yes, it’s easy to imagine the end of the world because we are at the start of a mass extinction event. But he’s talking about hegemony, and a kind of Marxist reading of history, and the kind of Gramscian notion that everybody’s in the mindset that capitalism is reality itself and that there can never be any other way — so it’s hard to imagine the end of capitalism. But I would just flip it and say, it’s hard to imagine how we get to a better system. Imagining the better system isn’t that hard; you just make up some rules about how things should work. You could even say socialism is that kind of utopian imaginary. Let’s just do it this way, a kind of society of mutual aid. And I would agree with anyone who says, “Well, that’s a good system.” The interesting thing, and also the new stories to tell if you’re a science fiction novelist, if you’re any kind of novelist — almost every story’s been told a few times — but the story of getting to a new and better social system, that’s almost an empty niche in our mental ecology. So I’ve been throwing myself into that attempt. It’s hard, but it’s interesting. Homo Economicus Is a Fraud DOK Amidst and between all the action of The Ministry, there are some polemics carried out, is that fair to say? One recurrent polemic is against mainstream economics, a theme running throughout the book that there’s a need for new metrics and new indices both to quantify the biosphere and to express what we truly value rather than just GDP and the stock market. KSR There is a polemic for sure. First, I would want to make a distinction between economics and political economy, because by and large, economics as it’s practiced now is the study of capitalism. It takes the axioms of capitalism as givens and then tries to work from those to various ameliorations and tweaks to the system that would make for a better capitalism, but they doesn’t question the fundamental axioms: everybody’s in it for themselves, everybody pursues their own self-interest, which will produce the best possible outcomes for everybody. These axioms are highly questionable, and they come out of the eighteenth century or are even older, and they don’t match with modern social science or history itself in terms of how we behave, and they don’t value the natural biosphere properly, and they tend to encourage short-term extractive gain and short-term interests. These are philosophical positions that are expressed as though they are fixed or are nature itself, when in reality they are made by culture. Political economy is a kind of nineteenth-century thing, a more open-ended idea where we could have different systems. And that accounts for a lot of the struggles of the twentieth century. But capitalism likes to pretend that it’s nature itself, and that’s what economics is today, largely. Take the term “efficiency.” In capitalist economics, that’s just regarded as almost a synonym for “good,” but it completely depends on what the efficiency is being aimed at. You know, machine guns are efficient, gas chambers are efficient. So, “efficiency” as such does not mean “good.” It is a measure of the least amount of effort put in for the most amount gotten out. One of the things you’re seeing during the pandemic is that the global system of creating masks is efficient, but it is also fragile, brittle, and unreliable because redundancy, robustness, and resilience are all relatively inefficient, if the only rubric of efficiency is profit. Capitalist economics misunderstands and misjudges the world badly, and that’s why we’re in the mess we’re in — caught between biosphere degradation and radical social inequality. These are both natural results of capitalism as such, a result of the economic calculations we make under capitalist axioms. Distinctions have to be made here. Quantification is really part of science. Social science has some tools for understanding and generalizing from the particulars of individuals to what the group might want. Twenty-five years ago, I might have said, “Economics, we have to throw it out.” That doesn’t hold for me anymore. Economics has a set of tools. And social science tools, working with the right axioms, could make for a socialist economics. There could be a post-capitalist economic system. But what you’re then talking about is a different political economy. That’s one of the things The Ministry is about. Can you morph, by stages, from the political economy that we’re in now, which is neoliberal capitalism, to what you might call anti-austerity, to a return to Keynesianism, and then beyond that to social democracy, and then beyond that to democratic socialism, and then beyond that to a post-capitalist system that might be a completely new invention that we don’t have a name for? Right-wing thinking is supremely hypocritical and convoluted and self-contradictory, and that needs to be pushed on and pointed out at every chance. This is why I hold myself to calling it “post-capitalism,” so as not to try and define it by any of the nineteenth-century political economies. I think many of the solutions can be found in socialism, but I don’t call myself a socialist. I would want to keep it a little more open to the idea that we have to morph capitalism as such, and that we might shove it to the margins, where we might have a market for the non-necessities. I think the market itself has to be reexamined, and this is so fundamental to the way that modern society works that it’s frightening, and, for me, it’s better to think in a stepwise fashion and to imagine society from where we are now transforming to an undefined better political economy. Planetary Heat Death or the End of Capitalism — We Can Choose DOK One of the axioms of that better political economy is expressed in The Ministry as “Public ownership of the necessities, and real political representation” — two things together that we are far from having, by greater or lesser degrees, really almost everywhere today. A key part of getting from here to there, to a new political economy, involves the question of finance. In New York 2140, one of your characters is a Wall Street trader speculating on intertidal markets, and much of the action concerns finance and the banks. In The Ministry, even more radical measures are contemplated for putting finance at the service of a livable, non-submerged future. Where did you get the inspiration for Carbon Quantitative Easing and the rest of the transformation of finance imagined in this book? KSR Carbon Quantitative Easing is not my idea. I really am just a listening facility here, trying to amplify ideas. That one is out there. Recently, even Lawrence Summers — who was the treasury secretary for Bill Clinton and a neoliberal of the first order — and his think tank have been putting out stuff about some kind of CQE. So it’s been spreading quickly as an idea, and I’m glad. But in the years since I wrote New York 2140, I learned more about the central banks and realized that nationalizing the banks, which happens in 2140, wouldn’t be going far enough. It would be great if all banks were owned by the people, and if banks were not private profit-making enterprises, that would be great — but it would only be one step along the way; it would not be enough. Because, at this point, central banks are only concerned with stabilizing money and maybe helping employment levels, and they will not do anything else unless they are under enormous pressure. They need to be changed, and that’s a lot of what this novel’s about. Changing the way we regard money, that would be a step toward post-capitalism right there. If money was created from scratch but not given to the banks to loan to whatever they wanted but given to decarbonization projects first, then flowing out into the general economy — the first spending money by governments, which make money in the first place, would be targeted toward decarbonization efforts. This strikes me as a good idea, a necessary idea. Because saving the biosphere doesn’t make a profit in the capitalist order, we will never do it, and we are therefore doomed. So a very fundamental reform of how we regard money itself is absolutely necessary. I’m saying that a post-capitalist political economy that regards money as created for the public good and is spent on that first — and then trickles into the general economy — is a fundamental shift, and without it, we’re in terrible trouble. DOK A lot of the action takes place in Switzerland, as you mentioned, because many of the main characters are members of the Ministry of the Future headquartered in Zurich. Do you worry that your story could evoke right-wing tropes like the globalist, world government bogeyman that nationalists talk about to avoid action on climate change? KSR Well, maybe so, but I would say the Left has to fight fire with fire. Right-wing ideas are also conceptions of globalization, in terribly poor disguises as being nationalist. But the nationalist system is embedded in capitalism; it’s just completely international and global. These right-wingers, if they could make an extra dime an hour by selling out national citizens by sending their industries to China or India — they’d do it in a second, and they already have. So they need to be called out for being completely inconsistent and hypocritical. And the Left needs to be much more aggressive on that, and say the problem is not globalization per se; the problem is bad globalization, which is capitalism, as opposed to good globalization, which is mutual aid and cooperation among the nation states by way of international treaties and things like the UN. The Paris Agreement is crucial. It’s a major event in world history. It could turn into the League of Nations, in which case we’re screwed. Or it could turn into something new in history, a way to decarbonize without playing the zero-sum game of nation against nation. So all this needs to be fought at the level of the discursive battle, and no concessions can be made on that point. I mean, right-wing thinking is supremely hypocritical and convoluted and self-contradictory, and that needs to be pushed on and pointed out at every chance — these supposed nationalists are also going to sell you out. This discursive battle, it’s very important. DOK You talked about the Great Trench, of how we get from here to there, and it strikes me that this book is very grounded. There’s no reference to a lunar colony, let alone to any Elon Musk Inc. version of Mars, and there’s no mention of off-planet gated communities like in the film Elysium. Does this absence imply that saving the earth, or transitioning to a livable system, requires stopping the capitalist colonization of space? I kept waiting for an Elon Musk character. KSR Well, since there are 106 chapters — I guess that I could have made it 107, and I could have talked about that. But maybe the absence does speak louder than words. All of those things are fantasies, and billionaire fantasy trips are not going anywhere. In Red Moon and Aurora, I’ve made my statement about what’s possible and what isn’t. Because in the capitalist world, you have to make a profit, and even the billionaires don’t have enough money to properly fund these ventures on their own. So they talk about asteroid mining — that’s bullshit. They talk about Helium-3 mining on the moon — that’s bullshit. There is no profit in space. It’s just a fantasy of our culture right now, because everybody’s been convinced by science fiction writers [laughs], and they’re not paying attention to the numbers game, I guess. I believe in space science. I’m totally in love with NASA, and with public space science, as part of government. There’s this saying of NASA’s, “space science is Earth science,” and I totally believe that.

#### 3. There is no such thing as “space philanthropy”- private actors are interested in self promotion, not saving humanity- their efforts directly gut government programs to allow market capture and “saving the world” is just a facade

Riederer 18

(RACHEL <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/07/space-barons-review-elon-musk-bezos-thai-cave>, 7-19)

It is impossible for any reader living through the ravages of global warming to scan these sentiments without skepticism. If someone is going to invest enormous amounts of wealth and time in an engineering project, gathering together some of the smartest scientists on the planet to develop and test creative solutions to an intractable problem, in the interest of saving the future of humanity, how could you choose any focus but climate change? Davenport doesn’t ask, taking at face value the space barons’ declarations that they are motivated by planetary rescue. For those interested in the movement to privatize space exploration and space itself, The Space Barons does serve as a useful primer, laying out the timelines and geneses of these companies. But it stops short of posing critical questions about what it means for such enterprises to be privately held — a line of questioning that, given the history of labor problems and tendencies toward monopolization at the barons’ non-space companies Amazon and Tesla, might be very good questions to ask indeed. It instead leans heavily on colorful anecdotes about the companies’ founders and their philosophies. Bezos, obsessed with the accomplishments of NASA ever since he watched the moon landing at the age of five, commissions an underwater search party to recover the Apollo-era Saturn V rocket engines from the floor of the Atlantic. Branson evangelizes about the “life-changing” effects of experiencing space and trains for spaceflight in a spinning centrifuge, declaring the adventure “rather fun.” A young Musk floats an idea for a Martian greenhouse project straight out of the sci-fi of Kim Stanley Robinson, “a P.T. Barnum-like stunt” in which he would launch a greenhouse full of seeds and growing medium onto the surface of Mars and make the red planet bloom. A more seasoned Musk sues the US Air Force for the right to compete for national-security launches alongside established aerospace contractors like Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Running through all of these engineering and business adventures is the rivalry between Bezos and Musk. Both are working toward the same goal: developing and producing rockets that can be reused on multiple flights, making regular spaceflight more efficient. When SpaceX successfully launched — and then re-landed — the Falcon 9 for the first time, in December of 2015, Musk was ecstatic. Until he saw a tweet from Bezos offering his congratulations and saying “Welcome to the club!” Bezos had done the same, with his rocket, the New Shepard, the month before. Musk took the success of the Falcon 9 as validation of his long-term goals. “It really quite dramatically improves my confidence that a city on Mars is possible,” he said. “That’s what this is all about.” Well, it’s part of what this is all about. The desire to be beloved, to be seen as a great visionary rescuer, is what’s so grating about Musk’s recent public announcements of altruism, and it’s present throughout the history of all of the companies profiled in The Space Barons. In addition to amassing billions of dollars in personal wealth and living out their rocket-launching boyhood dreams, the space barons insist on framing their pursuits as inspirational and civic-minded. The tension in the recent dust-up over Musk’s unused Thai-cave rescue pods isn’t about whether Musk and his engineers created the rescue pods, but why. Was it a good-faith effort to help a group of desperate kids, or a megalomaniacal attempt to place himself and his companies at the center of a giant news story? Musk wants the answer to be simple, defending his behavior by insisting that “something’s messed up if this is not a good thing.” The space barons are fond of metaphors of exploration and frontiers. They compare themselves to Shackleton and Magellan. “The thing that actually gets me the most excited about it,” Musk says, “is that I just think it’s the grandest adventure I could possibly imagine. It’s the most exciting thing — I couldn’t think of anything more exciting, more fun, more inspiring than to have a base on Mars.” This enthusiasm is fine, of course. But it also shatters the notion that Musk and companies are trying to thrust humanity into space to save us all from planetary disaster. Outer space, a flooded network of caves — anywhere dangerous and sparsely visited will draw to it both adventurers and rescuers. But their work proceeds differently, and someone who’s out for a grand adventure shouldn’t pretend to be a planetary EMT. Perhaps the worst thing about the space barons is that they’re burnishing their reputation by rushing into areas vacated by state divestment — divestment that in many cases, they themselves have helped promote. Witness Musk’s recent pledge to “fund fixing the water in any house in Flint that has water contamination” while lavishly contributing to the Republican Party. Musk and his brethren have hoovered up billions of dollars, funded plutocratic causes — and then balk when anyone raises a peep about their narcissistic antics. “They were driven by the business opportunities in space, by adventure, and by ego,” Davenport writes of the group he profiles. “[I]magine the Promethean legacies they’d leave after opening up the Final Frontier.” Yet Promethean legacy is a double-edge sword: the trickster who stole fire from the gods and gave it to mankind is as much a symbol of tragic consequences as of human progress.

#### Thus I affirm the resolution: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

### Contention 3: Framing

#### My criterion is the elimination of structural violence.

#### The impact of structural violence cumulatively outweighs – challenging the structures that facilitate inequality is necessary

Ansell 17- David A. Ansell, Senior Vice President, Associate Provost for Community Health Equity, and Michael E. Kelly Professor of Medicine at Rush University Medical Center (The Death Gap: How Inequality Kills, p. 7-10)

There are many different kinds of violence. Some are obvious: punches, attacks, gunshots, explosions. These are the kinds of inter- personal violence that we tend to hear about in the news. Other kinds of violence are intimate and emotional. But the deadliest and most thoroughgoing kind of violence is woven into the fabric of American society. It exists when some groups have more access to goods, resources, and opportunities than other groups, including health and life itself. This violence delivers specific blows against particular bodies in particular neighborhoods. This unequal advantage and violence is built into the very rules that govern our society. In the absence of this violence, large numbers of Americans would be able to live fuller and longer lives. This kind of violence is called structural violence, because it is embedded in the very laws, policies, and rules that govern day-to- day life.8 It is the cumulative impact of laws and social and economic policies and practices that render some Americans less able to access resources and opportunities than others. This inequity of advantage is not a result of the individuals personal abilities but is built into the systems that govern society. Often it is a product of racism, gender, and income inequality. The diseases and premature mortality that Windora and many of my patients experienced were, in the words of Dr. Paul Farmer, "biological reflections of social fault lines."9 As a result of these fault lines, a disproportional burden of illness, suffering, and premature mortality falls on certain neighborhoods, like Windora's. Structural violence can overwhelm an individual's ability to live a free, unfettered, healthy life. As I ran to evaluate Windora, I knew that her stroke was caused in part by lifelong exposure to suffering, racism, and economic deprivation. Worse, the poverty of West Humboldt Park that contributed to her illness is directly and inextricably related to the massive concentration of wealth and power in other neighborhoods just miles away in Chicago's Gold Coast and suburbs. That concentration of wealth could not have occurred without laws, policies, and practices that favored some at the expense of others. Those laws, policies, and practices could not have been passed or enforced if access to political and economic power had not been concentrated in the hands of a few. Yet these political and economic structures have become so firmly entrenched (in habits, social relations, economic arrangements, institutional practices, law, and policy) that they have become part of the matrix of American society. The rules that govern day-to-day life were written to benefit a small elite at the expense of people like Windora and her family. These rules and structures are powerful destructive forces. The same structures that render life predictable, secure, comfortable, and pleasant for many destroy the lives of others like Windora through suffering, poverty, ill health, and violence. These structures are neither natural nor neutral. The results of structural violence can be very specific. In Windora's case, stroke precursors like chronic stress, poverty, and uncontrolled hypertension run rampant in neighborhoods like hers. Windora's ill- ness was caused by neither her cultural traits nor the failure of her will. Her stroke was caused in part by inequity. She is one of the lucky ones, though, because even while structural violence ravages her neighbor- hood, it also abets the concentration of expensive stroke-intervention services in certain wealthy teaching hospitals like mine. If I can get to her in time, we can still help her. Income Inequality and Life Inequality Of course, Windora is not the only person struggling on account of structural violence. Countless neighborhoods nationwide are suffering from it, and people are dying needlessly young as a result. The mag- nitude of this excess mortality is mind-boggling. In 2009 my friend Dr. Steve Whitman asked a simple question, "How many extra black people died in Chicago each year, just because they do not have the same health outcomes as white Chicagoans?" When the Chicago Sun- Times got wind of his results, it ran them on the front page in bold white letters on a black background: "health care gap kills 3200 Black Chicagoans and the Gap is Growing." The paper styled the head- line to look like the declaration of war that it should have been. In fact, we did find ourselves at war not long ago, when almost 3,000 Americans were killed. That was September 11,2001. That tragedy propelled the country to war. Yet when it comes to the premature deaths of urban Americans, no disaster area has been declared. No federal troops have been called up. No acts of Congress have been passed. Yet this disaster is even worse: those 3,200 black people were in Chicago alone, in just one year. Nationwide each year, more than 60,000 black people die prematurely because of inequality.10 While blacks suffer the most from this, it is not just an issue of racism, though racism has been a unique and powerful transmitter of violence in America for over four hundred years.11 Beyond racism, poverty and income inequality perpetuated by exploitative market capitalism are singular agents of transmission of disease and early death. As a result, there is a new and alarming pattern of declining life expectancy among white Americans as well. Deaths from drug overdoses in young white Americans ages 25 to 34 have exploded to levels not seen since the AIDS epidemic. This generation is the first since the Vietnam War era to experience higher death rates than the prior generation.12 White Americans ages 45 to 54 have experienced skyrocketing premature death rates as well, something not seen in any other developed na- tion.13 White men in some Appalachian towns live on average twenty years less than white men a half-day's drive away in the suburbs of Washington, DC. Men in McDowell County, West Virginia, can look forward to a life expectancy only slightly better than that of Haitians.14 But those statistics reflect averages, and every death from structural violence is a person. When these illnesses and deaths are occurring one at a time in neighborhoods that society has decided not to care about—neighborhoods populated by poor, black, or brown people— they seem easy to overlook, especially if you are among the fortunate few who are doing incredibly well. The tide of prosperity in America has lifted some boats while others have swamped. Paul Farmer, the physician-anthropologist who founded Partners in Health, an inter- national human rights agency, reflects on the juxtaposition of "unprecedented bounty and untold penury": "It stands to reason that as beneficiaries of growing inequality, we do not like to be reminded of misery of squalor and failure. Our popular culture provides us with no shortage of anesthesia."15 That people suffer and die prematurely because of inequality is wrong. It is wrong from an ethical perspective. It is wrong from a fair- ness perspective. And it is wrong because we have the means to fix it.

#### Vote aff to prioritize the slow violence and everyday war against disenfranchised populations. You are conditioned to discount structural violence because it occurs outside of traditional risk frames, which normalizes state-sanctioned violence.

Hunt 18

(Dallas Hunt, PhD Candidate, University of British Columbia, Canada., Chapter 10 “Of course they count, but not right now”: Regulating precarity in Lee Maracle’s Ravensong and Celia’s Song, in Biopolitical Disaster Edited by Jennifer L. Lawrence and Sarah Marie Wiebe, 2018 Routledge, JKS)

“There is a hierarchy to care”: theoretical concerns and applications

In Frames of War (an extension and preoccupation with similar issues she outlines in her text Precarious Life), Judith Butler focuses on the ways in which particular, violent perceptions of everyday life are normalized and propagated as legible or granted “intelligibility” (through numbers, statistics, etc.). According to Butler, Frames of War follows on from Precarious Life ... especially its suggestion that specific lives cannot be apprehended as living. If certain lives do not qualify as lives or are, from the start, not conceivable as lives within certain epistemological frames, then these lives are never lived nor lost in the full sense. (2010: 1) For Butler, then, a primary concern is how these intelligibilities allow “a state to wage its wars without instigating a popular revolt” (xvi). Although Butler is writing within the context of the Iraq War and the “War on Terror,” her insights on precarity and modes of state violence exceed their immediate rele- vance. Indeed, as is clear below, the notions of war and settler-colonialism and the biopolitical rationalities they allow are eminently applicable to a local, Canadian context. The frames of war, Butler argues, are not circumscribed to combat zones with the mobilization of weapons. Instead, to Butler, “perceptual weapons” are acting on populations consistently to naturalize violences and enlist citizens to tacitly consent to (and, in some cases, actively participate in) violent forms that authorize dehumanization: “[w]aging war ... begins with the assault on the senses; the senses are the first target of war” (xvi). These perceptual violences resonate with Rob Nixon’s formulation of “slow violence” as well. To Nixon, slow violence is “a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all” (2011: 3). Further, and “[c]rucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded” (4). Conditioning the senses or what is intelligible, then, functions as the way in which state violences are legitimized, as the frames of war dictate the “sensuous parameters of reality itself” (ix). According to Butler, the task at hand is not only to “understand ... these frames, where they come from and what kind of action they perform” (2010: 83), but also to find and articulate “those modes of representation and appearance that allow the claim of life to be made and heard” (81). While Butler is exam- ining conditions of precarity, (in)security, and disposability in the context of “the War on Terror,” and Palestine–Israel, her examination of an imperial/ colonial power exerting force and enacting violence on vulnerable and racialized populations (and in the process producing and reproducing these vulnerable populations) can be fruitfully employed in the Canadian context, though not without some alteration. Although we may not perceive the more mundane, i.e. non-military, violences visited upon Indigenous communities as “war” strictly speaking, Sora Han’s oft-cited phrase that we must think of the United States (and settler-colonial nations more broadly) not “at war” but “as war” is useful here (cited in Simpson 2014: 153, emphasis in original). If we view the biopolitical man- agement of Indigenous populations and Indigenous territories as rationalities rooted in the organizing frame of settler-colonialism, then the states of emer- gency putatively thought to be produced through war are “structural, not eventful” – that is to say, war is the very condition of settler-colonialism and not a by-product of it (154). Indeed, the largest ever domestic deployment of military forces in North America took place within Canada, in the context of the so-called “Oka crisis.” As Audra Simpson writes, the “highest number of troops in the history of Indigenous-settler relations in North America was deployed to Kanehsatà:ke, as this was the most unambiguous form of exceptional relations, that of warfare. There were 2,650 soldiers deployed...” (2014: 152). And, as Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz and others have noted, Western imperial powers still refer to “enemy territories” abroad as “Indian Country” and to “wanted terrorists” as “Geronimo” (2014: 56). I follow the lineages of these Indigenous theorists who view settler-colonialism as a kind of permanent war, drawing parallels between the so-called everyday violences (displacement, sexual violence) inflicted upon Indigenous peoples in the US and Canada and the death-delivering reaches of empire embodied by the West more globally. Or, to echo Mink, the transformer/shapeshifter narrating the events in Mara- cle’s Celia’s Song: “This is war” (2014: 9). For Butler, there are varying tactics for distributing “precarity” differently, or what she describes as “that politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of support,” producing a “maximized precariousness for populations ... who often have no other option than to appeal to the very state from which they need protec- tion” (2010: 26). In the depictions provided in her writing, as well as that of Maracle, violence is deployed not only as “an effort to minimize precarious- ness for some and to maximize it for others,” but also as a mode of shaping the perceptions of citizens in order to make such acts legible, and hence, in a sense justifiable (Butler 2010: 54). Ultimately what Butler is advocating for is a new ethico-political orientation, one with the potential to disrupt the violent regimes of the sensible, as well as the ways in which precarity is currently allocated and distributed. Paraphrasing Jacques Rancière, Jeff Derksen also advocates for political movements that disrupt “regimes of the sensible”: “a politics of the aesthetic could ... redistribute and rethink the possibility of the subject (potentially an isolated figure) within the present and within a com- munity to come” (2009: 73). In sum, Butler’s text illustrates the ways in which State-sanctioned (and induced) precarity “perpetuate[s] a way of dividing lives into those that are worth defending, valuing, and grieving when they are lost, and those that are not quite lives” (2010: 42), as well as the resistive practices that might disrupt the naturalization of “differential distribution[s] of pre- carity” (xxv). The remainder of the chapter considers to what extent Mara- cle’s texts offer such a disruption of the mundane frames of settler-colonial war within the context of an exceptional moment (an epidemic), and asks how her work gestures toward the alternatives that might be offered by Indigenous frames.

#### 1AR theory –

#### A] AFF gets it because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible

#### B] Drop the debater – the short 1AR irreparably skewed from abuse on substance and time investment on theory

#### C] No RVIs – the 6-minute 2nr can collapse to a short shell and get away with infinite 1nc abuse via sheer brute force and time spent on theory

#### D] 1AR theory first –the 2NR has time to win multiple layers but the time crunched 2AR needs to be able to collapse to one

#### Reasonable aff interps— there are multiple T interps the 1NC can read, like spec good bad, which the aff will always violate — if our interp is okay, you should default to substance

### Presumption

#### This argument is nuts- we only have to defend the resolution and not anything more- it’s not like we have to “solve anything” we just have to prove the resolution is bad

#### 1] Voting aff does do something- it means that we have defended the resolution- that private entities are bad

#### 2] We don’t have to solve for all of capitalism- but extending it to space is a bad idea that has real world impacts- capitalism relies on moving to space to aid its spatial fix and we are saying that’s bad

#### 3] We do control root cause- capitalist ways of exploring space are bad

#### 4] NASA is not being able to do things b/c of its lack of funding- private companies are taking that up

#### 5] We aren’t reading any planks so I don’t know what any of this means in terms of applying to us- we don’t have to defend shifting means to the public sector, we only have to prove private is bad

# 1AR

## Case

#### Capitalism is in the midst of a crisis- it’s dependent on a spatial fix in which its problems need to move to various places, space is this final destination that billionares want to go to but we should not allow capitalism to continue surviving- it drives inequality, these billionaires only care about profit and dominance that doesn’t help anybody but them

### Framework

#### They say pleasure and pain are crucial but that means we win under that framework since we are decreasing struc violence

#### Large-scale threats of future suffering collapse ethics and create a form of temporal blackmail where we are willing to sacrifice urgent bodies now for the sake of magnitude. Instead, you should refuse that bribery and prioritize what cannot wait.

Olson 15 (Elizabeth, professor of geography and global studies at UNC Chapel Hill, ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting and Urgency,’ Progress in Human Geography, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526)

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the body is increasingly set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially large-scale future events of forecasted suffering. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can distort moral reasoning. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be bypassed because there are bigger scales to worry about:¶ What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that they necessitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006)¶ In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the urgency to secure the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as impulsive and thus requiring management. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). Bodies that are currently suffering cannot be urgent, because they are excluded from the potential collectivity that could be suffering everywhere in some future time. Similar bypassin

g of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014).¶ As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized, the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency is a ‘built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. The urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city.¶ In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency, the urgent body becomes literally nonsense, a non sequitur within societies, states and worlds that will always be more urgent.¶ If the important ethical work of urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes, ‘waiting … produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010: 186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and open than urgency.¶ In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its

#### Our impact outweighs on probability and magnitude – risk assessment is epistemologically biased towards white masculine elites who discount the severity of everyday localized violence in destroying marginalized populations.

Verchick 96 [Robert, Assistant Professor, University of Missouri -- Kansas City School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1989, “IN A GREENER VOICE: FEMINIST THEORY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE” 19 Harv. Women's L.J. 23]

Because risk assessment is based on statistical measures of risk, policymakers view it as an accurate and objective tool in establishing environmental standards. n275 The scientific process used to assess risk purports to focus single-mindedly on only one feature of a potential injury: the objective probability of its occurrence. n276 Risk assessors, who consider most value judgments irrelevant in determining statistical risk, seek to banish them at every stage. n277 As a result, the language of risk assessment -- and of related environmental safety standards -- often carry an air of irrebuttable precision and certainty. The EPA, for example, defines the standard acceptable level of risk under Superfund as "10<-6>" -- that is, the probability that one person in a million would develop cancer due to exposure to site contamination. n278 [\*76] Feminism challenges this model of scientific risk assessment on at least three levels. First, feminism questions the assumption that scientific inquiry is value-neutral, that is, free of societal bias or prejudice. n279 Indeed, as many have pointed out, one's perspective unavoidably influences the practice of science. n280 Western science may be infused with its own ideology, perpetuating, in the view of the ecofeminists, cycles of discrimination, domination, and exploitation. n281 Second, even if scientific inquiry by itself were value-neutral, environmental regulation based on such inquiry would still contain subjective elements. Environmental regulation, like any other product of democracy, inevitably reflects elements of subjectivity, compromise, and self-interest. The technocratic language of regulation serves only to "mask, not eliminate, political and social considerations." n282 We have already seen how the subjective decision to prefer white men as subjects for epidemiological study can skew risk assessments against the interests of women and people of color. The focus of many assessments on the risk of cancer deaths, but not, say, the risks of birth defects or miscarriages, is yet another example of how a policymaker's subjective decision of what to look for can influence what is ultimately seen. n283 Once risk data are collected and placed in a statistical form, the ultimate translation of that information into rules and standards of conduct once again reflects value judgments. A safety threshold of one in a million or a preference for "best conventional technology" does not spring from the periodic table, but rather evolves from the application [\*77] of human experience and judgment to scientific information. Whose experience? Whose judgment? Which information? These are the questions that feminism prompts, and they will be discussed shortly. Finally, feminists would argue that questions involving the risk of death and disease should not even aspire to value neutrality. Such decisions -- which affect not only today's generations, but those of the future -- should be made with all related political and moral considerations plainly on the table. n284 In addition, policymakers should look to all perspectives, especially those of society's most vulnerable members, to develop as complete a picture of the moral issues as possible. Debates about scientific risk assessment and public values often appear as a tug of war between the "technicians," who would apply only value-neutral criteria to set regulatory standards, and the "public," who demand that psychological perceptions and contextual factors also be considered. n285 Environmental justice advocates, strongly concerned with the practical experiences of threatened communities, argue convincingly for the latter position. n286 A feminist critique of the issue, however, suggests that the debate is much richer and more complicated than a bipolar view allows. For feminists, the notion of value neutrality simply does not exist. The debate between technicians and the public, according to feminists, is not merely a contest between science and feelings, but a broader discussion about the sets of methods, values, and attitudes to which each group subscribes. Furthermore, feminists might argue, the parties to this discussion divide into more than two categories. Because one's world view is premised on many things, including personal experience, one might expect that subgroups within either category might differ in significant ways from other subgroups. Therefore, feminists would anticipate a broad spectrum of views concerning scientific risk assessment and public values. Intuitively, this makes sense. Certainly scientists disagree among themselves about the hazards of nuclear waste, ozone depletion, and global warming. n287 Many critics have argued that scientists, despite their allegiance [\*78] to rational method, are nonetheless influenced by personal and political views. n288 Similarly, members of the public are a widely divergent group. One would not be surprised to see politicians, land developers, and blue-collar workers disagreeing about environmental standards for essentially non-scientific reasons. Politicians and bureaucrats are two sets of the non-scientific community that affect environmental standards in fundamental ways. Their adherence to vocal, though not always broadly representative, constituencies may lead them to disfavor less advantaged socioeconomic groups when addressing environmental concern

s. n289 In order to understand a diversity of risk perception and to see how attitudes and social status affect the risk assessment process, we must return to the feminist inquiry that explores the relationship between attitudes and identity. 1. The Diversity of Risk Perception A recent national survey, conducted by James Flynn, Paul Slovic, and C.K. Mertz, measured the risk perceptions of a group of 1512 people that included numbers of men, women, whites, and non-whites proportional to their ratios in society. n290 Respondents answered questions about the health risks of twenty-five environmental, technological, and "life-style" hazards, including such hazards as ozone depletion, chemical waste, and cigarette smoking. n291 The researchers asked them to rate each hazard as posing "almost no health risk," a "slight health risk," a "moderate health risk," or a "high health risk." The researchers then analyzed [\*79] the responses to determine whether the randomly selected groups of white men, white women, non-white men, and non-white women differed in any way. The researchers found that perceptions of risk generally differed on the lines of gender and race. Women, for instance, perceived greater risk from most hazards than did men. n292 Furthermore, non-whites as a group perceived greater risk from most hazards than did whites. n293 Yet the most striking results appeared when the researchers considered differences in gender and race together. They found that "white males tended to differ from everyone else in their attitudes and perceptions -- on average, they perceived risks as much smaller and much more acceptable than did other people." n294 Indeed, without exception, the pool of white men perceived each of the twenty-five hazards as less risky than did non-white men, white women, or non-white women. n295 Wary that other factors associated with gender or race could be influencing their findings, the researchers later conducted several multiple regression analyses to correct for differences in income, education, political orientation, the presence of children in the home, and age, among others. Yet even after all corrections, "gender, race, and 'white male' [status] remained highly significant predictors" of perceptions of risk. n296 2. Explaining the Diversity From a feminist perspective, these findings are important because they suggest that risk assessors, politicians, and bureaucrats -- the large majority of whom are white men n297 -- may be acting on attitudes about security and risk that women and people of color do not widely share. If this is so, white men, as the "measurers of all things," have crafted a system of environmental protection that is biased toward their subjective understandings of the world. n298 [\*80] Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz speculate that white men's perceptions of risk may differ from those of others because in many ways women and people of color are "more vulnerable, because they benefit less from many of [society's] technologies and institutions, and because they have less power and control." n299 Although Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz are careful to acknowledge that they have not yet tested this hypothesis empirically, their explanation appears consistent with the life experiences of less empowered groups and comports with previous understandings about the roles of control and risk perception. n300 Women and people of color, for instance, are more vulnerable to environmental threat in several ways. Such groups are sometimes more biologically vulnerable than are white men. n301 People of color are more likely to live near hazardous waste sites, to breathe dirty air in urban communities, and to be otherwise exposed to environmental harm. n302 Women, because of their traditional role as primary caretakers, are more likely to be aware of the vulnerabilities of their children. n303 It makes sense that such vulnerabilities would give rise to increased fear about risk. It is also very likely that women and people of color believe they benefit less from the technical institutions that create toxic byproducts. n304 Further, people may be more likely to discount risk if they feel somehow compensated for the activity. n305 For this reason, Americans worry relatively little about driving automobiles, an activity with enormous advantages in our large country but one that claims tens of thousands of lives per year. The researchers' final hypothesis -- that differences in perception can be explained by the lack of "power and control" exercised by women and people of color -- suggests the importance that such factors as voluntariness and control over risk play in shaping perceptions. [\*81] Risk perception research frequently emphasizes the significance of voluntariness in evaluating risk. Thus, a person may view water-skiing as less risky than breathing polluted air because the former is accepted voluntarily. n306 Voluntary risks are viewed as more acceptable in part because they are products of autonomous choice. n307 A risk accepted voluntarily is also one from which a person is more likely to derive an individual benefit and one over which a person is more likely to retain some kind of control. n308 Some studies have found that people prefer voluntary risks to involuntary risks by a factor of 1000 to 1. n309 Although environmental risks are generally viewed as involuntary risks to a certain degree, choice plays a role in assuming risks. White men are still more likely to exercise some degree of choice in assuming environmental risks than other groups. Communities of color face greater difficulty in avoiding the placement of hazardous facilities in their neighborhoods and are more likely to live in areas with polluted air and lead contamination. n310 Families of color wishing to buy their way out of such polluted neighborhoods often find their mobility limited by housing discrimination, redlining by banks, and residential segregation. n311 The workplace similarly presents workers exposed to toxic hazards (a disproportionate number of whom are minorities) n312 with impossible choices between health and work, or between sterilization and demotion. n313 Just as marginalized groups have less choice in determining the degree of risk they will assume, they may feel less control over the risks they face. "Whether or not the risk is assumed voluntarily, people have greater [\*82] fear of activities with risks that appear to be outside their individual control." n314 For this reason, people often fear flying in an airplane more than driving a car, even though flying is statistically safer. n315 If white men are more complacent about public risks, it is perhaps because they are more likely to have their hands on the steering wheel when such risks are imposed. White men still control the major political and business institutions in this country. n316 They also dominate the sciences n317 and make up the vast majority of management staff at environmental agencies. n318 Women and people of color see this disparity and often lament their back-seat role in shaping environmental policy. n319 Thus, many people of color in the environmental justice movement believe that environmental laws work to their disadvantage by design. n320 [\*83] The toxic rivers of Mississippi's "Cancer Alley," n321 the extensive poisoning of rural Indian land, n322 and the mismanaged cleanup of the weapons manufacturing site in Hanford, Washington n323 only promote the feeling that environmental policy in the United States sacrifices the weak for the benefit of the strong. In addition, the catastrophic potential that groups other than white men associate with a risk may explain the perception gap between those groups and white males. Studies of risk perception show that, in general, individuals harbor particularly great fears of catastrophe. n324 For this reason, earthquakes, terrorist bombings, and other disasters in which high concentrations of people are killed or injured prove particularly disturbing to the lay public. Local environmental threats involving toxic dumps, aging smelters, or poisoned wells also produce high concentrations of localized harm that can appear catastrophic to those involved. n325 Some commentators contend that the catastrophic potential of a risk should influence risk assessment in only minimal ways. n326 Considering public fear of catastrophes, they argue, will irrationally lead policymakers to battle more dramatic but statistically less threatening hazards, while accepting more harmful but more mundane hazards. n327 [\*84] At least two reasons explain why the catastrophic potential of environmental hazards must be given weight in risk assessment. First, concentrated and localized environmental hazards do not simply harm individuals, they erode family ties and community relationships. An onslaught of miscarriages or birth defects in a neighborhood, for instance, will create community-wide stress that will debilitate the neighborhood in emotional, sociological, and economic ways. n328 To ignore this communal harm is to underestimate severely the true risk involved. n329 Second, because concentrated and localized environmental hazards tend to be unevenly distributed on the basis of race and income level, any resulting mass injury to a threatened population takes on profound moral character. For this reason, Native Americans often characterize the military's poisoning of Indian land as genocide. n330 [\*85] 3. Understanding Through Diversity Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz challenge the traditional, static view of statistical risk with a richer, more vibrant image involving relationships of power, status, and trust. n331 "In short, 'riskiness' means more to people than 'expected number of fatalities.'" n332 These findings affirm the feminist claim that public policy must consider both logic and local experience in addressing a problem**.** n333 Current attempts to "re-educate" fearful communities with only risk assessments and scientific seminars are, therefore, destined to fail. n334 By the same token, even dual approaches that combine science and experience will fall short if the appeal to experience does not track local priorities and values. Cynthia Hamilton illustrates these points in her inspiring account of how a South Central Los Angeles community group, consisting mainly of working-class women, battled a proposed solid waste incinerator. n335 At one point, the state sent out consultants and environmental experts to put the community's fears into perspective. The consultants first appealed to the community's practical, experience-based side, by explaining how the new incinerator would bring needed employment to the area and by offering $ 2 million in community development. n336 But the community group found the promise of "real development" unrealistic and the cash gift insulting. n337 When experts then turned to quantifying the risks "scientifically" their attempts backfired again. Hamilton reports that "expert assurance that health risks associated with dioxin exposure were less than those associated with 'eating peanut butter' unleashed a flurry of dissent. All of the women, young and old, working-class and professional, had made peanut butter sandwiches for years." n338 The sandwich analogy, even assuming its statistical validity, could not convince the women because it did not consider other valid risk factors (voluntariness, dread, and so on) and because it did not appear plausible in the group members' experience. In the end, Hamilton explains that the superficial explanations and sarcastic responses of the male "experts" left the women even more united and convinced that "working-class women's [\*86] concerns cannot be dismissed." n339 Thus even the "science" of risk assessment, if it is to serve effectively, must include the voices of those typically excluded from its practice.

#### All of this outweighs extinction because structural violence goes unnoticed- focusing on their big impacts, no matter their reversability or whatever, is bad and gets outweighed- we come first

### AT: Space Priv

#### Private space can’t solve earth problems- it requires inequality

Marx 19

(Paris Marx is a freelance writer, host of left-wing tech podcast Tech Won't Save Us, and editor of Radical Urbanist. <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/12/jeff-bezos-the-expanse-space-fantasy-sci-fi-syfy>, 12-14)

It’s worth wondering what Jeff Bezos thinks about the plight of Belters, but it’s likely he pays them little mind. His vision of space colonization makes no mention of the working class, placing far more emphasis on the lives well-off residents will be able to lead and the small percentage of people who will be lauded as geniuses. That blind spot echoes how Bezos treats the Amazon workers who are responsible for his great wealth, leaving them to toil in warehouses where they’re constantly monitored, afraid to take bathroom breaks, get injured at rates more than twice the industry average, and have to suffer through high temperatures needed so the robots keep working (the robots, the workers are told, do not function well in cooler temperatures). Bezos may well believe the Belters are in their rightful place and not think much more about it, but that’s not the only way The Expanse demonstrates how regular people could suffer in a capitalist space future. Sacrificing People for Power Just as Bezos has little consideration for Amazon warehouse workers, the powerful in The Expanse have a similar disinterest in the plight of common people. That’s demonstrated both by senior members of government and one of the richest men in the solar system, the show’s very own Bezos. Back on Earth, the UN of The Expanse has failed to maintain an economy, to use Bezos’s words, of “dynamism and growth” despite colonizing the solar system. UN deputy undersecretary Chrisjen Avasarala explains that the government is unable to provide enough opportunities for its residents, so while some of them work, many survive on a welfare payment called Basic Assistance. It’s similar to the basic income that Silicon Valley titans have called for in response to the threat of automation, but when the show leaves the UN’s halls of power to give viewers a rare glimpse of the streets of Earth, it’s clear that’s not working out as promised. When one of the main characters escapes the Martian embassy, she meets a group of people who live in shanties near the sewers despite receiving the payment. One of the men explains the difficulty of their lives: being denied medication from clinics, children exposed to radiation from nearby factories, drinking sewer water in the summers, and applying for vocational training at seventeen years old and still waiting at fifty-two because there are so few spots. A small cash payment doesn’t make up for the lack of education and employment, and there’s a later allusion to a class of undocumented people on Earth who aren’t even eligible for Basic. While the high-ranking figures of the UN are portrayed as being aloof from the suffering of the have-nots, wealthy industrialist Jules-Pierre Mao sees them as having no humanity whatsoever. It’s hard to imagine that Bezos doesn’t feel some connection to a character like Mao, who owns a massive conglomerate that secretly built its own stealth ships and is willing to sacrifice as many lives as it takes to control the “protomolecule” alien life-form. Mao believes the proto-molecule could be used as a weapon but also hopes it could be merged with humans to create a higher form of life. Bezos has no problem squeezing the last bit of labor from Amazon workers, then casting them aside when they’re spent, but Mao’s dehumanization of people below him goes much further. He infects a station of 1.5 million people and uses Belter children as live test subjects, all of whom die as a result of his experiments. At one point, Mao states, “our actions affect the lives of millions . . . billions . . . entire planets . . . in ways that few people can comprehend,” but he doesn’t feel a responsibility to those billions of people. Rather, he develops a god complex that leads him to feel that he alone can move humanity forward, not so different from the ideologies of billionaires like Bezos and Musk. Don’t Let Billionaires Chart the Future While Bezos and Musk might have deluded themselves into believing that space colonization will be our salvation, The Expanse suffers no such delusions. It gives us a much more realistic glimpse of what space colonization driven by capitalism might look like: a terrible deal for anyone who isn’t enormously wealthy or in a high-ranking position in government or the military. Most of us would still be under the boot of those in power, as the Belters find themselves, or cast off to survive on a poverty stipend. Just as workers in the present have to fight against colonial powers and abusive bosses, so do Belters. The OPA isn’t always populated with the most ethical people, but over the course of the first three seasons, it grows from being a disorganized advocacy group to a quasi-government with a ship fighting alongside the navies of Earth and Mars. It’s the most inspiring development of the series, and the fourth season seems poised to delve further into what it actually means for Belters to have power. Will they live up to the Belter proverb that states, “the more you share, the more your bowl will be plentiful”; will their newfound power corrupt their stated egalitarian values; or will that story line be cast off if the show’s new billionaire benefactor doesn’t care so much about Belters? While it might bewilder us that Bezos would ever swoop in to save a TV show as honest about class conflict as The Expanse, it could be that we’re just overthinking it. It’s likely he sees it as little more than part of a PR campaign to get people to buy into his ambition to profit from the resource wealth of asteroids and other space rocks. And while the show doesn’t shy away from depicting the viciousness of capitalism in space, for Bezos, it might be much simpler than that — any vision of capitalism dominating us even as we spread out through the galaxy is a vision, as far as he’s concerned, worth promoting. Billionaires will never promote a future that breaks with capitalism because that would challenge their own positions of power and privilege right here in the present. And while dreams of space can entice the imagination, our future — at least in the near term — doesn’t lie among the asteroids. Our future is here on Earth, building a society where ordinary people are put before the rich and powerful.

### AT: Space Innovation

#### 1] All our cap bad stuff applies here- space companies don’t care about anything except profit and profit can’t solve inequalities and structures- it only encourages monopolistic dominance which isn’t in the interest of the human race, that turns all their links

#### 2] Reject this argument, NASA is competitive too- it’s just 1) not getting as much funding and 2) private companies are built off of some of NASA’s achievements, that’s Aronoff 18

#### 3] We win on epistemology because most of their ev is constructed off of the belief capitalism is inevidible- its marketing propaganda not peer reviewed evidence. Before you evaluate the negatives impact hold them to high standard on questions like feasibility, don’t be fooled by powerful rhetoric.

Marx 21

(Paris Marx is a socialist writer and host of the Tech Won't Save Us podcast. <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/07/billionaires-space-richard-branson-jeff-bezos-elon-musk> , 7-13)

For all the lauding of private space companies and the space billionaires that champion them, they remain heavily reliant on government money. This is the real face of the private space industry: billions of dollars in contracts from NASA, the military, and increasingly for telecommunications that are helping companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin control the infrastructure of space — and it’s all justified to the public under the promise that it’s in service of grand visions that are nothing more than marketing ploys. Part of the reason SpaceX has been so successful at winning these contracts is because Musk is not an inventor but a marketer. He knows how to use PR stunts to get people to pay attention, and that helps him win lucrative contracts. He also knows what things not to emphasize, like the potentially controversial military contracts that don’t get tweets or flashy announcement videos. Bezos’s trip to space is all about embracing spectacle, because he realizes it’s essential to compete for the attention of the public and the bureaucrats deciding who gets public contracts.

#### 4] Belief in private colonization is science fiction-Astronomical costs and technological infeasibility prove fantasies of colonization are designed to distract the public, not fix pressing problems. Their philanthropy argument is nonsense- the profit motive makes private colonization inherently unequal- that’s our Riederer Card

#### 6] Private colonization is a joke- assign it zero risk

Kern 21

(Sim,Sim Kern is a Gulf Coast journalist and speculative fiction writer, exploring intersections of climate change, identity, and social justice <https://www.salon.com/2021/07/07/no-billionaires-wont-escape-to-space-while-the-world-burns/>, 7-7)

And what about Musk's dream of a colony on Mars, or at least the Moon? Those are astronomically less feasible. The farther away from Earth you're trying to sustain life in space, the harder it gets. And while they have the benefit of gravity, the surface of the Moon and Mars are covered with a powdery regolith that gums up mechanisms. NASA is currently working on sending astronauts to live on the Moon as part of the Artemis mission. They've been working on Artemis plans for years and will continue to plan for years more before sending the first crew to sleep on the Moon — for a week or two, max. No, there will be no Moon-a-Lago, let alone a Mars-a-Lago, in our lifetimes. So despite Musk's lofty claims of making humanity "a multi-planetary species," that's way, way beyond the realm of current technical possibility. And his claim is especially absurd, considering that in order to generate the wealth that sustains billionaires like Musk, we're rapidly destroying the one planet we can live on — Earth. If we don't reverse the environmental and societal degradation caused by global capitalism, the ISS may turn out to be the pinnacle of human space exploration. Advertisement: So when you understand the science, it becomes clear that the "billionaire space race" is just that—nothing more than a pissing contest between egotistical robber barons. Branson and Bezos aren't investing their money to forward science or expand the bounds of human possibility. They're doing it to be the first rich guy to bounce around uselessly up there, as opposed to NASA astronauts who, again, do science. And after they bounce around uselessly, they're hoping to swindle more of their obscenely rich friends into doing the same. The pointlessness of it all is especially despicable when you understand that space tourism is funded with the hoarded wealth of billions of workers who are struggling to survive here on Earth. The space tourism industry will be built with the profits off supply chains that work people to death-by-exhaustion, literally enslave people, and are rapidly destroying the future habitability of our planet. That's a pretty bleak dystopia. We should really consider taking our wealth back from billionaires before they build it. But if we fail, join me in enjoying the schadenfreude. Space tourism will inevitably suck. Our billionaires won't find anything up there but a whole lot of time to sit with the gaping void in their hearts, which space certainly won't fill, while forcibly holding their asscheeks to a suctioning toilet seat, because they're constipated as hell from astronaut food. The world is burning, and billionaires are arguably the people most responsible. But at least they will not be able to escape to some other, better place. They will live and die (alone, like all of us) on this beautiful, precious, one-in-a-gazillion planet.

### OV – Always Read

#### Neg evidence may sound persuasive, but that rhetoric is constructed for someone and for some purpose. They’ve conceded the inequalities and horrors of capitalism- prefer it over all of their impact turns – it’s a more accurate picture of the world- multiple reasons:

### AT: Enviroment

#### Profit maximization and overconsumption means neolib guarantees environmental destruction – multiple warrants. Smith 14

Smith 14 Economic Historian He wrote his UCLA history Ph.D. thesis on the transition to capitalism in China and held post-docs at the East-West Center in Honolulu and Rutgers University. He has written on China, capitalism and the global environment and on related issues for New Left Review, Monthly Review, The Ecologist, the International Journal of Ecological Economics and Statistics, Real-World Economics Review, Adbusters magazine and other publications (Richard, “Green Capitalism: The God That Failed”, truthout, Thursday, 09 January 2014, <http://truth-out.org/news/item/21060-green-capitalism-the-god-that-failed>)

II. **DELUSIONS OF "NATURAL CAPITALISM"** Paul Hawken was right: **We need a "restorative economy,**" an economy that lives within nature's limits, that minimizes and even eliminates waste from production, and so on. **But he was completely wrong to imagine that we could ever get this under capitalism.** In what follows I am going to explain why this is so and, in conclusion, state what I think are the implications of this critique. To start with, I'm going to state five theses about green capitalism and then develop these arguments in the rest of this article. 1. **First,** **the project of "sustainable" "green" capitalism was misconceived and doomed from the start because maximizing** profit and saving the planet are inherently in conflict and cannot be systematically aligned even if, here and there, they might coincide for a moment. **That's because, under capitalism, CEOs and corporate boards are not responsible to society**; **they're responsible to private owners and shareholders. CEOs might embrace environmentalism so long as this also increases profits, but they're not free to subordinate profit maximizing to saving the world** - because to do so would be to risk shareholder flight or worse. I claim that **profit-maximization is an iron rule of capitalism,** a rule **that trumps all else** and sets the possibilities **and limits** of **ecological reform** - and not the other way around, as green capitalism theorists suppose. 2. **Second, no capitalist government on Earth can impose "green taxes" that would drive the coal industry** or any other industry **out of business, or even force major retrenchments** by suppressing production because, among other important reasons, **given capitalism, this would just provoke recession and mass unemployment** - if not worse. **This means the carbon tax strategy to stop global warming is a non-starter. Without green taxes, the entire green capitalist project collapses.** 3. **Third, green capitalism enthusiasts vastly underestimate** **the** gravity**, scope and speed of the** **global ecological collapse** we face **and thus unrealistically imagine that growth can**

### AT: Inevidible

#### 1] Extend Penny 20- Obviously capitalism is not inevitable- private space companies are the ones who make cap last long because they give it the drug it needs- the spatial fix it requires- we can stop this by not allowing private companies to further themselves and their monopolistic profit-motivated nonsense

## US PIC

### Long (0:25)

#### Condo is a voting issue- several reasons to prefer

#### Strat skew – multiple routes to the ballot gives the neg an unfair advantage and aff must use speech AND prep time to cover all routes or else neg just goes for the one off that was covered the least, the time-crunched 1AR has no chance

#### Decks clash – the 2NR just goes for the least covered off which doesn’t encourage clash and creates non-competitive debates

#### Dispo solves – they can kick if the aff makes a perm

#### Paradigm issues-

#### Drop the debater because it deters against future violations of the neg

#### Prefer competing interps because it minimizes judge intervention

## Xi DA

#### No link- we aren’t specifically banning anything and this disad relies on the premise of the effects of a ban. If we’re just saying private space companies are bad, Xi will never know and he won’t trigger himself

#### Huge obstacles to China soft power

Ford 1-28-17 - is a Captain in the U.S. Army JAG Corps who studied at Peking University. He has previously written for The Diplomat on China’s economy and its maritime disputes in the South China Sea

John, The Obstacles to China's Bid for Soft Power, The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-obstacles-to-chinas-bid-for-soft-power/

But China faces serious obstacles to successfully rebranding itself as an avatar of liberalism. When the London-based consultancy firm Portland Communications released a survey measuring the soft power of 30 countries, China came in dead last despite its efforts to improve its image. The primary obstacle is the obvious one: China wants to be embraced by the liberal West without actually being a very liberal country. As China scholar Bill Bishop put its “How can you win hearts and minds when you are known as a country that blocks Facebook, Google, YouTube, and Twitter?” The fact is that China’s government is still an authoritarian regime, which makes it hard for China to earn soft power. Most people do not admire censorship of the press or suppression of dissent.¶ Even on economics, the subject of Xi’s latest big push, China will have a hard time posing as a credible leader for liberal values because China continues to routinely practice protectionism at home. China famously and routinely violates other countries’ intellectual property, subsidizes domestic industry to undermine foreign competitors, and blocks foreigners from directly investing in certain Chinese industries. China can’t credibly claim to lead the way for trade liberalization if it doesn’t practice what it preaches and it won’t boost its soft power by setting expectations for how it will behave on trade that it has no intention of meeting.¶ Nor is China well positioned to defend freedom of trade given its poor record on freedom of navigation. China’s actions in the South China Sea include making maritime claims such as the nine-dash line that have no basis in international law. Freedom of navigation is inherently bound up in freedom of trade. China’s insistence that it has the right to exclude others from the South China Sea undermines the credibility of any claim that it is defending the liberal world order.¶ Xi’s defense of globalization is certainly appreciated but it is unlikely to lead to a meaningful increase in China’s soft power until people around the world see China further open up its economy and its political system. Because the kind of reforms that would win over public opinion overseas would carry serious political risks at home they are extremely unlikely to be undertaken any time soon. For this reason, Xi is likely to find that increasing China’s international prestige by becoming a defender of the liberal order is far easier said than done.

#### Tons of obstacles to Chinese hegemony- space isn’t the main internal link

Hsu 2-2-17 - Assistant Professor of Economics at the State University of New York at New Paltz

Sara, Why China Won't Replace The U.S. As The World's Superpower, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2017/02/02/why-china-wont-replace-the-u-s-as-the-worlds-superpower/#77ae367f1e09

Does all of this mean that China is headed for superpower status? No. It takes more than a power vacuum and rising economic status to establish a global hegemony.¶ Not going to happen¶ Even though China has be

# 2AR

### OV – Judge adapted

#### Condo is something to keep in mind- judges aren’t always confident about voting on condo but there are multiple reasons to prefer- conditionality is a thing that affects the entire debate and skews the round so vote drop the debater for multiple reasons- prefer this type of theory over regular policy debate because regular policy debate can’t happen as well without adhering to fairness in debate- fairness comes first because if debates aren’t fair then one side will just abuse some aspect of debate like conditionality which impacts things like topic education and strategy- more specifically, condo kills incentive for aff or neg to prep quality arguments since neg can just go for several arguments and collapse to least covered flow- the short nature of LD means there are only 2 opportunities for the aff to respond to the neg, meaning there won’t be enough time to engage in meaningful arguments if neg uses condo- additionally the 2AR doesn’t allow for new cards so we can’t have credible responses and neg automatically wins on evidence- now on the line by line…

#### FIRST ON THEIR OFFENSE

### AT: Neg Flex

#### They say they need flexibility, but they now have too much: what good does flexibility do when the aff cannot respond and there is no meaningful debate

#### The neg can already run for whatever off position they want to, they shouldn’t be given rights to run however many they want to as well- THIS SPEICIFCALLY APPLIES TO THIS DEBATE BECAUSE THEY MADE SO MANY CASE ARUGMENTS

### AT: Real World

#### We aren’t policymakers, we have a 45-min time constraint, and they don’t- we can’t simulate the real world by going for an infinite amount of positions and not engaging in any

#### Multiple rounds solve- we can just go to several rounds and hear different arguments, why jam it into one round

#### Turn: decking clash isn’t real world; arguments need to be strategic and sophisticated in order to even vaguely match policymakers

### AT: Process and Info

#### Turn: there’s no research when the neg doesn’t spend quality time developing an argument but instead goes for as many shallow arguments as possible

#### Research is inevitable: there’s always an incentive to catch opponent by surprise with good arguments, why need condo in order to supplement that

### AT: Ideology Flex

#### 1] Ideological flex is good but multiple rounds solve- all our real world offense applies here

### AT: Only One Condo

#### Doesn’t matter- you still made a ton of case arguments and I didn’t have time to get through any of my doc that’s not because of my speed it’s because you spread me out to thin which TURNS your case it DESTROYS CLASH

### AT: Turns Clash

#### What do you mean turns clash? All of our offense above solves that by going to multiple rounds- instead you chose to spread me out thin with a million case arguments and conditional arguments which means the aff can’t respond logically and with good substance- that turns case and ERR CLASH ON OUR SIDE

### AT: Reasonability

#### Competing interps is more important:

#### They say judge intervention isn’t a big deal, judges literally decide the brightline between what is reasonable and what is not, what are the chances that three randomly picked judges in the nation all choose the same brightline

#### Additionally, this causes a race to the bottom- people will continue testing judge’s tolerance and nudging brightline down until theoretically everything is considered reasonable

#### They say it prevents cheesy word PICs, but most word PICs don’t win a debate for a multitude of other reasons and shouldn’t be an excuse, judge intervention outweighs

### DEFENSE

#### All of their defensive arguments were like 5 seconds long I’ll explain why we win on them

#### 1] On strat skew, they say it’s no unique because they read a counterplan not a disad- this doesn’t make a sense, the MORE ARGUMENTS YOU READ THE MORE WE HAVE TO SKEW OUR STRATEGY BECAUSE WE CAN’T GIVE QUALITY ARGUMENTS- THAT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH WHETHER OR NOT IT IS A disad or a counterplan

#### 2] On clash- they said condo is better and they can collapse to one but there was no actual defense that they had here- all our offense TURNS their clash offense, they don’t get any of that b/c condo ruins the ability to make quality arguments- THE AMOUNT OF CASE ARGUMENTS THEY READE PLUS CONDITIONAL ADVOCACIES MEANS ERR AFF

#### 3] On dispo- we’ll concede that argument

### DTD \*\*HARD PUSH\*\*

#### Drop the debater not the argument:

#### 1] They say dropping the debater is too far: abuse has already occurred, the debate is already been skewed so if you just take out their argument then the rest of the debate is still messed up- we cannot fix this- condo skewed the 1AR and meaningful arguments will not be created in the 2AR and time disparities affect all the arguments

#### 2] Also drop the debater because it deters against future bad debates caused by the neg- debate is an educational space and should also be fair- it is the judge’s obligation to rid debate space of abuse so voting on DTD is KEY

#### 3] Reject their arguments that it returns the debate back to substance- there is no returning point- they have already messed up the entire debate

#### 4] DON’T COP OUT- judge’s nowadays like to cop out and just allow the neg to get access to all their neg positions and impacts- if we win condo then theory should be evaluated before any policy arguments

# 1AR RE-DO

## Case

### OV – Short

#### Capitalism is in a do or die moment, space privatization is the ultimate decisive factor- I’ll explain. Capitalism is about to collapse- our crisis of resources has us trapped and the next step for continuation is expanding to the cosmos- bringing cap to space is bad b/c it allows for more exploitation and more profiteering in the expense of inequality- billionaires are interested in monopolistic gain and letting them continue outweighs all other impacts

### OV – Always Read

#### Capitalism’s inherent flaws have brought climate change upon the world – vote for the k to reject futurism of a failed system

#### Err aff - Their ev is paid for by corporations Ennis 2

Schiwy and Ennis, ’02 (Freya, PhD Candidate in Romance Studies at Duke, and Michael, PhD Candidate in Lit at Duke, Nepantla: Views from the South 3.1 project muse). NS

**The essays** gathered in this dossier respond to issues raised during the workshop “Knowledges and the Known: Capitalism and the Geopolitics of Knowledge,” held at Duke University in November 2000. They **address concerns about the possibilities for critical knowledge production at a moment when national state structures are reconfiguring into global institutions and when technologies** (like gene prospecting) **and epistemic regimes (like property rights and human rights) are installing the particular as a new universal**, following the legacy of Enlightenment philosophy and Western political theory. They ask how **knowledge production is linked to location and subjectivity and what the importance of these critical perspectives can be when neoliberal capitalism increasingly instrumentalizes and commodifies knowledge, reinforcing the growing dependence of universities around the world on corporate money.** It is precisely within this context that Oscar Guardiola-Rivera engages current critical theory from the perspective

#### We’re ready for post-capitalism, in technology and awareness

Edles PhD 15

Edles, Laura Desfor,  (PhD, University of California, Los Angeles, 1990 is Professor of Sociology at California State University, Northridge.) 2015, “Sociological theory in the classical era : text and readings,” ISBN 978-1-4522-0361-4 // Comrade AW

This was precisely the purpose of Marx’s political activities: he sought to generate class consciousness—an awareness on the part of the working class of its common relationship to the means of production and common source of the workers’ oppressive conditions. Marx believed that this awareness was a vital key for sparking a revolution that would create a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” transforming it from a wage-earning, propertyless mass into the ruling class. Unlike all previous class-based revolutions, however, this one would be fought in the interests of the vast majority of the population and not for the benefit of a few, because the particular class interests of the proletariat had come to represent the universal interests of humanity. The epoch of capitalism was a necessary stage in this evolution—and the last historical period rooted in competitive class conflict (see Figure 2.2). Capitalism, with its unleashing of immense economic productivity, had created the capital and technology needed to sustain a communist society—the final stage of history —capable of providing for the needs of all of its inhabitants

### AT: Enviroment

#### 1. Endless growth is embedded in the structure of Cap’s DNA- capitalism wants to grow without borders and space is the ultimate destination for forever expansion

#### 2. Innovation picks up pace post-capitalism – we integrate the global south and socialize risk and reward

Smith 15

Tony Smith (Prof of Philosophy and author of “Technological Capital”), 3-31-2015, "Red Innovation," No Publication, [https://jacobinmag.com/2015/03/socialism-innovation-capitalism-smith //](https://jacobinmag.com/2015/03/socialism-innovation-capitalism-smith%20//) Comrade HW AW

The technological dynamism of capitalism has always been a powerful argument in its defense. But one of its secrets is that at the heart of this change we find neither bold entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, nor established firms. Investments pushing the frontiers of scientific knowledge are just too risky. The advances sought may not be forthcoming. Those that do occur may not ever be commercially viable. Any potentially profitable results that do arise may take decades to make any money. And when they finally do, there are no guarantees initial investors will appropriate most of the resulting windfall. There is, accordingly, a powerful tendency for private capital to systematically underinvest in long-term research and development. Despite popular perceptions that private entrepreneurs drive technological innovation, the leading regions of the global economy do not leave the most important stages of technological change to private investors. These costs are socialized. In the quarter-century after World War II, the high profits garnered by American corporations due to their exceptional place in the world market allowed corporate labs to engage in “[blue-skies research](http://scienceogram.org/in-depth/blue-skies-research/)” projects. But even then, public funding accounted for roughly two-thirds of all research and development expenditures in the United States, creating the foundations for the high-tech sectors of today. With the rise of competition from Japanese and European capital in the 1970s, private-sector funding of research and development increased. However, long-term projects were almost entirely abandoned in favor of product development and applied-research projects promising commercial advantages in the short-to-medium term. Basic research continued to be funded by the government, like the work in molecular biology that supported the move of agribusiness companies into biotechnology. The same was true for projects of special interest to the Pentagon — the developments associated with the [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency](http://www.darpa.mil/our_work/), for instance, which paved the way for modern global positioning systems — and other government agencies. But medium-to-long-term R&D in general was in great danger of falling into a “valley of death” between basic research and immediate development, with neither the government nor private capital providing significant funding for it. For all their rhetoric touting the “magic of the marketplace,” those in the Reagan administration recognized market failure when they saw it. They began to offer federal and publicly funded university laboratories various carrots and sticks to undertake long-term R&D for US capital. New programs were created to provide start-ups with resources to develop innovations prior to the “proof of concept” required by venture capitalists. Under Reagan, the [Small Business Innovation Development Act](https://www.sba.gov/offices/headquarters/oca/resources/6827) even mandated that federal agencies set aside a percentage of their R&D budget to fund research by small firms. These and other forms of public-private partnership have granted US capital enormous competitive advantages in the world market. It’s no surprise that Apple’s tremendously successful line of products — iPads, iPhones, and iPods — incorporate twelve key innovations. All twelve (central processing units, dynamic random-access memory, hard-drive disks, liquid-crystal displays, batteries, digital single processing, the Internet, the HTTP and HTML languages, cellular networks, GPS system, and voice-user AI programs) were developed by publicly funded research and development projects. **It hasn’t been the dynamics of the market so much as active state intervention that has fueled technological change**. The Promised Golden Age Technology is more than just a weapon for inter-capitalist competition; it is a weapon in struggles between capital and labor. Technological changes that create unemployment, de-skill the workforce, and enable one sector of the workforce to be played against another shift the balance of power in capital’s favor. Given this asymmetry, advances in productivity that could reduce work time while expanding real wages lead instead to forced layoffs, increasing stress for those still employed and eroding real wages. Two ongoing technological developments further strengthen the power of capital. Advances in transportation and communication now enable production and distribution chains to be extended across the globe, allowing capital to implement “divide and conquer” strategies against labor to an unprecedented extent. Astounding new labor-saving machines are also becoming more and more inexpensive. A recent exhaustive study of over seven hundred occupations [concluded](https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/08/18/robots-may-disrupt-half-of-all-us-jobs) that no less than 47 percent of employment in the United States is at high risk of being automated within two decades. Anything approaching this level of labor displacement will yield more misery, not progress, for ordinary workers. But the lower cost and higher capacities of machines have also led to change of a better sort. As the prices of computer hardware, software, and Internet connections have declined, many people can now create new “knowledge products” without working for big capitalists. Multitudes across the globe now freely choose to contribute to collective innovation projects of interest to them, outside the relationship of capital and wage labor. The resulting products can now be distributed as unlimited free goods to anyone who wishes to use them, rather than being scarce commodities sold for profit. It is beyond dispute that this new form of **social labor has generated** **innovations superior in quality and scale to the output of capitalist firms**. These innovations also tend to be qualitatively different. While technological developments in capitalism primarily address the wants and needs of those with disposable income, open-source projects can mobilize creative energies to address areas capital systematically neglects, such as [developing seeds](http://www.scidev.net/global/agriculture/news/open-source-seed-released-to-nurture-patent-free-food.html) for poor farmers or medicines for those without the money to buy existing medications. The potential of this new form of collective social labor to address pressing social needs across the globe is historically unprecedented. In order to flourish, however, open-source innovation requires free access to existing knowledge goods. Leading capital firms, hoping to extend their ability to privately profit from publicly supported research, have used their immense political power to extend the intellectual property rights regime in scope and enforcement, severely restricting the access open-source projects require. [Copyright](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2013/09/property-and-theft/), after all, was extended for twenty years at the turn of the century, just as Internet access was starting to balloon. Despite these barriers, the success of open-source projects shows that intellectual-property rights are not required for innovation. Further evidence is provided by the fact that most scientific and technological workers engaged in innovation are forced to sign away intellectual property rights as a condition of employment. These rights actually hamper advancement by raising the cost of engaging in the production of new knowledge, and by diverting funds to unproductive legal costs. The World is Flat? Capitalism also hampers the ability of much of the world to contribute to technological advancement. Whole regions of the global economy lack the wealth to support meaningful innovation. Today, only four countries [spend](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS) over 3 percent of their GDP on research and development; a mere six others devote 2 percent or more. Capital in these advantaged regions has the opportunity to establish a virtuous circle, free-riding on the extensive public investment discussed above. Privileged access to advanced R&D enables capitalists to appropriate high returns on successful innovations; these returns allow those companies to make effective use of technological advances in the next cycle, setting the stage for future profits. At the same time, enterprises in poorer regions, lacking access to high-level R&D, find themselves trapped in a vicious cycle. Their present inability to make significant innovations that would enable them to compete successfully in world markets undercuts their future prospects. Only a handful of countries — such as South Korea and Taiwan — have ever been able to move forward from this starting disadvantage. Global disparities in technological change alone do not explain why 1 percent of people in the world now [own](https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2015-01-19/richest-1-will-own-more-all-rest-2016) 48 percent of global wealth. But they are a major part of the story; technological change is a weapon that enables the privileged to maintain and extend their global advantages over time. Creative Non-Destruction **The destructive effects examined above are not necessary features of technological change; they are necessary features of technological change in capitalism.** **Overcoming them requires overcoming capitalism, even if we only have a provisional sense of what that might mean**. The pernicious tendencies associated with technological change in capitalist workplaces are rooted in a structure where managers are agents of the owners of the firm’s assets, with a fiduciary duty to further their private interests. But a society’s means of production are not goods for personal consumption, like a toothbrush. The material reproduction of society is an inherently public matter, as the technological development of capitalism itself, resting on public funds, confirms. Capital markets, where private claims to productive resources are bought and sold, treat public power as if it were just another item for personal use. They can, and should, be totally done away with. Large-scale productive enterprises should instead be acknowledged as a distinct type of public property, and exercises of authority within these workplaces as acts of public authority. The principle of democracy must then come into play: all exercises of this authority must be subject to the consent of those impacted by it. Though additional regulations would be needed if managers were elected and subject to recall by the workforce as a whole, **technological advances in productivity would not typically result in the involuntary unemployment of some and the overwork of others, but rather in reduced work for all.** We know this because workers say they want more time to spend with their families and friends, or on projects of their own choosing. With [democracy in the workplace](http://www.solidarityeconomy.net/2006/08/29/after-capitalism-economic-democracy-an-interview-with-david-schweickart/), the drive to introduce de-skilling technologies would be replaced with a search for ways to make work more interesting and creative. Suppose that decisions regarding the general level of new investment were also a matter for public debate, eventually decided by a democratic body. If there were pressing social needs, the overall rate of new investment could be increased; if this were not the case, it could be stabilized. These bodies could then set aside a portion of new investment funds to provide public goods free of charge, putting more useful goods and services outside the market’s reach. The public goods of scientific and technological knowledge resulting from basic research and long-term R&D would be decommodified, too, as would the fruits of open-source innovation. The latter could be unleashed by abolishing intellectual property rights and by providing an adequate [basic income](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2013/05/curious-utopias/) to all — enabling anyone who wished to participate in open-source projects to do so. If special incentives were required, generous prizes could be awarded to the first to solve important challenges. Remaining funds could then be distributed to other elected bodies at various geographical levels, each of which would determine what share would go to public goods in a region. The remainder would be distributed to local community banks charged with allocating them to worker enterprises. Various qualitative and quantitative measures could be employed to measure the extent to which those enterprises used technologies to meet social wants and needs effectively, with the results determining the income beyond the basic level received by their members (and the members of the community banks that allocated investment funds to them). Abolishing intellectual property rights would have the added benefit of ensuring that wealthy regions could not use technological knowledge as a weapon to create and reproduce inequality in the global economy. This danger would be all but eliminated if every region were granted a fundamental right to its per capita share of new investment funds. Finally, if workplaces used productivity advances to free up time for their workers rather than to increase the output of commodities, resources would be depleted and waste generated at a much lower rate. Abolishing capital markets and replacing them with democratic control over levels of new investment would free humanity from the “grow or die” imperative and the environmental consequences that follow from it. If enterprises were acknowledged as inherently matters of public concern, it would eliminate the obscene absurdity of having the fate of humanity rest on whether profit-driven oil companies have the political and cultural power to extract and sell an estimated $20 trillion of fossil-fuel reserves, as they clearly plan to do. If open-source innovation flourished, the creative energies of collective social labor across the planet could be mobilized to address environmental challenges. If poor regions with fragile ecologies were guaranteed their fair share of new investment funds, the pressure to sacrifice long-term sustainability for the sake of short-term growth would be overcome. Of course, all of these proposals are vague and provisional. Nonetheless, they show that the social consequences of technological change could be far different than they are today. We do not need private ownership of productive assets, or markets devoted to financial assets, to have a technologically dynamic society. With the necessary political shifts, technological change would no longer be associated with overaccumulation, financial crises, the stifling of open-source innovation, severe global inequality, or the increasingly palpable threat of environmental catastrophe. We need to unleash the full potential of human ingenuity. The way technology advances is already socialized in important, if restricted and inadequate ways. We can finish the job and make sure that its fruits are put to the benefit of ordinary people.

## Xi DA

#### No link- we aren’t specifically banning anything and this disad relies on the premise of the effects of a ban. If we’re just saying private space companies are bad, Xi will never know and he won’t trigger himself

#### Huge obstacles to China soft power

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John, The Obstacles to China's Bid for Soft Power, The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-obstacles-to-chinas-bid-for-soft-power/

But China faces serious obstacles to successfully rebranding itself as an avatar of liberalism. When the London-based consultancy firm Portland Communications released a survey measuring the soft power of 30 countries, China came in dead last despite its efforts to improve its image. The primary obstacle is the obvious one: China wants to be embraced by the liberal West without actually being a very liberal country. As China scholar Bill Bishop put its “How can you win hearts and minds when you are known as a country that blocks Facebook, Google, YouTube, and Twitter?” The fact is that China’s government is still an authoritarian regime, which makes it hard for China to earn soft power. Most people do not admire censorship of the press or suppression of dissent.¶ Even on economics, the subject of Xi’s latest big push, China will have a hard time posing as a credible leader for liberal values because China continues to routinely practice protectionism at home. China famously and routinely violates other countries’ intellectual property, subsidizes domestic industry to undermine foreign competitors, and blocks foreigners from directly investing in certain Chinese industries. China can’t credibly claim to lead the way for trade liberalization if it doesn’t practice what it preaches and it won’t boost its soft power by setting expectations for how it will behave on trade that it has no intention of meeting.¶ Nor is China well positioned to defend freedom of trade given its poor record on freedom of navigation. China’s actions in the South China Sea include making maritime claims such as the nine-dash line that have no basis in international law. Freedom of navigation is inherently bound up in freedom of trade. China’s insistence that it has the right to exclude others from the South China Sea undermines the credibility of any claim that it is defending the liberal world order.¶ Xi’s defense of globalization is certainly appreciated but it is unlikely to lead to a meaningful increase in China’s soft power until people around the world see China further open up its economy and its political system. Because the kind of reforms that would win over public opinion overseas would carry serious political risks at home they are extremely unlikely to be undertaken any time soon. For this reason, Xi is likely to find that increasing China’s international prestige by becoming a defender of the liberal order is far easier said than done.

#### Tons of obstacles to Chinese hegemony- space isn’t the main internal link

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Sara, Why China Won't Replace The U.S. As The World's Superpower, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2017/02/02/why-china-wont-replace-the-u-s-as-the-worlds-superpower/#77ae367f1e09

Does all of this mean that China is headed for superpower status? No. It takes more than a power vacuum and rising economic status to establish a global hegemony.¶ Not going to happen¶ Even though China has been in the spotlight for years–first as the “factory of the world” and then as “bridge builder of the world”–its capacity for economic reform is in question, and its financial sector remains far less developed than that of the Western world. Growth is slowing, and economic inefficiencies abound, as reform of the services sector has been monumentally slow.¶ China’s financial sector also fails to provide investors with consistently profitable real returns. Serious constraints associated with deeply embedded government involvement in the economy threaten the future of the country.¶ In addition, the spread of soft power alone does not guarantee the rise to superpower status. For one, we still have yet to witness the long-term viability of China’s recent economic partnerships. Second, the presence of soft power abroad without strong domestic institutions threatens to undermine China’s global presence. For example, China’s own lack of legal enforcement may not play out well along OBOR, resulting in corruption or project non-viability, particularly since many of the nations in which it will invest have poor legal frameworks themselves. Also China’s ongoing capital controls and lack of financial liberalization hinder internationalization of the RMB, which makes RMB financing of global projects less attractive.¶ The U.S. example ¶ First, it should be mentioned that hegemon status is not automatically granted to nations that trade the most or grow the fastest. If that were the case, Japan would have been granted world superpower status by 1970 and Taiwan would have gained superpower status by 1980.¶ Second, to some extent, it was chance that allowed the United States to become a global power after World War II. The rest of the developed world, including Europe and Japan, was in disarray. At the Bretton Woods meeting in 1944, world leaders agreed to anchor their exchange rates in gold, which would then be tied to the U.S. dollar. As a result, the U.S. dollar became the most important currency in the world, and the United States rose to superpower status.¶ Certainly, the United States had been on par with or above Europe in terms of living standards and level of industrialization before World War II, and was therefore seen as an economic equal. It was the restructuring of global currencies at Bretton Woods, however, that boosted the United States to center country status.¶ What this means for China¶ China lacks the kind of global support that the U.S. received after World War II, which provided tacit agreement for the U.S. to become the world’s anchor of economic stability. While China does enjoy this type of backing in Asia, allowing it to act as a center country within the continent, Western nations are wary of China, as evidenced by the creation of the TPP. Further, China’s living standards are not close to those in the West, and its currency is not considered international yet, as preconditions for becoming a global superpower.¶ It is possible that these conditions will change over time, but in the short run, we will not see China become the “next United States” in global power. Until then, a global power vacuum may arise–as long as the political-economic mindset of Western nations remains inward-looking, and that of non-Western nations remains weak.

#### No risk China establishes leadership—too many countries would resist

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Robert, *Fire on the water: China, America, and the future of the Pacific*, Naval Institute Press, pg. 39-40

Nor do the odds favor the smooth arrival of the report's fourth scenario: the reestablishment of a Chinese Middle Kingdom, with the region's other nations a supporting cast in a Sinocentric hierarchy. China's leaders will certainly never declare this scenario as their preferred end state, any more than U.S. leaders would say out loud that a liberalizing politi-cal revolution inside China is a U.S. policy goal (in this regard, we should probably consider the Chinese foreign minister's agitated outburst about the proper places of "big countries" and "small countries" at the ASEAN Regional Forum conference in Hanoi in July 2010 as perhaps a revealing gaffe).8 China's stated aspirations call for "peaceful development" not the reestablishment of the ancient tributary system. Yet the correctness for many in China of a Sinocentric hierarchy is something that seems to result from five millennia of recorded Chinese culture.9 ¶ Whether a Sinocentric structure in Asia is a subconscious Chinese goal or not, there are enough lingering fears elsewhere in the region about this prospect to create active resistance to the concept. Simply put, we should expect Japan, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and many others to resist the establishment of a new Middle Kingdom. Should the United States scale back its security role in the region, that resistance would also occur, only in more unstable and dangerous forms. ¶ It is important to discuss why China's neighbors tolerate—indeed, even welcome—U.S. security hegemony in the region and why, by contrast, these same countries would strongly resist Chinese hegemony. There is a struc-tural reason why this is so, and it relates to geography and is therefore enduring: China is a large neighbor in the region and the United States is not. Because the United States has to project its presence across a vast ocean, it requires the permission of most countries in the region to continue its role as the security hegemon. The United States requires bases, access rights, and negotiated agreements with local governments to fulfill its secu-rity guarantees. If these governments withdrew their permission due, say, to bad American behavior, the United States would find it difficult and costly to sustain its presence across the ocean in the face of broad resistance. ¶ China, by contrast, is a permanent presence in the region that the neigh- bors can never dislodge. Should China engage in the same bad behavior, these countries cannot make China go away. They can only fight or accept China's treatment. It is therefore easier for the countries in the region to enter into a security contract with an outside power, knowing they have some bar- gaining leverage and an escape clause. When dealing with a powerful neigh-bor like China that isn't going anywhere, the only way to achieve the same bargaining leverage is to match that neighbor's power, especially its military power. And that implies arms races and spiraling security dilemmas.10 ¶ Thus, hegemons are not all created equal. It is easier to strike a bargain with an outside hegemon than with a local one—an immutable reason why the U.S. security presence will be welcome in the region. Even more crucially, U.S. service as the region's security hegemon is much more likely to result in stability than if the region were left alone to find its own stable structure (more on this below). Adding to America's attractiveness as an outsider are the United States' seven-decade record of keeping the region's commons open for all and its not having territorial disputes with countries in the region. The logic behind why most countries in the region welcome the United States as the security hegemon, and why most would resist China attempting to play the same role, is a strong argument for maintaining this arrangement.

## AT: US REM PIC

#### 1] Perm do both- the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust AND the US should fund appropriation of outer space REM mining for public entities. Solves all their offense since none of it is specific to private entities

#### 2] Non-UQ- REM mining is happening right now which means the plan doesn’t cut out all internal links to their impact

#### 3] Asteroid mining can’t solve- it’s not even feasible

Fickling 20

David Fickling (columnist covering commodities and industrial and consumer companies, reporter for Bloomberg, Dow Jones, WSJ, Financial Times, Guardian.; “We’re Never Going to Mine the Asteroid Belt”; *Bloomberg News*; December 21, 2020; <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-12-21/space-mining-on-asteroids-is-never-going-to-happen>; HW-EMJ

It’s wonderful that people are shooting for the stars — but those who declined to fund the expansive plans of the nascent space mining industry were right about the fundamentals. Space mining won’t get off the ground in any foreseeable future — and you only have to look at the history of civilization to see why. One factor rules out most space mining at the outset: gravity. On one hand, it guarantees that most of the solar system’s best mineral resources are to be found under our feet. Earth is the largest rocky planet orbiting the sun. As a result, the cornucopia of minerals the globe attracted as it coalesced is as rich as will be found this side of Alpha Centauri. Gravity poses a more technical problem, too. Escaping Earth’s gravitational field makes transporting the volumes of material needed in a mining operation hugely expensive. On Falcon Heavy, the large rocket being developed by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, transporting a payload to the orbit of Mars comes to as little as $5,357 per kilogram — a drastic reduction in normal launch costs. Still, at those prices just lofting a single half-ton drilling rig to the asteroid belt would use up the annual exploration budget of a small mining company. Power is another issue. The international space station, with 35,000 square feet of solar arrays, generates up to 120 kilowatts of electricity. That drill would need a similar-sized power plant — and most mining companies operate multiple rigs at a time. Power demands rise drastically once you move from exploration drilling to mining and processing. Bringing material back to Earth would raise the costs even more. Japan’s Hayabusa2 satellite spent six years and 16.4 billion yen ($157 million) recovering a single gram of material from the asteroid Ryugu and returning it to Earth earlier this month. What might you want to mine from space? Water is an essential component of most earth-bound mining operations and a potential raw material for hydrogen-oxygen fuel that could be used in space. The discovery in October of ice molecules in craters on the Moon was taken as a major breakthrough. Still, the concentrations of 100 to 412 parts per million are extraordinarily low by terrestrial standards. Copper, which typically costs about $4,500 per metric ton to refine, has an average ore grade of about 6,000 ppm. The more promising commodities are platinum, palladium, gold and a handful of rare related metals. Because of their affinity for iron, these so-called siderophile elements mostly sunk toward the metallic core of our planet early in its formation, and are relatively scarce in the Earth’s crust. Estimates of their abundance on some asteroids, such as the enigmatic Psyche 16 beyond the orbit of Mars, suggest concentrations several times higher than can be found in terrestrial mines. Still, human ingenuity is all about cutting our coat according to our cloth. If such platinum-group metals are going to justify the literally astronomical costs of space mining, they’ll need to count on sustained high prices for the decade or so that would be needed to get such an operation up and running — and that sort of situation is all but unheard-of in the materials industry. When prices of an essential commodity get excessively high, chemists get extraordinarily good at finding ways to avoid using it, scrap merchants improve their recycling rates, and miners discover new deposits that wouldn’t have been viable at lower prices. Even criminals get in on the game. That eventually pushes supply up and demand down, so that prices rebalance — a dynamic we’ve seen play out in the markets for rare earths, lithium and cobalt in recent years. The world mines about three times more platinum than it did in the early 1970s, but prices have barely changed once adjusted for inflation. That might sound a disappointing prospect to those looking for excuses for humanity to colonize space — but really it should be seen as a tribute to our ingenuity. Humanity’s failure to exploit extraterrestrial ore reserves isn’t a sign that we lack imagination. If anything, it’s a sign of the adaptive genius that put us in orbit in the first place.

#### 4] Brands card doesn’t link to the rest of the NB- it’s specific to military bases and allied commitments- REMs don’t link

5] **Heg structurally causes interventions that create more instability, prolif, and terror- which outweigh**

**Ashford, PhD, 19**

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 6, CNAS)

Military intervention abroad is **not a bug, but rather a feature of American primacy**. Certainly, some would argue that disasters like the Iraq war are a momentary aberration in a broader pattern of benevolent foreign policy behavior. Yet supporters of primacy are often schizophrenic about this issue. Hal Brands, for example, has argued both that democracy promotion is a core liberal project, and that the norms of nonaggression and sovereignty are paramount to the U.S.-led order.10 Others describe humanitarian or pro-democracy intervention as a necessary – even core – component of maintaining international order.11 In reality, the broad, sweeping goals of liberal internationalism almost inevitably lead to intervention, at least in an era of unipolarity. The rationale may vary from case to case, but illiberal behavior – military conquest –typically is excused as justifiable in the service of liberal goals,12 from nonproliferation in Iraq, to human rights in Libya or Kosovo, to counterterrorism in Niger and Cameroon. Since the end of the Cold War and the end of bipolarity, such interventions have become substantially more numerous; by one estimate, the United States engaged in four times as many military interventions since 1992 as during the whole of the Cold War.13 American endorsement of problematic norms like the Responsibility to Protect have only added to the problem. The results of the intervention trap have been dire. The **few moderate successes have been largely outweighed by an impressive number of failures**. The war in Iraq upset the balance of power in the Middle East and helped to contribute to the rise of ISIS. The U.S.-installed government of Afghanistan continues to slowly lose ground against a resurgent Taliban. The intervention in Libya produced an ongoing civil conflict. And American actions in these cases may be **driving dictators elsewhere – like North Korea’s Kim Jong Un – to pursue the protection that only nuclear weapons can bring.** Even interventions like Kosovo, typically viewed as more benign, can be problematic. As James Goldgeier notes, “Because it ended with NATO victorious and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic irreversibly weakened, it does not get the same level of attention as the 2003 Iraq War or the 2011 intervention in Libya. But it should.”14 Confrontations with both Russia and China during the Kosovo intervention helped to worsen relations, and the intervention itself later served as a precedent for the Bush administration’s unilateral invasion of Iraq. On a broader level, the exponential growth of U.S. counterterrorism commitments overseas – from drone strikes to special ops forces and the deployment of troops to engage in “train-and-equip” missions – **has driven groups with predominantly local grievances into the arms of global terror groups, and has increased radicalization** in various areas.15 Counterterrorism missions are frequently invisible to the American people, and policymakers rarely debate their missions or cost, continuing to rely on the dated 2001 Authorization to use Military Force. Constant interventions squander blood and treasure, all while **chipping away at U.S. military readiness.**16 As Michael Spirtas of Rand describes, “Almost two decades of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in a generation of American service members with little experience in thinking about or preparing for major power conflict.”17 These outcomes are **not the consequence of a few poor decisions, but rather of the core motivating concepts of primacy** and its expansive aims. If we continue to adhere to a strategy that views America as the world’s policeman and savior, we will remain stuck in **the intervention trap.**

### Condo

#### Condo is a voting issue- several reasons to prefer

#### Strat skew – multiple routes to the ballot gives the neg an unfair advantage and aff must use speech AND prep time to cover all routes or else neg just goes for the one off that was covered the least, the time-crunched 1AR has no chance

#### Decks clash – the 2NR just goes for the least covered off which doesn’t encourage clash and creates non-competitive debates

#### Dispo solves – they can kick if the aff makes a perm

#### Paradigm issues-

#### Drop the debater because it deters against future violations of the neg

#### Prefer competing interps because it minimizes judge intervention