## K

### 1NC

#### The aff’s advantages are designed to paper over the faults of neoliberalism and protect capital on a broader scale.

#### L: Their faith in market logics allows for rampant international austerity and privatization of healthcare – this is a tradeoff DA that outweighs and turns case.

Sell and Williams, 20

[Susan K., School of Regulation and Global Governance @ The Australian National University, Political Science @ George Washington University; and Owain D., University of Queensland, Public Health: “Health under capitalism: a global political economy of structural pathogenesis,” Review of International Political Economy, 27:1 (2020), 1-25, DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2019.1659842]//AD

More recently, economic crises have (re-)inspired neoliberal governance responses to health and rejuvenated the authority of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (De Vogli, Marmot, & Stuckler, 2013; De Vogli & Birbeck, 2005; Farmer, 2003; Rowden, 2013; Schrecker, 2016a; Stuckler & Basu, 2013) The IMF has acted with revitalized authority to force sharp reductions in spending on health services and salaries in new debtor states, with decisions often backed and facilitated by the EU (Kentikelenis, 2017). In Greece, in the face of the euro crisis, hospital budgets were cut by 40% with 26,000 public health workers’ jobs at risk (Kentikelenis et al., 2011, p. 1457). While mixed national health systems are common in many countries, the state often remains as a stubborn presence and health care provider. Yet governments and multilateral organizations repeatedly emphasize the appeal of private insurers and the private sector as health care providers. Neoliberalism and its implications for health governance are evident in structural adjustment and austerity policies adopted in the wake of debt and financial crises when health budgets are starved to make banks whole (Clark & Heath, 2014; Mooney, 2012; Stuckler & Basu, 2013). Austerity measures in the wake of financial crises in Latin America and South East Asia, and the global financial crisis of 2008 put pressure on publicly funded national health systems. States have responded, either willingly or not, with divestment in health and the opening up the sector to market forces. In some cases, such as the UK, the resultant phases of health service privatization and rolling back of social insurance systems proceed in a piecemeal fashion from non-core services to the heart of the public system, and with attacks on publicly supported financial risk pooling or progressive tax transfers to those in need of health assistance (Pieper, 2018). Policymakers tout the market as a more efficient means of allocating scarce resources for health. There are substantial profits to be made both out of the public purse in collaborative financial and investment relations with the state for health projects, as is the case with the often highly subsidized Public Private Partnerships and Public Private Investment deals in many European countries (Lanas, 2016; Roehrich, Barlow, & Wright, 2014). Multiple economic interests are at play in privatization and state rollbacks; the market for health is substantial, and health related economic sectors are often hugely profitable. In developing countries, health service firms and private insurers are penetrating burgeoning middle class markets and cherry picking which health services are provided privately (Jasso-Aguilar, Waitzkin, & Landwehr, 2005)). Finally, many of the orthodoxies associated with neoliberalism continue to shape and constrain health policy and regulation, with spending on public health and services attenuated in many countries since the 2008 global financial crisis (Brumby & Verhoeven, 2010). Despite contestation and the presence of welcome alternative policy pathways, we risk neglecting structural and political economic drivers, including economic ideologies, as powerful and often dominant logics operating in and influencing that governance system.

#### L: The WTO is inevitably a tool of accumulation for capitalist imperialism – international institutional monopoly capitalism overdetermines the plan’s move to peace – causes war, environmental degradation, and extinction.

Cuong, 18

[Vu Manh, Researcher @ VietEra Foundation: “International institutional monopoly capitalism and its manifestations,” published by Monthly Review on December 19, 2018. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Cuong-Vu-10/publication/331162082\_International\_institutional\_monopoly\_capitalism\_and\_its\_manifestations/links/5c6c2588299bf1e3a5b62764/International-institutional-monopoly-capitalism-and-its-manifestations.pdf]//AD

\*IIMC=International Institutional Monopoly Capitalism

The Evolution of Monopoly Capitalism Monopoly capitalism emerged from “laissez-faire” capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as described clearly by V.I. Lenin in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, allowing giant corporations to dominate the accumulation process. Since the late 1970s, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, this system has reached a new level in its development, forging imperial centralism or “International Institutional Monopoly Capitalism” (IIMC), whereby a handful of powerful nation-states explicitly use international organizations to impose their interests and further expand accumulation. Figure 1 presents a brief overview of the conceptualization of capitalism throughout its history, focusing on the development of monopoly capitalism from the 1870s to the present, including both economic and politic facets. It includes IIMC as the newest term in the evolution of monopoly capitalism. (2) (3) (4) (5) As Karl Marx noted, capitalism has an inherent drive toward endless accumulation through the production of “surplus value.” In relation to this defining characteristic of the system, there have been distinct historical configurations of its operation. IIMC represents the highest form of the imperialism stage of capitalism, given the increasingly coordination between the monopoly capital and the state within core nations. As a state-formed monopoly capitalism, IIMC has been forcing most economies to participate in its system, regardless of whether those economies are capitalist or socialist (except North Korea). This is what Nikolai Bukharin pointed to a century ago. According to Samir Amin, in the globalization era, the efficiency of economic management by nation-states has changed. Under IIMC, advanced capitalist states are even stronger, as far as their economic-political reach, and are able to control international institutions and organizations. Within these core nations, the state uses its strength to support the formation of “supercompanies” (the multinational corporations that monopolize one or a number of products/services worldwide), serving the interests of the richest class, while bringing some additional benefits to its broader population. These countries are monopoly nations. Through international institutional settings (e.g., World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization), monopoly capital and monopoly nations extend their influence and power into every corner of the world, even the few remaining socialist strongholds, causing complex conflicts within globalization and regionalization processes. Capital Concentration and the Establishment of Monopoly Nations Capital accumulation and the centralization and concentration of capital led to the formation of monopolies (cartels, syndicates, trusts, consortiums, and conglomerates). This fundamental law of capitalism continues to take effect in the IIMC period, albeit at a very high level. However, the following organic processes contributed to the formation of monopoly nations: 1. The concentration and centralization of capital in super-companies: The increasing strength and expansion of super-companies, especially over the last five decades, have advanced economic internationalization and globalization. Globally, the 500 largest companies generated $31.1 trillion in 2014. They accounted for nearly 40 percent of world income –up 20 percent from less than 20 percent in 1960. Super-companies not only have a monopoly within one country’s borders but also are dominant in other countries worldwide. The overseas assets of the world’s 100 largest non-financial super-companies in 2011 accounted for 63 percent of their total assets, whereas foreign sales reached 65 percent of their total. This is reflected in the intensification of foreign direct investment (FDI); the significant transfer of employment, technology and international financial operations; and the strong rise of financial systems, bank credit, and insurance. Many super-companies with powerful finances (assets, revenues) can far exceed the gross domestic product (GDP) of many economies. For example, Procter & Gamble (ranked 100 in the list of the largest companies), as noted in Table 1,has revenues that are higher than the GDP of Oman,which is the largest economy in a group of 124 smalland medium-sized economies, with $81.8billion in 2014. Supercompanies can dramatically influence small and/or poor countries as they pressure governments to condone environmental degradation, violation of national labor laws, and abuse of labor rights. They can force these governments to tender incentives, which maximize their profits by allowing extremely poor working conditions and low wages. Some super-companies actively destroy local agriculture and kill marine life, which has sparked mass protests. They often hire military personnel to open fire on peaceful protestors and make assassinations. 2. The mass exploitation of workers: The division of labor extends throughout the world. In 2011, the employment of foreign affiliates worldwide reached sixty-nine million jobs, up by 8 percent from 2010. Specifically, the total number of employees of the ten largest companies worldwide in 2014 exceeded 9.8 million, which is more than the population of many independent nations.  This international division of labor is a product of monopoly capitalism, seeking to avoid the “law of declining rate of profit” and striving to increase the rate of profit. John Bellamy Foster and John Smith have clearly presented this trend, using archetypical examples of the labor and production associated with iPhones, T-shirts, and coffee, which involve super-exploitation overseas by super-companies. As a result, over the last three decades, an enormous amount of surplus value has been produced in the periphery, but captured by super-companies within monopoly nations. Through the international division of labor and expansion of branches worldwide, super-companies promote alliances in the form of complex cooperation among themselves and between themselves and small- and medium-sized companies. They adopt a “divide and rule” approach to control labor worldwide. These super-companiestake advantage of the economies of scale to increase their market shares and influence. Once they are in place in peripheral countries, they influence habits and traditional customs. Workers re-align themselves to earn a living wage. 3. The symbiotic growth of monopoly nations and super-companies: Both the state and capital rely on each other to exploit existing internal natural resources (e.g., OECD with its oil); control major production resources throughout the world (e.g., the United States in regard to Iraq’s oil, China influence on its neighbors’ sea routes and exclusive economic zone in the East and South China Seas); and possess key technologies, such as weapons, cell cloning, artificial intelligence robots, patent medicine develop, or media and communication. In other words, monopoly nations are the products of “five monopolies.” Super-companies and monopoly nations exert their technological and economic powers to dominant the world market, leading to both positive and negative impacts. Super-companies like capitalists to have control over mass destructive weapons, in order to defeat competitors and to destroy commoners’ benefits. The first and most outstanding monopoly nation is the United States, which has only two companies that reached a turnover in excess of $5 billion in 1955: General Motors ($9.82 billion) and Exxon Mobil ($5.66 billion). However, by 1990, the number of large companies (over $5 billion of turnover) had reached more than 100. In 2013, the smallest company (Exelon: energy sector) of the 132 largest companies had a turnover of $23.5 billion. On a global scale, the company that has the lowest ranking in the top 500 list of largest companies (ranked by Fortune in 2013) is Ricoh (office-equipment sector), reaching sales of over $23.2 billion. Also included in this list are eighty-nine companies from China, which is a rapid increase, compared to its thirty-four companies in 2008. As of 2015, the Global 500 are represented by 36 countries, but nearly 472 of the Global 500 are from only 16 countries: Canada, the United States, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Brazil, India, and Russia. Of these 16 countries, 13 are the world’s largest economies. Table 2 lists the typical monopoly nations in the world in 2015. The combining of super-companies and states that Lenin analyzed nearly 100 years ago, in which capitalists pivot around political agencies and monopolies, led to the integration of monopoly nations and international institutions/organizations. Thus, under the conditions of IIMC, this integration has crucially influenced the globalization process of the world economy, specifically for the peripheral countries. Although these monopoly nations dominate at different levels and their income is not equivalent, they do not conquer other nations; nonetheless, they help transfer a vast surplus of value from peripheral countries into the core countries. Monopoly Nations Monopolize International Institutions The rise of super-companies has not meant the end of competition, which is globally more intense today than ever before. Simultaneously, monopoly nations do not displace super-companies or prevent their monopolistic power; on the contrary, these states directly and indirectly provide super-companies with advantages and benefits. As Harry Braverman explained, “the state is guarantor of the conditions, the social relations, of capitalism, and the protector of the ever more unequal distribution of property.” The role of the state has changed in monopoly nations: it not only regulates the domestic economy, exploits the state capital, and protects monopolies on the international market, but it also represents and supports the allies of domestic monopolies to affect the activities of international institutions/organizations in its favor and increase its competitiveness. The role of the state and its various imperial alliances with local politicians is facilitated through the discourse of national and international competitiveness. Thus, the rise of monopoly nations has not killed competition in all of its forms. In fact, rivalry is more frequent and fierce between monopoly nations and other economies. The formation of monopoly nations and the emergence of a number of new industrialized countries have caused problems for individual economies to address and settle the issues related to international economic activities. For example, the legal systems and the legal provisions of nations have become a barrier to the circular flow of resources and limited the mobilities of the supercompanies. These can range from the agricultural protection policies that were severely opposed by the Cairns Group at the Uruguay Round in 1986 (the first time developing countries had played an active role) to the restriction regulations in immigration. They are also associated with cultural or political issues such as Internet censorship in China, Euroscepticism trend in European Union and Brexit in the United Kingdom, the opposition of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and new protectionism in the United States. Meanwhile, the international institutions had just proved their consistency in their role of coordination and international arbitration among new member economies in the beginning phase. Subsequently, the competitiveness among countries has moved to a higher level and continued to increase, which manifested itself in many forms such as disputes of commerce, technology, and finance, etc. The recent disputes include: batteries (solar) between the United States and India; beef among the United States, Indo, and Japan; steel pipes between Japan and China; auto parts between the United States and China; catfish, frozen shrimp, and garments between Viet Nam and the United States; and rare earths among the United States, the European Union, Japan, and China. There is a severe conflict among the United States, the European Union, Ukraine, and Russia on the recent issue of annexing Crimea. Since its establishment, the World Trade Organization has witnessed many disputes over dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguarded trade among member economies. Most of these arguments are related to monopoly nations. The number of quarrels is growing rapidly: over the last twenty years in particular, the World Trade Organization has had to resolve hundreds of cases. Specifically, the United States is a typical monopoly nation that is associated with the majority of the commercial disputes in the world (344 cases), followed by the European Union (316 cases), Japan (180 cases), and China (155 cases). In the context of the multitude of interlocking and complicated disagreements, the dispute settlement mechanism of World Trade Organization constitutes the basic cornerstone maintaining the multilateral trading order. However, monopoly nations have been controlling this mechanism. If there are disputes among the strongest monopoly nations, this makes them direct competitors (these include the United States, Japan, Western Europe, Russia, and China). Thus, monopoly nations tend to compromise and align with others to monopolize the World Trade Organization. Otherwise, super-companies always plan well to avoid a devalued competition. In the case of Ford, Toyota, and the other leading auto firms, the companies did not try to undersell each other in their prices. Instead, they competed for the low-cost position by making reductions in prime production (labor and raw material) costs that could be implemented in peripheral regions. Monopoly nations monopolize not only the World Trade Organization but also other international institutions/organizations or forums, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and regional banks. Furthermore, monopoly nations monopolize political forums like G-7, the European Union, and even the most powerful United Nations. Monopoly nations also monopolize most other regional organizations, from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and most recent the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Below is a list of typical international institutions/organizations and mechanisms that the monopoly nations are monopolizing: • United Nations: Founded in 1945, it was monopolized at its founding by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. These five members not only have the responsibility to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations but also have the power to veto, thus enabling them to oppose or prevent any proposed resolution of the other members. As a rule, as these five members become stronger, the United Nations is weaker. The weakness of the United Nations is expressed not only in the handling of the South China Sea dispute, but also in events such as Ukraine’s political crisis, the East China Sea quarrels, and its ability to eliminate wars and serious conflicts since the fall of Soviet (31) (32) (33) MR Online | International institutional monopoly capitalism and its manifestations Page 8 of 26 https://mronline.org/2018/12/19/international-institutional-monopoly-capitalism-and-… 07/01/2019 Union, specifically wars for economic purpose. For instance, the U.S. war machine engaged in Afghanistan (2001-14) and Iraq (2003-11); the Russia annexation of Crimea (2014); and the threat of a Chinese war in the South China Sea. The key motivation of the current aggressive and strongest monopoly nations is to gain control over vital strategic resources. • World Bank: Founded in 1944, an international institution was originally dominated by the United States and the United Kingdom. The domination of monopoly nations is evident in the voting rights of the member economies in the World Bank. Of the members, in 2013 the United States had highest voting rights at 17.69 percent, followed by Japan (6.84 percent), China (4.42 percent), Germany (4.00 percent), the United Kingdom (3.75 percent), and France (3.75 percent). • International Monetary Fund: Established in 1944, the International Monetary Fund’s funding is contributed by the member economies. Since its inception, the United States has always been the largest contributor (17.69 percent) and has been dominant through the majority of the voting rights, followed by other members with large holdings in 2010, such as Japan (6.56 percent), Germany (6.12 percent), the United Kingdom (4.51 percent), France (4.51 percent), and China (4.00 percent). • World Trade Organization: The World Trade Organization was established in 1995 to replace the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that had been in effect since 1948. Its mission is to eliminate or minimize trade barriers to free trade. The majority of its decisions are based on negotiation and consensus. However, the negotiation process does not always reach consensus among all of its members. This process is often criticized by many developing economies because they are not welcome in the negotiations and because, according to Richard Steinberg, the trade negotiations are actually promoted and end at a negotiating position that provides special benefit for the European Union and the United States. The formation of the regional institutions/organizations, the multilateral economic cooperation forums, and bilateral negotiations are an expression of the ever-increasing conflict between the regionalization and globalization processes. Such examples include the conflicts between the European Union and World Trade Organization on agricultural policy; between North American Free Trade Agreement and World Trade Organization on juridical and political issues; and between Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and World Trade Organization on oil price/supply management. These processes lead to very complicated overlapping and interlocking regional and international organizations because a monopoly nation can be a member of several organizations simultaneously. Thus, these organizations become the direct or indirect means to facilitate the monopoly nations in exploiting other countries. It is inevitable that the activities of powerful international institutions (such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization) have not really brought equal benefits to all. The IIMC built a complex called the “IMNs-United Nation: Specialized Agencies, International Institutions/Organizations, and Region Organizations” (IMNsInIs). This organization is beyond the scope of previous international institutions. In other words, the IIMC is a combination of the power of super-companies, monopoly nations, and the juridical capacity of the international institutions. Under IIMC, capital globalization has not only strengthened the power of monopoly nations but has simultaneously created the dependence of other states/nations on the world market and finance system, which are dominated by monopoly nations. This relationship among states/ nations reflects the development of monopoly nations at the expense of the peripheral regions. In addition, “IMNs-InIs” is different from “transnational capitalism class – transnational state” structure in quality, in which the former has instrumentalized the latter. In IMNs-InIs, the international organizations have progressively been the “instrumental institutions” in the hands of monopoly nations to favor them and hinder other economies. This is typically the case when the United Nations Security Council members impose sanctions against other nations, trumping any efforts that could weaken their veto power. It is true in how monopoly nations dominate the WTO through the Doha Development Agenda to hinder agricultural economies of peripheral countries. It is evident in how the International Monetary Fund serves wealthy countries but increases poverty and environmental degradation in poor countries. The establishment of the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has raised concerns for both the United States and Japan regarding whether the bank will have high standards of governance and safeguards, which will prevent damage to other creditors. The IIMC is the final stage of “state-formed monopoly capitalism,” the new form of capitalist production that maintains the existence of capitalism and adapts it to new historical conditions.

#### L: Securitizing biological risks ties health to the protection of global capitalism. ‘Disease as threat’ narratives militarize responsibility for public health, replicating past colonial structures to secure neoliberalism.

Mohan J. **DUTTA, 15**. Professor and Head of the Department of Communications and New Media at the National University of Singapore, Adjunct Professor of Communication at the Brian Lamb School of Communication at Purdue University. Neoliberal Health Organizing, 2015, p. 167-169.

The globalization of economies has produced accelerated patterns of movements of capital, goods, services, materials, and labor, simultaneously resulting in the accelerated production and circulation of anxieties constituted around these movements. Neoliberal organizing of health manifests itself in the development and deployment of surveillance, management, and coordination networks that see health primarily in the **realm of threats** posed by diseases dispersed through global networks, networks of bioterror, emerging **infectious diseases**, and **biowarfare** (Salinsky, 2002). The response of health systems therefore is formulated in the form of network structures of biodefense and homeland security, performing functions of surveillance, information gathering, and information dissemination, constituted around the **economic logics** of growth and efficiency. The protection of the economic opportunities of globalization becomes the function of public health systems formulated in the **narrative of geosecurity** and implemented in the form of programs controlled by the **police-military complex** within structures of biodefense, biosecurity and geosecurity. With this emphasis on security, the mandate for health depicts **continuity with colonial** implementations of public health administration to manage erstwhile colonies, increasingly being set within the military metaphor of health, turning health into a geosecurity threat for the new configurations of **empire**, and therefore, deploying **military interventions** to address health issues. Consider the following depiction in a report issued by the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) that offers a picture of the global health threats posed by infectious diseases: New and reemerging infectious diseases will pose a rising global health threat and will complicate U.S. and global security over the next twenty years. These diseases will endanger U.S. citizens at home and abroad, threaten U.S. armed forces deployed overseas, and exacerbate social and political instability in key countries and regions in which the United States has significant interests. (Gordon, 2000) [END PAGE 167] The protection of human health is seen as a **function of the military**, tied to the goals of **defending global capitalism** against the threats to health and reflecting the colonial undertones of health containment measures deployed by the instruments of empire. In this instance of the report published by the NIC, knowledge about health is constituted in the realm of intelligence gathering to protect the interests of national security of the United States. Framed as threats to the health of citizens at home and abroad and to the health of the armed forces deployed overseas, infectious diseases are seen as contributors to social and political instability in key strategic regions of significant value to the United States. International relations are understood in the language of security, casting interpenetrating networks as targets of surveillance and management. The portrayal of infectious diseases as threats to geosecurity deploys valuable health resources into the hands of the military, placing the power of disease management under military structures and framing the responses to disease in military interpretations. Moreover, the juxtaposition of epidemic narratives amid narratives of war and bioterror heighten the concerns for geosecurity, foregrounding and necessitating a variety of military response strategies (Aaltola, 2012). The interpenetrating relationship between health and the military constitute one element of the consolidation of power in the hands of the global elite achieved through neoliberal transformations. The military emerges as a global organizational structure for the management of health, simultaneously justifying the deployment of resources to the military and the deployment of military strategies to address health issues. This emphasis on the military framed within the realm of protecting geostrategic interests constructs health in the realm of threats, simultaneously **erasing** questions of fundamental human rights to health. Similarly, in the president's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a significant proportion of resources are housed in the military in order to deploy military-to-military interventions within the broader umbrella of protecting the geostrategic interests of the United States. Consider, for instance, the workings of the U.S. Africa Command to address HIV/ AIDS prevention as a security threat in Africa. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is the result of an internal reorganization of the U.S. military command structure, creating one administrative headquarters that answers to the Secretary of Defense and is responsible for U.S. military relations with 53 African countries. AFRICOM recognizes that HIV/AIDS has an enormous impact on economic and political stability across the continent, and, by degrading military medical readiness, weakens the national security of individual countries. HIV/ AIDS programming will be a key component of AFRICOM's security cooperation and humanitarian assistance activities. (www.pepfar.gov/about/agencies/ cl 9397.htm) [END PAGE 168] Critical to the deployment of a militarized form of governance in addressing health is the consolidation of power within elite structures, working through militarized systems of governance to control disease to protect the economic interests of the status quo. The military, as an instrument of power and control, functions within the narratives of security cooperation and humanitarian assistance activities to assert its **power and control** in global governance. Intelligence gathering emerges as an instrument for the generation of data to secure and protect **zones of economic function**. This gathering of targeted intelligence and the deployment of targeted interventions becomes particularly critical within the context of maintaining open zones of communication and economic exchange within the neoliberal structuring of economic relationships. Knowledge and technical interventions in this sense are constituted amid the paradoxical agenda of needing to protect boundaries and at the same time ensuring transnational spaces of movement of capital, labor, services, materials, and markets. In this chapter, we closely interrogate the meanings that circulate around the militarization of health, and attend to the communicative processes through which the militarization of health is achieved. The surveillance of spaces and the militarization of responses, I argue, are continuous with colonial logics of controlling spaces in distant locales of imperial governance, and are discontinuous from the colonial forms of governance because of the paradoxes of networked flows in neoliberal governance.

#### I: Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause goes unquestioned. Farbod 15

( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)

Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6% per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800%.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85% of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50% of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1% will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80% of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return**.**

#### I/F: The role of the ballot is to resist neoliberal ideology – filter negative arguments through an epistemological dismantling of neoliberalism.

HAY & ROSAMUND, PhDs, 2002 (Colin and Ben, Journal of European Public Policy Volume 9, Issue 2, 2002 p. 3-5)

The implicit supposition which seems to underlie much of the sceptical or second-wave literature seeking to expose the ‘myth’ or ‘delusion’ of globalisation, is that a rigorous empirical exercise in demystification will be sufficient to reverse the tide of ill-informed public policy made in the name of globalisation. Sadly, this has not proved to be the case. For **however convinced we might be by the empirical armoury mustered against the hyperglobalisation thesis** by the sceptics, their **rigorous empiricism leads them to fail adequately to consider the way in which globalisation comes to inform public policy-making.** **It is here,** we suggest, that **the discourse of globalisation** — and the discursive construction of the imperatives it is seen to conjure along with attendant fatalism about the possibilities for meaningful political agency — **must enter the analysis**. For, as the most cursory reflection on the issue of structure and agency reveals, **it is the ideas actors hold about the context in which they find themselves** rather than the context itself **which informs the way in which they behave** (Hay 1999a, forthcoming a). **This is no less true of policy makers and governments**. **Whether** the **globalisation** thesis **is ‘true’** or not **may matter far less than whether it is deemed to be true** (or, quite possibly, just useful) **by those employing it**. Consequently, **if the aim** of the sceptics **is to discredit the political appeal to dubious economic imperatives associated with globalisation**, then they might **we**ll **benefit from asking** themselves **why and under what conditions** politicians and **public officials invoke** external **economic constraints** in the first place. It is to this task that we direct our attentions in this paper. Yet at the outset a certain word of caution is perhaps required. For, even if we accept the potential causal role that ideas about globalisation might play in the structuration of political and economic outcomes, we may be in danger of narrowing the discursive field of our attentions at the outset. The ideas policy makers use to legitimate and/or to rationalise their behaviour should not simply be seen as more or less accurate reflections of the context they perceive (based on more or less complete information). Nor should discourses be understood as necessarily and exclusively ‘strategic’ (i.e. as relating to situations in which an actor’s employment of a discourse correlates directly to particular material interests). **Discourse matters** in at least two respects. **The way** in which **actors behave is not merely a reflection** of the degree of accuracy and completeness **of the information they possess**; **it is also** a reflection of **their normative orientation** towards their environment and potential future scenarios. Thus the constraints and/or opportunities which globalisation is held to imply might be understood (or misunderstood) in very similar ways in different (national) contexts. Yet such understanding are likely to provoke divergent responses from political actors with different normative orientations and diverse institutional contexts. Put simply, **though actors may share a** common **understanding of** the process of **globalisation, they may respond** very **differently to its** perceived **challenges and threats** **depending on whether one regards the future it promises in a positive or negative light** – witness the still ongoing debate within the governing SPD in Germany between supporters of Schröder and Lafontaine (see Lafontaine 1998; Lafontaine and Müller 1998; Schröder 1998; and for a commentary Jeffery and Handl 1999), or that in France between Bourdieu, Forrester and anti-globalisation groups like ATTAC on the one hand and social liberals within the Parti Socialiste on the other (see Bourdieu 1998; Boudieu and Wacquant 1999; Forrester 1999; and for a commentary Bouvet and Michel 1999; Meunier 2000). Within the European Commission, there is evidence to suggest that common understandings of globalisation can be quite consistent with distinct conceptions of the capacity to exercise meaningful agency as actors take up quite different ‘subject positions’ in relation to globalisation (Rosamond, 1999; 2000b). **It is important**, then, at the outset **that we consider the potential causal role of ideas about globalisation in the structuration of political and economic outcomes**.3 Our central argument is, we think, likely to prove controversial. It is simply stated, though its implications are more complex. Essentially, we suggest, **policy makers acting on the basis of assumptions consistent with the hyperglobalisation thesis may well serve**, in so doing, **to bring about outcomes consistent with that thesis, irrespective of its veracity and,** indeed, irrespective of its perceived veracity**.** This provocative suggestion with, if warranted, important implications, clearly requires some justification (see also Hay 1999b; Rosamond 1999, 2000b, 2000c). **Globalisation has become** a key referent of contemporary political discourse and, increasingly, **a lens through which policy-makers view the context in which they find themselves.** **If** we can assume that political actors have no more privileged vantage point from which to understand their environment than anyone else and — as most commentators would surely concede — that **one of the principal discourses through which that environment now comes to be understood is that of globalisation, then the content of such ideas is likely to affect significantly political dynamics.**

#### A: The alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only party organizing can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct chauvinist tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for global liberation.

Escalante, Philosophy @ UOregon, 18

[Alyson, M.A., is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/>] rVs

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

## CP

### 1NC

#### Text: The People’s Republic of China should offer Chinese developed vaccines and medical technology related to COVID-19 to the world for free

#### Their Carman Card admits that efforts from the US fails, they contradict with themselves US Heg fails, the CP massively ramps up Chinese “vaccine diplomacy” which solves the case

Juecheng and Yuwei 8-13-21

(Zhao and Hu, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231387.shtml)

One of China’s most valued contributions to the global fair accessibility to COVID-19 vaccines is to enable more developing countries to hone their ability to produce vaccines by themselves, Zha Daojiong, professor of International Political Economy from Peking University, who closely studies the global vaccine equitable allocation framework, told the Global Times in a recent exclusive interview. Sharing his insights on widely discussed “vaccine nationalism,” “wavering vaccine intellectual property,” and “COVAX operation challenges,” Zha believes that China is advocating negotiations among countries on equitable global distribution of vaccines from a humanitarian, and global perspective. China has vowed to make efforts to provide the world with 2 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines this year and donate $100 million to COVAX to promote global vaccine provision. This commitment comes amid the rampaging Delta variant, which is bringing more challenges for developing countries to access vaccines and combat the pandemic while the West continues to drag its heels in fulfilling its promises. The promise was made at the first meeting of a forum on international cooperation on COVID-19 vaccines held on August 5. Zha suggested that the forum, alongside the Initiative for Belt and Road Partnership on COVID-19 Vaccine Cooperation, reflect China’s efforts to support long-term cooperation in the vaccine industry globally. However, some Western media have labeled China and Russia as the pioneers of the global "vaccine diplomacy" campaign. The choice of vaccines by countries has become the epitome of global geopolitics.   Foreign comments on China using "vaccine diplomacy" in a narrow geopolitical sense reflect the real competition among COVID-19 vaccine providers, Zha told the Global Times. Due to China’s mature vaccine technologies, longer shelf life and lower requirement for storage and transportation, Chinese made vaccines are a more preferable choice for many developing countries with relatively weak vaccination infrastructure . This has been reflected in the approval of Chinese vaccines in more than 100 countries. But the phenomenon of “vaccine nationalism” was never absent in the decision by governments to choose vaccines, Zha suggested. “For example, some countries and regions would include geopolitical factors in choosing vaccines. These countries would reject certain vaccines. Moreover, some media outlets refuse to accept the fact that the professional assessment of vaccine efficacy is also a scientific process. Instead, they made comments on potential vaccines based on their geopolitical interests. This is also a kind of “vaccine nationalism”. Voices blaming “vaccine nationalism” have long been present in developed countries. For instance, Zha recalled how, during the H1N1 pandemic of 2009 which affected more than 200 countries and regions for more than a year, certain developed countries bought out entire stocks of vaccines against H1N1 once they were developed. Though some of those countries had promised to donate vaccines to others after they met their vaccination needs, the virus had long disappeared before their donations were made. Therefore, many in other nations lost the opportunity of a timely vaccination. Providing assistance from one country to another in the field of infectious or non-infectious diseases is often referred to as "health diplomacy." Some international public health research literature support "health diplomacy" because cooperation in this field is conducive to the improvement of political, economic and diplomatic relations, Zha said. China has taken important steps to close the global vaccine gap, including the acceleration of large-scale production, boosting fair distribution, and licensing local production in more countries.

#### Chinese leadership stops global secessionist conflict, which turns china args in the second advantage.

Griffiths 16 **-** Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney (Ryan, States, Nations, and Territorial Stability: Why Chinese Hegemony Would Be Better for International Order, Security Studies, 25:3, 519-545, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2016.1195628)

I began the article by claiming that the Pax Sinica would be better for international order. In making this claim I define “better” in narrow terms emphasizing territorial stability, which can be assessed in several ways. How often do either external aggressors or internal separatists shift sovereign borders through violence? What is the frequency of secessionist civil war? How much international discord is there on the topic of secession and recognition? This is the ledger I use when comparing the Pax Sinica with the post-1945 American-led order. There are many other factors, to be sure, and critics might point to a number of ways in which Chinese hegemony would be worse. For example, they may question the support for human rights under Chinese leadership. I do not argue that Chinese hegemony would be better in all ways—there are pros and cons to any order—but I contend that there are net benefits where territorial stability is concerned. Analyzed under these terms the key differences between the American order and the imagined Chinese order have to do with the politics of secession and sovereign recognition. International order matters because it determines diplomatic practices and shapes behavior. It sets the rules of the game. The American-led order over the last seventy years has attempted to balance the norms of territorial integrity and self-determination by establishing rules for what nations are eligible for independence. But, as Fabry notes, that is an enormously challenging project because developing clear rules that separate the lucky from the unlucky requires that states derive agreed-upon criteria in a constitutive process.73 Given the politics and conflicting principles of international life (and the evolving nature of normative arguments), inconsistency, ambiguity, and accusations of hypocrisy are unavoidable. The resulting political space creates uncertainty for states and nationalist movements over when self-determination applies and when it should be subordinated to territorial integrity. Incidents like the Ukrainian crisis cast a shadow over separatist crises elsewhere. The leadership in Azerbaijan detects double standards in American policy, wondering why it “punishes Russia for annexing Crimea, but not Armenia for similar behavior in Karabakh.”74 Such uncertainly can makes states feel vulnerable, as it has in Azerbaijan, change the incentives for key actors, and increase the chance of conflict. Secessionist civil war is a common feature of contemporary times. Scholars estimate that at least half of the civil wars since 1945 have involved secessionism, and Barbara F. Walter argues that secessionism is the chief source of violence in the world today.75 Erica Chenowith and Maria Stephan find that secessionism is one of the few (if only) forms of political protest where violent tactics are more effective than nonviolent.76 Meanwhile, Tanisha Fazal and I identify fifty-five secessionist movements as of 2011 and record that many of these movements feel they have a reasonable chance of gaining independence in light of the somewhat flexible practices surrounding recognition.77 Given the strategic environment in which secessionists operate, where violence can be effective and where sovereignty is thought to be obtainable, it should come as no surprise that conflict is common. In regard to territorial stability, the concern of contemporary times is not traditional territorial conquest, but the threat posed by state fragmentation.78 This is where Chinese hegemony ought to improve international order.

## DA

#### Pharma industry innovation is up but profit margins are razor thin

Young 9-14-21

(Peter, CEO and President of Young & Partners, and a member of Pharm Exec’s Editorial Advisory Board. https://www.pharmexec.com/view/fishawack-health-appoints-new-ceo-jonathan-koch)

Business. The business outlook for pharma manufacturers is positive with regard to drug development and the volume and quality of promising drugs in the pipeline. The industry’s innovations in drug development and productivity have improved. Combined with indirect R&D pursuits through the biotech industry, overall development activity has been strong and should continue to be strong. There has been a shift in emphasis toward orphan drugs, oncology therapies, new innovations such as mRNA, gene therapy, CAR-T, immune system solutions, CRISPR, etc. The current pandemic has been a plus for the reputation of the industry, but a negative with regard to the ability to execute clinical trials and to maintain industry supply chains. Generic pharma companies are under severe profit pressures and will continue to consolidate, cut costs, and try to push selectively into higher value and more protected product areas. They are under intense pricing and competitive pressure.

#### Weakening IP discourage mRNA research into curing cancer

Spiegel 10-4-21

(Andrew Spiegel, Esquire is the executive director of the Global Colon Cancer Association. https://www.thecentersquare.com/national/op-ed-how-the-covid-ip-waiver-could-sabotage-crucial-cancer-research/article\_a177e6d0-2517-11ec-8327-3f88179d2343.html)

President Joe Biden craves a cure for cancer. In a speech to Congress this spring, he vowed to "end cancer as we know it." And as vice president, he helped start the Cancer Moonshot initiative. Yet by giving his backing to a global waiver of intellectual property (IP) rights for COVID-19 vaccines, President Biden may have endangered millions of Americans living with cancer. The Biden administration has said that it would join a World Trade Organization move to suspend IP safeguards for the vaccines. Its intentions are no doubt sincere, founded in the belief that a waiver will help rid the world of COVID-19. Yet the setting aside of IP protections has consequences that the administration seems to have overlooked. If adopted, the waiver won't galvanize the supply of vaccines bound for the developing world – certainly not in the immediate term. What it will do is threaten scientific innovation that could lead to cures for cancer and other diseases. I'll explain why. Technically, the waiver supported by the United States would only apply to IP on COVID-19 vaccines. So what has this got to do with cancer? There are two consequences. First, intellectual property underpins scientists' incentives to make discoveries. Without proprietary "armor" to protect research, rivals could blithely – and lawfully – use scientists' know-how, data, or manufacturing processes. Second, waiving IP on underlying vaccine technology has ramifications for drug innovation. Since the same technologies are used for potential treatments for other diseases, vaccine-makers would have to give up IP on those projects too. Consider the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines. They use "mRNA" to promote an immune response to COVID-19, a technology that took decades to develop. With the successful rollout of mRNA COVID-19 vaccines, researchers in the United States and Germany now hope they can use mRNA to fight other viruses. Moderna has active trials for mRNA vaccines for Zika, HIV, and the flu. Cancer doctors and patients pray that mRNA is the key to a cure. Moderna, in fact, has two mRNA vaccine candidates for cancer. Researchers hope that mRNA could instruct the body to combat cancerous tumors like it fights a virus. With the IP waiver, Moderna's mRNA technology could end up with rivals, leaving the company with greatly diminished incentives – and greatly diminished investment dollars – to continue with mRNA clinical trials, including ones for cancer. Advanced drug innovation could come to a halt. What investor would fund biotech startups if copycats can swoop in? This scenario is made especially distressing by the fact that the upsides of the IP waiver are negligible. Manufacturers need specialized facilities and hundreds of ingredients to make vaccines. Vaccine-makers have struck licensing deals to scale up production. Every facility on earth that can safely produce effective vaccines is already doing so. Getting rid of IP won't make the scale-up go any faster. It could, however, unleash millions of shoddy copycats and event counterfeit vaccine doses.

#### Contagious cancer is a serious possibility and threatens the existence of our species

Johnson 16 – George Johnson, columnist and science journalist for the New York Times, M.A. in Journalism and Public Affairs, American University (“Scientists Ponder the Prospect of Contagious Cancer,” *New York Times*, February 22nd, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/science/scientists-ponder-the-prospect-of-contagious-cancer.html?mcubz=0)

For all its peculiar horror, cancer comes with a saving grace. If nothing else can stop a tumor’s mad evolution, the cancer ultimately dies with its host. Everything the malignant cells have learned about outwitting the patient’s defenses — and those of the oncologists — is erased. The next case of cancer, in another victim, must start anew. Imagine if instead, cancer cells had the ability to press on to another body. A cancer like that would have the power to metastasize not just from organ to organ, but from person to person, evolving deadly new skills along the way. While there is no sign of an imminent threat, several recent papers suggest that the eventual emergence of a contagious human cancer is in the realm of medical possibility. This would not be a disease, like cervical cancer, that is set off by the spread of viruses, but rather one in which cancer cells actually travel from one person to another and thrive in their new location. So far this is known to have happened only under the most unusual circumstances. A 19-year-old laboratory worker who pricked herself with a syringe of colon cancer cells developed a tumor in her hand. A surgeon acquired a cancer from his patient after accidentally cutting himself during an operation. There are also cases of malignant cells being transferred from one person to another through an organ transplant or from a woman to her fetus. On each of these occasions, the malignancy went no further. The only known cancers that continue to move from body to body, evading the immune system, have been found in other animals. In laboratory experiments, for instance, cancer cells have been transferred by mosquitoes from one hamster to another. And so far, three kinds of contagious cancers have been discovered in the wild — in dogs, Tasmanian devils and, most recently, in soft shell clams. The oldest known example is a cancer that spreads between dogs during sexual intercourse — not as a side effect of a viral or bacterial infection, but rather through direct conveyance of cancer cells. The state of the research is described in a review, “The Cancer Which Survived,” published last year by Andrea Strakova and Elizabeth P. Murchison of the University of Cambridge. The condition, canine transmissible venereal tumor disease, is believed to have sprung into existence 11,000 years ago — as a single cell in a single dog — and has been circulating ever since. (Why did this happen in dogs and not, say, cats? Perhaps because of what the authors demurely call the dogs’ “long-lasting coital tie” — the half an hour or so that a male and female are locked in intercourse, tearing genital tissues and providing the cancer cells with a leisurely crossing.) Normally a cancer evolves in a single body over the course of years or decades, accumulating the mutations that drive it to power. But to have survived for millenniums, researchers have proposed, canine cancer cells may have developed mechanisms — like those in healthy cells — to repair and stabilize their own malignant genomes. Early on, cancer cells typically flourish by disabling DNA repair and ramping up the mutational frenzy. Somewhere along the way, the age-old canine cells may have reinvented the device to extend their own longevity. There is also speculation that this cancer may have learned to somehow modify canine sexual behavior in ways that promote the disease’s spread and survival. The second kind of contagious cancer was discovered in the mid-1990s in Tasmanian devils, which spread malignant cells as they try to tear off one another’s faces. Though it may be hard to sympathize, devil facial tumor disease threatens the creatures with extinction. With so few examples, transmissible cancer has been easy to dismiss as an aberration. But in December, scientists at the Universities of Tasmania and Cambridge reported in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences that Tasmanian devils are passing around another kind of cancer — genetically distinct from the first. It’s weird enough that one such cancer would arise in the species. What are the chances that there would be two? One theory is that the animals are unusually vulnerable. Driven so close to extinction — by climate change, perhaps, or human predators — the species is lacking in genetic diversity. The cells of another devil injected through a vicious wound may seem so familiar that they are ignored by the recipient’s immune system. If some of the cells carry the mutations for the facial cancer, they might be free to flourish and develop into a new tumor. But the scientists also proposed a more disturbing explanation: that the emergence of contagious cancer may not be so rare after all. “The possibility,” they wrote, “warrants further investigation of the risk that such diseases could arise in humans.” Cancer has probably existed ever since our first multicellular ancestors appeared on Earth hundreds of millions of years ago. The life spans of even the longest-lived animals may be just too brief for cancers to easily evolve the ability to leap to another body. Otherwise, contagious cancer would be everywhere.

## Case

### Adv1

#### Vacc Dip CP solves all of their advantages: 1] Succeeds global vaccination AND faster with more sustainable vaccines.

#### 2] Its necessary to acknowledge China’s success in holding down the pandemic within their own nation and allow them to fix what the US and global north has failed to do. Plan solves for terror escalation impact

### Solvency

#### Aff doesn’t attack all of the root causes of disease spread- lack of materials, equipment, tech, and facilities when faced with skyrocketed demands means solving IP protections alone isnt enough. This turns the internal link of advantage 1.

Brant & Burns 7-29-21 [Jennifer Brant, CEO and Founder of Innovation Insights, and Thaddeus Burns, Head of Life Science Government & Public Affairs at Merck and served in senior positions at the US Department of Commerce and the White House Office of the US Trade Representative, served as a member of the National Academy of Sciences Committee charged with preparing a report on the science and technology capabilities of the U.S. Department of State. “Trade restrictions are delaying the COVID response. The WTO must act.” July 29, 2021. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/07/wto-members-must-launch-new-work-to-reinforce-the-covid-response-in-november/>] AL

The COVID-19 pandemic hit at a time when bio-manufacturing was undergoing a process of democratization. Technological progress had enabled growing capacity in many countries including Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Tunisia, Argentina, and Egypt. By 2020, the business model for bio-manufacturing had fundamentally changed and it was becoming the norm for companies to distribute research, development and manufacturing across geographies and work with partners. As recently as 15 years ago, building a facility to produce biologics such as monoclonal antibodies or vaccines could require an investment of as much as €500m, and it would take up to 3 years to bring that facility online. New manufacturing technologies have made it cheaper and easier to build new facilities and to scale up existing ones. Today, an investment of €20m can get a bio-manufacturing plant up and running. Such changes are part of the reason the global community was able to launch production of new COVID-19 vaccines so quickly. The urgency of COVID-19 accelerated further innovations in bio-manufacturing equipment and processes, and compressed production time in a way that will have positive impacts in the future. But the pandemic also revealed major weaknesses in global value chains. It was difficult for manufacturers to keep up with the sudden surge for demand for raw materials and equipment, as many new research and development and manufacturing partnerships rapidly took off. To extend capacity, new employees, intensive training and collaboration, and more infrastructure were needed. The global community was faced with the reality that facilities cannot be built everywhere in an instant, and that there are bottlenecks in the supply chain.

Government action in some cases made things worse. Some countries enacted export restrictions on COVID-related products, which made it extremely difficult to run a global supply chain. Another difficult issue has been the tariffs applied on biologics and the products needed for their manufacture. Eighteen months into the pandemic, biologics manufacturers are still trying to cope with a range of challenges. There is still surging demand for equipment and raw materials. In some cases, they have expanded manufacturing capacity to produce more equipment such as filters and bioreactors. This continues to require time and significant investments.

#### Negotiations on a waiver will take too long – reject fiat arguments the purpose of debate is to embrace literal terms Mercurio 06-24

(Bryan Mercurio; Law Prof. at The Chinese University of Hong Kong; (06-24-21) The IP Waiver for COVID-19: Bad Policy, Bad Precedent; IIC on Springer Link; <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5>; CKD)

On 5 May 2021, the US reversed its position and announced that it would support a waiver for COVID-19 vaccines.[Footnote6](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn6) To be clear, this does not mean that the US supported the waiver as proposed by India and South Africa. Instead, the US has simply agreed to negotiate the perimeters of a waiver. Others, including the European Union (EU), Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) and even leading developing countries such as Brazil, Chile and Mexico remain opposed or lukewarm on the waiver.[Footnote7](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn7) The US dropping opposition does not mean the concerns of other Members will simply disappear – one would hope that these nations opposed the waiver for valid reasons and did not simply blindly follow the US. Indeed, many of the above-listed Members remain unconvinced that even such a draconian step as a waiver of IPRs would accomplish the goal of increased vaccine production.[Footnote8](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn8) For its part, the EU continues to favour an approach which makes better use of existing flexibilities available in the TRIPS Agreement.[Footnote9](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn9) Thus, those expecting quick agreement on the waiver will be disappointed. Negotiations at the WTO are always difficult and lengthy,

and US Trade Representative Katherine Tai acknowledged that the “negotiations will take time given the consensus-based nature of the institution and the complexity of the issues involved”.[Footnote10](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn10) Issues of negotiation will include the scope of the waiver. Whereas the original proposal and its amended form extend the waiver beyond patents and vaccines to include nearly all forms of IP (i.e. copyright,[Footnote11](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn11) industrial designs and trade secrets) as well as to all “health products and technologies including diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccines, medical devices, personal protective equipment, their materials or components, and their methods and means of manufacture for the prevention, treatment or containment of COVID-19”[Footnote12](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn12) (with no requirement on how or the extent to which they are related to or useful in combatting COVID-19), the US and others seem to support a waiver limited to patents and vaccines.[Footnote13](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn13) The length of the waiver will also be a contentious negotiating issue, with proponents seeking a virtual indefinite waiver lasting until the Membership agrees by consensus that it is no longer required – meaning even a single Member’s objection to ending the waiver would mean the waiver continues to remain in force[Footnote14](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn14) – as will the request that any action claimed to be taken under the waiver is outside the scope of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism.[Footnote15](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn15) These provisions will almost certainly be opposed by other Members, who would perhaps agree to a time-limited waiver which could be extended rather than an unchallengeable indefinite waiver which will be difficult to reverse. The proposal also fails to mention anything in relation to transparency and notification requirements and lacks safeguards against abuse or diversion. These points will likely also prove contentious in the negotiations. With so many initial divergences and as yet undiscussed issues, the negotiations at best could be completed by the time of the next WTO Ministerial Conference, scheduled to begin on 20 November 2021. There is precedent in this regard, as previous TRIPS negotiations involving IP and pharmaceuticals were not fully resolved until the days before the Ministerial Conferences (in 2003 and 2005).[Footnote16](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn16) There is also a chance that the negotiations will continue past the calendar year 2021. The chance for a swift negotiation diminished with the release of a revised proposal by India and South Africa on 22 May 2021. As mentioned above, the proposal contains no limit as to product coverage, scope, notification requirements or safeguards and proposes that the waiver will remain in effect for what could be an indefinite period. This was not a proposal designed to engender quick negotiations and a solution. Instead, the proposal perhaps reveals India’s and South Africa’s true intent to use the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to roll-back IPRs rather than a good-faith effort to rapidly increase access to lifesaving vaccines and treatments around the world.