## Cap K

### 1NC [4:28]

#### While on the surface the aff seems anti-corporate, their advantages are designed to paper over the faults of neoliberalism and protect capital on a broader scale.

#### The aff’s faith in market logics allows for rampant international austerity and privatization of healthcare – this is a tradeoff DA that outweighs and turns case.

Sell and Williams, 20

[Susan K., School of Regulation and Global Governance @ The Australian National University, Political Science @ George Washington University; and Owain D., University of Queensland, Public Health: “Health under capitalism: a global political economy of structural pathogenesis,” Review of International Political Economy, 27:1 (2020), 1-25, DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2019.1659842]//AD

More recently, economic crises have (re-)inspired neoliberal governance responses to health and rejuvenated the authority of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (De Vogli, Marmot, & Stuckler, 2013; De Vogli & Birbeck, 2005; Farmer, 2003; Rowden, 2013; Schrecker, 2016a; Stuckler & Basu, 2013) The IMF has acted with revitalized authority to force sharp reductions in spending on health services and salaries in new debtor states, with decisions often backed and facilitated by the EU (Kentikelenis, 2017). In Greece, in the face of the euro crisis, hospital budgets were cut by 40% with 26,000 public health workers’ jobs at risk (Kentikelenis et al., 2011, p. 1457). While mixed national health systems are common in many countries, the state often remains as a stubborn presence and health care provider. Yet governments and multilateral organizations repeatedly emphasize the appeal of private insurers and the private sector as health care providers. Neoliberalism and its implications for health governance are evident in structural adjustment and austerity policies adopted in the wake of debt and financial crises when health budgets are starved to make banks whole (Clark & Heath, 2014; Mooney, 2012; Stuckler & Basu, 2013). Austerity measures in the wake of financial crises in Latin America and South East Asia, and the global financial crisis of 2008 put pressure on publicly funded national health systems. States have responded, either willingly or not, with divestment in health and the opening up the sector to market forces. In some cases, such as the UK, the resultant phases of health service privatization and rolling back of social insurance systems proceed in a piecemeal fashion from non-core services to the heart of the public system, and with attacks on publicly supported financial risk pooling or progressive tax transfers to those in need of health assistance (Pieper, 2018). Policymakers tout the market as a more efficient means of allocating scarce resources for health. There are substantial profits to be made both out of the public purse in collaborative financial and investment relations with the state for health projects, as is the case with the often highly subsidized Public Private Partnerships and Public Private Investment deals in many European countries (Lanas, 2016; Roehrich, Barlow, & Wright, 2014). Multiple economic interests are at play in privatization and state rollbacks; the market for health is substantial, and health related economic sectors are often hugely profitable. In developing countries, health service firms and private insurers are penetrating burgeoning middle class markets and cherry picking which health services are provided privately (Jasso-Aguilar, Waitzkin, & Landwehr, 2005)). Finally, many of the orthodoxies associated with neoliberalism continue to shape and constrain health policy and regulation, with spending on public health and services attenuated in many countries since the 2008 global financial crisis (Brumby & Verhoeven, 2010). Despite contestation and the presence of welcome alternative policy pathways, we risk neglecting structural and political economic drivers, including economic ideologies, as powerful and often dominant logics operating in and influencing that governance system.

#### The WTO is inevitably a tool of accumulation for capitalist imperialism – international institutional monopoly capitalism overdetermines the plan’s move to peace – causes war, environmental degradation, and extinction.

Cuong, 18

[Vu Manh, Researcher @ VietEra Foundation: “International institutional monopoly capitalism and its manifestations,” published by Monthly Review on December 19, 2018. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Cuong-Vu-10/publication/331162082\_International\_institutional\_monopoly\_capitalism\_and\_its\_manifestations/links/5c6c2588299bf1e3a5b62764/International-institutional-monopoly-capitalism-and-its-manifestations.pdf]//AD

\*IIMC=International Institutional Monopoly Capitalism

The Evolution of Monopoly Capitalism Monopoly capitalism emerged from “laissez-faire” capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as described clearly by V.I. Lenin in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, allowing giant corporations to dominate the accumulation process. Since the late 1970s, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, this system has reached a new level in its development, forging imperial centralism or “International Institutional Monopoly Capitalism” (IIMC), whereby a handful of powerful nation-states explicitly use international organizations to impose their interests and further expand accumulation. Figure 1 presents a brief overview of the conceptualization of capitalism throughout its history, focusing on the development of monopoly capitalism from the 1870s to the present, including both economic and politic facets. It includes IIMC as the newest term in the evolution of monopoly capitalism. (2) (3) (4) (5) As Karl Marx noted, capitalism has an inherent drive toward endless accumulation through the production of “surplus value.” In relation to this defining characteristic of the system, there have been distinct historical configurations of its operation. IIMC represents the highest form of the imperialism stage of capitalism, given the increasingly coordination between the monopoly capital and the state within core nations. As a state-formed monopoly capitalism, IIMC has been forcing most economies to participate in its system, regardless of whether those economies are capitalist or socialist (except North Korea). This is what Nikolai Bukharin pointed to a century ago. According to Samir Amin, in the globalization era, the efficiency of economic management by nation-states has changed. Under IIMC, advanced capitalist states are even stronger, as far as their economic-political reach, and are able to control international institutions and organizations. Within these core nations, the state uses its strength to support the formation of “supercompanies” (the multinational corporations that monopolize one or a number of products/services worldwide), serving the interests of the richest class, while bringing some additional benefits to its broader population. These countries are monopoly nations. Through international institutional settings (e.g., World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization), monopoly capital and monopoly nations extend their influence and power into every corner of the world, even the few remaining socialist strongholds, causing complex conflicts within globalization and regionalization processes. Capital Concentration and the Establishment of Monopoly Nations Capital accumulation and the centralization and concentration of capital led to the formation of monopolies (cartels, syndicates, trusts, consortiums, and conglomerates). This fundamental law of capitalism continues to take effect in the IIMC period, albeit at a very high level. However, the following organic processes contributed to the formation of monopoly nations: 1. The concentration and centralization of capital in super-companies: The increasing strength and expansion of super-companies, especially over the last five decades, have advanced economic internationalization and globalization. Globally, the 500 largest companies generated $31.1 trillion in 2014. They accounted for nearly 40 percent of world income –up 20 percent from less than 20 percent in 1960. Super-companies not only have a monopoly within one country’s borders but also are dominant in other countries worldwide. The overseas assets of the world’s 100 largest non-financial super-companies in 2011 accounted for 63 percent of their total assets, whereas foreign sales reached 65 percent of their total. This is reflected in the intensification of foreign direct investment (FDI); the significant transfer of employment, technology and international financial operations; and the strong rise of financial systems, bank credit, and insurance. Many super-companies with powerful finances (assets, revenues) can far exceed the gross domestic product (GDP) of many economies. For example, Procter & Gamble (ranked 100 in the list of the largest companies), as noted in Table 1,has revenues that are higher than the GDP of Oman,which is the largest economy in a group of 124 smalland medium-sized economies, with $81.8billion in 2014. Supercompanies can dramatically influence small and/or poor countries as they pressure governments to condone environmental degradation, violation of national labor laws, and abuse of labor rights. They can force these governments to tender incentives, which maximize their profits by allowing extremely poor working conditions and low wages. Some super-companies actively destroy local agriculture and kill marine life, which has sparked mass protests. They often hire military personnel to open fire on peaceful protestors and make assassinations. 2. The mass exploitation of workers: The division of labor extends throughout the world. In 2011, the employment of foreign affiliates worldwide reached sixty-nine million jobs, up by 8 percent from 2010. Specifically, the total number of employees of the ten largest companies worldwide in 2014 exceeded 9.8 million, which is more than the population of many independent nations.  This international division of labor is a product of monopoly capitalism, seeking to avoid the “law of declining rate of profit” and striving to increase the rate of profit. John Bellamy Foster and John Smith have clearly presented this trend, using archetypical examples of the labor and production associated with iPhones, T-shirts, and coffee, which involve super-exploitation overseas by super-companies. As a result, over the last three decades, an enormous amount of surplus value has been produced in the periphery, but captured by super-companies within monopoly nations. Through the international division of labor and expansion of branches worldwide, super-companies promote alliances in the form of complex cooperation among themselves and between themselves and small- and medium-sized companies. They adopt a “divide and rule” approach to control labor worldwide. These super-companiestake advantage of the economies of scale to increase their market shares and influence. Once they are in place in peripheral countries, they influence habits and traditional customs. Workers re-align themselves to earn a living wage. 3. The symbiotic growth of monopoly nations and super-companies: Both the state and capital rely on each other to exploit existing internal natural resources (e.g., OECD with its oil); control major production resources throughout the world (e.g., the United States in regard to Iraq’s oil, China influence on its neighbors’ sea routes and exclusive economic zone in the East and South China Seas); and possess key technologies, such as weapons, cell cloning, artificial intelligence robots, patent medicine develop, or media and communication. In other words, monopoly nations are the products of “five monopolies.” Super-companies and monopoly nations exert their technological and economic powers to dominant the world market, leading to both positive and negative impacts. Super-companies like capitalists to have control over mass destructive weapons, in order to defeat competitors and to destroy commoners’ benefits. The first and most outstanding monopoly nation is the United States, which has only two companies that reached a turnover in excess of $5 billion in 1955: General Motors ($9.82 billion) and Exxon Mobil ($5.66 billion). However, by 1990, the number of large companies (over $5 billion of turnover) had reached more than 100. In 2013, the smallest company (Exelon: energy sector) of the 132 largest companies had a turnover of $23.5 billion. On a global scale, the company that has the lowest ranking in the top 500 list of largest companies (ranked by Fortune in 2013) is Ricoh (office-equipment sector), reaching sales of over $23.2 billion. Also included in this list are eighty-nine companies from China, which is a rapid increase, compared to its thirty-four companies in 2008. As of 2015, the Global 500 are represented by 36 countries, but nearly 472 of the Global 500 are from only 16 countries: Canada, the United States, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Brazil, India, and Russia. Of these 16 countries, 13 are the world’s largest economies. Table 2 lists the typical monopoly nations in the world in 2015. The combining of super-companies and states that Lenin analyzed nearly 100 years ago, in which capitalists pivot around political agencies and monopolies, led to the integration of monopoly nations and international institutions/organizations. Thus, under the conditions of IIMC, this integration has crucially influenced the globalization process of the world economy, specifically for the peripheral countries. Although these monopoly nations dominate at different levels and their income is not equivalent, they do not conquer other nations; nonetheless, they help transfer a vast surplus of value from peripheral countries into the core countries. Monopoly Nations Monopolize International Institutions The rise of super-companies has not meant the end of competition, which is globally more intense today than ever before. Simultaneously, monopoly nations do not displace super-companies or prevent their monopolistic power; on the contrary, these states directly and indirectly provide super-companies with advantages and benefits. As Harry Braverman explained, “the state is guarantor of the conditions, the social relations, of capitalism, and the protector of the ever more unequal distribution of property.” The role of the state has changed in monopoly nations: it not only regulates the domestic economy, exploits the state capital, and protects monopolies on the international market, but it also represents and supports the allies of domestic monopolies to affect the activities of international institutions/organizations in its favor and increase its competitiveness. The role of the state and its various imperial alliances with local politicians is facilitated through the discourse of national and international competitiveness. Thus, the rise of monopoly nations has not killed competition in all of its forms. In fact, rivalry is more frequent and fierce between monopoly nations and other economies. The formation of monopoly nations and the emergence of a number of new industrialized countries have caused problems for individual economies to address and settle the issues related to international economic activities. For example, the legal systems and the legal provisions of nations have become a barrier to the circular flow of resources and limited the mobilities of the supercompanies. These can range from the agricultural protection policies that were severely opposed by the Cairns Group at the Uruguay Round in 1986 (the first time developing countries had played an active role) to the restriction regulations in immigration. They are also associated with cultural or political issues such as Internet censorship in China, Euroscepticism trend in European Union and Brexit in the United Kingdom, the opposition of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and new protectionism in the United States. Meanwhile, the international institutions had just proved their consistency in their role of coordination and international arbitration among new member economies in the beginning phase. Subsequently, the competitiveness among countries has moved to a higher level and continued to increase, which manifested itself in many forms such as disputes of commerce, technology, and finance, etc. The recent disputes include: batteries (solar) between the United States and India; beef among the United States, Indo, and Japan; steel pipes between Japan and China; auto parts between the United States and China; catfish, frozen shrimp, and garments between Viet Nam and the United States; and rare earths among the United States, the European Union, Japan, and China. There is a severe conflict among the United States, the European Union, Ukraine, and Russia on the recent issue of annexing Crimea. Since its establishment, the World Trade Organization has witnessed many disputes over dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguarded trade among member economies. Most of these arguments are related to monopoly nations. The number of quarrels is growing rapidly: over the last twenty years in particular, the World Trade Organization has had to resolve hundreds of cases. Specifically, the United States is a typical monopoly nation that is associated with the majority of the commercial disputes in the world (344 cases), followed by the European Union (316 cases), Japan (180 cases), and China (155 cases). In the context of the multitude of interlocking and complicated disagreements, the dispute settlement mechanism of World Trade Organization constitutes the basic cornerstone maintaining the multilateral trading order. However, monopoly nations have been controlling this mechanism. If there are disputes among the strongest monopoly nations, this makes them direct competitors (these include the United States, Japan, Western Europe, Russia, and China). Thus, monopoly nations tend to compromise and align with others to monopolize the World Trade Organization. Otherwise, super-companies always plan well to avoid a devalued competition. In the case of Ford, Toyota, and the other leading auto firms, the companies did not try to undersell each other in their prices. Instead, they competed for the low-cost position by making reductions in prime production (labor and raw material) costs that could be implemented in peripheral regions. Monopoly nations monopolize not only the World Trade Organization but also other international institutions/organizations or forums, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and regional banks. Furthermore, monopoly nations monopolize political forums like G-7, the European Union, and even the most powerful United Nations. Monopoly nations also monopolize most other regional organizations, from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and most recent the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Below is a list of typical international institutions/organizations and mechanisms that the monopoly nations are monopolizing: • United Nations: Founded in 1945, it was monopolized at its founding by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. These five members not only have the responsibility to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations but also have the power to veto, thus enabling them to oppose or prevent any proposed resolution of the other members. As a rule, as these five members become stronger, the United Nations is weaker. The weakness of the United Nations is expressed not only in the handling of the South China Sea dispute, but also in events such as Ukraine’s political crisis, the East China Sea quarrels, and its ability to eliminate wars and serious conflicts since the fall of Soviet (31) (32) (33) MR Online | International institutional monopoly capitalism and its manifestations Page 8 of 26 https://mronline.org/2018/12/19/international-institutional-monopoly-capitalism-and-… 07/01/2019 Union, specifically wars for economic purpose. For instance, the U.S. war machine engaged in Afghanistan (2001-14) and Iraq (2003-11); the Russia annexation of Crimea (2014); and the threat of a Chinese war in the South China Sea. The key motivation of the current aggressive and strongest monopoly nations is to gain control over vital strategic resources. • World Bank: Founded in 1944, an international institution was originally dominated by the United States and the United Kingdom. The domination of monopoly nations is evident in the voting rights of the member economies in the World Bank. Of the members, in 2013 the United States had highest voting rights at 17.69 percent, followed by Japan (6.84 percent), China (4.42 percent), Germany (4.00 percent), the United Kingdom (3.75 percent), and France (3.75 percent). • International Monetary Fund: Established in 1944, the International Monetary Fund’s funding is contributed by the member economies. Since its inception, the United States has always been the largest contributor (17.69 percent) and has been dominant through the majority of the voting rights, followed by other members with large holdings in 2010, such as Japan (6.56 percent), Germany (6.12 percent), the United Kingdom (4.51 percent), France (4.51 percent), and China (4.00 percent). • World Trade Organization: The World Trade Organization was established in 1995 to replace the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that had been in effect since 1948. Its mission is to eliminate or minimize trade barriers to free trade. The majority of its decisions are based on negotiation and consensus. However, the negotiation process does not always reach consensus among all of its members. This process is often criticized by many developing economies because they are not welcome in the negotiations and because, according to Richard Steinberg, the trade negotiations are actually promoted and end at a negotiating position that provides special benefit for the European Union and the United States. The formation of the regional institutions/organizations, the multilateral economic cooperation forums, and bilateral negotiations are an expression of the ever-increasing conflict between the regionalization and globalization processes. Such examples include the conflicts between the European Union and World Trade Organization on agricultural policy; between North American Free Trade Agreement and World Trade Organization on juridical and political issues; and between Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and World Trade Organization on oil price/supply management. These processes lead to very complicated overlapping and interlocking regional and international organizations because a monopoly nation can be a member of several organizations simultaneously. Thus, these organizations become the direct or indirect means to facilitate the monopoly nations in exploiting other countries. It is inevitable that the activities of powerful international institutions (such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization) have not really brought equal benefits to all. The IIMC built a complex called the “IMNs-United Nation: Specialized Agencies, International Institutions/Organizations, and Region Organizations” (IMNsInIs). This organization is beyond the scope of previous international institutions. In other words, the IIMC is a combination of the power of super-companies, monopoly nations, and the juridical capacity of the international institutions. Under IIMC, capital globalization has not only strengthened the power of monopoly nations but has simultaneously created the dependence of other states/nations on the world market and finance system, which are dominated by monopoly nations. This relationship among states/ nations reflects the development of monopoly nations at the expense of the peripheral regions. In addition, “IMNs-InIs” is different from “transnational capitalism class – transnational state” structure in quality, in which the former has instrumentalized the latter. In IMNs-InIs, the international organizations have progressively been the “instrumental institutions” in the hands of monopoly nations to favor them and hinder other economies. This is typically the case when the United Nations Security Council members impose sanctions against other nations, trumping any efforts that could weaken their veto power. It is true in how monopoly nations dominate the WTO through the Doha Development Agenda to hinder agricultural economies of peripheral countries. It is evident in how the International Monetary Fund serves wealthy countries but increases poverty and environmental degradation in poor countries. The establishment of the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has raised concerns for both the United States and Japan regarding whether the bank will have high standards of governance and safeguards, which will prevent damage to other creditors. The IIMC is the final stage of “state-formed monopoly capitalism,” the new form of capitalist production that maintains the existence of capitalism and adapts it to new historical conditions.

#### Securitizing biological risks ties health to the protection of global capitalism. ‘Disease as threat’ narratives militarize responsibility for public health, replicating past colonial structures to secure neoliberalism.

Mohan J. **DUTTA, 15**. Professor and Head of the Department of Communications and New Media at the National University of Singapore, Adjunct Professor of Communication at the Brian Lamb School of Communication at Purdue University. Neoliberal Health Organizing, 2015, p. 167-169.

The globalization of economies has produced accelerated patterns of movements of capital, goods, services, materials, and labor, simultaneously resulting in the accelerated production and circulation of anxieties constituted around these movements. Neoliberal organizing of health manifests itself in the development and deployment of surveillance, management, and coordination networks that see health primarily in the **realm of threats** posed by diseases dispersed through global networks, networks of bioterror, emerging **infectious diseases**, and **biowarfare** (Salinsky, 2002). The response of health systems therefore is formulated in the form of network structures of biodefense and homeland security, performing functions of surveillance, information gathering, and information dissemination, constituted around the **economic logics** of growth and efficiency. The protection of the economic opportunities of globalization becomes the function of public health systems formulated in the **narrative of geosecurity** and implemented in the form of programs controlled by the **police-military complex** within structures of biodefense, biosecurity and geosecurity. With this emphasis on security, the mandate for health depicts **continuity with colonial** implementations of public health administration to manage erstwhile colonies, increasingly being set within the military metaphor of health, turning health into a geosecurity threat for the new configurations of **empire**, and therefore, deploying **military interventions** to address health issues. Consider the following depiction in a report issued by the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) that offers a picture of the global health threats posed by infectious diseases: New and reemerging infectious diseases will pose a rising global health threat and will complicate U.S. and global security over the next twenty years. These diseases will endanger U.S. citizens at home and abroad, threaten U.S. armed forces deployed overseas, and exacerbate social and political instability in key countries and regions in which the United States has significant interests. (Gordon, 2000) [END PAGE 167] The protection of human health is seen as a **function of the military**, tied to the goals of **defending global capitalism** against the threats to health and reflecting the colonial undertones of health containment measures deployed by the instruments of empire. In this instance of the report published by the NIC, knowledge about health is constituted in the realm of intelligence gathering to protect the interests of national security of the United States. Framed as threats to the health of citizens at home and abroad and to the health of the armed forces deployed overseas, infectious diseases are seen as contributors to social and political instability in key strategic regions of significant value to the United States. International relations are understood in the language of security, casting interpenetrating networks as targets of surveillance and management. The portrayal of infectious diseases as threats to geosecurity deploys valuable health resources into the hands of the military, placing the power of disease management under military structures and framing the responses to disease in military interpretations. Moreover, the juxtaposition of epidemic narratives amid narratives of war and bioterror heighten the concerns for geosecurity, foregrounding and necessitating a variety of military response strategies (Aaltola, 2012). The interpenetrating relationship between health and the military constitute one element of the consolidation of power in the hands of the global elite achieved through neoliberal transformations. The military emerges as a global organizational structure for the management of health, simultaneously justifying the deployment of resources to the military and the deployment of military strategies to address health issues. This emphasis on the military framed within the realm of protecting geostrategic interests constructs health in the realm of threats, simultaneously **erasing** questions of fundamental human rights to health. Similarly, in the president's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a significant proportion of resources are housed in the military in order to deploy military-to-military interventions within the broader umbrella of protecting the geostrategic interests of the United States. Consider, for instance, the workings of the U.S. Africa Command to address HIV/ AIDS prevention as a security threat in Africa. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is the result of an internal reorganization of the U.S. military command structure, creating one administrative headquarters that answers to the Secretary of Defense and is responsible for U.S. military relations with 53 African countries. AFRICOM recognizes that HIV/AIDS has an enormous impact on economic and political stability across the continent, and, by degrading military medical readiness, weakens the national security of individual countries. HIV/ AIDS programming will be a key component of AFRICOM's security cooperation and humanitarian assistance activities. (www.pepfar.gov/about/agencies/ cl 9397.htm) [END PAGE 168] Critical to the deployment of a militarized form of governance in addressing health is the consolidation of power within elite structures, working through militarized systems of governance to control disease to protect the economic interests of the status quo. The military, as an instrument of power and control, functions within the narratives of security cooperation and humanitarian assistance activities to assert its **power and control** in global governance. Intelligence gathering emerges as an instrument for the generation of data to secure and protect **zones of economic function**. This gathering of targeted intelligence and the deployment of targeted interventions becomes particularly critical within the context of maintaining open zones of communication and economic exchange within the neoliberal structuring of economic relationships. Knowledge and technical interventions in this sense are constituted amid the paradoxical agenda of needing to protect boundaries and at the same time ensuring transnational spaces of movement of capital, labor, services, materials, and markets. In this chapter, we closely interrogate the meanings that circulate around the militarization of health, and attend to the communicative processes through which the militarization of health is achieved. The surveillance of spaces and the militarization of responses, I argue, are continuous with colonial logics of controlling spaces in distant locales of imperial governance, and are discontinuous from the colonial forms of governance because of the paradoxes of networked flows in neoliberal governance.

#### Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause goes unquestioned. Farbod 15

( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)

Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6% per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800%.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85% of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50% of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1% will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80% of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return**.**

#### The role of the ballot is to resist neoliberal ideology – filter negative arguments through an epistemological dismantling of neoliberalism.

HAY & ROSAMUND, PhDs, 2002 (Colin and Ben, Journal of European Public Policy Volume 9, Issue 2, 2002 p. 3-5)

The implicit supposition which seems to underlie much of the sceptical or second-wave literature seeking to expose the ‘myth’ or ‘delusion’ of globalisation, is that a rigorous empirical exercise in demystification will be sufficient to reverse the tide of ill-informed public policy made in the name of globalisation. Sadly, this has not proved to be the case. For **however convinced we might be by the empirical armoury mustered against the hyperglobalisation thesis** by the sceptics, their **rigorous empiricism leads them to fail adequately to consider the way in which globalisation comes to inform public policy-making.** **It is here,** we suggest, that **the discourse of globalisation** — and the discursive construction of the imperatives it is seen to conjure along with attendant fatalism about the possibilities for meaningful political agency — **must enter the analysis**. For, as the most cursory reflection on the issue of structure and agency reveals, **it is the ideas actors hold about the context in which they find themselves** rather than the context itself **which informs the way in which they behave** (Hay 1999a, forthcoming a). **This is no less true of policy makers and governments**. **Whether** the **globalisation** thesis **is ‘true’** or not **may matter far less than whether it is deemed to be true** (or, quite possibly, just useful) **by those employing it**. Consequently, **if the aim** of the sceptics **is to discredit the political appeal to dubious economic imperatives associated with globalisation**, then they might **we**ll **benefit from asking** themselves **why and under what conditions** politicians and **public officials invoke** external **economic constraints** in the first place. It is to this task that we direct our attentions in this paper. Yet at the outset a certain word of caution is perhaps required. For, even if we accept the potential causal role that ideas about globalisation might play in the structuration of political and economic outcomes, we may be in danger of narrowing the discursive field of our attentions at the outset. The ideas policy makers use to legitimate and/or to rationalise their behaviour should not simply be seen as more or less accurate reflections of the context they perceive (based on more or less complete information). Nor should discourses be understood as necessarily and exclusively ‘strategic’ (i.e. as relating to situations in which an actor’s employment of a discourse correlates directly to particular material interests). **Discourse matters** in at least two respects. **The way** in which **actors behave is not merely a reflection** of the degree of accuracy and completeness **of the information they possess**; **it is also** a reflection of **their normative orientation** towards their environment and potential future scenarios. Thus the constraints and/or opportunities which globalisation is held to imply might be understood (or misunderstood) in very similar ways in different (national) contexts. Yet such understanding are likely to provoke divergent responses from political actors with different normative orientations and diverse institutional contexts. Put simply, **though actors may share a** common **understanding of** the process of **globalisation, they may respond** very **differently to its** perceived **challenges and threats** **depending on whether one regards the future it promises in a positive or negative light** – witness the still ongoing debate within the governing SPD in Germany between supporters of Schröder and Lafontaine (see Lafontaine 1998; Lafontaine and Müller 1998; Schröder 1998; and for a commentary Jeffery and Handl 1999), or that in France between Bourdieu, Forrester and anti-globalisation groups like ATTAC on the one hand and social liberals within the Parti Socialiste on the other (see Bourdieu 1998; Boudieu and Wacquant 1999; Forrester 1999; and for a commentary Bouvet and Michel 1999; Meunier 2000). Within the European Commission, there is evidence to suggest that common understandings of globalisation can be quite consistent with distinct conceptions of the capacity to exercise meaningful agency as actors take up quite different ‘subject positions’ in relation to globalisation (Rosamond, 1999; 2000b). **It is important**, then, at the outset **that we consider the potential causal role of ideas about globalisation in the structuration of political and economic outcomes**.3 Our central argument is, we think, likely to prove controversial. It is simply stated, though its implications are more complex. Essentially, we suggest, **policy makers acting on the basis of assumptions consistent with the hyperglobalisation thesis may well serve**, in so doing, **to bring about outcomes consistent with that thesis, irrespective of its veracity and,** indeed, irrespective of its perceived veracity**.** This provocative suggestion with, if warranted, important implications, clearly requires some justification (see also Hay 1999b; Rosamond 1999, 2000b, 2000c). **Globalisation has become** a key referent of contemporary political discourse and, increasingly, **a lens through which policy-makers view the context in which they find themselves.** **If** we can assume that political actors have no more privileged vantage point from which to understand their environment than anyone else and — as most commentators would surely concede — that **one of the principal discourses through which that environment now comes to be understood is that of globalisation, then the content of such ideas is likely to affect significantly political dynamics.**

#### Capitalism causes inevitable crises, inequality, and dehumanization—the alternative is a class-based critique of the system—pedagogical spaces are the crucial staging ground for keeping socialism on the horizon

**McLaren**, Distinguished Fellow – Critical Studies @ Chapman U and UCLA urban schooling prof, and Scatamburlo-D’Annibale, associate professor of Communication – U Windsor, ‘**4**

(Peter and Valerie, “Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference’,” Educational Philosophy and Theory Vol. 36, Issue 2, p. 183-199)

For well over two decades we have witnessed the jubilant liberal and conservative pronouncements of the demise of socialism. Concomitantly, history's presumed failure to defang existing capitalist relations has been read by many self-identified ‘radicals’ as an advertisement for capitalism's inevitability. As a result, the chorus refrain ‘There Is No Alternative’, sung by liberals and conservatives, has been buttressed by the symphony of post-Marxist voices recommending that we give socialism a decent burial and move on. Within this context, to speak of the promise of Marx and socialism may appear anachronistic, even naïve, especially since the post-al intellectual vanguard has presumably demonstrated the folly of doing so. Yet we stubbornly believe that the chants of T.I.N.A. must be combated for they offer as a fait accompli, something which progressive Leftists should refuse to accept—namely the triumph of capitalism and its political bedfellow neo-liberalism, which have worked together to naturalize suffering, undermine collective struggle, and obliterate hope. We concur with Amin (1998), who claims that such chants must be defied and revealed as absurd and criminal, and who puts the challenge we face in no uncertain terms: humanity may let itself be led by capitalism's logic to a fate of collective suicide or it may pave the way for an alternative humanist project of global socialism. The grosteque conditions that inspired Marx to pen his original critique of capitalism are present and flourishing. The inequalities of wealth and the gross imbalances of power that exist today are leading to abuses that exceed those encountered in Marx's day (Greider, 1998, p. 39). Global capitalism has paved the way for the obscene concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands and created a world increasingly divided between those who enjoy opulent affluence and those who languish in dehumanizing conditions and economic misery. In every corner of the globe, we are witnessing social disintegration as revealed by a rise in abject poverty and inequality. At the current historical juncture, the combined assets of the 225 richest people is roughly equal to the annual income of the poorest 47 percent of the world's population, while the combined assets of the three richest people exceed the combined GDP of the 48 poorest nations (CCPA, 2002, p. 3). Approximately 2.8 billion people—almost half of the world's population—struggle in desperation to live on less than two dollars a day (McQuaig, 2001, p. 27). As many as 250 million children are wage slaves and there are over a billion workers who are either un- or under-employed. These are the concrete realities of our time—realities that require a vigorous class analysis, an unrelenting critique of capitalism and an oppositional politics capable of confronting what Ahmad (1998, p. 2) refers to as ‘capitalist universality.’ They are realities that require something more than that which is offered by the prophets of ‘difference’ and post-Marxists who would have us relegate socialism to the scrapheap of history and mummify Marxism along with Lenin's corpse. Never before has a Marxian analysis of capitalism and class rule been so desperately needed. That is not to say that everything Marx said or anticipated has come true, for that is clearly not the case. Many critiques of Marx focus on his strategy for moving toward socialism, and with ample justification; nonetheless Marx did provide us with fundamental insights into class society that have held true to this day. Marx's enduring relevance lies in his indictment of capitalism which continues to wreak havoc in the lives of most. While capitalism's cheerleaders have attempted to hide its sordid underbelly, Marx's description of capitalism as the sorcerer's dark power is even more apt in light of contemporary historical and economic conditions. Rather than jettisoning Marx, decentering the role of capitalism, and discrediting class analysis, radical educators must continue to engage Marx's oeuvre and extrapolate from it that which is useful pedagogically, theoretically, and, most importantly, politically in light of the challenges that confront us. The urgency which animates Amin's call for a collective socialist vision necessitates, as we have argued, moving beyond the particularism and liberal pluralism that informs the ‘politics of difference.’ It also requires challenging the questionable assumptions that have come to constitute the core of contemporary ‘radical’ theory, pedagogy and politics. In terms of effecting change, what is needed is a cogent understanding of the systemic nature of exploitation and oppression based on the precepts of a radical political economy approach (outlined above) and one that incorporates Marx's notion of ‘unity in difference’ in which people share widely common material interests. Such an understanding extends far beyond the realm of theory, for the manner in which we choose to interpret and explore the social world, the concepts and frameworks we use to express our sociopolitical understandings, are more than just abstract categories. They imply intentions, organizational practices, and political agendas. Identifying class analysis as the basis for our understandings and class struggle as the basis for political transformation implies something quite different than constructing a sense of political agency around issues of race, ethnicity, gender, etc. Contrary to ‘Shakespeare's assertion that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet,’ it should be clear that this is not the case in political matters. Rather, in politics ‘the essence of the flower lies in the name by which it is called’ (Bannerji, 2000, p. 41). The task for progressives today is to seize the moment and plant the seeds for a political agenda that is grounded in historical possibilities and informed by a vision committed to overcoming exploitative conditions. These seeds, we would argue, must be derived from the tree of radical political economy. For the vast majority of people today—people of all ‘racial classifications or identities, all genders and sexual orientations’—the common frame of reference arcing across ‘difference’, the ‘concerns and aspirations that are most widely shared are those that are rooted in the common experience of everyday life shaped and constrained by political economy’ (Reed, 2000, p. xxvii). While post-Marxist advocates of the politics of ‘difference’ suggest that such a stance is outdated, we would argue that the categories which they have employed to analyze ‘the social’ are now losing their usefulness, particularly in light of actual contemporary ‘social movements.’ All over the globe, there are large anti-capitalist movements afoot. In February 2002, chants of ‘Another World Is Possible’ became the theme of protests in Porto Allegre. It seems that those people struggling in the streets haven’t read about T.I.N.A., the end of grand narratives of emancipation, or the decentering of capitalism. It seems as though the struggle for basic survival and some semblance of human dignity in the mean streets of the dystopian metropoles doesn’t permit much time or opportunity to read the heady proclamations emanating from seminar rooms. As E. P. Thompson (1978, p. 11) once remarked, sometimes ‘experience walks in without knocking at the door, and announces deaths, crises of subsistence, trench warfare, unemployment, inflation, genocide.’ This, of course, does not mean that socialism will inevitably come about, yet a sense of its nascent promise animates current social movements. Indeed, noted historian Howard Zinn (2000, p. 20) recently pointed out that after years of single-issue organizing (i.e. the politics of difference), the WTO and other anti-corporate capitalist protests signaled a turning point in the ‘history of movements of recent decades,’ for it was the issue of ‘class’ that more than anything ‘bound everyone together.’ History, to paraphrase Thompson (1978, p. 25) doesn’t seem to be following Theory's script. Our vision is informed by Marx's historical materialism and his revolutionary socialist humanism, which must not be conflated with liberal humanism. For left politics and pedagogy, a socialist humanist vision remains crucial, whose fundamental features include the creative potential of people to challenge collectively the circumstances that they inherit. This variant of humanism seeks to give expression to the pain, sorrow and degradation of the oppressed, those who labor under the ominous and ghastly cloak of ‘globalized’ capital. It calls for the transformation of those conditions that have prevented the bulk of humankind from fulfilling its potential. It vests its hope for change in the development of critical consciousness and social agents who make history, although not always in conditions of their choosing. The political goal of socialist humanism is, however, ‘not a resting in difference’ but rather ‘the emancipation of difference at the level of human mutuality and reciprocity.’ This would be a step forward for the ‘discovery or creation of our real differences which can only in the end be explored in reciprocal ways’ (Eagleton, 1996, p. 120). Above all else, the enduring relevance of a radical socialist pedagogy and politics is the centrality it accords to the interrogation of capitalism. We can no longer afford to remain indifferent to the horror and savagery committed by capitalist's barbaric machinations. We need to recognize that capitalist democracy is unrescuably contradictory in its own self-constitution. Capitalism and democracy cannot be translated into one another without profound efforts at manufacturing empty idealism. Committed Leftists must unrelentingly cultivate a democratic socialist vision that refuses to forget the ‘wretched of the earth,’ the children of the damned and the victims of the culture of silence—a task which requires more than abstruse convolutions and striking ironic poses in the agnostic arena of signifying practices. Leftists must illuminate the little shops of horror that lurk beneath ‘globalization’s’ shiny façade; they must challenge the true ‘evils’ that are manifest in the tentacles of global capitalism's reach. And, more than this, Leftists must search for the cracks in the edifice of globalized capitalism and shine light on those fissures that give birth to alternatives. Socialism today, undoubtedly, runs against the grain of received wisdom, but its vision of a vastly improved and freer arrangement of social relations beckons on the horizon. Its unwritten text is nascent in the present even as it exists among the fragments of history and the shards of distant memories. Its potential remains untapped and its promise needs to be redeemed.

**TL--Vaccines**

**No solvency and reject "empirical" claims -- vaccines require complex infrastructure to manufacture, not just patents**

**Hotez 5/10** [Peter J. Hotez, Maria Elena Bottazzi, and Prashant Yadav. "Producing a Vaccine Requires More Than a Patent," Foreign Affairs, 5-10-2021, accessed 8-8-2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-05-10/producing-vaccine-requires-more-patent] HWIC

On May 5, President Joe Biden announced that the United States would support an international bid to waive intellectual property rights to vaccines for the duration of the coronavirus pandemic, thereby ostensibly allowing other countries to ramp up production even of the sophisticated technology behind the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines against COVID-19. Many in the global health community and developing world welcomed the decision as a victory for greater equity in vaccine distribution, in which middle- and low-income countries are lagging far behind wealthy ones. But the jubilation may be premature. The drive for intellectual property waivers originates in part from the world’s experience fighting the last war, against HIV/AIDS. Patent pools, intellectual property waivers, and other liberalizing mechanisms were urgent in assuring equity of access to lifesaving drugs during that epidemic. But these tools are better suited to medicines and other pharmaceuticals than to vaccines. Producing vaccines—particularly those as technologically complex as the messenger RNA (mRNA) inoculations against COVID-19—requires not only patents but an entire infrastructure that cannot be transferred overnight. The sharing of patents is an important and welcome development for the long term, but it may not even be the most pressing first step. JUST OPEN THE SPIGOT At the turn of the millennium, multinational pharmaceutical companies were charging $10,000 per patient for a daily drug regimen that could keep those infected with HIV/AIDS alive. Those in low- and middle-income countries in Africa and elsewhere could access this cocktail only under limited circumstances. Then, in 2001, the Indian drug manufacturer Cipla Limited began producing versions of a triple antiretroviral drug cocktail for a mere $350. Cipla, in collaboration with Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), helped usher in a new era of global access to essential medicines—one that justified relaxing or even ignoring international patents and other property rights to produce and distribute an important and lifesaving drug as a generic. Since that time, global health advocacy organizations have found increasingly sophisticated ways to work with multinationals in ensuring access to essential medicines for low- and middle-income countries. In the 2010s, the global health initiative Unitaid helped create a Medicines Patent Pool, in which pharmaceutical companies from all over the world offered antiretroviral drug licenses, thereby creating a path for developing generic versions so long as the patent holders received royalties. The mechanism supplied voluntary licenses to new producers even while protecting the legal rights of the drugs’ original manufacturers. Companies such as Gilead, for example, have supplied voluntary licenses for their antivirals directly to generic manufacturers, allowing for tiered pricing across countries. Barely any COVID-19 vaccines have been administered in the African continent or in low- or middle-income countries in Asia and Latin America. Global health professionals have understandably sought to ascertain whether a similar approach could help make the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines less lopsided. More than one billion vaccine doses have now been administered—but overwhelmingly to people living in just a few countries. More than half have been administered in the United States (250 million) and China (290 million) alone, followed by India (160 million), the United Kingdom (51 million), and Germany (32 million). In contrast, for all practical purposes, barely any COVID-19 vaccines have been [administered](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccinations-tracker.html) in the African continent or in low- or middle-income countries in Asia and Latin America. Global health advocates have responded to this inequity by seeking to apply the lessons they learned from antiretroviral drugs and demanding patent pools or other intellectual property waivers for COVID-19 vaccines. In March 2021, Médecins Sans Frontières organized protests at the World Trade Organization (WTO) headquarters in Geneva, unfurling a banner that read, “No COVID Monopolies—Wealthy Countries Stop Blocking TRIPS Waiver,” referring to the organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. The assumption underlying such demands is that intellectual property is a crucial barrier blocking vaccine developers, especially in low- and middle-income countries, from producing COVID-19 vaccines to scale—particularly the high-performing mRNA vaccines that Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna currently produce. These vaccines elicit more than 90 percent protective immunity against both symptomatic illness and documented infection, including asymptomatic infection, with COVID-19. They are successfully driving the recovery of the United States, Israel, and other nations. But so far, mRNA vaccines are mostly invisible to Africa, Latin America, and low- and middle-income countries in other regions. The hope of those pushing for TRIPS waivers and patent pools is that these will unleash the technology to make the recovery global. IT TAKES A WHOLE ECOSYSTEM Intellectual property sharing may be helpful in the long term. But producing complicated biologics, especially innovative ones such as mRNA or adenovirus-vectored vaccines, is not solely a matter of patent access. Small-molecule antiviral drugs are comparatively straightforward: the multistep chemical processes through which they are synthesized are often fully detailed in published patents or scientific papers. Chemists and formulation experts can often synthesize and scale up production just from knowing the drug structure. But vaccines are different. Producing and manufacturing lipid-encased mRNA molecules, recombinant adenoviruses, or even the proteins or whole inactivated viruses used in older-generation vaccines requires a far higher level of sophistication than is needed for producing small-molecule drugs. Moreover, vaccine production must meet stringent requirements for quality control, quality assurance, and regulatory oversight. The **effective transfer of such complex technology requires a receiving ecosystem that can take years, sometimes decades, to build**. Countries seeking to ramp up vaccine production will need to train staff scientists and technicians. They will also need scientific administrators versed not only in basic research and development but also in detailed record keeping, including specific documentation practices such as batch production records. Moreover, they will need strong quality control systems and regulatory guardrails. Building such an infrastructure requires intensive training and often considerable financial investment and risk. It also takes time—by some estimates, vaccine development requires at least 11 years, and even then the probability that such efforts will result in bringing a vaccine to market is less than ten percent. Consider that the COVID-19 vaccines were themselves the outcome of decades of research and development. Few nations are prepared to take such risks. Only a handful of low- or middle-income countries currently have the capacity to produce new vaccines. Only a handful of low- or middle-income countries currently have the capacity to produce new vaccines. The most notable and largest is India, which currently makes the adenovirus-vectored vaccines developed by Janssen and by Oxford and AstraZeneca, as well as an older-technology recombinant protein vaccine and a whole inactivated virus vaccine. Manufacturers in Brazil, Cuba, and some Southeast Asian countries have experience producing childhood vaccines and may be able to develop the capacity to make COVID-19 vaccines as well. Other possibilities may develop elsewhere, including in the Middle East and Africa. But in the near term, such manufacturers will require financing, access to very large amounts of raw materials and supplies (possibly including relaxation of export controls), and some technical expertise in manufacturing and quality control if they are to produce the existing vaccines against COVID-19. Vaccinating India alone will require almost two billion doses, and more than 12 billion doses will be required to vaccinate the world. The emergence of new variants and the need for booster doses may increase demand even further. Whether mRNA vaccine technology can be scaled to produce billions of doses in 2021, or even by early 2022, remains entirely unknown, but the goal is worth pursuing. To this end, some kind of patent relaxation may be necessary, but far from sufficient. Would-be producers will need technical know-how, regulatory controls, and components that are currently in very short supply, such as nucleotides and lipids.

#### Tech transfer is key and not included under IP

Smith 05/05

(Laura Smith-Spark; Newsdesk Editor, CNN Digital; (05-05-21) Rich nations urged to share vaccine knowledge while WTO debates waiving patents; CNN; <https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/05/world/covid-19-vaccine-patents-wto-intl/index.html>; CKD)

Thomas Bollyky, director of the Global Health Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, told CNN on Friday that what's really needed to scale up global manufacturing of vaccines is technology transfer. "It's not just a matter of intellectual property. It's also the transfer of know-how," he said. "I don't think there's clear evidence that a waiver of an intellectual property is going to be the best way for that technology transfer to occur." Waiving patents will not work in the same way for vaccines as it has for drugs, Bollyky said. For HIV drugs, for example, manufacturers were more or less able to reverse engineer them without much help from the original developer. "It's very different for vaccines, where it's really a biological process as much as a product. It's hard to scale up manufacturing in this process for the original company, let alone another manufacturer trying to figure this out without assistance," he said. "It requires a lot of knowledge that's not part of the IP." The deal between AstraZeneca and the Serum Institute of India is a successful example of such technology transfer, Bollyky said, where the licensing of IP happened voluntarily. "The question is what can we do to facilitate more deals like the one between AstraZeneca and the Serum Institute of India to have this transfer," he said. Michael Head, senior research fellow in global health at the University of Southampton, in England, told CNN that increasing regional manufacturing capacity, particularly in the global south, was key -- and should be a focus between pandemics. "Sharing intellectual property during the pandemic is something that should happen but that doesn't resolve the issues," he said. "Manufacturing vaccines is hard. It's hard to rapidly set up a new site with all the equipment, infrastructure, all the vaccine ingredients, with suitable staff to produce a large number of high quality vaccine products." Philanthropist Bill Gates, a major supporter of [global Covid-19 vaccine equity](https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/05/world/covax-explainer-intl/index.html) through the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, also [told Sky News](https://news.sky.com/story/covid-19-bill-gates-hopeful-world-completely-back-to-normal-by-end-of-2022-and-vaccine-sharing-to-ramp-up-12285840) last month that he did not believe overriding IP rules was the answer. "There's only so many vaccine factories in the world and people are very serious about the safety of vaccines," he said. "The thing that's holding things back in this case is not intellectual property. There's not, like, some idle vaccine factory with regulatory approval that makes magically safe vaccines. You've got to do the trials on these things and every manufacturing process has to be looked at in a very careful way."

#### Equitable distribution of vaccines can’t combat disease spread because of other barriers like vaccine uptake, effectiveness, durability, eligibility factors, logistical problems, and mutations- ignore aff’s myopic promotions

MacLeod 2-10 [Iain MacLeod, co-founder and CEO of Aldatu Biosciences of Watertown, Massachusetts, which develops novel viral diagnostics, including those for pathogens such as SARS-CoV-2, and a research associate at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. “Do the math: Vaccines alone won’t get us out of this pandemic.” February 10, 2021. <https://www.statnews.com/2021/02/10/vaccines-alone-wont-end-pandemic/>] AL

But it seems as if there is light at the end of the tunnel. As long as we maintain social distancing, keep wearing masks, and washing our hands, it feels to many as though we can hold on until we get vaccinated. I’m sorry to be writing the words that follow, but here they are: We can’t vaccinate our way out of this pandemic. And the myopic focus on achieving herd immunity through mass vaccination may even make it tougher for America — and the world — to defeat Covid-19. Don’t get me wrong: Mass vaccination is essential. But herd immunity is a numbers game. It is defined as the point at which community spread of a disease stops because unprotected individuals are surrounded by a “herd” of people who are immune to infection, making it difficult, if not impossible, for infected people to pass on the disease. Many experts have said we will achieve herd immunity when about 70% of the population is immune to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes Covid-19, either through vaccination or by having had Covid-19. How do we reach that number? It’s harder than it seems. For starters, while the Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna vaccines showed about 95% efficacy in the clinical trials, **vaccine effectiveness** — how well a vaccine performs under real-world conditions — is likely to be lower for several reasons. One is that the people who participate in clinical trials are an imperfect representation of the whole population. They tend to be healthier, and younger. Real-world factors such as vaccine transportation and storage can also reduce vaccine effectiveness. Say the Moderna and Pfizer vaccines now being given across the country achieve 90% effectiveness. Vaccinating 70% of U.S. residents puts us at 63% immunity. So, we’ll need to vaccinate a full 80% of the population to reach the herd immunity threshold. **Additional vaccines are starting to be approved. Some of them have lower efficacy.** For instance, the AstraZeneca vaccine has about 70% efficacy, and Johnson & Johnson has reported that its one-dose vaccine has 66% efficacy. Their real-world performance could be lower still. If these vaccines become part of the mix in the U.S., actual protection will be lower than the estimated 90% we’d get from just the Moderna and Pfizer vaccines. There are other barriers to achieving herd immunity. Vaccine uptake — how many people actually get vaccinated — is far below the level we need, in part because Covid-19 beliefs have been politicized in the U.S. and a percentage of the population doesn’t even believe the disease is real. In a Kaiser Health News survey released near the end of January, 13% of Americans said they would “definitely not” get vaccinated, 7% would take the vaccine only if it was “required,” and another 31% would “wait and see how it’s working” before getting vaccinated. Not encouraging numbers for those hoping for a quick journey to herd immunity. Even when ample vaccine supplies are restored — perhaps by President Biden invoking the Defense Production Act — other factors will further drive down the number of people who get vaccinated. Eligibility factors currently exclude approximately 25% of U.S. residents from Covid-19 vaccination. The Pfizer vaccine can be administered only to those age 16 and up; for the Moderna vaccine, it’s those 18 and up. This represents approximately 20% of the population. Furthermore, although the CDC says that pregnant people may get vaccinated, it stops short of a clear recommendation. The decision is a “personal choice” left up to individuals and their health care providers. Excluding those currently ineligible for vaccination against SARS-CoV-2 due to age or other conditions leaves 75% of Americans with no restrictions on vaccination. Factoring in the 13% of Americans who definitely don’t want the vaccine and the 7% who would get it only if it was required means just 49.5% of Americans would have immunity in the near future. If half of those who are in a wait-and-see mode don’t get vaccinated — another 15% of the population — then we are looking at just 40% vaccine coverage of the currently eligible population, far below the 70% needed for herd immunity. And that’s even before considering that real-world vaccine effectiveness will be below clinical trial levels. The young people who aren’t cleared to get the Moderna and Pfizer vaccines have proven to be highly efficient asymptomatic spreaders of Covid-19. Leaving this population unprotected will enable the disease to continue to spread widely. Finally, we don’t yet know the durability of the immune response to the various vaccines. It may persist. Or it may wear off, leaving people vulnerable after they’ve been vaccinated and creating conditions for new outbreaks. If my years of global health work on the HIV/AIDS epidemic has taught me anything, it’s that even the best laid plans can’t anticipate every challenge. To vaccinate 75% of the U.S. population, approximately 248 million people — that’s nearly 500 million doses — are needed. And it means we need to be vaccinating nearly 2 million people a day so all of them are immune by the fall of 2021. As I write this, we’re vaccinating only about 1 million people a day. At that pace, Reuters estimates it would take until April 2022 for 75% of Americans to receive at least their first vaccine dose. And that’s only if everything goes well logistically (it won’t) and if there are no further mutations in SARS-CoV-2 that make combating it more difficult (there will be). It’s time to stop promoting the myopic belief that the unrealistic goal of herd immunity can be achieved in 2021 and start looking to reinforcing all aspects of the health care response as we start to concede that Covid-19 will become an endemic disease that will continue to lurk in the population. For the foreseeable future, that means continued physical distancing; occupancy limits in restaurants and other retail establishments; replacement of physical menus with smart phone-based menus to prevent surface spread of the virus, and more. We’ll also need to monitor people who have been vaccinated to gauge the durability of the immune system’s response and whether booster shots are necessary, as they are for tetanus and diphtheria. Finally, our nation’s public health infrastructure will need to be bolstered, putting in place new protocols to monitor for new variants of the virus as soon as they emerge. Can we defeat Covid-19? We can and we will. But setting sights on a near-term goal of achieving herd immunity ignores the math that governs the spread of disease. That approach is going to take a while. To get past Covid-19, we need to use all the tools available.

### Too Slow

#### Reducing IP rights aren’t quick enough to help the pandemic – legal battles slow the process – experts agree

Smith 05/05

(Laura Smith-Spark; Newsdesk Editor, CNN Digital; (05-05-21) Rich nations urged to share vaccine knowledge while WTO debates waiving patents; CNN; <https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/05/world/covid-19-vaccine-patents-wto-intl/index.html>; CKD)

But even as public pressure grows, some experts argue that handing over the IP rights for Covid-19 vaccines won't necessarily mean that more can be rapidly produced worldwide at large scale. US infectious diseases chief Anthony Fauci [told the UK's Financial Times](https://www.ft.com/content/2f41b122-5738-4707-a822-0d79276710c5) on Monday that he was not convinced that forcing companies to share their intellectual property was the most effective approach, warning that legal battles could slow the process. "Going back and forth, consuming time and lawyers in a legal argument about waivers -- that is not the endgame. People are dying around the world and we have to get vaccines into their arms in the fastest and most efficient way possible," he said.

#### Negotiations on a waiver will take too long

Mercurio 06-24

(Bryan Mercurio; Law Prof. at The Chinese University of Hong Kong; (06-24-21) The IP Waiver for COVID-19: Bad Policy, Bad Precedent; IIC on Springer Link; <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5>; CKD)

On 5 May 2021, the US reversed its position and announced that it would support a waiver for COVID-19 vaccines.[Footnote6](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn6) To be clear, this does not mean that the US supported the waiver as proposed by India and South Africa. Instead, the US has simply agreed to negotiate the perimeters of a waiver. Others, including the European Union (EU), Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) and even leading developing countries such as Brazil, Chile and Mexico remain opposed or lukewarm on the waiver.[Footnote7](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn7) The US dropping opposition does not mean the concerns of other Members will simply disappear – one would hope that these nations opposed the waiver for valid reasons and did not simply blindly follow the US. Indeed, many of the above-listed Members remain unconvinced that even such a draconian step as a waiver of IPRs would accomplish the goal of increased vaccine production.[Footnote8](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn8) For its part, the EU continues to favour an approach which makes better use of existing flexibilities available in the TRIPS Agreement.[Footnote9](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn9) Thus, those expecting quick agreement on the waiver will be disappointed. Negotiations at the WTO are always difficult and lengthy, and US Trade Representative Katherine Tai acknowledged that the “negotiations will take time given the consensus-based nature of the institution and the complexity of the issues involved”.[Footnote10](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn10) Issues of negotiation will include the scope of the waiver. Whereas the original proposal and its amended form extend the waiver beyond patents and vaccines to include nearly all forms of IP (i.e. copyright,[Footnote11](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn11) industrial designs and trade secrets) as well as to all “health products and technologies including diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccines, medical devices, personal protective equipment, their materials or components, and their methods and means of manufacture for the prevention, treatment or containment of COVID-19”[Footnote12](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn12) (with no requirement on how or the extent to which they are related to or useful in combatting COVID-19), the US and others seem to support a waiver limited to patents and vaccines.[Footnote13](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn13) The length of the waiver will also be a contentious negotiating issue, with proponents seeking a virtual indefinite waiver lasting until the Membership agrees by consensus that it is no longer required – meaning even a single Member’s objection to ending the waiver would mean the waiver continues to remain in force[Footnote14](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn14) – as will the request that any action claimed to be taken under the waiver is outside the scope of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism.[Footnote15](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn15) These provisions will almost certainly be opposed by other Members, who would perhaps agree to a time-limited waiver which could be extended rather than an unchallengeable indefinite waiver which will be difficult to reverse. The proposal also fails to mention anything in relation to transparency and notification requirements and lacks safeguards against abuse or diversion. These points will likely also prove contentious in the negotiations. With so many initial divergences and as yet undiscussed issues, the negotiations at best could be completed by the time of the next WTO Ministerial Conference, scheduled to begin on 20 November 2021. There is precedent in this regard, as previous TRIPS negotiations involving IP and pharmaceuticals were not fully resolved until the days before the Ministerial Conferences (in 2003 and 2005).[Footnote16](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-021-01083-5#Fn16) There is also a chance that the negotiations will continue past the calendar year 2021. The chance for a swift negotiation diminished with the release of a revised proposal by India and South Africa on 22 May 2021. As mentioned above, the proposal contains no limit as to product coverage, scope, notification requirements or safeguards and proposes that the waiver will remain in effect for what could be an indefinite period. This was not a proposal designed to engender quick negotiations and a solution. Instead, the proposal perhaps reveals India’s and South Africa’s true intent to use the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to roll-back IPRs rather than a good-faith effort to rapidly increase access to lifesaving vaccines and treatments around the world.