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#### Security is a psychological construct- the aff’s scenarios for conflict are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other. Claims of war and conflict create a false dichotomy between the good us and the evil them, ignoring our role in provoking the aggression.

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(John, former Professor of Psychology at Harvard and Pulitzer Prize Winner, <http://johnemackinstitute.org/1988/08/the-enemy-system-short-version/>) BW

The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the “enemy system”[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding man as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: “I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness”. This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and one’s own contribution to that threat-by distortions of perception, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy, or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. “We never see our enemy’s motives and we never labor to assess his will, with anything approaching objectivity”.[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us. In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: “War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy.”[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation’s leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the psychological mechanisms that impel individuals to kill or allow killing in their name, often with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war “The enemy is seen as less than human? He’s faceless. He’s an animal”.” Keen tries to answer his question: “The image of the enemy is not only the soldier’s most powerful weapon; it is society’s most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to participate in acts of violence they would never consider doing as individuals”.[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process. The image of the enemy as less than human may be hard to dislodge. For example, a teacher in the Boston area reported that during a high school class on the Soviet Union a student protested: “You’re trying to get us to see them as people”. Stephen Cohen and other Soviet experts have noted how difficult it is to change the American perception of the Soviet Union, despite the vast amount of new information contradicting old stereotypes.” Bernard Shaw in his preface to Heartbreak House, written at the end of World War I, observed ironically: “Truth telling is not compatible with the defense of the realm”. Nations are usually created out of the violent defeat of the former inhabitants of a piece of land or of outside enemies, and national leaders become adept at keeping their people’s attention focused on the threat of an outside enemy.[14] Leaders also provide what psychiatrist Vamik Volkan called “suitable targets of externalization”[10] – i.e., outside enemies upon whom both leaders and citizens can relieve their burdens of private defeat, personal hurt, and humiliation.[15] All-embracing ideas, such as political ideologies and fixed religious beliefs act as psychological or cultural amplifiers. Such ideologies can embrace whole economic systems, such as socialism or capitalism, or draw on beliefs that imply that a collectivity owes its existence to some higher power in the universe. It was not Stalin as an individual whom Nadezhda Mandelstam blamed for the political murder of her poet husband Osip and millions of other citizens but the “craving for an all-embracing idea which would explain everything in the world and bring about universal harmony at one go”.[16] Every nation, no matter how bloody and cruel its beginnings, sees its origins in a glorious era of heroes who vanquished less worthy foes. One’s own race, people, country, or political system is felt to be superior to the adversary’s, blessed by a less worthy god. The nuclear age has spawned a new kind of myth. This is best exemplified by the United States’ strategic defense initiative. This celestial fantasy offers protection from attack by nuclear warheads, faith here being invested not in a god but in an anti-nuclear technology of lasers, satellites, mirrors, and so on in the heavens.

#### Threats are constructed – their security discourse creates a self fulfilling prophecy that makes true understanding of structural causes behind “threats” impossible. Mack 91

Dr. Mack, professor at Harvard Medical School, 1991, (John E., “The Psychodynamics of International Relationships” Vol 1 p. 58-59)

Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with an argument that, reduced to its essentials , goes something like this: “It’s very well to psychologize but my enemy is real. The Russians (or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans) are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real struggles between us and them and differing national interests: competition over oil, land or scarce resources and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations (or political systems) It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance of superiority of (military and political) power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness.” This argument is neither wrong nor right, but instead simply limited. It fails to grapple with a critical distinction that informs the entire subject. Is the threat really generated by the enemy as it appears to be at any given moment, or is it based on one’s own contribution to the threat, derived from distortion of perception by provocative words and actions in a cycle of enmity and externalization of responsibility? In sum, the enemy IS real, but we have not learned to identify our own role in creating that enemy or in elaborating the threatening image we hold of the other group or country and its actual intentions or purposes. “we never see our enemy’s motives and we never labor to asses his will with anything approaching objectivity.”

#### The Russian threat paradigm, proven by 1ac Brown 10 talking about how Russia will respond with military violence, is grounded in racial and ideological dogma that works to maintain the imperial nature of western power and endless war. This culminates in a self-fulfilling prophecy leading to Russian expansionism and militarism.

Brown, PhD IR @ Aberdeen, 10 [James, Prof Political Science @ University of Aberdeen, “A Stereotype, Wrapped in a Cliché, Inside a Caricature: Russian Foreign Policy and Orientalism,” POLITICS: 2010 VOL 30(3), 149–159]

As a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“East” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). It represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the West must confront forcefully. Moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: Today, bookstores in the US are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about Islam and terror, Islam exposed, the Arab threat and the Muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange Oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). This portrayal of the East as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of Orientalist literature. However, as well as exaggerating the East’s distinctiveness, the Orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. The second core characteristic of Orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from Western norms. Specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as Chaim Weizmann put it to Arthur Balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). What is more, unlike superior Europeans, [they] Orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). In dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). Furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, Orientalism is committed to rectifying it. The East must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the West imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. The knowledge produced by Orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. For this reason, Said brands Orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the Orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of Western power’ (ibid., p. 223). Having said this, recognition of Orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. The third prominent feature of Orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). Said explains that over time Western writing about the Orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. Analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. Their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). Every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. This problem is exacerbated by the tendency for Area Studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). Some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: First is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). Second is eternality: the Orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. Momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). Third, Orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the West. Prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘Oriental personality’ (ibid., p. 31). Fourth, Orientalists have a great talent for combining ‘imperial vagueness and precise detail’ (ibid., p. 50). Therefore, while indulging in the most shameless of generalisations, Orientalists simultaneously bombard the reader with ‘sheer, overpowering, monumental description’ (ibid., p. 162). Fifth, despite pretensions to expertise, numerous Orientalists are remarkably underqualified to speak about the East and cannot even claim knowledge of the relevant languages (ibid., pp. 178, 193). In developing the argument outlined above, Said refers almost exclusively to representations of the Arab world. However, as an intellectual model, Orientalism lends itself to application well beyond its original field of study as a means of drawing attention to any area of scholarship in which the literature has become stuck in a monotonous cycle of reaffirmation. With this in mind, this article employs Orientalism to critique Western discourse on Russian foreign policy. Orientalism and Russian foreign policy Orientalism and Russia are not unacquainted. In fact, Russia (or the Soviet Union) features more than ten times in Orientalism. There is also a substantial secondary literature that explores Orientalism in the Russian context (e.g. Bolton, 2009; David-Fox, Holquist and Martin, 2006; Khalid, 2000). However, for both Said and the vast majority of subsequent scholars, Russia is significant, not as an object of Orientalist modes of thought, but as an origin. In particular, the literature highlights Russia’s long imperial history, its tendency to define its core culture in contradis-tinction to those of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and its imposition of a standardised way of life upon the peoples of its empire. However, just because a culture is itself an instigator of Orientalism does not mean that it is not also a recipient. This fact has been recognised by Iver Neumann. In Uses of the Other, Neumann describes the historical construction of Russia as Europe’s Other. In particular, he draws attention to representations of the country as a ‘barbarian at the gate’ (Neumann, 1999, p. 77), acknowledges the popular stereotype of ‘an alleged Russian Volksgeist (“national character”) of sloth, drunkenness, and laziness’ (ibid., p. 104) and highlights the perception of Russia as ‘a gigantic specimen to which the most advanced legal and administrative ideas could be applied with a completeness impossible in western Europe’ (Anderson, quoted in ibid., p. 78). In making this case, Neumann cites Said and clearly demonstrates the appropriateness of his model to this context. However, Russia is not the exclusive focus of his book and, even when dealing with the subject, Neumann’s concern is with long-standing cultural representations of the country and not contemporary portrayals of its position in international politics. Elsewhere, some scholars have explored specific deficiencies in the Western political discourse about Russia (Gleason, 1951; Lieven, 2000; Malia, 1999; Mikoyan, 2006; Solzhenitsyn, 1980); most recently, studies have highlighted anti-Russian sentiment among US policymakers (Tsygankov, 2009) and lack of balance in Western media coverage of the 2008 Russo–Georgian war (English and Svyatets, 2010). And yet, as valuable as these contributions are, they tend to frame their arguments in terms of Russophobia and do not recognise the interdisciplinary relevance of Orientalism. This article fills the gap in this literature by demonstrating how Said’s model can be employed to make sense of the clichés, distortions and exaggerations that taint this discourse. The use of this alternative framework is a valuable addition, not only because it highlights some heretofore un-noted deficiencies, but also because it does so by drawing upon a more substantive and deep-rooted theory than the nebulous Russophobia. As such, rather than simply describing the weaknesses, the Orientalist model is able to employ its sophisticated understanding of the process of Othering to offer a clear and credible account of their emergence. Moreover, Said’s depiction of how the discourse about a region can come to be dominated by a partisan and self-perpetuating orthodoxy provides a valuable explanation for the pervasiveness and durability of the unfortunate representation of Russian foreign policy that is detailed here. Each of these considerations provides significant scope for further research, thus encouraging the opening up of this subject area to much-needed intellectual rejuvenation. At this point I should make clear that it is not my intention to suggest that all Western accounts of Russian foreign policy are Orientalist; there are many fine studies that do not fit the model. However, as the following paragraphs reveal, there is a sizeable mass of literature that unmistakably displays the characteristic symptoms of Orientalism. With regard to the first trait – the exaggeration of difference – there is a striking propensity to portray Russian foreign policy as markedly different from that of Western states. Although probably of older origin, this perception was powerfully reinforced by the stark dividing lines of the Cold War and by Moscow’s use of ideological rhetoric to justify its international strategy. Despite the collapse of communism, this image of Russia as an Other, which pursues a qualitatively different mode of behaviour, remains prominent in Western scholarship. It might be noted that all branches of Area Studies are prone to stress countries’ dissimilarities, while downplaying their commonalities, since this represents much of the field’s unique selling point. However, be this as it may, there is certainly a tendency for Russia’s mode of engagement in international affairs to be presented as unusual. To be specific, scholars regularly present Russian foreign policy as puzzling, unpredictable and divergent from the Western norm. Indeed, the country’s behaviour is considered to be so exceptional and difficult to define that standard analytical models are not thought to apply (Arias-King, King de Arias and Arias de la Canal, 2008; Kubicek, 1999, pp. 547–548; Legvold, 2007a, pp. 10–11). Bobo Lo, one of the best-known Western experts on the subject, clearly highlights this conception, beginning his popular textbook with the observation that Russia’s external activities reflect ‘the perversity of human nature’ and, ‘far from exhibiting an underlying if specific pragmatism ... have been liberally streaked with irrationality’ (Lo, 2002, p. 1). Moreover, in accordance with the Orientalist model, this image of inscrutable foreignness is persistently reaffirmed through shared language use. Most notable in this regard is the literature’s compulsive repetition of Churchill’s claim that Russia’s actions are a ‘riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma’ (Arias-King, King de Arias and Arias de la Canal, 2008, p. 118; Donaldson and Nogee, 2009, p. 65; Joyce, 1984, p. 134; Lo, 2002, p. 1; March, 2006, p. 88; Rubinstein, 1989, p. 12). Another popular means of expressing the same idea is the medical metaphor, whereby Russia is presented as ‘genetically different’ (Wesson, 1974, p. 3), exhibiting allergic reactions (Lo, 2008, p. 258) and afflicted by various ailments, including Borderline Personality Disorder (Arias-King, King de Arias and Arias de la Canal, 2008). Meanwhile, others contribute to this sense of exoticism, deviance and distance via clichés about bears (Garnett, 1997, p. 61; Menon, 1995), chess (Goldman, 2008, pp. 92, 154–155) and nesting dolls (Legvold, 2009, pp. 42–43). Furthermore, as Said predicts, as well as being presented as somehow more extraordinary and incomprehensible than the behaviour of any other large, complex state, Russian foreign policy is portrayed as significantly more dangerous. Despite its ‘syndrome of backwardness’ (Snyder, 1994, p. 181), Russia continues to represent a serious potential threat to international stability (Kubicek, 1999, pp. 567–568; Pipes, 1997; Snyder, 1994, p. 197) and is thus a popular subject for Western polemic (Baker and Glasser, 2005; Lucas, 2008). Turning to the second tenet of Orientalism – the assumption of Western superiority – there is also clear evidence that Russia’s mode of engagement in international politics is routinely presented as inferior to that of Western countries. In a manner that contributes to the image of Russian deviationism (though contradicts the illusion of mysterious unpredictability), a substantial values gap is proposed to exist between Russian and Western strategic cultures (Forsberg, 2004, pp. 261–263; Mankoff, 2010, p. 134; March, 2006, p. 93). In essence, while the West is considered to have largely transcended Hobbesian modes of thought, Russian foreign policy remains ‘nakedly realist’ (March, 2006, p. 92), fixated with security, sovereignty and the pursuit of national interest. This is an entirely legitimate observation, yet what is dubious is the disparaging suggestion that this approach is un-European (ibid., p. 93), anachronistic (Lo, 2008, p. 176) or even so backward as to be rooted in a different historical era (Vihavainen, 2009, pp. 53–54). What is more, not only is Russia’s strategy deemed outdated, but its attempts to implement it are also seen as substandard since its policymaking is habitually cast as chaotic, error prone and even feckless (Garnett, 1998, pp. 67–70; Legvold, 2007a, pp. 7–10; Lo, 2008, p. 141; Simes, 2007, p. 36). Again, there may be some truth to this, especially with regard to the early 1990s, yet so embedded has this image become that even successful (from the Russian perspective) undertakings – such as the use of energy as a means of economic and political leverage, and military intervention in Georgia – are instinctively portrayed as fundamental failures (Baev, 2008, pp. 128–129; Sestanovich, 2008, pp. 25–26; Vendil Pallin and Westerlund, 2009). Furthermore, as the Orientalist model suggests, as well as being convinced of the waywardness of Russia’s approach, Western scholars are committed to rectifying it. The issue of how its pupil was ‘lost’ in the 1990s continues to be debated (Columbus, 2001; Eyal, 2009; Simes, 2007), thus assuming that Russia was ever someone’s to lose, and academics presumptuously dictate how the country can be returned to the ‘right’ path (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006). While nominally independent, such scholarship clearly shares and serves the interests of Western power. Finally, traces of Orientalism are detectable in the intellectual models employed in the study of this subject. Although the number of publications in this area is large, accounts of Russian foreign policy, when not essentially heavyweight descriptions (e.g. Donaldson and Nogee, 2009; Kennedy-Pipe, 1998; Rangsimaporn, 2009), are remarkably repetitive and unimaginative. Testimony to this fact is provided by the surprising number of similarities to be found in the analyses, if not the ultimate expectations, of liberal (e.g. Legvold, 2007b) and conservative (e.g. Pipes, 1996) commentators. Rather than undertaking innovative research into how findings from other disciplines can be applied to this context or drawing new cross-national comparisons, scholars habitually reiterate a core set of convictions which, on the basis of use rather than truth, has become the standard narrative. Employing simplifications and unsubstantiated claims that would not be tolerated with regard to Western states, this basic approach does little to enhance our understanding of Russian foreign policy. At core, the orthodox discourse takes the view that there is a specifically Russian mindset or pattern of behaviour to which the country inevitably reverts. While Western states are assumed to respond rationally to incentives and constraints, Russian policy is guided by some primordial instinct that has been indelibly imprinted upon its national character by the weight of geography and history. This predisposition naturally inclines the country towards expansionism, militarism and autocracy (Brzezinski, 1984; Galeotti, 1995, pp. 3–24; Lo, 2003, pp. 72–83; Pipes, 1996; Snyder, 1994, p. 179). Moreover, so enduring is this assumed inclination that it is deemed to apply across the fault lines of Russian and Soviet history. In consequence, there is an uncommon tendency to explain Russia’s current foreign policy by drawing upon historical precedent (Bunce, 1993; Joyce, 1984; Lederer, 1962; Legvold, 2007b and 2009; Lo, 2008, pp. 17–37; Vihavainen, 2009). For example, Russia is said still to possess a collective ‘Mongol complex’ as the result of the subjugation of Russian lands from the 13th to 15th centuries (Lo, 2008, pp. 18–19; Vihavainen, 2009). This phenomenon apparently helps account for today’s ambivalent national identity and troubled relations with both East and West. In explaining why no respected scholar would account for modern British policies in such a way, Timo Vihavainen states bluntly that ‘England had changed, while Russia had not’ (2009, pp. 18–19). Encouraged by this view that Russia is trapped in the past, all manner of modern phenomena are labelled atavism and dubious parallels are drawn between modern and historical figures, such as between Vladimir Putin and Peter the Great, Stolypin and Stalin (Lo, 2003, pp. 6, 133–134; McDonald, 2007, pp. 182–183; Murawiec, 2000). Of course, there is nothing wrong with historical comparison per se; it is a widely used and valuable analytical technique. However it should be employed when genuinely merited and not simply as a matter of conventio

#### Their defense of nato, proven by 1ac bond 17 talking about how the breakup of nato as bad, is awful. NATO is a vehicle for destructive intervention – reject its legitimization.

Kuus 9—Department of Geography, The University of British Columbia (Merje, Cosmopolitan militarism? Spaces of NATO expansion, Environment and Planning A 2009, vol 41, pages 545-562, AMiles)

`With little fanfare—and even less notice—the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has gone global'' (Daalder and Goldgeier, 2006, page 105), proclaims a recent article in Foreign Affairs, the flagship journal of the United States foreign policy establishment. Indeed, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) now has twenty-six member states and twenty-three partner countries—the latter include three candidate states—as well as looser cooperation agreements with a further eleven states.(1) All countries that neighbor NATO's member states are incorporated into the alliance's networks of cooperation. In addition, NATO is developing closer relations with `contact countries' like Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand with which it does not (yet) have formal cooperation agreements. The alliance has enlarged twice since the end of the Cold War, and further enlargements are widely anticipated, perhaps as soon as later this decade. The buzz in the military - industrial - academic complex— or what its practitioners call `the strategic community'—is about global, not European, partnerships of `new Atlanticism' and `forward defense'. The alliance's summits are impeccably choreographed spectacles that project the image of an integrative and inclusive NATO of global reach. That NATO acts **not against threats** but for `Euroatlantic values'—freedom and security, cooperation and solidarity, just and lasting peace, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Its space is not closed off in defense against territorial threats, but is open in an effort to spread these values. Stretching `from Vancouver to Vladivostok' and from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean, NATO's network space incorporates Afghanistan and Algeria as well as Canada and Croatia into a distinctly globalist discourse of common security and shared values. ``These days'', notes The Economist (2006), ``NATO looks ever more like a kind of United Nations in military uniform'' (page 14). This expansion of NATO's geographic scope and mechanisms of legitimation is significant. It points to a reconfiguration of where and how **Western military power is** exercised and **normalized**. Traditionally, militarism relies on nationalist geographical imaginaries. Historically, the spaces of empire, the West, or the Free World have also served to `ground' militarism. The current phase of NATO enlargement projects a different story. It is a story of the whole humanity and the whole global space gently guarded by beneficent NATO. The world's largest military alliance appears to have departed from the ideological framework of the Cold War era—in which NATO was an antidote to Soviet Communism—and to have become a magnetic center of international cooperation in spheres like peacekeeping, landmine destruction, and democracy building. There is no outside and no ideological enemy in this space; there are only different kinds and degrees of belonging to the inside. **Formal intergovernmental agreements** and collaboration projects **are only one medium for this globalist discourse**. **More importantly, the discourse is produced through** a wide range of activities in the **civil society: academic conferences** and workshops **as** **well as educational** and cultural **events** for different audiences. These activities are often carried out by networks of NGOs, which operate in all NATO member and partner countries, sometimes in collaboration with umbrella associations that coordinate their activities. For example, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) links nearly thirty such national NGOs. Sponsored by NATO's Public Diplomacy Division and the United States Mission to NATO (the national NGOs have their own sponsors), it calls itself ``one of the strongest and most influential youth NGO networks in the world'' (S—rensen and Th—rud, 2005, page 1). The processes of NATO's public legitimation thus combine a unified message with a relatively decentred institutional structure. I investigate how NATO's globalist discourse operates. Approaching militarization as a multilayered process through which military approaches to political problems gain elite and popular acceptance, I focus not on NATO's core meaning or capabilities but on the processes of its public legitimation. I argue that the normative space in which NATO has a constitutive influence on social relations is expanding ahead of formal membership. This expansion is effected through what I call **cosmopolitan militarism**: the framing of a military alliance in terms of cosmopolitan spaces that transcend national borders and ideological blocks to unite the whole globe. Cosmopolitan militarism here is an evolving mechanism or tendency in legitimizing NATO in its member and partner states. My argument is not that NATO is cosmopolitan, but rather that **it packages** or enacts **itself as such**. By unpacking how this is done, my analysis expands the interdisciplinary scholarship on the militarization of political culture and political space today. In empirical terms, I focus on Central Europe, defined here as the ten states that have acceded into the alliance since the end of the Cold War. These states are selected because they are at the forefront of NATO's expansion efforts. They share their `integration stories' with potential entrants and coach them for closer integration with NATO, and their NGOs receive substantial funding for events that popularize the alliance beyond its borders. Their own position in this effort is ambiguous. In spite of their full membership in NATO, they are also on the margins of the alliance. As newcomers, whose membership was by no means certain until this decade, they still need to prove their Western credentials. At home, their governments need to justify increased military budgets at the time of stagnant or even declining health, education, and other social spending. Moreover, these countries joined the alliance specifically **because they saw NATO as an exclusively Western club.** After a decade of rhetoric about joining Europe, their governments now need to justify sending military personnel outside Europe, to places that are popularly looked upon as non-European and less civilized. In short, Central European politicians and the general public need to remake their mental maps of Europe, the West, and global politics. As a result, the legitimation of NATO's normative space is more visible in Central Europe than in Western Europe, where similar activities have been going on since the 1950s. The investigation will proceed in three steps. The following section situates the paper in the geographic scholarship on militarization so as to highlight the need for further work on that process, especially in settings and scales other than the nation-state. In the subsequent empirical sections I examine the production of NATO's cosmopolitan militarism. In section 3 I delineate the development of NATO as an institution, highlighting its expansion and its extensive partnership agreements around the globe. In the fourth section I look at how the globalist geographical imaginaries are put into practice in the public relations campaigns of NATO and its related NGOs. **Analyzing** this public relations machinery from official speeches to **educational**, and entertainment **activities that seem far from** **militarism**, **I foreground the agents of militarization** **beyond** the institutions of **the nation-state**. The empirical examples come from the vast amount of information available through the websites of NATO and its supporting NGOs. This information includes not only official speeches and conference programs, but also policy papers, event descriptions, and educational materials, as well as visual materials like photo sequences, promotional videos, and video files of briefings, ceremonies, and lectures.(2) NATO summits have separate websites that cover the formal program as well as the supporting publicity events. Taken together, these materials enable me to foreground the material processes through which **militarization happens on a daily basis**. The new spaces of NATO are not simply preached; they are made in a very tangible and material level in multiple scales through a myriad of seemingly mundane practices like geographic education, language training, or international youth networking. These spaces are made intellectually plausible and experientially attractive. My objective is both to identify the key mechanisms that drive cosmopolitan militarism and to give a feel for NATO's public relations machinery in its smart, even glamorous, detail. This ambience is essential for understanding the popular appeal and effect of cosmopolitan militarism. In the concluding section I outline the implications of cosmopolitan militarism to the study of militarization. 2 The spaces and scales of militarization Militarism and militarization are key aspects of social life today. Militarism here refers to an ideology. the central tenet of which is that military force is a necessary resolver of conflict, whereas militarization refers to a multifaceted social process by which military approaches to social problems gain elite and popular acceptance (Enloe, 2004, page 219). Most **militarization** thus defined takes place in what is called peacetime. Its central locations are not the military or even the defense ministry; it rather **operates** **through civilian structures like education**, entertainment, and the popular media. The emerging geographic research on militarization focuses not as much on military institutions and military conflict—although these issues are undoubtedly important—as on the structures of legitimacy on which military force depends (Mamadouh, 2005; Woodward, 2004; see also Flint, 2005). Intersecting with scholarship in international relations (Cohn, 1987; Enloe, 2000) and anthropology (Gusterson, 2004; Lutz, 2006), this work exposes the explicit glorification and implicit normalization of military force and military institutions throughout society (Gregory, 2004, chapter 6; Sidaway, 2003; Thrift, 2006). I show that militarization is not imposed on the society; it is woven through the social fabric. However, more work still needs to be done to better understand how militarization occurs in different spheres of social life. Geographers need to engage the current period of military conflict without uncritically reifying the role of the state or the military in this process (Dalby, 1996, page 659; Flint, 2003a; 2003b). Empirically, this requires close attention to places far beyond military bases and defense ministries, to everyday practices like aid operations, cultural diplomacy, or youth NGOs—in short, the military ^ industrial ^ media ^ entertainment network that sustains and legitimizes military force (Der Derian, 2001). Examining all these `other' settings beyond the formal sphere of the state would show in greater detail that militarization extends much beyond the promotion of military force per se, in particular that it involves the normalization of militaristic presumptions about international, national, and personal matters. Such an examination would also help us to look beyond ``politics with a big P'' (Flint, 2003c) and to examine militarization as daily enactment. Such accounts must closely examine the role of moral claims in militarization today. Although moral arguments have always been an integral part of justifying political violence, they have become a central feature of the post-Cold-War settlement (Chomsky, 1999). The military complex becomes a key part of the production of moral good, and, conversely, `moral intervention' becomes a precondition for military intervention (Flint and Falah, 2004). The `enlargement' of the sphere of democratic states is thus underpinned by a militarized geography with moral rationalizations (Dalby, 2005, page 423; Falah et al, 2006; Gregory and Pred, 2006). The conceptual apparatus of the `war on terror' likewise rests on universalist and globalist geographical imaginaries (Retort, 2005; Sparke, 2005). These tendencies prompt Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) to posit that today's power relations are based not on force itself, but on the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace. Power relies on an `ethicopolitical dynamic' in which war is no longer an activity of defense or resistance, but one that is justified by an appeal to essential values and justice (page 11). For Hardt and Negri, empire's powers of intervention do not begin directly with its weapons of lethal force but rather with its moral instruments (page 35). **Military intervention becomes** juridically **legitimate** only **when it is inserted into existing international consensuses**. The first task of the empire is ``to enlarge the realm of the consensuses that support its own power'' (page 15). This production of consensuses is practiced by a variety of bodies, like state institutions and the news media, and most importantly by the so-called NGOs. For Hardt and Negri, then, **NGOs form a key part of the production of imperial right because they prepare the normative space for military intervention** (page 40). The above bodies of scholarship present a number of disagreements, but they all point to the need to examine militarization at scales other than the state. Traditionally, militarism is analyzed in the context of one state, especially the United States. That state is indeed the preeminent military power today. Its military spending amounts to nearly one half of the world's total, it operates over 800 `significant-size' military bases abroad, and it actively participates in several military conflicts (Lutz, 2006, page 593; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2006). NATO enlargement, and the strong US support that makes it possible, can be seen in terms of American hegemony, of the US exercising its power extraterritorially (Flint and Falah, 2004). It can be conceptualized as an attempt by the US to maintain centrality in the sphere where it is still clearly the dominant military power (Agnew, 2005). However, although global power relations today are effected in significant measure through US military power, they are also diffuse and decentered. This relatively decentered mode of operation is the starting point of Hardt and Negri's (cf 2000; 2004) argument about the network-like operation of power. In the passage from modern imperialism to postmodern empire, they argue, the dialectic of inside ^ outside has been replaced by ``a play of degrees and intensity, of hybridity and artificiality'' (Hardt and Negri, 2000, pages 186 ^ 188). Empire has no others; it integrates others (page 195). Today's security measures signal ``a lack of distinction between inside and outside, between the military and the police. Whereas `defense' involves a protective barrier against external threats, `security' justifies a constant martial activity equally in the homeland and abroad'' (Hardt and Negri, 2004, page 21). Whereas disciplinary power closes off space, measures of security lead to opening and globalization (Agamben, 2002). The `war on terror', then, is not a war against terrorists; it is a war to create and maintain a social order. As such, it is spatially indeterminate (Hardt and Negri, 2004, page 14). Hardt and Negri's thesis has a number of weaknesses that have been debated at length (Agnew, 2005; Balakrishnan, 2003; Sparke, 2005). Nevertheless, it is helpful in pinpointing the role of publicity campaigns and transnational networks in the operation of power today (Wood, 2003). NATO offers illuminating examples of such campaigns and networks. The alliance is separate from the military of any state. It has no military force separate from the member states. Although forces of individual member states may work under NATO command on specific missions, these forces are committed to such missions in a strictly intergovernmental fashion. All missions are decided unanimously among the member states. National expenditures on NATO are minor compared with national defense budgets. The alliance's imagery is painstakingly international with multiple languages and multiple flags always in sight. NATO summits are meetings of civilians—heads of state and government—and military uniforms feature only in the background. NATO has no single command center like the Pentagon and its summits move around among the member states. Although it is headquartered in Brussels, a city that most people associate with wet-lunching Eurocrats rather than military men, most of its decision making is located in national capitals. The alliance seems easy to dismiss as a minor accessory to the `real' militaries of nation-states. **Yet NATO is the indispensable alliance for Western military force today**. Its members account for roughly two thirds of the global military expenditures, it is a key player in several military conflicts, and it is continually bolstering its technical capabilities to operate globally.(3) The war in Kosovo was a NATO mission and the military operations in Afghanistan likewise involve substantial NATO forces. More importantly, NATO's norms and consensuses shape a range of domestic policy spheres in the member and candidate states, from military spending and defense structures to civil rights in the armed forces. **The alliance's discourse of democracy and human rights now forms an integral part of the justification of military intervention globally. It is precisely this low-key `soft' image that makes NATO an exceptionally illuminating example of cosmopolitan militarism.** The alliance prompts us to go beyond the focus on one state, such as the US, and to consider the transnational operation of militarization in liberal democratic societies. I use the concept of cosmopolitanism to capture the mechanisms through which NATO is legitimized in its member and partner states. Militarism and cosmopolitanism appear to be incompatible at first: the former associates with nationalism and statism, while the latter eschews these notions. Although there is no single cosmopolitanism, the ideas and practices commonly described as cosmopolitan all position themselves in opposition to nationalist and statist particularity (cf Cheah and Robbins, 1998). They evoke an allegiance to the worldwide community of humans. This is exactly what NATO does. Through cosmopolitan rhetoric and imagery, the alliance casts itself as an agent of global peace. The important question here, then, is not whether NATO is a `truly' cosmopolitan institution or whether it is merely a fig leaf for the US military ^ industrial complex; the question rather is how NATO's activities are publicly legitimized through evoking loyalties to the whole of humanity. To use the concept of cosmopolitanism in this way is neither to assign any core meaning to it nor to implicate all cosmopolitan practices in militarization. It is rather to foreground the ways in which **cosmopolitan spatial imaginaries** can **legitimize militarization**.(4) NATO is statist and intergovernmental in its institutional structure, but it is cosmopolitan in its public legitimation in the member states.

#### Knowing Nukes- The affirmative’s appeals to survival, proven by Edwards 17 talking about how dangerous nuclear war is to the survival of humanity, are not neutral but rather naturalize status quo concepts of universal humanity and a return to order – the discourse of the aff makes their impacts inevitable and only the alt solves.

Chaloupka, PhD, 92

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In this chapter, I begin to map that intersection by examining a key universalism contained in most of the politics that engage issues of nuclearism. Survival is a coded position that privileges certain questions and marginalizes others. In this chapter, I want to make aspects of that privilege more explicit, more accessible to controversy. Assigning "survival" the status of summary and goal implies a relatively settled "humanity" that is, one hopes, to survive. One would hardly need to hope that people not survive to bring that code into question (although some radically misanthropic environmentalists playfully take just such a position). Savvy about codes and symbols, the nuclear critic might begin by highlighting what our most universalistic survival codes assume. Survival Perhaps the central political metaphor of antinuclearists involves the appeal to survival of the human species as a principle that can guide social and political response. But after Jonathan SchelPs Fate of the Earth presented that case, the narrowness of this appeal began to draw criticism. As Robert Jay Lifton has noted, the emergence of neo-Nazi survivalists is not without consequence for nuclear opponents who have used the survival language so extensively themselves.3 Schell broadened his metaphors in The Abolition,4 and nuclear opponents in general have tried to define survival in a way that is not individualist. Nonetheless, recent essays by political theorist George Kateb bring even that modified project into question, finding within the "survival" position an indefensible replacement totality.5 Kateb's critique focuses on the political metaphysics implied by the survival position. To turn "existence" into a principle that could inform action is to ignore many other philosophical commitments made in this century. The metaphysical privileging of existence as key to a great and total meaning (that might motivate political action in a classically liberal framework) is unavailable "in an age when the death of God has been announced with adequate plausibility." 6 Existence does not have systemic attributes amenable to univocal judgments. At least some of us cannot accept the validity of revelation, or play on ourselves the Kantian trick of regarding existence as if it were the designed work of a personal God, or presume to call it good, and bless it as if it were the existence we would have created if we had the power, and think that it therefore deserves to exist and is justifiable just as it is. No: these argumentative moves are bad moves; they are transparent tricks.7 Kateb wants to articulate a defensible "attachment to existence" without relying on "any kind of totality." Existence cannot be justified by any "internal" or human standard developed independently of a supposed divine authentication. That is to say, attachment cannot be cultivated by way of a theology . . . or by way of a believable reconciliation to the facts of wickedness, suffering, waste, cruelty, obscenity, and death. The universe . . . is without sponsorship; and existence on earth fails every test that is strenuously pressed. . . . What is needed is precisely a mode that is content not to make the world —human and natural existence on earth —into a story, a picture, an order or a pattern . . . that is, into a self-adequate totality or into a necessary part of a transcendent totality.8 The puzzle we retain, after Nietzsche, is to find a way to establish human value without the aid of an external totality (whether religious, scientific, or merely commonsensical).9 Kateb's strategy is to shift attention to the institutional and philosophical contexts within which this discussion of survival proceeds. Such a broadening of the question could confront the excessive individualism that otherwise makes "survival" a suspect theme. If the extreme individualism of this century cannot be absorbed into metaphysics, Kateb claims, it is still the case that individualism and the institutions of democracy are not easily dismissed: "Individualism in some of its developments after the seventeenth century contains . . . saving thoughts and feelings. The great work of Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman comprises the main development, and the phrase 'democratic individuality' perhaps best names their idealism."10 To broaden these saving possibilities within individualism, Kateb (in a surprising move, for him) suggests that we take heart from the "antidemocratic individualist doctrines of Nietzsche and Heidegger," both writers who influence contemporary language approaches. "The best defensive idealism is individualism," but "the self-surpassing of both rightsbased individualism and existentialist individualism is the unique source of a selfless and saving attachment."1! In short, without adopting the categories I am attaching to this position, Kateb poses the possibility of a historical, yet ambivalent and even poststructuralist, individualism —a political form of nuclear criticism —as a response to the broad crisis of meaning in the late modern era.12 Kateb distinguishes himself from Foucault and Derrida when he stresses continuities, arguing that the dilemma for democratic individualism was highlighted by the nuclear age, but was visible previously. Several features of democratic society have long been at tension with the democratic idealism he sees as that society's best protector. Not only this puzzle, but also its resolution, precede nukes. Citing Whitman, Kateb argues that a conventional, democratic individualism could be founded on practice. Being " 'both in and out of the game and watching and wondering at it' ... is far better than being rooted in what is superstitiously regarded as reality. To watch the action as one acts is to play; to play is never to lose sight of others."13 This amounts to a proposal for an individualism defined relatively, justified by social and aesthetic judgments, and implemented on the model of play. Even after the metaphysics of existence has become impossible, politics and thought continue, because "democratic individuality radically changes both action and contemplation."14 Whether or not Kateb specifically intends it as such, this is a poststructuralist reading of democratic individuality —pragmatic, aesthetic, and interpretive. The individual acquires the critical distance necessary to judge his or her existence by acknowledging that the external vantage point previously provided by theology is now absent. On the basis of that understanding, the epistemological standpoint of individual thought and action can shift. Sources of meaning dislodge from supposedly essential, natural "facts" of existence, and instead situate themselves in the interplay of contemplation and action. Thus, "the hidden source of modern democracy may always have been the death of God." But the (nuke-induced) "precariousness of existence now deepens this sense," moving us toward a preferable democratic possibility. "Individualism in its contradictory variety is the best defensive idealism in the nuclear situation."15 Whether or not this is indeed an "idealism" is an issue nuclear criticism would pose to Kateb. In any case, it is an unlikely "idealism" —lacking ideals or a positively structured given practice in which to situate them. Kateb's analysis may be most useful for nuclear criticism's deconstruction of "survival" as a cornerstone of this debate. Still, others interested in the relationships between language and politics will be dubious about Kateb's defense of "idealism," with its implication that a strong role still exists for the intellectual as a speaker of that ideal, a judge of its cases, and an articulator of what "existence" and "survival" might be. Ironically, Michel Foucault's treatment of this possibility also includes this approach's first insights on nuclearism: Some years have now passed since the intellectual was called upon to play this role. A new mode of the 'connection between theory and practice' has been established. Intellectuals have got used to working, not in the modality of the 'universal', the 'exemplary', the 'just-and-truefor- alP, but within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them (housing, the hospital, the asylum, the laboratory, the university, family and sexual relations).16 This passage should remind us of the roles played by intellectuals in the nuclear opposition. Humanists have learned the physics of power plants in order to object at siting hearings near their cities. Physicists, simultaneously, have learned the language of political opposition, organizing colleagues against Star Wars in their universities and institutes. In the example I will consider in a later chapter, the intellectual contribution was a phrase (the nuclear freeze) and a strategic political approach —not a manifesto of values and ideals. In the interview quoted above, Foucault goes on to make his bestknown comments on nuclear politics. His claim is that the intellectual par excellence is no longer the writer, who brings that "idealism" to concrete form, but the university activist, the "technician, magistrate, teacher." Global significance is not lost in this transformation. Such actors "have become able to participate, both within their own fields and through mutual exchange and support, in a global process of politicisation of intel lectuals."17 Foucault's example of an intellectual who operates in the realm of the specific is a central nuclearist: This figure of the 'specific' intellectual has emerged since the Second World War. Perhaps it was the atomic scientist (in a word, or rather a name: Oppenheimer) who acted as the point of transition between the universal and the specific intellectual. It's because he had a direct and localised relation to scientific knowledge and institutions that the atomic scientist could make his intervention; but, since the nuclear threat affected the whole human race and the fate of the world, his discourse could at the same time be the discourse of the universal.18 Focusing on the discontinuity entailed by nuclear technology (rather than on the search for continuities, as Kateb does), Foucault reconciled the role of the intellectual with the epistemological break required for "survival" to make sense as a political position. In a genealogy of nukes, the displacement of survival as key concept may be the crucial move toward oppositional politics. At least, that displacement marks the seriousness of the break with previous stances. Without that break, "survival" represents, at best, an appeal to a philosophically precarious doctrine of existence. At worst, it could be a selfish preference, little more than a narrowly narcissistic concern for physical health. Survivalists of every political stripe would respond that there is a general issue at stake, whether we like that issue, or whether the philosophical or psychological dimensions of that issue are felicitous or not. In other words, they are appealing to a brute condition, a stark threat that we cannot choose to ignore. The nuke —in league with the antinuke — does make it plain that we have common "species" interests, as the survivalists argue. But the issue is still not that simple. On one hand, this claim of species interest must confront the possibility that it is a vain or opportunistic claim. That is to say, it is not a self-evident condition. The concept of a self-aware species is a political act, inextricably bound to the possibility of political response —the possibility that all survivalist politics requires. On the other hand, such a position also must confront the fact that this species constitutes itself by identifying interests and solutions; there really is no "ordinary life" to return to after we settle survival issues. That political struggle already will have conditioned whatever life one would then resume. In other words, the species may have interests, but it is also the case that such a species is constituted, not found or remembered. In short, the call to survival not only addresses "real" lives (whatever those might be), but also constitutes those lives. What does it matter that this constituting activity has happened? Crucially, this constituted species sees itself as natural (what else could a species be?), but that perception is at odds with its situation. The context is far from "natural" (in the sense that no strong coherence underlies it); a better case can be made that it is contrived, contradictory, rule-bound, and, finally, absurd. Foucault's accomplishment, then, was not only to have joined with existentialists, Dadaists, and others who have so effectively "denaturalized" human history in this century. In addition, Foucault advanced these efforts by showing possibilities for freeing activity available only after history is denatured. For the species to act on the goal of survival embroils us in a simplistic, if still powerful, circle. The species must have always had some motivation to survive as a species, but its commitment to certain practices (especially rationality and science) is both unquestionable and the source of the threat amidst which the species finds itself lodged. Thus, the species must have mutated to produce such a result, and a mutated species might not be able to act on behalf of its survival. The absolutization of humanity proposes to lead us away from the twists, perversities, and gaps that continually preside over the nuclear age. Absurdity and contradiction have become elemental terms in our era. They are "hardened positions," to borrow a term, even if the notion of a hardened irony might be familiar only to Baudrillard. The species survival position cannot be comfortable in emphasizing those absurdities. But unless it does so, the survival position can scarcely discuss the nuclear age at all. From the approach I am taking, then, we might even call this diagnosis of unspeakability a rhetorically determined stance; antinuclearists have been forced to describe the age as unspeakable in order to continue to draw upon and defend an absolutized, natural humanity. As a consequence, the species survival position may not notice the broad effects of the age's distinctively spoken (speakable) character. Nuclear criticism could offer a better political response if it could expose the specific operations of power that enable some politics of opposition. Before considering that possibility, however, we must be more precise about this "unspeakability" that continually haunts talk of nukes.

#### Threat imagery impoverishes scholarship and policy making- their claims can't be evaluated outside of the project of security that created them. Self Fulfilling prophecy outweighs aff predictions offense

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Where, then, does this leave us—in an elevated state of awakening or in a depressed state of confusion and resentment? It is, admittedly, burdensome and intimidating to face a deluge of questions without being afforded the intellectual crutch of an authoritative answer or two. That is the price we pay, though, for having allowed our minds to be crippled by Cold War dogma. Possessed of truth, we ignored, we denied, we disdained anyone or anything that contradicted our certainty. We did not question, we did not seek answers other than the ones we already had. To do so would have been superfluous, and clearly suspect. Now we must undergo corrective surgery. Whatever answers might emerge from the questions posed here, three fundamental issues deserve our attention. The first concerns the very language—the terminology—we use in public discourse. In his rather well-known 1946 essay, "Politics and the English Language," George Orwell drew the link between the debasement of language and the decline of civilization. He was convinced that both conditions were taking place in tandem at the time he wrote. By the same token, he believed the problem could be reversed. By ridding oneself of the many bad habits of English usage we have adopted, one can think more clearly, he said, and thereby take the first step toward political regeneration.74 The use of the word "threat" certainly seems to fit here. Although it is not a new word, the Cold War gave it heightened visibility, broadened and obscured its meaning, and made it part of the lingua franca of contemporary international politics. What should be all too obvious is the adversarial image the term conveys and the Manichean world view it engenders. Threattalk becomes threatthink. The resultant paranoia and intolerance invariably blind us to emerging developments and conditions that truly threaten our well-being but fall outside the bounds of our distorted perception. This brings us to a second fundamental issue: the effect our image of threat has on reality. The late Kenneth Boulding made the astute observation that there is a reciprocal, escalatory dynamic associated with threat imagery. For example, Country A, feeling itself threatened (however and for whatever reasons) by Country B, increases its armaments to reduce its insecurity. This makes B feel threatened, and so B increases its armaments to bolster its security. This makes A feel even more threatened, so A again increases its armaments. This growing threat "forces" B to further increase its armaments. And so on until either war breaks out or some other change (such as internal economic collapse) reverses the process.75 This is how threatthink becomes threat. If there is a single, documentable truth to be derived from an assessment of threat-based thinking, it is that the perception of threat— at least where that threat has a human component—almost invariably becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. For this reason alone—the fact that we have shown ourselves perversely capable of creating unwanted inevitability—we must face up to a third fundamental issue: the more general failure of our overall approach to envisioning the future. Most of us justifiably consider ourselves unqualified to divine the future. We therefore typically defer to experts and authorities—futurists and assorted government technocrats presumably possessed of special powers or information the rest of us do not have—who end up thereby dictating not only our future but our present as well. These are the individuals who tell us not only that there are threats, but what they are and how we must deal with them. What we refuse to recognize is that the future these purported visionaries are able to see is invariably nothing more imaginative than a simple projection of what already is happening. It also is an assured way for them to solidify and perpetuate their own power over us. The future they see, because the rest of us accept it on authority as all but inevitable, closes out any perceived need to pursue other potentially fruitful possibilities; it provides an excuse for ignoring present needs that, if fulfilled, might well produce a markedly different future; it ensures nothing more enlightened or progressive than creeping incrementalism and evolutionary drift; it creates false expectations about what can and will be; and when it fails to materialize—as it so often does because of the unexpected-it produces feelings of helplessness, not among the purveyors of the deception, but among those of us who have so carelessly relinquished our fate to them.76 Threats are in the future. Threat assessment is about the future. Vision is of the future. The Cold War clouded our vision and crippled our ability to determine, objectively, whether there are threats that should concern us, what they are, why they are important, and how we should deal with them. Our future will depend in large measure on our willingness to overcome our Cold War myopia and to demonstrate a newfound degree of individual and collective vision. Whether vision is a gift or an acquired skill, we will have to seek out the visionaries in our midst who can either lead the rest of us less gifted out of our self-imposed darkness or at least stand as models on which we can pattern ourselves. And how will we know vision when we see it? We need not doubt that its presence will be so unlike anything we are used to, we will know. But if we are searching for a standard against which to judge, we could do no better than to recall the surpassing insight Abraham Lincoln demonstrated on at least one occasion at the height of the US Civil War. At an official reception, the president referred to Southerners rather as erring human beings than as foes to be exterminated. An elderly lady, a fiery patriot, rebuked him for speaking kindly of his enemies when he ought to be thinking of destroying them. "Why, madam," said Lincoln, "do I not destroy my enemies when I make them my friends?',77 (86-88)

#### The alternative is to reject the AFF’s security representations as a critical intellectual labor that makes imagination of a more peaceful future possible. Neocleous 08

(Neocleous 8 — Prof of Government @ Brunel University; London (Mark, Critique of Security, pg. 184-5)

Anyone well versed in history or with experience of university life will know about the shameful ways in which large numbers of academics have elevated venality into the cardinal academic virtue, complying with the demands of those in power and the wishes of those with money: witness the political scientists, historians, anthropologists, geographers, cartographers, sociologists, linguists and many others who reworked their disciplines according to the principles and myths, and the principle myths, of fascism.' 'Academic life under fascism', notes Christopher Hutton, 'is a dismal ... episode in an unedifying story of relations between the modem academic and the state, and between academics and power both within and outside the university. But this part of the history of fascism is merely the worst moment in the wider and equally unedifying story of relations between academics and the state more generally, merely one way m which intellectuals have kowtowed to the principles and myths, and the principle myths, concerning security and the state. Spouting the jargon of security and enthralled by the trappings of power, their intellectual labour consists of nothing less than attempts to write hand-books for the princes of the new security state. The death of countless numbers in a more 'efficient' bombing of a city, the stationing of troops halfway around the World in order to bring to an end any attempt at collective self-determination, the use of military machines against civilians, the training of police forces in counter-insurgency practices, but more than anything the key concepts and categories used to explain and justify these things - all defended, supported and even ‘improved” by security intellectuals for whom, ultimately, intelIecua1 labour boils down to little more than the question of the most efficient manner. In which to achieve the security demanded by the state and bourgeois order. In rationalizing the political and corporate logic of security, the security intellectual conceals the utter irrationality of the system as a whole. The security intellectual then is nothing less than the security ideologue, peddling the fetish of our time. The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up, That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do, but it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalizes all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritizing of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end - constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,” dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state, and legitimizes state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole. The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modem politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitizing of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centered on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognizing that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that securitizing an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.

#### Representations must precede policy discussion

Neta Crawford ,PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at boston univ. Argument and Change in World Politics, 2002 p. 19-21

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

#### The role of the ballot should be to assume the position of a critical intellectual- debate is primarily an academic activity. The signal sent intellectually outweighs any specific policy proposal- this card is the bees knees

Richard Wyn Jones, Professor International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, ‘99 (Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, p. 155-163)

The **central political task of the intellectuals** is to aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony. This task is accomplished through **educational activity**, because, as Gramsci argues, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350). Discussing the relationship of the “philosophy of praxis” to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend to leave the “simple” in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and “simple” it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332-333). According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative “intellectual-moral bloc” should take place under the auspices of the Communist Party – a body he described as the “modern prince.” Just as Niccolo Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtu-ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern price could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125-205). Gramsci’s relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the 1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of domination – for example, in the case of gender – to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those associated with class conflict.1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the “infallible party” has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security. These examples may be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality. One clear security-related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident defense intellectuals (the “alternative defense” school) encouraged and drew strength from peace activism. Together they had an effect **not only on short-term policy** but on the dominant discourses of strategy and security, a **far more important result in the long run**. The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common security. As Thomas Risse-Kappen points out, the term “common security” originated in the contribution of peace researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse-Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic; it certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common security were taken up by a number of different intellectuals communities, including the liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the center-left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet “institutchiks” – members of the influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52-54; Risse-Kappen 1994: 196-200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, “in response to social movement pressure, German social organizations such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD” (Risse-Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration. As Risse-Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard-liners into power, the US arms control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace movement and what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse-Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993: 90-110). Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and intellectuals persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that it did at least have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior. The most dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet Union. Through various East-West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as “nonoffensive defense” (these links are detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin , and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse-Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors. It is clear, for example, that new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East-West relations in order to facilitate much-needed domestic reforms (“the interaction of ideas and material reality”). But what is significant is that the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective security before it (Claude 1984: 223-260), are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably **become somewhat debased**. The hope is that **enough of the residual meaning can survive** to shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonsrates in relation to NATO expansion). The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role – a significant one at that – in making the world a better and safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular. Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution in society. CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND THE THEORY-PRACTICE NEXUS Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of Gramsci’s theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994). Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” (Said 1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’etat **the prism through which problems are viewed**. Here the project stands full-square within the critical theory tradition. If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing – even if they are self-consciously aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the survival of minority cultures – can become “a force for the direction of action.” Again, Gramsci’s work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramsci’s terminology, “historic blocs” (Gramsci 1971: 323-377). Gramsci adopted Machiavelli’s view of power as a centaur, ahlf man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. Obviously, for Gramsci, there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change. In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marx’s well-worn phrase, “All that is solid melts into the air.” Gramsci’s intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971: 229-239). Gramsci argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular, struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating their theorizing to political practice. THE TASKS OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of war of position, then the main task of those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, that is, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also involves **challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals**, traditional or organic, whose views serve to legitimate, and hence **reproduce, the prevailing world order**. This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while **drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking about security behind its positivist façade**. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth” (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of “speaking truth to power” (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking “truth against the world.” Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that “strategists must be prepared to ‘speak truth to power’” (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to lend suffering a voice is the **precondition of all truth”** (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in Neufeld 1995: 116-121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the approach is simultaneously playing apart in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position. There are a number of avenues of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy. **As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism** toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for instant pundistry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: “As teachers, we try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture …. As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” (Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when **delusions were healed** not by focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such “unobtrusive yet insistent work” does not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. **The conceptual and the practical dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against**. Rather, **through their educational activities, proponent of critical security studies should aim to provide support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change**. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, **critical theorists can perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social movements.** That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealand’s antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the country’s political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also COrtright 1993: 5-13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and succor from each other’s efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of the a “message in a bottle,” but in this case, contra Adorno’s expectations, they were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be naïve to understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused by what he describes as the growing “professionalisation” of academic life (Said 1994: 49-62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are extremely risk-averse. It pays – in all senses – to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons”). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a **very real interest in marginalizing dissent.** Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.” The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.

## Case

#### All their advantages are links to security by talking about how dangerous countries in space are, ensures that they wont be able to solve

#### Their advantages aren’t facts, they are sensationalized news reports designed to instill fear-basing policies on constructed threats creates a self fulfilling prophecy

Walt, PhD, 15

(Stephen M., Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from UC Berkeley, “Chill Out, America”, Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/29/chill-out-america-fear-terror-threats/)

These days, prominent experts and politicians seem determined to keep the American people in a perpetual state of trembling fear. Richard Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations thinks “the question is not whether the world will continue to unravel but how fast and how far.” The former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin Dempsey, told Congress last year that “[the world is] more dangerous than it has ever been.” (Someone really ought to tell the general about the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and a little episode known as World War II.) Not to be outdone, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger believes the United States “has not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of the Second World War.” And then there’s CNN and Fox News, which seem to think that most news stories should be a variation on Fear Factor. One could multiply alarming forecasts such as these almost endlessly. As investigative journalist David Sirota tweeted in response to a recent speech by New Jersey governor and erstwhile presidential aspirant Chris Christie, where FDR told Americans the “only thing we have to fear is fear itself,” today’s politicians and pundits mostly tell us to “Be Afraid. Be Very Afraid.” But if you’re an ordinary American citizen living here in the United States, how much should you worry about foreign dangers? Surely, people in contemporary Syria, South Sudan, Gaza, Libya, eastern Ukraine, and any number of other places face obvious and disturbing dangers, as the media reminds us daily. But Americans? Not so much unless you have friends or family in a war zone or you’ve invested your entire retirement portfolio in Greek government bonds. Here in the United States, in fact, it’s hard to identify any looming or imminent external threats, and certainly none as dire as the dangers that other societies face or as serious as the challenges the United States has overcome in the past. As I’ve noted before, the United States still has the world’s largest and most diverse economy, the world’s most powerful conventional forces, and a robust nuclear deterrent. It has no powerful enemies nearby, close allies in every corner of the world, and it is insulated from most foreign dangers by two enormous oceans. Despite the hype about the shrinking of geopolitical space and the emergence of a tightly connected “global village,” distance and the “stopping power of water” still provide considerable security, if not quite 100 percent protection. Look, nobody is saying that there aren’t any problems lurking outside U.S. borders, or suggesting there aren’t some nasty characters in today’s world. For starters, eight other countries have nuclear weapons, and we’re not on the best of terms with some of them. China’s growing power and long-term ambitions are an obvious concern, and the violent extremist movements that are convulsing countries in the Middle East and Africa are troubling on several levels. I’m even willing to concede that cybersecurity is worth some degree of vigilance, even if the danger is often overhyped. Problems such as these deserve attention, careful study, and sometimes vigorous and sustained action. But when did the country that conquered North America, won World Wars I and II, and stared down Joseph Stalin and his successors become so easily scared by spooks, ghosts, tin-pot dictators, and marginal radical movements like the Islamic State, whose total fighting force is smaller than two U.S. Army divisions and whose territory is mostly worthless desert? That’s not to say these problems are of no concern; it’s to ask why we routinely see this year’s troubles as the Greatest Danger Ever. We exaggerate external dangers in part because violent events are vivid and dramatic, and they seem scary even when they are rare and when they are taking place tens of thousands of miles away. (The Islamic State understands this, by the way, which is why they use beheadings instead of something more “civilized” and discreet, such as a drone strike.) As Steven Pinker and Andrew Mack have noted, global news coverage and the 24/7 news cycle have led many people to conclude the world is becoming more violent and dangerous, when the actual long-term trend has been going in the other direction. Durable peace is a boring “non-event” in which nothing much happens, so nobody bothers to report it. And that means most people don’t appreciate how safe they really are. But the main reason so many people stay afraid is that fear is good for the people who purvey it, and so they work hard to instill fear in the rest of us. Fear is what keeps the United States spending more on defense than the next dozen states combined. Fear is what gets politicians elected, fear is what justifies preventive wars, excessive government secrecy, covert surveillance, and targeted killings. And fear is what keeps people watching CNN and Fox News, and running out to buy the New York Times or the Washington Post. As both democratic and authoritarian leaders have long known, you can get people to do a lot of foolish things if they are sufficiently scared. Unfortunately, this enduring exaggeration of external dangers can blind us to real problems. In fact, if you look at the past 25 years or so, it is abundantly clear that external enemies have done far less damage to the United States than we have done to ourselves. Saddam Hussein was a very bad man, but he wasn’t threatening or harming Americans after we kicked his ass in 1991. Ditto Slobodan Milosevic, Muammar al-Qaddafi, and the whole wretched Assad family. They were all problems, to be sure, but they weren’t threatening many Americans and U.S. leaders did business with each of them at one time or another. In terms of actual harm inflicted, America’s most lethal opponent in recent years was the original al Qaeda. Al Qaeda struck U.S. military and diplomatic assets in several countries during the 1990s, and then the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks killed 2,977 people and caused an estimated $178 billion in property damage and other economic losses. Those losses are hardly trivial — even for a $16 trillion economy — but they pale in comparison to the damage that we’ve done to ourselves. Do the math. After 9/11, the Bush administration’s foolhardy invasion of Iraq cost at least $3 trillion dollars, more than 40,000 U.S. personnel killed or wounded, and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis dead. What did we get for it? A broken Iraqi state, enhanced Iranian influence in the region, and the emergence of the Islamic State. The invasion of Iraq also diverted resources and attention from Afghanistan, guaranteeing the NATO mission there would also fail (at a cost of another $1 trillion or so). Let’s add to these costs the creation of failed states in Libya and Yemen. The United States is not solely responsible for either outcome, but our interventions in both places surely did not help. The panicked U.S. response to 9/11 also produced an excessive “war on terror” that included the use of torture, illegal surveillance, and the emergence of an out-of-control intelligence community that repeatedly broke U.S. law and then lied about it. The costs to our global image are far from trivial, and it remains to be seen if our commitment to civil liberties will emerge unscathed. None of these actions were forced upon us by a powerful, hostile foe; they were choices made by U.S. leaders from both parties.

#### Commercialization is inevitable, and the benefits of space exploration outweigh any defects that it doesn’t already solve for Sharma 9/07/21

(Maanas Sharma, September 7, 2021, Sharma is a journalist for the Journal of Interdisciplinary Public Policy, “The privatized frontier: the ethical implications and role of private companies in space exploration”, [https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4238/1 //](https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/unions-ignore-long-history-of-excluding-minorities-from-jobs/article_ef58bccd-f04a-5172-8dbd-18b8ee5eb9e2.html%20/)NL)

Another key matter to note is restricted capitalism in space “could also be our salvation.”[11] Private space **exploration could** reap **increas**ed **access to resources and other benefits that can be used to solve the very problems on Earth that critics of capitalism identify**. Since governments offset some of their projects to private companies, **government agencies can focus on altruistic projects that** otherwise would not fit in the budget before and do **not have the immediate commercial use that private companies look for**. Scott Hubbard, an adjunct professor of aeronautics and astronautics at Stanford University, discusses how “this strategy allows the space agency to continue ‘exploring the fringe where there really is no business case’” but still has important impacts on people down on Earth.[12] Indeed, this idea is a particularly powerful one when considering the ideal future of private companies in space exploration. Though there is no one set way **governments** will interact with companies, the consensus is that they **must radically reimagine their main purpose as the role of private space exploration continues to grow.** As governments utilize services from private space companies, “[i]nstead of being bogged down by the routine application of old research, **NASA can prioritize** their limited budget to **work** more **on research** of other unknowns **and development of new** long-term space travel **tech**nologies.”[13] According to the Council on Foreign Relations**, such technologies have far-reaching benefits on Earth as well.** Past developments obviously include communications satellites, by themselves a massive benefit to society, but also “refinements in artificial hearts; improved mammograms; and laser eye surgery… thermoelectric coolers for microchips; high-temperature lubricants; and a means for mass-producing carbon nanotubes, a material with significant engineering potential; [and h]ousehold products.”[2**] Agencies like NASA are the only actors able to pursue the next game-changing missions**, “where the profit motive is not as evident and where the barriers to entry are still too high for the private sector to really make a compelling business case.”[8] These technologies have revolutionized millions, if not billions, of lives, demonstrating the remarkable benefits of space exploration. It follows then that **it is net ethical to prioritize these benefits**.