### Private Entities = all

**Interp and violation: the aff can't defend that the appropriation of outer space by a subset of private entities is unjust. “Entities” is a generic bare plural.**

**Leslie and Lerner 16** Leslie, Sarah-Jane [Sarah-Jane Leslie (Ph.D., Princeton, 2007) is the dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy. She has previously served as the vice dean for faculty development in the Office of the Dean of the Faculty, director of the Program in Linguistics, and founding director of the Program in Cognitive Science at Princeton University. She is also affiliated faculty in the Department of Psychology, the University Center for Human Values, the Program in Gender and Sexuality Studies, and the Kahneman-Treisman Center for Behavioral Science and Public Policy], and Adam Lerner, Ph.D, Postgraduate Research Associate in the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University, 4-24-2016, "Generic Generalizations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/> SM

Isolating the Generic Interpretation Consider the following pairs of sentences: (1) a. Tigers are striped. b. Tigers are on the front lawn. (2) a. A tiger is striped. b. A tiger is on the front lawn. (3) a. The tiger is striped. b. The tiger is on the front lawn. The sentence pairs above are prima facie syntactically parallel—both are subject-predicate sentences whose subjects consist of the same common noun coupled with the same, or no, article. However, the interpretation of first sentence of each pair is intuitively quite different from the interpretation of the second sentence in the pair. In the second sentences, we are talking about some particular tigers: a group of tigers in (1b), some individual tiger in (2b), and some unique salient or familiar tiger in (3b)—a beloved pet, perhaps. In the first sentences, however, we are saying something general. There is/are no particular tiger or tigers that we are talking about. The second sentences of the pairs receive what is called an existential interpretation. The hallmark of the existential interpretation of a sentence containing a bare plural or an indefinite singular is that it may be paraphrased with “some” with little or no change in meaning; hence the terminology “existential reading”. The application of the term “existential interpretation” is perhaps less appropriate when applied to the definite singular, but it is intended there to cover interpretation of the definite singular as referring to a unique contextually salient/familiar particular individual, not to a kind. There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In (1b), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” salva veritate, but in (1a) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, “tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. (1a) does not entail that animals are striped, but (1b) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995). Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in (1a) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in (1b) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.) 1.2 Stage Level and Individual Level Predicates Having distinguished two quite different meanings of these seemingly similar sentence pairs, the question arises: what is the basis of these two interpretations? This is of course a matter of debate, but one important thesis is that it is the predicate that determines which of the two readings the subject will receive, particularly in the case of bare plural generics. In his 1977 dissertation, Greg Carlson argued that the distinction between “stage level” and “individual level” predicates is key here, and proposed that stage level predications give rise to existential readings of bare plurals and indefinite singulars, while individual level ones give rise to generic readings. The distinction between the two types of predicates can be drawn intuitively, and also on the basis of linguistic patterns (Milsark 1974; Carlson 1977; Stump 1985). Semantically, individual level predicates express properties that normally are had by items for quite extended periods, often comprising the items’ whole existence. Stage-level predicates, on the other hand, express properties normally had by items for relatively short time intervals. Some examples of both types are as follows: Individual level predicates “is tall”; “is intelligent”; “knows French”; “is a mammal”; “is female”; “is a singer”; “loves Bob”; “hates Bob” Stage level predicates “is drunk”; “is barking”; “is speaking French”; “is taking an exam”; “is sober”; “is sick”, “is sitting”; “is on the lawn”, “is in the room”. Clearly the semantic distinction is not hard and fast: a teetotaler may be sober for the entire course of his existence, and the chronically ill may be sick for the entire course of theirs, and Alice in Wonderland is tall at some times but short at others. In the normal course of affairs, individual level predicates express more stable and less temporally intermittent properties than stage level ones do. The distinction also manifests itself linguistically. Stage level predicates are permissible in the following constructions, while individual level ones are not: (4) John saw Bill drunk/sober/sick/naked. (5) John saw Bill speaking French/taking an exam/smoking cigarettes. (6) John saw Bill on the lawn/in the room. (7) \*John saw Bill intelligent/tall/a mammal/male. (8) \*John saw Bill knowing French/hating Bob. There-insertion constructions behave similarly: (9) There are men drunk/sober/sick/naked. (10) There are men speaking French/taking an exam/smoking cigarettes. (11) There are men on the lawn/in the room. (12) \*There are men intelligent/tall/mammals/male. (13) \*There are men knowing French/hating Bob. Stage level predicates can be modified by locatives, while individual level ones cannot: (14) John is drunk/speaking French/smoking in 1879 Hall. (15) \*John is a mammal/intelligent/male in 1879 Hall. (16) \*John knows French/hates Bob in 1879 Hall. Carlson noted the difference in syntactic behavior between individual and stage level predicates, and proposed that the distinction between the classes of predicates underlies the distinction between existential and generic readings of bare plurals: (17) Students are drunk/speaking French/on the lawn. (existential) (18) Students are intelligent/mammals/tall/male. (generic) (19) Students know French/hate Bob. (generic) Stage level predicates appear to give rise to the existential reading of bare plurals, while individual level ones give rise to generic readings. Carlson also took the distinction to underwrite the difference between existential and generic readings of the indefinite singular:

**This applies to the res – 1] Upward entailment test – “appropriation by private entities is unjust” doesn’t imply that “appropriation by entities is unjust” because state appropriation might not be unjust 2] Adverb test – "appropriation by private entities is generally unjust" doesn’t substantially change the meaning of the res 3] predicate – “is unjust” is individual level not stage level because moral statements are immutable and don't change like time or circumstance**

#### Negate –

**1] Precision:**

**A] Topicality is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden, they agreed to debate the topic when they came to the tournament**

**B] Jurisdiction -- you can’t vote affirmative if they haven’t affirmed**

**C] It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it.**

**2] Limits: any one private entity, category of entities, entities in a certain state etc. could be an aff – unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on. Limits are key to reciprocal prep burden, this topic already has very few neg generics and spec kills the innovation DA and space appropriation good – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs**

**Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed our 1NC construction, allowing 1AR restart doesn't solve**

**Competing interps on T – topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical, only competing interps create norms -- reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention causing a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation**

## CP – ASAT Ban

### Kuplic

#### CP: States should

#### Amend the Outer Space Treaty to prohibit the use of technologies that damage, destroy, or disable another's property in outer space, including but not limited to Anti Satellite weapons

#### Create strict rules surrounding weapons launches and an organization to monitor and enforce those rules in a new global treaty with agreements about definitions

#### Enhance customary international law to include countries who did not explicitly agree to it, criticize any states which deploy weapons into space

Kuplic JD 14

Blair Stephenson Kuplic (operational law attorney at United States Pacific Fleet, obviously a law degree, has written a lot about space military strat), Summer 2014, “The weaponization of outer space: preventing an extraterrestrial arms race," North Caroline Journal of International Law,https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&amp;httpsredir=1&amp;article=2011&amp;context=ncilj, // HW AW

VI. Recommendations on How to Prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space Given the existing ambiguities and deficiencies in our current, but outdated system of international law for outer space, new developments in international law will be critical for preventing any further weaponization or militarization of outer space. A. By Amending the Outer Space Treaty An **amendment to the Outer Space Treaty** would help to fill the gaps in the written law regarding outer space and to address new technologies and issues that have arisen since the Outer Space Treaty was entered into force in 1967. More specifically, the treaty could be amended **to prohibit ASAT**, "soft kill," and electromagnetic and radiation weapons.2 34 However, given the propensity of technology to develop at exponentially-increasing rates, **general language prohibiting the use of technologies that damage, destroy, or disable another's property** in outer space may be more likely to withstand the test of time.235 B. Through a New Treaty A **new treaty may be even more effective** in halting, or even reversing, the weaponization of outer space. In addition to prohibiting the destruction, damage, or interference with satellites in outer space, the new treaty could create rules related to the development and deployment of weapons capable of damage, destruction, or interference, and also **establish an international body** with the power to monitor member states' space programs and enforce the treaty. The existence of an oversight body may help to reduce some states' feelings that an arms race in outer 233 Index of Online General Assembly Resolutions Relating to Outer Space: Recorded Votes on Resolutions, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosalen/SpaceLaw/gares/gavotes.html#ARES67\_113 (last visited Apr. 2, 2014). 234 See Blake & Imburgia, supra note 100, at 202-03 (advocating for the regulation of such "soft kill" weapons if they are used for military or combat purposes). 235 See INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, supra note 216, at 182 (discussing the difficulties of creating an all-encompassing and lasting definition of space weapon). 1158 Vol. XXXIX WEAPONIZATION OF OUTER SPACE space is necessary to protect national security interests.23 6 Additionally, a new treaty could clarify some of the ambiguities related to the meaning of important terms regarding outer space. 3 7 Member parties could agree on specific definitions for "space weapon," determine what constitutes an act of aggression in outer space, and even clarify whether space should be nonmilitary or nonaggressive and what those terms mean.238 C. Political Feasibility of a New Treaty or Amendment to the Outer Space Treaty Comments made by representatives at the United Nations First Committee Meeting on October 23, 2012, suggest that countries realize the importance of developing more specific laws to prevent an arms race in outer space. 2 39 Even so, the feasibility of a new treaty, or even an amendment to the Outer Space Treaty, will undoubtedly be the most difficult hurdle to overcome when attempting to develop a new, legally binding system of laws regarding outer space. The uneven footing among countries, which is a factor when considering conflict on land or at sea, is amplified many times when outer space is involved because the financial and technological resources necessary to gain power in outer space are even higher than in conventional warfare.2 40 States with no military technologies currently in outer space will be more open to imposing restrictions on the use of these technologies than countries who are already using outer space for military purposes.24' In order to create an amendment or a new treaty to which most states-especially those currently dominant in outer space-will agree, all states must feel that they will benefit from 236 See Andrew T. Park, Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space, 28 Hous. J. INT'L L. 871, 908 (2006) ("Increasing transparency and monitoring the verification of compliance measures also provides the necessary confidence among parties to a legal regime that negotiated obligations are being fulfilled and, therefore, that real security benefits will be realized."). 237 See Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 207, at 195. 238 See id. 239 See generally Full-Spectrum Dominance, supra note I (showing that a majority of countries support legally binding regulations on weapons in outer space). 240 See Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 207, at 194. 241 See Barnet, supra note 33, at 288-89. 2014 1159 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. the treaty.24 The United States will likely prove the biggest obstacle in establishing a new treaty or amending the Outer Space Treaty. The United States has a history of resisting many international agreements, in part because the United States believes those agreements come with some deterioration of U.S. sovereignty. 24 3 Additionally, the United States has a track record of resisting agreements specifically designed to prevent an arms race in outer space.244 However, with the era of the Bush Administration over, the United States may be more open to an agreement on outer space.245 Comments made by Frank A. Rose, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance of the U.S. Department of State, during a presentation at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum Space Security Workshop bolster the idea that the United States is now more open than during previous administrations to an agreement that would curtail the weaponization of outer space.2 46 Rose stated that **an International Code of Conduct, such as the European Union's, "would help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust in space by establishing non-legally binding guidelines that reduce the hazards of accidental and purposeful debris-generating events."** 2 47 This openness to the European Union's International Code of Conduct signals that the United States' position on weapons in outer space may be shifting toward a willingness to agree against the use of anti-satellite weapons in outer space, in accordance with the Code's Section 4.2.248 A new agreement on outer space should, however, be legally 242 See Quinn, supra note 89, at 497 n.195 (explaining that the international climate at the time of the Outer Space Treaty meant that it addressed fears borne by every nation). 243 Sarah Ashfaq, Something for Everyone: Why the United States Should Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & PoL'Y 357, 360 (2010). 244 See supra Part V.A. 245 See Barnet, supra note 33, at 288. 246 See Frank A. Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Remarks: Strengthening Security in Space through Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (Dec. 6, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/201625.htm. 247 Id 248 Revised Draft Code, supra note 192, sec. 4.2. 1160 Vol. XXXIXX WEAPONIZATION OF OUTER SPACE binding in order to effectively prevent the weaponization of outer space. Although the European Union's International Code of Conduct is a good starting point, specific provisions prohibiting military actions in outer space would be more effective than the narrow, albeit specific, prohibition of the destruction of outer space objects.2 49 This provision would not prevent weapons such as the "soft kill" weapons or some uses of the electromagnetic and radiation weapons discussed above.250 1. Should the United States Ratify a New Treaty or Amendment? The United States would be well served by signing onto a new treaty limiting the weaponization of outer space. Although the United States is currently dominant in outer space, and while most other countries do not have the financial or technological resources to match the United States, the relative simplicity and affordability of some technologies-kinetic energy ASAT, in particular-means that space superiority does not necessarily equal invulnerability to an attack that could cripple military operations or even the daily life of civilian society.25 ' By agreeing to some limitations on the militarization of outer space, the United States could still keep most of its current space technologies, which are crucial for military and civilian operation, but would protect these technologies from damage, destruction or interference by other countries.2 52 D. By Enhancing Customary International Law Enhancing customary international law may be a more effective means of preventing an arms race in outer space. **Even if a broadly supported treaty is unfeasible, customary international law could bind countries who did not explicitly agree to the law, as long as the country does not "publicly and consistently" repudiate that law or norm**.2 53 In this way, a rule of customary international law may be not only easier than negotiating a treaty, 249 See Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 207, at 184-85. 250 See supra Part II.A.4-5. 251 See Barnet, supra note 33, at 286-87. 252 See id at 291. 253 Koplow, supra note 42, at 1229. 2014 1161 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. but also farther-reaching.2 54 States opposing the use of weapons in outer space should refrain from using those weapons themselves, while also making public that they are refraining because they feel that it violates international norms relating to outer space. 2 5 5 Additionally, those states should openly criticize any states using weapons in outer space.256 If these statements and actions are made by a broad range of countries, the idea that weapons in outer space are illegal will likely take hold, and these actions can eventually develop into a law prohibiting weapons in outer space under customary international law.

## DA – Instability

### shell

#### Xi is successfully consolidating power now but *legitimacy* is key

Hale 11-8-21

(Erin, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/8/xi-looks-to-consolidate-power-at-key-party-meeting)

Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to further consolidate his leadership at a key meeting of the Communist Party’s Central Committee this week amid a flurry of flattering publicity from state media. The Central Committee is made up of more than 300 of the party’s top leaders who include provincial governors and party secretaries as well as financial and military elites. The Beijing meeting, which continues until Thursday, is expected to further pave the way for Xi to secure an unprecedented third term in office at next year’s Party Congress, one of China’s most important political meetings, which is held once every five years. While the National People’s Congress removed term limits in 2018, enabling Xi to rule China indefinitely, he needs the endorsement of top party leaders, says Tai Wei Lim, a research fellow adjunct at the National University of Singapore’s East Asian Institute. “[Xi] needs the legitimacy of leading members of the party for an unprecedented additional term, especially when he is not normatively following a term limit convention – convention, not law – in the post-Mao era,” Lim told Al Jazeera. Xi’s aspirations appear to be to take a place among China’s foremost Communist leaders, including Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, who steered China through its political and economic reopening in the late 1970s and 80s. As the child of one of the party’s founding members and the country’s political elite, Xi is known as a “princeling” and since taking office in 2013, he has obtained a cult of personality not seen since Mao was in power. Earlier this year, the party marked its centenary and the upcoming Central Committee is expected to pass a “historical resolution” reviewing its achievements over the past 100 years, according to Xinhua news agency. The text will also uphold Xi’s “core position” within the party, it said. The party’s public relations blitz around Xi comes as China faces its internal struggles with a resurgence of COVID-19 cases, an ongoing energy crisis and a teetering real estate sector saddled in debt.

#### Xi’s rallying the party around space development – its central to his entire agenda

Loftus ’19 (Peter; 1st Lieutenant, US Air Force, M.A. in International Relations and Affairs from Johns Hopkins University; Spring 2019; “Counter and Cooperate: How Space Can Be Used to Advance US–China Cooperation While Curbing Beijing’s Terrestrial Excesses”; <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-33_Issue-1/SEA-Loftus.pdf>; Air & Space Power Journal; accessed 9/1/19; TV)

Since People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Jinping XI came to power in 2012, China’s diplomatic disposition has experienced a profound evolution. Jinping XI is promoting his vision of the “Chinese Dream” and national rejuvenation, the goal of which is to reverse the “Century of Humiliation” that China suffered, from the start of the First Opium War in 1839 and lasting until the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power in 1949. In testimony before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Dr. Alison A. Kaufman, a senior Asia policy researcher with the Center for Naval Analyses, explained that this period provides a key foundational story for the CCP. “Today, this narrative has become a key legitimizer for CCP rule, because the CCP is portrayed as the only modern Chinese political party that was able to successfully stand up to foreign aggression.”2 The dilemma for Beijing is how to ascend without ensnaring itself and the US in Thucydides’s Trap. Previously the PRC abided by former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of Tao Guang Yang Hui, which translates to “lay low and bide one’s time.” The purpose of this strategy was to fight the perception that China is an ascendant threat, incurring preemptive hostilities from outside powers. Today, however, China is much more confident on the world stage. Beijing seeks to promote its vision for the future on the diplomatic front, and space policy plays an important role in this objective. According to James Andrew Lewis, the Center for Strategic & International Studies technology and public policy program director, China’s space endeavors are “. . . especially important to show that it has reclaimed its place among the leading nations of the world. China’s successes in space reinforce its claims to regional dominance by demonstrating that it is the most advanced among Asian nations, with technology and resources that others cannot match.”3 China’s space initiatives play an instrumental role in showing that it has returned to its place as a preeminent regional power. While China’s neighbors question US commitment to the Indo-Asia-Pacific, Beijing’s promulgation of a multidecade plan for developing space capabilities demonstrates its staying power and ambition. China’s Informational Power While China’s focus on diplomatic messaging travels outward, the informational element of Chinese space policy is mainly directed inward. To this day, the CCP’s legitimacy is premised upon a Faustian bargain with its citizens. In exchange for economic results, social improvement, and the respect of the world, the political elite expects loyalty and acquiescence from the public. The CCP’s space aspirations play a fundamental role in demonstrating the government’s ambitions for China’s future. They include landing a rover on the far side of the moon by 2018, landing a Mars rover by 2020, probing asteroids by 2022, sending humans to the moon by 2025, bringing Mars samples back by 2028, sending an exploratory mission to Jupiter by 2029, and establishing a lunar research station manned by robots with occasional astronaut visits by 2050.4 Shooting for the stars keeps the Chinese people’s eyes skyward and away from CCP malfeasance. To borrow Karl Marx’s reference to religion, Beijing’s space policy is an opiate for the Chinese masses. China’s Military Power The Gulf War had a visceral effect on Chinese military planners. The rapid neutralization of Saddam Hussein’s military demonstrated what decades of Cold War military spending were able to procure for the US armed forces, especially in the realm of command and control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). The Chinese took this to heart and incorporated informationized warfare into their military doctrine in 1993.5 Increasingly, space has become a central focus of China’s national security strategy, which continues to expand outward from an immediate defense of the Chinese homeland to protecting interests overseas and even in space. In this capacity, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing a comprehensive space strategy to allow for it to compete with near-peer adversaries. As the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission states:

#### Consolidation of power under Xi is vital to prevent CCP collapse.

Kuhn 16 — Robert Lawrence Kuhn, Columnist for *China Daily* and *South China Morning Post*, Author of *How China’s Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China's Past, Current and Future Leaders* and *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*—the first biography of a living Chinese leader, holds a Ph.D. in Anatomy and Brain Research from the Brain Research Institute at the University of California-Los Angeles and an M.S. in Management from the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016 (“Why China needs Xi Jinping as its core leader,” *South China Morning Post*, November 20th, Available Online at <http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2047173/why-china-needs-xi-jinping-its-core-leader>, Accessed 01-27-2017)

When, at a recent party plenum, President Xi Jinping ( 習近平 ) was designated as “core” of the Communist Party’s Central Committee, some Western media were quick to condemn the rise of a new “strongman”. While recognising the significance of Xi as the core was correct, conjuring up visions of an emerging dictator was not. I recalled my meeting with Xi years earlier, when he was still party secretary of Zhejiang (浙江) province. Even then he was criticising “empty talk” and advising, “We should never overestimate our accomplishments or indulge ourselves in our achievements”. I took note of how Xi stressed, “We need to assess ourselves objectively”. Hardly, in retrospect, the ruminations of a gestating dictator. To understand why Xi is now the core, one must appreciate the complex challenges of our times. China is now facing multiple challenges: domestically – slow growth, industrial overcapacity, endemic pollution, imbalanced development, income disparity, social injustice, social service demands; and, internationally – wars, regional conflicts, sluggish economies, volatile markets, trade protectionism, ethnic clashes, terrorism, geopolitical rivalries, and territorial disputes in the South and East China seas. Most critically, because China must deepen its reforms to achieve its oft-promised goal of a “moderately prosperous society” by 2020, the resistance of entrenched interest groups must be overcome. More subtly, there is what some call a pervasive “soft resistance” – local officials who do not do their job and economic elites who migrate. If reform had been progressing smoothly, then why strengthen central authority by investing Xi with the status of core leader? Xi has encountered obstacles; if there were no obstacles, there would be no need for a core leader. I have been speaking to party officials and theorists about Xi as core leader. In fact, the necessity of having a leadership core to maintain stability and expedite reform is the first and foremost of what I found to be four factors relating to Xi’s elevation. A second factor is that not only does Xi have the responsibility for China’s transformation, he is also accountable for it. Moreover, he has shown courage in confronting and dismantling a vast, corrupt system of bribery, patronage and illicit wealth accretion. A third factor is that Xi as the core does not end, and even may not diminish, the cardinal principle of “democratic centralism”. The party bolsters each of the concepts: encouraging the democratic solicitation of input and feedback from members, lower-ranked officials, and the public; and strengthening centralism through Xi’s leadership of the principal levers of power (his positions as party general secretary, head of state, chairman of the Central Military Commission, and head of the “leading groups” on reform, national security and internet security). A fourth factor is that a core is required to manage the party more strictly and thereby give members and the public more confidence. Witness Xi’s relentless and unprecedented anti-corruption campaign, which is altering how government officials and industry managers work and even think. Let no one assume that Xi’s battle against corruption has been risk-free. Significantly, these four factors undergirding Xi as the core leader map onto his overarching political framework, his strategic blueprint called “The Four Comprehensives” – a moderately prosperous society, reform, rule of law, party discipline. Xi’s core status arises, we’re told, through the collective will of the party and the people. Becoming party core is not an automatic consequence of being general secretary; a core leader must fit the times and the status must be earned. Speaking at a press conference following the 18th Central Committee’s sixth plenum last month, Huang Kunming (黄坤明), executive vice-minister of the committee’s Publicity Department, said that the “central and local departments as well as the military all expressed their support” for Xi’s position as party core, adding that this decision was “based on the valuable experience of the party and we feel keenly about it”. Huang explained that “a core is needed to ensure that the party will be the governing party”, describing it as significant for upholding the Central Committee’s authority and maintaining the central, unified leadership of the party and for its “staying true to its mission”. Therefore, party theorists explain, Xi as core leader is more a ratification of reality than a shift of fundamentals. What does Xi as core mean in a historical context? It was Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) who introduced the concept when he designated Jiang Zemin (江澤民) as “core of the third generation” of central leaders, bolstering Jiang’s stature following his unexpected appointment as party leader in 1989. At the time, China was facing the dual impediments of economic stagnation and social uncertainty at home, and economic quarantine and diplomatic isolation abroad. As Deng pointed out: “Any leading group should have a core; a leadership with no core is unreliable.” Only then did Deng retrospectively apply the novel term to Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and to himself, as core of the first and second generations, respectively. (Of course, Mao was so utterly dominant that calling him core during his lifetime would have seemed a demotion. Deng remained core even when he no longer held any official position.) Today’s world is more complex. China faces threats at home and abroad. Volatility grows and uncertainty abounds – the Middle East and Donald Trump are offered as evidence. The need to secure China’s stability is more essential than ever, and thus to strengthen Xi’s authority is a primary reason, I’m told, for designating Xi as core leader. Party theorists say China “urgently” requires a political nucleus that is sophisticated and nuanced, attuned to contemporary times. Though conditions now differ from those in 1989, Deng’s admonition rings timelessly true. However, that a core leader is needed now does not mean one will always be needed. When China becomes a fully modernised nation, perhaps by mid-century, conditions may change again. I hear frequently of the “painful lessons of China’s century of blood and tears” and that for China not to have a tested and authoritative leadership core would be “unthinkable”. Party inner talk says “Xi Jinping has passed the test of the people” to be China’s political core, leadership core, and a core of the times. Chinese scholars argue that “core” is a unique characteristic of Chinese political theory – however inapplicable (even inexplicable) in Western political theory. They call Western concerns that Xi as core leader means that “a new emperor is born” wildly unfounded, even paranoic. In feudal society, the emperor ruled unconditionally with arbitrary imperial power, and in such a “command-obey” system, goes the argument, there is simply no need for a core. Rather, given today’s party political structure, the concept of a core both strengthens cohesion and serves to prevent a personality cult, not to promote one. Having a core means acknowledging that the party system is not the “emperor system” – absolute power is rejected – and that the optimum system, at least for the foreseeable future, is a combination of concentrated centralism and democratic collective leadership. Corroborating this functional balance, in the communiqué issued following the sixth plenum, the “collective leadership system” is reconfirmed. It states: “The implementation of collective leadership and personal division of labour is an important component of democratic centralism and must always be adhered to.” And it stresses: “Any organisation or individual shall, under any circumstance, not be allowed to violate this system for any reason.” The three “any’s” seem no accident. Some analysts see contradictions. On the one hand, the communiqué calls for democracy and constructive criticism internally within the party. On the other, disobeying the central leadership is forbidden, backed by vigilant supervision and tough discipline. Yet to read these statements as contradictory is to misunderstand what is happening here. Xi appreciates the complex and arduous tasks that lie ahead. He told me so a decade ago, and it is obviously truer today than it was then. The statements are harmonised, first, by the party’s motivation to seek optimum policies for the country, and second, by keeping most of the divergent views internal. True loyalty is telling leadership in private what one really believes is in their best interests, not pandering and fawning by repeating what one thinks leadership wants to hear. Though there are concerns, no one here worries that Xi will become Mao. China is now the world’s largest trading nation and its second-largest economy. China’s diplomacy is expanding and its military is growing. From its Belt and Road initiative building infrastructure and facilitating trade in over 60 developing countries to its leading role in the UN peacekeeping forces, China, the “Middle Kingdom”, is involved in every meaningful matter of international affairs. So, what kind of China do we want? Certainly not one with weak central leadership and fragmented citadels of power. With its huge and imbalanced population, and its diverse culture and traditions, China today requires a leader with sufficient strength and prestige to secure social stability, drive economic reform, and guide it in being a responsible world power. Xi as core leader should be good for China and, thus, for the world.

#### CCP instability causes extinction.

Perkinson 12 — Jessica, Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs; reviewed by: Quansheng Zhao, Professor of international relations and Chair of Asian Studies Program Research Council at American University, and John C. King, Assistant Professor School of International Service, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American University, April 19th, Available Online at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson\_american\_0008N\_10238display.pdf?sequence=1)

Should the CCP undergo some sort of dramatic transformation – whether that be significant reform or complete collapse, as some radical China scholars predict2 – the implications for international and US national security are vast. Not only does China and the stability of the CCP play a significant role in the maintenance of peace in the East Asian region, but China is also relied upon by many members of the international community for foreign direct investment, economic stability and trade. China plays a key role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula as one of North Korea’s only allies, and it is argued that instability within the Chinese government could also lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation across the Taiwan Strait. For the United States, the effect of instability within the CCP would be widespread and dramatic. As the United States’ largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation in the US. In addition, China is the largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US. It is with this in mind that China scholars within the United States and around the world should be studying this phenomenon, because the potential for reform, instability or even collapse of the CCP is of critical importance to the stability of the international order as a whole. For the United States specifically, the potential - or lack thereof - for reform of the CCP should dictate its foreign policy toward China. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that the Chinese market is not a stable one, it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability, particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US.

## DA – Heg

### shell

**Heg terminally in decline and war coming now – China rise shifts the world to a peaceful, multipolar system, BUT the aff’s anti-Chinese rhetoric prevents revolution, making transition wars and fascist takeover inevitable.**

**Shea, 1-26-21**

[Rainer, decolonial organizer and anti-imperialist journalist, published 1-26-2021, "The U.S. will lose the cold war with China. Then collapse will come for it," Medium, https://rainershea612.medium.com/the-u-s-will-lose-the-cold-war-with-china-then-collapse-will-come-for-it-af52d36a2613]//AD

I’m fascinated by the ideological battle that’s emerged in American political discourse over whether or not China should be viewed favorably, because this battle is the 21st century’s equivalent of the Cold War-era debates within the U.S. over the USSR. Once again, Marxist-Leninists and other principled anti-imperialists are going up against the rightists, liberals, and anti-communist “leftists” who prefer to believe the lies the U.S. State Department is promoting about Washington’s greatest adversary. But things have changed compared to the last cold war. Despite what the partisans of neoliberal capitalism and U.S./NATO imperialism want us to believe, amid this cold war **Washington finds itself sinking into geopolitical isolation and terminal economic decline**. Since Washington won the Cold War, the U.S. empire has been experiencing an unprecedented amount of decline, and there’s abundant evidence that this will be the generation when the U.S. experiences the same kind of **imperial implosion** that’s happened to all of history’s past fallen empires. Already, Washington has **lost its military primacy in the Indo-Pacific to China**, the era of a **U.S.-dominated southwest Asia has ended**, the **U.S. and the E.U. have descended into inter-imperialist economic warfare**, the **shift towards a multi-polar world has become cemented** amid the strengthening of a Russian/Chinese military alliance and China’s economic rise, and **Washington has so far failed to achieve regime change** in Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Syria, Iran, Bolivia, Lebanon, Belarus, or Thailand. At the center of the motives behind Washington’s current micro-militarism (the term for when declining empires engage in reckless warfare to try to regain lost territory) is China. **China is proving to be a more formidable challenger to the U.S. than the Soviet Union was**, with China’s **Belt and Road Initiative working to undo the global inequities of Western neo-colonialism** by providing Third World countries the tools for economic and infrastructural development. This alone is deeply alarming the members of the U.S. imperialist intelligentsia, and the craftiest among them are ruthlessly working to manipulate the narrative around China. Take, for example, John Bolton, the Iraq invasion war criminal who’s on record for saying that “If I had to say something I knew was false to protect American national security, I would do it.” Keep this statement of Bolton’s in mind while reading the following paragraph from the Washington Post op-ed that he wrote a few days into the Biden presidency: Understanding the nature of Beijing’s threat is also critical. This is not an ideological, Cold War struggle. China is not pursuing Marxist theory, although its domestic policies certainly have nothing to recommend them. Xi is not only crushing Uighurs and other non-Han minorities, but also extinguishing religious freedom and crushing Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement. American minds do not take kindly to “civil-military fusion,” or “social credit scores,” whereby Beijing measures the worthiness of its own citizens. This is not Communism at work, but authoritarianism, pure and simple. Misreading it as Marxism 2.0 will impede strategic clarity, not enhance it. In this essay, Bolton may be considering the long game of the ideological battle that’s going on within the core of the empire. If his pledge to knowingly promote falsehoods in order to preserve the empire’s internal stability has any role behind his choice of words in this propaganda piece, he’s trying to crush hope for the communist movement within the U.S. by portraying China as “not truly Marxist.” This is something that the more manipulative anti-Chinese cold war propagandists have often done. If people in the U.S. who are drifting towards class consciousness become convinced that China is just another capitalist empire (despite the country being a workers’ democracy whose foreign policy model drastically differs from that of actual imperialist powers), **they’ll not believe that socialism and anti-imperialism are on the rise throughout the globe.** They’ll also be more inclined to believe the lies Bolton repeats about Chinese “minority persecution” and “Hong Kong oppression.” These kinds of ideological manipulations are all about **preparing for the most important war** that the U.S. empire is going to have to fight during the 21st century: **the war against a class uprising within U.S. borders**. **If the groups that will lead the inevitable class revolts of these coming decades view China and other Marxist-Leninist countries as “authoritarian” and “not truly socialist,” they’ll be open to imperialist co-optation**. They’ll also be easily steered away from the Marxist-Leninist goals of organizing under a democratic centralist party, overthrowing the capitalist state, and forming a dictatorship of the proletariat. Such is the outcome that the capitalist state and its lackeys are working feverishly to prevent. In this last decade, as American society has drifted closer towards destabilization amid the perpetual depression it’s been in since 2008, U.S. military analysts have begun putting out reports which **anticipate a near future of internal warfare** for the empire. One of these reports has envisioned special operations forces having to be sent into the peripheries of U.S. megacities to contain guerrilla uprisings. Another has declared that the rapidly accelerating militarization which climate crisis-related natural disasters have been bringing to American society is only the beginning, with the country’s future under climate collapse essentially being one of endless internal war. Another has described near-future scenarios where the army will be sent in to invade and occupy U.S. localities, and where the government will need to shut off internet and cell phone access within the occupied areas while ensuring that local media only puts out official U.S. military propaganda. When these kinds of domestic warfare scenarios manifest-and let’s not pretend they won’t happen, the Pentagon has described them as “unavoidable”-the ideological battle that’s happening right now will be taken to its logical conclusion. As the state cracks down with the most extreme force possible, the reactionary militias and vigilantes carry out terror campaigns amid the chaos, and marginalized peoples find themselves in tremendous danger, the groups that will be most reliable at fighting against this encroaching violence are the ones which haven’t been co-opted by the empire. The revolutionary cadre members who weren’t swayed by the lies of the war propagandists will likely be among those willing to carve out resistance pockets, not give into the state’s demands, and work towards a revolution in the same vein as the ones which have liberated other places from the forces of empire. At that point, **the question will no longer be whether or not the U.S. empire can win the great-power competition. It will be whether or not the U.S. state can survive.** And if the state can’t, **the question will then become whether the reactionaries or the revolutionaries prevail and come to fill the power vacuum.**

**Multipolarity, not Chinese hegemony, supplants US imperial unilateralism without transition war – that solves global crises from COVID to climate change.**

**Qiao Collective, 10-14-20**

[Qiao Collective, collective of diasporic Chinese writers, artists, and activists committed to opposing U.S. aggression on China and the Global South, inspired by the living legacies of Third World communisms and Chinese socialism and internationalism, aim to provide critical resources to equip the left to combat the misinformation and propaganda that fuels the New Cold War on China: “The End of Engagement,” published 10-14-20, https://www.qiaocollective.com/en/articles/end-of-engagement?fbclid=IwAR2FOf9AMQ1KOPehFMk3DmvXdNOZzEH5MurNaDvYrHM2TEC1EnS2pvwcjwk]//AD

Yet, the end of engagement also poses a historic juncture between the paths of unilateralism and of multilateralism. Contrary to State Department fear mongering, **China’s rise is not a threat to U.S. hegemony because China seeks its own hegemony**. The **real threat** to U.S. hegemony is **China’s role in ushering in a new era of multilateralism**, in which institutions such as the UN once wielded as proxies of a hegemonic “Pax Americana” fulfill their promise instead as platforms for international peace and cooperation. China’s increasing commitments to UN peacekeeping forces, the World Health Organization, and international COVID-19 vaccine efforts such as COVAX all speak to **China’s interest in bolstering rules-based multilateralism as a counterweight to ongoing U.S. belligerence**. Such are China’s rejoinders to the U.S. Cold War mentality. Before the United Nations General Assembly in September, President Xi Jinping declared that China “**has no intention to fight either a Cold War or a hot one** with any country,” **rejecting zero sum geopolitics** and calling for **global cooperation** to face the global crises of **COVID-19** and **climate change.** That Chinese sovereignty and the socialist path have been heralded as an existential threat to the Western alliance speaks far more to the nature of U.S. hegemony than it does to the character of China’s rise. After all, it is not China but the U.S. empire that insists on dividing the world into opposing camps. In the end, there are only two sides to be taken: the side of imperialism, unilateralism, and hegemony—and the side of the future.

**Socialist governance is key to environmental sustainability – US heg prevents sustainability, only China can solve – outweighs on timeframe and turns every scenario.**

**Donato, 20**

[Donald, writer appearing in People’s World, Britain's Morning Star and the social science journal International Critical Thought (Routledge). For nearly 30 years, he has written about social and economic development as a planner, field researcher, development project manager, an adviser for research, publications, and communications, and a freelance journalist. Donato is a member of the National Writers Union-UAW Local 1981, article published 1-10-2020: "The Green New Deal and China’s Green Revolution," People's World, https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/the-green-new-deal-and-chinas-green-revolution/]//AD

While growing public interest in the GND here at home is laudable, the **momentum of looming climate catastrophe is already slaughtering millions** of animals and humans in places like Australia and Indonesia. Support for bold, progressive action on the climate emergency underscores the reality that we are in **a race with time** to stop the **suicidal destruction of the ecosystem that sustains us all**. The Green New Deal and initiatives like it throughout the world are essential parts of that race, but there are some examples that may be more worth studying than others. **There is also a social system better equipped than ours to rapidly respond to the dangers we face**. To efficiently accomplish the broad goals of the GND, the U.S. must engage in comparative scientific prioritization and planning which works for both the people and the land. China’s Green Revolution The Chinese leadership have achieved nearly miraculous environmental goals in just a few years, while maintaining economic growth of over 6% in 2019, while the U.S. struggled to achieve 2.1%, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis. As Dean Baker, senior economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C. wrote, “Rather than spending so much effort worrying about what China is taking from us, we should be thinking about what we can get from China.” The ways in which China is leading the green revolution are many. China has become the world manufacturing **leader of electric cars**. It has invested heavily in a national fleet of electric buses for public transportation. **The People’s Republic has the highest afforestation rate of any country or region in the world**. It **leads in the research, development and manufacture of renewable energy sources** and is the **world’s top electricity producer from renewable energy** sources, with over double the generation of the second-ranking country, the U.S. As a follow-up to decades of progress on environmental concerns, this past October, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China adopted a policy framework to “promote highly efficient utilization of resources, improve institutions for ecological restoration and conservation, and strengthen the accountability system.” This framework is meant to expand China’s two-pronged approach to clean up its environment, including the **strict regulation of pollutant discharges** and **cleaning up existing pollutants**. To help us understand how China’s environmental policies are performing, a report was released in November 2019 by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment. The report estimates that in 2018, China’s carbon dioxide emissions have been reduced by 45.8% compared to 2005, which is equivalent to 5.26 billion tons of carbon dioxide emissions. An important factor in this reduction has been the growth of non-fossil energy, which accounted for 14.3% of primary energy consumption. China has been able to turn its environmental situation around by adjusting its industrial structure, conserving energy and improving energy efficiency, optimizing the energy structure, **controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions** from non-energy activities, **increasing carbon sinks** by planting millions of trees and designating millions of hectares of conservation areas, strengthening coordinated control of GHG and air pollutants and promoting low-carbon pilots and local actions. **But none of this would have been possible without a governmental system that is devoted to prioritizing human and ecological needs over profits.** Of course, there is waste, profit and corruption in China, but the overarching goal of the government, like the motto which hangs outside the central government headquarters in Beijing, is to serve the people. Planning for the future Another important part of the Chinese approach to environmental policy is spatial planning, referred to commonly as “the three red lines.” Three red lines aims to accelerate the creation of a spatial planning system for national territory and map out ecological protection areas, permanent farmland and urban zones. “The spatial planning system plays an important role in the country’s management system and will be crucial in promoting the efficient, fair and high-quality use of the territory,” said Zhang Bing, deputy director of the National Territorial Spatial Planning Bureau of the Ministry of Natural Resources. “The core principle of the three red lines is making protection a priority,” said Zhang, who took pains to emphasize that economic and social development must be integrated into ecological concerns. Comparing the two approaches China’s complex strategy has quickly addressed several factors that are contributing to ecological collapse **around the world.** The model is far from perfect, but the Chinese approach is **far more comprehensive than any other country of comparable size and impact**. Critical to the struggle of American workers and environmentalists is the fact that the GND is still in its formative stages and there is still time for significant detail to be added to future legislation. Another enabler of China’s green revolution is the political reality that **modernization and scientific progress are part of the guiding principles of a state established by a socialist revolution**. This is **something the U.S. cannot replace with half-measures**. Land use, resource allocation and re-allocation, national planning, investment and regulation, are but a few of the vital elements necessary to ensure an equitable, efficient and **sustainable future**.

## Case

#### No solvency for how the plan stops space militarization and they didn’t specify how the plan works or solves in the AC

#### Tons of alt causes to space militarization that isnt’ private companies, military superiority, sovereignty over LEO, or want of satellites are cause militarization and aren’t solved by the plan

#### Their alliance ev is awful-all it says is that China is selling stuff to Russia right now; nothing about the PRC using the private sector to pursue an military alliance since its all economic; control-F their ev and you don’t see any mention of an potential alliance

#### All their China threat ev is from U.S defence officials who have a benefit in securitizing Moscow and Beijing; gives them more power and funding to deal with these “threats”

#### No link from Moscow-Beijing alliance to war, that’s a key link in their scenario since without it they have no ev that states why Moscow and Beijing would want to go to war

#### Non-state actors in space are conflict dampeners – they avoid geopolitical tension and have financial incentives to keep conflict low

Frankowski 17 (Pawel, Assistant Professor at the Faculty of National Security. His current research interests include space policy, labour standards in free trade agreements, and theories of international relations, Jagiellonian University in Kakow, “OUTER SPACE AND PRIVATE COMPANIES CONSEQUENCES FOR GLOBAL SECURITY”, <https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.14.2017.50.06>)

In the terms of privatization and space security, space remains relatively untapped, but commercial and military benefits from space exploration/exploitation could even lead to ‘privatization of space’. Such privatization will result from growing pressure on spacefaring countries to defect from cooperation, since is less viable with good number of multiple actors who entered the space.36 However, space policy and space research are characterized by very high costs, which are rather impossible to bear by private companies, limited by economic calculation. As pointed out earlier, under-investment in technological development by private companies it is related to the fact that these actors are not focused on profits of a social nature, such as improving the quality of life of the recipient of the product.37 This makes some technology, potentially beneficial to society, not developed or introduced into use, because the profit margin is too small to make this viable for commercial players. To conclude, privatization of space security can develop in unexpected ways, but in today’s space environment private actors would rather play the role of security regulators than security providers. When investment in space technologies is less profitable than other areas of economy, private actors would focus on soft law and conflict prevention in space, and new private initiatives will appear. For example, apart from important space companies, as SpaceX or Blue Origin active in outer space, other private actors as Secure World Foundation (SWF), who focus on space sustainability, will play more important role in crafting international guidelines for space activities.38 This path the way for future solutions and projects, as cleaning the space debris, extracting resources from asteroids and planetoids, refuelling satellites, providing payload capabilities for governmental entities on market-based logic, will be based on activity non-state actors, providing soft law and regulatory solutions, where space faring states are unable to find any compromise. Therefore private companies will be in fact global (or space) regulators, as part of UNCOPUS, being involved in space activities.39 The last argument for private involvement in space security comes from an approach based on common good and resilience of space assets, emphasized by the Project Ploughshares, as an important part of space security. As of 2017 there are more than 700,000 man-made objects on the Earth’s orbit bigger than 1 cm, while 17,000 of them are bigger than 10 cm.40 Some of them are traced by SSA systems, both American and European, but these systems are public-military owned, and private operators are not granted any access to this data. Any collision of space object with space debris, even with small particles, might result in a chain reaction, called Kessler’s syndrome, and not only private but public, and military assets will be destroyed or impaired. In such conditions, a reluctant cooperation between the public and private sector, and unwillingness to share vulnerable data by public actors seem to confirm that private space activity is more than necessary. This is an apparent case when logic of mistrust between state powers must be overcome by private actors, perhaps by suggesting common preferences for debris mitigation, and space situational awareness. In the case of space debris, Space Data Association, an initiative supported by private sector, with its main aim to enhance data sharing between commercial satellite operators, could be an example of nascent public good provided by private actors for the sake of global security.

**China has no demonstrated co-orbital capabilities**

Todd **Harrison et al**, Director of Aerospace Security Project and Senior Fellow at International Security Program at CSIS, MS MIT Aeronautics, Kaitlyn Johnson, Associate Fellow and Associate Director, Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, MA National Security American U, Thomas Roberts, adjunct fellow at the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, BA Astrophysics Princeton, April 20**18**, “Space Threat Assessment 2018,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, pp. 12-13, https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Harrison\_SpaceThreatAssessment\_FULL\_WEB.pdf

China has also developed and launched several satellites for testing technologies which could be used as co-orbital counterspace capabilities, however **none of these tests have resulted in a verifiable destructive incident**. Co-orbital satellite capabilities can serve a dual-purpose role as both on-orbit servicing and inspection satellites for peaceful purposes and as counterspace threats—and it is difficult to distinguish between the two.

For example, in 2008 a Chinese spacecraft deployed a miniature imaging satellite, called BX-1, that was jettisoned from its mother spacecraft. The satellite was unable to be actively controlled until after it had passed near the International Space Station (ISS).71 However, many reports in the United States claimed that this was the first co-orbital ASAT test from China. While the BX-1 did fly dangerously close to the ISS, **the maneuver appears to be unintentional**.72

**Co-orbital ASATs fail**

**Doboš and Pražák 19** (Bohumil, Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, and Jakub, Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, “To Clear or to Eliminate? Active Debris Removal Systems as Antisatellite Weapons”, Vol. 47, February) DB

The article aimed to assess **the utility of the ADR systems as ASAT weapons**. While looking at the limitations of the currently operational ASAT weapons, we can identify many advantages that the ADR system would hold if used in a harmful manner. **It does not produce additional clouds of orbital debris and is not a military-only technology**. Nevertheless, **ADR systems carry their own set of restrictions if used as an ASAT weapon, namely limited reach and easy destructibility by kinetic ASAT weapons**. This leads us to the consideration that **the technology of the ADR system is probably not practical for the conduct of massive ASAT attacks if developed in a scope proposed by the supporters of active debris mitigation**. As a dual-use technology, its primary function is, nevertheless, determined by the intent of the owner. If the ADR systems are to be effectively utilized in the civil sector, the actor operating them must be perceived as reliable by the vast majority of the international space community. We think that this will be best done by commercialization of the effort in the context of cooperation with state space agencies operating in the sphere—especially civilian ESA—that might help with the technological development. This support should be done under the coordination by the UN as to decrease the negative perception of the operation of such systems.

#### No solvency – Chinese-Russian space alliance is NOT based in space -it’s one out of hundreds of causes for partnership

Jennings 12-3-21

Ralph Jennings (UC berkeley graduate, has covered china since 1988), 12-3-2021, "China Deepens Informal Alliance With Russia," VOA, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-deepens-informal-alliance-with-russia/6338773.html, // HW AW

SAN FRANCISCO — China and Russia have strengthened their political, economic and military relations this year, despite their uneasy history in the past, as both countries say they resent what they call growing pressure from the West. So far this year, the two have held a series of military exercises and issued joint diplomatic statements aimed at Western countries. On November 27, for example, an essay by both countries’ ambassadors to Washington protested the upcoming U.S.-led [Summit for Democracy](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20211127-in-joint-op-ed-china-and-russia-decry-us-democracy-summit) for creating divisions in the world. Neither Russia nor China appeared on the list of 110 invitees. Russia depends on China’s massive industrial economy for oil and gas exports as environmental rules in the European Union complicate energy imports there, said Vassily Kashin, senior fellow at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He said two-way relations were at their strongest since the 1950s. “Most importantly, we have a common position concerning the global order, which is that we don’t like the U.S. global order, so this close partnership is based on common opposition to the U.S.-led global order,” Kashin said. Western democracies from the United States to Australia and throughout Europe have strengthened their own ties this year at a time of concern about China’s policies. Western governments have signaled opposition to Beijing’s aggressive language on Taiwan, its crackdown on dissenters in Hong Kong and its policies targeting a Muslim minority in China's Xinjiang region. Countries, including the West and some in Southeast Asia, further resent China’s [“wolf warrior diplomacy”](https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/sino-asean-relations-and-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/) approach that has seen China’s Communist Party become more vocal about promoting its views among overseas audiences. In foreign relations, experts say Beijing has been using [“increasingly assertive tactics”](https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats-use-and-abuse-twitter/) to “aggressively defend their home country,” often in the cyber world. China and Russia in turn hope to stop a return to U.S.-driven soft power of the Barack Obama-George W. Bush presidencies, when smaller countries saw the United States as “more acceptable leaders” among great powers, said Alan Chong, associate professor at the Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Chinese soft power, Chong said, “has taken a hit” because of President Xi Jinping's comments that make him sound strong at home at the expense of solidarity and friendship overseas. China sees U.S. President Joe Biden as “a very tough opponent,” he added. Western governments have called out China this year particularly over its perceived aggression toward Taiwan, a self-ruled island that Beijing calls its own. A U.S. official also warned Russia last month about troop buildup near Ukraine. Evidence of stronger Sino-Russian ties With the world’s second-strongest military, after the United States, Russia holds occasional military exercises with China — five made public to date — while selling arms to its giant neighbor to the south. In October, China and Russia held their 10th annual "Maritime Interaction” naval drills with the Russian Pacific Fleet’s anti-submarine ship Admiral Panteleyev, the Moscow-based [Sputnik](https://sputniknews.com/20211019/tokyo-closely-watching-naval-activities-near-japan-in-wake-of-russia-china-joint-drills-1090034240.html) news service reported. China's People's Liberation Army Navy sent several destroyers and a diesel submarine. The two navies drill together to strengthen “combat capabilities” in case of “seaborne threats,” Sputnik said. Russia and China held five days of military exercises in a remote region of central China in August, drawing more than 10,000 service personnel, aircraft, artillery and armored vehicles. **China and Russia also began operating a space weather center**