## FW vs K

#### A. Interpretation: The affirmative may only defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entites is unjust

#### “Resolved” means to enact by law.

Words & Phrases ’64

(Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

**Unjust means unlawful**

**Waters 98** [H. FRANKLIN WATERS, Senior District Judge. Colonia Ins. Co. v. City Nat. Bank, 13 F. Supp. 2d 891 - Dist. Court, WD Arkansas 1998] TDI

3. Unjust Enrichment

Plaintiffs allege in the amended complaint that Coleman has been unjustly enriched by all amounts he received from Welch and AGA. "To find unjust enrichment, a party must have received something of value, to which he was not entitled and which he must restore." Coleman's Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 55 Ark.App. 275, 299, 935 S.W.2d 289, 302 (1996) (citing Dews v. Halliburton Indus., Inc., 288 Ark. 532, 536, 708 S.W.2d 67, 69 (1986)). "However, there must be some operative act, intent, or situation to make the enrichment unjust and compensable." Sparks Regional Medical Ctr. v. Blatt, 55 Ark.App. 311, 317, 935 S.W.2d 304, 306 (1996) (citation omitted). "One who is free from fault cannot be held to be unjustly enriched merely because he has chosen to exercise a legal or contract right." Id. (citation omitted).

Arkansas law is clear on the issue that in the realm of unjust enrichment, the word **"unjust" means "unlawful."** "One is not unjustly enriched by receipt of that to which he is legally entitled. \* \* \* No recovery of money received can be based upon unjust enrichment when the recipient can show a legal or equitable ground for keeping it." Halvorson v. Trout, 258 Ark. 397, 403, 527 S.W.2d 573, 577 (1975) (quoting Whitley v. Irwin, 250 Ark. 543, 550-51, 465 S.W.2d 906, 910-11 (1971)). See also, Jackson County Grain Drying Coop. v. Newport Wholesale Electric, Inc., 9 Ark.App. 41, 46, 652 S.W.2d 638, 640 (1983) (no one shall be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another; the word "unjustly" means "unlawfully").

Coleman contends that because he was an employee of AGA, he was entitled to the money he received as remuneration for his services, and, as such, he was not unjustly enriched. The court believes that, based on the reasons set forth above, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Coleman knew that the source of the money he received from Welch and AGA, especially the bonuses and gifts, was plaintiffs' premiums. Therefore, Coleman is not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim.

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### Violation: They don’t meet because they read X

#### B. Fairness –

#### 1. Debate is a game – tournament results and ballot prove. Other impacts like political activism or education can be pursued in other arenas. Fairness is unique to debate, that makes it the most important impact.

#### 2. Not defending the topic is unfair –

#### a) Predictability –

#### Altering the topic gives the aff a huge edge, they can prepare for half a year on an issue that catches us by surprise. reparation is better than thinking on your feet – research demonstrates pedagogical humility and research skills are the only portable debate training.

#### b) Limits –

#### There are a finite amount of governmPent restrictions, but an infinite number of non topical affs. Consider this our “library disad”- not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months.

#### c) Causality –

#### Debating the resolution forces the affirmative to defend a cause and effect relationship, the state doing x results in y. Non topical affs establish their own barometer “I think x is good for me” that aren’t negateable. Only the neg promotes switch side debate.

#### d) Exclusionary rule –

#### You can’t vote on the case outweighs T because lack of preparation prevents rigorous testing of the AC claims and inflates the credence of their arguments. If we win fairness we don’t have to “outweigh” other impacts

#### C. Engagement –

#### Aff’s interp destroys engagement – predictable stasis point research accessibility and neg ground. Even if public policy isn’t the best focus for activism, it’s crucial for dialogue because it’s grounded in consistent reporting and academic work.

/

#### Two impacts –

#### a) Changing the topic post facto structurally favors the aff by manipulating balance of prep – vote neg because debate is a competitive game that’s meaningless without substantive constraints.

#### b) Their model creates a structural disincentive to substantial research. Failure to defend the actor and mechanism of the resolution allows them to shift their advocacy to the terms most favorable to them – causes dogmatism and forces the neg into generics at the margins of the literature – destroys good scholarship.

#### Drop the debater on T – their model ensures that the round is skewed from the beginning because their advocacy prevents me from generating 1NC offense.

#### Theory is competing interpretations – reasonability encourages arbitrary judge intervention and debaters playing to a particular judge’s questionable preferences

#### E. Aff cedes the political –outright rejection of hegemonic practices means the aff fails, coalitions break down, and hawks seize the political – only engagement solves

**Mouffe 2009**

(Chantal Mouffe is Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, “The Importance of Engaging the State”, *What is Radical Politics Today?*, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pp. 233-7)

## The way we envisage social criticism has very important consequences for radical politics. Radical politics today is often characterised in terms of desertion, exodus and refusal to engage with existing institutions. Whereas I believe that radical politics should instead be concerned with building political engagement, through developing competing, antagonistic political claims. My aim here is to highlight the main differences between these two characterisations. The first could roughly be described as ‘critique as withdrawal’; the second as ‘critique as engagement’. I will argue that, ultimately, the problem with the form of radical politics advocated by ‘critique as withdrawal’ is that it has a flawed understanding of the very nature of ‘the political’ itself. Critique as withdrawal The model of social criticism and radical politics put forward by Michel Hardt and Antonio Negri in their books Empire (2000) and Multitude (2004) is a good illustration of ‘critique as withdrawal’. Empire is often referred to as the Communist manifesto for the twenty-first century in academic and activist conferences. In this book, the authors call for a total break with modernity and the elaboration of a postmodern approach. In their view such a break is required because of the crucial transformations of globalisation and the subsequent workers’ struggle experienced by our society during the last decades of the twentieth century. According to Hardt and Negri, these transformations can be broadly summarised in the following way: 1. Sovereignty has taken a new form: there is a new global sovereignty, which Hardt and Negri call ‘Empire’. They argue that this Empire is a new imperialism that replaces the attempt by nation states to extend their own sovereignty beyond their borders. In contrast to old-style imperialism, the current Empire has no territorial centre of power and no fixed boundaries; it is decentred and deterritorialised, progressively incorporating the entire global realm with open, expanding frontiers. 2. This transformation corresponds, they say, to the transformation of the capitalist mode of production. The role of industrial factory labour has been reduced. Priority is instead given to communicative, cooperative and affective labour. In the postmodernisation of the global economy, the creation of wealth tends towards regulating and mediating life itself. It permeates every aspect of our life. The scope of the rule of Empire is social life in its entirety. All aspects of our life are controlled – from the way we work and exchange ideas across international borders, through to how we think about our body image. 3. We are witnessing the passage from a ‘disciplinary society’ to a ‘society of control’ characterised by a new paradigm of power. In the disciplinary society, which corresponds to the first phase of capitalist accumulation, command is constructed through diffuse networks of apparatus. These produce and regulate customs, habits and productive practices with the help of disciplinary institutions like prisons, factories, asylums, hospitals, schools and others. The society of control, in contrast, is a society in which mechanisms of command are less obvious. The society of control is dominated by the many mechanisms of the globalised, postmodern capitalist society, which seek to directly organise the brain and body (from the internet, through to complex global systems of trade). What is directly at stake is the regulation of life itself. This is what they call ‘biopower’. 4. Hardt and Negri produce new terms to help explain this situation. These are ‘mass intellectuality’, ‘immaterial labor’ and ‘general intellect’. The central role previously occupied by the labour-power of mass factory workers in the production of surplus-value is today said to be increasingly filled by intellectual, immaterial and communicative labour-power. For Hardt and Negri, the figure of immaterial labour involved in communication, cooperation and the reproduction of affects occupies an increasingly central position in the schema of capitalist production. 5. A new term is needed to refer to this collective worker that Hardt and Negri call the ‘Multitude’. They believe that the transition to Empire – where territorial state sovereignty is less important – has opened up new possibilities for the liberation of this Multitude. The Multitude have shaped a new form of globalisation, which means that previous systems and structures of exploitation and control, such as the state, are no longer needed. This is why their book Empire is so often referred to as the Communist manifesto of the twenty-first century. According to this manifesto, the creative forces of the Multitude are capable of constructing a counter-empire, of overthrowing the state apparatus of control. The present systems of control are no longer necessary. An alternative political organisation of the global flows of exchange now dominates in this era of globalisation. We can, therefore, get rid of territorial sovereignty because it only serves to oppress our creativity. Hardt and Negri therefore clearly illustrate what I previously called, in my introduction to this chapter, ‘critique as withdrawal’: a refusal to engage with existing institutions. At this point it is worth introducing the work of Paolo Virno to complement the picture. Virno’s analyses in his book Grammar of the Multitude (2004) dovetail in many respects with those of Hardt and Negri. But there are also some significant differences. For instance, he is much less sanguine about the future. While Hardt and Negri have a messianic vision of the role of the Multitude, which will necessarily bring down Empire and establish an ‘Absolute Democracy’, Virno does not. For Virno, the present conditions are not right for a communist future. It is unlikely that the sort of ‘Absolute Democracy’ that Hardt and Negri envisage will actually take place. Instead of seeing the generalisation of immaterial labour as a type of ‘spontaneous communism’ like Hardt and Negri, Virno tends to see post-Fordism as a manifestation of the ‘communism of capital’. Under post-Fordism, consumers pursue different goals, with services responding accordingly. This means that today, for Virno, capitalistic initiatives orchestrate material and cultural conditions for their own benefit. And the role of political action should be to create a sphere of common affairs – which he calls the ‘Republic of the Multitude’ – to challenge this situation. Virno proposes two key terms to describe the type of political action which he thinks is necessary. These are ‘exodus’ and ‘civil disobedience’. And for me, they again illustrate what I call ‘critique as withdrawal’: something which is an important and influential trend in radical politics today because exodus advocates mass defection from the state. This requires the development of a non-state public sphere and a radically new type of democracy. It involves experimenting in new forms of nonrepresentative and extra-parliamentary democracy, organised around leagues, councils and soviets. The Multitude never aspire to transform themselves into a majority. They develop a power that refuses to become government. This is why, according to Virno, civil disobedience needs to be emancipated from the liberal tradition. He does not just want to ignore specific laws if they do not conform to the principles of a given territorial constitution or state. For Virno, like Hardt and Negri, radical disobedience goes much further – it puts the existence of the state itself in question. In both Hardt and Negri, and Virno, there is therefore emphasis upon ‘critique as withdrawal’. They all call for the development of a non-state public sphere. They call for self-organisation, experimentation, non-representative and extra-parliamentary politics. They see forms of traditional representative politics as inherently oppressive. So they do not seek to engage with them, in order to challenge them. They seek to get rid of them altogether. This disengagement is, for such influential personalities in radical politics today, the key to every political position in the world. The Multitude must recognise imperial sovereignty itself as the enemy and discover adequate means of subverting its power. Whereas in the disciplinary era I spoke about earlier, sabotage was the fundamental form of political resistance, these authors claim that, today, it should be desertion. It is indeed through desertion, through the evacuation of the places of power, that they think that battles against Empire might be won. Desertion and exodus are, for these important thinkers, a powerful form of class struggle against imperial postmodernity. According to Hardt and Negri, and Virno, radical politics in the past was dominated by the notion of ‘the people’. This was, according to them, a unity, acting with one will. And this unity is linked to the existence of the state. The Multitude, on the contrary, shuns political unity. It is not representable because it is an active self-organising agent that can never achieve the status of a juridical personage. It can never converge in a general will, because the present globalisation of capital and workers’ struggles will not permit this. It is anti-state and anti-popular. Hardt and Negri claim that the Multitude cannot be conceived any more in terms of a sovereign authority that is representative of the people. They therefore argue that new forms of politics, which are non-representative, are needed. They advocate a withdrawal from existing institutions. This is something which characterises much of radical politics today. The emphasis is not upon challenging the state. Radical politics today is often characterised by a mood, a sense and a feeling, that the state itself is inherently the problem. Critique as engagement I will now turn to presenting the way I envisage the form of social criticism best suited to radical politics today. I agree with Hardt and Negri that it is important to understand the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. But I consider that the dynamics of this transition is better apprehended within the framework of the approach outlined in the book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). What I want to stress is that many factors have contributed to this transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, and that it is necessary to recognise its complex nature. My problem with Hardt and Negri’s view is that, by putting so much emphasis on the workers’ struggles, they tend to see this transition as if it was driven by one single logic: the workers’ resistance to the forces of capitalism in the post-Fordist era. They put too much emphasis upon immaterial labour. In their view, capitalism can only be reactive and they refuse to accept the creative role played both by capital and by labour. To put it another way, they deny the positive role of political struggle. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics we use the word ‘hegemony’ to describe the way in which meaning is given to institutions or practices: for example, the way in which a given institution or practice is defined as ‘oppressive to women’, ‘racist’ or ‘environmentally destructive’. We also point out that every hegemonic order is therefore susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices – feminist, anti-racist, environmentalist, for example. This is illustrated by the plethora of new social movements which presently exist in radical politics today (Christian, anti-war, counter-globalisation, Muslim, and so on). Clearly not all of these are workers’ struggles. In their various ways they have nevertheless attempted to influence and have influenced a new hegemonic order. This means that when we talk about ‘the political’, we do not lose sight of the ever present possibility of heterogeneity and antagonism within society. There are many different ways of being antagonistic to a dominant order in a heterogeneous society – it need not only refer to the workers’ struggles. I submit that it is necessary to introduce this hegemonic dimension when one envisages the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. This means abandoning the view that a single logic (workers’ struggles) is at work in the evolution of the work process; as well as acknowledging the pro-active role played by capital. In order to do this we can find interesting insights in the work of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello who, in their book The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005), bring to light the way in which capitalists manage to use the demands for autonomy of the new movements that developed in the 1960s, harnessing them in the development of the post-Fordist networked economy and transforming them into new forms of control. They use the term ‘artistic critique’ to refer to how the strategies of the counter-culture (the search for authenticity, the ideal of selfmanagement and the anti-hierarchical exigency) were used to promote the conditions required by the new mode of capitalist regulation, replacing the disciplinary framework characteristic of the Fordist period. From my point of view, what is interesting in this approach is that it shows how an important dimension of the transition from Fordism to postFordism involves rearticulating existing discourses and practices in new ways. It allows us to visualise the transition from Fordism to postFordism in terms of a hegemonic intervention. To be sure, Boltanski and Chiapello never use this vocabulary, but their analysis is a clear example of what Gramsci called ‘hegemony through neutralisation’ or ‘passive revolution’. This refers to a situation where demands which challenge the hegemonic order are recuperated by the existing system, which is achieved by satisfying them in a way that neutralises their subversive potential. When we apprehend the transition from Fordism to postFordism within such a framework, we can understand it as a hegemonic move by capital to re-establish its leading role and restore its challenged legitimacy. We did not witness a revolution, in Marx’s sense of the term. Rather, there have been many different interventions, challenging dominant hegemonic practices. It is clear that, once we envisage social reality in terms of ‘hegemonic’ and ‘counter-hegemonic’ practices, radical politics is not about withdrawing completely from existing institutions. Rather, we have no other choice but to engage with hegemonic practices, in order to challenge them. This is crucial; otherwise we will be faced with a chaotic situation. Moreover, if we do not engage with and challenge the existing order, if we instead choose to simply escape the state completely, we leave the door open for others to take control of systems of authority and regulation. Indeed there are many historical (and not so historical) examples of this. When the Left shows little interest, Right-wing and authoritarian groups are only too happy to take over the state. The strategy of exodus could be seen as the reformulation of the idea of communism, as it was found in Marx. There are many points in common between the two perspectives. To be sure, for Hardt and Negri it is no longer the proletariat, but the Multitude which is the privileged political subject. But in both cases the state is seen as a monolithic apparatus of domination that cannot be transformed. It has to ‘wither away’ in order to leave room for a reconciled society beyond law, power and sovereignty. In reality, as I’ve already noted, others are often perfectly willing to take control. If my approach – supporting new social movements and counterhegemonic practices – has been called ‘post-Marxist’ by many, it is precisely because I have challenged the very possibility of such a reconciled society. To acknowledge the ever present possibility of antagonism to the existing order implies recognising that heterogeneity cannot be eliminated. As far as politics is concerned, this means the need to envisage it in terms of a hegemonic struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects attempting to incarnate the universal and to define the symbolic parameters of social life. A successful hegemony fixes the meaning of institutions and social practices and defines the ‘common sense’ through which a given conception of reality is established. However, such a result is always contingent, precarious and susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic interventions. Politics always takes place in a field criss-crossed by antagonisms. A properly political intervention is always one that engages with a certain aspect of the existing hegemony. It can never be merely oppositional or conceived as desertion, because it aims to challenge the existing order, so that it may reidentify and feel more comfortable with that order. Another important aspect of a hegemonic politics lies in establishing linkages between various demands (such as environmentalists, feminists, anti-racist groups), so as to transform them into claims that will challenge the existing structure of power relations. This is a further reason why critique involves engagement, rather than disengagement. It is clear that the different demands that exist in our societies are often in conflict with each other. This is why they need to be articulated politically, which obviously involves the creation of a collective will, a ‘we’. This, in turn, requires the determination of a ‘them’. This obvious and simple point is missed by the various advocates of the Multitude. For they seem to believe that the Multitude possesses a natural unity which does not need political articulation. Hardt and Negri see ‘the People’ as homogeneous and expressed in a unitary general will, rather than divided by different political conflicts. Counter-hegemonic practices, by contrast, do not eliminate differences. Rather, they are what could be called an ‘ensemble of differences’, all coming together, only at a given moment, against a common adversary. Such as when different groups from many backgrounds come together to protest against a war perpetuated by a state, or when environmentalists, feminists, anti-racists and others come together to challenge dominant models of development and progress. In these cases, the adversary cannot be defined in broad general terms like ‘Empire’, or for that matter ‘Capitalism’. It is instead contingent upon the particular circumstances in question – the specific states, international institutions or governmental practices that are to be challenged. Put another way, the construction of political demands is dependent upon the specific relations of power that need to be targeted and transformed, in order to create the conditions for a new hegemony. This is clearly not an exodus from politics. It is not ‘critique as withdrawal’, but ‘critique as engagement’. It is a ‘war of position’ that needs to be launched, often across a range of sites, involving the coming together of a range of interests. This can only be done by establishing links between social movements, political parties and trade unions, for example. The aim is to create a common bond and collective will, engaging with a wide range of sites, and often institutions, with the aim of transforming them. This, in my view, is how we should conceive the nature of radical politics

#### TVA – Affirm whole res with a Dalit advantage

#### TVA is terminal defense – proves our models aren’t mutually exclusive - any response to the substance of the TVA is offense for us because it proves our model allows for clear contestation. Form over Content doesn’t take it out since we don’t restrict Form, just the substantive burden of the Aff.

## FW

#### The ROB is to interrogate the gendered nature of the 1AC as a research project.

Bacchi 16

(Carol, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia, (2016): Policies as Gendering Practices: Re-Viewing Categorical Distinctions, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, DOI: 10.1080/1554477X.2016.1198207, JKS)

One important constitutive effect is how we are produced as subjects through the problematizations implicit in such texts, a process described as “subjectification” (Bacchi 2009, 16–17). For example, Foucault (1980) argues that specific problematizations of sexuality (e.g., sexuality as moral code, sexuality as biological imperative) create “subject positions” that enjoin people to become particular kinds of sexual subjects (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 308). Marston and McDonald (2006) describe how individual subjects are produced in specific policy practices “as worker-citizens in workfare programs, as parent-citizens in child and family services or consumer-citizens in a managerial and marketized mixed economy of welfare” (3). Given the proliferation of practices, the formation of one’s subjectivity is an ongoing and always incomplete process: “the doer/subject/person is never fixed, finally as a girl or a woman or whatever, but always becoming or being” (Jones 1997, 267). Subjectification effects therefore are neither deter- mined nor predictable. People sometimes take up subject positions in ways that challenge hierarchical relations. For example, the discourse of rights creates as one possible positioning that of the human rights advocate. Moreover, as practices “through which things take on meaning and value” (Shapiro 1988, xi), policies have material (lived) effects, shaping the possibilities for people’s and peoples’ lives (Bacchi 2009, 16–18). Policies achieve these constitutive effects through discursive practices, which comprise the “conditions of emergence, insertion and functioning” of discourses (Foucault 1972b, 163), and hence bridge a material-symbolic distinction (Bacchi and Bonham 2014). A particular conception of power underpins an understanding of policies as constitutive practices. Power is conceptualized as productive rather than as simply repressive. Power is not considered to be something people possess (e.g., “he or she has power”) but as a capacity exercised in the production of subjects and objects (Heller 1996, 83). This productive or generative view of power does not conclude that power and resistance are necessarily equal in their effects, however. Such a conclusion would deny the hierarchies by which the organization of discourse takes effect (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 310). This understanding of policy as constitutive of subjects and objects sits in sharp contrast to conventional views of the policy process, which, in the main, can be characterized as reactive. That is, in general, policy is considered to be a response to some condition that needs to be ameliorated or “fixed.” Policies are conceived as “reactions” to “problems.” By contrast, the understanding of policy offered in this article portrays policies as constitutive or productive of (what are taken to be) “problems,” “subjects,” and “objects” (Allan 2010, 14). It follows that it is no longer adequate to think in terms of conventional policy “outcomes,” understood as the results or “impacts” of government actions. New questions are required, such as the following: What does the particular policy, or policy proposal, deem to be an appropriate target for intervention? What is left out? How does the shape of the proposal affect how people feel about themselves and the issue? And how does it produce them as particular kinds of subjects?

#### Their answers to Framework sound liberatory but are actually justifications for “separate and equal” Dalit studies

**Rege 7** [Rege, Sharmila. "Dalit Studies as Pedagogical Practice: Claiming More Than Just a ‘Little Place’in the Academia." Review of Development and Change 12.1 (2007): 1-33. ]

Introducing the testimonios in the curricula is a complex and difficult process as distinct from efforts to 'caste-sensitise' curricula. Constructing oppostional dalit feminist pedagogies, a complex and difficult process, is distinct from efforts to 'caste-sensitise' women's studies curricula or curricula in any discipline or academic field. The absence of caste cannot as if be easily resolved by adding dalit women to the curricula, tbus making dalit women bear the excessive burden of caste in the curricula. Two models of 'including' dalit women in the curricula that are commonly practised can be best described as the 'feminist as tourist' and 'feminist as explorer models'.""' While the first model prescribes, 'add dalit women and stir' the other suggests 'add dalit women as separate and equal'. The feminist as tourist model operates a paradigm that assumes unmarked feminism as 'original' and makes brief forays into the 'problems' of dalit women through a single module or example. The picture briefly then is one of monolithic images of dalit who have the problems, and, unmarked feminism which has the theory and historical agency. The 'feminist as explorer' model operates through pedagogical strategies that may be misconstrued as sensitive because entire courses seem to be dedicated to dalit women. The explorer model constructs separate courses on dalit women's writings largely falling mto a framework of cultural relativism. Therefore, in such courses it appears as if women from different cultures write differently, so we are treating them separately but equally. All questions of power, agency and common criteria for evaluation are thus silenced in such curricular models. Oppostional dalit feminist pedagogies reject uncritical classical anthropological gaze at dalit women and suggest that dalit women's analytical gaze be thrown back at theories and praxis that does not state caste on its own terms. Such curricular models propose that dalit women's testimonios be read historically and relationally in the dalit articulations of the woman's question and the articulations of caste in the writings and associations of upper caste women in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The pedagogical project therefore sought to put together materials drawn from printed and oral modes of publicity to engage readers of the testimonios in a complex relational understanding of social location, experience and history. (14-15)

#### Use of feminist as explorer model turns and outweighs the case

#### ;Defense- voting aff doesn’t solve/will be coopted by global capital

#### Offense- partitioning area studies from “debate” as a distinct sphere legitimates US imperialism

Mohanty, PhD, 03

(Chandra, GenderStudies@Syracuse , Feminism without Borders )

Feminist-as-Explorer Model. This particular pedagogical perspective originates in area studies, where the "foreign" woman is the object and subject of knowledge and the larger intellectual project is entirely about countries other than the United States. Thus, here the local and the global are both defined as non-Euro-American. The focus on the international implies that it exists outside the U.S. nation-state. Women's, gender, and feminist issues are based on spatial/geographical and temporal/historical categories located elsewhere. Distance from "home" is fundamental to the definition of international in this framework. This strategy can result in students and teachers being left with a notion of difference and separateness, a sort of "us and them" attitude, but unlike the tourist model, the explorer perspective can provide a deeper, more contextual understanding of feminist issues in discretely defined geographical and cultural spaces. However, unless these discrete spaces are taught in relation to one another, the story told is usually a cultural relativist one, meaning that differences between cultures are discrete and relative with no real connection or common basis for evaluation. The local and the global are here collapsed into the international that by definition excludes the United States. If the dominant discourse is the discourse of cultural relativism, questions of power, agency, justice, and common criteria for critique and evaluation are silenced.23 In women's studies curricula this pedagogical strategy is often seen as the most culturally sensitive way to "internationalize" the curriculum. For instance, entire courses on "Women in Latin America" or "Third World Women's Literature" or "Postcolonial Feminism" are added on to the predominantlyU. S.-based curriculum as a way to "globalize" the feminist knowledge base. These courses can be quite sophisticated and complex studies, but they are viewed as entirely separate from the intellectual project of U. S. race and ethnic studies.24 The United States is not seen as part of "area studies," as white is not a color when one speaks of people of color. This is probably related to the particular history of institutionalization of area studies in the U. S. academy and its ties to U.S. imperialism. Thus areas to be studied/conquered are "out there," never within the United States. The fact that area studies in U.S. academic settings were federally funded and conceived as having a political project in the service of U.S. geopolitical interests suggests the need to examine the contemporary interests of these fields, especially as they relate to the logic of global capitalism. In addition, as Ella Shohat argues, it is time to "reimagine the study of regions and cultures in a way that transcends the conceptual borders inherent in the global cartography of the cold war" (2001, 1271). The field of American studies is an interesting location to examine here, especially since its more recent focus on U.S. imperialism. However, American studies rarely falls under the purview of "area studies." The problem with the feminist-as-explorer strategy is that globalization is an economic, political, and ideological phenomenon that actively brings the world and its various communities under connected and interdependent discursive and material regimes. The lives of women are connected and interdependent, albeit not the same, no matter which geographical area we happen to live in. Separating area studies from race and ethnic studies thus leads to understanding or teaching about the global as a way of not addressing internal racism, capitalist hegemony, colonialism, and heterosexualization as central to processes of global domination, exploitation, and resistance. Global or international is thus understood apart from racism- as if racism were not central to processes of globalization and relations of rule at this time. An example of this pedagogical strategy in the context of the larger curriculum is the usual separation of "world cultures" courses from race and ethnic studies courses. Thus identifying the kinds of representations of(nonEuro-American) women mobilized by this pedagogical strategy, and the relation of these representations to implicit images of First World/North women are important foci for analysis. What kind of power is being exercised in this strategy? What kinds of ideas of agency and struggle are being consolidated? What are the potential effects of a kind of cultural relativism on our understandings of the differences and commonalities among communities of women around the world? Thus the feminist-as-explorer model has its own problems, and I believe this is an inadequate way of building a feminist crosscultural knowledge base because in the context of an interwoven world with clear directionalities of power and domination, cultural relativism serves as an apology for the exercise of power.(240-2)

## Case

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### voting aff doesn’t do anything but show you outdebated HW ML

#### Dalit violence will still occur at the everyday post aff and their one win can’t change the debate space; we’re two teens in a debate round

#### They conceded voting aff doesn’t solve dalit violence but only provides a survival strategy and:

#### Focus on survival strategy stops collective resistance to oppression – survival is inherently privatized and feeds off the myth of the self interested individual surviving on their own which fails to create communal struggles key to overturn larger structures of oppression and is redeployed by conservative ideology to justify structural violence

Giroux 3 – McMaster University, Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies

(Henry A, Pedagogies of Difference, Race, and Representation: Film as a Site of Translation and Politics Pedagogies of Difference: Rethinking Education for Social Change, edited by Peter Pericles Trifonas, pg. 95-96)

Any attempt to address Baby Boy as a form of public pedagogy would have to analyze the largely privatized and individualized analysis that shapes this film and how it resonates with the ongoing privatization and depoliticization of the public sphere. As neoliberalism has gained momentum since the 1980s, one of its distinguishing features has been an assault on all those public spheres that are not regulated by the language of the market. Under the onslaught of neoliberal ideology and its tum toward free market as the basis for human interaction, there is an attempt to alter radically the very vocabulary we use in describing and appraising human interest, action, and behavior. Individuals are now defined largely as consumers, and self-interest appears to be the only factor capable of motivating people. Public spaces are increasingly displaced by commercial interests, and private utopias become the only way of understanding the meaning of the good life. It gets worse. As public life is emptied of its own separate concerns -importance of public goods, civic virtue, public debate, collective agency, and social provisions for the marginalized-it becomes increasingly more difficult to translate private concerns into public considerations. The Darwinian world of universal struggle pits individuals against each other while suggesting that the misfortunes and problems of others represent both a weakness of character and a social liability. Within such a system, the state gives up its obligations to provide collective safety nets for people and the ideology of going it alone furthers the myth that all social problems are the result of individual choices. Unfortunately, Baby Boy not only refuses to challenge the myth of individual motivation and pathology as the source of unemployment, violence, welfare dependency, bad housing, inadequate schools, and crumbling infrastructures, it actually reinforces this well rehearsed stable of conservative ideology. It does so by suggesting that collective problems can only be addressed as tales of individual survival, coming of age stories that chronicle either selfishness, laziness, and lack of maturity or individual perseverance. By suggesting that Jody 's life is colonized by the private, cut off from larger social, economic, and political issues, Baby Boy both renders hope private and suggests that communities in struggle can only share or be organized around the most private of intimacies, removed in large part from the capacity to struggle over broader issues. Dependency in this film is a dirty word, and seems to ignore the ways in which it resonates with right wing attacks on the welfare state and the alleged perils of big government. Granted, Baby Boy is supposedly about the refusal of immature African-American youth to grow up, but the film 's attack on dependency is so one-sided that it reinforces the myth that social safety nets simply weaken character, and it supports this ideology, in part, by refusing to acknowledge how dependency on the welfare state has worked for those millions for whom it has "made all the difference between wretched poverty and a decent life."41 Similarly, if Jody 's dreams are limited to the demands of the traditional family structure and the successes associated with the market ideology, there is no room in Baby Boy to recognize democracy, not the market, as a force of dissent and a relentless critique of institutions, as a source of civic engagement, or as a discourse for expanding and deepening the possibilities of critical citizenship and social transformation. In the end, Baby Boy fails to offer a space for translating how the private and public mutually inform each other; consequently, it reinforces rather than ruptures those racially oppressive trends in American society that disfigure the possibility of racial justice, democratic politics, and responsible citizenship.

#### Survival strategies rely on a false distinction between practical and strategic concerns

Escobar, PhD, 95

(Arturo, Anthropology@UNC, Encountering Development)

The reach of state policies vis-à-vis gender subordination is generating important debates among Latin American researchers. In discussing the Nicaraguan experience during the 1980s, Paola Pérez Alemán, for instance, distinguished among three kinds of situations: the incorporation of women ªinto the world of men,º say, in agrarian cooperatives or predominantly male peasant organizations; the organization of women along the lines of traditional gender roles (that is, in the sphere of ªreproductionº); and the creation of organizations, particularly in communal and educational areas, that allowed for greater questioning of traditional gender roles. Although the first two types may have been important in creating spaces for women to discuss their problems and share experiences as women, only in the third type of situation could practical gender interests (those directly linked to questions of survival and quality of life, in areas such as food, water, and health) and strategic gender interests (those derived speci®cally from gender subordination) be articulated (Pérez Alemán 1990). The distinction between practical and strategic gender interests, originating in the work of Maxine Molyneux (1986), although helpful at some levels, is also problematic. As Amy Lind (1992) maintains, implicit in this approach is the assumption that women's “basic needs” are separate from their “strategic needs,” and that a “practical” or a “survival strategy” cannot simultaneously be a political strategy that challenges the social order. This scenario also tends to assume that most poor women are concerned only with their “daily survival” and therefore have no strategic agenda beyond their immediate economic struggles. This type of analysis overlooks the critical contributions and challenges that organized poor women represent to the social order. Like Behar (earlier), Lind reminds us that poor women also negotiate power, construct collective identities, and develop critical perspectives on the world in which they live. Women's (and others') struggles to “put food in their mouths” might entail cultural struggles. In the 1990s, most feminists accept that the division between practical and strategic gender interests is not so easily perceived. Two new strategies are being pursued: to replace ªwomen in developmentº by ªgender in development º as the organizing principle for women's efforts within development; and to complement the productivist approaches that are in vogue with empowerment strategies. The ®rst goal re¯ects the continued assumption on the part of states that macroeconomic policies are gender neutral; it is intended to mainstream women's issues into the conception and design of economic policy as a wholeÐto push states into recognizing the real differences that exist between women and men as social subjects, and the need to consider the effect of macro policies on the sexual division of labor. The empowerment approach seeks ªto transform the terms under which women are linked to productive activities in such a way that the economic, social and cultural equality of their participation is insuredº (León 1993, 17). The result would be public policies with a gender perspective that does not subordinate empowerment to the goals of productivity. It is a question of making sure that biological differences cease to entail gender subordination. (186-7)

#### This frames their survival as contingent on winning or losing debate arguments - the ballot shouldn’t be a referendum on psychic violence – that makes debate impossible since the judge will inevitably have to attack one side – instead we should view debate as a constructive deliberative forum to come up with political strategies to fight oppression

#### They have a higher priority to prove solvency since they have to prove that the benefits of voting aff o/w not being topical

#### Dalit politics fractures resistance to patriarchy

Arya, PhD, 20

(Sunaina, Senior Research Fellow, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Dalit or Brahmanical Patriarchy? Rethinking Indian Feminism CASTE: A Global Journal on Social Exclusion Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 217–228 February 2020 ISSN 2639-4928)

Contemporary writings in Indian feminism pose some difficulties towards theorising gender. This paper argues that a conception of notions like ‘dalit patriarchy’ or ‘intracaste’ or ‘multiple’ patriarchies, is a consequence of a perfunctory understanding of the concept brahmanical patriarchy. Mulling around both the ideas offers a conclusion that mainstream Indian feminists’ approach toward gender justice is incomprehensive and uncommitted. Thus, it proposes to rethink Indian feminist discourse with specific focus on its socio-cultural difference from rest of the world. This implies that theorising from a dalit feminist standpoint is the only way to consummate feminist philosophy, specifically for the Indian subcontinent, and in general. Let us see, how. While thinking through various aspects of dalit reality, political theorist Gopal Guru reflected upon the patriarchal control over dalit women within their caste group which he vaguely called ‘dalit patriarchy’ (Guru, 1995, p. 2549). He was critical of the patriarchal norms and practices prevalent within the dalit community, while having no intentions of creating a major hurdle for dalit feminists today. In recent times, mainstream Indian feminists have furthered the concept and attempted to popularise it as a separate form of patriarchy free from the umbrella of brahmanical patriarchy. They suggest that dalit men, as a part of their exploitation by ‘upper’1 caste, also face taunts regarding their masculinity which results in their aggressive behaviour on dalit women (Chakravarti, 2013 [2003], p. 86; Geetha, 2009, p. 108). This is discussed in detail in the first section of the paper. The popularity of ‘dalit patriarchy’ is ever increasing in contemporary feminist scholarship. Lucinda Ramberg builds her perspective ‘upon the feminist anti-caste scholarship of Anjali Arondekar, Charu Gupta, Gail Omvedt, Shailaja Paik, Sharmila Rege, and Anupama Rao, who have described ‘untouchable’ womanhood as unfolding within two patriarchies—brahmanical and dalit’ (Ramberg, in Rao 2018). Kumkum Sangari titles her paper on religious diversity around ‘multiple patriarchies’ without any discussion or engagement with its meaning (1995 p. 3295). Not only mainstream Indian and western scholars but also dalit feminists are left unaffected by this category. Shailaja S. Paik recollects Ambedkar’s feminist movement: by ‘giving up castespecific, stigmatised dressing styles and heavy jewellery, dalit women asserted against both Brahmanical (caste and gender codes) as well as intracaste patriarchies’ (Paik, 2016; Tilak, 2018). Reviewing Dutt’s memoir, Coming Out as Dalit, Dhanaraj mentions ‘inter- and intra-caste patriarchies’ (Dhanaraj, 2019; Dutt, 2019). This high granting of such terms to be true is counterproductive for our feminist emancipatory goals. What we require is to think carefully upon such interventions for a comprehensive picture of the mode of patriarchy at play. We find two presumed phenomena related with the conceptualisation of dalit patriarchy. One, it is distinct from brahmanical patriarchy, and secondly, there exist multiple patriarchies. Chakravarti writes, ‘as Ambedkar had pointed to caste as a system of graded inequalities, we should note that patriarchies in the subcontinent were contained within a larger system which was graded according to caste’ (Chakravarti, 2013[2003], p. 83). Let us ponder upon the origin and definition of dalit patriarchy and observe whether it is actually ‘graded according to caste’.

#### Dalit politics is a form of standpoint theory

Arya, PhD, 20

(Sunaina, Senior Research Fellow, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Dalit or Brahmanical Patriarchy? Rethinking Indian Feminism CASTE: A Global Journal on Social Exclusion Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 217–228 February 2020 ISSN 2639-4928)

Any idea of gender justice bears no meaning if it does not entail justice for all; therefore, pioneers of black feminism Kimberle Crenshaw, Patricia Hill Collins, and others have democratised first-world feminism by adding ‘difference’ at its centre through intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989; Colloins, 1989). Originally, the difference has been conceived as a unique kind of discriminatory aspect which black women face due to their race-gender-class deprivations. Mainstream feminists of India accept this crucial concept of ‘difference’ and intersectionality, for their difference located in third-world and on race, but reject the same for internal differences within the subcontinent (Menon, 2015). Rege offers a critique of this difference from a dalit feminist standpoint position, arguing that it is incomplete without an addition of difference from the aspect of caste (Rege, 1998, p. WS39-WS46). Thus, it is evident that democratising Indian feminism demands theorising from a dalit perspective. The difference, thus formulated, is the unique discriminatory aspect which dalit women face at the intersection of their caste-class-gender deprivations, which as the author calls ‘dalit difference.’ Placing dalit difference at the core of feminist thought helps us consummate feminist philosophy, as it does not contradict with the rights and interests of other, privileged people. Dalit feminism is not the feminism of the dalits, or for the dalits; it is simply a standpoint which regards the caste question at its heart, to address the brahmanical nature of patriarchy peculiar to India. There is abundant scholarship to help us develop a dalit feminist thought (Guru, 1995; Rege, 1998, 2000, 2013 [2006], 2013; Ambedkar, 2003; Rajan, 1999; Aloysius, Mangubhai and Lee, 2006; Jogdand, 2013; Patil, 2013; Rege et al, 2013; Pawar and Moon, 2014; Gopal, 2015; John, 2015; Mahadevan, 2015; Paik, 2016). Importantly, it is required to be cognizant of, and overcome, some challenges. Challenges for a Theory of Gender Established critiques of Indian feminism call forth our attention to the questions of authenticity and representation. There is an anxious churning to interview, study, and translate dalit women’s life-stories to produce literature to the credits of savarna women as representatives (Rege, 2013 [2006], pp.11-121). Mainstream Indian feminists have been exploiting dalit women’s vulnerability to add to their own privileges, and such risks are indispensable in developing a theory of gender. Julie Stephens argues that ‘[i]f anyone is actually ‘speaking out’, it is the interviewer, yet the feminist discourse repeatedly insists that it ‘does not speak for’ them (Stephens, 1994, p. 97). Rege mentions two models for the ‘inclusion’ of dalit women in any discipline’s curricula—(i) ‘feminist-as-tourist’ suggesting ‘add dalit women and stir’; and, (ii) ‘feminist-as-explorer’ to ‘add dalit women as separate and equal’ (Mohanty, 2003, 244). That is, the –tourist model performs a ‘cognizant saviour feminist’ enlightening the ‘helpless dalit women’; the –explorer model pretends to treat them ‘equally’ while justifying their separation on cultural differences. This power-play is commonly observed in contemporary feminist writings in India, which we must discourage.

#### Making all arguments embodied results in masking not liberation

Mohanty, PhD, 03

(Chandra, GenderStudies@Syracuse , Feminism without Borders )

Barkley Brown draws attention to the centrality of experience in the classroom. While this is an issue that merits much more consideration than 1 can give here, a particular aspect of it ties into my general argument. Feminist pedagogy has always recognized the importance of experience in the classroom. Since women's and ethnic studies programs are fundamentally grounded in political and collective questions of power and inequality, questions of the politicization of individuals along race, gender, class, and sexual parameters are at the very center of knowledges produced in the classroom. This politicization often involves the "authorization" of marginal experiences and the creation of spaces for multiple, dissenting voices in the classroom. The authorization of experience is thus a crucial form of empowerment for students – a way for them to enter the classroom as speaking subjects. However, this focus on the centrality of experience can also lead to exclusions; it often silences those whose “experience” is seen to be that of the ruling-class groups. This more-authentic-than-thou attitude to experience also applies to the teacher. For instance, in speaking about Third World peoples, I have to watch constantly the tendency to speak "for" Third World peoples. For 1 often come to embody the "authentic" authority and experience for many of my students; indeed, they construct me as a native informant in the same way that left-liberal white students sometimes construct all people of color as the authentic voices of their people. This is evident in the classroom when the specific "differences" (of personality, posture, behavior, etc.) of one woman of color stand in for the difference of the whole collective, and a collective voice is assumed in place of an individual voice. In effect, this results in the reduction or averaging of Third World peoples in terms of individual personality characteristics: complex ethical and political issues are glossed over, and an ambiguous and more easily manageable ethos of the “personal” and the “interpersonal” takes their place. Thus a particularly problematic effect of certain pedagogical codifications of difference is the conceptualization of race and gender in terms of personal or individual experience. Students often end up determining that they have to “be more sensitive” to Third World peoples. The formulation of knowledge and politics through these individualistic, attitudinal parameters indicates an erasure of the very politics of knowledge involved in teaching and learning about difference. It also suggests an erasure of the structural and institutional parameters of what it means to understand difference in historical terms. If all conflict in the classroom is seen and understood in personal terms, it leads to a comfortable set of oppositions; people of color as the central voices and the bearers of all knowledge in class, and white people as ‘observers’ with no responsibility to contribute and/or nothing valuable to contribute. In other words, white students are constructed as marginal observers and students of color as the real “knowers” in such a liberal or left classroom. While it may seem like people of color are thus granted voice and agency in the classroom, it is necessary to consider what particular kind of voice it is that is allowed them/us. It is a voice located in a different and separate space from the agency of white students. Thus, while it appears that in such a class the histories and cultures of marginalized peoples are now “legitimate” objects of study and discussion, the fact is that this legitimation takes place purely at an attitudinal, interpersonal level rather than in terms of a fundamental challenge to hegemonic knowledge and history. Often the culture in such a class vacillates between a high level of tension and an overwhelming desire to create harmony, acceptance of “difference,” and cordial relations in the classroom. Potentially this implicitly binary construction (Third World students vs. white students) undermines the understanding of complication that students must take seriously in order to understand "difference" as historical and relational. Coimplication refers to the idea that all of us (First and Third World) share certain histories as well as certain responsibilities: ideologies of race define both white and black peoples, just as gender ideologies define both women and men. Thus, while "experience" is an enabling focus in the classroom, unless it is explicitly understood as historical, contingent, and the result of interpretation, it can coagulate into frozen, binary, psychologistic positions.53 To summarize, this effective separation of white students from Third World students in such an explicitly politicized women's studies classroom is problematic because it leads to an attitudinal engagement that bypasses the complexly situated politics of knowledge and potentially shores up a particular individual-oriented codification and commodification of race. It implicitly draws on and sustains a discourse of cultural pluralism, or what Henry Giroux (1988) calls "the pedagogy of normative pluralism" (95), a pedagogy in which we all occupy separate, different, and equally valuable places and where experience is defined not in terms of individual qua individual, but in terms of an individual as representative of a cultural group. This results in a depoliticization and dehistoricization of the idea of culture and makes possible the implicit management of race in the name of cooperation and harmony. (202-4)

#### This turn outweighs the case- voting affirmative only creates *privileged marginals*

John **Champagne** Associate Professor of English Ph.D. English, Critical and Cultural Studies, University of Pittsburgh M.A. Cinema Studies, New York University The Ethics of Marginality A New Approach to Gay Studies 19**95**

As might be expected, given my approving citation of Joan Scott’s work in the previous chapter, I am extremely wary of the recent tendency in gay and lesbian studies to deploy largely untheorized notions of autobiography and expcricnce. I am particularly suspicious of the eagerness with which the liberal academy has lent its benevolent ear to our stories as of late. Replacing the psychiatrist’s couch with, for example, the podium at an academic conference or the pages of a dissertation seems to leave too much the same.1 I am less certain than some of my colleagues that the casting of ourselves as an object of knowledge for the disciplines of English or film studies is necessarily a gain, political or otherwise. The rapidity with which “queerness” in particular **has become grist for the academic mill**—evidenced, for example, in the current plethora of “queer” panels and papers at the recent annual meetings of both the Modern Language Association and the Society for Cinema Studies—should at the very least invite us to examine the facility with which the academy manages to **interpolate allegedly oppositional cultural practices**.2 In the wake of the work of such theorists as Foucault and Derrida, it is difficult to cling to the idealist precept that knowledge (in this particular instance, knowledge of the Other) is simply made available by the academy for an unproblematic and disinterested use, benevolent or otherwise, even under the guise of the “appreciation” of difference. Add to this questions of the relationship between the humanities and broader political and economic concerns, and it becomes increasingly impossible to maintain a happy outlook concerning the liberal academy’s continued pursuit of knowledge of the Other.3 Additionally, in the current historical moment, practitioners of gay and lesbian studies seems particularly **vulnerable to being seduced by the academic star system**. The relative newness of the discipline, combined with the liberal academy’s desperate attempts to **contain the threat of difference by** creating and celebrating privileged marginals, has allowed a handful of highly visible scholars in the field to claim their place in the academic pantheon. Unfortunately, as mighr be expected, the logic of scarcity still prevails, suggesting that the discipline will tolerate only a certain small number of scholars in the field. Although most universities claim, falsely or otherwise, to have nothing like the financial resources necessary to begin programs in gay and lesbian studies in these times of programmatic cutbacks, there are already rumors of an impending turf war between various factions in the emerging discipline. Autobiographical narratives in particular unfortunately make possible, given both this current state of academic affairs as well as U.S. culture’s fantasies concerning the lures and powers of the individual personality, a kind of **fetishization** of the gay and lesbian academic body.4 They might unwittingly contribute to the continued production of gay and lesbian subjects as marginalized by privileging the personal experiences of only a handful of the **chosen few**. As Spivak might have it, this placing of token gay and lesbian subjects within the academic star system necessarily **obscures the shifting differences and distinctions between representation as proxy and representation as portrait**, the gay academic representing, in both his corporeal body and the body of his work, an image that is perhaps unwittingly but necessarily also a politically and economically interested proxy.5 Gay academic stars perhaps roo readily **stand in** for the interests of an often unspecified otherness (or, rather, an otherness specified exclusively by sexual orientation), an otherness that, if more carefully plotted, would necessarily be crossed by competing interests of class, gender. and racc, to name only the most obvious. The token presence of highly visible gay and lesbian scholars **might obscure the question of in whose politi cal interests they speak** when they claim to be speaking as gay and lesbian.6 Thirdly, for reasons outlined in the preceding chapter, I am uncomfortable with the continued reliance by identity politics on a **strategy of visibility,** a strategy that sometimes privileges experiential, testimonial accounts of oppression over intellectual interrogations of positioning, and that **seems particularly susceptible to being embraced by the most recent wave of antiintellectual, antitheorctical academicians.** The continued holding of the body of “experience” over the head of “theory,” as if experience were some kind of self-evident answer to the difficult questions posed by poststructuralism, particularly around questions of identity, agency, and the political, is a strategy shared {although shared unevenly) by certain academic critics on the Left as well as the Right. I would only want to add here that such testimonial accounts necessarily rely for their political force on an **unproblematized conflation of the two senses of representation**, a conflation of which Spivak reminds us to be wary. The testimonial necessarily stands in for an experience of oppression “larger” than the individual, the native informant acting as the vocal and visible representative of the (largely silent, largely invisible) collective. **The testimonial is thus an individual and privileged representation of experience** (portrait) that works to represent (by proxy) the political interests of the group to which the informant claims to belong. This seems a fairly apt description of, say, a work like Riggs’s Tongues Untied. Although it is impossible to separate cleanly and finally these two senses of representation, it is perhaps possible to be (scrupulously) ethically attuned to the problematics engaged in the act of representing. As I have suggested in previous chapters, perhaps only a continuously unfolding deconstruction of one’s privileged position as native informant might complicate and undercut the claims of one’s own experiential account of oppression (representation as portrait} to represent adequately (as proxy) the interests of the Other.

#### They’ve wildly misread their Rege evidence- it isn’t an argument to “soil” the academy, its an article arguing academics must dirty their hands by getting involved in democratic politics -they vote neg on framework

Re-underlining of their card -which is the conclusion

**Rege 7** [Rege, Sharmila. "Dalit Studies as Pedagogical Practice: Claiming More Than Just a ‘Little Place’in the Academia." Review of Development and Change 12.1 (2007): 1-33. ]

In putting together learning and teaching materials from dalit collective action for interpretative and political engagement with caste, I am making a case for dalit studies as Phule's Tritya Ratna {third eye) - a medium for interrogating misrecognition of the social world perpetuated by the dominant The practices of such a dalit studies must move within and across disciplines, back and forth between assumptions of theory, institutional spaces in the academy and democratic struggles outside it. On this matter, there are several notes to be shared with feminist comrades in the academy for both dalit and feminist studies have emerged through an interrogation of the canonical opposition between 'scholarship' and 'commitment'. However, like all inheritances, much about this inherited relationship has come to be assumed and discussions on the matter are but few. We need more of loud thinking and sharing on the relationship between researchers and social movements and intellectuals and the academy. How may intellectuals in their pedagogical practices reinvent their relation to the dalit movement in ways that move beyond relations of instrumentality or fusion? How may scholars guard against a scholastic bias but also a bias of 'campus radicalism' that confuses the things of logic for the logic of things? Dalit studies as pedagogical practice has to encounter these questions in producing instruments both for defence against the symbolic domination of the academy as also for a merciless critique of its concepts, metaphors and modes ofreasoning. For at stake, is no longer just a space in the brahman galli, or an 'expert view' in the neo-liberal corridors of power but claims to 'universalising the conditions of access to the universal. 62

Footnote 62

This phrase and several ideas in developing the conclusion are influenced by

Pierre Bourdieu, Against the Tyranny of the Market.

“Against the Tyranny of the Market” is a famous book arguing for rebuilding the welfare state

“In his most explicitly political work to date, Pierre Bourdieu, speaks out against the dismantling of public welfare in the name of private enterprise and global competitiveness.” <https://books.google.com/books/about/Acts_of_Resistance.html?id=7s5qQgAACAAJ&source=kp_book_description>

#### This is offense- Severing Dalit testimonials from politics collapses into sentimentalism

**Rege 7** [Rege, Sharmila. "Dalit Studies as Pedagogical Practice: Claiming More Than Just a ‘Little Place’in the Academia." Review of Development and Change 12.1 (2007): 1-33. ]

Dalit testimonios as historical narratives of experience counter the conveniently more popular readings of caste derived from 'talking with Brahmans' and views from 'top to down' that structure the social science curricula. However, reading dalit 'autobiographies' minus the political ideology and practices of the dalit movement does stand the risk of making a spectacle of dalit suffering and p-'ain for non-dalit reader