# ML – T-FW File

## FW vs K

#### A. Interpretation: The affirmative may only defend that WTO members ought to reduce IPs

**Resolved reflects policy passage before a legislative body.** **Parcher** **01**

(Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, <http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html>)

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constituent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision.  (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### Reduce means a net decrease

Public Law 87-253

(Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, 97th US Congress, Sept 8, 1982, Lexis)

E) Prior to approving any application for a refund, the Secretary shall require evidence that such reduction in market- ings has taken place and that such reduction is a net decrease in marketings of milk and has not been offset by expansion of production in other production facilities in which the person has an interest or by transfer of partial interest in the produc- tion facility or by the taking of any other action. which is a scheme or device to qualify for payment.

#### A. Medicine refers to substances only.

Kurrer 21 [Christian Kurrer, Policy Analyst at European Parliament. "Medicines and Medical Devices," European Parliament, 05-2021, accessed 9-2-2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/50/medicines-and-medical-devices] HWIC

A. General rules on medicines

A medicinal product (medicine) is a substance or combination of substances that is used for the treatment or prevention of diseases in human beings. With the aim of safeguarding public health, the market authorisation, classification and labelling of medicines has been regulated in the EU since 1965. The evaluation of medicines has been centralised through the European Medicines Agency (EMA) since its creation in 1993 and a centralised authorisation procedure was put in place in 1995 to guarantee the highest level of public health and to secure the availability of medicinal products. The main pieces of legislation in this area are Directive 2001/83/EC[[1]](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/50/medicines-and-medical-devices" \l "_ftn1) and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004[[2]](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/50/medicines-and-medical-devices" \l "_ftn2), which lay down the rules for establishing centralised and decentralised procedures.

#### Violation: They don’t meet because they read embracing the lack and the death drive

#### B. Fairness –

#### 1. Debate is a game – tournament results and ballot prove. Other impacts like political activism or education can be pursued in other arenas. Fairness is unique to debate, that makes it the most important impact.

#### 2. Not defending the topic is unfair –

#### a) Predictability –

#### Altering the topic gives the aff a huge edge, they can prepare for half a year on an issue that catches us by surprise. Preparation is better than thinking on your feet – research demonstrates pedagogical humility and research skills are the only portable debate training.

#### b) Limits –

#### There are a finite amount of government restrictions, but an infinite number of non topical affs. Consider this our “library disad”- not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months.

#### c) Causality –

#### Debating the resolution forces the affirmative to defend a cause and effect relationship, the state doing x results in y. Non topical affs establish their own barometer “I think x is good for me” that aren’t negateable. Only the neg promotes switch side debate.

#### d) Exclusionary rule –

#### You can’t vote on the case outweighs T because lack of preparation prevents rigorous testing of the AC claims and inflates the credence of their arguments. If we win fairness we don’t have to “outweigh” other impacts

#### C. Engagement –

#### Aff’s interp destroys engagement – predictable stasis point research accessibility and neg ground. Even if public policy isn’t the best focus for activism, it’s crucial for dialogue because it’s grounded in consistent reporting and academic work.

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#### Two impacts –

#### a) Changing the topic post facto structurally favors the aff by manipulating balance of prep – vote neg because debate is a competitive game that’s meaningless without substantive constraints.

#### b) Their model creates a structural disincentive to substantial research. Failure to defend the actor and mechanism of the resolution allows them to shift their advocacy to the terms most favorable to them – causes dogmatism and forces the neg into generics at the margins of the literature – destroys good scholarship.

#### Drop the debater on T – their model ensures that the round is skewed from the beginning because their advocacy prevents me from generating 1NC offense.

#### Theory is competing interpretations – reasonability encourages arbitrary judge intervention and debaters playing to a particular judge’s questionable preferences

#### D. Debate inevitably involves exclusions on content—making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits. This process outweighs the content of the aff.

Amanda ANDERSON 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor for the Humanities at Brown University [*The Way We Argue Now*, Princeton University Press, p. 25-28]

Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any substantive normative guidance is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics through appeal to the principles of respect and reciprocity that he claims are inherent in linguistic practices geared toward reaching understanding. Attempting to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of both the Frankfurt School and poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the powerful instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life.” The potential he refers to is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language.” 7 Habermas acknowledges the dominance and reach of instrumental reason—his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the historical conditions and social effects of that dominance—yet at the same time he wishes to retrieve an emancipatory model of communicative [END PAGE 25] reason derived from a linguistic understanding of intersubjective relations. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29). Habermas has famously argued that he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible; he insists instead that we view the normative constraints of the ideal speech community as “universal pragmatic presuppositions” of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. Benhabib, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by promoting a “historically self-conscious universalism” that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (SS, 30). Benhabib’s work thus constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of specific potentialities of modernity. She differs from him in two key respects, besides the emphasis already outlined. First, she believes that Habermas’s emphasis on consensus seriously distorts his account of communicative ethics. Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus, Benhabib champions instead a discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going: When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing moral conversation, we begin to ask not what all would or could agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible, but what would be allowed and perhaps even necessary from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of the moral conversation among us. The emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue. (SS, 38)8 [END PAGE 26] The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for Benhabib undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly opposes any ethics or politics that privileges the unencumbered or detached self over the concrete, embodied, situated self. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”: Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans, without endorsing all these pluralities and differences as morally and politically valid. While agreeing that normative disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are constituents, that is, necessary conditions of the moral standpoint, interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection and action. In this sense, “universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied and embedded identity, but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a point of view acceptable to all. Universality is not the ideal consensus of fictitiously defined selves, but the concrete process in politics and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. (SS, 153) This passage encapsulates the core of Benhabib’s position, which attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism as traditionally understood. On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm, enabling crucial distinctions between those notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and embedded” and promotes encounters with otherness so as to nurture the development of a moral attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.” Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “all” here cannot coherently include those who have, according to universalism’s own principles, forfeited their place as equal participants in the ethicopolitical [END PAGE 27] community. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s redefinition of universalism insists on inevitable exclusion, but not in the sense that many poststructuralist and postmodernist cultural critics do, as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality. Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness and plurality, which ultimately prove self-undermining in their toleration of communities, individuals, and practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices.

#### E. Aff cedes the political –outright rejection of hegemonic practices means the aff fails, coalitions break down, and hawks seize the political – only engagement solves

**Mouffe 2009**

(Chantal Mouffe is Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, “The Importance of Engaging the State”, *What is Radical Politics Today?*, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pp. 233-7)

The way we envisage social criticism has very important consequences for radical politics. Radical politics today is often characterised in terms of desertion, exodus and refusal to engage with existing institutions. Whereas I believe that radical politics should instead be concerned with building political engagement, through developing competing, antagonistic political claims. My aim here is to highlight the main differences between these two characterisations. The first could roughly be described as ‘critique as withdrawal’; the second as ‘critique as engagement’. I will argue that, ultimately, the problem with the form of radical politics advocated by ‘critique as withdrawal’ is that it has a flawed understanding of the very nature of ‘the political’ itself. Critique as withdrawal The model of social criticism and radical politics put forward by Michel Hardt and Antonio Negri in their books Empire (2000) and Multitude (2004) is a good illustration of ‘critique as withdrawal’. Empire is often referred to as the Communist manifesto for the twenty-first century in academic and activist conferences. In this book, the authors call for a total break with modernity and the elaboration of a postmodern approach. In their view such a break is required because of the crucial transformations of globalisation and the subsequent workers’ struggle experienced by our society during the last decades of the twentieth century. According to Hardt and Negri, these transformations can be broadly summarised in the following way: 1. Sovereignty has taken a new form: there is a new global sovereignty, which Hardt and Negri call ‘Empire’. They argue that this Empire is a new imperialism that replaces the attempt by nation states to extend their own sovereignty beyond their borders. In contrast to old-style imperialism, the current Empire has no territorial centre of power and no fixed boundaries; it is decentred and deterritorialised, progressively incorporating the entire global realm with open, expanding frontiers. 2. This transformation corresponds, they say, to the transformation of the capitalist mode of production. The role of industrial factory labour has been reduced. Priority is instead given to communicative, cooperative and affective labour. In the postmodernisation of the global economy, the creation of wealth tends towards regulating and mediating life itself. It permeates every aspect of our life. The scope of the rule of Empire is social life in its entirety. All aspects of our life are controlled – from the way we work and exchange ideas across international borders, through to how we think about our body image. 3. We are witnessing the passage from a ‘disciplinary society’ to a ‘society of control’ characterised by a new paradigm of power. In the disciplinary society, which corresponds to the first phase of capitalist accumulation, command is constructed through diffuse networks of apparatus. These produce and regulate customs, habits and productive practices with the help of disciplinary institutions like prisons, factories, asylums, hospitals, schools and others. The society of control, in contrast, is a society in which mechanisms of command are less obvious. The society of control is dominated by the many mechanisms of the globalised, postmodern capitalist society, which seek to directly organise the brain and body (from the internet, through to complex global systems of trade). What is directly at stake is the regulation of life itself. This is what they call ‘biopower’. 4. Hardt and Negri produce new terms to help explain this situation. These are ‘mass intellectuality’, ‘immaterial labor’ and ‘general intellect’. The central role previously occupied by the labour-power of mass factory workers in the production of surplus-value is today said to be increasingly filled by intellectual, immaterial and communicative labour-power. For Hardt and Negri, the figure of immaterial labour involved in communication, cooperation and the reproduction of affects occupies an increasingly central position in the schema of capitalist production. 5. A new term is needed to refer to this collective worker that Hardt and Negri call the ‘Multitude’. They believe that the transition to Empire – where territorial state sovereignty is less important – has opened up new possibilities for the liberation of this Multitude. The Multitude have shaped a new form of globalisation, which means that previous systems and structures of exploitation and control, such as the state, are no longer needed. This is why their book Empire is so often referred to as the Communist manifesto of the twenty-first century. According to this manifesto, the creative forces of the Multitude are capable of constructing a counter-empire, of overthrowing the state apparatus of control. The present systems of control are no longer necessary. An alternative political organisation of the global flows of exchange now dominates in this era of globalisation. We can, therefore, get rid of territorial sovereignty because it only serves to oppress our creativity. Hardt and Negri therefore clearly illustrate what I previously called, in my introduction to this chapter, ‘critique as withdrawal’: a refusal to engage with existing institutions. At this point it is worth introducing the work of Paolo Virno to complement the picture. Virno’s analyses in his book Grammar of the Multitude (2004) dovetail in many respects with those of Hardt and Negri. But there are also some significant differences. For instance, he is much less sanguine about the future. While Hardt and Negri have a messianic vision of the role of the Multitude, which will necessarily bring down Empire and establish an ‘Absolute Democracy’, Virno does not. For Virno, the present conditions are not right for a communist future. It is unlikely that the sort of ‘Absolute Democracy’ that Hardt and Negri envisage will actually take place. Instead of seeing the generalisation of immaterial labour as a type of ‘spontaneous communism’ like Hardt and Negri, Virno tends to see post-Fordism as a manifestation of the ‘communism of capital’. Under post-Fordism, consumers pursue different goals, with services responding accordingly. This means that today, for Virno, capitalistic initiatives orchestrate material and cultural conditions for their own benefit. And the role of political action should be to create a sphere of common affairs – which he calls the ‘Republic of the Multitude’ – to challenge this situation. Virno proposes two key terms to describe the type of political action which he thinks is necessary. These are ‘exodus’ and ‘civil disobedience’. And for me, they again illustrate what I call ‘critique as withdrawal’: something which is an important and influential trend in radical politics today because exodus advocates mass defection from the state. This requires the development of a non-state public sphere and a radically new type of democracy. It involves experimenting in new forms of nonrepresentative and extra-parliamentary democracy, organised around leagues, councils and soviets. The Multitude never aspire to transform themselves into a majority. They develop a power that refuses to become government. This is why, according to Virno, civil disobedience needs to be emancipated from the liberal tradition. He does not just want to ignore specific laws if they do not conform to the principles of a given territorial constitution or state. For Virno, like Hardt and Negri, radical disobedience goes much further – it puts the existence of the state itself in question. In both Hardt and Negri, and Virno, there is therefore emphasis upon ‘critique as withdrawal’. They all call for the development of a non-state public sphere. They call for self-organisation, experimentation, non-representative and extra-parliamentary politics. They see forms of traditional representative politics as inherently oppressive. So they do not seek to engage with them, in order to challenge them. They seek to get rid of them altogether. This disengagement is, for such influential personalities in radical politics today, the key to every political position in the world. The Multitude must recognise imperial sovereignty itself as the enemy and discover adequate means of subverting its power. Whereas in the disciplinary era I spoke about earlier, sabotage was the fundamental form of political resistance, these authors claim that, today, it should be desertion. It is indeed through desertion, through the evacuation of the places of power, that they think that battles against Empire might be won. Desertion and exodus are, for these important thinkers, a powerful form of class struggle against imperial postmodernity. According to Hardt and Negri, and Virno, radical politics in the past was dominated by the notion of ‘the people’. This was, according to them, a unity, acting with one will. And this unity is linked to the existence of the state. The Multitude, on the contrary, shuns political unity. It is not representable because it is an active self-organising agent that can never achieve the status of a juridical personage. It can never converge in a general will, because the present globalisation of capital and workers’ struggles will not permit this. It is anti-state and anti-popular. Hardt and Negri claim that the Multitude cannot be conceived any more in terms of a sovereign authority that is representative of the people. They therefore argue that new forms of politics, which are non-representative, are needed. They advocate a withdrawal from existing institutions. This is something which characterises much of radical politics today. The emphasis is not upon challenging the state. Radical politics today is often characterised by a mood, a sense and a feeling, that the state itself is inherently the problem. Critique as engagement I will now turn to presenting the way I envisage the form of social criticism best suited to radical politics today. I agree with Hardt and Negri that it is important to understand the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. But I consider that the dynamics of this transition is better apprehended within the framework of the approach outlined in the book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). What I want to stress is that many factors have contributed to this transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, and that it is necessary to recognise its complex nature. My problem with Hardt and Negri’s view is that, by putting so much emphasis on the workers’ struggles, they tend to see this transition as if it was driven by one single logic: the workers’ resistance to the forces of capitalism in the post-Fordist era. They put too much emphasis upon immaterial labour. In their view, capitalism can only be reactive and they refuse to accept the creative role played both by capital and by labour. To put it another way, they deny the positive role of political struggle. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics we use the word ‘hegemony’ to describe the way in which meaning is given to institutions or practices: for example, the way in which a given institution or practice is defined as ‘oppressive to women’, ‘racist’ or ‘environmentally destructive’. We also point out that every hegemonic order is therefore susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices – feminist, anti-racist, environmentalist, for example. This is illustrated by the plethora of new social movements which presently exist in radical politics today (Christian, anti-war, counter-globalisation, Muslim, and so on). Clearly not all of these are workers’ struggles. In their various ways they have nevertheless attempted to influence and have influenced a new hegemonic order. This means that when we talk about ‘the political’, we do not lose sight of the ever present possibility of heterogeneity and antagonism within society. There are many different ways of being antagonistic to a dominant order in a heterogeneous society – it need not only refer to the workers’ struggles. I submit that it is necessary to introduce this hegemonic dimension when one envisages the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. This means abandoning the view that a single logic (workers’ struggles) is at work in the evolution of the work process; as well as acknowledging the pro-active role played by capital. In order to do this we can find interesting insights in the work of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello who, in their book The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005), bring to light the way in which capitalists manage to use the demands for autonomy of the new movements that developed in the 1960s, harnessing them in the development of the post-Fordist networked economy and transforming them into new forms of control. They use the term ‘artistic critique’ to refer to how the strategies of the counter-culture (the search for authenticity, the ideal of selfmanagement and the anti-hierarchical exigency) were used to promote the conditions required by the new mode of capitalist regulation, replacing the disciplinary framework characteristic of the Fordist period. From my point of view, what is interesting in this approach is that it shows how an important dimension of the transition from Fordism to postFordism involves rearticulating existing discourses and practices in new ways. It allows us to visualise the transition from Fordism to postFordism in terms of a hegemonic intervention. To be sure, Boltanski and Chiapello never use this vocabulary, but their analysis is a clear example of what Gramsci called ‘hegemony through neutralisation’ or ‘passive revolution’. This refers to a situation where demands which challenge the hegemonic order are recuperated by the existing system, which is achieved by satisfying them in a way that neutralises their subversive potential. When we apprehend the transition from Fordism to postFordism within such a framework, we can understand it as a hegemonic move by capital to re-establish its leading role and restore its challenged legitimacy. We did not witness a revolution, in Marx’s sense of the term. Rather, there have been many different interventions, challenging dominant hegemonic practices. It is clear that, once we envisage social reality in terms of ‘hegemonic’ and ‘counter-hegemonic’ practices, radical politics is not about withdrawing completely from existing institutions. Rather, we have no other choice but to engage with hegemonic practices, in order to challenge them. This is crucial; otherwise we will be faced with a chaotic situation. Moreover, if we do not engage with and challenge the existing order, if we instead choose to simply escape the state completely, we leave the door open for others to take control of systems of authority and regulation. Indeed there are many historical (and not so historical) examples of this. When the Left shows little interest, Right-wing and authoritarian groups are only too happy to take over the state. The strategy of exodus could be seen as the reformulation of the idea of communism, as it was found in Marx. There are many points in common between the two perspectives. To be sure, for Hardt and Negri it is no longer the proletariat, but the Multitude which is the privileged political subject. But in both cases the state is seen as a monolithic apparatus of domination that cannot be transformed. It has to ‘wither away’ in order to leave room for a reconciled society beyond law, power and sovereignty. In reality, as I’ve already noted, others are often perfectly willing to take control. If my approach – supporting new social movements and counterhegemonic practices – has been called ‘post-Marxist’ by many, it is precisely because I have challenged the very possibility of such a reconciled society. To acknowledge the ever present possibility of antagonism to the existing order implies recognising that heterogeneity cannot be eliminated. As far as politics is concerned, this means the need to envisage it in terms of a hegemonic struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects attempting to incarnate the universal and to define the symbolic parameters of social life. A successful hegemony fixes the meaning of institutions and social practices and defines the ‘common sense’ through which a given conception of reality is established. However, such a result is always contingent, precarious and susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic interventions. Politics always takes place in a field criss-crossed by antagonisms. A properly political intervention is always one that engages with a certain aspect of the existing hegemony. It can never be merely oppositional or conceived as desertion, because it aims to challenge the existing order, so that it may reidentify and feel more comfortable with that order. Another important aspect of a hegemonic politics lies in establishing linkages between various demands (such as environmentalists, feminists, anti-racist groups), so as to transform them into claims that will challenge the existing structure of power relations. This is a further reason why critique involves engagement, rather than disengagement. It is clear that the different demands that exist in our societies are often in conflict with each other. This is why they need to be articulated politically, which obviously involves the creation of a collective will, a ‘we’. This, in turn, requires the determination of a ‘them’. This obvious and simple point is missed by the various advocates of the Multitude. For they seem to believe that the Multitude possesses a natural unity which does not need political articulation. Hardt and Negri see ‘the People’ as homogeneous and expressed in a unitary general will, rather than divided by different political conflicts. Counter-hegemonic practices, by contrast, do not eliminate differences. Rather, they are what could be called an ‘ensemble of differences’, all coming together, only at a given moment, against a common adversary. Such as when different groups from many backgrounds come together to protest against a war perpetuated by a state, or when environmentalists, feminists, anti-racists and others come together to challenge dominant models of development and progress. In these cases, the adversary cannot be defined in broad general terms like ‘Empire’, or for that matter ‘Capitalism’. It is instead contingent upon the particular circumstances in question – the specific states, international institutions or governmental practices that are to be challenged. Put another way, the construction of political demands is dependent upon the specific relations of power that need to be targeted and transformed, in order to create the conditions for a new hegemony. This is clearly not an exodus from politics. It is not ‘critique as withdrawal’, but ‘critique as engagement’. It is a ‘war of position’ that needs to be launched, often across a range of sites, involving the coming together of a range of interests. This can only be done by establishing links between social movements, political parties and trade unions, for example. The aim is to create a common bond and collective will, engaging with a wide range of sites, and often institutions, with the aim of transforming them. This, in my view, is how we should conceive the nature of radical politics.

## TVA

#### The aff is always already the TVA-there is no outside the state, so they are working within it

Smith 10 - Ph.D., co-founder of Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, UC Riverside Associate Professor

(Andrea Smith, Building Unlikely Alliances: An Interview with Andrea Smith, uppingtheanti.org/journal/article/10-building-unlikely-alliances-an-interview-with-andrea-smith/)

You’ve said that you saw the Obama election as a moment for social movements to build themselves. What are your thoughts about electoral politics and the role of the state in terms of the question of power? Until you have an alternative system, then there is no “outside” of the current system. I don’t think there is a pure place in which to work, so you can work in many places, including inside the state. I think there is no reason not to engage in electoral politics or any other thing. But it would probably be a lot more effective if, while we are doing that, we are also building alternatives. If we build the alternatives, we have movements to hold us accountable when we work within the system and we also have more negotiating power. It can actually be helpful. In terms of, say, state repression, if we have some critical people within the state then we might be able to do something about it. We might think about them as a way to relieve some of the pressure while trying to build the alternatives. I don’t think it is un-strategic to think about it like that. I am just not the kind of person who ever says, “never do ‘x’.” You always have to be open-minded and creative. It may not work out. You may get co-opted or something bad might happen. But if we really knew the correct way to do something we would have done it by now.

### K

#### Lacanian psychoanalysis dematerializes the body

**McNally**, Professor of Political Science at York University , 19**97**

(David, *Language, History, And Class Struggle* in In defense of history)

A further observation is perhaps necessary in this regard with respect to Jacques Lacan and his poststructuralist reading of psychoanalysis. Often, Lacan’s emphasis on the unconscious mind and its determinants is seen as representing a refusal of linguistic determinism. Yet, things are not so straightforward since Lacan offers up a linguistic interpretation of the unconscious. In so doing, he breaks sharply from the materialist impulse that in many respects represents Freud’s most radical and subversive side: his theory of bodily drives or instincts which seek pleasure. True, Freud saw t these instincts as socially mediated, as pliable and capable of a variety of ^ forms of expression. Nevertheless, Freud’s insistence that the human mind is a site in which bodily drives express themselves and come into conflict with social rules and conventions, stands removed from those traditions which see the realm of mind, language, and thought as an essentially self-sufficient one. For Freud, the unconscious is, among other things, a site where repressed bodily desires continue to express themselves. Much if not all of this is lost in Lacan’s claim that “the unconscious is structured like a language.” For what Lacan has done is largely to **dematerialize Freud’s theory**, to loosen its ties to the human body, and to reconstruct it on linguistic lines. When he describes human nature as “woven by effects in which is to be found the structure of language,” he is recasting Freud’s theory on the model of linguistics. As a result, language is severed from the human body and the socio-material practices in which people engage. Whatever Lacan’s intent, he puts us back in the prison-house where lan­guage speaks “through man.”7(30)

#### A return to sustainable humanism is necessary – psychic violence is sociological, not libidinal and trying to intervene psychologically causes elitist power grabs, which is why you should favor communism as an analytic for praxis based on an egalitarian social order.

Curtis 9 (Adam, documentary: Century of the Self) http://moresketchynotes.blogspot.com/2009/08/century-of-self-part-2-engineering-of.html //AD

But despite all his efforts, Greenson was unable to help Marilyn Monroe. On August 5th 1962 she committed suicide in her house. The suicide shocked many in the analytic community, including Anna Freud. And high profile figures in American life who had previously been enthusiasts for psychoanalysis now began to question why psychoanalysis had become so powerful in America. Was it really because it benefitted individuals or had it in fact become a form of constraint in the interests of social order. The critics included Monroe's ex-husband, Arthur Miller. Arthur Miller - Interview 1963: My argument with so much psychoanalysis these days is the preconception that suffering is a mistake, or a sign of weakness, or a sign even of illness. When in fact, possibly the greatest truths we know will have come out of people's suffering. That the problem is not to undo suffering or to wipe it off the face of the earth but to make it inform our lives, instead of trying to cure ourselves of it constantly and avoid it. And avoid anything but that lobotomized sense of what they call happiness. There's too much of an attempt it seems to me at controlling man rather than freeing him; of defining him rather than letting him go. And it's part of the whole ideology of this age which is power mad. At the same time an onslaught was launched on the way psychoanalysis was being used by business to control people. The first blow came with a bestseller, The Hidden Persuaders written by Vance Packard. It accused psychoanalysts of reducing the American people to emotional puppets whose only function is to keep mass production lines running. They did this by manipulating people's unconscious desires, to create longings for ever new brands and models. They had turned the population into unwilling participants in the system of planned obsolescence. The second blow came from an influential philosopher and social critic, Herbert Marcuse. He had been trained in psychoanalysis. Herbert Marcuse - Interviewed 1967: This is a childish application of psychoanalysis which does not take at all into consideration the very real political systematic waste of resources of technology and of the productive process. For example this planned obsolescence; for example the production of innumerable brands and gadgets who are in the last analysis always the same; the production of innumerable different models of automobiles; and this prosperity at the same time, consciously or unconsciously leads to a kind of schizophrenic existence. I believe that in this society an incredible quantity of aggressiveness and destructiveness is accumulated precisely because of the empty prosperity which then simply erupts. Marcuse's argument is not simply that psychoanalysis had been used for corrupt purposes, it was more fundamental. Marcuse said that the very idea that you needed to control people was wrong. Human beings did have inner emotional drives, but they were not inherently violent or evil. It was society that made these drives dangerous by repressing and distorting them. Anna Freud and her followers had increased that repression by trying to make people conform to society. In so doing, they made people more dangerous not less. Dr, Neil Smelser - Political theorist and psychoanalyst: Marcuse challenged that social world and he said that's a world that should not be adapted to. And in fact what the individual was adapting to was corrupt and evil and corrupting. In other words he switched the source of evil from inward conflict to the society itself. That the sickness in society lay at the society level not at the sickness of human beings in it. And if people did not challenge that then they were in fact submitting to evil.

#### Our critique independently outweighs the K - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause goes unquestioned. Farbod 15

( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)

Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6% per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800%.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85% of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50% of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1% will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80% of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return**.**

#### The alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only party organizing can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct chauvinist tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for global liberation.

Escalante, Philosophy @ UOregon, 18

[Alyson, M.A., is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/>] rVs

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing.

#### FW—The role of the ballot is to resist neoliberal ideology – filter negative arguments through an epistemological dismantling of neoliberalism.

HAY & ROSAMUND, PhDs, 2002 (Colin and Ben, Journal of European Public Policy Volume 9, Issue 2, 2002 p. 3-5)

The implicit supposition which seems to underlie much of the sceptical or second-wave literature seeking to expose the ‘myth’ or ‘delusion’ of globalisation, is that a rigorous empirical exercise in demystification will be sufficient to reverse the tide of ill-informed public policy made in the name of globalisation. Sadly, this has not proved to be the case. For **however convinced we might be by the empirical armoury mustered against the hyperglobalisation thesis** by the sceptics, their **rigorous empiricism leads them to fail adequately to consider the way in which globalisation comes to inform public policy-making.** **It is here,** we suggest, that **the discourse of globalisation** — and the discursive construction of the imperatives it is seen to conjure along with attendant fatalism about the possibilities for meaningful political agency — **must enter the analysis**. For, as the most cursory reflection on the issue of structure and agency reveals, **it is the ideas actors hold about the context in which they find themselves** rather than the context itself **which informs the way in which they behave** (Hay 1999a, forthcoming a). **This is no less true of policy makers and governments**. **Whether** the **globalisation** thesis **is ‘true’** or not **may matter far less than whether it is deemed to be true** (or, quite possibly, just useful) **by those employing it**. Consequently, **if the aim** of the sceptics **is to discredit the political appeal to dubious economic imperatives associated with globalisation**, then they might **we**ll **benefit from asking** themselves **why and under what conditions** politicians and **public officials invoke** external **economic constraints** in the first place. It is to this task that we direct our attentions in this paper. Yet at the outset a certain word of caution is perhaps required. For, even if we accept the potential causal role that ideas about globalisation might play in the structuration of political and economic outcomes, we may be in danger of narrowing the discursive field of our attentions at the outset. The ideas policy makers use to legitimate and/or to rationalise their behaviour should not simply be seen as more or less accurate reflections of the context they perceive (based on more or less complete information). Nor should discourses be understood as necessarily and exclusively ‘strategic’ (i.e. as relating to situations in which an actor’s employment of a discourse correlates directly to particular material interests). **Discourse matters** in at least two respects. **The way** in which **actors behave is not merely a reflection** of the degree of accuracy and completeness **of the information they possess**; **it is also** a reflection of **their normative orientation** towards their environment and potential future scenarios. Thus the constraints and/or opportunities which globalisation is held to imply might be understood (or misunderstood) in very similar ways in different (national) contexts. Yet such understanding are likely to provoke divergent responses from political actors with different normative orientations and diverse institutional contexts. Put simply, **though actors may share a** common **understanding of** the process of **globalisation, they may respond** very **differently to its** perceived **challenges and threats** **depending on whether one regards the future it promises in a positive or negative light** – witness the still ongoing debate within the governing SPD in Germany between supporters of Schröder and Lafontaine (see Lafontaine 1998; Lafontaine and Müller 1998; Schröder 1998; and for a commentary Jeffery and Handl 1999), or that in France between Bourdieu, Forrester and anti-globalisation groups like ATTAC on the one hand and social liberals within the Parti Socialiste on the other (see Bourdieu 1998; Boudieu and Wacquant 1999; Forrester 1999; and for a commentary Bouvet and Michel 1999; Meunier 2000). Within the European Commission, there is evidence to suggest that common understandings of globalisation can be quite consistent with distinct conceptions of the capacity to exercise meaningful agency as actors take up quite different ‘subject positions’ in relation to globalisation (Rosamond, 1999; 2000b). **It is important**, then, at the outset **that we consider the potential causal role of ideas about globalisation in the structuration of political and economic outcomes**.3 Our central argument is, we think, likely to prove controversial. It is simply stated, though its implications are more complex. Essentially, we suggest, **policy makers acting on the basis of assumptions consistent with the hyperglobalisation thesis may well serve**, in so doing, **to bring about outcomes consistent with that thesis, irrespective of its veracity and,** indeed, irrespective of its perceived veracity**.** This provocative suggestion with, if warranted, important implications, clearly requires some justification (see also Hay 1999b; Rosamond 1999, 2000b, 2000c). **Globalisation has become** a key referent of contemporary political discourse and, increasingly, **a lens through which policy-makers view the context in which they find themselves.** **If** we can assume that political actors have no more privileged vantage point from which to understand their environment than anyone else and — as most commentators would surely concede — that **one of the principal discourses through which that environment now comes to be understood is that of globalisation, then the content of such ideas is likely to affect significantly political dynamics.**

### Case:

#### On their ROB:

#### The CAP K explains what the nature of capitalism is and the evils is causes which comes before psychoanalysis since we have root cause

#### On Dean 17, this card doesn’t explain anything, psychoanalysis upholds and maintains the system of capitalism so it will never to be solved

#### Psychoanalysis has zero logical or empirical basis, can’t be scaled up, and totalizes the existence of the human condition in pseudoscientific terms

Robinson 8 [Andrew, political theorist and activist based in the UK Contemporary Political Theory. Avenel: Aug 2008. Vol. 7, Iss. 3; pg. 351, 7 pgs]

By his own admission, Stavrakakis does not provide blueprints (which is unsurprising), nor does he provide prescriptions, political direction or policy proposals (pp. 13-14, 30). This leaves the work of dubious relevance to people doing politics whether as activists, politicians or administrators. The aim is rather to argue for radical democracy as 'the institutionalization of a mechanism which enables the continuous re-articulation of the symbolic field constituting society' (p. 129). The author makes very broad claims about this function of democracy, which is 'the most pressing task' of politics (p. 60), the only way to ensure permanent creation of the new (p. 60) and the only legitimate form of hegemony (p. 256). The argumentation backing up these claims mostly amounts toassertion and exegesis. However, this is not simply a case for existing liberal democracies. Radical democracy is contrasted with existing democracies (pp. 255-256) and is taken to imply a change in the arrangement of jouissance . Instead of the fantasies pervasive today, typified by their blaming of the other for the incompleteness of the self, Stavrakakis proposes a passage to feminine jouissance that encircles the lack (pp. 22-23, 111, 144, 268, 278-279). Present democracies have been hit by an assault on the two pillars of modern democracy -- equality and liberty -- by the neoliberals and neoconservatives, respectively, leading to a 'post-political' world in which conflict is avoided and thus returns as social problems, and in which a new, almost pre-democratic despotism is taking shape (pp. 263-264). Despite this, democracy can still function as 'the mobilising force, the common denominator, for a politics of alternatives' (p. 258).

These political conclusions are dubious. Liberal democracies in fact tend to be quite closed to change and to be supplemented with aggressive nationalist and racist identities. The liberal state, like the authoritarian state, tends to essentialize itself as a form in such a way as to deny its own contingency. It is not clear that the radical democratic framework guarantees basic rights or prevents the state from making essentialist claims on others. Stavrakakis assumes that the democratic form itself directly achieves the goal of recognizing contingency (p. 141). Yet this cannot be the case, since as Stavrakakis admits, this form does not prevent actually existing democracies from being inflected with fantasmatic projects such as ultranationalism, or degenerating into a 'post-political' disavowal of conflict. Further, whichever party gets in power -- by majority will or procedural hitch -- is generally able to ignore intransigent realities, pursue its own fantasmatic actings-out and repress, foreclose, disavow or otherwise silence whatever forms of social otherness are not to its tastes. Beyond this, there is a fantasmatic frame of the liberal-democratic state that pits the permanent institutions such as the police, bureaucracy and secret service against semi-permanent Others, hence displacing real social antagonisms into narratives of 'crime', 'disorder', 'terrorism', 'madness', 'anarchy' and so on. Can this fundamental fantasy be traversed without shattering the frame of the 'democratic' state itself? One might also wonder if the 'politics of alternatives' has not already emerged -- and passed by entirely the radical democrats -- in the form of the anti-capitalist and anti-neoliberal movements.

The linking of Lacanian theory to liberal democracy seems just too convenient. One cannot but be reminded of the Soviet-era dissidents whose critiques of the existing regimes ended up reproducing them in their proposed alternatives -- hence operating as the fantasmatic supplement of the regimes themselves. Surely a full acceptance of social contingency would generate social relations radically different from those pertaining in a society where such acceptance has not occurred. Acceptance of contingency might, for instance, necessitate the elimination of punishment, which involves a fantasy frame blaming the other (the criminal) for social conflict and risk; it would instead require that risk be assumed by all social actors and not displaced into special 'exceptional' spaces. It would seem to imply that the state needs to be constrained from the outside by other institutions, that a social order where power is negotiated or contested among multiple institutions is better than one where a single site monopolizes the field of social power. Or maybe it would be better served by the fluidity of affinity and the looseness of custom than by the fixity of state and law. Perhaps the revival of activities inscribing agonism and difference emerge, not inside the state, but in societal relations, oppositional movements and everyday life.

While the Lacanianism of the title is self-explanatory, it raises another problem -- why the 'left' in 'Lacanian left'? Stavrakakis defines 'left' as meaning a democratic legitimation of antagonism and 'alternatives' (p. 30), a definition that begs the question, identifying the 'left' directly with Lacanianism. This is pretty much unrecognizable in relation to general usage, in which 'left' is generally associated with the welfare or self-assertion of the worst-off, and the prioritizing of substantive social issues over property, propriety and order. Is Lacanian theory really 'left' in this more usual sense? It is, on Stavrakakis's own admission, 'subversive' rather than 'revolutionary' (pp. 2, 158) and has a 'reformist direction' (p. 109). What this means in concrete terms is that the structural frame is taken as unchangeable but the elements within it can be reshuffled. 'Exclusion and antagonism may be unavoidable, but acknowledging this does not restrict our ability to influence their particular articulations, to displace continuously the limits they impose' (p. 226). Again in common with other 'radical democrats', Stavrakakis says little to reassure either the excluded or included of the present that they will not be the losers of such a reshuffling; it is unclear as to who will be excluded in this process, and indeed, if any one exclusion can be deemed ethically worse than any other. At best it is possible that the presently marginalized could come out on top from such reshuffling. However, this is not the main aim of Lacanian theory, which has more to do with the recognition of contingency, rejection of 'utopianism' and defence of liberal-democratic regimes -- of the 'situationness', or ordering as such, of society, along with its 'eventness' or the recurrence of radical acts (pp. 156-157). This leads to assertions of the need for hierarchical power. For instance, authority is taken as inevitable in all social situations; it is 'a frame presupposed in every social experience' (p. 173). 'Without someone in command reality disintegrates' (p. 174). Such an orientation has a long history, but it is a history of the right, not the left, associated particularly with anti-communist liberals such as Popper, Kolakowski and Berlin, and traceable to the classical liberalism of authors such as Jefferson, de Tocqueville and J.S. Mill, who viewed constitutionality, political pluralism and a competitive 'marketplace of ideas' as necessary to impede the totalitarian tendencies of any one perspective taken alone. Contingency, anti-utopianism, a humble acceptance of limits to knowledge and action, the primacy of lack in human experience, are all paralleled in this older tradition. <<<Continues next page>>>

The strengths and weaknesses of the text largely follow from the usefulness and limits of the perspective it provides. The Lacanian perspective, as a partial truth, certainly provides interesting insights and a different way of seeing, and as such often generates productive contributions. However, it fails drastically to understand the partiality of its own 'truth'. In Stavrakakis's words, lack can't be signified but it can be formalized (p. 279). In other words, a final map of the structure of reality can still, from this perspective, be drawn -- and has been drawn already by Lacan. In effect, the result is a claim to be the theoretical end of history -- all else is utopian, essentialist and so on. In many respects, the perspective is also reactive, defined by what it is against (anti-essentialist, anti-utopian, anti-fantasmatic). It is less clear what it is for -- although the idea of feminine jouissance begins the task of constructing a positive pole. Its relation to the other is very intolerant and dismissive. It is not open to other voices because it is always ready to judge the other as failing its own rigid internal criteria. It expresses a dangerous urge to drive the other out of the community of speakers, and perhaps out of existence altogether. The chapter on Castoriadis is symptomatic here. Castoriadis in many ways stands for the entire field of horizontalist radicalism -- horizontalists and immanentists (Stirner, Reich, Negri, Deleuze, Marcuse, various critics of Lacan) circle around the text like barbarians at the gates. The dispute between Lacanianism and horizontalism is a dispute the stakes of which Lacanians are reluctant to confront, instead hiding behind the view from one side -- 'they disagree with us, therefore they are wrong'. Except that 'wrong' is usually replaced by one of a number of theoretical epithets -- romantic, utopian, essentialist -- which sound superficially like useful categories of theory but which are never defined and which serve mainly as a name to call people who disagree with one or another basic Lacanian assumption. The impression is given that those who hold these perspectives are somehow naïve, intellectually disreputable or unrespectable, but this connoted claim is never demonstrated. It is simply a choice of one perspective over another, conveyed in loaded language. Like most of its ilk, this book does plenty to show what Lacanian theory does, how it 'works' as a theoretical machine or toolkit, but rather less to say why it should be preferred to other approaches (assuming, of course, that not wanting to be called names is insufficient reason to accept its validity). Lacanian theory suffers from an ontological and epistemological restrictiveness