### 1NC – T

#### Interp: Workers have certain employment rights endowed to them.

UK Government, ND

[UK Government: “Employment status,” no publication date. https://www.gov.uk/employment-status/worker]//AD

Employment rights

Workers are entitled to certain employment rights, including:

getting the National Minimum Wage

protection against unlawful deductions from wages

the statutory minimum level of paid holiday

the statutory minimum length of rest breaks

to not work more than 48 hours on average per week or to opt out of this right if they choose

protection against unlawful discrimination

protection for ‘whistleblowing’ - reporting wrongdoing in the workplace

to not be treated less favourably if they work part-time

#### Violations:

#### 1. No minimum wage – 1AC Fulcher

#### 2. Wage theft – 1AC Fulcher

#### 3. No rest breaks or paid leave – 1AC Eisen

#### 4. Involuntary servitude is allowed for prisoners.

Ourdocuments.gov, ND

[Government website: “Transcript of 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Abolition of Slavery (1865) ,” no publication date. [https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=40&page=transcript]//AD](https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=40&page=transcript%5d//AD)

AMENDMENT XIII

Section 1.

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2.

Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

#### Net benefits:

#### 1. Critical education – flattening the afterlives of slavery to work naturalizes the conditions of prisons – limiting this aff out specifically is a refusal to capitulate to liberal notions of work that include proto-slave labor. Outweighs all their offense because whiteness has a hold on our political imaginaries, which voting neg represents a decisive break from.

#### 2. Ground – no unifying core neg generics AND no reasonable answer to the “slavery shouldn’t exist” aff – you shouldn’t vote aff just because we have case defense – it is horrible to endorse a model of debate where students defend prisons.

#### Topicality must be a voting issue because it tells the neg what they do and don’t have to prepare – use competing interps because T is a yes/no question

### K

#### Their focus on prison labor, proven by HRW ’19 allowing prison labours to publicize their conditions, as a part of the prison industrial complex is a diversionary tactic that normalizes broader forms of population control utilized by neoliberal governments. This is not a semantic point – this mindset informs of how they view non-prison labor and replicates class based racism.

Ertel 15 - JACOB ERTEL Jacob Ertel is a graduate of Oberlin College (Oberlin), where he studied Political Economy. Ertel was an organizer for Students for a Free Palestine (SFP), an affiliate of Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), on the Oberlin campus. AUGUST 10, 2015 https://www.counterpunch.org/2015/08/10/do-we-need-to-rethink-the-prison-industrial-complex/

As a rhetorical tool, the notion of the PIC has been central in galvanizing public interest in the country’s astounding incarceration boom—and the 2.2 million people enveloped by it, over 60 percent of who are people of color—since the 1980s. In self-referentially positioning itself in relation to the more widely known ‘military-industrial complex,’ moreover, the PIC effectively calls attention to the state’s capacity to reproduce itself through a range of disciplinary institutions crucial to capitalism’s functioning. Though the PIC is useful in its ability to accessibly demonstrate the conjoined interests of capital and the state, some have argued that the term glosses over key historical, theoretical, and material conditions that can negatively affect our ability to understand the prison system and ultimately act against it. French sociologist Loïc Wacquant is among the most brazen of the term’s critics. Though Wacquant obnoxiously dismisses the PIC as an “activist myth,” various elements of his critique should merit our attention, if for no other reason than their provocatively counterintuitive framing. First and perhaps most surprisingly, Wacquant explains that only a miniscule percentage of incarcerated people actually work for private firms. In 2009, for example, only 0.3 percent of inmates nation-wide were employed by such companies. Even if this trend were to develop exponentially in the coming years, it would still fail to account for the fundamental features of the prison system, as no single economic sector relies principally or even significantly on prison labor, however disturbing this dynamic may be. Prisons likewise do not actually constitute a significant boon to the United States’ economy; in fact, inmates are generally employed at a net loss to the government (though their activity is heavily subsidized and regulated), and US corrections-based spending at local, municipal, and federal levels constitutes only a small fraction of the GDP. None of this is to discount the disturbing reality of private prisons. And the private prison industry is growing: Corrections Corporation of America’s profits alone have increased by 500 percent in the past twenty years, and the three largest private prison corporations have spent over $45 million combined in lobbying efforts, giving some credence to Critical Resistance’s explication of the PIC. Yet despite increasing profit margins and appalling moral bankruptcy, private prisons are hardly the norm, and they likely won’t be anytime soon. One must also wonder whether the specific demonization of the private prison industry implicitly naturalizes the much larger and much more encompassing public prison nexus in the United States, one which has grown 790 percent since 1980 and which is not immune from the grave abuses (sexualized violence, correctional officer misconduct, food rationing, etc.) frequently cited as byproducts of the private prison industry. Such an analysis can tend towards a conspiratorial view of history that, regardless of whether or not it ultimately rings true, misses the central dynamic undergirding state involvement vis-à-vis both institutions of social welfare and institutions of imprisonment, detention, and poverty under neoliberalism. Wacquant identifies such a dynamic in Punishing the Poor as a “paradox of neoliberal rationality” in which “the state stridently reasserts its responsibility, potency, and efficiency in the narrow register of crime management at the very moment when it proclaims and organizes its own impotence on the economic front, thereby revitalizing the twin historical-cum-scholarly myths of the efficient police and the free market.” This trend is illustrated by dramatically changing state expenses—for instance, by 1995 US corrections budget appropriations exceeded funding for public housing by a factor of three, resembling the inverse relationship of 1980 funding allocations. In other words, explains Wacquant, the prison system has over time become the United States’ largest public housing initiative for the poor. This reframing of the PIC thus positions the state in a slightly different light, portraying the heightened capacity for incarceration within a frankly more grotesque functionality. If, as opposed to the traditional PIC framing in which labor done in both private and public prisons is conceived as a major economic boon, Black labor (which alone disproportionally constitutes roughly 36 percent of the prison population) is even more ineluctably characterized as surplus labor under post-Fordism, then the state can simply endow itself with the power to hyper-criminalize without pretext in order to deal with those who both serve no use to the economy and frustrate the largely white middle class whose labor does provide such a benefit. The heightening of aggressive, ‘zero-tolerance’ policing functions associated with gentrification is case in point, as those who are shut out of the deteriorating welfare system and forced to turn to informal economies become even more vulnerable to warehousing or police brutality, thus aiding in the production of ‘renewed’ urban space for the gentrifying middle-class. These critiques of the contemporary framing of the ‘prison-industrial complex’ are not simply a practice in detached pseudo-intellectualization; they are important because they frame the role of Black labor to the US economy in a fundamentally different way, one that can be instructive for current struggles and movements. Rather than assuming that the hyper-exploited production process occurring in prisons is central to the growth of the economy and the private corporations that contribute to it, for example, perhaps it is worthwhile to consider prison labor’s actual relative lack of productivity as symptomatic of a post-Fordist economy that deals with its “relatively redundant population of laborers…of greater extant than suffices for the average needs of the self-expansion of capital” (in the words of Marx) through mass warehousing. Contrary to the popular slogan then, ontologically speaking, Black lives cannot matter under neoliberalism because they have been cast as inessential to the quotidian functioning of the economy. Any critique of the current iteration of the PIC, however, must seriously reckon with the not at all insignificant rise of privatized detention centers. Private prison companies are responsible for 62 percent of the beds used by the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigrations and Customs Enforcement branch, and private firms such as the Corrections Corporation of America and GEO Group operate nine out of ten of the country’s largest immigration detention centers. Both of these companies have lobbied the Department of Homeland Security on immigration policy, and thus constitute a formidable force in shaping the fate of undocumented migrants largely driven to cross the border due to free trade agreements and the drug war. For this reason, the PIC as depicted by Critical Resistance may more accurately describe a ‘security-industrial’ or ‘detention-industrial’ complex. One might incorrectly read this imputation as implying that the recent success of Columbia Prison Divest’s campaign is ultimately inessential or futile. One might also infer that a call to reframe the prison-industrial complex may necessarily entail solely Keynesian or social democratic solutions, as opposed to the explicitly abolitionist stance put forth by radical groups such as Critical Resistance. On the contrary, such a reframing affirms the importance of (for now) symbolic initiatives such as divestment from the private prison industry, and is in fact entirely compatible with the notion of abolition and the prescriptions for restorative and transformative justice platforms often associated with radical adherents to the traditional usage of the PIC. For one, if for no other purpose, the PIC is useful in its function as effective political propaganda that has and should continue to pique a widespread interest in, at the very least, prison expansion. The primary short-term goal of any abolitionist movement must be to call attention to injustice, and there is no reason why the PIC should be abandoned, even if its empirical grounding may be questioned and readjusted. Likewise, the movement to divest from the private prison industry carries not merely symbolic import, but the potential to unify a range of (unfortunately) often-disparate divestment movements. For instance, Group4Securicor (more commonly referred to as G4S), which was targeted by Columbia’s private prison divestment campaign, operates in 125 countries and manages prisons and detention centers in Israel and the occupied West Bank, often in contravention of the Fourth Geneva Convention. One can thus read a refreshingly global and intersectional element into the prison divestment movement, one that makes use of the traditional and incomplete formulation of the PIC. While the success of private prison divestment at Columbia should certainly be seen as a tremendous victory for all divestment movements, reframing the prison-industrial complex as suggested above could prove useful in the seemingly perennial and fraught struggle to build a unified Left in the United States. Such potential exists because this reframing of the prison system cuts across multiple dimensions of neoliberalism to explicitly address the rise of incarceration rates and prison expansion within the context of economic deregulation and the state’s reneging on social protections since the 1980s. It prompts us not to be satisfied when Obama mentions the ‘school-to-prison pipeline’ once every seven years, to strive beyond incomplete iterations of abolition that might inadvertently limit themselves to ultimately reformist paradigms, and above all to form stronger connections between the prison abolition movement and the labor movement, between the immigration movement and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement.

#### Rights-focus on labor organizing represents legislative capture, proven by Kelly 18 calling a r2s key to labor conditions, – it reinscribes the ontological domination of the state through cooption and interpretation of revolutionary struggle by the law – that alienates movement organizers from each other, demobilizing radical struggle.

Gabel, 84

[Peter, Prof. Law @ New College of California School of Law, San Francisco: “The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves,” Texas Law Review 62, no. 8 (May 1984). [https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/tlr62&div=65&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=&collection=journals]//AD](https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/tlr62&div=65&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals%5d//AD)

\*edited for offensive language

B. The Strategy of State Officials: Pseudo-Recognition and Containment by Interpretation

Rights-victories can facilitate a movement's cooptation by tempting the movement to "return" its power to the State in exchange for what I will call a pseudo-recognition of the movement's particular demands. I use the term "the State" here, just as I have earlier, to refer not to a collection of officials conceived as a conceptual unit, but to the projected image of authority that these officials "speak for" and that alienated consciousness "believes in" to provide itself with an illusory political foundation. This collectively believed-in authority serves as the political vehicle for opposing the internal development of the movement precisely to the degree that the group as a whole feels the need to resist the sense of possibility awakened by the movement's energy.

During the movement's rising period, the need to remain alienated continues to exist in each of us, including those at the movement's core, but its intensity is distributed throughout the group as a whole according to "social position," understood in a strictly experiential sense. For insofar as the movement initially finds the conviction to discover itself and "arise" through an affirmation of its difference from the rest of the group, it provokes a complex reaction in the group as a whole that depends in part upon how each person feels "positioned" in relation to the movement's particularity. While each movement as a movement aims at universality, the demands that emerge from its alienated particularity are aimed against others in their alienated particularity in a way that both [silences] ~~mutes~~ (in some locations) and accentuates (in other locations) the movement's transformative appeal. For example, a workers' movement may cause "management" and all those who identify with managerial "differentness" to want to "defend themselves"; yet the very fact that the workers have at first defined themselves against management may allow students who are beginning to discover themselves through their difference from teachers to "hear" the movement's deeper meaning. [Black people] ~~Blacks~~ who organize against whites may cause whites to rigidify behind their difference, while striking a chord among women who are also coming to experience each other in a new way through their discovery of the social meaning of a common physical difference. While any true account of a movement's impact would require a narrative description with much greater phenomenological texture than I can produce here, it is through the totality of these ontological resonances, each acquiring its quality from the unique way that the movement aims at the disalienating universal through the alienated particular, that the movement influences the "consciousness-war" occurring within each one of us between the need to remain alienated and the desire to surpass this alienation.

In this early period it is virtually inevitable that the balance of forces within the group as a whole ("society") will tilt in favor of the loyalty to substitute connection that forms the inertia of the status quo, and the group tacitly will rely upon its State officials to cope with the heightened conflict that the movement has generated within it. The "social position" of these officials is somewhat unique because they are called upon to represent the constitution of the group to itself as it actually is (in the sense that their perceived legitimacy as "representatives" extends no further than the group's own dominant self-understanding), and yet they also help to constitute the balance of forces that forms this understanding in their capacity as real people who are part of the group. And as people they are likely to be relatively unavailable to the movement's transformative appeal because this appeal threatens the very "belief in the State" upon which their existing identities depend; they will be inclined to defend themselves against any movement, because movements by their very nature pose a challenge to the alienated universality that in their case constitutes their particularity. As a result, State officials are likely to play the part of "barometers on the side of alienation," seeking to recognize the movement's presence within the group to the extent necessary to maintain their legitimacy, but doing so in a way that sides with the tilt in the group as a whole toward preserving the collective belief in the authority of the State.

The cooptation strategy that these officials adopt-a strategy that may or may not be conscious as regards its form, but remains unconscious as regards its experiential meaning-is to calibrate their responses to the movement's demands so as to encourage the tendency already present in the movement to return to a state of quiescence. This strategy seems to involve roughly three stages37 that take place across a time-span (often decades) dictated by the pulse of the movement itself. At first, these officials refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the movement's demands at all because they are inconsistent with existing law. This risks increasing the anger that forms part of the movement's strength and it may provoke destabilizing confrontations and demonstrations that increase the movement's visibility and appeal (for example, it may create a dispersed group of "sympathizers"). But this risk is a calculated one because it shores up the resolve of those who are opposed to the movement by backing up this resolve with an affirmation of what "the people" believe, while also tempting those within the movement to warp their own understanding of how the movement itself is constituted. Because the movement has achieved its disalienating reciprocity in part on the basis of a "surface recognition" of its common difference within the alienated social order, and because this new feeling of connection is as yet somewhat weak in light of the movement's incomplete internal confidence in its own autonomous and transcendental constitution, the movement suffers from an internal tendency to turn itself back into a group that is constituted "from the outside" on the basis of the inert particularity that as a movement it is seeking to surpass. When State officials refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the movement's demands, the movement may partially give in to this tendency by seeing itself less through its own eyes and more through the "eyes of the State," as if "the State" were the source of its being and for that reason ought to recognize it. The initial refusal of recognition by State officials, in other words, may begin to seduce the movement into deciding that "getting our rights" is the movement's ultimate objective rather than being but a moment of its own internal development. To that extent the movement's anger at the State may reveal a tendency toward compliance rather than transformation.

As the movement gathers momentum in this double direction-the one toward itself, the other away from itself and toward "the State"- the forces of alienation will begin to realign themselves to prepare for the second stage of the State's strategy, the stage of pseudo-recognition. Through a real intuition that spreads through the withdrawn selves on the basis of their existing organization of reciprocity (a phenomenological definition of "the social structure"), some people remain staunchly opposed to the movement because of their particular social relationship to it, while others begin to mediate the movement's relationship to the group as a whole (through "the media," for example) by recasting the movement's demands as a legitimate "rights-debate" with "difficult arguments on both sides." As leaders of collective experience, these oracles of the center seek to "mold public opinion" in a way that secures its anonymous or empty character against the risk that the desire unleashed by the movement could become a genuinely public force; their efforts are nervously aimed at reassuring the group as a whole that the images supporting our substitute connection can be reorganized to accommodate the movement's demands. These efforts are a measure of the movement's authentic impact. But they are also aimed at bombarding the movement itself with a false picture of its public success by suggesting that the movement is making headway because of its compatibility with the political foundations of the status quo (when exactly the reverse is the case). To the degree that the State's original refusal of recognition has already encouraged the movement to experience its own reciprocity as deriving from its external and role-based particularity, this shift toward mediation may further this temptation by implying that the "bad State" may be willing to back down and atone for its wrongs if the movement will abandon its transformative ambitions, or at least postpone them until an unrealizable future when these ambitions will be "allowed."

When State officials subsequently begin to recognize the movement's specific demands in the form of rights-victories, they do so with the hope that the movement will "trick itself' into equating these victories with its own internal ends. As State officials know perfectly well, it is not necessary or even conceivable that the movement will accept the acquisition of a few rights as all that it means to accomplish. It is necessary only that the movement divert itself from its authentic self-understanding enough to deceive itself into thinking that its objectives could eventually be realized through existing law, as if alienation could ever be overcome with its own agreement. For State officials comprehend in their being that once this diversion occurs, the movement will tend increasingly to see its own capacity to realize itself'as located outside of itself in "the State," and to that degree its transformative momentum will tend to collapse from within for reasons described earlier: "belief in the State" itself derives from the reciprocal denial of desire that divides us from each other by our role-performances and that secures the apparent reality of these performances through our collective obedience to a projected authority. Thus the recognition of the movement's demands by State officials is actually a pseudo-recognition because it intends to strip these demands of their universal and transformative meaning and to induce the movement to grasp itself as a "recognized particularity," playing its part along with all of the others in the circle of collective denial that forms the alienated whole.

But just as the State's original refusal to recognize the movement may partly strengthen as well as weaken the movement's internal solidarity, the eventual recognition of the movement also has this dual potential: it runs the risk of giving the movement the foothold in public consciousness that partly inspired its struggle for rights in the first place. The consciousness-war can be quite fluid at the moment of recognition, with each side struggling over the meaning of what is happening, and struggling not only against each other but among themselves and within everyone insofar as these "sides" are lived as a universal conflict that pervades each person's relationship to others. When bluecollar workers win the right to strike, the bank teller may or may not be happy depending upon countless resonations that overdetermine each other in both directions without absolutely determining anything in advance (including her relationship to her mother, her husband's job, her loyalty to the bank, her "white-collar" identity, her sense of how women should respond to conflict, her vision of her children's prospects, and including what, if anything, happens in the bank that day). To control this fluidity, State officials, to the extent that they remain on the side of alienation, must rely on the third stage of their strategy, the stage of "interpretation," to stabilize a situation that they have had no choice but to help create.

This third stage has been discussed extensively in those critical legal studies writings38 that have traced in specific historical instances how these officials attempt, through a process of doctrinal interpretation and legislative compromise elaborated over many years, to reconcile the movement's rights-victories with the pact of the withdrawn selves (as expressed through the intent of the framers, of the legislature, of the parties, of "the people"), and to distinguish these victories from their true social origins in the intent of the movement. During this extended period while the consciousness-war is waged with fluctuating intensity in countless microphenomenological contexts that mutually influence and totalize each other, these officials play a unique and constitutive role in equilibrating the conflict as a whole by purporting to universalize the meaning of each shift in direction through successive case-by-case revisions of what the Constitution says.39 They absorb what they can of the social texture of these shifts, test it for available alienated image-content, write it up as a fantasy narrative that is vaguely consistent with prior chapters, and then feed it back into the group as a whole as the official interpretation of how they, the people, believe it should "come out."' 40 But I think it is a mistake to understand this process as something that one group does to another, as if the State were trying to manipulate the movement into internalizing false consciousness by acting upon it in a one-way fashion. It is rather the final phase of a reciprocal and intersubjective struggle over the possibilities of social connection itself, as this struggle is mediated through a contest over the ontological meaning of legal concepts in their universal or constitutional dimension.

To the degree that the movement is successful in this universal sense, it can use a rights-strategy as part of its effort to leverage itself into public space with the ultimate aim of creating an experience of public community that could dissolve people's belief in and obedience to the State itself-it is only then that the judge can appear as a man in a tunic and "the law" can appear as something like his speech-impediment. But to the degree that the State is successful in using its rightsstrategy to tempt the movement to substitute rights-consciousness for its own critical self-understanding, the movement's members will gradually find themselves losing each other in their legal reflection and becoming attached to this reflection as the medium through which they recognize one another. By their efforts they will have changed their material and cultural circumstances to the degree that their particular demands can be "balanced" with the common commitment to maintaining the stability of the hierarchical order. But they will experience a hemorrhage of being that will allow them to be reabsorbed into this order, first by depriving them of their unique public appeal in a way that will lead public space to reenclose around them, and finally by hierarchizing themselves to secure the denial of desire upon which their continued acceptance within the group as a whole seems to depend.

#### Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause goes unquestioned. Farbod 15

( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)

Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6% per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800%.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85% of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50% of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1% will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80% of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return**.**

#### The alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only party organizing can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct chauvinist tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for global liberation.

Escalante, Philosophy @ UOregon, 18

[Alyson, M.A., is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/>] rVs

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

#### FW—The role of the ballot is to resist neoliberal ideology – filter negative arguments through an epistemological dismantling of neoliberalism.

HAY & ROSAMUND, PhDs, 2002 (Colin and Ben, Journal of European Public Policy Volume 9, Issue 2, 2002 p. 3-5)

The implicit supposition which seems to underlie much of the sceptical or second-wave literature seeking to expose the ‘myth’ or ‘delusion’ of globalisation, is that a rigorous empirical exercise in demystification will be sufficient to reverse the tide of ill-informed public policy made in the name of globalisation. Sadly, this has not proved to be the case. For **however convinced we might be by the empirical armoury mustered against the hyperglobalisation thesis** by the sceptics, their **rigorous empiricism leads them to fail adequately to consider the way in which globalisation comes to inform public policy-making.** **It is here,** we suggest, that **the discourse of globalisation** — and the discursive construction of the imperatives it is seen to conjure along with attendant fatalism about the possibilities for meaningful political agency — **must enter the analysis**. For, as the most cursory reflection on the issue of structure and agency reveals, **it is the ideas actors hold about the context in which they find themselves** rather than the context itself **which informs the way in which they behave** (Hay 1999a, forthcoming a). **This is no less true of policy makers and governments**. **Whether** the **globalisation** thesis **is ‘true’** or not **may matter far less than whether it is deemed to be true** (or, quite possibly, just useful) **by those employing it**. Consequently, **if the aim** of the sceptics **is to discredit the political appeal to dubious economic imperatives associated with globalisation**, then they might **we**ll **benefit from asking** themselves **why and under what conditions** politicians and **public officials invoke** external **economic constraints** in the first place. It is to this task that we direct our attentions in this paper. Yet at the outset a certain word of caution is perhaps required. For, even if we accept the potential causal role that ideas about globalisation might play in the structuration of political and economic outcomes, we may be in danger of narrowing the discursive field of our attentions at the outset. The ideas policy makers use to legitimate and/or to rationalise their behaviour should not simply be seen as more or less accurate reflections of the context they perceive (based on more or less complete information). Nor should discourses be understood as necessarily and exclusively ‘strategic’ (i.e. as relating to situations in which an actor’s employment of a discourse correlates directly to particular material interests). **Discourse matters** in at least two respects. **The way** in which **actors behave is not merely a reflection** of the degree of accuracy and completeness **of the information they possess**; **it is also** a reflection of **their normative orientation** towards their environment and potential future scenarios. Thus the constraints and/or opportunities which globalisation is held to imply might be understood (or misunderstood) in very similar ways in different (national) contexts. Yet such understanding are likely to provoke divergent responses from political actors with different normative orientations and diverse institutional contexts. Put simply, **though actors may share a** common **understanding of** the process of **globalisation, they may respond** very **differently to its** perceived **challenges and threats** **depending on whether one regards the future it promises in a positive or negative light** – witness the still ongoing debate within the governing SPD in Germany between supporters of Schröder and Lafontaine (see Lafontaine 1998; Lafontaine and Müller 1998; Schröder 1998; and for a commentary Jeffery and Handl 1999), or that in France between Bourdieu, Forrester and anti-globalisation groups like ATTAC on the one hand and social liberals within the Parti Socialiste on the other (see Bourdieu 1998; Boudieu and Wacquant 1999; Forrester 1999; and for a commentary Bouvet and Michel 1999; Meunier 2000). Within the European Commission, there is evidence to suggest that common understandings of globalisation can be quite consistent with distinct conceptions of the capacity to exercise meaningful agency as actors take up quite different ‘subject positions’ in relation to globalisation (Rosamond, 1999; 2000b). **It is important**, then, at the outset **that we consider the potential causal role of ideas about globalisation in the structuration of political and economic outcomes**.3 Our central argument is, we think, likely to prove controversial. It is simply stated, though its implications are more complex. Essentially, we suggest, **policy makers acting on the basis of assumptions consistent with the hyperglobalisation thesis may well serve**, in so doing, **to bring about outcomes consistent with that thesis, irrespective of its veracity and,** indeed, irrespective of its perceived veracity**.** This provocative suggestion with, if warranted, important implications, clearly requires some justification (see also Hay 1999b; Rosamond 1999, 2000b, 2000c). **Globalisation has become** a key referent of contemporary political discourse and, increasingly, **a lens through which policy-makers view the context in which they find themselves.** **If** we can assume that political actors have no more privileged vantage point from which to understand their environment than anyone else and — as most commentators would surely concede — that **one of the principal discourses through which that environment now comes to be understood is that of globalisation, then the content of such ideas is likely to affect significantly political dynamics**

### 1NC – Fire PIC

#### Text: The 49 United States excluding California ought to recognize an unconditional right for incarcerated workers to strike. California should recognize a right for incarcerated workers, except those in the prison firefighter program, to strike.

#### Firefighter programs decidedly better than prison and solve megafires – saves numerous preventable deaths.

Hahn, 21

[Matthew Hahn, union electrician and meditation teacher who writes about his time in prison and issues related to criminal justice: “Sending us to fight fires was abusive. We preferred it to staying in prison.” Published by Washington Post on 10-15-21. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/prison-firefighter-california-exploit/2021/10/15/3310eccc-2c61-11ec-8ef6-3ca8fe943a92\_story.html]//AD

On the perimeter of the smoldering ruins of Lassen National Forest in Northern California this summer, an orange-clad crew of wildland firefighters worked steadily to contain the Dixie Fire, the largest single wildfire in state history. Using rakes, axes and chain saws, they literally moved the landscape, cleaving burned from unburned to contain the flames. This work was dangerous, and they made just a few dollars per hour, working 24-hour shifts.

But it was better than being in prison.

I used to be one of the incarcerated people whom California employs to fight wildfires, and I was fortunate. During my nine years in prison for drug-related burglaries, ending in 2012, I never met a fellow prisoner who didn’t want to be in “fire camp,” as the program is known. Some dreamed of going but knew they would never be allowed to live in such a low-security facility. Others, like me, did everything in their capacity to ensure that they got there as soon as humanly possible. For the most part, this meant being savvy and lucky enough to stay out of trouble during the first few years of my incarceration.

Though the program is voluntary, some well-meaning people on social media and in activist circles like to compare fire camp to slavery. Every fire season, they draw attention to its resemblance to chain gangs of the past, its low wages and its exploitative nature. Some argue that incarcerated firefighters face insurmountable barriers to careers in that field after parole, though this has started to change in recent years. Others argue that the voluntary nature of fire camp is a ruse, that consent cannot be offered by the coerced.

There is some truth to these objections, but they ignore the reality of why people would want to risk life and limb for a state that is caging them: The conditions in California prisons are so terrible that fighting wildfires is a rational choice. It is probably the safest choice as well.

I’m from a long line of California ranchers. Now we flee fires all the time.

California prisons have, on average, three times the murder rate of the country overall and twice the rate of all American prisons. These figures don’t take into account the sheer number of physical assaults that occur behind prison walls. Prison feels like a dangerous place because it is. Whether it’s individual assaults or large-scale riots, the potential for violence is ever-present. Fire camp represents a reprieve from that risk.

Sure, people can die in fire camp as well — at least three convict-firefighters have died working to contain fires in California since 2017 — but the threat doesn’t weigh on the mind like the prospect of being murdered by a fellow prisoner. I will never forget the relief I felt the day I set foot in a fire camp in Los Angeles County, like an enormous burden had been lifted.

The experience was at times harrowing, as when my 12-man crew was called to fight the Jesusita Fire, which scorched nearly 9,000 acres and destroyed 80 homes in the Santa Barbara hills back in 2009. I distinctly remember our vehicle rounding an escarpment along the coast when the fire revealed itself, the plume rising and then disappearing into a cloud cover of its own making. Bright orange fingers of flame danced along the top of the mountains.

The fire had been moving in the patches of grass and brush between properties, so we zigzagged our way between homes, cutting down bushes, beating away flames and leaving a four-foot-wide dirt track in our wake. I was perpetually out of breath, a combination of exertion and poor air quality. My flame-resistant clothing was soaked with sweat, and I remember seeing steam rise from my pant leg when I got too close to the burning grass.

The fire had ignited one home’s deck and was slowly burning its way to the structure. We cut the deck off the house, saving the home. I often fantasize about the owners returning to see it still standing, unaware and probably unconcerned that an incarcerated fire crew had saved it. There was satisfaction in knowing that our work was as valuable as that of any other firefighter working the blaze and that the gratitude expressed toward first responders included us.

#### The program reduces recidivism and violent crime by ingraining first-responder logic.

Lockheart, 20

[Rasheed, former prisoner, 10-1-2020, "Being a Prison Firefighter Taught Me to Save Lives," Marshall Project, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/10/01/being-a-prison-firefighter-taught-me-to-save-lives]//AD

There’s a full-fledged firehouse equipped with engines at San Quentin Prison. To work for the department, which serves the facility and over 100 units of mostly employee housing on the grounds, prisoners have to interview with the fire chief and captains and go before a panel composed of the warden and other staff.

You have to be a good fit and know how to work in a team. And they only consider people who have a record of good behavior within the last five years—that means few or no disciplinary write-ups or infractions. You cannot have been convicted of arson, sex offenses, murder or attempted escape, and you have to be at the lowest security level.When I applied in 2016, I had five years left in my sentence. Dozens of guys were trying to get into the firehouse, but they only take nine to 12 at a time. I thought I was in great shape—I was on the San Quentin A’s baseball team, and I played football. But I was nowhere close to being in firefighting shape. We had to be able to hike more than a mile with a 75-pound hose on our backs. I didn’t think I was going to make it at first.It wasn’t really the act of firefighting that made me want to join. Initially, I just wanted the job because I would get to sleep in a room by myself, eat good and train dogs. Plus those guys just look cool. Who as a kid didn’t think firefighters were awesome? Joining the department was also an opportunity to escape the politics and culture of prison. I wouldn't be confined to a cell or have COs hanging over my shoulder all the time; I would be treated like a human being. After years of incarceration I was sold. I didn’t expect it, but firefighting would be the most influential thing I’d ever taken part in. Being a member of the department meant being available 24/7 for calls inside and outside the prison. On the outside, we had house fires, medical emergencies, car accidents and grass fires. Inside we responded to cell fires, provided CPR and transported bodies from housing units to the hospital. In my nearly three years on the job, I did CPR almost 50 times. Only four people lived. The sad truth is that San Quentin has an aging population of people either dying of old age or giving up. There were suicides and a fentanyl outbreak. Sometimes we’d get five overdoses in a week. In 2017, almost 20 people died of various causes. I did CPR on every one of them. On one call, a gentleman had fallen off his bunk and hit his head. He went through three rounds of CPR and two with the defibrillator. On the third round of CPR, I felt him gasp for breath and I could feel his heartbeat underneath my hands. I said to my captain, “Holy shit, I think he's breathing!” He lived and was back on the yard two days later. I can't explain what it feels like to have someone come back to life under your hands. There's nothing like it.

One thing I noticed early on was the difference between the mentalities of people on death row and those in the general population. When we were doing CPR or taking a dead body off the tier, the men on death row had a look of resignation, like ‘Damn, he made it out.’ There was one guy on death row who committed suicide. He always sticks with me because he had his beard trimmed and his hair lined up. He died perfectly groomed but with a look on his face like, I think this is a mistake. People in the general population avoided watching us carry out dead bodies. If you have a life sentence in California, it doesn’t necessarily mean you’ll be incarcerated forever. If you do all the right things and invest in yourself, there is a possibility that you will make it out. With the chance of release, the men in general population didn’t want to think about their own mortality. At times I did feel survivor's guilt about being at the firehouse living the good life. When I was responding to a call, I didn’t have time to be in an emotional space with it. The guilt would kick in when I came back from a call involving one of my incarcerated peers. These were guys I hung out with and played basketball with. But contrary to popular belief about prison culture being dominated by envy, people loved to see me rising above incarceration. I regularly had guys I didn't even know saying they were proud of me and thanking me for representing them. It was like, That’s one of ours. When I was about to be released, I already knew I couldn’t be a firefighter on the outside because my armed robbery felony would exclude me from getting a license. But in September, Gov. Newsom signed AB 2147, a law that puts me on a path to expunging my record and getting my EMT certification. It’s not a fix-all, but it makes the pathway a little bit easier .Once you're a first responder, you're always a first responder. It never leaves your system. There's not a day that goes by that I don't smell smoke. Once you've lived that life, it's a hard thing to leave behind.

#### Megafires kill biodiversity.

Stevens, 12

[Bonnie, 5-15-2012, "An era of mega fires," Arizona Daily Sun, https://azdailysun.com/news/science/an-era-of-mega-fires/article\_a14f3c7d-7a36-5c12-a48e-75a8ea4e3fff.html]//AD

"Mega fires are huge, landscape-scale fires in excess of 100-thousand acres," said Covington, executive director of the Ecological Restoration Institute (ERI) at Northern Arizona University. "We're seeing this throughout the West, but Arizona is on the leading edge."

Covington says mega fires are symptoms of an unhealthy forest caused by a century of actions -- mostly fire suppression, and overgrazing during the late 1800s -- that have changed the structure and function of ponderosa pine and dry mixed conifer forests.

"We need to stop being surprised by the types of fires we're having," said Summerfelt, wildland fire management officer for the city of Flagstaff. "My first fire was on the North Kaibab and it was considered huge. It was 20 acres. A 20-acre fire now means nothing. So in those three-and-a-half decades in my career, I've been able to watch fire change in size and intensity to levels today that even a decade ago would have been unthinkable. And we're not done breaking records."

Covington says Arizona is set up for three more enormous crown fires across the Mogollon Rim that burn through the tops of old growth trees and can ignite spot fires as far as 3 miles ahead of the blaze. "There's the Payson to Winslow corridor, the Sedona to Flagstaff corridor and the Prescott corridor. If we don't get out in front of these and do restoration treatments, it's just going to be a matter of time before we have three more major landscapes burn up."

As we approach the 10th anniversary of the Rodeo-Chediski Fire, scientists, firefighters and natural resource managers are examining today's forest conditions and reviewing lessons learned from the state's two largest fires.

To compare, both fires were started by people on warm, dry, windy days.

"With the Wallow Fire, we knew we were in extreme conditions. We had fuel everywhere and our probability of ignition for any fire that hit the ground was 100 percent. With 62 mph wind gusts, it was blowing so hard it was tough to walk," said Zornes.

Former Forest Service ranger and firefighter Jim Paxon, now Arizona Game and Fish Department spokesperson, describes the 468,000-acre Rodeo-Chediski Fire as a plume-dominated fire.

"It was pretty much fuels related, fed by the millions of excess trees in our overcrowded forests. It had extremely high energy. When I started fighting fire in the late'60s we didn't have these big columns of plumes that would build up, collapse in an explosion on the ground and create hurricane winds. This didn't happen until the '90s."

As a result, 49 percent of the area in the Rodeo-Chediski Fire was considered severely burned. For the 538,000-acre Wallow Fire, that figure is 28 percent.

"It could take a couple hundred years for these forests to return back to what they were," said Alpine District Ranger Rick Davalos. "Some of the severely burned area includes older growth trees."

ERI researchers say crown fires that kill old growth trees also destroy critical wildlife habitat.

"The Mexican spotted owl is the biggest concern we have as an endangered species that we're trying to help out," Paxon said. "The Forest Service is under extreme pressure not to do any cutting around the nesting sites. So between the two fires we lost 20 percent of the Mexican spotted owl nests that exist in the world."

In addition, heat from the Wallow Fire baked streams and killed aquatic life. Then floods, from monsoon rains after the fire, moved silt into rivers and lakes making matters worse.

"The problem with these fires is they remove so much of the vegetation they can create hydrophobic soils. The water won't penetrate the soil. It runs across the surface so all that ash and sediment ends up in streams and rivers. In the Wallow Fire it ruined the habitat for the re-introduced Apache trout," Covington said. "So, whether you look at fish or you look at birds or you look at mammals, the impact of these mega fires over the long haul is very negative."

#### Biodiversity loss causes extinction and turns climate change

Phil Torres, Scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, 5-20-2016, "Biodiversity Loss: An Existential Risk Comparable to Climate Change," Future of Life Institute, https://futureoflife.org/2016/05/20/biodiversity-loss/

Biodiversity Loss: An Existential Risk Comparable to Climate Change

According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the two greatest existential threats to human civilization stem from climate change and nuclear weapons. Both pose clear and present dangers to the perpetuation of our species, and the increasingly dire climate situation and nuclear arsenal modernizations in the United States and Russia were the most significant reasons why the Bulletin decided to keep the Doomsday Clock set at three minutes before midnight earlier this year.

But there is another existential threat that the Bulletin overlooked in its Doomsday Clock announcement: biodiversity loss. This phenomenon is often identified as one of the many consequences of climate change, and this is of course correct. But biodiversity loss is also a contributing factor behind climate change. For example, deforestation in the Amazon rainforest and elsewhere reduces the amount of carbon dioxide removed from the atmosphere by plants, a natural process that mitigates the effects of climate change. So the causal relation between climate change and biodiversity loss is bidirectional.

### Case:

#### Prisons would go down fighting – causes legal lobbying to extend prison sentences to secure the labor pool – turns case.

Serwer, 14

[Adam, Buzzfeed News National Editor: "California AG "Shocked" To Learn Her Office Wanted To Keep Eligible Parolees In Jail To Work," BuzzFeed News, 11-18-2014. https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/adamserwer/some-lawyers-just-want-to-see-the-world-burn]//AD

Lawyers for California Attorney General Kamala Harris argued in court this fall against the release of eligible nonviolent prisoners from California's overcrowded prisons — because the state wanted to keep them as a labor force.

Harris, a rising star in the Democratic Party, said she learned about the argument when she read it in the paper.

"I will be very candid with you, because I saw that article this morning, and I was shocked, and I'm looking into it to see if the way it was characterized in the paper is actually how it occurred in court," Harris told BuzzFeed News in an interview Monday. "I was very troubled by what I read. I just need to find out what did we actually say in court."

The Supreme Court found California's prisons were so overcrowded in 2011 that the conditions violated the Constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Since then, California has been under federal court supervision as it seeks to comply with the order that the state reduce its prison population. In February, the state had agreed to reduce its population by releasing nonviolent prisoners with only two felonies who had served half their sentences.

Last week, the Los Angeles Times reported that attorneys in Harris' office had unsuccessfully argued in court that the state could not release the prisoners it had agreed to release because "if forced to release these inmates early, prisons would lose an important labor pool." Those prisoners, the Times reported, earn wages that range from "8 cents to 37 cents per hour."

In a Sept. 30 filing in the case, signed by Deputy Attorney General Patrick McKinney but under Harris' name, the state argued, "Extending 2-for-1 credits to all minimum custody inmates at this time would severely impact fire camp participation — a dangerous outcome while California is in the middle of a difficult fire season and severe drought."

Approximately 4,400 California prisoners help the state battle wildfires, at wages of about $2 a day. There is an exception in the agreement that allows the state to retain firefighters — but only firefighters — who are otherwise eligible for release.

Like incarcerated firefighters, inmates who perform "assignments necessary for the continued operation of the institution and essential to local communities" draw from the same pool of inmates who pose a limited threat to public safety, the state argued in a September filing. Therefore, reducing that population would require the prisons to draw more incarcerated workers away from its firefighting crews.

**Strikes are generally not effective- the ones that work are surprises to the employer, meaning aff’s recognition of an unconditional right to strike undermines any chance of solvency**

**Garneau 19** [Marianne Garneau is a labor educator and organizer with the historic IWW, Industrial Workers of the World. She’s the publisher of the website Organizing.Work. “Why Don’t Strikes Achieve More?” Organizing Work. May 1, 2019. <https://organizing.work/2019/05/why-dont-strikes-achieve-more/>] HW Alex Lee

Under this legal framework, strikes are a blunted tactic, quite intentionally so. They do accomplish something – in each of the three cases described above, workers would almost certainly have got a worse deal had they not struck. There are also strikes that yield apparently better deals, such as the contract bargained by Unite Here with Marriott hotels – arguably in part because contracts at seven different bargaining units expired simultaneously, allowing almost 8,000 workers to strike at once. But **strikes don’t change the big-picture balance of power between employers and workers**. Most of the time, strikes are like a fistfight in which one side gets a bloody nose, the other gets a black eye, and **each walks away saying “You shoulda seen the other guy.”** At best, a win looks like giving the other side two wounds while you only suffer one. Where do we go from here? Strikes can nonetheless be powerful, of course: it remains the case that withholding production is the greatest tool workers have. **Strikes are most effective when they contain an element of surprise, when the employer does not see them coming**, or when they skirt the framework described above. Quickie strikes and sit-downs can resolve a problem before things even escalate to appealing to the labor relations infrastructure (grievances, lawyers, arbitration). Fairly spontaneous, mass strikes do frighten and intimidate employers and tilt things in workers’ favor. It’s important for us on the left to maintain our ability to accurately analyze and assess strikes and their resolutions. If you were to look at union press releases following strikes, you would never know they were incorporating two-tiers or other losses. Unions tend to minimize the damage, so as not to demoralize workers or shake their faith in the union. However, if we keep calling losses (or pyrrhic victories) wins, we may lose the ability to discern wins and losses, and the difference. And we will lose sight of what makes a strike effective.

#### Vote Neg on presumption: allowing prisoners to strike doesn’t mean that there will be radical reforms in wages and

#### No solvency: Alt causes: the prison industrial complex includes broken, racist court systems; corrupt policing;

#### Prison wages and conditions are minuscule solving for racial injustice and structural violence

#### At best they get solving like 5% of structural violence, and even then, prio structural violence