## 1

#### Interp: Reduce means permanent reduction – it’s distinct from “suspend”

Reynolds 59 – Judge (In the Matter of Doris A. Montesani, Petitioner, v. Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department 9 A.D.2d 51; 189 N.Y.S.2d 695; 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7391 August 13, 1959, lexis)

Section 83's counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his "tour" and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway.  [\*\*\*13]  The section says "reduced", does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The plain dictionary meaning of the word is to diminish, lower or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate permanency.

#### Violation – they fiat a temporary waiver of medicines for covid

#### 1. Ground – allows affs to put infinite conditions in the plan – makes it impossible to be neg. aff doesn’t specify the timeframe for how long a waiver will be, which allows them to skirt neg offense

#### 2. Precision – if the condition in the plan is not met, IPP for medicines are not being reduced – means they don’t affirm

#### Paradigm Issues –

#### 1. Fairness first – debate is a game, and it’s the only way to determine the better debater

#### 2. Topicality is Drop the Debater – it’s a fundamental baseline for clash, best way to set norms

#### 3. Use Competing Interps –

#### Race to the top

#### Reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention

#### 4. No RVI’s –

#### Chilling effect on T and theory

#### Encourages baiting

#### Illogical – you don’t win for being fair

#### 5. T before theory – less time to set norms, 1NC abuse was necessary to check 1AC abuse

## 2

#### Text:

#### 1. The World Trade Organization ought to be abolished.

#### 2. The following 164 countries listed in the speech doc ought to independently and without influence from international government reduce intellectual property protections for medicines during pandemics.

Afghanistan

Albania

Angola

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Australia

Austria

Bahrain, Kingdom of

Bangladesh

Barbados

Belgium

Belize

Benin

Bolivia, Plurinational State of

Botswana

Brazil

Brunei Darussalam

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cabo Verde

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile

China

Colombia

Congo

Costa Rica

Côte d’Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Denmark

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador

Estonia

Eswatini

European Union (formerly EC)

Fiji

Finland

France

Gabon

Gambia

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

Greece

Grenada

Guatemala

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Hong Kong, China

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait, the State of

Kyrgyz Republic

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Latvia

Lesotho

Liberia

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Macao, China

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mexico

Moldova, Republic of

Mongolia

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozambique

Myanmar

Namibia

Nepal

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

North Macedonia

Norway

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Romania

Russian Federation

Rwanda

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Samoa

Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Suriname

Sweden

Switzerland

Chinese Taipei

Tajikistan

Tanzania

Thailand

Togo

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom

United States

Uruguay

Vanuatu

Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of

Viet Nam

Yemen

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Hawley, senator, JD Yale, 20

(Josh, 5-5, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html)

The coronavirus emergency is not only a public health crisis. With [30 million Americans unemployed](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/us-weekly-jobless-claims.html), it is also an economic crisis. And it has exposed a hard truth about the modern global economy: it weakens American workers and has empowered China’s rise. That must change. The global economic system as we know it is a relic; it requires reform, top to bottom. We should begin with one of its leading institutions, the World Trade Organization. We should abolish it.

**Eliminating the WTO ends U.S. global hegemony**

**Bello, PhD, 2000**

(Walden, Sociology @ Stanford, https://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1352/ecologist/Should%20WTO%20be%20abolished.pdf)

The idea that the world needs the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is one of the biggest lies of our time. The WTO came about, in 1995, mainly because it was in the interest of the US and its corporations. The European Union, Japan and especially the developing countries were mostly ambivalent about the idea; it was the US which drove it on. Why? Because though the US, back in 1948, blocked the formation of an International Trade Organisation (ITO), believing that, at that time, the interests of its corporations would not be served by such a global body, it had changed its mind by the 1990s. Now it wanted an international trade body. Why? Because its global economic dominance was threatened. The flexible GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) system, which preceded the WTO, had allowed the emergence of Europe and East Asia as competing industrial centres that threatened US dominance even in many high-tech industries. Under GATT’s system of global agricultural trade, Europe had emerged as a formidable agricultural power even as Third World governments concerned with preserving their agriculture and rural societies limited the penetration of their markets by US agricultural products. In other words, before the WTO, **global trade was growing by leaps and bounds**, but countries were using trade policy to industrialise and adapt to the growth of trade so that their economies would be enhanced by global trade and not be marginalised by it. That was a problem, from the US point of view. And that was why the US needed the WTO. The essence of the WTO is seen in three of its central agreements: the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The purpose of TRIPs is **not to promote free trade but to enhance monopoly power**. One cannot quarrel with the fact that innovators should have preferential access to the benefits that flow from their innovation for a period of time. TRIPs, however, goes beyond this to institutionalise a monopoly for high-tech corporate innovators, most of them from the North. Among other things, TRIPs provides a generalised minimum patent protection of 20 years; institutes draconian border regulations against products judged to be violating intellectual property rights; and – contrary to the judicial principle of presuming innocence until proven guilty – places the burden of proof on the presumed violator of process patents. What TRIPs does is reinforce the monopolistic or oligopolistic position of US high tech firms such as Microsoft and Intel. It makes industrialisation by imitation or industrialisation via loose conditions of technology transfer – a strategy employed by the US, Germany, Japan, and South Korea during the early phases of their industrialisation – all but impossible. It enables **the technological leader**, in this case **the US, to greatly influence** **the pace of technological and industrial development in the rest of the world**.

**Primacy causes endless war, terror, authoritarianism, prolif, and Russia-China aggression.**

**Ashford, PhD, 19**

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 4, CNAS)

**Humility is a virtue**. Yet in the last quarter century, American policymakers have been far more likely to embrace the notion of America as the “indispensable nation,” responsible for protecting allies, promoting democracy and human rights, tamping down conflicts, and generally managing global affairs. Compare this ideal to the U.S. track record – **endless Middle Eastern wars, the rise of ISIS, global democratic backsliding, a revanchist Russia, resurgent China**, and a world reeling from the election of President Donald Trump – and this label seems instead **the height of hubris.** Many of the failures of U.S. foreign policy speak for themselves. As the daily drumbeat of bad news attests, interventions in Iraq and Libya were **not victories for human rights or democracy, but rather massively destabilizing** for the Middle East as a whole. Afghanistan – despite initial military successes – has become a quagmire, highlighting the futility of nation- building. Other failures of America’s grand strategy are less visible, but no less damaging. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe helped to reignite hostility between Russia and the West. Worse, it has diluted the alliance’s defensive capacity and its democratic character. And even as the war on terror fades from public view, it remains as open-ended as ever: Today, the United States is **at war in seven countries and engaged in “combating terrorism’ in more than 80**.1 To put it bluntly: America’s strategy since the end of the Cold War – **whether it is called primacy or liberal internationalism** – may not be a total failure, but it **has not been successful** either. Many have tried to place blame for these poor outcomes.2 But recrimination is less important than understanding why America’s strategy has failed so badly and avoiding these mistakes in future. Much of the explanation is the natural outcome of changing constraints. **Iraq and Libya should not be viewed as regrettable anomalies, but rather the logical outcome of unipolarity and America’s liberal internationalist inclination to solve every global problem.** It’s also a reliance on **flawed assumptions** – that what is good for America is always good for the world, for example. Support for dangerous sovereignty-undermining norms adds to the problem; just look at the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has proved not to protect populations or stabilize fragile states, but to **provoke chaos, encourage nuclear proliferation, and undermine the international institutions.** Perhaps, if nothing else had changed, a form of watered-down liberal internationalism that foreswore interventionism and drew back from the war on terror might have been possible.3 But international politics are undergoing a period of profound transformation, from unipolarity to regional or even global multipolarity. **Primacy** – and the consistent drumbeat of calls in Washington to do more, always and everywhere – **is neither sustainable nor prudent.** Nor can we fall back on warmed-over Cold War–era strategies better suited to an era of bipolar superpower competition.

## 3

#### A. Uniqueness- Pharma profits are up from COVID vaccines, patent waivers threaten this

Buchholz 5-17-21

(Katharina, https://www.statista.com/chart/24829/net-income-profit-pharma-companies/)

The profitability of coronavirus vaccines has been in the spotlight since U.S. President Joe Biden come out in support of temporarily lifting vaccine patents to make the production of the life-saving inoculations more financially feasible for poorer countries. EU leaders meanwhile remain divided over such a move. Company financial reports show that COVID-19 vaccine makers and developers like Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, Moderna, AstraZeneca and BioNTech have seen their profits increase since the vaccine rollout, at times majorly. In early May, stocks of several companies that benefit from COVID-19 vaccine sales took a nosedive on the news of Biden’s reversal. Moderna stocks, for example, were still down more than 6 percent at close on May 5, the day of the announcement. Stocks recovered somewhat as German chancellor Angela Merkel came out against patent waivers the following day. While fluctuations in the stock market price have hurt drug makers in the short term, patent waivers would diminish the bottom line of companies involved with the development and production of COVID-19 vaccines in the long term. Pharma giants like Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer bring in billions of dollars of income every quarter from diverse sources, so the COVID bump was smaller for them. In the case of Pfizer, which has been a bigger producer than J&J, the year-over-year profit increase was a handsome 44 percent, however. For smaller AstraZeneca, the COVID year meant that its profits doubled. In the case of Moderna, the past year has turned a Q1 loss into a profit. The case is similar for German company BioNTech, which collaborated with Pfizer on its COVID vaccine. While Q1 2021 brought in a profit of $1.1 billion, the company ran a deficit since its founding in 2008 up until Q4 2020, when it posted a profit for the first time. The $446 million earned stood in contrast to losses of almost $428 million accrued in the first nine months of the year.

#### B. Link- IP Protections are vital to innovation and economic growth-reject myopic moralizing about human rights

Bacchus, JD, 20

(James, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, a professor of global affairs at the University of Central Florida, An Unnecessary Proposal A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines <https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-12/FTB_78.pdf>, 12-16)

At the heart of this emerging trade debate is a belief by many people worldwide that all medicines should be “global public goods.” There is little room in such a belief for consideration of any rights to IP. As one group of United Nations human rights experts expressed: “There is no room for . . . profitability in decision-making about access to vaccines, essential tests and treatments, and all other medical goods, services and supplies that are at the heart of the right to the highest attainable standard of health for all.”16 This view is myopic. Subordinating IP rights temporarily to pressing public needs during a pandemic or other global health emergency is one thing. Eliminating any consideration of “profitability” in all policymaking relating to “access to vaccines, essential tests and treatments, and all other medical goods, services and supplies” is quite another.17 To be sure, there is a superficial moral appeal in such a view. But does this moral appeal hold up if such a “human rights” approach does not result in meeting those urgent public needs? With the belief that medicines should be “public goods,” there is literally no support in some quarters for the application of the WTO TRIPS Agreement to IP rights in medicines. Any protection of the IP rights in such goods is viewed as a violation of human rights and of the overall public interest. This view, though, does not reflect the practical reality of a world in which many medicines would simply not exist if it were not for the existence of IP rights and the protections they are afforded. Technically, IP rights are exceptions to free trade. A long-standing general discussion in the WTO has been about when these exceptions to free trade should be allowed and how far they should be extended. The continuing debate over IP rights in medicines is only the most emotional part of this overall conversation. Because developed countries have, historically, been the principal sources of IP rights, this lengthy WTO dispute has largely been between developed countries trying to uphold IP rights and developing countries trying to limit them. The debate over the discovery and the distribution of vaccines for COVID-19 is but the latest global occasion for this ongoing discussion. The primary justification for granting and protecting IP rights is that they are incentives for innovation, which is the main source for long-term economic growth and enhancements in the quality of human life. IP rights spark innovation by “enabling innovators to capture enough of the benefits of their own innovative activity to justify taking considerable risks.”18 The knowledge from innovations inspired by IP rights spills over to inspire other innovations. The protection of IP rights promotes the diffusion, domestically and internationally, of innovative technologies and new know-how. Historically, the principal factors of production have been land, labor, and capital. In the new pandemic world, perhaps an even more vital factor is the creation of knowledge, which adds enormously to “the wealth of nations.” Digital and other economic growth in the 21st century is increasingly ideas-based and knowledge intensive. Without IP rights as incentives, there would be less new knowledge and thus less innovation. In the short term, undermining private IP rights may accelerate distribution of goods and services—where the novel knowledge that went into making them already exists. But in the long term, undermining private IP rights would eliminate the incentives that inspire innovation, thus preventing the discovery and development of knowledge for new goods and services that the world needs. This widespread dismissal of the link between private IP rights and innovation is perhaps best reflected in the fact that although the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 aspire to “foster innovation,” they make no mention of IP rights.19 As Stephen Ezell and Nigel Cory of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation wrote, “A fundamental fault line in the debate over intellectual property pertains to the need to achieve a reasoned balance between access and exclusive rights.”20 This fault line is much on display in the WTO rules on IP rights. These rules recognize that “intellectual property rights are private rights” and that rules and disciplines are necessary for “the provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual property rights.”21 Yet, where social and economic welfare is at stake, WTO members have sought to strike a balance in these rules between upholding IP rights and fulfilling immediate domestic needs.

#### C. Impact- Pharmaceutical profits are key to innovation against emerging disease threats – the impact is extinction

Engelhardt 8 – PhD, MD, Professor of Philosophy @ Rice

(Hugo, “Innovation and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Critical Reflections on the Virtues of Profit,” EBrary)

Many are suspicious of, or indeed jealous of, the good fortune of oth-ers. Even when profit is gained in the market without fraud and with the consent of all buying and selling goods and services, there is a sense on the part of some that something is wrong if considerable profit is secured. There is even a sense that good fortune in the market, especially if it is very good fortune, is unfair. One might think of such rhetorically disparaging terms as "wind-fall profits". There is also a suspicion of the pursuit of profit because it is often embraced not just because of the material benefits it sought, but because of the hierarchical satisfaction of being more affluent than others. The pursuit of profit in the pharmaceu-tical and medical-device industries is tor many in particular morally dubious because it is acquired from those who have the bad fortune to be diseased or disabled. Although the suspicion of profit is not well-founded, this suspicion is a major moral and public-policy challenge.¶ Profit in the market for the pharmaceutical and medical-device¶ industries is to be celebrated. This is the case, in that if one is of the view (1) that the presence of additional resources for research and development spurs innovation in the development of pharmaceuticals and med-ical devices (i.e., if one is of the view that the allure of profit is one of the most effective ways not only to acquire resources but productively to direct human energies in their use), (2) that given the limits of altruism and of the willingness of persons to be taxed, the possibility of profits is necessary to secure such resources, (3) that the allure of profits also tends to enhance the creative use of available resources in the pursuit of phar-maceutical and medical-device innovation, and (4) if one judges it to be the case that such innovation is both necessary to maintain the human species in an ever-changing and always dangerous environment in which new microbial and other threats may at any time emerge to threaten human well-being, if not survival (i.e., that such innovation is necessary to prevent increases in morbidity and mortality risks), as well as (5) in order generally to decrease morbidity and mortality risks in the future, it then follows (6) that one should be concerned regarding any policies that decrease the amount of resources and energies available to encourage such innovation. One should indeed be of the view that the possibilities for profit, all things being equal, should be highest in the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries. Yet, there is a suspicion regarding the pursuit of profit in medicine and especially in the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries.

#### D. Emerging diseases and bioterrorism are comparatively the largest impact – pharmaceutical industry key

Milne 4 – Formerly a practicing veterinarian in New Jersey and Maryland, Dr. Milne attended Johns Hopkins University in 1987-88 where he earned a master's degree in public health with a concentration in epidemiology. For six years, he worked for the New Jersey Department of Health in risk assessment as well as legislative and regulatory review, and finally served as Emergency Response Coordinator. Dr. Milne joined Tufts University's Center for the Study of Drug Development in 1998 as a Senior Research Fellow, after graduation from law school. His research interests include the evaluation of regulatory initiatives affecting the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, and incentive programs for the development of new medicines for neglected diseases of the developing world. Dr. Milne is currently Assistant Director at the Center and a member of the bar in New Hampshire

(Christopher, “Racing the Globalization of Infectious Diseases: Lessons from the Tortoise and the Hare,” 11 New Eng. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1)

Although we have faced planet-killing events such as nuclear brinkmanship during the Cold War and mega-meteors colliding with earth in pre-history, the most imminent threat is one we face everyday from the globalization of infectious diseases. Leading authorities in government, medical institutions, and schools of public health have been ringing the warning bell for over a decade about the major threats to global public health. 2Link to the text of the note Threats such as infectious diseases in the developing world, drug resistant bacteria, and the problem of multiple HIV strains, remain unaddressed. The public health community lacks answers to key scientific questions for an AIDS vaccine, and needs to press harder on research for a tuberculosis (TB) vaccine, a process which could take twenty to fifty years. 3Link to the text of the note Experts believe that the threat warning level has risen from orange to red, comparing the circumstances favoring a pandemic today to the "Perfect Storm," due to the continuing increase of worldwide antimicrobial resistance, diminished U.S. capacity to recognize and respond to microbial threats, and the likelihood of intentional releases of biological agents.¶ The sources of this public health challenge derive from a panoply of emerging and re-emerging natural plagues, thirty of which have been recognized just in the last few decades with thirteen occurring in North America. 4Link to the text of the note According to Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institutes [3] of Allergies and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), emerging diseases are defined as ones that have not been previously recognized, such as acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) or severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Comparatively, re-emerging disease has usually been in existence for a long time but has changed location, as did the West Nile Virus. Dr. Fauci considers bioterrorism to be a part of the continuum of emerging and re-emerging diseases, and points out that when it comes to bioterror: "The Worst Bioterrorist May be Nature Itself." 5Link to the text of the note¶ Infectious diseases with the potential to be global killers come in two basic forms: the "slow epidemic," taking months or years to reach pandemic status, with an insidious onset and long latency, that resists treatment - the archetypical example being AIDS, 6Link to the text of the note and the "fast epidemic," rapidly spreading from country to country, typically aerosol-borne, with fairly quick onset, and high mortality and morbidity - most recently manifested in pandemic SARS. 7Link to the text of the note Both forms have potential uses as bioweapons, although most of the counter-terror attention focuses on the SARS-like diseases.¶ Part II of this article will discuss the scenarios for a global pandemic presented by SARS, AIDS, or bioweaponized incarnations - what they have done, what they could do, and why it is so hard to stop them. Part III will describe the scope of the public health problem, particularly the globalization factors that serve as enablers of the pandemic potential of these diseases, as well as a host of ill-defined "x" factors that have served to further complicate the dynamics of dealing with these global killers. Part IV will consider solutions to the problem by discussing what we have versus what we need. Part V will present recommendations for how government, pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, as well as international non-governmental organizations can be part of the solution. Lastly, Part VI provides a conclusion.¶ "Ring around the rosie, pocket full of posies,¶ Ashes, ashes - we all fall down!" - According to legend, a children's rhyme dating from the time of the plague in medieval Europe.¶ II. Scenes from a Plague¶ SARS has been compared to the bubonic plague of the Middle Ages, but the Black Death was not a "fast epidemic" due to the limitations of its [4] mode of transmission, as well as the modes of medieval transportation. While SARS is somewhat comparable to flu epidemics of the last century and to the putative bioterror agents of today, AIDS has the dubious distinction of being closer to the experience of the Black Death. However, unlike that ancient pandemic, which was more limited temporally and geographically, AIDS is embarking upon what, Dr. Peter Piot, executive director of UNAIDS, refers to as a "true globalization phase." 8Link to the text of the note¶ A. Black Death Redux¶ The superlatives used to describe the public health impact of AIDS never seem to be exhausted. One commentator noted that AIDS will soon exceed the death toll of the Bubonic Plague, making it the most "numerically lethal pandemic" the world has ever known. 9Link to the text of the note The World Health Organization (WHO) refers to it more prosaically, but with similar notoriety, as the "toughest health assignment the world has ever faced." 10Link to the text of the note Even after twenty years, AIDS is still something of a medical and scientific conundrum. Diversity of the virus increases with duration of infection, further complicating drug treatment. 11Link to the text of the note Vaccine development is similarly complicated due to existence of ten major genetic types or clades of HIV-1, each with a distinct geographical spread. 12Link to the text of the note¶ What we do know is that AIDS is caused by an infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), transmitted through unprotected sex, sharing hypodermic needles, transfusions of contaminated blood, or from mother to child during pregnancy, labor, delivery, or breast-feeding. The virus attacks the immune system by infecting white blood cells, known as CD4+ cells, making it difficult for the body to fight off infections. AIDS itself is considered the final stage of HIV disease. 13Link to the text of the note Without treatment, HIV will progress to full-blown AIDS within nine to eleven years, and is usually fatal within two years after that point. 14Link to the text of the note The AIDS/HIV toll is [5] approaching forty million infected, with fourteen thousand new infections daily and ninety-five percent of new infections occurring in the developing world. 15Link to the text of the note¶ What we do not know is just how soon and how much of an impact AIDS will have. In sub-Saharan Africa, only an estimated ten percent of the predicted illness and death has occurred; the full impact on people, communities, and economies is still to come. 16Link to the text of the note Nonetheless, one forecast is that seventy million will die of AIDS by 2020, mostly in Africa and Asia. 17Link to the text of the note Besides its own death-dealing impact, AIDS exacerbates the morbidity and mortality of other "slow epidemics" like malaria and tuberculosis, and drains resources that would otherwise be dedicated to their treatment. 18Link to the text of the note By 2010, a report by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) states that five countries - Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, and China - will suffer a total of fifty to seventy-five million cases of HIV/AIDS. 19Link to the text of the note¶ For a preview of the AIDS wasteland that faces us without a serious course change, consider the devastation wrought by AIDS on Botswana. Before the AIDS epidemic reached Botswana in the early 1990s, per-capita income had risen tenfold over the previous thirty years, primary school enrollment had doubled, and infant mortality had decreased almost threefold. A decade after AIDS swept over the land, thirty percent of the country's economic growth was erased and the number of years each citizen is expected to contribute to the economy has been reduced from fifteen-to-thirty productive years to just five. Moreover, one-fifth of Botswana's children will soon be AIDS orphans. 20Link to the text of the note Botswana now has the lowest life expectancy of any country in the world at 30.8 years of age, which is about three times less than the highest life expectancy of 83.5 years in the European nation of Andorra. 21Link to the text of the note At the current pace, close to [6] fifty percent of the world's population could live in countries gripped by the AIDS pandemic by the end of the decade.¶ B. Cold Virus on Steroids¶ The official acronym for severe acute respiratory syndrome is SARS-CoV, which derives from the fact that it is a coronavirus, the same family of viruses that cause the common cold. However, SARS acts more like a cold virus pumped up on anabolic steroids. According to statistics, the recent outbreak of SARS was both debilitating and deadly: eleven percent of its victims died; sixty percent required hospitalization; twenty to thirty percent needed treatment in intensive care units with intubations; six to twenty percent suffered respiratory sequelae; and thirty to sixty percent experienced post-traumatic stress. 22Link to the text of the note Ultimately, the SARS pandemic led to ten billion dollars in economic losses. 23Link to the text of the note¶ The SARS incubation period is typically six days, but can range anywhere from two to twenty days. SARS is more environmentally stable than other respiratory viruses. However, unlike most respiratory viruses the role of seasonality is unknown, noting that most respiratory viruses are winter creatures. SARS is primarily transmitted by respiratory droplets or fomites (i.e., inanimate objects or substances that transfer an infectious agent), in health care and hospital settings, but also by contaminated sewage. Old age and co-existing illness are contributory factors to SARS, but children tend to contract a more mild form of the illness. SARS is believed to be of an animal origin, but unlike most other species jumpers, SARS has also become efficient at human-to-human transmission. 24Link to the text of the note¶ Although we are still learning from the SARS pandemic, some lessons are clear: animal pathogens pose major risks; a problem in a remote area can become a world problem within weeks; molecular virology can identify and sequence genetic structures of new pathogens within weeks; the epidemiological tracks of a disease can be followed even in remote areas; basic infection control measures work well; and the phenomena of the superspreader (i.e., an infected person responsible for a disproportionate number of transmissions), airborne transmission, and heightened risk to health care workers (i.e., twenty-one percent of SARS infections were in health care workers 25Link to the text of the note) complicate control efforts. 26Link to the text of the note Another lesson is that [7] humans can be the worst enemy regarding transmission. Four SARS outbreaks occurred within one year in Singapore, Taipei, and Beijing from laboratory accidents. 27Link to the text of the note The loose ends that dangle perilously from the tail of the SARS epidemic caused one SARS researcher to remark ominously: "this is not the end of the story… ." 28Link to the text of the note¶ C. Black Wind of Death¶ A warning on a radical Islamic fundamentalist website stated that a "Black Wind of Death" would soon be visited upon the enemies of Islam. Some believe that this statement refers to the use of a bioweapon. A conservative estimate of the number of naturally occurring potential bioterror agents is about seventy to eighty, but the possibilities for genetically engineered pathogens are practically limitless. In fact, the pioneers of the Soviet bioweapons program were able to refine the "binary inoculary," in which treatment of the first microbe would set off infection with a more deadly second microbe. The combinations were limitless, but the results were always the same - the ultimate nightmare. For example, if a person contracts a dreaded disease, such as the plague, and is treated with tetracycline, the treatment may unleash a second disease lying dormant, such as Ebola, for which there is no cure.¶ The question remains: How much lethal know-how is out there? In the 1980s, the Soviets' bioweapons industry employed about sixty thousand people, half of whom were scientists. In the past thirty years, critical masses of two to three thousand new pathogens have appeared; some developing from nature and some designed in the lab, but not always as bioweapons. Fully mapping and understanding the complex interactions of hosts and pathogens for the known biological entities that could be weaponized would take decades. 29Link to the text of the note D.A. Henderson, senior advisor for the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh, framed this problem: "Like it or not, I'm afraid the threat is with us forever." 30Link to the text of the note¶ [8] "Globalization, after all, is fundamentally about market expansion, the rise of new political, social, and cultural movements, and changes in the state and institutions." - Hitchner, Tufts University¶ III. Scope¶ For better or worse, globalization is also about public health. The scope of the public health challenge faced today must now be considered within the context of other globalization factors. Just as addressing the problems of globalization, public health must also be taken into account. This is especially true for infectious diseases, as West Nile virus, monkey pox, SARS, avian flu, and antibiotic-resistant bugs are only the beginning. According to one expert, "the new normal" has become a public health problem uniquely created by globalization. 31Link to the text of the note¶ A. The Global Village: A Good Place to Raise Deadly Offspring¶ 1. The Urbanization Triplets: Crowding, Poverty, and Destruction of Habitat¶ Certain sequelae of globalization have been identified as facilitating the spread of global infectious diseases. Urbanization, which is defined as rapid population growth in the cities, especially in tropical and subtropical areas in less developed countries, results in large populations coming into closer contact with one another, increasing the probability of infectious diseases. Urbanization is also characterized by poverty and poor sanitation. 32Link to the text of the note Poverty is considered both a cause and an effect of widespread disease. For instance, poverty often results in malnutrition, which in turn weakens the population's ability to fight off diseases, such as malaria. Malaria can cause the deaths of up to half of a million children per year in sub-Saharan Africa alone, resulting in a loss of one percent of the region's GNP. 33Link to the text of the note Urbanization and poverty also contribute to overcrowding in hospitals and health care facilities, which then leads to a struggle with sterilization and isolation procedures. Cross-contamination through blood and instruments occurs more readily. Due to the favorable environment, microbes increase in number and become more diverse through mutations. If a virulent "bug" pops up, it has a good chance of becoming established quickly.¶ Urbanized areas are often large population centers and are served by [9] modern transportation routes. Once an individual becomes infected, they are only a plane ride away from anywhere in the world. 34Link to the text of the note Urbanization also causes destruction of natural habitats, resulting in the release of previously unknown infectious diseases. Many such diseases have been unleashed by the increased human contact with animal reservoirs, due to altered land-use patterns and changing movement of animal and human populations. 35Link to the text of the note In fact, many of the thirty or so new pathogens recognized in the past three decades originated in animals. 36Link to the text of the note¶ 2. The "T-way" of Global Plague¶ Through the pathways provided by the "3Ts" of globalization - travel, trade, and tourism - humans have inadvertently paved the way for pandemics. Two million people travel internationally everyday, 37Link to the text of the note with approximately five hundred million traveling by commercial airlines every year, 38Link to the text of the note and millions of tons of food, hazardous materials, and waste in transport daily. 39Link to the text of the note With international travel increasing by fifty percent each decade, the prospects of containing new outbreaks of disease are diminishing. 40Link to the text of the note We are no longer protected by formerly formidable natural barriers like oceans, and even less so by artificial barriers, such as political borders.¶ B. The "X" Factors: The Known, the Unknown, and the Unknowable¶ The factors discussed are complex and their impacts are still under study, but to some degree, they are "known" factors that are quantifiable in the calculus of planning for the future. There are also a number of biological, environmental, socioeconomic, cultural, legal, and political factors that continue to crop up in unpredictable manners. Some were previously unknown but have been factored into the problem equation. Others seem to be so random in occurrence and incalculable as to outcomes [10] that the ultimate impacts remain "unknowable."¶ 1. Microbial Resistance¶ Resistant strains to antibiotics developed within a few years of the discovery of antibiotics some fifty years ago. However, according to the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the difference now is that resistance is no longer an isolated problem, especially in hospitals. 41Link to the text of the note For example, in the United States, about seventy percent of bacteria causing infections in hospitals are resistant to at least one of the most common drugs used to treat them. 42Link to the text of the note In the United Kingdom, the infection rate for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, a common hospital contaminant, has risen six-hundred percent over the last ten years. 43Link to the text of the note The WHO warned that due to the overuse of antibiotics in rich countries and the under use in poor countries, drug resistance is a worldwide problem. The result is wasting of billions of dollars that could have been better spent on research and development (R&D) for infectious disease treatments over the last few years. 44Link to the text of the note¶ Antibiotics are not the only medicines with resistance problems. The main drugs used to combat AIDS, the so-called anti-retrovirals (ARVs), are also a source of concern. A recent study showed that ten percent of all newly infected patients in Europe 45Link to the text of the note are infected with drug-resistant strains. In San Francisco, the rate is twenty-seven percent. 46Link to the text of the note According to a recent survey of infectious disease specialists in the U.S., only forty-one percent of patients are able to be treated with the most commonly used ARV regimen, while another forty-five percent are on back-up regimens. For fourteen percent of infected patients, treatment with ARVs has all but failed. 47Link to the text of the note¶ [11] Experts agree that resistance is also a problem in the developing world, 48Link to the text of the note further complicated by factors such as counterfeit drugs, irregular access to treatments, environmental degradation, inconsistent compliance, and diversion of drugs to the black market. 49Link to the text of the note¶ 2. Sociocultural¶ None of the problems associated with the globalization of infectious diseases seem to be confined to one part of the world. For instance, half of reported polio cases worldwide occurred in Nigeria, due to disruption of vaccination efforts. This interruption stemmed from a rumor that the United States government was clandestinely implementing population control by adding contraceptives to the vaccine. 50Link to the text of the note In the U.S., a surgeon recently reported that a several-year-long effort to convince a hospital staff to regularly use a sixty percent alcohol gel for hand disinfection was almost thwarted by a rumor that the gel would reduce fertility. 51Link to the text of the note¶ Actions taken by the general public are often at cross-purposes with actions taken to protect the public health. One of the most crucial problems involved with tackling AIDS in the developing world is the extreme fear and social stigma associated with the disease. These sentiments are exemplified by violence and abuse against woman in Africa 52Link to the text of the note and discrimination against HIV patients by their own families and hospitals in India. 53Link to the text of the note In the U.S., the population is so risk-averse that the construction of three Biosafety Level Four labs in California, Texas, and Massachusetts are being vigorously disputed by residents. 54Link to the text of the note¶ [12] ¶ 3. Legal¶ The criminal element always seems to find a way to further complicate an already complicated situation, which is not dissimilar to opportunistic infections. Up to ten percent of the world's drug supply is counterfeit, and may be perhaps as high as fifty percent in many developing countries. 55Link to the text of the note Diversion of medicines to the black market is most common in certain parts of the developing world, but occurs universally. Serostim, a growth hormone prescribed to fight wasting syndrome in AIDS patients, has found an underground recreational use as a bodybuilding drug in the United States. The drug costs about eighty thousand dollars for a year's supply, often paid for by Medicaid, but on the black market, it can fetch two thousand dollars for a week's supply. 56Link to the text of the note Even a new disease, such as SARS, did not take long to develop a criminal element. In May 2002, the FDA issued a special alert regarding internet marketing of bogus SARS prevention products. 57Link to the text of the note¶ In addition to violations of the law, tensions exist within the law as well. The needs of bioscience and the concerns for biosecurity are often adverse. The regulations for "select agents" are so confusing that one researcher was reportedly arrested simply because he traversed a room where a select agent was stored. 58Link to the text of the note Such incidents are one reason why an international group of scientists seeks to keep SARS off the select agents list, arguing [13] that restrictions would stifle research and hurt public health efforts. 59Link to the text of the note However, other experts acknowledge that the transfer of knowledge among scientists is often a leaky process, and scientists may become unwitting accomplices to global bioterror. 60ALink to the text of the note careful balance must be struck between freedom in research endeavors and controls designed to prevent the misuse of material and knowledge. 61Link to the text of the note¶ Conflicts of law also exist between public health and privacy. Due to the evolving nature of the newly implemented medical privacy regulations under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 62Link to the text of the note state health officials believe themselves to be limited in releasing information regarding deaths from the flu or other reportable diseases, due to new legal protections afforded to patients. However, HIPAA contains a public health exception, and most officials argue that releasing certain information is required by state public health laws to provide information about risk factors that the public should be aware of. 63Link to the text of the note¶ The United States Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) has become embroiled in this problem as well. SEC regulations are an issue, not only due to antitrust laws prohibiting collaboration on countermeasures by "competing" companies, 64Link to the text of the note but also due to accounting regulations that determine when a company can recognize revenue from a stockpile. Under the current scheme, the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) plans to purchase vaccines, but have companies store them until needed to avoid additional cost and logistical problems for HHS. Problems then arise under current SEC regulations, as entities may not declare revenue from undelivered products. 65Link to the text of the note¶ [14] ¶ 4. The Ultimate "X" Factor¶ Global infectious disease, bioterror, and national security are becoming strange bedfellows. The HHS Secretary announced in the fall of 2003 that grants totaling 350 million dollars over five years would be made available for the establishment of eight Regional Centers of Excellence for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases Research (RCEs), stating: "These new grants add to this effort and will not only better prepare us for a bioterrorism attack, but will also enhance our ability to deal with any public health crisis, such as SARS… ." 66Link to the text of the note Concern regarding the public health crisis precipitated by SARS was believed to have caused some "holdouts" waffling on support of Bioshield to come on board. 67Link to the text of the note The President of the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials believes that the infusion of dollars into bioterrorism awareness has helped to improve the public health system capacity to deal with health emergencies in general. 68Link to the text of the note¶ Internationally, the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) discussed a health issue for the first time as a threat to world stability: HIV/AIDS in Africa. 69Link to the text of the note The African, Caribbean, and Pacific Ocean sectors of the World Trade Organization (WTO) petitioned the WTO's Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to find a solution to the deadlock over access to affordable drugs, as the outbreak of diseases such as SARS had made it "a matter of urgency." 70Link to the text of the note The deadlock was broken. In a report by the United States National Intelligence Council, experts emphasized the worldwide threat presented by infectious disease to military capacity, socioeconomic development, international trade and travel, and global stability. 71Link to the text of the note¶ [15] However, common goals can sometimes result in competition instead of cooperation when time, money, and resources are limited. The media reported that National Institute of Health (NIH) studies on AIDS, TB, malaria, and other infectious diseases would be shortened in length due to a White House mandate shifting funding to development of an anthrax vaccine. 72Link to the text of the note While the NIAID budget grew twenty-fold from 1980 to 2004, the increase was mainly due to efforts to combat changing priorities of life-threatening infectious diseases, such as AIDS in the 1990s and bioterror in the 2000s. 73Link to the text of the note In fact, the NIAID budget allotment for AIDS R&D has flat lined for 2002 through 2005, while the biodefense budget went up from $ 200 million in 2002 to $ 1.6 billion slated for 2005. 74Link to the text of the note In a survey of nearly four hundred scientists, forty-six percent felt that government spending on bioterror R&D diverts monies from more important investigative work. 75Link to the text of the note Internationally, in January 2002, the WHO's Executive Board stated that it was focusing attention on the health effects of poverty, but also needed to devote attention to preparations for "newer threats such as the deliberate use of anthrax and smallpox agents." 76Link to the text of the note¶ C. The World as a Marketplace, Health Care as a Business¶ Due to the globalization of infectious diseases, the distinction between national and international public health programs have as little relevance as political borders. 77Link to the text of the note However, this also implies that public health counter-measures must be considered within the context of market realities driving globalization. There is a strengthening current within the international public health community to consider access to health care as a universal human right shared by rich and poor alike. 78Link to the text of the note However, one must inquire: Where does the money for health research come from? Independent [16] foundations and charities contribute only about four percent of the billions spent globally each year on health research. 79Link to the text of the note Regarding medicine, a sizeable amount of the funding for basic research comes from governments, but the lion's share of the funding for applied research that turns concepts brewing in test-tubes on lab benches into bottles for injection on clinic shelves comes from private industry. In particular, these are the major pharmaceutical companies, also known as "big pharma." 80Link to the text of the note¶ They don't call it big pharma for nothing! The industry's financial might and resources are impressive. When the list of the world's one hundred largest public companies by market value is released each year, close to one-fifth are pharmaceutical companies. Monsanto, a life-science multinational corporation, has a R&D budget more than twice the R&D budget of the entire worldwide network of public sector tropical medicines research institutes. 81Link to the text of the note¶ These resources must be brought to bear if the global community is to make any headway against the globalization of infectious diseases. However, this is where the economic and political realities of globalization are actualized. According to previous work on providing incentives to industry to conduct R&D for neglected parasitic and infectious diseases in the developing world, five disincentives must be addressed: lack of interest on the part of big pharma; an unfavorable cost/risk ratio for big pharma; the fact that only impoverished markets exist for the products of such R&D; the difficulty of directing capacity in the Northern hemisphere to address the needs of the South; and the realities of the vaccine market. 82Link to the text of the note

## Case

### AT: Solvency

#### IP protections don’t cause disease spread because patent incidence is low and independently increases access- prefer empirics.

Stevens 04 [Philip Stevens, Director of Health Projects at the International Policy Network. “Diseases of poverty and the 10/90 Gap.” November 2004. <https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/InternationalPolicyNetwork.pdf>] AL

Much debate on this issue of access has centred around the claim that patents held by pharmaceutical companies are a significant contributor to the dire health outcomes experienced by people in the poorest parts of the world. This claim is based on the premise that pharmaceutical companies use their patents to withhold drugs from poorer people in order to maximise their profits. However, **this premise is false.** A study by Amir Attaran has shown that in 65 low- and middleincome countries, where four billion people live, **patenting is rare for the 319 products** on the World Health Organisation’s Model List of Essential Medicines. Only seventeen essential medicines on the list are on patent in any of the countries, so that **overall patent incidence is low (1.4 percent)** and concentrated in larger markets. Those drugs on patent include 12 antiretrovirals and one antifungal, with most of those ARVs belonging to one company.30 Furthermore, **many companies choose not to enforce their patents** in certain lower-income countries. Of the 969 cases surveyed by Attaran where companies probably could have obtained and maintained patents for these essential medicines, they did so only 31 per cent of the time. However, intellectual property rights (IPR) are still important factor in ensuring access to essential medicines. Without IPR, it is **unlikely that sufficient incentives would have existed to develop many of the 319 products on the WHO’s essential medicines list in the first place.** This is substantiated by the fact that 90 per cent of the products on the list were originally discovered and/or developed by private companies.31

#### Equitable distribution of vaccines can’t combat disease spread because of other barriers like vaccine uptake, effectiveness, durability, eligibility factors, logistical problems, and mutations- ignore aff’s myopic promotions. The debate is over- they had NO IP key warrant or card in the whole 1AC, even in the solvency section!

MacLeod 2-10 [Iain MacLeod, co-founder and CEO of Aldatu Biosciences of Watertown, Massachusetts, which develops novel viral diagnostics, including those for pathogens such as SARS-CoV-2, and a research associate at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. “Do the math: Vaccines alone won’t get us out of this pandemic.” February 10, 2021. <https://www.statnews.com/2021/02/10/vaccines-alone-wont-end-pandemic/>] AL

But it seems as if there is light at the end of the tunnel. As long as we maintain social distancing, keep wearing masks, and washing our hands, it feels to many as though we can hold on until we get vaccinated. I’m sorry to be writing the words that follow, but here they are: We can’t vaccinate our way out of this pandemic. And the myopic focus on achieving herd immunity through mass vaccination may even make it tougher for America — and the world — to defeat Covid-19. Don’t get me wrong: Mass vaccination is essential. But herd immunity is a numbers game. It is defined as the point at which community spread of a disease stops because unprotected individuals are surrounded by a “herd” of people who are immune to infection, making it difficult, if not impossible, for infected people to pass on the disease. Many experts have said we will achieve herd immunity when about 70% of the population is immune to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes Covid-19, either through vaccination or by having had Covid-19. How do we reach that number? It’s harder than it seems. For starters, while the Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna vaccines showed about 95% efficacy in the clinical trials, **vaccine effectiveness** — how well a vaccine performs under real-world conditions — is likely to be lower for several reasons. One is that the people who participate in clinical trials are an imperfect representation of the whole population. They tend to be healthier, and younger. Real-world factors such as vaccine transportation and storage can also reduce vaccine effectiveness. Say the Moderna and Pfizer vaccines now being given across the country achieve 90% effectiveness. Vaccinating 70% of U.S. residents puts us at 63% immunity. So, we’ll need to vaccinate a full 80% of the population to reach the herd immunity threshold. **Additional vaccines are starting to be approved. Some of them have lower efficacy.** For instance, the AstraZeneca vaccine has about 70% efficacy, and Johnson & Johnson has reported that its one-dose vaccine has 66% efficacy. Their real-world performance could be lower still. If these vaccines become part of the mix in the U.S., actual protection will be lower than the estimated 90% we’d get from just the Moderna and Pfizer vaccines. There are other barriers to achieving herd immunity. Vaccine uptake — how many people actually get vaccinated — is far below the level we need, in part because Covid-19 beliefs have been politicized in the U.S. and a percentage of the population doesn’t even believe the disease is real. In a Kaiser Health News survey released near the end of January, 13% of Americans said they would “definitely not” get vaccinated, 7% would take the vaccine only if it was “required,” and another 31% would “wait and see how it’s working” before getting vaccinated. Not encouraging numbers for those hoping for a quick journey to herd immunity. Even when ample vaccine supplies are restored — perhaps by President Biden invoking the Defense Production Act — other factors will further drive down the number of people who get vaccinated. Eligibility factors currently exclude approximately 25% of U.S. residents from Covid-19 vaccination. The Pfizer vaccine can be administered only to those age 16 and up; for the Moderna vaccine, it’s those 18 and up. This represents approximately 20% of the population. Furthermore, although the CDC says that pregnant people may get vaccinated, it stops short of a clear recommendation. The decision is a “personal choice” left up to individuals and their health care providers. Excluding those currently ineligible for vaccination against SARS-CoV-2 due to age or other conditions leaves 75% of Americans with no restrictions on vaccination. Factoring in the 13% of Americans who definitely don’t want the vaccine and the 7% who would get it only if it was required means just 49.5% of Americans would have immunity in the near future. If half of those who are in a wait-and-see mode don’t get vaccinated — another 15% of the population — then we are looking at just 40% vaccine coverage of the currently eligible population, far below the 70% needed for herd immunity. And that’s even before considering that real-world vaccine effectiveness will be below clinical trial levels. The young people who aren’t cleared to get the Moderna and Pfizer vaccines have proven to be highly efficient asymptomatic spreaders of Covid-19. Leaving this population unprotected will enable the disease to continue to spread widely. Finally, we don’t yet know the durability of the immune response to the various vaccines. It may persist. Or it may wear off, leaving people vulnerable after they’ve been vaccinated and creating conditions for new outbreaks. If my years of global health work on the HIV/AIDS epidemic has taught me anything, it’s that even the best laid plans can’t anticipate every challenge. To vaccinate 75% of the U.S. population, approximately 248 million people — that’s nearly 500 million doses — are needed. And it means we need to be vaccinating nearly 2 million people a day so all of them are immune by the fall of 2021. As I write this, we’re vaccinating only about 1 million people a day. At that pace, Reuters estimates it would take until April 2022 for 75% of Americans to receive at least their first vaccine dose. And that’s only if everything goes well logistically (it won’t) and if there are no further mutations in SARS-CoV-2 that make combating it more difficult (there will be). It’s time to stop promoting the myopic belief that the unrealistic goal of herd immunity can be achieved in 2021 and start looking to reinforcing all aspects of the health care response as we start to concede that Covid-19 will become an endemic disease that will continue to lurk in the population. For the foreseeable future, that means continued physical distancing; occupancy limits in restaurants and other retail establishments; replacement of physical menus with smart phone-based menus to prevent surface spread of the virus, and more. We’ll also need to monitor people who have been vaccinated to gauge the durability of the immune system’s response and whether booster shots are necessary, as they are for tetanus and diphtheria. Finally, our nation’s public health infrastructure will need to be bolstered, putting in place new protocols to monitor for new variants of the virus as soon as they emerge. Can we defeat Covid-19? We can and we will. But setting sights on a near-term goal of achieving herd immunity ignores the math that governs the spread of disease. That approach is going to take a while. To get past Covid-19, we need to use all the tools available.

### AT: Pandemics

**On RECNA- it’s been over a year and a half, why haven’t nuke wars triggered in the squo?**

**On Ord- again, this card was written in March 2020, the START of the pandemic; COVID extinction should have triggered already. It doesn’t say that the next pandemic will kill us, just that its easier for pandemics to spread now. If COVID didn’t kill, no pandemic will**

**Overreliance on vaccines hurts pandemic response at large**

**Lovelace 1/13** [Berkeley Lovelace Jr., health-care reporter for CNBC, mainly covering pharmaceuticals and the Food and Drug Administration. “WHO says Covid vaccines aren’t ‘silver bullets’ and relying entirely on them has hurt nations,” CNBC, 1-13-2021, accessed 8-11-2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/15/who-says-covid-vaccines-arent-silver-bullets-and-relying-entirely-on-them-has-hurt-nations.html] HWIC

The World Health Organization said Friday that [coronavirus](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/15/coronavirus-live-updates.html) vaccines aren’t “silver bullets” and relying solely on them to fight the pandemic has hurt nations. Some countries in Europe, Africa and the Americas are seeing spikes in Covid-19 cases “because we are collectively not succeeding at breaking the chains of transmission at the community level or within households,” WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said during a news conference from the agency’s Geneva headquarters. With [global deaths reaching 2 million](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/15/coronavirus-live-updates.html) and new variants of the virus appearing in multiple countries, world leaders need to do all they can to curb infections “through tried and tested public health measures,” Tedros said. “There is only one way out of this storm and that is to share the tools we have and commit to using them together.” The [coronavirus](https://www.cnbc.com/coronavirus/) has infected more than 93.3 million people worldwide and killed at least 2 million since the pandemic began about a year ago, according to data compiled by Johns Hopkins University. The virus continues to accelerate in some regions, with nations reporting that their supply of oxygen for Covid-19 patients is running “dangerously low,” the WHO said. Some countries, including the U.S., have focused heavily on the use of vaccines to combat their outbreaks. While vaccines are a useful tool, they will not end the pandemic alone, Mike Ryan, executive director of the WHO’s health emergencies program, said at the news conference. “We warned in 2020 that if we were to rely entirely on vaccines as the only solution, we could lose the very controlled measures that we had at our disposal at the time. And I think to some extent that has come true,” Ryan said, adding the colder seasons and the recent holidays also may have also played a role in the spread of the virus. “A big portion of the transmission has occurred because we are reducing our physical distancing. ... We are not breaking the chains of transmission. The virus is exploiting our lack of tactical commitment,” he added. “We are not doing as well as we could.” Dr. Bruce Aylward, a senior advisor to the WHO’s director-general, echoed Ryan’s comments, saying, vaccines are not “silver bullets” “Things can get worse, numbers can go up,” he said. We have vaccines, yes. But we have limited supplies of vaccines that will be rolled out slowly across the world. And vaccines are not perfect. They don’t protect everyone against every situation.” In the U.S., the pace of vaccinations is going slower than officials had hoped. As of Friday at 6 a.m. ET, more than 31.1 million doses of vaccine had been distributed across the U.S., but just over 12.2 million shots have been administered, according to data compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Meanwhile, cases are rapidly growing, with the U.S. recording at least 238,800 new Covid-19 cases and at least 3,310 virus-related deaths each day, based on a seven-day average calculated by CNBC using Johns Hopkins data. On Thursday, President-elect Joe Biden [unveiled a sweeping plan](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/14/biden-unveils-sweeping-plan-to-combat-the-covid-pandemic-in-the-us.html) to combat the coronavirus pandemic in the United States. While his administration will invest billions in a vaccine campaign, it will also scale up testing, invest in new treatments and work to identify new strains, among other measures.

#### A vaccine waiver greenlights counterfeit medicine – independently turns Case.

Conrad 5-18 John Conrad 5-18-2021 "Waiving intellectual property rights is not in the best interests of patients" <https://archive.is/vsNXv#selection-5353.0-5364.0> (president and CEO of the Illinois Biotechnology Innovation Organization in Chicago.)//Elmer

The Biden's administration's support for India and South Africa's proposal before the World Trade Organization to temporarily waive anti-COVID vaccine patents to boost its supply will fuel the **development of counterfeit vaccines and weaken the already strained global supply chain**. The proposal will not increase the effective number of COVID-19 vaccines in India and other countries. The manufacturing standards to produce COVID-19 vaccines are **exceptionally complicated**; it is unlike any other manufacturing process. To ensure patient safety and efficacy, only manufacturers with the **proper facilities and training should produce the vaccine, and they are**. Allowing a temporary waiver that permits compulsory licensing to allow a manufacturer to export counterfeit vaccines will **cause confusion and endanger public health**. For example, between 60,000 and 80,000 children in Niger with fatal falciparum malaria were treated with a counterfeit vaccine containing incorrect active pharmaceutical ingredients, resulting in more than **100 fatal infections.** Beyond the patients impacted, counterfeit drugs erode public confidence in health care systems and the pharmaceutical industry. Vaccine hesitancy is a rampant threat that feeds off of the distribution of misinformation. Allowing the production of vaccines from improper manufacturing facilities further opens the door for antivaccine hacks to stoke the fear fueling **vaccine hesitance**.

#### No nuclear escalation – historical empirics prove checks solve.

Tertrais, PhD, ‘17

(Bruno, PoliSci@SciencesPo, “On The Brink”—Really? Revisiting Nuclear Close Calls Since 1945, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 2) BW

Why have nuclear weapons not been used since 1945? The more time passes, the more the question becomes relevant and even puzzling for pessimists. Most strategists of the 1960s would be stunned to hear that as of 2017, there still has yet to be another nuclear use in anger. The prospects of a “nuclear weapons ban” or recurring proposals for “de-alerting”—instituting changes that can lengthen the time required to actually use the weapons—make the question even more relevant. Has mankind really stood “on the brink” several times since Nagasaki, and have we avoided nuclear catastrophe mostly because of pure “luck”? 1 Recent books, articles, and reports, as well as two wide-audience documentaries, say yes.2

This is not the case. The absence of any deliberate nuclear explosion (except for testing) since 1945 can simply be explained by human prudence and the efficiency of mechanisms devoted to the guardianship of nuclear weapons. Banning nuclear weapons may or may not be a good idea. But it should not be based on the myth of an inherently and permanently high risk of nuclear use.

The analysis that follows covers the deliberate use of nuclear weapons by a legitimate authority, either by error (“false alarm”) or not (“nuclear crisis”). It does not cover the risk of an accidental nuclear explosion, an unauthorized launch, or a terrorist act.3 It covers 37 different known episodes, including 25 alleged nuclear crises and twelve technical incidents, which have been mentioned in the literature to one degree or another as potentially dangerous.4

The short answer? If we are to discard Pope John Paul II’s explanation (“Divine Providence”),5 it is that the system worked and that, with rare exceptions, those in charge of nuclear weapons have been responsible, prudent, and careful. “Close calls” have ranged in fact from “not-so-close” to “very distant.”

False Alarms

A number of technical incidents have taken place since 1945, all of which led to one degree or another to nuclear precautionary measures, generally involving the elevation of alert levels. Most of these incidents are well documented, but one of them does not seem to have taken place at all. It was revealed in 2015 that in the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a Mace missile squadron based in Okinawa received a launch order.6 The ambassador of a Latin American country to the United Nations claimed that this incident “could have altered the course of civilization forever.” 7 One should note that according to the account—based on a single testimony—the safeguards worked: given that the procedure was not respected (the order came at DEFCON-2, whereas it was supposed to happen only at DEFCON-1), the unit commander suspended the launch.8 In any case, an in-depth inquiry by Stars & Stripes magazine at the end of 2015 did not find any confirmation of the incident; U.S. Air Force historians did not find any trace of it.9

At least a dozen real incidents took place in the United States in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. (Even though there is little or no evidence that as many happened in other countries, one should assume that some also occurred in the Soviet Union or elsewhere.)10 In these cases, alert levels were elevated due to a false alarm, generally caused by the malfunction of a technical system. For instance, in 1960 a U.S. early warning radar in Greenland confused the moonrise with a missile launch.11 In 1961, a dysfunctional transmitter made the Strategic Air Command (SAC) believe that its lines of communication had been cut off.12 In 1962, a cascade of minor incidents and misinterpretation led to bombers being put on alert.13 The same year, a rare conjunction of events led a U.S. radar station to believe that a Soviet missile attack was underway.14 Something similar occurred in 1967, when a solar storm jammed three early warning radars.15 In 1980, two incidents caused by faulty computer chips led U.S. authorities to mistakenly believe that a Soviet attack could be underway.16

In the Soviet Union, a well-known 1983 incident of the same sort was recently publicized through a documentary entitled The Man Who Saved The World (2014), according to which “millions of lives were hanging by a thread,” and no less than “the end of our civilization” was at stake.17 A more sobering account of the incident casts serious doubts on whether this was actually the case. When the alarm sounded in the Soviet nuclear command center because of a U.S. missile launch, the officer in charge suspected that it was a mistake and requested visual confirmation. Such confirmation never came, and the command thus stood down.18

Some incidents involve direct human errors. This was the case for the infamous magnetic tape mistake of 1979, which went up the chain of command to the U.S. presidency. Woken up by a phone call announcing that 200 missiles were coming in the direction of U.S. territory, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski requested a confirmation.19 He was informed a couple of minutes later that ten times that number of missiles had now been detected. The cause was the insertion of a tape used for training and exercises in SAC computers. Nobody knows what President Jimmy Carter would have done had Brzezinski told him that he only had a few minutes to decide, but can one seriously believe that he would have launched a massive counter-strike in the absence of any confirmation that an attack was underway?

In a few of these incidents, a real launch caused confusion. In 1980, for instance, the Soviet Union launched four submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) as part of an exercise, and a U.S. early warning radar wrongly judged that one of them was going in the direction of the United States. This evaluation was quickly corrected.20

The Norwegian rocket launch of 1995 belongs in the same category and has become another poster child for nuclear dangers. However, the episode should rather be taken as a testimony to Russian cool-headedness. Norwegian and American scientists launched a new type of rocket, the Black Brant XII, in order to study weather data; they had sent word of the launch to Moscow, but the information had not reached the appropriate authorities. Since Black Brant XII was new, large, and with a high-altitude trajectory, its launch was interpreted as a possible missile strike. Some in the general staff raised the hypothesis of a highaltitude electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) detonation. Yeltsin considered an interception, but it soon became clear that Russia was not a target. “After the rocket emerged onto a ballistic curve, the direction of the flight became clear, and we could see that it would in no way touch on Russian territory, but land in the Spitsbergen region—we calmed down and took no serious measures … ”21 Generals Vladimir Dvorkin, a well-known Russian expert, and Eugene Habiger, former head of STRATCOM, denied that the incident had any character of gravity.22

The System Worked

Based on the above examples, one must wonder: is luck a necessary hypothesis to explain why none of these events led to nuclear war? Is it not at least equally possible that since 1945, people in charge of nuclear weapons “have taken greater care [of them] than is taken in any other situation involving human agents and complex mechanical systems”? 23

Nuclear-armed countries have set up mechanisms designed to ensure that nuclear weapons will not be used by mistake. This includes fail-safe procedures (where non-use remains the default condition up until the last possible moment) as well as dual phenomenology (the need to confirm the attack by two independent means relying on different physical principles). When The Man Who Saved The World was shown in New York City, the Russian mission to the United Nations issued a communiqué that stated: “Under no circumstances a decision to use nuclear weapons could be made or even considered in the Soviet Union (Russia) or in the United States on the basis of data from a single source or a system. For this to happen, a confirmation is necessary from several systems: ground-based radars, early-warning satellites, intelligence reports, etc.” 24 In all the incidents mentioned above, safety mechanisms worked, even in the early 1960s when they were still rudimentary.

Furthermore, is it credible to imagine that the head of a State or government would order a nuclear strike without being certain that a major military attack was underway? U.S. nuclear expert Jeffrey G. Lewis rightly argues that he cannot imagine that an American president would embark in nuclear reprisals if there was the slightest doubt on the reality of the attack.25 Retired Russian General Vladimir Dvorkin thinks similarly, claiming that “No president, no matter what president it is, will ever make a decision about launch-onwarning based on information about one rocket or missile or even … two or three missiles.” 26

From the point of view of logic and complex systems analysis, it remains possible that a combination of incidents can lead to the failure of all safety mechanisms designed to prevent accidental nuclear war. Such a thesis is embodied by the classic work of Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety. It would thus only be “a matter of time” due to cumulative probabilities.27 In a recent documentary about nuclear risks, author Eric Schlosser reiterates the point: “it’s also due to luck, pure luck, and the problem with luck is that eventually it runs out … Every machine ever invented eventually goes wrong.” 28

But the probability of failure increases markedly with time only if conditions do not change—and conditions do change. Safety mechanisms have been perfected (without necessarily becoming more complex) and lessons of past incidents are being learned. Sagan claimed in 1993 that the Yom Kippur war (see below), as well as the 1979 and 1980 incidents (see above), are proof that organizations fail to learn from experience. But if that was the case, why would the number of known incidents have significantly declined since 1983? We only know of one significant incident in nearly 35 years: the Black Brant XII episode. Charles Perrow, the father of “normal accidents” theory (those resulting from the complexity and interconnection of systems), wrote: “with regard to firing [nuclear weapons] after a false warning we reach a surprising conclusion, one I was not prepared for: because of the safety systems involved in a launchon-warning scenario, it is virtually impossible for well-intended actions to bring about an accidental attack.” 29

Nuclear Crises

A second type of crisis involves episodes during which there was an alleged risk of deliberate nuclear use. One has to differentiate between types of crises: to say that the use of nuclear weapons was “discussed” for instance, is different from “considered” or from “planned.” A closer look at them suggests that in most cases, there was an elevation of alert levels and/or various forms of nuclear signaling, and in some cases contingency planning, but no evidence of intention of, or temptation to, actually employ nuclear weapons in almost all cases. As is the case for false alarms, many of the known cases involve U.S. nuclear forces. But there is no evidence in the public domain that the Soviet Union ever considered the use of nuclear weapons outside the East–West confrontation, for instance.

False Nuclear Events

One should start with the nuclear crises that were not. Many episodes sometimes labeled as such did not have any nuclear dimension. There was no “nuclear ultimatum” during the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946, for instance, despite what President Truman himself claimed.30 Nor was there any significant nuclear dimension to the Falklands war of 1982, despite reports to the contrary.31

On some of the most-often mentioned episodes, there are important question marks. The famous Kissinger “DEFCON 3” initiative of October 1973, aimed at deterring Moscow from intervening in the Middle East during the Yom Kippur war, involved all U.S. forces, not merely nuclear ones. There was never any explicit nuclear signal or threat during the crisis, and it is far from certain that nuclear weapons per se played any role then.32

Likewise for the Kashmir crisis of 1990, a moment of high tension between Pakistan and India. Despite initial reports to the contrary, which were thinly sourced, it seems that there was never any significant nuclear dimension in it— if at all. A roundtable organized in 1994 involving participants in the crisis concluded that the two countries were never on the nuclear brink during that spring.33 Another in-depth study of the crisis one year later led to the same conclusion.34 There may have been confusion between regular, unrelated Pakistani nuclear activities and deliberate crisis-time decisions.35 The former head of Pakistani weapons designs has stated that his country did not have a weaponized device at the time.36

One crisis deserves a separate treatment. By the fall of 1983, a particularly tense moment of the Cold War, NATO was conducting the final phase (Able Archer) of its annual Autumn Forge exercise, which was more elaborate than in previous years.37 Moscow increased the alert of a significant number of forces including nuclear units. NATO simulated nuclear strikes on the 9th and 11th of November. How dangerous was the crisis? A 2008 British documentary claimed that the world had come very close to catastrophe,38 but more information is available today. “We knew that NATO were [sic] doing an exercise,” said General Ivan Yesin, then head of Soviet strategic forces.39 His opinion is reflected by those of other former Soviet and Warsaw Pact officials.40 Note that by November 11, even as the NATO exercise reached its climax, the Soviet alert had been withdrawn and normal flights had resumed. Most indepth analyses of the 1983 crisis all concur that Moscow did not really fear an attack and that the alert was just a precautionary one.41 One should also note that the Pershing 2 missiles, which were in Moscow’s view a possible instrument for a surprise attack, had not yet been deployed to Germany: the first ones arrived on November 23.

Nuclear Signaling

Instances of deliberate nuclear signaling through verbal threats or ad hoc deployments were frequent during the Cold War, and most of them have been well documented: the Berlin blockade of 1948–1949, the Suez crisis of 1956, the status of Berlin crisis of 1958, the U.S. intervention in Lebanon that same year, the October 1962 retaliatory threat by President Kennedy, the Sino–Soviet Ussuri skirmishes of 1969, the India–Pakistan war of 1971, and the Vietnam War all belong to that category. But there is no evidence in the public domain that such episodes included either nuclear contingency planning or serious consideration of nuclear use.

What about India–Pakistan crises post-1998 (the year both countries tested nuclear devices)? In 1999, there were threats on both sides, and some evidence of an increase in alert levels of Indian missiles.42 There is no clear evidence of the same steps being taken on the Pakistani side: during the crisis, the head of Pakistani nuclear forces was in Switzerland.43 This is also true for the 2001– 2002 “Twin Peaks” crisis, during which there is no evidence, despite some heated rhetoric, that either of the two sides was ready to embark in nuclear brinkmanship. A former Pakistani nuclear official reports that Islamabad did not change the alert level of its forces during the crisis.44

The Ukrainian crisis that began in 2014 has seen many small nuclear signals, including an increase in flights of Russian nuclear-capable bombers around the European continent. But the only known instance of a clear nuclear-related threat by Russian authorities referred to a hypothetical past situation. In 2015, answering a question about raising alert levels at the height of the Crimean crisis a few months before, Vladimir Putin said, “We were ready to do it,” but seemed to refer to a situation where Western forces would have tried to repel Russia in Crimea, since he added, “Historically, this territory is ours. Russians live there. They were in danger.” 45 Hardly a case of nuclear coercion.

Contingency Planning

Then we have crises where contingency planning was indeed made—an indication that nuclear use was possible. However, there is no evidence that any political leader had his or her “finger on the button” in any of these episodes. In some cases, the use of nuclear weapons was suggested by subordinates and not pursued further. Twice in 1950, General MacArthur suggested such use in Korea, but his requests were rejected.46 In 1967, some in the Israeli government seem to have considered a nuclear demonstration in the Sinai if Egypt threatened the country’s urban centers.47 In 1968, U.S. commanders in Vietnam recommended the use of theater nuclear weapons to defend Khe Sanh, but senior military authorities disagreed.48 In 1973, it seems that part of Israel’s nuclear arsenal was put on alert49—but even at the darkest hour, as is now known through the testimony of a direct witness, Prime Minister Golda Meir categorically refused the nuclear demonstration suggested by General Moshe Dayan.50 Finally, in 1980, a Pentagon study reportedly considered the same option in case of a Soviet invasion of Iran;51 but the contingency never came up.

The more interesting cases are those where the approach was “top-down,” i.e. where nuclear contingency planning was ordered by the highest political authorities. In 1954, Washington considered striking the Vietminh’s positions around Dien Bien Phu to support the beleaguered French forces.52 President Eisenhower was reluctant: he wanted to do it only in the case of an international intervention; he also doubted the added value of nuclear (as opposed to conventional) weapons. In any case, “Eisenhower never came close to approving any action to save Dien Bien Phu,” as former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy describes.53

During the 1961 Berlin crisis, nuclear options were discussed in depth—a discussion that contributed to the emergence of the flexible response doctrine—but only in case of a war over Berlin, which never materialized.54

In 1969, Henry Kissinger ordered the Pentagon to elaborate bombing plan Duck Hook, designed to force Hanoi to negotiate. It is possible (though still not certain to this day) that it included small-scale nuclear options. The plan was shortlived.55 Despite his bravado, President Nixon was aware of the political costs of using nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia.56 In fact, Kissinger said later that during his time in government, “there was no situation in which we were involved, in which we ever made a plan for using nuclear weapons [apart from the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP, the massive war plan to respond to a Soviet attack)].” 57 The famous journalist Seymour Hersh himself, a staunch critic of the administration, admits that he never found any evidence of an imminent use of nuclear weapons at that time.58

Finally, one should mention the 1990 request by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to evaluate the results of a use of theater nuclear weapons on Iraqi forces. Mr. Cheney would later say that he was acting out of “curiosity” and for the sake of “comprehensiveness.” The study was immediately destroyed.59

Serious Consideration of Nuclear Use

We are left then with three cases where the use of nuclear weapons seems to have been very seriously considered: the Korean War, the two Formosa Strait crises in the 1950s, and of course the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Korea and Formosa

As soon as the Korean War began, President Truman ordered the preparation of attack plans in case the Soviet Union was to enter the fray.60 He sent B29 nuclear bombers twice in the region, in 1950 and 1951—the second time with several assembled weapons. However, in June 1951, a Joint Staff study threw cold water on these plans by concluding an absence of “good” targets for nuclear use.61

The use of nuclear weapons was also seriously discussed several times at the beginning of the Eisenhower administration, between February and May 1953.62 One contingency plan involved the large-scale tactical and strategic (on Chinese territory) use of nuclear weapons.63 On May 20, the U.S. president secretly approved this option in the form of a memorandum entitled “NSC Action 794” to be executed if circumstances warranted a resumption of offensive action—which never came, since the Armistice was signed in July.64 As described by Columbia University professor Richard Betts, “NSC Action 794 was not a commitment, but it was as close to a final decision as a president can come, short of the moment of execution.” 65 Nobody knows what Eisenhower would have decided had fighting erupted again.

In any event, several reasons prevented the use of nuclear weapons during the Korean War.66 As documented, inter alia, by Nina Tannenwald and T.V. Paul, both presidents appeared seriously concerned with the international reputation of the United States.67 And in almost all scenarios, the use of nuclear weapons did not offer any prospect to make a serious difference on the ground.68

During the Formosa Strait (also known as the Taiwan Strait) crises of 1954– 1955 as well as 1958, nuclear use was seriously considered in case of an invasion of Taiwan.69 But that was to come only as a last resort, for fear of allied reactions or Soviet escalation. Eisenhower was prepared but not “anxious” to use nuclear weapons.70 Despite his public positions on the subject, a U.S. Air Force report made clear that “the President simply did not accept the contention that nuclear weapons were as conventional as high explosives.” 71

Cuba

The Cuban Missile Crisis seems to remain the only moment since 1945 when the world came really close to nuclear use. This refers less to the retaliatory threat that President Kennedy publicly made in case a missile was launched against the Americas,72 instead referring more to three specific episodes about which the details only became public in the 1990s.

First, on October 24, 1962, the U.S. Navy attempted to force a B29 Soviet submarine to surface. The U.S. crew was unable to reach the general staff.73 An “exhausted” and “furious” Soviet captain Vassili Savitsky considered putting the ship’s 15-kiloton nuclear torpedo in operational condition. He told his crew: “We’re going to blast them now! We will die, but we will sink them all—we will not disgrace our Navy.” 74 The traditional account holds that only the fortuitous presence in the submarine of the fleet commander, Vassili Arkhipov, prevented the shot, since he voted against it. But this version is questionable. According to the Soviet Navy rules, the circumstances for allowing the torpedo strike were not met: written rules of engagement stated that it was possible only on Moscow’s orders.75 Also, it is by no means certain that any real vote took place. The commander “consulted” Arkhipov and deputy political officer Ivan Maslennikov—and they were both opposed. Viktor Mikhailov, an officer on board, testified that “Savitski never lost it.” 76

In the second episode, on October 27 at the height of the crisis, U.S. radars in Alaska detected two Soviet MiG-19s attempting to intercept a U.S. U2 reconnaissance plane, which was flying towards the Kola Peninsula due to a navigation error. Two U.S. F-102s took off to accompany the plane, armed with Falcon nuclear airto-air missiles. However, Khrushchev declared in his memoirs that the Soviet Union would not have intercepted the plane under such circumstances (even less with nuclear missiles) before ascertaining that it was not a navigation error.77

In the third episode, Soviet forces in Cuba were endowed with theater nuclear weapons, and rules of engagement initially allowed them to be used in case of an invasion if no contact with Moscow was possible. However, Khrushchev took the initiative on October 26 to alter those rules as to ensure that a Kremlin order would be a prerequisite.78

The Tradition of Non-Use Is Strong

The Cuban crisis reveals that Soviet and U.S. officials were able to refrain from foolish judgments even in conditions of extreme stress. Adversaries have never put at stake the “vital interests” of their opponents—either because they were unable to, or because they never intended to, or simply because they feared retaliation. The barriers to the use of nuclear weapons were solid, and the “tradition of non-use” emerged very quickly.

One last element of the anti-nuclear narrative deserves discussion. There is no certainty at all that any use of a nuclear weapon would turn into a major nuclear war. Yes, Cuba was a time of great danger. But why would the use of a nuclear torpedo, for instance, necessarily have led to a global thermonuclear exchange? Is it not at least equally likely that the two countries would have done their best to limit escalation? It is possible, as Herman Kahn famously argued, that “the nuclear threshold is not so weak that a single use of nuclear weapons would make anyone careless about crossing it a second time.” 79

Escalation in the nuclear age would not necessarily be a descent into the abyss. It might very well be the equivalent of walking up a staircase where the last stairs are considerably higher than the first ones. Resistance to actual use or launch could increase as one moves up the escalation ladder—not unlike two magnets repelling each other.

The narrative claiming that the world has stood many times “on the brink of apocalypse,” or that we were within a “hair’s breadth” of a nuclear catastrophe, thus deserves deconstruction. It discards the strength of the technical, operational, or mental safety valves that prevent nuclear use. Stanislas Petrov, the “man who saved the world,” was not a superhero who single-handedly stopped a runaway train: he was an average Soviet official who applied procedures.

### **AT: Credibility**

#### Huge time frame deficit-

#### They say the brink is NOW- here’s their super ridiculous link chain. First WTO cred goes up which takes a bunch of time, next biden and xi resolve all of their trade relations problems which takes even more time, and only THEN can the two work together to pass a bunch of climate policies which will take even more time to pass. If brink is NOW, aff solves nothing

#### Note- they don’t fiat a single step of this link chain because its not in the plan text. That means we can make solvency deficits to each step

#### Trade relations-

#### ZERO specifications as to what biden and xi actually do once the plan passes

#### Getting rid of IP patents wont affect all of the other necessary trade relations- no warrant for spillover

#### Climate policies-

#### Again, ZERO specifications as to what biden and xi specifically do

#### No solvency- there are like two hundred countries other than china and the US that release emissions- just the two of them alone can’t solve

#### No solvency- climate policies wont be passed due to things like republican backlash. Even if they do get passed, they’ll be way too slow and far in the future

#### Debate over vaccines is inconsequential to WTO credibility- prefer other factors such as developed members avoiding obligations, the dysfunctional Appellate Body, and an inability to monitor trade

Grassley & Wyden 19 [Chuck Grassley, US Senator from Iowa and chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and Ron Wyden, US Senator from Oregon and ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee. “The World Trade Organization is faltering. The US can’t fix it alone.” October 10, 2019. <https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/10/perspectives/world-trade-organization-grassley-reform/index.html>] AL

With the World Trade Organization Public Forum underway in Geneva, it is time for members to confront and address the problems that are eroding the WTO’s credibility and effectiveness. These are problems that, if left unresolved, will endanger the WTO’s future relevance. Today, the WTO is where nations negotiate the rules for international trade and resolve disputes that arise when a trading partner believes the rules aren’t being followed. This trading system has been critical to helping reduce global poverty rates, which have shrunk even while the global population has expanded. We support the WTO’s mission, but we are growing frustrated that the institution is not fully and effectively performing its intended functions. First, while the WTO was intended to be a forum for multilateral trade negotiations, it has proven difficult to come to agreements that give a fair shot to all nations, not just wealthier countries that can subsidize their industries. In addition, some WTO members that have advanced economies are claiming “developing country status” in order to avoid their trade obligations. For years, economic powerhouses, like China, have relied on this self-designation to shirk WTO commitments in critical areas such as agriculture and illegal subsidies. This hinders progress for members that want to expand trade and commerce and undermines the integrity of the WTO itself. This is why we support the US proposal to change the way the WTO treats developing countries, which is targeted at strengthening the negotiating function of the organization. Still, two ongoing projects offer the WTO a chance to get it right. Negotiations are underway to curtail the fish subsidies that have long promoted overfishing and unfair competition and to decrease barriers to e-commerce and digitally-supported trade. If concluded, these agreements would demonstrate that the WTO can still serve as the institution it was intended to be. Second, while the WTO serves as a forum to settle disputes among its members, we have serious concerns about the degree to which the system is working. The Appellate Body – the quasi-judicial review forum used to take a second look into dispute decisions – has long strayed off course from its original form and function. Our concerns about systemic and procedural problems with the Appellate Body are not new, nor are they partisan. US presidents on both sides of the aisle have taken issue with Appellate Body members addressing issues that were not raised by the parties to involved in the dispute, taking longer than 90 days to decide appeals, and creating new rights and obligations for WTO members – all against the terms of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. We see great value in having an institution like the Appellate Body that ensures dispute panels faithfully apply the rules to which we all agreed. However, the Appellate Body also needs to operate as the members agreed. Lastly, the WTO must improve its ability to monitor member states’ trade policies and practices. Some WTO members, like China, consistently fail to meet their obligations to accurately report the subsidies they provide to domestic industries. In other cases, members have failed to disclose measures that affect international trade, such as India’s ban on US agricultural products for alleged safety concerns, which the WTO ultimately found to be disguised protectionism, or China’s various cybersecurity requirements on information and communication technology. This is unacceptable. A number of countries regularly take advantage of other WTO members that comply with notification and transparency rules while ignoring their own obligations. The United States has advocated for measures that would incentivize the member states to abide by the rules by providing for consequences in cases of noncompliance, such as loss of privileges to chair WTO bodies.

#### No warming impact and not human caused.

Fleming, PhD, 19

(Rex, AtmosphericScience@Michigan, The Rise and Fall of the Carbon Dioxide Theory of Climate Change, 6-11, Springer, p.47-8)

Matt Ridley, a British journalist and businessman, created quite a stir with his presentation of the Angus Millar Lecture of the Royal Society of the Arts, in Edinburgh, 31 October 2011. He pointed out that the climate did change naturally in the past (without mankind’s CO2 influence) – stalagmites, tree rings and ice cores all confirm that it was significantly warmer 7000 years ago. He pointed out that sea level is rising at the ‘unthreatening rate of a foot per century and is decelerating’ Greenland is losing ice at the rate of 150 gigatonnes per year, which is 0.6% per century. Tropical storm intensity and frequency have ‘gone down, not up, in the last 20 years’ [16]. He added “remember Jim Hansen of NASA told us in 1998 to expect 2–4 degrees of warming in 25 years. We are experiencing one-tenth of that.” He defined himself a ‘heretic’ for no longer accepting what had been preached on climate change, and called the CO2 warming enthusiasts ‘alarmists’. Probably his most impactful statement was that “the alarmists have been handed power over our lives; the heretics have not. Remember Britain’s unilateral Climate Change Act is officially expected to cost the hard-pressed UK economy ₺ 18.3 billion a year for the next 39 years and achieve an unmeasurable small change in carbon dioxide levels”.