## 1

**Academic philosophy is anti-Black – the 1AC’s abstraction from the material consequences of racialized violence absolves white philosophers of their contributions to America’s apathy towards Black death – their race-neutral rhetoric and assertion of universal humanistic principles reduces systemic racism to a problem of recognition that prevents effective mobilization against white supremacy – vote negative to reject the Western metaphysical tradition and recognize the permanent failure of white philosophy.**

Tommy J. **Curry and Curry 18** [Tommy, PhD, Prof. of Philosophy @ TAMU, Gwenetta, PhD, Ass. Prof. of Gender and Race Studies @ Alabama], “On the Perils of Race Neutrality and Anti-Blackness: Philosophy as an Irreconcilable Obstacle to (Black) Thought,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, Nos. 3-4 (May-September 2018). DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12244

We begin with the first author’s reflections on philosophy and its recurring problem of denying the realities of race and racism, reflections that have arisen as a Black (male) philosopher whose life has been threatened for doing Black philosophy. The experience of confronting death, being fearful of being killed doing my job as a critical race theorist, and being threatened with violence for thinking about racism in America has a profound effect on concretizing what is at stake in our theories about anti-Black racism. Whereas my work on race and racism in philosophy earlier in my career was dedicated to the problems created by the mass ignorance of the discipline to the political debates and ethnological history of Black philosophers in the 19th and 20th centuries, I now find myself thinking more seriously about the way that **philosophy**, really theory itself—our present categories of knowledge, such as race, class, and gender, found through disciplines—actually **hastens the deaths of subjugated peoples in the U**nited **S**tates. **Academic philosophy routinely abstracts away from**—directs thought to not attend to the realities of death, dying, and despair created by—**antiBlack racism. Black, Brown, and Indigenous populations are routinely rationalized as disposable flesh. The deaths of these groups launch philosophical discussions** of social injustice and spark awareness by whites, **while the deaths of white people direct policy and demand outrage. Because racialized bodies are confined to inhumane living conditions that nurture violence** and despair **that become attributed to the savage nature of nonwhites and evidence of their inhumanity, the deaths of these** **dehumanized peoples are** often **measured against the dangers they are thought to pose to others**.

**The interpretation of the inferior position that racialized groups occupy in the U**nited **S**tates **is grounded in how whites often think of themselves in relation to problem populations. This relationship is** often **rationalized by avoidance and by** the **denials** of whites **about being causally related to the harsh conditions imposed on nonwhites in the world. Philosophy, and its glorification of the rational individual, ignores the complexity of anti-Black racism by blaming the complacency**, if not outright hostility, **towards Blacks on the mass ignorance of white America**. To remedy this problem, Black philosophers are asked to respond by gearing their writings, lectures, and professional presence to further educate and dialogue with white philosophers in order to enable them to better understand anti-Black racism and white supremacy (Curry 2008, 2015). This therapy is often rewarded as scholarship. **Philosophical positions that analyze racism as a problem of miscommunication, misunderstanding, and ignorance** (philosophies predicated on the capacity of whites to change) **are rewarded and praised as the cutting edge and most impactful theories about race and racism. Reducing racism to a problem of recognition** and understanding **allows white philosophers to remain absolved of their contribution to the apathy that white America has to the death** and subjugation **Black Americans endure** at the hands of the white race.

To some readers, speaking about races as different groups with opposite, if not antagonistic, social lives seems to run contrary to the idea that there are no real races, just people, only the human race. This is the core of **race-neutral theory** in academic philosophy. Race neutrality **asserts that while race, class, and gender may** in fact **differentiate bodies, the capacity for reason—the human essence beneath it all—is what is ultimately at stake in the recognition of difference**. While **this mantra** has been offered to whites since the integrationist strategies of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1950s under Chief Justice Earl Warren, it **has had little effect in restructuring the psychology of white individuals or remedying** the **institutional** practices of **racism that continue to exclude** or punish **Black Americans**. How are Black scholars to speak about racism, specifically the violence and death that seem to gravitate towards Black bodies if the rules of philosophy and the fragility of white Americans insist that racism is not the cause of the disproportionate death Black Americans suffer and race is not a significant factor in Black people’s lives?

This article is an attempt to debunk the seemingly neutral starting point of academic philosophy. **For decades, Black philosophers have attempted to** educate white philosophers and **reorient the philosophical anthropologies of the discipline. Black, Brown, and Indigenous philosophers have dedicated their lives** and careers **to educating white philosophers** and students, **with little to no effect on the composition** and disposition **of the discipline**. While it is not uncommon for philosophy departments to say they support diversity, the reality is that many, if not most, Black philosophers continue to write about the problem of racism, their experiences of marginalization, and the violence they suffer from white colleagues, disciplinary organizations, and universities. **This article should be read as an attempt not to amend the Western metaphysical tradition but to reveal the obstacles that indicate its perennial failure**. It is the position of the authors that many of the demands for disciplinary change are often expressed as politics, when in reality **there are issues of metaphysics** (the concerns of being) **and philosophical anthropology** (the concerns about the (non)being capable of thinking) **that are unaddressed in much of the current literature**. Section I of this article describes what Black philosophy has taken to be the problem of racism in academic philosophy more broadly. Since the 1970s Black philosophers have criticized, attacked, and attempted to reform the discipline with little effect. This section interrogates why that is the case. Section II argues that the failure of philosophy to change is a problem of metaphysics or the illusion that Blackness is compatible with the idea of the white human. Section III presents the social scientific evidence demonstrating the seeming permanence of anti-Black racism and the dangerous nature of colorblind ideology, which does not recognize that societal organization and racism determine the life chances of Blacks. This article ends with a suggestion of what Black philosophy would look like if its primary mandate were not to persuade whites to remedy their own racist practices, but to diagnose and build strategies against the present problems of racism in philosophy before us.

**Their philosophical orientation approaches the world from a ‘view from nowhere’ that abstracts away from historical injustice. Their framework rests on the idea that we can generate universal rules based on shared features of humanity. This propagates a Eurocentric world view.**

Arnold **Farr 4** “Whiteness Visible: Enlightenment Racism and the structure of Racialized Consciousness” From What Whiteness Looks Like? Edited by George Yancy. 2004

**Philosophy’s own self-understanding is very problematic for many of us of African descent** who enter the field of philosophy. **Philoso- phy’s universal claims about the human condition systemically,** sys- tematically, and persistently **omit the experience of oppressed social groups**, especially those of African descent. **There is no end to the texts in philosophy that attempt to explain rationality** or the development of human consciousness **without considering the ways consciousness develops in the oppressed.** **There is an assumption that race has no place in philosophy**. As Lucius Outlaw writes:¶ But why bring such a dangerous and seemingly discredited notion as “race” into philosophy to be legitimized, even if not “properly” justified, in support of a possibly misguided quest to “conserve” racial and ethnic groups? For should not philosophizing, as has been claimed for centuries, be devoted to setting out principles and norms of reason to guide human beings in fashioning their lives through which they can become fully, flourishingly human? **Various philosophers have long argued that if such principles and norms—of truthfulness and justice,** for example—**are to be binding on all, they must not rest on the valorization and privileging of the norms and life-agendas of any particular groups, races, or ethnicities**.3¶ **Philosophy’s goal of universality forces it to dismiss the particulars of one’s existence. The possibility of introducing “perspective” into phi- losophy undermines philosophy’s claim to the privileged view from nowhere.** It is feared that once the perspectives of various social groups are introduced, philosophy will find itself struggling to make coherent sense of incommensurate truth-claims. However, as Outlaw goes on to point out, we are biological creatures who are affected by our biological and geographical situations.¶ **One of the tragedies in Western philosophy is the idea that we can somehow approach philosophical inquiry in a disinterested manner**. **A second problem is the assumption that insofar as we may not achieve a disinterested disposition our interests are still universal. The philoso- pher tends to assume that his/her interests are universal without care- fully examining the biological, geographical, racial, cultural, and class basis for that interest.** **The view from nowhere is an impossibility be- cause this view is initiated by an interest that has its foundation in the material world of the philosopher**. As Charles Mills has pointed out, we are members of various epistemic communities. These epistemic com- munities influence our interest, and they also determine what ques- tions are important for us. **Our epistemic communities also provide us with a basis for evaluating what lies outside of our community.4**¶ **The idea that our philosophical inquiry begins within the confines of a particular epistemic community, is legitimated by that commu- nity, and develops by employing the theoretical tools of that commu- nity is an idea that has not yet been well received by philosophers.** **The idea that philosophical principles are universal and that philosophy it- self is color-blind allows the whiteness of traditional Western philoso- phy to make itself invisible.** The task of this chapter is to make the whiteness of philosophy visible. There are many ways this may be accomplished, though it is not possible in the confines of this chapter to discuss or apply all of them. Hence, I will confine myself to the case study of Hegel and the whiteness of Geist.

**Even if they win that their colorblindness is theoretically ideal, it is practically impossible because racialized bodies are marked by their skin color – the psychological construction of Black as inferior makes their impacts inevitable – philosophy’s segregation of black scholarship is not neutral and not normal.**

Tommy J. **Curry and Curry 18** [Tommy, PhD, Prof. of Philosophy @ TAMU, Gwenetta, PhD, Ass. Prof. of Gender and Race Studies @ Alabama], “On the Perils of Race Neutrality and Anti-Blackness: Philosophy as an Irreconcilable Obstacle to (Black) Thought,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, Nos. 3-4 (May-September 2018). DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12244

Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2010: 15) explains that **colorblind racism emerged as a new racial ideology in the late 1960s** concomitantly with the crystallization of the “new racism” as America’s new racial structure. **Whites could no longer get away with the overt racist practices** that were used before the civil rights movements **but instead depended on more subtle ways to maintain their racial dominance** without using race. In today’s society, there are very few whites who outwardly consider themselves to be racist, but they will still support systems that create inequalities among minority populations.

Bonilla-Silva’s (1996) account of racism leads him to develop the idea of racialized social systems, a term that refers to societies where economic, political, social, and ideological levels are partially structured by the placement of actors in racial categories. Bonilla-Silva theorizes that **the racialized system incentivizes how racialized persons develop their identities within racist structures. Race is not simply imposed on bodies but is psychologically invested in by individuals in terms of how dominant racial groups identify themselves in relationship to the** **groups** and individuals **they construct as inferiors. For some groups assimilation is possible. This is the case for ethnic groups like the Irish and the Jews because their skin color is closer to that of whites, but it would be impossible for Black groups to similarly disappear. Colorblindness could exist in theory, but in reality, people see skin color, and in America, white skin stands for superiority.**

Racial **segregation** has been a mainstay of the American race problem since the beginning of slavery. Assigning the places that Blacks belonged, whether it be in the fields or as the “house Negro,” **has been one of the primary ways that racism has been enforced against Blacks**. Even after the end of slavery, **Jim Crow was established to terrorize Blacks into staying confined by their segregated spaces**. We would argue that **even today**, the established racial dynamic in America maintains racial segregation. In The Hidden Cost of Being African American, Thomas Shapiro (2004: 152) has shown how **whites have been able to move into the neighborhoods with the better schools and resources with the help of their inheritances**. Many of the people he interviewed about their housing location stated that they did not look at race when deciding to move to certain neighborhoods but rather they focused on the lifestyle and “standards” of the people. **Most stated that “it just happened” that there were no African Americans at the school their child attends. These understandings of “standards” and lifestyle are nested in the notion that white culture defines the norms and standards**. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s concept of “white habitus” explains the tendency whites have for racial segregation, namely, their preference for moving to all-white neighborhoods and the effects this practice has on African Americans.

Shapiro’s work parallels the findings of Bonilla-Silva’s theory of white habitus. Bonilla-Silva et al. (2006: 233) describe “white habitus” as a racialized, uninterrupted socialization process that conditions and creates whites’ racial taste, perceptions, feelings, and emotions and their views on racial matters. The most pronounced effect of white habitus is that “it promotes a sense of group belonging (a white culture of solidarity) and negative views about nonwhites.” In these **all-white spaces, whites become the standard or norm while anything or anyone different becomes unnatural or problematic**. White habitus promotes minorities being viewed based on stereotypes and generalizations perpetuated by the media or through other second-hand sources. **The greatest irony of Bonilla-Silva et al.’s interviews was their finding that “whites do not interpret their racial isolation and segregation from Blacks as something racial.”** This qualitative project shows that **even when whites are communally segregated** from Blacks, **they do not interpret this as a racialized or racist environment**. The absence of Blacks is thought to be compatible with how white Americans think about colorblindness. The idea of white superiority, or whiteonly neighborhoods, is not understood by many white Americans as racist. In one of Shapiro’s (2004: 152) interviews, the participant states that she has “Black friends.” However, Bonilla-Silva et al. (2006: 248) point out that when whites claim to have Black friends, they usually are referring to formal activities such as sports or classroom work groups. Once the activity is over the relationship ends; the so-called Black “friends” are not actual neighbors or friends who live within their social environment. **Academic philosophy operates similarly**.

**This turns the aff – America is organized around the subjugation and death of non-white people – discriminatory applications of their policy are inevitable absent a recognition of racialization in the law – their colorblindness is mutually exclusive with the necessary upheaval of the racial dynamics that necessitate inequality.**

Tommy J. and Gwenetta **Curry and Curry 18** [Tommy, PhD, Prof. of Philosophy @ TAMU, Gwenetta, PhD, Ass. Prof. of Gender and Race Studies @ Alabama], “On the Perils of Race Neutrality and Anti-Blackness: Philosophy as an Irreconcilable Obstacle to (Black) Thought,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, Nos. 3-4 (May-September 2018). DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12244

It is now accepted fact that **scientists have been able to demonstrate that race does not exist on a biological level, but instead was constructed by society**. Classifying race as a social construct conveys that there is a “process of endowing a group or concept with a delineation, name or reality” (Delgado and Stefancic 2012: 155). Race has a reality to it, a substance given by the historical and cultural projections of the specific society within which it is birthed. **While philosophers commonly entertain**, at least at the theoretical level, **the idea that race does not have any real consequence, that is a pernicious supposition**. Tessman and On (2001: 5) suggest that “**an analysis of racialization as the process of the social construction of race can lead theorists away from the possibility of race-conscious strategies for struggling against racism**.” **If the issues surrounding race and racism are not addressed, minorities will still fall victim to unfair treatment in education, housing, and the court systems**.

Although the concept of race is socially constructed, the populations most affected by racialization and racial disparities agree that **there are still real consequences to race because of its embeddedness within** practically **all facets of American society. Race consciousness is necessary to diagnose the function** and effects **of racialization in law, policy, and social interactions**. As the sociologist Michael Banton (2001: 164) argues, some elements of the racial idiom are still needed in law because “the concept of a racial group is the price to be paid for a law against indirect discrimination.” Contrary to the idea that race is mere societal rhetoric, Banton argues that the language of race is needed in law to combat prejudice and discrimination against victim groups. This point is made extremely clear by the data presented by Michelle Alexander in The New Jim Crow: Colorblindness in the Age of Mass Incarceration. She argues that **racism is a driving force behind social organization—an architecture around which social hierarchy and disparity accumulate. Racism explains why the penal system is filled with Black men who are incarcerated and how labeling them as felons**, primarily due to the criminalization of drugs, **causes them to lose their basic civil rights**. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, passed by Congress as part of the War on Drugs, called for strict lease enforcement and eviction of public housing tenants who engage in criminal activity (Alexander 2010: 142). In the spirit of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the Clinton Administration sought to strengthen the law in 1996, adding **the “One Strike and You’re Out”** legislation whose goal is to prevent people with criminal records from being able to live in public housing. This **measure to “crack down” on crime has had a debilitating effect on the family lives of people of color living in public housing units**.

**America is organized around the subjugation, death, and political suppression of racialized people’s voice**.

**Instead you should affirm Black philosophy as a site to engage in radical theorizations that are a genuine reflection of Black experience – attempts at integration commodifies Black philosophers as extensions of white thinkers which waters down Black philosophy to a form for white philosophers to deem respectable scholarship – a fundamental reorientation of the discipline away from universal reason is key.**

Tommy J. **Curry and Curry 18** [Tommy, PhD, Prof. of Philosophy @ TAMU, Gwenetta, PhD, Ass. Prof. of Gender and Race Studies @ Alabama], “On the Perils of Race Neutrality and Anti-Blackness: Philosophy as an Irreconcilable Obstacle to (Black) Thought,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, Nos. 3-4 (May-September 2018). DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12244

The debate about what constitutes or is real philosophy continues to dominate the discussions concerning race and racism. Drawing from the inclusion/exclusion or integrationist/segregationist paradigms, the problem of race and racism in philosophy is routinely understood as what is allowed to stand within or excluded from the discipline. The integrationist or post-civil-rights understanding of racism in philosophy routinely misses that **racism involves a complex and denaturing dynamic regarding the thought and perceptions of oppressed groups**. This is a paradigmatic and methodological problem introduced by Curry (2011a, 2011b) as signs of Black philosophy’s “derelictical” crisis. As Curry (2011a: 144) explains:

At its most basic level, philosophy is an activity of inquiry into the world which is supposed to guarantee its practitioners some level of assuredness in the ways we interpret the realities before us. If we take African American philosophy to be philosophical activity, then we should expect, by necessity of being philosophy, that Africana philosophy should result in the same methodological rigor—some assuredness in the ways that Africana people have used to interpret their realities. Unfortunately, the present day crisis of African American philosophy makes this simple formulation an impossibility. By making the methodological rigor of Africana philosophy dependent on its popular acceptance; its closeness to the political dogmas of our racial era, we condemn our area of study to under-specialization whereby our works of philosophical genius, past and present, will be judged solely by the degree to which they extend the universalizing character of Europe and her theories. To t**he extent that African American philosophy chooses to abandon the genealogical patterns of Black thought for philosophically privileged associations with white thinkers, it remains derelictical—continuing to neglect its only actual duty**—the duty **to inquiry into the reality of African-descended people as they have revealed it**.

We begin with the premise that **racism permeates the discipline of philosophy**. We are attempting to bring attention to the ways in which **authentic Black philosophy has been revised and denatured into a form that whites in the discipline accept as philosophical**. Whereas all disciplines have norms or rules of scholarly rigor, **philosophy demands that Black thinking and thought tend towards specific political ends in order to be considered philosophy**. Whether or not the thought and texts of Black philosophers are correctly interpreted, understood, or even read ultimately becomes irrelevant to the larger political orientation of the discipline.

**Black philosophers are read as extensions of white thought. A Black philosophical figure is relevant only to the extent that he or she can be understood as the unrealized intentionality of canonical white figures. Black historical figures are made philosophical by the extent to which their voice can be imagined as what Dewey, Hegel, Addams, or Foucault would have said**

**ry at the most abstract levels of thought is what is at stake in the Black philosophical project**.

## 2

**The standard is maximizing expected well-being. [To clarify, hedonistic act util]. Prefer –**

**1] Ethics is undergirded by desire – without it, we’d have never encountered goodness.**

**Sayre-McCord 01**

Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, "Mill's “Proof” Of The Principle of Utility: A More Than Half-Hearted Defense", Social Philosophy and Policy, 2001, accessed: 1 April 2020, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility-a-more-than-halfhearted-defense/FDBE07CBE08D4E17523930BF8C7BBC32, R.S.

When it comes to visibility, no less than desirability, Mill explicitly denies that a "proof" in the "ordinary acceptation of the term" can be offered.25 As he notes, "To be incapable of proof by reasoning is com mon to all first principles; to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct."26 Nonetheless, support -- that is, evidence, though not proof -- for the first premises of our **knowledge** is **provided by** "our **senses, and** our internal **consciousness.**" Mill's suggestion is that, when it comes to the first principles of conduct, desire play the same epistemic role that the senses play, when it comes to the first principles of knowledge.

To understand this role, it is important to distinguish the fact that someone is sensing something from what is sensed, which is a distinction mirrored in the contrast bet ween the fact that someone is desiring something and what is desired. In the case of our senses, the evidence we have for our judgments concerning sensible qualities traces back to what is sensed, to the content of our sense-experience. Likewise, Mill is suggesting, in the case of value, the evidence we have for our judgments concerning value traces back to what is desired, to the content of our desires. Ultimately, the grounds we have for holding the principles we do must, he thinks, be traced back to our experience, to our senses and desires. Yet the evidence we have is not that we are sensing or desiring something but what it is that is sensed or desired.

When we are having sensations of red, when what we are looking at appears red to us, we have evidence (albeit overrideable and defeasible evidence) that the thing is red. Moreover, if things never looked red to us, we could never get evidence that things were red, and would indeed never have developed the concept of redness. Similarly, when we are desiring things, when what we are considering appears good to us, we have evidence (albeit overrideable and defeasible evidence) that the thing is good. Moreover, **if we never desired** things, **we could never get evidence** that **things were good, and** would indeed **never have developed** the concept of **value.**

Recall that desire, for Mill, like taste, touch, sight, and smell, is a "passive sensibility." All of these, he holds, provide us with both the content that makes thought possible and the evidence we have for the conclusions that thought leads us to embrace. "Desiring a thing" and "thinking of it as desirable (unless for the sake of its consequences)" are treated by Mill as one an d the same, just as seeing a thing as red and thinking of it as red are one and the same. Accordingly, a person who desires x is a person who ipso facto sees x as desirable. Desiring something, for Mill, is a matter of seeing it under the guise of the good. This means that it is important, in the context of Mill's argument, that one not think of desires as mere preferences or as just any sort of motive. They constitute, according to Mill, a distinctive subclass of our motivational states, and are distinguished (at least in part) by t heir evaluative content. Thus, Mill is neither assuming nor arguing that something is good because we desire it; rather, he is depending on our desiring it as establishing that we see it as good.

At the same time, while desiring something is a matter of seeing it as good, one could, on Mill's view, believe that something is good without desiring it, just as one can believe something is red without seeing it as red. While desire is supposed to be the fundamental source of our concept of, and evidence for, desirability, once the concept is in place there are contexts in which we will have reason to think it applies even when the corresponding sensible experience is lacking. Indeed, in Chapter IV, Mill is concerned not with generating a desire, but with justifying the belief that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end, and so concerned with defending the standard for determining what should be desired.

Mill's aim is to take what people already, and he thinks inevitably, see as desirable and argue that those views commit them to the value of the general happiness (whet her or not their desires follow the deliverances of t heir reason). Those who, like Mill, desire the general happiness already hold the view that the general happiness is desirable. They accept the claim that Mill is trying to defend. As Mill knows, however, there are many who do not have this desire -- many who desire only their own happiness, and some who even desire that others suffer. These are the people he sets out to persuade, along with others who are more generous and benevolent, but who nonetheless do not see happiness as desirable, and the only thin g desirable, as an end. Mill's argument is directed at convincing t hem all -- whether their desires follow or not -- that they have grounds for, and are in fact already com mitted to, regarding the happiness of others as valuable as an end.

Mill recognizes that whatever argument he might hope to offer will need to appeal to evaluative claims people already accept (since he takes to heart Hume's caution concerning inferring an 'ought' from an 'is'). The claim Mill thinks he can appeal to -- that one's own happiness is a good (i.e. desirable) -- is something licensed as available by people desiring their own happiness. Yet he is not supposing here that the fact that they desire their own happiness, or anything else, is proof that it is desirable, just as he would not suppose that the fact that someone sees something as red is proof that it is. Rather, he is supposing that if people desire their own happiness, or see something as red, one can rely on t hem having available, as a premise for further argument, the claim that their own happiness is desirable or that the thing is red (at least absent contrary evidence). As he puts it in the third paragraph, "If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end nothing could ever convince any person that it was so."

Thus, in appealing to the analogy bet ween judgments of sensible qualities and judgments of value, Mill is not trading on an ambiguity, nor does his argument here involve identifying being desirable with being desired or assuming that "desirable" means "desired." He is instead relying consistently on an empiricist account of concepts and their application -- on a view according to which we have the concepts, evidence, and knowledge we do only thanks to our having experiences of a certain sort. In the absence of the relevant experiences, he holds (with other empiricists), we would not only lack the required evidence for our judgments, we would lack the capacity to make the judgments in the first place. **In** the **presence of** the relevant **experience**s, though, **we have** both the concepts and the required **evidence** -- "not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require."

## Case

#### Framing issue – don't vote on arguments without claim, warrant and implication in the speech they were introduced – anything else turns debate into minesweeper and incentivizes the 1AC hiding blippy arguments to avoid clash – that decks engagement and ends the debate after the 1AR which is educationally bankrupt and unfair

#### Don’t vote on spikes-

#### A. Bad model- they transform debate into minesweeper, incentivizing as many short unexplained arguments that can be extrapolated into cheap wins, this actively trades off with topic education/research based strategies

#### B. Discourages clash- instead of comparing warrants debaters are incentivized to uplayer their arguments to preclude/exclude everything the other team says

#### Use a paradigm of comparative worlds where both debaters must prove their world is better than their opponent’s –

#### A] Reciprocity – truth testing justifies multiple NIBS like skep and a prioris which gives them a 2:1 advantage

#### B] Excludes key critical positions that test oppressive rhetoric, which is key to accessibility, which is a multiplier for other impacts since debate doesn’t matter if we can’t access them.

#### C] Clash – we create a stasis point for discussion over real world policies and we clarify what each person advocates vs. vague and generic notions of truth and falsity

#### Independently, we prove the resolution true through moral obligation.

#### 1. Just bc we define the sides as aff/neg and affirm is defined as truth doesn’t mean that’s the actual role of the sides – the ROB is comparative worlds – o/w on debatability because [ ]

#### Context proves they are wrong and resolved outweighs since it’s in the resolution

Parcher, 01

(Jeff, Former Debate Coach at Georgetown¶ “Jeff P--Is the resolution a question?,” 2-26-11,¶ <http://cedadebate.org/pipermail/mailman/2001-February/031021.html>, accessed 2-8-13 //Bosley)¶

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### 2. Multiple definitions- they use possessive, as in “to affirm one’s loyalty”. No one possess the resolution so the more appropriate definition is “express agreement”

#### Don’t presume aff–

#### 1. They need to prove why the neg statement is more likely true than false – we’ve read qualified evidence, they’ve given you a riddle

#### 2. We don’t always assume statements true, we use intuition – “the sky is green” is something we presume to be false

#### 3. presumption flows aff –7-4 time skew while aff has infinite prep and first and last speech means if there’s no offense we probably did the better debating – outweighs their definition since it’s based on the structural fairness of LD and negate isn’t in the resolution

#### 4. This isn’t court – there’s a constitutional burden to prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but no such burden exists in LD – “resolved” means legislative model is best

**Words and Phrases 64** Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

**Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature**;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “**to establish by law**”.

#### Use epistemic modesty to evaluate framework. A. More consistent with decision process – 1 in 10 chance drinking coffee causes poison no rational person would do it. Even though there’s a small chance of being poisoned, the impact outweighs.

#### reject their skeptical claims on face – refusal to acknowledge universal truths like “you ought not be racist” will be coopted to justify atrocities – you as an educator have an obligation to reject it

### Advantage

#### Teacher strikes hurt students' education quality and their success in the labor market.

Lovenheim and Willén 15 [Michael F. Lovenheim, associate professor of policy analysis and management at Cornell University; Alexander Willén, doctoral student in policy analysis and management at Cornell University. "A Bad Bargain", Education Next, updated November 17, 2015, accessed 11-1-2021, https://www.educationnext.org/bad-bargain-teacher-collective-bargaining-employment-earnings/] HWIC

Results

These data enable us to examine the effects of teacher collective-bargaining policies on multiple indicators of students’ labor-market success. Taken as a whole, our results clearly indicate that laws supporting collective bargaining for teachers have adverse long-term consequences for students. Earnings. We find strong evidence that teacher collective bargaining has a negative effect on students’ earnings as adults. Attending school in a state with a duty-to-bargain law for all 12 years of schooling reduces later earnings by $795 dollars per year (see Figure 3). This represents a decline in earnings of 1.9 percent relative to the average. Although the individual effect is modest, it translates into a large overall loss of earnings for the nation as a whole. In particular, our results suggest a total loss of $196 billion per year accruing to those who were educated in the 34 states with duty-to-bargain policies on the books.

Hours worked. Consistent with this reduction in earnings, we also find that exposure to a duty-to-bargain law throughout one’s school years is associated with a decline of 0.49 hours worked per week. This is a 1.4 percent decline relative to the average, and it suggests that a reduction in hours worked is a main driver of the lower earnings.  
Wages. The reduced earnings caused by unionization could also reflect lower wages, and the evidence suggests a negative relationship between collective-bargaining exposure and wages. While this relationship is not statistically significant, it is consistent with our other results and suggests that teacher collective bargaining may also have a modest adverse effect on average wages.

Employment. The fact that teacher collective bargaining reduces working hours suggests that duty-to-bargain laws may also affect employment levels. In fact, when we use the share of individuals who are employed as the outcome variable, we find that duty-to-bargain laws reduce employment. Specifically, exposure to a duty-to-bargain law for all 12 years of schooling lowers the likelihood that a worker is employed by 0.9 percentage points. Duty-to-bargain laws have no impact on unemployment rates, however, suggesting that they reduce employment by leading some individuals to drop out of the labor force altogether.

Occupational skill level. Finally, we analyze the effects of collective bargaining on the skill level of a student’s selected occupation, as measured by the share of workers in that occupation who have any education beyond a high school diploma. The results suggest yet another negative effect: being exposed to a duty-to-bargain law for all 12 years of schooling decreases the proportion of such workers in an occupation by almost half of a percentage point (or 0.6 percent relative to the average). This effect is modest in size, but it implies that teacher collective bargaining leads students to work in occupations requiring lower levels of skill.