# St. Marx - Round 2 Neg vs Midlothian AC

## 2NR

### AT: perf con

#### Contradiction frame presumes prior universal referent we call into question

Bleiker, PhD, 01

(Roland, PoliSci@ Queensland, The Zen of International Relations: IR Theory from East to West edited by S. Chan, P. Mandaville)

One cannot eliminate the contradictory, the fragmentary and the discontinuous. Contradictions are only contradictions if one assumes the existence of a prior universal standard of reference. What is different appears as divergent, dissonant and negative only as long as our consciousness strives for a totalising standpoint, which we must avoid if we are to escape the reifying and excluding dangers of identity thinking.70 Just as reality is fragmented, we need to think in fragments. Unity then is not to be found by evening out discontinuities. Contradictions are to be preferred over artificially constructed meanings and the silencing of underlying conflicts. Thus, Adorno advocates writing in fragments, such that the resulting text appears as if it always could be interrupted, cut off abruptly, any time, any place.71 He adheres to Nietzsche's advice that one should approach deep problems like taking a cold bath, 'quickly into them and quickly out again'.72 The belief that one does not reach deep enough this way, he claims, is simply the superstition of those who fear cold water. But Nietzsche's bath has already catapulted us into the vortex of the next linguistic terrain of resistance, the question of style.(52)

No Link (EXPLAIN)

Negation theory

-We can prove the plan is a bad idea for a number of reasons

-We say your frame is wrong, but even if its right, people who agree with your frame think your plan is wrong

-Our DA proves a specific instance of our K impact- that their frame inevitably leads to war

No Impact

-we’ll only go for 1 in the 2NR

-If it’s really a double turn they can make a concession to get out of it and jack us

-we have to debate in both worlds and deal with the contradiction arg

Offense

-Competitive equity- the aff gets the first and last speech, right to chose case area and plan wording, infinite prep, the broadest topic in recent history- we need flexibility

-education- no contradictions limits us to a 1 arg 1NC, this is no different from reading harms takeouts and impact turns

-Better 2AC’s- forces them to make strategic decisions and have the gusto to make concessions

No voter

-Reject the argument not the team

-time skew is inevitable due to disparities like speed and skill

-debate is a game- we try to skew strategic thinking in other ways

## AT Condo Bad

#### The neg gets 1 conditional advocacy.

#### Offense

#### 1. Logic- proving a CP is bad doesn’t prove the plan is good, a logical policy maker can always choose not to act. Logic outweighs – it’s the basis of all rational arguments.

#### 2. Neg Flex- we are inherently reactionary, we need in round flexibility to test the plan and have a fighting chance. If they had phenomenal answers to the CP the debate would be over after the 1AR which is educationally bankrupt.

#### 3. The 1AR should be hard- it’s the turning point in the debate. The aff doesn’t have to contradict themselves or undercover- they need to make tough choices.

#### 4. Hard 1AR and 2AR inevitable: 1 advocacy isn’t impossible to respond to, and the 2NR is just going to go for the under-covered one anyway. In fact, collapsing in the 2NR is a gift to the even shorter 2AR

#### 5. Key to research – unidimensional 1NCs discourage the neg from prepping multiple strategies against a case. Research outweighs – it’s the only portable skill we take into the real world.

#### Defense

#### Our defense-

#### 1. We debate in both worlds too- no unique abuse for the affirmative, if we kick the CP the entire AC becomes offense.

#### 2. Straight turns and perms check – they can stick us with the net benefit and get infinite condo advocacies on each flow.

#### 3. No new 2AR args – we don’t get a 3NR to respond. Err neg on 1AR theory – it was so blippy in the 1AR that the 2AR will be totally new which makes negating impossible.

### Overview

#### Extend the links—the aff is not explicitly authoritarian, but their advantages allow the state to justify tyranny and limit civil liberties. While pandemics are obviously a danger, they have become a construct used to justify the continued existence of the national security apparatus. The Cold War is over, and the US has few real rivals left. The state has filled in the gaps of the traditional security paradigm with disease as a perceived threat to Western heg.

#### Extend the impact—securitization forces us into shell-shocked acceptance of the state’s actions. We come to believe that any actions, however horrific, are justified to combat perceived threats.

#### Extend the alt/FW—we must reject the narratives of security threats. Regardless of whether the threats are constructed or not, the descriptions and epistemologies we use to describe them justify autocratic control. Our civil liberties and democratic rights are at stake here.

## 1NC

### DA – Disease

**A. UQ: Pharma profits are up from COVID vaccines, patent waivers threaten this**

**Buchholz 5-17-21**

(Katharina, https://www.statista.com/chart/24829/net-income-profit-pharma-companies/)

The profitability of coronavirus vaccines has been in the spotlight since U.S. President Joe Biden come out in support of temporarily lifting vaccine patents to make the production of the life-saving inoculations more financially feasible for poorer countries. EU leaders meanwhile remain divided over such a move. Company financial reports show that COVID-19 vaccine makers and developers like Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, Moderna, AstraZeneca and BioNTech have seen their profits increase since the vaccine rollout, at times majorly. In early May, stocks of several companies that benefit from COVID-19 vaccine sales took a nosedive on the news of Biden’s reversal. Moderna stocks, for example, were still down more than 6 percent at close on May 5, the day of the announcement. Stocks recovered somewhat as German chancellor Angela Merkel came out against patent waivers the following day. While fluctuations in the stock market price have hurt drug makers in the short term, patent waivers would diminish the bottom line of companies involved with the development and production of COVID-19 vaccines in the long term. Pharma giants like Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer bring in billions of dollars of income every quarter from diverse sources, so the COVID bump was smaller for them. In the case of Pfizer, which has been a bigger producer than J&J, the year-over-year profit increase was a handsome 44 percent, however. For smaller AstraZeneca, the COVID year meant that its profits doubled. In the case of Moderna, the past year has turned a Q1 loss into a profit. The case is similar for German company BioNTech, which collaborated with Pfizer on its COVID vaccine. While Q1 2021 brought in a profit of $1.1 billion, the company ran a deficit since its founding in 2008 up until Q4 2020, when it posted a profit for the first time. The $446 million earned stood in contrast to losses of almost $428 million accrued in the first nine months of the year.

**B. Link: Strong IP protection spurs innovation by encouraging risk-taking and incentivizing knowledge sharing—prefer statistical analysis of multiple studies**

**Ezell and Cory 19**

[Stephen Ezell, vice president & global innovation policy @ ITIF, BS Georgetown School of Foreign Service. Nigel Cory, associate director covering trade policy @ ITIF, MA public policy @ Georgetown. "The Way Forward for Intellectual Property Internationally," Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 4-25-2019, accessed 8-25-2021, https://itif.org/publications/2019/04/25/way-forward-intellectual-property-internationally] HWIC

IPRs Strengthen Innovation Intellectual property rights power innovation. For instance, analyzing the level of intellectual property protections (via the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness reports) and creative outputs (via the Global Innovation Index) shows that counties with stronger IP protection have more creative outputs (in terms of intangible assets and creative goods and services in a nation’s media, printing and publishing, and entertainment industries, including online), even at varying levels of development.46 IPR reforms also introduce strong incentives for domestic innovation. Sherwood, using case studies from 18 developing countries, concluded that poor provision of intellectual property rights deters local innovation and risk-taking.47 In contrast, IPR reform has been associated with increased innovative activity, as measured by domestic patent filings, albeit with some variation across countries and sectors.48 For example, Ryan, in a study of biomedical innovations and patent reform in Brazil, found that patents provided incentives for innovation investments and facilitated the functioning of technology markets.49 Park and Lippoldt also observed that the provision of adequate protection for IPRs can help to stimulate local innovation, in some cases building on the transfer of technologies that provide inputs and spillovers.50 In other words, local innovators are introduced to technologies first through the technology transfer that takes place in an environment wherein protection of IPRs is assured; then, they may build on those ideas to create an evolved product or develop alternate approaches (i.e., to innovate). Related research finds that trade in technology—through channels including imports, foreign direct investment, and technology licensing—improves the quality of developing-country innovation by increasing the pool of ideas and efficiency of innovation by encouraging the division of innovative labor and specialization.51 However, Maskus notes that without protection from potential abuse of their newly developed technologies, foreign enterprises may be less willing to reveal technical information associated with their innovations.52 The protection of patents and trade secrets provides necessary legal assurances for firms wishing to reveal proprietary characteristics of technologies to subsidiaries and licensees via contracts. Counties with stronger IP protection have more creative outputs (in terms of intangible assets and creative goods and services in a nation’s media, printing and publishing, and entertainment industries, including online), even at varying levels of development. The relationship between IPR rights and innovation can also be seen in studies of how the introduction of stronger IPR laws, with regard to patents, copyrights, and trademarks, affect R&D activity in an economy. Studies by Varsakelis and by Kanwar and Evenson found that R&D to GDP ratios are positively related to the strength of patent rights, and are conditional on other factors.53 Cavazos Cepeda et al. found a positive influence of IPRs on the level of R&D in an economy, with each 1 percent increase in the level of protection of IPRs in an economy (as measured by improvements to a country’s score in the Patent Rights Index) equating to, on average, a 0.7 percent increase in the domestic level of R&D.54 Likewise, a 1 percent increase in copyright protection was associated with a 3.3 percent increase in domestic R&D. Similarly, when trademark protection increased by 1 percent, there was an associated R&D increase of 1.4 percent. As the authors concluded, “Increases in the protection of the IPRs carried economic benefits in the form of higher inflows of FDI, and increases in the levels of both domestically conducted R&D and service imports as measured by licensing fees.”55 As Jackson summarized, regarding the relationship between IPR reform and both innovation and R&D, and FDI, “In addition to spurring domestic innovation, strong intellectual property rights can increase incentives for foreign direct investment which in turn also leads to economic growth.”56

**C. IL: Biopharmaceutical innovation is key to prevent future pandemics and bioterror**

**Marjanovic and Feijao 20**

[Sonja Marjanovic Ph.D., Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Carolina Feijao, Ph.D. in biochemistry, University of Cambridge; M.Sc. in quantitative biology, Imperial College London; B.Sc. in biology, University of Lisbon. "How to Best Enable Pharma Innovation Beyond the COVID-19 Crisis," RAND Corporation, 05-2020, accessed 8-8-2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA407-1.html] HWIC

As key actors in the healthcare innovation landscape, pharmaceutical and life sciences companies have been called on to develop medicines, vaccines and diagnostics for pressing public health challenges. The COVID-19 crisis is one such challenge, but there are many others. For example, MERS, SARS, Ebola, Zika and avian and swine flu are also infectious diseases that represent public health threats. Infectious agents such as anthrax, smallpox and tularemia could present threats in a bioterrorism context.1 The general threat to public health that is posed by antimicrobial resistance is also well-recognised as an area in need of pharmaceutical innovation. Innovating in response to these challenges does not always align well with pharmaceutical industry commercial models, shareholder expectations and competition within the industry. However, the expertise, networks and infrastructure that industry has within its reach, as well as public expectations and the moral imperative, make pharmaceutical companies and the wider life sciences sector an indispensable partner in the search for solutions that save lives. This perspective argues for the need to establish more sustainable and scalable ways of incentivising pharmaceutical innovation in response to infectious disease threats to public health. It considers both past and current examples of efforts to mobilise pharmaceutical innovation in high commercial risk areas, including in the context of current efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. In global pandemic crises like COVID-19, the urgency and scale of the crisis – as well as the spotlight placed on pharmaceutical companies – mean that contributing to the search for effective medicines, vaccines or diagnostics is essential for socially responsible companies in the sector. 2 It is therefore unsurprising that we are seeing industry-wide efforts unfold at unprecedented scale and pace. Whereas there is always scope for more activity, industry is currently contributing in a variety of ways. Examples include pharmaceutical companies donating existing compounds to assess their utility in the fight against COVID-19; screening existing compound libraries in-house or with partners to see if they can be repurposed; accelerating trials for potentially effective medicine or vaccine candidates; and in some cases rapidly accelerating in-house research and development to discover new treatments or vaccine agents and develop diagnostics tests.3,4 Pharmaceutical companies are collaborating with each other in some of these efforts and participating in global R&D partnerships (such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative effort to accelerate the development of potential therapies for COVID-19) and supporting national efforts to expand diagnosis and testing capacity and ensure affordable and ready access to potential solutions.3,5,6 The primary purpose of such innovation is to benefit patients and wider population health. Although there are also reputational benefits from involvement that can be realised across the industry, there are likely to be relatively few companies that are ‘commercial’ winners. Those who might gain substantial revenues will be under pressure not to be seen as profiting from the pandemic. In the United Kingdom for example, GSK has stated that it does not expect to profit from its COVID-19 related activities and that any gains will be invested in supporting research and long-term pandemic preparedness, as well as in developing products that would be affordable in the world’s poorest countries.7 Similarly, in the United States AbbVie has waived intellectual property rights for an existing combination product that is being tested for therapeutic potential against COVID-19, which would support affordability and allow for a supply of generics.8,9 Johnson & Johnson has stated that its potential vaccine – which is expected to begin trials – will be available on a not-for-profit basis during the pandemic.10 Pharma is mobilising substantial efforts to rise to the COVID-19 challenge at hand. However, we need to consider how pharmaceutical innovation for responding to emerging infectious diseases can best be enabled beyond the current crisis. Many public health threats (including those associated with other infectious diseases, bioterrorism agents and antimicrobial resistance) are urgently in need of pharmaceutical innovation, even if their impacts are not as visible to society as COVID-19 is in the immediate term. The pharmaceutical industry has responded to previous public health emergencies associated with infectious disease in recent times – for example those associated with Ebola and Zika outbreaks.11 However, it has done so to a lesser scale than for COVID-19 and with contributions from fewer companies. Similarly, levels of activity in response to the threat of antimicrobial resistance are still low.12 There are important policy questions as to whether – and how – industry could engage with such public health threats to an even greater extent under improved innovation conditions.

#### D. Patent protection is especially important to the pharmaceutical industry and biodefense.

Petruzzi, JD Candidate, 5

(Heather, 3L at George Washington University Law School, THE MISSING LINK: THE NEED FOR PATENT PROTECTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BIODEFENSE VACCINES, Public Contract Law Journal, 37(1), Fall)

Although most private companies consider patent rights their most valuable asset,28 they play a special role in the pharmaceutical industry for two reasons. First, drug research is time consuming, expensive, and risky.29 For example, it takes more than a decade and an average of over $200 million to develop a drug in the United States.30 Second, the pharmaceutical industry has unique concerns given the nature of medical research. Oftentimes new drug discoveries build from existing technology and not completely original ideas.31 As a result, old and new drugs intersect and overlap during many phases of discovery.32 Private pharmaceutical companies fear that if the Government owns the rights to a biodefense drug, this may hinder future development based on similar technology or reduce the value of existing patents that served as a guide to the new vaccine.33 Thus, patent rights have greater importance in the pharmaceutical industry because they can affect the value of the company's prior blockbuster drug or inhibit its future research and development in areas unrelated to the Government and bioterrorism.

**E. That causes extinction, which outweighs.**

**Millett & Snyder-Beattie 17**

Millett, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; and Snyder-Beattie, M.S., Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 08-01-2017. “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” Health Security, 15(4), PubMed

In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could **threaten human existence**. Although the **probability** of human extinction from bioweapons **may** be low, the **expected value** of **reducing** the risk could **still** be **large**, since such risks jeopardize the existence of **all future generations**. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. **Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls** on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to **remote populations**, overcome **rare genetic resistances**, and **evade detection**, cures, and **countermeasures**. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: **Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off**, and so **evolutionary pressures** could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they **do not rule** the possibility **out** entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of **species going extinct due to disease**—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also **historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out** by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include **native American tribes** exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But **many diseases are proof** of principle that **each worst-case attribute can be realized independently**. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, **natural evolution** would be an **unlikely** source for pathogens with the **highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach**. But **advances in biotech**nology might allow the creation of diseases that **combine such traits**. Recent controversy has **already emerged** over a number of **scientific experiments** that resulted in viruses with enhanced **transmissibility**, **lethality**, and/or the ability to overcome **therapeutics**.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a **long historical track record** of **state-run bioweapon research** applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and **m**utually **a**ssured **d**estruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 The **possibility of a war** between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27

### K Sec

#### Security is a psychological construct- the aff’s scenarios for conflict are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other. Claims of war and conflict create a false dichotomy between the good us and the evil them, ignoring our role in provoking the aggression.

Mack, MD @ Harvard, 91

(John, former Professor of Psychology at Harvard and Pulitzer Prize Winner, <http://johnemackinstitute.org/1988/08/the-enemy-system-short-version/>) BW

The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the “enemy system”[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding man as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: “I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness”. This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and one’s own contribution to that threat-by distortions of perception, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy, or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. “We never see our enemy’s motives and we never labor to assess his will, with anything approaching objectivity”.[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us. In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: “War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy.”[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation’s leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the psychological mechanisms that impel individuals to kill or allow killing in their name, often with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war “The enemy is seen as less than human? He’s faceless. He’s an animal”.” Keen tries to answer his question: “The image of the enemy is not only the soldier’s most powerful weapon; it is society’s most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to participate in acts of violence they would never consider doing as individuals”.[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process. The image of the enemy as less than human may be hard to dislodge. For example, a teacher in the Boston area reported that during a high school class on the Soviet Union a student protested: “You’re trying to get us to see them as people”. Stephen Cohen and other Soviet experts have noted how difficult it is to change the American perception of the Soviet Union, despite the vast amount of new information contradicting old stereotypes.” Bernard Shaw in his preface to Heartbreak House, written at the end of World War I, observed ironically: “Truth telling is not compatible with the defense of the realm”. Nations are usually created out of the violent defeat of the former inhabitants of a piece of land or of outside enemies, and national leaders become adept at keeping their people’s attention focused on the threat of an outside enemy.[14] Leaders also provide what psychiatrist Vamik Volkan called “suitable targets of externalization”[10] – i.e., outside enemies upon whom both leaders and citizens can relieve their burdens of private defeat, personal hurt, and humiliation.[15] All-embracing ideas, such as political ideologies and fixed religious beliefs act as psychological or cultural amplifiers. Such ideologies can embrace whole economic systems, such as socialism or capitalism, or draw on beliefs that imply that a collectivity owes its existence to some higher power in the universe. It was not Stalin as an individual whom Nadezhda Mandelstam blamed for the political murder of her poet husband Osip and millions of other citizens but the “craving for an all-embracing idea which would explain everything in the world and bring about universal harmony at one go”.[16] Every nation, no matter how bloody and cruel its beginnings, sees its origins in a glorious era of heroes who vanquished less worthy foes. One’s own race, people, country, or political system is felt to be superior to the adversary’s, blessed by a less worthy god. The nuclear age has spawned a new kind of myth. This is best exemplified by the United States’ strategic defense initiative. This celestial fantasy offers protection from attack by nuclear warheads, faith here being invested not in a god but in an anti-nuclear technology of lasers, satellites, mirrors, and so on in the heavens.

#### Disease discourse justifies authoritarian control

Whitehall, PhD, 15

(Geoffrey, *Pre-emptive global biopolitics and the ProMED network*, Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses 3:1, )

Without the veil of an assumed evolutionary geopolitical narrative, the life sciences can be recognised to be essential to what is called biopolitics – the politicisation and governmentalisation of life itself. At the heart of already existing contemporary global governance is the question: how is all life on the planet governmentally to be managed so that ‘some’ might live more? Likewise, without the arsenal of an assumed scientific objectivity, global health is implicated in a particular kind of geopolitics – the politicisation and governmentalisation of the earth. Biopolitics and geopolitics, as such, rely on each other (Foucault, 2007). On the one hand, in an attempt to de-politicise the militarised management of globalised populations or ecosystems, the liberal discourse of global health is employed. On the other hand, in the name of driving and funding specific scientific research, the legitimising discourse of geopolitical danger is employed. The effect is that global health itself is openly re-politicised as a particular (not universal) kind of geopolitical project. As such, when attentive to the lived collision of global governance, some fundamental political, ethical and ontological shifts become immediately apparent. When dealing with a dangerous pandemic, for example, the question concerning ‘who and how many’ changes. It is no longer simply a reductive contest between national versus human populations. Nor is the question answered by seeking consensus, common values or universal futures. As the constituent population shifts the managerial ecumene changes in order to incorporate new populations, new risks and unimagined failures into future governance scenarios. The questions become broader than simply who and how many humans will be sacrificed and to what ends. Instead, the question becomes which human, animal and viral populations are already managed (and how), which are to be newly managed (and how) and which are to be sacrificed or destroyed (and how)? Given the scope of already existing governance, cross-contaminations, unintended consequences and even tragic losses become opportunities (if not motivations) to develop (even) more expansive and intensive zones and types of governance. Entire environments can now be managed, subverted and/or (re)valued in order to incorporate and/or develop hitherto unimagined global (security, market, cultural, governance) potentialities. To this end, already existing systems, networks and routes require continual evaluation, adaptation and investment in order to maximise potential benefits while simultaneously neutralising (or reincorporating) potential losses. Together these shifts resonate across critical concerns about resilience, liberalism and biopolitics. This is what the complex map of already existing contemporary global governance is beginning to look like.

#### Disease is a securitized construct used to fill the lack of threats in the post-Cold War era.

Periera 2008 (Ricardo - PhD candidate in International Politics and Conflict Resolution at the Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Portugal, “Processes of Securitization of Infectious Diseases and Western Hegemonic Power: A Historical-Political Analysis” PDF)

The end of the Cold War and the global expansion of the neo-liberal model brought about changes more in terms of nature of threat than subject of threat. States as sovereign units are not bound to cause so much preoccupation from a security viewpoint as “non-traditional threats” do: environmental imbalances, religious fanaticism and terrorism, ethnic wars, refugees and other ‘irregular’ migrations, urban insecurities, reductions in energy resources, etc. Often these “new threats” were regarded as risks Western societies had to take for the sake of their own middle-class lifestyle, which one would describe as Western “ontological security.” They are described by Anthony Giddens as “dark side” of globalization, drawing from what Ulrich Beck has called “risk society.” One such risk turned out as actual hazard in September 11, 2001 was global terrorism. With regard to epidemics, risks and effective hazards have pronouncedly been associated with the deterioration of many populations’ living standards in developing countries, particularly in Africa. Phenomena such as “new wars,” i.e. post-Cold War civil wars, and “failed states,” that is, states “unable or unwilling” to offer the residents basic public goods such as food, access to health or public security, have strongly potentiated that negative trend. These phenomena appear as both cause and effect of the threats mentioned above. The human security paradigm emerged in the early 1990s as a political and instrumental response to the problems that “new wars” and “failed states” have posed throughout the post-Cold War era. It embodies the early 1980s ambition of several authors in Security Studies (Homer-Dixon, Ullman, etc.) of enlarging the concept of security in which threat builds less in function of states and more of populations and their well-being. Informing the nascent European defense and foreign security policies and the Middle Powers Initiative, human security has been embedded since the early 1990s in the United Nation’s conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction missions. It was so defined by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP): “human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic diseases as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.” According to this definition, the concept of human security presents itself as an eminently emancipating, pacifist and human rights-centered doctrine. It is in that vein that I believe that it is widely promoted by the activist community, as, for instance, the panel “Human Security and HIV,” coordinated by Alex de Waal, at the 2008 International AIDS Conference in Mexico City confirmed. Yet, Mark Duffield warns us on human security’s two interconnected problems. One problem with the human security paradigm is its ambivalence, since, as one suggested above, it incorporates two rather conflicting agendas, i.e. human rights and security. Duffield argues that “in a single concept the idea of human security […] contains the optimism of sustainable development while, at the same time, it draws attention to the conditions that menace international stability.” Writing about HIV/AIDS, human rights and security, Laurie Garret expresses such tension in these terms: “As vital as the human rights agenda is in the HIV pandemic, however, it ought not to be permitted to befuddle attention to security.” The second problem meets the ethical issue emerging from the induction of a state of exception for a non-military issue. Following 1930s scholarship by Carl Schmitt on the establishment of a state of exception, securitization may jeopardize civil liberties, democratic order and therefore the emancipating horizon of human security. It is relevant to clarify that pathogenic agents only appear as menacing human beings when they, first, infiltrate human ecology and afterwards penetrate and develop themselves within the human body. Thus, those agents as such do not pose any threat. What is actually convertible to a threat status are peoples, societies and, in the last analysis, states. If one perceives detection, prevention, care and eventual cure of populations as the major measures against disease, one defines as security objective the contention, if not the abolition, of the multiplication of the number of people carrying the agent. It also accounts for the social impact that such multiplication feeds and probably provokes. The securitized people are depicted as those “at risk,” “vulnerable,” if not making up “dangerous classes.” In Southern and Eastern Africa they are, among the general population, “orphans and vulnerable children.” In China, India, Russia, and the West, they are drug injectors, migrants, homosexuals and the general mass of “marginalized ones.” Conversely, the securitizing agents tend to be most influent groups in society, where power, according to Williams, is more “‘sedimented’ (rhetorically and discursively, culturally, and institutionally) and structured in ways that make securitizations somewhat predictable and thus subject to probabilistic analysis.”

#### Catastrophe scenarios program us affectively to accept violence and dehumanization

Evans And Reid, PhD’s, 14

(Brad, International Studies @ Bristol, Julian, International Politics @ Lapland, Resilient Life: The art of Living Dangerously)

Anybody who has experienced immunization will appreciate the violence of the encounter. The whole process begins with the awareness of some vaguely looming threat which promises in the worst case an extremely violent ending. To pre-empt this happening, the subject is physically penetrated by the alien body with a controlled level of the lethal substance which, although producing violent sickness, is a fate less than death. Such violence unto oneself offers to counter violence with violence such that life may carry on living in spite of the dangers we are incapable of securing ourselves against. It is to give over to a form of self-harm albeit in a way that is actively desired and positively conceived. How else may we live otherwise? Resilience follows a similar logic. It encourages that we partake in the violence of the world to keep death at bay. For in the process of learning to live through the insecurity of the times, the subject is asked to incorporate the catastrophic intellectually, viscerally and affectively, thereby providing certain immunization against a more endangering fate. Indeed, since the ultimate litmus test is to bring to question the worst case scenario, the future cannot appear to us as anything other than completely monstrous. What, however, is actually slain as the future is wagered by the violence of the present may only become revealed with the passage of time. None of this operates outside of the realm of power politics. We only have to consider here (a) the moral judgements and political stakes associated with HIV as a pandemic that is more than simply biological, and (b) the development of viral analogies to explain more generally the problems ‘infecting’ societies from terror to criminality to evidence the point. Immunization is precisely about exposing oneself to something that is potentially lethal, thereby raising the threshold level for existence such that violence is normalized on account of our vulnerabilities to that which may be tempered but remains undefeatable. We are drawn here to Stellan Rye's (1913) silent horror movie The Student from Prague (Der Student von Prag) which has inspired a number of compelling literary and cinematic classics. In this tragic tale of poverty and violence, the impoverished student, Balduin, makes a bargain with the Devil as he exchanges the reﬂection of image for more immediate compensations. Upon eventually seeing himself, however, the student is avenged by an angry double that begins to wreak havoc as it seeks out revenge in light of its betrayal. Following an eventual violent confrontation the student has with his double, Balduin shatters the mirror that is central to the plot, and invariably destroys the fantasy of endangerment which also became the source of his afflicted curse. Inevitably, however, since the double was an essential element of this Faustian agreement, in killing the violent double, so the student kills himself. Otto Rank famously related this to the narcissistic self whose very sense of loneliness and alienation is caused by an anguish of a fear of death; even though it is precisely the violence of the pact which pushes the subject further towards the precipice. Whilst it is tempting to read this in familiar dialectical terms, there is a more sophisticated double move at work here, as the violence is already encoded within the initial act of demonic violation before the tragic encounter. For the double merely highlights the self-propelling tendency, from the fantasy of endangerment to the reality of the catastrophic. There is also a semantic interchange at work in Rye's Doppelganger as it stakes out the choice between a violated/violent life and eventual death. Since reason or logic prove utterly incapable of explaining the condition of Balduin's existence, let alone offering any promise of salvation from the oppressive situation to which he is fatefully bound, the double serves as an important metaphor for the narcissism of the times, as the subject wilfully accepts a violation and all the violence this entails in exchange for an illusion or fantasy of security which proves in the end to have been imbued with the catastrophic from the outset. Our understanding of the fundamental tenets of violence is invariably transformed such that we are forced to think about forms of violation/ intervention prior to any sense of dialectical enmity. Premetic Violence René Girard's thesis Violence and the Sacred offers a theory of violence that is exclusively bound to the desire to ‘overcome’ tragedy. To develop this theory, Girard speciﬁcally relates to the classic Greek play by Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, which he uses to illustrate the relationship between tragic dispossession and violence. It is through the tale of Oedipus and his return to reclaim the realm from which he was abandoned that we uncover a genesis of sacriﬁcial violence that is linked to some ‘past tragedy’.3\_9 Oedipus thus epitomizes the motif of the lost prince whose modes of contestation can be understood through competing claims to the ‘same object of desire: The story follows that when two uncompromising entities vie over the same object of desire, violence necessarily erupts. Through Girard's decoding of the Oedipus myth, what we therefore ﬁnd is any attempt to re-possess the object of desire necessarily requires the guilt of those currently in possession - a sacriﬁcial victim. Thus, to overcome tragedy one must come from the ‘outside’ - a violently destined return that can only be justiﬁed by making a claim to the original sin, or what Girard terms a return to the ‘original scene: However, as Sophocles tells it, such violence is more than simply a reclamation of that which has been taken. The violence of the already dispossessed desires to re-establish the authentic order which has been falsely appropriated - the paradise lost. Importantly, for Girard, such violence is not a relation of difference but is more deﬁned by the logic of mimesis: ‘At ﬁrst, each of the protagonists believes that he can quell the violence; at the end each succumbs to it. All are drawn unwittingly into a violent reciprocity - which they always think they are outside of, because they all initially came from outside and mistake this positional and temporary advantage for a permanent and fundamental superiority.40 Plunging into an opposition which ‘reduces the protagonists into a uniform condition of violence’, all claims to ‘difference’ are effectively ‘eclipsed’ by ‘a resurgence of reciprocity.41 It has been common to read Rye's doubling as a clear example of mimetic behaviour. This has found clear applications from Hegelian-inspired revolutionary accounts of dialectical reasoning, to Frantz Fanon's theory of (post)colonial brutality, onto the exceptional violence of Schmitt's sovereign decisionism. While accepting how this logic has played a structural role in the demar- cation of certain regimes of violence which came to hallmark distinct marks of separation, we need to depart from this logic if we are to make sense of the violence of the catastrophic imaginary. What, in other words, becomes of violence once we reconceptualize the idea of the original scene and its logics of exposure such that violence itself becomes virtually ordained? That is to say, what becomes of violence once it begins to precede any dialectical arrangement? Mimetic violence, we have noted, is obj ectiﬁable. Based upon establishing various forms of mystical foundations, it has a distinct materiality to it that permits clear lines of demarcation and embodiment. These work both spatially and temporally. The object for violence is locatable, while the time of its occurrence offers clear (if sometimes contested) conceptions as to its beginning and ending. It beneﬁts, then, from the guarantees of identiﬁcation and the ability to represent that which must be vanquished at a given moment ‘in timei The virtual nature of the violence endured by the resilient subject offers no such guarantees. Collapsing the space-time continuum of mimetic rivalry, it is merely projected into the future without the prospect of bounce-back. Internalized, however, into the very living conditions of the subject now permanently under siege, the violence is no less real. As any author of horror ﬁction will tell, the mind can be a terrifying place to inhabit. Once the source of endangerment becomes unknowable by deﬁnition, everything becomes the potential source of a violent encounter. Resilience challenges the logic of mimetic violence, therefore, in two fundamental ways. Firstly, it shows us that our only way of dealing with endangerment is to absorb its lethal tendencies. That which has the potential to destroy must become part ofsociety's make-up and its epistemic fabric. We too, in the process, become more lethally endowed as a result. Invariably, the more lethal we become, the more we end up embracing the biophysical conditions of our potential undoing as a principle form of human conditioning. The body accepts the lethality on account of preparedness. Secondly, there is an outward projection against that which could potentially threaten our existence. But this projection doesn't connect to any mimetic rival. We have no clear sense of what it is that so endangers in its particular guise, only a generalizable indication that something which is part of the integral whole will eventually bring about our ﬁnal demise. Deprived, then, of the potential to ‘at last stand’ upon a terrain whose forms of endangerment were known in advance, we continue to walk through a veritable mineﬁeld of potential disasters of a multi-dimensional nature, not knowing when the explosion will happen, with little comfort provided by the intellectual comforts of the past, and with no fence on the horizon beyond which relative security may be achieved and freedom from endangerment realized. The only solution, we are told, remains to expose oneself to all its disastrous permutations so that we may be better prepared against those already charged and yet to detonate, along with those yet to even be inserted into this catastrophic topography. But what does it mean to say that violence is now beyond representation? And what type of reality are we producing if we are calling into question the depths of ﬁeld that once gave qualitative and quantitative meaning to our relations to violence? For Paul Virilio, whose work we may connect to the premetic, this inaugurates ‘the futurism of the instant’ whose kairos shatters all metaphysical meaning: This spells disorientation in knowledge acquired over the course of millennia regarding the spatial environment and the cycle of seasons; an integral accident in knowledge of history as well as of the usual concrete geography that goes with it, the unity of place and time of a secular history. No doubt this is the fatal novelty of the historic tragedy befalling humanity and a progress that will no longer be exclusively technologistical and extra-planetary, but merely human, ‘all too human’. Masochism vis-a-vis an abhorred past that no longer passes muster is now symmetrically doubled with a masochism in relation to a future where, for want of fear, we will, this time, have space, all the space of a miniscule planet reduced to nothing, or as good as, by the progress of our discoveries.2 Nihilism Unbound Writing in the nineteenth century, Nietzsche argued that nothing was more deeply characteristic of the modern world than the power of nihilism.E Nietzsche's intervention here allowed us to move beyond the well-rehearsed attack upon Platonic reason or Christian faith, to focus instead upon ‘the radical repudiation of value, meaning and desirabilityiﬁ Nihilism, thus understood, referred to the triumph of reactive thinking. It was all about the negation of life as it appeared to be incapable of afﬁrming that which is properly and creatively different to human existence. Hence, for Nietzsche, nihilism was not simply reducible to some historical event in time, i.e. an exceptional moment in history which could be shamefully written into annals of human suffering. Nihilism was the recurring motor of history as the operation of power leads to a will to nothingness that strips life of any purposeful meaning. Crucially, as Nietzsche understood, this repudiation of the afﬁrmative realm of experience is something we create for ourselveaﬁ Nihilism, in other words, is to be understood through a sophisticated manipulation of desires such that the individual subject depreciates itself to such an extent that it actively participates in a custom of political self- annihilation. Central to Nietzsche's thinking on the perpetuation of nihilism is the notion of ressentiment. In his On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche explains this in terms of the slave mentality. This produces a feeling of impotence which not only translates into vengefulness, but more problematic still, teaches the slave that the only way it can become free is to give over to the prevailing reason mastery has set in place. Sloterdijk equates this ressentiment with rage, the basis of all great theisms.4i Such a condition, as Nietzsche understood, was ‘paralysing’ insomuch as it annuls the possibility of thinking and acting otherwise, and it was ‘exhausting’ insomuch as life was forced to compromise with the very lethality that put its condition originally into question. Through a ‘spirit of revenge’ what is lacking is therefore produced in a double movement, for lack is not some original gesture, it derives out of the ressentiment to deny us the opportunity to bring something different into the world. This raises a number of pressing questions: Could it be that not only have we become slaves to our biological existence, but in claiming false mastery of the earth we have given to ourselves an illusionary sovereignty? For how can we have mastery if that which we claim to be able to dominate as the principle force makes us increasingly vulnerable with each passing moment? Have we not, then, become slaves to ourselves and slaves to the earth, and resentful of them as a result? Nihilism has never been alien to liberal biopolitics. It is arguably its most potent expression. Its early development can be traced to Kant's Copernican revolution of the mind. Placing life at the centre of its universe, Kant forced us to look for meaning beyond the realms of theological destiny. Whilst this moved us beyond the suffering and lament of the Christian subject which so irked Nietzsche, Kant's universal substitute proved to be no substitute at all. The universal was actually denied to us due to the limits of our reason and our imperfections as ﬁnite beings - imperfections that signiﬁcantly proved incapable of moving us beyond the reductionism of metaphysical idealism and its crude representations, towards a more afﬁrmative form of meta- physics that worked in practice. As Drucilla Cornell writes, ‘Martin Heidegger famously wrote that Kant takes us to the limit of the very notion of critique and ultimately raises, but does not fully address, the question of ‘who’ is this ﬁnite being that must think through the transcendental imaginationfﬂ In a remarkably potent yet tragic stroke, Kant wrote the death of the omnipotent God and the types of docile subjects it produced who were rendered immobile due to its vengeance and fury, while putting in its place a fallen subject that was fated to be forever incomplete because of the burdens of its own actions. While Kant's thinking paved the way for new eschatological forms of power to emerge that took leave of traditional sovereign moorings, the fallen subject was compelled to become resentful of its biological existence. Bios were to remain forever imperfect by design and fated to be judged accordingly. With life fated to live a biologically endowed existence, it is stripped of its capacity to have a meaningful existence beyond the limits of its bodily formations, while political strategies operate by governing through the problem of ﬁnitude, even though the ﬁnite inevitably became a philosophical problem too difﬁcult to comprehend. As a result, forced to endure a growing resentment of its unfolding drama, liberalism slowly became morally equipped to continually intervene upon the souls of the living simply by offering to prolong the subject's existence better than any other political rationality. Such was the realization of our ﬁnite entrapment in the bodily form that the ability to philosophically transgress the injunction between life and death became increasingly impossible. Indeed, as we shall point out later, while liberal societies have a particular relationship to the question of dying as our existence is continually put into question, such that with each passing second we learn to survive until we become truly meaningless in the end, the idea of death remains incommensurable to the liberal subject. No longer does the resilient subject solely project its resentfulness onto the souls of ‘Others’. It resents the living world, for it too is radically endangering. It is here that catastrophic imaginaries begin to truly thrive. The resilient subject is shaped and anxiously mobilized by the prospect of the coming catastrophe. It fears the transformation of the subject, just as it fears the transformation of the ecosystem that gives sustenance to life. Our rage as such, to borrow from Sloterdijk, has become truly limitless. As everything becomes the source of our endangerment, we internalize the ressentiment and proliferate our impotence with unrivalled intensity and absolute necessity. Hence this produces a form of nihilism which is ‘unbounded: For no longer do we simply resent the teleological unfolding of history as we phase shift from masters to slaves to masters; there is no mastery to speak of and as a result all our lament ﬁlters into a politics of ressentiment as we are left to simply govern through our continually unfolding state of unending emergency. (111-17)

#### The alternative is to reject the AFF’s security representations as a critical intellectual labor that makes imagination of a more peaceful future possible. Neocleous 08

(Neocleous 8 — Prof of Government @ Brunel University; London (Mark, Critique of Security, pg. 184-5)

Anyone well versed in history or with experience of university life will know about the shameful ways in which large numbers of academics have elevated venality into the cardinal academic virtue, complying with the demands of those in power and the wishes of those with money: witness the political scientists, historians, anthropologists, geographers, cartographers, sociologists, linguists and many others who reworked their disciplines according to the principles and myths, and the principle myths, of fascism.' 'Academic life under fascism', notes Christopher Hutton, 'is a dismal ... episode in an unedifying story of relations between the modem academic and the state, and between academics and power both within and outside the university. But this part of the history of fascism is merely the worst moment in the wider and equally unedifying story of relations between academics and the state more generally, merely one way m which intellectuals have kowtowed to the principles and myths, and the principle myths, concerning security and the state. Spouting the jargon of security and enthralled by the trappings of power, their intellectual labour consists of nothing less than attempts to write hand-books for the princes of the new security state. The death of countless numbers in a more 'efficient' bombing of a city, the stationing of troops halfway around the World in order to bring to an end any attempt at collective self-determination, the use of military machines against civilians, the training of police forces in counter-insurgency practices, but more than anything the key concepts and categories used to explain and justify these things - all defended, supported and even ‘improved” by security intellectuals for whom, ultimately, intelIecua1 labour boils down to little more than the question of the most efficient manner. In which to achieve the security demanded by the state and bourgeois order. In rationalizing the political and corporate logic of security, the security intellectual conceals the utter irrationality of the system as a whole. The security intellectual then is nothing less than the security ideologue, peddling the fetish of our time. The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up, That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do, but it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalizes all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritizing of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end - constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,” dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state, and legitimizes state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole. The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modem politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitizing of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centered on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognizing that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that securitizing an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.

#### Judges in debate are academics, not political scientists—plan desirability isn’t offense or even a relevant concern, you should prioritize epistemological interrogation. Zambernardi, 15

University of Bologna (Lorenzo, “Politics is too important to be left to political scientists: A critique of the theory–policy nexus in International Relations”, European Journal of International Relations 1–21, April 2015, dml)

There are two main reasons why the notion of applied social science still appears to be unsound. The first one has to do with **the need for policymaking to rely on some degree of prediction** (Chernoff, 2009; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013: 436; Merton and Lerner, 1951: 304). As Herbert Simon (2001: 32, 60) explained, while ‘basic’ science describes the world and makes generalizations about collected phenomena, ‘applied’ science is grounded on the predictive power of the knowledge we possess.6 Indeed, choosing one policy rather than another means having some expectations about the effects of the policy itself. As Bueno de Mesquita (2009) rightly contends, **you can shape and engineer the future** only if you are able to make accurate predictions**.** However, **even if one overlooks the fact that IR scholars have** systematically tried (Gaddis, 1992–1993: 10)7 but failed **to predict major events** such as the Iranian Revolution, the peaceful end of the Cold War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and, more recently, the Arab Spring, **available studies show that experts are not much better at predicting future outcomes than common people**. In his Expert Political Judgment, Philip Tetlock (2005) has shown that experts, largely political scientists, area study specialists and economists working in academic and non-academic institutions, are not very good at predicting future developments. They are better than the ‘unwashed masses’ (i.e. Berkeley undergrads), but no better than relatively simple statistical procedures and attentive readers of newspapers. Moreover, Tetlock found that knowledge of a specific issue might make one a better forecaster, but **being a specialist can actually reduce the ability to predict future developments**: ‘we reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly’ (Tetlock, 2005: 59). That leads to a paradoxical situation in which **more knowledge means** a lower capacity of being a reliable forecaster. Tetlock’s conclusion is quite depressing for those scholars who wish to influence policymaking: In this age of academic hyper-specialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals — distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on — are any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times in ‘reading’ emerging situations. (Tetlock, 2005: 233)8 If the ability to predict is a necessary requirement for an applied science but IR scholars are only slightly better at predicting than the general public, why should they be credited with a privileged epistemological standpoint in the policymaking process? Here, I am not suggesting that policymakers can master political subjects better than scholars; as Henry Nau (2008: 636) points out, ‘neither profession can make a superior claim to social knowledge.’ Nor do I contend that prediction is impossible. In fact, some limited prediction is possible but, again, experts of international politics are not much better at forecasting than practitioners and laypeople. Although failure to predict might not pose any problems for a scientific study of politics — as explaining (Keil, 2010; Lepgold and Nincic, 2001: 89; Singer, 1990: 74) or scenario analysis (Bernstein et al., 2000) can be sufficient goals9 — it **does have** detrimental implications **for a social science that** aspires to advise, drive and change politics. Advising, designing and planning are all based on the assumption that social scientists are much better at prediction than the general public. Yet, such a claim is, at present, unsubstantiated. The second reason why the argument for an applied IR theory seems misguided is concerned with the issue of the knowledge generated within the discipline. In particular, there is no agreement among scholars about what we know and how international politics works. Even if we neglect the problems concerning prediction and go for a pragmatic attitude to political knowledge — an attitude by which the latter is simply what investigators agree upon (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009; Peirce, 1992[1878]: 138–139) — **scholars do not agree about what we know and about the best means to reach political goals**. Interestingly, disagreement on these important areas can be found not only between different epistemological approaches, but also among like-minded scholars working within the same theory of knowledge and even within the same school, tradition, research programme or paradigm. The problem lies not solely in the fact that there are several theories aiming to explain one and the same political phenomenon, but rather in the fact that it has become impossible to establish the scientific validity of the knowledge produced in the discipline. Despite the presence of agreed-upon rules to determine theory acceptance (Bueno de Mesquita, 2004; Christensen and Snyder, 1997; Elman and Elman, 2002; Hopf, 1998; Lake, 2013; Legro and Moravcsik, 1999; Vasquez, 1997), there is still sharp disagreement on the progress of IR. Indeed, the widespread (though not universal10) adoption of the criteria suggested by Imre Lakatos (1970) — the methodology of scientific research programmes — has not generated consensus on the progress in terms of knowledge achieved by the discipline. If some of the main theorists of some of the main schools of IR claim that their research programmes are all progressive (Di Cicco and Levy, 2003; Keohane and Martin, 2003; Lee Ray, 2003; Moravcsik, 2003) and, therefore, all scientific and cumulative, then one could infer that none of them is probably truly progressive, at least in Lakatos’s terms. For Lakatos, judgement on progress is not simply a contest between theory and empirical evidence, but rather a three-cornered contest between competing theories and empirical evidence. Moreover, besides awarding a promising future to their research programmes, some of these scholars have also claimed that their rivals’ theoretical programmes are ‘degenerative’ and, thus, outside the scope of science (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999; Vasquez, 1997). Thus, not only do meta-theoretical debates about epistemology and ontology appear irresolvable (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009; Sil and Katzenstein, 2010a: 417), but so are empirically testable questions rarely resolved. Indeed, there is no consensus on what causes war, on the economic and political sources of democracy, on when states should intervene abroad, and on other major issues concerning international politics. The debate over these questions seems interminable.11 The fact that strong disagreement also exists in the hard sciences is not good news for IR theory. Although scientific research always implies the assumption of fallibility and the knowledge produced is often subject to change, that does not mean that the natural and social sciences are essentially identical. Dismissing the differences in accuracy, prediction and control between the natural sciences and social sciences as ‘mere matters of degree’ is an old but untenable strategy in order to defend the scientific study of politics (Crick, 1959: 218). Indeed, **differences in degree might soon turn into differences in kind**. The modest success of IR theory in developing a body of policy-relevant knowledge barely comparable to the one generated by the natural sciences suggests that the so-called scientific method has not yet been able to produce remarkable results when employed in the study of international politics. Hayek’s and Morgenthau’s critiques of applied social science still appear to be valid, though many students of international politics think and write that such an unsuccessful record does not question the possibility of an applied political science. If no theory or method can deliver any truly predictive knowledge of international politics, then policy must be insensitive to theoretical and empirical findings. This is why, despite being concerned with relevant political issues and emphasizing any potential dangers and mistakes, **IR theory** should not directly inform policy. French statesman Georges Clemenceau famously remarked that ‘war is too important to be left to the generals.’ Paraphrasing Clemenceau, I would argue that politics is too important to be left to political scientists. Suggesting that policies are to ignore scientific conjectures, however, does not imply that there should be no role for IR theory and no point in theorizing about international politics and foreign policy. **Being practically relevant does not equate to directly affecting policy**. The argument developed here does not deny the importance of IR scholarship, which, far from claiming any direct influence of a scientist kind, can have practical relevance in two different functions. The first one refers to the role of theory in political judgement. In particular, I would argue that **theory is an important tool for** the intellectual development of policymakers. From this viewpoint, no broad line of demarcation should be drawn between the practitioner and the scholar. The second function, on the other hand, is concerned with IR scholarship as a whole and involves its unintended effects on policymaking. Such influence is indirect, yet no less important. Here, I contend that a broad line of demarcation should be drawn between decision-making and IR theory. Despite the fact that these two implications might appear to be inconsistent at first sight, as I will try to show in the next two sections, they tend to reduce the scholar’s role but not the function of scholarship. IR as a tool of self-education While, at present, point prediction appears impossible in international politics, what about the most common type of forecasting in social science — that is, probabilistic predictions? Apart from Bueno de Mesquita perhaps, no scholar would claim to have developed the right formula for forecasting future outcomes. Proponents of statistical models, for example, would argue that the predictions they make are probabilistic and the variables they employ are ‘probability-raisers’ (Grynaviski, 2013: 824). In relation to the theory–policy nexus, however, **facts and figures cast in probabilistic terms** cannot solve the dilemmas of policy. Although scholars might be content with knowing that there is a certain relationship between variables, policymakers cannot act according to probabilistic propositions in the particular, individual cases that they have to face. In matters of war and peace, for instance, where many lives may be at stake, **the error term is** something that cannot be ignored: ‘How, for example, can the cost of thinking rather too well of a particular speculation within pure theory be compared to the pain, sufferance and death which follow errors in the application of theory?’ (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986: 34). Practitioners are not interested in distinguishing between approximations and exact results not because they fail to understand the epistemological limits of the social sciences and the complex nature of political reality, but because they often face issues and circumstances that are unique. Since a variable ruled out of a theory on account of its rare or scarce influence on a particular phenomenon might have a major effect under specific circumstances, generalizations are of little help to practitioners. Likewise, knowledge of causal mechanisms and processes, highly valuable for understanding how variables are connected to one another, does not solve the problem of whether the case that a policymaker is facing is either a particular case of a general class of events or a contingency characterized by unique features.12 Thus, general propositions about causal chains and mechanisms are also of limited use for policymaking. As George and Bennett (2004: 277) acknowledge: ‘No theory or systematic generic knowledge can provide policy specialists with detailed, high-confidence prescriptions for action in each contingency that arises. **Such policy-relevant theory and knowledge** does not exist **and** is not feasible.’ By clarifying the problems and risks involved in certain situations, theory can contribute to informing policy. However, scientific knowledge cannot replace political deliberation; many instances in international politics are so unique that the idea that generalizations can be employed to conduct foreign policy appears misguided.13 What ‘makes men foolish or wise, understanding or blind, as opposed to knowledgeable or learned or well informed’, writes Isaiah Berlin (1999: 24), ‘is the perception of these unique flavours of each situation as it is, in its specific differences.’ To these ‘unique flavours’, IR conceived as a scientific enterprise has not much to offer. Good political judgement might not be illusory; the illusion is to think that judgement can be replaced with rational calculation or probabilistic inference. Acting on the highest probabilities available, indifference to the ‘particular’ and blindness to the individual circumstances **is a very dangerous path to take** in international politics. Thus, **it is necessary to understand** the nature**,** the structure **and** the issues **of a particular context** regardless of universal formulas and general rules. As Isaiah Berlin (1999: 45) argued: What makes statesmen, like drivers of cars, successful is that they do not think in general terms — that is, they do not primarily ask themselves in what respect a given situation is like or unlike other situations in the long course of human history... Hence, every situation must be understood in its own distinctiveness and a particular decision should not be the rigid application of a mathematical formula, but rather **a deliberation** based on critical reflection **over the specific situation in which one needs to act.**

### Case

#### No solvency: The aff’s scenario is nonsense and they don’t solve because of bioweapon development – all of their impact evidence says that bioterrorism is about engineering NEW pathogens which means that current vaccines and medicine are irrelevant in minimizing damage from an attack. Either terrorists use an existing virus and the attack is easily treatable and not an existential threat or the entire world is screwed and the aff can’t solve. Vote neg on presumption to encourage better research.

#### Vaccines: COVID and vaccines flow negative – it took almost a full year to develop a COVID vaccine which isn’t feasible against ultra-deadly bioweapon and patent protection was what encouraged the expensive vaccine race and rapid production by so many medical companies.

#### Squo solves: Frame aff solvency through an incremental lens. They only get offense for the amount they make more effective current bioterror prevention and treatment mechanisms and they certainty don’t “solve” bioterror.

#### The squo solves – compulsory licensing already exists globally and there’s an emergency exception to ensure speed.

Mullowney and Harris, JDs, 13

(Jared, Texas Tech, Neil, Texas Tech, Patent Protectability or Public Health?—An Examination of the Patent Compulsory License and Bioterrorism, Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law, 4(1))

One potential benefit in the event of a bioterrorism attack and the major focus of this Article is the compulsory license scheme found in the American patent system.61 A compulsory license is a license granted to a non-patent holder to make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import a patented product.62 What makes the compulsory license interesting is that, unlike the copyright compulsory licenses,63 the patent compulsory license is a license granted by the United States Government.64 What also makes the compulsory license scheme interesting is that the patent holder is not able to bring suit against the compulsory licensee for patent infringement.65 Instead of flat payment from the licensee to the patent holder and instead of total reimbursement of profits made off of the license, the patent holder’s remedy is against the United States Government “for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture.”66 The compulsory license is not unique to the American patent system. In fact, the TRIPS Agreement also lays out a groundwork for a compulsory license system.67 Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement lays forth guidelines for determining when another entity may use or make a product protected by a patent without the patent holder’s permission.68 The major provisions set forth in TRIPS focus on the necessity and the effort of the government to obtain a voluntary license first. Specifically, TRIPS provides that compulsory license authorization shall be considered on a case-by-case basis,69 shall be permitted only after efforts are made to obtain a voluntary license,70 the duration and scope of the compulsory license shall be limited,71 the licensee shall not be able to assign the license to another entity,72 manufacturing of a patent product under a compulsory license shall be for domestic use,73 the license shall terminate if and when the circumstances giving rise to the license cease to exist,74 and the patent holder shall be reimbursed adequately, as determined on a case-by-case basis.75 One major exception to section (b) requiring voluntary license negotiation is in the event of a national emergency or “other circumstances of extreme urgency.”76

#### Seriously, countries can already unilaterally override patent privileges to protect public health.

Okediji, JD Harvard, 14

(Ruth, Professor @ Harvard Law School, “The Role of WIPO in Access to Medicines” in Balancing Wealth and Health, Chapter 13, 312-313)

The right of countries to adopt measures to protect public health is one of the grounds explicitly mentioned as part of the principles of the TRIPS Agreement,20 and the Doha Declaration subsequently established elements of this right, including the residual power of countries to unilaterally determine the conditions in which public health needs can override patent privileges.21 Access to medicines is an integral part of the human right to health in many countries (Lee and Hunt 2012). WIPO, however, has been far less embracing of human rights approaches to IP as a basis for access to medicines despite robust scholarly examination and affirmation of a positive effect of the IP-human rights link on access to medicines (Land, this volume; Land and Pakenham-Walsh 2012; Helfer and Austin 2011). To the extent patent grants circumscribe the terms of access, human rights norms provide countervailing arguments of equal or, arguably, greater moral force. These normative strategies of resistance to maximalist patent rights have had a measurable impact on access to medicines campaigns across Brazil, Latin America, South Africa, and East Africa. At a minimum, human rights arguments, because they so easily galvanize global public concern, can exert significant bottom-up pressure that eventually affects the scope and direction of the exercise of IP rights.22 Even when formally marginalized within politically agile organizations such as WIPO or the WTO, human rights arguments constitute a centripetal force compelling normative reconsideration of global patent norms. This overlapping regime complex, which frames the access to medicine challenge, requires shared competence across international organizations in addressing public health and access to medicines.