## Condo Good – Short

#### The neg gets [X] condo advocacies.

### Offense

#### 1. Logic- proving a CP is bad doesn’t prove the plan is good, a logical policy maker can always choose not to act. Logic outweighs – it’s the basis of all rational arguments.

#### 2. Neg Flex- we are inherently reactionary, we need in round flexibility to test the plan and have a fighting chance. If they had phenomenal answers to the CP the debate would be over after the 1AR which is educationally bankrupt.

#### 3. The 1AR should be hard- it’s the turning point in the debate. The aff doesn’t have to contradict themselves or undercover- they need to make tough choices.

#### 4. Key to research – unidimensional 1NCs discourage the neg from prepping multiple strategies against a case. Research outweighs – it’s the only portable skill we take into the real world.

### L: Medical Diplomacy (MUST READ)

#### The plan’s reduction of IP is in line with a broader strategy of vaccine diplomacy – this treats global health as a game of political football to advance imperialist interests in the long-term – only anti-capitalist organizing solves.

Patanè, 21

[Andrea, writer for the IMT: “COVID-19 pandemic: patents and profits,” In Defence of Marxism, published 5-15-2021. https://www.marxist.com/covid-19-pandemic-patents-and-profits.htm]//AD

We are 16 months into a pandemic that according to some reports has claimed 6.9m lives and plunged capitalism into its deepest-ever crisis, and the ruling class is still torn by internecine squabbles over patent waivers, export bans and priority-deals. New rifts have opened up between sections of the bourgeoisie following the recent announcement that US president Joe Biden’s administration now supports “negotiations” on waiving COVID-19 vaccine patents. This is much to the consternation of the Big Pharma parasites, who are pocketing tens of billions of dollars thanks to their exclusive ownership of COVID-19 vaccines and other drugs. Again and again, we find proof that capitalism, a system based on narrow national interests and the pursuit of private profits is utterly unfit for purpose. Indeed, as a recent WHO-led investigation just confirmed, the entire pandemic was preventable. The market and bourgeois politicians brought about this disaster, and are utterly failing to resolve it. IP and Big Pharma profits In October last year, faced with the prospect of global vaccine shortages and the inability of poorer countries to acquire them, India and South Africa presented to the World Trade Organization a request to waive intellectual property rights on all the COVID-19-related drugs and technologies. This would allow the manufacture of cheap, generic versions anywhere in the world. Vaccines and medical technologies fall under the WTO agreements on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, known as TRIPS, which protects the IP of the major pharmaceutical companies. According to one report, a TRIPS waiver could help in vaccinating more than 60 percent of the world population by the end of the year. Everyone on earth could be fully vaccinated by the end of 2022. The pandemic nightmare that billions of people are living through could be over once and for all. Surely then, a TRIPS waiver sounds like a sensible and necessary request? Especially given that the likes of Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson and AstraZeneca have already racked up profits of more than $26bn during the pandemic. What was being demanded was not too radical either: a one time temporary waiver on intellectual property rights related to just one vaccine. Also, the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health – agreed by all WTO states – maintains that public health should take precedence over the enforcement of IP rights. Unfortunately, Big Pharma takes a very different view, and isn’t going to let a trivial thing like the Doha Declaration undermine its private claim to COVID-19 vaccines. From their point of view, any concession in this particular case would set a very dangerous precedent. The IP protections afforded to Big Pharma are denying huge swathes of the world population access to vaccines, compounded by the vaccine nationalism of rich countries, which can afford to pay suppliers directly and are gobbling up global supplies. As, Dr. Tedros – the general director of WHO – has warned in the NYT that, following the current trajectory of vaccinations: “[w]e face the very real possibility of affluent countries administering variant-blocking boosters to already vaccinated people when many countries will still be scrounging for enough vaccines to cover their most-at-risk groups”. This is quite an appealing prospect for the Big Pharma bloodsuckers: namely, COVID-19 going endemic, much like a seasonal flu. With new variants breeding out of control in poor countries every year, and seasonal vaccines developed and distributed for those who can pay, billions of dollars would continue to flow in the pockets of these leeches, potentially for the years to come. Moderna CEO Stephane Bancel has already tempted his shareholders with such a “business model” – and is now projecting more than $19.2 billion in sales for this year! However, this bonanza depends on Big Pharma keeping a firm hold on its vaccine IP. Hundreds of thousands of people dying every single year as a result of COVID-19 going endemic is a very minor concern. Unsurprisingly then, Big Pharma has been lobbying governments world over against the TRIPS waiver. Up until now, they have been successful. As of October 2020, the US and EU not only opposed the waiver, but blocked the possibility of any discussion of it from taking place at WTO meetings. Now – after a criminal seven-month period in which hundreds of thousands of people have lost their lives to preventable second and third COVID-19 waves – Biden’s administration has come out in support of entering into negotiations over the TRIPS waiver. Unsurprisingly, Big Pharma reacted to this announcement with dismay. Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla argued that an IP waiver would “disrupt the flow of raw materials” for the vaccine production chain. One suspects he means Big Pharma’s exclusive control over these raw materials will be disrupted. Meanwhile, Johnson & Johnson called the waiver proposal “an unprecedented step that will undermine our global response to the pandemic and compromise safety”, by allowing poor countries to produce vaccines. This is despite the fact that India produces the highest number of vaccines in the world, and was one of the two countries that proposed the waiver in the first place. Big Pharma companies also complained that an IP-waiver would hand the likes of China access to Western-produced mRNA technologies, which aside from vaccine production, could be repurposed for, among other things, cancer research (quelle horreur!). Let us not forget that mRNA technology was developed in publicly-funded university research facilities in the first place, before it was appropriated by private companies. This is simply an argument for the latest developments in medical science being freely available to the entire world, rather than the private property of this or that capitalist regime. A “calculated risk” Far from an act of ‘international solidarity', this latest move from the US government is a calculated political risk, and will be implemented in the interests of US imperialism. A section of the more serious wing of the bourgeoisie understands that a proper economic recovery can happen only if the pandemic is suppressed worldwide. As we have explained elsewhere, wealthy countries risk losing billions of dollars if the pandemic is brought under control only within their own borders, because new variants (like those in India and Brazil) can always mutate elsewhere and reinfect their populations, causing further economic disruption. Therefore, even on a capitalist basis, it is expedient in the long-term for the rich countries to facilitate a global vaccination campaign. Even Pope Francis anointed the demand from his seat in Rome! Biden’s announcement is also an act of vaccine diplomacy. America’s main rivals, China and Russia, have been shoring up their spheres of influence by distributing their Sinopharm and Sputnik V vaccines to poor countries left out by the vaccine nationalism of the US and Europe. Chinese and Russian vaccines have been exported into countries traditionally under western spheres of influence, including Brazil and Hungary. Pushing to waive IP protections on COVID-19 vaccines is therefore partly an effort to push back against the encroachment of rival imperialist powers, which have so far outcompeted Washington in the global vaccination drive. Biden’s announcement is also an attempt to restore the standing and authority of US imperialism on the world stage, which has been bruised by the ‘America First’ vaccine nationalist policy started by Donald Trump, and continued by Biden. According to the FT, Katherine Tai (top US trade envoy) and Jake Sullivan (national security adviser) made the case to Biden that pushing for the waiver “was a low-risk way to secure a diplomatic victory”, after coming under fire for not “respond[ing] quickly enough to the unfolding COVID-19 crisis in India”. Here you have it, straight from the horse’s mouth. Under capitalism, vaccines – rather than providing a way out of the pandemic – are tools for ‘low-risk diplomatic victories’. As if this was some sort of football match between world leaders! In short, Biden is stepping in to prioritise the interests of US imperialism as a whole over the immediate interests of the Big Pharma capitalists. But we should say clearly: this cynical attempt to claim the moral high ground came only after the US used its massive economic clout to secure enough vaccines to inoculate its own population several times over. And in fact, the wartime Defense Production Act is still in effect, which forces US manufacturers to fulfil domestic demands for medical equipment before exports are permitted. This de facto export ban has created bottlenecks in the supply chain that have already undermined the WHO-led COVAX programme to vaccinate poor countries. Rest assured, Biden’s policy remains ‘America First’, just by somewhat more calculated means than his predecessor. Protectionist EU Meanwhile, in the Eurozone, where vaccine shortages still abound, EU leaders fired back at Biden that he should lift his export ban and give up some of America’s surplus supply before talking about waiving IP protections. President Emmanuel Macron in France said he favoured waiving vaccine IP in principle, but that this was a lower priority than the US and Britain ending export bans on resources and giving up their spare vaccines. “If we want to work quickly, today there isn’t one factory in the world that can’t produce doses for poor countries because of intellectual property,” Macron said on the weekend. “The priority today is not intellectual property – it’s not true. We would be lying to ourselves. It’s production.” Indeed! And production could be considerably ramped up if Big Pharma companies weren’t content to maintain existing factories at full capacity, rather than creating and repurposing new factories that will stand idle (and unprofitable) when the pandemic ends. It should be noted that no French company has managed to produce a vaccine as yet, meaning IP protection is a lesser concern from the perspective of French capitalism. This is unlike Germany, in which Pfizer’s partner BioNTech is based, and whose Chancellor Angela Merkel argued for preserving IP protections in order to ensure free market “innovation”, stating last Friday: “I believe that we need the creativity and innovative force of companies, and for me, this includes patent protection.” Merkel conveniently forgets that, since the beginning of the pandemic, state intervention has been a far more important influence over vaccine production than the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. The research that led to the COVID-19 technologies vaccines was overwhelmingly paid for out of the public purse. The AstraZeneca vaccine, for instance, was 97 percent publicly funded. Not to mention the billions spent by various states on purchasing doses. This has nothing to do with preserving ‘innovation’, and everything to do with protecting the private interests of German capitalism. Vaccine supremacy Despite misgivings from the likes of Germany, this latest move by the US might force the EU to change its tune. At a European Council summit on the weekend, President Charles Michel said: “[o]n the intellectual property, we don’t think in the short term that it’s the magic bullet but we are ready to engage on this topic as soon as a concrete proposal will be put on the table.” Still, Brussels is embittered at the US for refusing to offer any of its excess supply to help with shortages after the EU bungled its initial vaccine rollout. At the close of the summit, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen again stated Europe was “open to discussion” on waiting IP, but mostly used the opportunity to strike back at the US: “The European Union is the pharmacy of the world and open to the world. Up to today in the European Union, 400 million doses of vaccines have been produced and 50 percent of them — 200 million doses — have been exported to 90 different countries in the world. So we invite others to do the same [this clearly means the US]. This is the best way right now in the short term to approach the bottlenecks and the lack of vaccines worldwide.” Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo used even-sterner language: “As Europeans, we don’t need to be schooled. The U.S. hasn’t exported a single vaccine in the past six months. Europe is the one that’s been producing for itself and the rest of the world these past six months.” Now the European rollout is a bit more in hand (though still lagging behind the US and Britain, for example), the EU is trying to pursue vaccine diplomacy of its own to compete with China, Russia and the US in the race for vaccine supremacy. At the summit, Leyen announced plans to send more than 600,000 doses to countries in the Western Balkans, with further donations planned for countries in the Eastern Partnership group comprising Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. This notably includes Ukraine, which has already pleaded in vain with Washington for vaccines. While this is all going on, the EU is still waging a war with the British-based AstraZeneca company – taking them to court over delayed deliveries of vaccines. Once again, at a critical juncture in the fight against the pandemic, when global cooperation is most needed, the political leaders of bourgeoisie are embroiled in recriminations and shoring up their narrow national interests. No time for this madness! While the world leaders squabble, the nightmare continues for workers imprisoned by this pandemic. In her official statement to the WTO, Tai said: “negotiations [i.e. for the patent waiving] will take time”. But time is exactly what millions of workers that face the deadly virus today do not have. Because the WTO makes decisions by consensus, with any one of the 164 member states being able to block decisions, the end of November is considered a ‘realistic goal’ for presenting a draft agreement. This is seven months away! While tens of thousands of deaths are being recorded on a daily basis. When deadly new variants are devastating India and Latin America. It took less time to develop the first working vaccine than apparently, it will to agree a patent waiver on that vaccine! This is nothing short of insanity. Furthermore, the US statement to the WTO fell short of making explicit reference to the transferring of vaccine technology and know-how. If the technology underpinning vaccine production is not shared, even with a patent waiver, it will take months before manufacturers will be able to reverse-engineer a generic version, and months further to test it. The Big Pharma fat cats will not share their technology (which was publicly funded in the first place) voluntarily. They are forecasting sales for billions of dollars for 2021 and will do everything they can to push further back the development of generic versions. They can afford to drag things out. For them, time means billions in profits. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown capitalism for what it is. Rather than being a force for progress, private property and the nation state are the main obstacles preventing us from putting an end to the pandemic. Under a democratic, global plan of production we could put the mighty forces of industry and science at the service of society. All the necessary research, technology and expertise could be marshalled to fight this terrible virus. Vaccine production could be stepped up to reach the majority of the world population by the end of the year. It is capitalism alone that prevents this. We must fight the pandemic with class struggle! Expropriate the Big Pharma fat cats!

### L: WTO

#### The WTO is inevitably a tool of accumulation for capitalist imperialism – international institutional monopoly capitalism overdetermines the plan’s move to peace – causes war, environmental degradation, and extinction.

Cuong, 18

[Vu Manh, Researcher @ VietEra Foundation: “International institutional monopoly capitalism and its manifestations,” published by Monthly Review on December 19, 2018. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Cuong-Vu-10/publication/331162082\_International\_institutional\_monopoly\_capitalism\_and\_its\_manifestations/links/5c6c2588299bf1e3a5b62764/International-institutional-monopoly-capitalism-and-its-manifestations.pdf]//AD

\*IIMC=International Institutional Monopoly Capitalism

The Evolution of Monopoly Capitalism Monopoly capitalism emerged from “laissez-faire” capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as described clearly by V.I. Lenin in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, allowing giant corporations to dominate the accumulation process. Since the late 1970s, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, this system has reached a new level in its development, forging imperial centralism or “International Institutional Monopoly Capitalism” (IIMC), whereby a handful of powerful nation-states explicitly use international organizations to impose their interests and further expand accumulation. Figure 1 presents a brief overview of the conceptualization of capitalism throughout its history, focusing on the development of monopoly capitalism from the 1870s to the present, including both economic and politic facets. It includes IIMC as the newest term in the evolution of monopoly capitalism. (2) (3) (4) (5) As Karl Marx noted, capitalism has an inherent drive toward endless accumulation through the production of “surplus value.” In relation to this defining characteristic of the system, there have been distinct historical configurations of its operation. IIMC represents the highest form of the imperialism stage of capitalism, given the increasingly coordination between the monopoly capital and the state within core nations. As a state-formed monopoly capitalism, IIMC has been forcing most economies to participate in its system, regardless of whether those economies are capitalist or socialist (except North Korea). This is what Nikolai Bukharin pointed to a century ago. According to Samir Amin, in the globalization era, the efficiency of economic management by nation-states has changed. Under IIMC, advanced capitalist states are even stronger, as far as their economic-political reach, and are able to control international institutions and organizations. Within these core nations, the state uses its strength to support the formation of “supercompanies” (the multinational corporations that monopolize one or a number of products/services worldwide), serving the interests of the richest class, while bringing some additional benefits to its broader population. These countries are monopoly nations. Through international institutional settings (e.g., World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization), monopoly capital and monopoly nations extend their influence and power into every corner of the world, even the few remaining socialist strongholds, causing complex conflicts within globalization and regionalization processes. Capital Concentration and the Establishment of Monopoly Nations Capital accumulation and the centralization and concentration of capital led to the formation of monopolies (cartels, syndicates, trusts, consortiums, and conglomerates). This fundamental law of capitalism continues to take effect in the IIMC period, albeit at a very high level. However, the following organic processes contributed to the formation of monopoly nations: 1. The concentration and centralization of capital in super-companies: The increasing strength and expansion of super-companies, especially over the last five decades, have advanced economic internationalization and globalization. Globally, the 500 largest companies generated $31.1 trillion in 2014. They accounted for nearly 40 percent of world income –up 20 percent from less than 20 percent in 1960. Super-companies not only have a monopoly within one country’s borders but also are dominant in other countries worldwide. The overseas assets of the world’s 100 largest non-financial super-companies in 2011 accounted for 63 percent of their total assets, whereas foreign sales reached 65 percent of their total. This is reflected in the intensification of foreign direct investment (FDI); the significant transfer of employment, technology and international financial operations; and the strong rise of financial systems, bank credit, and insurance. Many super-companies with powerful finances (assets, revenues) can far exceed the gross domestic product (GDP) of many economies. For example, Procter & Gamble (ranked 100 in the list of the largest companies), as noted in Table 1,has revenues that are higher than the GDP of Oman,which is the largest economy in a group of 124 smalland medium-sized economies, with $81.8billion in 2014. Supercompanies can dramatically influence small and/or poor countries as they pressure governments to condone environmental degradation, violation of national labor laws, and abuse of labor rights. They can force these governments to tender incentives, which maximize their profits by allowing extremely poor working conditions and low wages. Some super-companies actively destroy local agriculture and kill marine life, which has sparked mass protests. They often hire military personnel to open fire on peaceful protestors and make assassinations. 2. The mass exploitation of workers: The division of labor extends throughout the world. In 2011, the employment of foreign affiliates worldwide reached sixty-nine million jobs, up by 8 percent from 2010. Specifically, the total number of employees of the ten largest companies worldwide in 2014 exceeded 9.8 million, which is more than the population of many independent nations.  This international division of labor is a product of monopoly capitalism, seeking to avoid the “law of declining rate of profit” and striving to increase the rate of profit. John Bellamy Foster and John Smith have clearly presented this trend, using archetypical examples of the labor and production associated with iPhones, T-shirts, and coffee, which involve super-exploitation overseas by super-companies. As a result, over the last three decades, an enormous amount of surplus value has been produced in the periphery, but captured by super-companies within monopoly nations. Through the international division of labor and expansion of branches worldwide, super-companies promote alliances in the form of complex cooperation among themselves and between themselves and small- and medium-sized companies. They adopt a “divide and rule” approach to control labor worldwide. These super-companiestake advantage of the economies of scale to increase their market shares and influence. Once they are in place in peripheral countries, they influence habits and traditional customs. Workers re-align themselves to earn a living wage. 3. The symbiotic growth of monopoly nations and super-companies: Both the state and capital rely on each other to exploit existing internal natural resources (e.g., OECD with its oil); control major production resources throughout the world (e.g., the United States in regard to Iraq’s oil, China influence on its neighbors’ sea routes and exclusive economic zone in the East and South China Seas); and possess key technologies, such as weapons, cell cloning, artificial intelligence robots, patent medicine develop, or media and communication. In other words, monopoly nations are the products of “five monopolies.” Super-companies and monopoly nations exert their technological and economic powers to dominant the world market, leading to both positive and negative impacts. Super-companies like capitalists to have control over mass destructive weapons, in order to defeat competitors and to destroy commoners’ benefits. The first and most outstanding monopoly nation is the United States, which has only two companies that reached a turnover in excess of $5 billion in 1955: General Motors ($9.82 billion) and Exxon Mobil ($5.66 billion). However, by 1990, the number of large companies (over $5 billion of turnover) had reached more than 100. In 2013, the smallest company (Exelon: energy sector) of the 132 largest companies had a turnover of $23.5 billion. On a global scale, the company that has the lowest ranking in the top 500 list of largest companies (ranked by Fortune in 2013) is Ricoh (office-equipment sector), reaching sales of over $23.2 billion. Also included in this list are eighty-nine companies from China, which is a rapid increase, compared to its thirty-four companies in 2008. As of 2015, the Global 500 are represented by 36 countries, but nearly 472 of the Global 500 are from only 16 countries: Canada, the United States, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Brazil, India, and Russia. Of these 16 countries, 13 are the world’s largest economies. Table 2 lists the typical monopoly nations in the world in 2015. The combining of super-companies and states that Lenin analyzed nearly 100 years ago, in which capitalists pivot around political agencies and monopolies, led to the integration of monopoly nations and international institutions/organizations. Thus, under the conditions of IIMC, this integration has crucially influenced the globalization process of the world economy, specifically for the peripheral countries. Although these monopoly nations dominate at different levels and their income is not equivalent, they do not conquer other nations; nonetheless, they help transfer a vast surplus of value from peripheral countries into the core countries. Monopoly Nations Monopolize International Institutions The rise of super-companies has not meant the end of competition, which is globally more intense today than ever before. Simultaneously, monopoly nations do not displace super-companies or prevent their monopolistic power; on the contrary, these states directly and indirectly provide super-companies with advantages and benefits. As Harry Braverman explained, “the state is guarantor of the conditions, the social relations, of capitalism, and the protector of the ever more unequal distribution of property.” The role of the state has changed in monopoly nations: it not only regulates the domestic economy, exploits the state capital, and protects monopolies on the international market, but it also represents and supports the allies of domestic monopolies to affect the activities of international institutions/organizations in its favor and increase its competitiveness. The role of the state and its various imperial alliances with local politicians is facilitated through the discourse of national and international competitiveness. Thus, the rise of monopoly nations has not killed competition in all of its forms. In fact, rivalry is more frequent and fierce between monopoly nations and other economies. The formation of monopoly nations and the emergence of a number of new industrialized countries have caused problems for individual economies to address and settle the issues related to international economic activities. For example, the legal systems and the legal provisions of nations have become a barrier to the circular flow of resources and limited the mobilities of the supercompanies. These can range from the agricultural protection policies that were severely opposed by the Cairns Group at the Uruguay Round in 1986 (the first time developing countries had played an active role) to the restriction regulations in immigration. They are also associated with cultural or political issues such as Internet censorship in China, Euroscepticism trend in European Union and Brexit in the United Kingdom, the opposition of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and new protectionism in the United States. Meanwhile, the international institutions had just proved their consistency in their role of coordination and international arbitration among new member economies in the beginning phase. Subsequently, the competitiveness among countries has moved to a higher level and continued to increase, which manifested itself in many forms such as disputes of commerce, technology, and finance, etc. The recent disputes include: batteries (solar) between the United States and India; beef among the United States, Indo, and Japan; steel pipes between Japan and China; auto parts between the United States and China; catfish, frozen shrimp, and garments between Viet Nam and the United States; and rare earths among the United States, the European Union, Japan, and China. There is a severe conflict among the United States, the European Union, Ukraine, and Russia on the recent issue of annexing Crimea. Since its establishment, the World Trade Organization has witnessed many disputes over dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguarded trade among member economies. Most of these arguments are related to monopoly nations. The number of quarrels is growing rapidly: over the last twenty years in particular, the World Trade Organization has had to resolve hundreds of cases. Specifically, the United States is a typical monopoly nation that is associated with the majority of the commercial disputes in the world (344 cases), followed by the European Union (316 cases), Japan (180 cases), and China (155 cases). In the context of the multitude of interlocking and complicated disagreements, the dispute settlement mechanism of World Trade Organization constitutes the basic cornerstone maintaining the multilateral trading order. However, monopoly nations have been controlling this mechanism. If there are disputes among the strongest monopoly nations, this makes them direct competitors (these include the United States, Japan, Western Europe, Russia, and China). Thus, monopoly nations tend to compromise and align with others to monopolize the World Trade Organization. Otherwise, super-companies always plan well to avoid a devalued competition. In the case of Ford, Toyota, and the other leading auto firms, the companies did not try to undersell each other in their prices. Instead, they competed for the low-cost position by making reductions in prime production (labor and raw material) costs that could be implemented in peripheral regions. Monopoly nations monopolize not only the World Trade Organization but also other international institutions/organizations or forums, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and regional banks. Furthermore, monopoly nations monopolize political forums like G-7, the European Union, and even the most powerful United Nations. Monopoly nations also monopolize most other regional organizations, from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and most recent the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Below is a list of typical international institutions/organizations and mechanisms that the monopoly nations are monopolizing: • United Nations: Founded in 1945, it was monopolized at its founding by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. These five members not only have the responsibility to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations but also have the power to veto, thus enabling them to oppose or prevent any proposed resolution of the other members. As a rule, as these five members become stronger, the United Nations is weaker. The weakness of the United Nations is expressed not only in the handling of the South China Sea dispute, but also in events such as Ukraine’s political crisis, the East China Sea quarrels, and its ability to eliminate wars and serious conflicts since the fall of Soviet (31) (32) (33) MR Online | International institutional monopoly capitalism and its manifestations Page 8 of 26 https://mronline.org/2018/12/19/international-institutional-monopoly-capitalism-and-… 07/01/2019 Union, specifically wars for economic purpose. For instance, the U.S. war machine engaged in Afghanistan (2001-14) and Iraq (2003-11); the Russia annexation of Crimea (2014); and the threat of a Chinese war in the South China Sea. The key motivation of the current aggressive and strongest monopoly nations is to gain control over vital strategic resources. • World Bank: Founded in 1944, an international institution was originally dominated by the United States and the United Kingdom. The domination of monopoly nations is evident in the voting rights of the member economies in the World Bank. Of the members, in 2013 the United States had highest voting rights at 17.69 percent, followed by Japan (6.84 percent), China (4.42 percent), Germany (4.00 percent), the United Kingdom (3.75 percent), and France (3.75 percent). • International Monetary Fund: Established in 1944, the International Monetary Fund’s funding is contributed by the member economies. Since its inception, the United States has always been the largest contributor (17.69 percent) and has been dominant through the majority of the voting rights, followed by other members with large holdings in 2010, such as Japan (6.56 percent), Germany (6.12 percent), the United Kingdom (4.51 percent), France (4.51 percent), and China (4.00 percent). • World Trade Organization: The World Trade Organization was established in 1995 to replace the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that had been in effect since 1948. Its mission is to eliminate or minimize trade barriers to free trade. The majority of its decisions are based on negotiation and consensus. However, the negotiation process does not always reach consensus among all of its members. This process is often criticized by many developing economies because they are not welcome in the negotiations and because, according to Richard Steinberg, the trade negotiations are actually promoted and end at a negotiating position that provides special benefit for the European Union and the United States. The formation of the regional institutions/organizations, the multilateral economic cooperation forums, and bilateral negotiations are an expression of the ever-increasing conflict between the regionalization and globalization processes. Such examples include the conflicts between the European Union and World Trade Organization on agricultural policy; between North American Free Trade Agreement and World Trade Organization on juridical and political issues; and between Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and World Trade Organization on oil price/supply management. These processes lead to very complicated overlapping and interlocking regional and international organizations because a monopoly nation can be a member of several organizations simultaneously. Thus, these organizations become the direct or indirect means to facilitate the monopoly nations in exploiting other countries. It is inevitable that the activities of powerful international institutions (such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization) have not really brought equal benefits to all. The IIMC built a complex called the “IMNs-United Nation: Specialized Agencies, International Institutions/Organizations, and Region Organizations” (IMNsInIs). This organization is beyond the scope of previous international institutions. In other words, the IIMC is a combination of the power of super-companies, monopoly nations, and the juridical capacity of the international institutions. Under IIMC, capital globalization has not only strengthened the power of monopoly nations but has simultaneously created the dependence of other states/nations on the world market and finance system, which are dominated by monopoly nations. This relationship among states/ nations reflects the development of monopoly nations at the expense of the peripheral regions. In addition, “IMNs-InIs” is different from “transnational capitalism class – transnational state” structure in quality, in which the former has instrumentalized the latter. In IMNs-InIs, the international organizations have progressively been the “instrumental institutions” in the hands of monopoly nations to favor them and hinder other economies. This is typically the case when the United Nations Security Council members impose sanctions against other nations, trumping any efforts that could weaken their veto power. It is true in how monopoly nations dominate the WTO through the Doha Development Agenda to hinder agricultural economies of peripheral countries. It is evident in how the International Monetary Fund serves wealthy countries but increases poverty and environmental degradation in poor countries. The establishment of the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has raised concerns for both the United States and Japan regarding whether the bank will have high standards of governance and safeguards, which will prevent damage to other creditors. The IIMC is the final stage of “state-formed monopoly capitalism,” the new form of capitalist production that maintains the existence of capitalism and adapts it to new historical conditions.

### L: Medicine

#### The plan’s focus on medicine trades off with a more holistic approach to healthcare – that ensures health inequities while not solving the root of the problem.

Sell and Williams, 20

[Susan K., School of Regulation and Global Governance @ The Australian National University, Political Science @ George Washington University; and Owain D., University of Queensland, Public Health: “Health under capitalism: a global political economy of structural pathogenesis,” Review of International Political Economy, 27:1 (2020), 1-25, DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2019.1659842]//AD

Capitalism and private economic activity have produced new health technologies and medicines over time, while at the same time binding these welcome developments in health to supply via the global market. This has skewed the provision of health care toward an increasingly biomedical and reductive model at the expense of more holistic approaches including social determinants of health (Tseris, 2017). Privileged approaches that focus on biomedicine and silver bullets crowd out population-level health policies that address more comprehensive components of health. Governance constructs these outcomes and is co-produced by the interests in regulation and its capture (Glasgow & Schrecker, 2016).

## IMPACTS

### War

#### Capitalism causes conflict due to constant demand for resources

McDonald 02 [(Patrick J., Doctor of Philosophy), “The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, the War Machine, and Liberal International Relations Theory] IC

While classical liberals generally hold that capitalism increases prosperity and expands individual liberty, Marxist scholarship takes a much more negative view of its consequences, particularly with respect to the outbreak of war in the international system. Instead of empowering the pacific elements of society, notably a business class, to restrain the state from pursuing an aggressive foreign policy, Marxist-Leninism locates the origins of war in this capitalist sector. As the capitalist system reproduces itself, greater portions of national wealth concentrate in the hands of a few leading holders of capital. This dominant domestic coalition then translates control over the forces of production into political influence and encourages policies of protectionism and expansionism, by military force if necessary, to acquire new sources of raw materials and cheap labor. More generally called imperialism, such policies culminate in war between those states with the most developed economies—the great powers.5 The classical writers on imperialism, including Luxemburg, Hilferding, Bukharin, and Lenin built on Marx’s concentration on capitalist development within economies to examine how these pressures led to the global integration of economies outside of Western Europe.6 Most of these arguments began from the same dynamic, namely the exploitation of labor by the holders of capital, to explain this expansion. Arguing that wages are set by the costs of subsistence and not labor’s productivity, the owners of capital are able to generate a surplus from this divergence. A contradiction then emerges in such a system. By paying labor subsistence wages, the owners of capital constrain labor’s ability to consume all the goods produced in an economy. Marked by periods of crisis due to underconsumption and limited investment, these pressures translate into a search for foreign outlets for both investment and unsold goods. Many of these Marxist arguments, and those of a liberal, Hobson,7 traced the sources of underconsumption to a series of financial changes across European economies in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Hilferding (1981) noted that as most firms shifted from being owned by single individuals or families to multiple shareholders, the rise of joint stock companies allowed the wealthiest owners of capital to expand their control over smaller investors. Even though the largest capitalists no longer owned all of the capital in a firm, their majority control granted them authority over production decisions. As their ability to control large portions of financial capital increased, they were able to exert greater influence over industrial capital as well. At the center of all these developments, the largest banks actively encouraged the consolidation of industry as a way of minimizing lending risks. While competitive capitalism was marked by a separation between industrial and financial capital, the fusion of these two interests defined monopoly capitalism. Moreover, this centralization tended to feed on itself. Competitive industries were forced to consolidate as a defensive tactic to offset rising costs due to the consolidation in the rest of the domestic economy. The financial sector thus sat at the apex of a domestic economic structure that allowed them to control investment and productive decisions over consolidated industries. This power then translated into political influence and support for a more aggressive foreign policy. To offset declining interest rates due to a surplus of savings and underconsumption in the home economy, the financial sector sought outlets for their excess capital, many times calling on the military power of the state to protect these investments abroad. Because the supply of foreign outlets was finite, the need for military intervention increased as the competition among great powers to divide up the world intensified. Lenin, for example, argued that this competition among the leading capitalist states to secure colonial outlets caused World War I. Moreover, the financial class also encouraged other policies, such as protection, that also intensified conflict among states. While bolstering consolidation by preventing foreign competition in the domestic economy, protection also generated pressures to expand the size of the domestic market through expansion if necessary. While these writers generally agreed that the trend toward consolidation and monopolization within domestic economies would produce international conflict, they disagreed over its inevitability and thus of the direct links between capitalism and war. Instead of ultimately ending in expansion, Hobson argued that state intervention to redistribute income could enhance the purchasing power of labor and reduce the need to seek foreign outlets for the problems of underconsumption. Kautsky (1970) argued that imperialism was not the necessary result of capitalist development but a deliberate policy choice. As the costs of subjugating colonial territories and arms races with other great powers increased, he argued that it would promote opposing domestic interests that could foster a compromise among the leading industrial powers. In this stage of ultraimperialism, capitalists would collude to divide up the rest of the world. Lenin (1993) instead saw this consolidation and drive to seek out new markets as the inevitable product of capitalist development. These dynamics would ultimately end in war that would wipe the slate clean for a socialist revolution.

## ALTS

### Communist Horizon

#### The alternative is to orient political and social struggle toward the communist horizon – this redirection is crucial to redefine the political futures psychoanalytically imagineable– anything less is mere apologism for continued leftist failure

**Dean 12** [Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, *The Communist Horizon*, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2012, p. 1-12]

The term "horizon" marks a division. Understood spatially, the horizon is the line dividing the visible, separating earth from sky. Understood temporally, the horizon converges with loss in a metaphor for privation and depletion. The "lost horizon" suggests abandoned projects, prior hopes that have now passed away. Astrophysics offers a thrilling, even uncanny, horizon: the "event horizon" surrounding a black hole. The event horizon is the boundary beyond which events cannot escape. Although "event horizon" denotes the curvature in space/time effected by a singularity, it's not much different from the spatial horizon. Both evoke a fundamental division that we experience as impossible to reach, and that we can neither escape nor cross. I use "horizon" not to recall a forgotten future but to designate a dimension of experience that we can never lose, even if, lost in a fog or focused on our feet, we fail to see it. The horizon is Real in the sense of impossible-we can never reach it-and in the sense of actual (Jacques Lacan's notion of the Real includes both these senses). The horizon shapes our setting. We can lose our bearings, but the horizon is a necessary dimension of our actuality. Whether the effect of a singularity or the meeting of earth and sky, the horizon is the fundamental division establishing where we are. With respect to politics, the horizon that conditions our expe1ience is communism. I get the term "communist horizon" from Bruno Bosteels. In The Actuality of Communism, Bosteels engages with the work of Alvaro Garcia Linera. Garcia Linera ran as Evo Morales's vice presidential ru1ming mate in the Bolivian Movement for Socialism-Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MAS-IPSP). He is the author of multiple pieces on Marxism, politics, and sociology, at least one of which was written while he served time in prison for promoting an armed uprising (before becoming vice president of Bolivia, he fought in the Tupac Kataii Guerrilla Army). Bosteels quotes Garcia Linera's response to an interviewer's questions about his party's plans following their electoral victim)': "The general horizon of the era is communist."1 Garcia Linera doesn't explain the term. Rather, as Bosteels points out, Garcia Linera invokes the communist horizon "as if it were the most natural thing in the world," as if it were so obvious as to need neither explanation nor justification. He assumes the communist horizon as an ineducible feature of the political setting: "We enter the movement with our expecting and desiring eyes set upon the communist horizon." For Garcia Linera, communism conditions the actuality of politics. Some on the Left dismiss the communist horizon as a lost horizon. For example, in a postmodern pluralist approach that appeals to many on the Left, the economists writing as J. K . Gibson-Graham reject communism, offering "post-capitalism" in its stead. They argue that descriptions of capitalism as a global system miss the rich diversity of practices, relations, and desires constituting yet exceeding the economy and so advocate "reading the economy for difference rather than dominance" (as if dominance neither presupposes nor relies on difference).2 In their view, reading for difference opens up new possibilities for politics as it reveals previously unacknowledged loci of creative action within everyday economic activities. Gibson-Graham do not present Marxism as a failed ideology or communism as the fossilized remainder of an historical expe1iment gone horribly wrong. On the contrary, they draw inspiration from Marx’s appreciation of the social character of labor. They engage Jean-Luc Nancy's emphasis on communism as an idea that is the "index of a task of thought still and increasingly open." They embrace the reclamation of the commons. And they are concerned with neoliberalism's naturalization of the economy as a force exceeding the capacity of people to steer or transform it. Yet at the same time, Gibson-Graham push away from communism to launch their vision of postcapitalism. Communism is that against which they construct their alterative conception of the economy. It's a constitutive force, present as a shaping of the view they advocate. Even as Nancy's evocation of communism serves as a horizon for their thinking, they explicitly jettison the term "communism," which they position as the object of "widespread aversion" and which they associate with the "dangers of posing a positivity, a nonnative representation." Rejecting the positive notion of "communism," they opt for a te1m that suggests an empty relationally to the capitalist system they ostensibly deny, "post-capitalism." For Gibson-Graham, the term "capitalist" is not a term of critique or opprobrium; it's not part of a manifesto. The term is a cause of the political problems facing the contemporary Left. They argue that the discursive dominance of capitalism embeds the Left in paranoia, melancholia, and moralism. Gibson-Graham's view is a specific instance of a general assumption shared by leftists who embrace a generic post-capitalism but eschew a more militant anticapitalism. Instead of actively opposing capitalism, this tendency redirects anticapitalist energies into efforts to open up discussions and find ethical spaces for decision-and this in a world where one bond trader can bring down a bank in a matter of minutes. I take the opposite position. The dominance of capitalism, the capitalist system, is material. Rather than entrapping us in paranoid fantasy, an analysis that treats capitalism as a global system of appropriation, exploitation, and circulation that enriches the few as it dispossesses the many and that has to expend an enormous amount of energy in doing so can anger, incite, and galvanize. Historically, in theory and in practice, critical analysis of capitalist exploitation has been a powerful weapon in collective struggle. It persists as such today, in global acknowledgment of the excesses of neoliberal capitalism. As recently became clear in worldwide rioting, protest, and revolution, linking multiple sites of exploitation to narrow channels of privilege can replace melancholic fatalism with new assertions of will, desire, and collective strength. The problem of the Left hasn't been our adherence to a Marxist critique of capitalism. It's that we have lost sight of the communist horizon, a glimpse of which new political movements are starting to reveal. Sometimes capitalists, conservatives, and liberal democrats use a rhetoric that treats communism as a lost horizon. But usually they keep communism firmly within their sight. They see communism as a threat, twenty years after its ostensible demise. To them, communism is so threatening that they premise political discussion on the repression of the communist alternative. In response to left critiques of democracy for its failure to protect the interests of poor and workingclass people, conservatives and liberals alike scold that "everybody knows" and "history shows" that communism doesn't work. Communism might be a nice ideal, they concede, but it always leads to violent, authoritarian excesses of power. They shift the discussion to communism, trying to establish the limits of reasonable debate. Their critique of communism establishes the political space and condition of democracy. Before the conversation even gets going, liberals, democrats, capitalists, and conservatives unite to block communism from consideration. It's off the table. Those who suspect that the inclusion of liberals and democrats in a set with capitalists and conservatives is illegitimate are probably democrats themselves. To determine whether they belong in the set of those who fear communism, they should consider whether they think any evocation of communism should come with qualifications, apologies, and condemnations of past excesses. If the answer is "yes," then we have a clear indication that liberal democrats, and probably radical democrats as well, still consider communism a threat that must be suppressed-and so they belong in a set with capitalists and conservatives. All are anxious about the forces that communist desire risks unleashing. There are good reasons for liberals, democrats, capitalists, and conservatives to be anxious. Over the last decade a return to communism has re-energized the Left. Communism is again becoming a discourse and vocabulary for the expression of universal, egalitarian, and revolutionary ideals. In March 2009, the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities hosted a conference entitled "On the Idea of Communism." Initially planned for about 200 people, the conference ultimately attracted over 1 ,200, requiring a spillover room to accommodate those who couldn't fit in the primary auditorium. Since then, multiple conferences-in Paris, Berlin, and New York-and publications have followed, with contributions from such leading scholars as Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Bruno Bosteels, Susan Buck-Morss, Costas Douzinas, Peter Hallward, Michael Hardt, Antonio Neg1i, Jacques Ranciere, Alberto Toscano, and Slavoj Zizek. The conferences and publications consolidate discussions that have been going on for decades. For over thirty years, Antonio Negri has sought to build a new approach to communism out of a Marxism reworked via Spinoza and the Italian political experiments of the 1970s. The Empire trilogy that Negri coauthored with Michael Hardt offers an affirmative, non-dialectical reconceptualization of labor, power, and the State, a new theory of communism from below. Alain Badiou has been occupied with communism for over forty years, from his philosophical and political engagement with Maoism, to his emphasis on the "communist invariants"-egalitarian justice, disciplinary tenor, political volunteerism, and trust in the people-to his recent appeal to the communist Idea. Communism is not a new interest for Slavoj Zizek either. In early 2001 he put together a conference and subsequent volume rethinking Lenin. Where Negri and Badiou reject the Party and the State, Zizek retains a certain fidelity to Lenin. "The key 'Leninist' lesson today," he writes, is that "politics without the organizational form of the Party is politics without politics."4 In short, a vital area of radical philosophy considers communism a contemporary name for emancipation)', egalitarian politics and form part of the communist legacy. These ongoing theoretical discussions overlap with the changing political sequences marked by 1968 and 1989. They also overlap with the spread of neoliberal capitalist domination, a domination accompanied by extremes in economic inequality, ethnic hatred, and police violence, as well as by widespread militancy, insurgency, occupation, and revolution. The current emphasis on communism thus exceeds the coincidence of academic conferences calling specifically for communism's return with the new millennium's debt crises, austerity measures, increased unemployment, and overall sacrifice of the achievements of the modern welfare state to the private interests of financial institutions deemed too big to fail. Already in an interview in 2002, p1ior to his election to the Bolivian presidency, Evo Morales had announced that "the neoliberal system was a failure, and now it's the poor people's turn."·' Communism is reemerging as a magnet of political energy because it is and has been the alterative to capitalism. The communist horizon is not lost. It is Real. In this book, I explore some of the ways the communist horizon manifests itself to us today. As Bosteels argues, to invoke the communist horizon is to produce "a complete shift in perspective or a radical ideological turnabout, as a result of which capitalism no longer appears as the only game in town and we no longer have to be ashamed to set our expecting and desiring eyes here and now on a different organization of social relationships."6 With communism as our horizon, the field of possibilities for revolutionary theory and practice starts to change shape. Barriers to action fall away. New potentials and challenges come to the fore. Anything is possible. Instead of a politics thought primarily in terms of resistance, playful and momentary aesthetic disruptions, the immediate specificity of local projects, and struggles for hegemony within a capitalist parliamentary setting, the communist horizon impresses upon us the necessity to abolish capitalism and to create global practices and institutions of egalitarian cooperation. The shift in perspective the communist horizon produces turns us away from the democratic milieu that has been the form of the loss of communism as a name for left aspiration and toward the reconfiguration of the components of political struggle-in other words, away from general inclusion, momentary calls for broad awareness, and lifestyle changes, and toward militant opposition, tight organizational forms (party, council, working group, cell), and the sovereignty of the people over the economy through which we produce and reproduce ourselves.

# CP – Abolish WTO

## Notes

Do not read the 1NC Heg Bad and 1NC China Rise modules together – they directly contradict.

I think the colonialism net benefit is a solid addition to either module but it works especially well arguing heg bad and paired with Memmi in the 2NR it can give the aff a lot of trouble especially if the 1AR doesn’t have a specific answer.

One really sneaky idea for an elims debate is to swap out one of the smaller countries for a non-WTO member state and assuming they don’t catch it and make a solvency deficit the competition debate is basically over because the CP indisputably does less than the aff.

Ashford is amazing because there are so many different warrants so if I am collapsing to the CP with heg bad I would pick one impact module that their defense didn’t answer and blow it up and read more cards on that impact (not the link or else they get new answers).

One of my favorite things to do when I debated was to read disads and CP net benefits on the case page. It depends on what you want but personally I would only read the text and the short solvency advocate card as the “off case” then read the net benefits for WTO bad on the case with the other arguments and analytics. It keeps the aff on their toes and they will likely not respond as thoroughly as if the net benefits were part of the “off case.”

## CX

How does the aff use the WTO to ensure enforcement?

How does the aff ensure cooperation between WTO member states over the plan?

## CP

### 1NC Text

#### Text:

#### 1. The World Trade Organization ought to be abolished.

#### 2. The following 164 countries listed in the speech doc ought to independently and without influence from international government [opponent’s plan]

Afghanistan

Albania

Angola

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Australia

Austria

Bahrain, Kingdom of

Bangladesh

Barbados

Belgium

Belize

Benin

Bolivia, Plurinational State of

Botswana

Brazil

Brunei Darussalam

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cabo Verde

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile

China

Colombia

Congo

Costa Rica

Côte d’Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Denmark

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador

Estonia

Eswatini

European Union (formerly EC)

Fiji

Finland

France

Gabon

Gambia

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

Greece

Grenada

Guatemala

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Hong Kong, China

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait, the State of

Kyrgyz Republic

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Latvia

Lesotho

Liberia

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Macao, China

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mexico

Moldova, Republic of

Mongolia

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozambique

Myanmar

Namibia

Nepal

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

North Macedonia

Norway

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Romania

Russian Federation

Rwanda

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Samoa

Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Suriname

Sweden

Switzerland

Chinese Taipei

Tajikistan

Tanzania

Thailand

Togo

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom

United States

Uruguay

Vanuatu

Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of

Viet Nam

Yemen

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Hawley, senator, JD Yale, 20

(Josh, 5-5, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html)

The coronavirus emergency is not only a public health crisis. With [30 million Americans unemployed](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/us-weekly-jobless-claims.html), it is also an economic crisis. And it has exposed a hard truth about the modern global economy: it weakens American workers and has empowered China’s rise. That must change. The global economic system as we know it is a relic; it requires reform, top to bottom. We should begin with one of its leading institutions, the World Trade Organization. We should abolish it.

### 1NC Colonialism

#### The WTO as an institution is unethical and perpetuates colonialism

Godrej 20

(Dinyar, Co-editor @ New Internationalist, 4-20, https://newint.org/features/2020/02/10/brief-history-impoverishment)

For countries that were undergoing economic ravishment by structural adjustment, the 1990s brought new torments in the form of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a club dominated by rich nations. In the name of creating a ‘level playing field’, the WTO required poorer countries to sign up to an all-or-nothing, binding set of rules, which removed protections for domestic industries and allowed foreign capital unhindered access. This was strongly prejudicial to the interests of local industries, which were not in a position to withstand foreign competition. Influence within the WTO is weighted by the size of a nation’s economy – thus even if all poorer nations joined forces to demand policy changes they would still not have a chance against wealthy nations. This trade injustice has drawn widespread protests and pressure for the WTO to reform. Meanwhile, wealthy nations are increasingly going down the route of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Usually negotiated in secret, the interests of their corporations are paramount in FTAs and include the ability to sue states for eye-watering sums (should they, for example, want to terminate a contract or nationalize an industry) with no provision for states to do the same. Such instruments are working to create a utopia for transnational corporations, creating a business-friendly climate, which translates as the demolition of labour protection, tax cuts for the wealthiest and a supine regulatory environment. Tax havens operated by the richest countries are home to huge sums of illicit wealth draining out of some of the poorest. Today, due to how the global economy has been engineered, for every dollar of aid sent to poorer countries, they lose 10 times as much in outflows – and that’s before one counts their losses through unfair trade rules and underpaid labour. Foreign investors take nearly $500 billion a year in profits from the Global South, and trade-power imbalances cost poorer nations $700 billion a year in lost export revenue. 7 CONCENTRATION In the 21st century wealth increasingly flows through corporate hands towards a small super-elite. In a trend that began in the 1990s, the lion’s share of equity value is being realized through squeezing workers: the classification ‘working poor’ so familiar in the Global South is now increasingly also being used in the wealthy North, where neoliberal capitalism is leading inevitably to wage erosion and work precarity, coupled with the withdrawal of state support. Inequality is rising dramatically. In 2018 the richest 26 people owned wealth equivalent to the poorest half of the world’s population. And their wealth was increasing at the rate of $2.5 billion a day. Meanwhile 3.4 billion people – nearly half the world – were living on less than $5.50 a day.

### 1NC Heg Bad

#### Eliminating the WTO ends U.S. global hegemony

Bello, PhD, 2000

(Walden, Sociology @ Stanford, https://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1352/ecologist/Should%20WTO%20be%20abolished.pdf)

The idea that the world needs the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is one of the biggest lies of our time. The WTO came about, in 1995, mainly because it was in the interest of the US and its corporations. The European Union, Japan and especially the developing countries were mostly ambivalent about the idea; it was the US which drove it on. Why? Because though the US, back in 1948, blocked the formation of an International Trade Organisation (ITO), believing that, at that time, the interests of its corporations would not be served by such a global body, it had changed its mind by the 1990s. Now it wanted an international trade body. Why? Because its global economic dominance was threatened. The flexible GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) system, which preceded the WTO, had allowed the emergence of Europe and East Asia as competing industrial centres that threatened US dominance even in many high-tech industries. Under GATT’s system of global agricultural trade, Europe had emerged as a formidable agricultural power even as Third World governments concerned with preserving their agriculture and rural societies limited the penetration of their markets by US agricultural products. In other words, before the WTO, global trade was growing by leaps and bounds, but countries were using trade policy to industrialise and adapt to the growth of trade so that their economies would be enhanced by global trade and not be marginalised by it. That was a problem, from the US point of view. And that was why the US needed the WTO. The essence of the WTO is seen in three of its central agreements: the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The purpose of TRIPs is not to promote free trade but to enhance monopoly power. One cannot quarrel with the fact that innovators should have preferential access to the benefits that flow from their innovation for a period of time. TRIPs, however, goes beyond this to institutionalise a monopoly for high-tech corporate innovators, most of them from the North. Among other things, TRIPs provides a generalised minimum patent protection of 20 years; institutes draconian border regulations against products judged to be violating intellectual property rights; and – contrary to the judicial principle of presuming innocence until proven guilty – places the burden of proof on the presumed violator of process patents. What TRIPs does is reinforce the monopolistic or oligopolistic position of US high tech firms such as Microsoft and Intel. It makes industrialisation by imitation or industrialisation via loose conditions of technology transfer – a strategy employed by the US, Germany, Japan, and South Korea during the early phases of their industrialisation – all but impossible. It enables the technological leader, in this case the US, to greatly influence the pace of technological and industrial development in the rest of the world.

#### Primacy causes endless war, terror, authoritarianism, prolif, and Russia-China aggression.

Ashford, PhD, 19

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 4, CNAS)

Humility is a virtue. Yet in the last quarter century, American policymakers have been far more likely to embrace the notion of America as the “indispensable nation,” responsible for protecting allies, promoting democracy and human rights, tamping down conflicts, and generally managing global affairs. Compare this ideal to the U.S. track record – endless Middle Eastern wars, the rise of ISIS, global democratic backsliding, a revanchist Russia, resurgent China, and a world reeling from the election of President Donald Trump – and this label seems instead the height of hubris. Many of the failures of U.S. foreign policy speak for themselves. As the daily drumbeat of bad news attests, interventions in Iraq and Libya were not victories for human rights or democracy, but rather massively destabilizing for the Middle East as a whole. Afghanistan – despite initial military successes – has become a quagmire, highlighting the futility of nation- building. Other failures of America’s grand strategy are less visible, but no less damaging. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe helped to reignite hostility between Russia and the West. Worse, it has diluted the alliance’s defensive capacity and its democratic character. And even as the war on terror fades from public view, it remains as open-ended as ever: Today, the United States is at war in seven countries and engaged in “combating terrorism’ in more than 80.1 To put it bluntly: America’s strategy since the end of the Cold War – whether it is called primacy or liberal internationalism – may not be a total failure, but it has not been successful either. Many have tried to place blame for these poor outcomes.2 But recrimination is less important than understanding why America’s strategy has failed so badly and avoiding these mistakes in future. Much of the explanation is the natural outcome of changing constraints. Iraq and Libya should not be viewed as regrettable anomalies, but rather the logical outcome of unipolarity and America’s liberal internationalist inclination to solve every global problem. It’s also a reliance on flawed assumptions – that what is good for America is always good for the world, for example. Support for dangerous sovereignty-undermining norms adds to the problem; just look at the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has proved not to protect populations or stabilize fragile states, but to provoke chaos, encourage nuclear proliferation, and undermine the international institutions. Perhaps, if nothing else had changed, a form of watered-down liberal internationalism that foreswore interventionism and drew back from the war on terror might have been possible.3 But international politics are undergoing a period of profound transformation, from unipolarity to regional or even global multipolarity. Primacy – and the consistent drumbeat of calls in Washington to do more, always and everywhere – is neither sustainable nor prudent. Nor can we fall back on warmed-over Cold War–era strategies better suited to an era of bipolar superpower competition.

# Case

### COVID

#### Covid-19 is being brought under control now- vaccination efforts, immunity, etc

Byjillian **Kramer,** 8-06-20**21**, "How will the pandemic end? The science of past outbreaks offers clues.," Science, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/how-will-the-pandemic-end-the-science-of-past-outbreaks-offers-clues>

When the worldwide spread of a disease is brought under control in a localized area, it’s no longer a pandemic but an epidemic, according to the WHO. If COVID-19 persists globally at what the WHO judges to be “expected or normal levels,” the organization will then re-designate the disease “endemic.” At that stage, SARS-CoV-2 will become a circulating virus that’s “less consequential as we build immunity,” says [Saad Omer](https://medicine.yale.edu/yigh/profile/saad_omer/), an epidemiologist and director of the Yale Institute for Global Health. ([Read more about how we’ll live with COVID-19 as an endemic disease](https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/covid-19-will-likely-be-with-us-forever-heres-how-well-live-with-it).) Only [two diseases](https://asm.org/Articles/2020/March/Disease-Eradication-What-Does-It-Take-to-Wipe-out) in recorded history that affect humans or other animals have ever been eradicated: smallpox, a life-threatening disease for people that covers bodies in painful blisters, and rinderpest, a viral malady that infected and killed cattle. In both instances, intensive global vaccination campaigns brought new infections to a halt. The [last confirmed case of rinderpest](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2010/oct/14/rinderpest-virus-eradicated) was detected in Kenya in 2001, while the [last known smallpox case](https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/history/history.html) occurred in the U.K. in 1978. [Joshua Epstein](https://publichealth.nyu.edu/faculty/joshua-epstein), professor of epidemiology in the New York University School of Global Public Health and founding director of its Agent-Based Modeling Laboratory, argues that eradication is so rare that the word should be wiped from our disease vocabulary. Diseases “retreat to their animal reservoirs, or they mutate at low levels,” he says. “But they don’t typically literally disappear from the global biome.” There is no one definition of what the end of a pandemic means. RACHAEL PILTCH-LOEBHARVARD T.H. CHAN SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH Most causes of past pandemics are still with us today. More than [3,000 people caught the bacteria that cause both bubonic and pneumonic plague](https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/plague) between 2010 and 2015, according to the WHO. And the virus behind the 1918 flu pandemic that ravaged the globe, killing at least 50 million people, ultimately morphed into less lethal variants, with its [descendants becoming strains of the seasonal flu](https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/nejmp0904819). As with the 1918 flu, it’s likely the SARS-CoV-2 virus will continue to mutate, and the human immune system would eventually adapt to fend it off without shots—but not before many people fell ill and died. “Developing immunity the hard way is not a solution that we should be aspiring to,” Omer says. Finding ways to slow the spread of a disease and manage its effects is by far the safer path, experts say. Today, for instance, pest control and advanced hygiene keep the plague at bay, while any new cases can be treated with antibiotics. For other diseases, such as the flu, vaccines can also make a difference. The available COVID-19 vaccines are highly safe and effective, which means getting enough people vaccinated can end this pandemic faster and with lower mortality than natural infections alone. Why we need vaccines for all WHO Director Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus last week [reinstated a goal](https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19-30-july-2021) of vaccinating at least 10 percent of every nation’s population by September, with the loftier goal of reaching 40 percent global inoculation by year’s end and 70 percent by mid-2022.

### Circumvention (IP): Regional Trade Agreements

### Circumvention: Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)

#### The plan gets circumvented through prioritization of bilateral trade agreements with those who respect the spirit of intellectual property.

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[Cédric, Associate Prof. Political Economy @ U-Geneva, member @ Paris Nord Economics Center; and William, Dean @ The New School for Social Research: “Intellectual Monopoly in Global Value Chains,” published in 2018, https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01850438]//AD

The contention over IPRs exemplified by the dispute between the US and China, reflects the heightened sensitivity of the US and other high-income economies to IPRs in an era where their governments and businesses consider innovation as their main competitive advantage. The US today is the leader of the movement toward stricter international IP norms, in contrast to its position in earlier periods (Peng, Ahlstrom, Carraher, & Shi, 2017). It is the most active complainant at the WTO under the TRIPS agreement but, as illustrated by the recent actions of the Trump administration, TRIPS is not enough (Sell, 2010). The US seeks other ways to extend internationally the standard of IP protection found in U.S. law and in particular to apply existing IP protection to digital media (Akhtar & Ferguson, 2011, p. 25). In order to circumvent the flexibility in the WTO TRIPS Agreement, and the reluctance of developing countries at the WTO to raise WTO standards of IP protection (Helfer, 2004), developed economies have relied increasingly on bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements (PTAs) to accomplish the objective of securing intellectual property related economic advantages (Abbott, 2006; Shadlen, 2008). The international intellectual property policymaking arena has grown ever more complex with overlapping transnational norms. For example, the 33 pages of the chapter dedicated to IPRs in the US-CAFTA agreement details the treaties and conventions that the parties shall ratify, which defines precisely and extensively the scope of IPRs concerned (copyrights, performance, patents, communication, trademarks, plants, microorganisms, industrial design, geographical indication, name domains…). Additionally, it describes enforcement mechanisms to be implemented in national legislation and considers supplementary protection of intellectual property under the investment chapter (CAFTA, 2004). IP provisions included in Japanese and EU international trade agreements are more general but they also provide supplementary coverage and additional obligations (Liberti, 2010). Moreover, investment treaties and chapters dedicated to investment protection in trade agreements open additional routes for IP protection, which can exercise a powerful chilling effect on government actions via the exposure to the risk of costly investor-state arbitration disputes (Ho, 2015, 2016; Kasolowsky & Leikin, 2017). The DESTA database (Dür et al., 2014) allows us to track this qualitative evolution in bilateral and regional trade agreements. IP provisions of trade agreements were nonexistent before the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in 1992. They became a standard feature of trade agreements in the 2000s. Figure 6 shows the number of PTAs signed each year and of those, the ones which included IPRs. It also shows the percentage of PTAs with an IP provision. By 2016, every PTA signed included an IP provision.

#### The plan’s reinvigoration of IP waivers opens the floodgates for regional trade agreements that counterbalance the free trade effects of the aff.

Bhala, 7

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\*RTA=Regional Trade Agreement

How do multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade liberalization efforts relate to one another? In particular, is the ‘‘Bicycle Theory’’ of trade negotiations correct, whereby these efforts must continue (as a cyclist must keep pedaling to move forward) or they will come to a halt (as a cyclist would stop, even fall off)? Competitive liberalization presumes there are three bicycles, and trade talks at the multilateral, regional, or bilateral level will spur such talks on another level, or the other two levels. But, the right metaphor for trade negotiations may be not a bicycle but a hedge. The Financial Times Guy de Jonquie`res puts the concern this way: Washington has claimed … that its use of muscular bilateral trade diplomacy will re-energize the multilateral trading system by unleashing a wave of ‘‘competitive liberalization.’’ The Doha [Round] debacle has exposed that theory for what it is. In practice, bilateralism has fed off itself, intensifying the rush into preferential deals while draining energy from the Doha talks, polarizing the US Congress and further diminishing its appetite for trade initiatives of all descriptions.7 Moreover, a reverse causal directional arrow may exist: stalled or failed talks at one level (e.g., the Doha Round) may bring out calls for talks at another level (e.g., bilateral FTAs).8 There is plenty of evidence in favor of a reverse directional arrow. Israel, for example, began pursuing FTA negotiations with MERCOSUR in December 2005, the month of the unsuccessful WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, and talks continue apace.9 India boasted FTAs with Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. In light of the July 2006 collapse of Doha Round negotiations, India announced it would pursue FTAs vigorously, including with the EU and Japan. Even Chile, well disposed to unilateral trade barrier reduction, has not sat on the sidelines. It has FTAs with China and South Korea, a ‘‘Partial Scope Agreement’’ with India, and (as of June 2006) is discussing a comprehensive ‘‘Economic Association Agreement’’ with Japan. The Collective Action Problem WTO Members did not commitment themselves to ensuring regional integration compliment their Doha Round negotiations. They could have entered into an ‘‘RTA Peace Clause,’’ whereby they placed a standstill on all new FTAs and CUs until they completed the Round. Instead, they raced each other to seal RTA deals. Does this behavior suggest it would be easier for the roughly 150 WTO Members to reach consensus in a multilateral trade round if they did not have the option of joining an FTA? That is, does this option give them an exit strategy, which in turn creates a collective action problem – namely, no one Member is willing to forego the RTA option unless all other Members do, but each Member passes the responsibility to others to take the lead in exerting discipline.

#### That forces countries to protect IP beyond TRIPs standards – turns case.

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Many of America’s newer FTAs, especially accords negotiated after the Uruguay Round, call upon partner countries to go beyond IP protection and enforcement measures set out in the TRIPs Agreement. In part, that reflects America’s bitter experience with lax IP enforcement in major markets like China. US trade negotiators relied, to the detriment of the American IP sector, on promises made by China of future implementation and enforcement during talks for Chinas accession to the WTO, which culminated in a November 1999 US–China bilateral agreement, and accession effective 11 December 2001.30 The subsequent history, from the US vantage point, was one of failure to adhere to the promises. One lesson learned by US trade negotiators was to insist on results – actual implementation and enforcement – before accession. They drilled the point in WTO accession talks with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which culminated with a bilateral accord in the fall of 2005, and accession on 11 December 2005.31 A second lesson from the adverse experience with China was to use FTAs as a vehicle to go beyond the TRIPs Agreement, i.e., to demand TRIPs Plus commitments from a would-be FTA partner. Consider the following examples: In the U.S.–Jordan FTA, Jordan agreed to ratify and implement within two years two IP agreements that are not part of its TRIPs obligations: the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. The aim of these agreements, which are known as ‘‘Internet Treaties,’’ is to protect copyrighted works in a digital network environment. Thus, for example, they provide a creator with the exclusive right to make its creative works available online. The same TRIPs Plus provisions, incorporating the most up-to-date international copyright protection standards, exist in the U.S.–Morocco FTA. In the U.S.–Chile FTA and U.S.–Singapore FTA, Chile and Singapore agreed to TRIPs Plus commitments not only for patents, trademarks, and copyrights, but also for trade secrets. The two countries also accepted the obligation of ensuring its legal system contains meaningful penalties for piracy and counterfeiting. In negotiations for a U.S.–Australia FTA, the US had two key objectives concerning IP. First, it sought better IP protection, especially with respect to grey (parallel) market products. The US achieved this objective through provisions in the FTA that not only complement, but also enhance, existing international standards for both protection and enforcement of IP rights. These TRIPs Plus provisions include strong penalties for counterfeiting and piracy. Second, the US opposed the Australian pharmaceutical benefits scheme of pricing. On this point, agreement proved difficult and the end result – though TRIPs Plus – was nebulous. The two countries affirmed their shared objectives of (1) maintaining high quality healthcare and (2) improving public health standards. They agreed on three principles in pursuit of these objectives: (1) the importance of innovative pharmaceuticals, (2) the significance of research and development in the pharmaceutical industry, with appropriate governmental support including IP protection, and (3) the need for timely and affordable access to innovative pharmaceuticals through procedures that value objectively pharmaceuticals based on their therapeutic relevance. The sticking point was the procedures by which a federal health care program lists and prices new pharmaceuticals for reimbursement. Both sides agreed the procedures should demand transparency and accountability. But, how could the US be certain Australia would not discriminate against drugs from US pharmaceutical companies when listing and pricing medicines in its Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme? From Australias perspective, how could its consumers be assured they would have access to effective US drugs at non-astronomical prices? The FTA establishes a Medicines Working Group to continue the conversation between the two countries on pharmaceutical issues, and creates in Australia an independent review process for listing decisions. The conversation indeed continues on this and other controversies. For example, when approving the FTA, the Australian Parliament added an ‘‘Anti-Evergreening’’ amendment to Australian law.32 This change blocks a pharmaceutical company from evergreening a patent or using the judicial process to preclude introduction of a generic medicine. The US opposes the amendment. In June 2006, NGOs – 416 of them, including the AFL-CIO, Citizens Trade Campaign, Communications Workers of America, Friends of the Earth, National Farmers Union, Sierra Club, and United Steel Workers – signed a letter urging Congress to reject the U.S.–Oman FTA (which Congress ultimately passed that summer.) They argued the accord not only lacked meaningful labor and environmental protections, but also would hurt poor and sick Omanis. The FTA IP provisions benefited large pharmaceutical companies by protecting their ‘‘unprecedented monopoly rights’’ of large pharmaceutical companies, forbidding for extended periods competition from generic products, and limiting access to affordable medicines.33 In the U.S.–Colombia FTA, signed in February 2006, but not implemented as of November 2006, Colombia agreed to join the WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA).34 The ITA, an outgrowth of the Uruguay Round, lists a large number of computer and computer-related products subject to duty-free, quota-free treatment. However, it is a plurilateral accord, hence joining is required neither by TRIPs nor any other WTO accord. In January 2006, the US and Thailand were engaged in FTA negotiations, which commenced in June 2004. US insistence on TRIPs Plus IP commitments contributed to large-scale protests in Chiang Mai, Thailand, against an FTA, and brought talks to a halt.35 Four specific TRIPs Plus controversies arose:36 (1) The US insisted on 25-year span for patent protection, beyond the TRIPs Agreement norm of 20 years. (2) The US called for compensatory patent extensions by the Thai government to pharmaceutical companies, if the government ‘‘unreasonably’’ delayed either the grant of a drug patent, or approval of a drug for market use. The TRIPs Agreement does not contain this mandate. (3) The US sought a data exclusivity provision not found in the TRIPS Agreement. This provision would preclude manufacturers of generic drugs (which, of course, tended to be Thai companies) from using clinical trial data, or other scientific information, from any other company (e.g., an American pharmaceutical giant), to prove its generic product was safe and effective after the product had entered the market. Thailands Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO) objected. The GPO provides ‘‘first line’’ anti-retroviral medicines (i.e., older ones, some of which the patent had lapsed) to 80,000 AIDS patients (as of 2006), and sought to expand this program to 150,000 patients (by 2008). The GPO planned to offer generic ‘‘second line’’ drugs (i.e., newer, more sophisticated medicines still subject to a patent). Data exclusivity would inhibit its ability to do so. Further, data exclusivity would apply even to an unpatented drug, where no patent had been sought because the market for the drug was thought to be too small. (4) The US required tight language that would limit the terms and conditions under which the GPO could effect a compulsory license of a new drug. The US offered a side letter assurance that the language would be consistent with the November 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health. Again, the GPO replied the language would adversely affect its ability to provide drugs to Thai AIDS patients. Thousands of Thai health care workers, AIDS victims, and activists – fearful of high-priced medicines should their government ‘‘cave’’ to the demands, demonstrated noisily, but peacefully (in front of the Sheraton Chiang Mai!) for about two days. Farmers, who were upset at US demands concerning agricultural trade (e.g., that Thailand reduce rice tariff barriers), joined them. The US team left the Sheraton as inconspicuously as possible, through a side door behind the concierge desk, into an unmarked van, and down a side street. The USTR blamed the ensuing stall in negotiations on Thai political unrest.37 Not surprisingly, some international trade law scholars offer persuasive arguments for the proposition that ‘‘TRIPs Plus’’ is ‘‘TRIPs Minus’’ for poor countries. For example, Dr Mohammed El-Said of the University of Central Lancashire cogently argues TRIPs Plus commitments in deals like the U.S.–Jordan and U.S.–Bahrain FTA end up doing greater harm than good to the US partners, hence rendering those countries worse off than under WTO disciplines.38 This line of argumentation would appear to be consistent with the competitive imperialism paradigm. In that paradigm, major trading powers race against one another to get the best possible deal for themselves. They neither intend to, nor hope to see, the IP provisions in their FTA and CU deals multilateralized. Obviously, if their provisions become WTO law, then their benefits no longer are specially tailored. All WTO Members, consisting of a not inconsiderable number of free riders (from the American or European perspective, at least), would enjoy whatever benefits they can realize for whatever IP industry they have.

### XT Circ (IP): RTAs

#### RTAs counter un-preferential trade agreements that imperialist powers don’t like.

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For the US, then, traditionally, RTAs were a tool of the weak, like the original European Community (EC) nations. Now, it is a tool in the hands of a large, potent counterweight to the US on the world stage. So, it must also be in the toolkit of the largest and most powerful economy, the US. The need to counter preferential inroads of others, particularly major industrial countries, now is a lodestar of American trade policy. Should ‘‘pre-emption’’ or ‘‘rebuttal’’ (depending on the vantage point) be an appropriate criterion for entering into an FTA? That is, should countering the trade strategy of another country be a motive for negotiating an FTA? To put the question provocatively, are FTAs a tool used by hegemonic trading nations in their race against one another to create neo-colonialist spheres of influence in developing and least developed regions, and thereby vie for economic and political influence with one another? The Financial Times, hardly leftist leaning, suggests is a possibility, commenting that bilateral trade deals ‘‘have tended to be heavily tilted in favor of the powerful and decked out like Christmas trees with provisions for special interests.’’20 In brief, do competitive liberalization and economic, political economy, political, and national security criteria explain FTAs? Or, are FTAs really about competition among imperialist powers?