## New Affs Bad

#### Interp: The affirmative must disclose the plan text and advantage area if they break new.

They didn’t--see screenshot

Graphical user interface, application

Description automatically generated

#### Standards –

#### 1. Clash – having no idea what the debate will be about makes being neg impossible – the aff gets plan text choice and infinite prep to craft the most strategic case. No disclosure makes this impossible to overcome b/c it means the neg only gets 4 mins of prep to answer a strategy that they had a full month for. they’ll say generics, but their model of debate means the neg has no time to cut an update to their generics specific to the AFF and we’ll lose every debate.

#### 2. Discourages tricks – plan text disclosure discourages cheap shot aff’s. If the aff isn’t inherent or easily defeated by 20 minutes of research, the case should lose. The neg is entitled to some research time to make sure the AFF is inherent, topical, and controversial. Otherwise bad AFF’s can win on purely surprise factor, which is a bad model b/c it encourages finding the most fringe surprising case possible instead of a well researched and defensible aff.

#### Vote on substantive engagement: otherwise we’re speaking without debating and there’s nothing to separate us from dueling oratory. It also creates the most valuable long-term skills since we need to learn how to defend our beliefs in any context, like politics.

#### Drop the debater on new affs: Their lack of disclosure makes substance irreparable b/c our entire argument is that we did not have a basis to engage the aff to begin with.

#### Competing interps since reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

## T

#### A. Interpretation: the affirmative may only garner offense from the hypothetical enactment of the resolution.

#### Violation: They don’t meet bc offense comes from things other than plan

#### *\*GO SLOW\** Our interp is compatible with them reading \_\_\_\_\_ which solves their \_\_\_ offense and our offense bc \_\_\_\_\_.

#### B. Our Offense

#### They destroy engagement – predictable stasis ensures research accessibility and negative ground. Even if public policy isn’t the best focus for activism, it’s crucial for dialogue because it’s grounded in consistent reporting and academic work.

#### Two impacts -

#### 1) Changing the topic post facto structurally favors the aff by manipulating balance of prep – vote neg because debate is a competitive game that’s meaningless without substantive constraints.

#### 2) Also key to have well-prepared opponents. Exclusionary rule: They transform debate into a monologue which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subjected to well researched scrutiny.

#### Their model creates a structural disincentive to substantial research. Failure to defend the actor and mechanism of the resolution allows them to shift their advocacy to the terms most favorable to them – causes dogmatism and forces the neg into generics at the margins of the literature – destroys good scholarship.

#### C. Drop the debater on T – the round is already skewed from the beginning because their advocacy excluded my ability to generate NC offense– letting them sever doesn’t solve any of the abuse

#### Theory is an issue of competing interpretations because reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters will exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

## Res PIC

#### I affirm rhetorical decolonization and the entirety of the 1AC with the exception of reducing intellectual property protections for medicines in the member nations of the World Trade Organization.

**Pharma profits are up from COVID vaccines, patent waivers threaten this**

**Buchholz 5-17-21**

(Katharina, https://www.statista.com/chart/24829/net-income-profit-pharma-companies/)

The profitability of coronavirus vaccines has been in the spotlight since U.S. President Joe Biden come out in support of temporarily lifting vaccine patents to make the production of the life-saving inoculations more financially feasible for poorer countries. EU leaders meanwhile remain divided over such a move. Company financial reports show that COVID-19 vaccine makers and developers like Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, Moderna, AstraZeneca and BioNTech have seen their profits increase since the vaccine rollout, at times majorly. In early May, stocks of several companies that benefit from COVID-19 vaccine sales **took a nosedive on the news of Biden’s reversal**. Moderna stocks, for example, were still down more than 6 percent at close on May 5, the day of the announcement. Stocks recovered somewhat as German chancellor Angela Merkel came out against patent waivers the following day. While fluctuations in the stock market price have hurt drug makers in the **short term**, patent waivers would diminish the bottom line of companies involved with the development and production of COVID-19 **vaccines in the long term**. Pharma giants like Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer bring in billions of dollars of income every quarter from diverse sources, so the COVID bump was smaller for them. In the case of Pfizer, which has been a bigger producer than J&J, the year-over-year profit increase was a handsome 44 percent, however. For smaller AstraZeneca, the COVID year meant that its profits doubled. In the case of Moderna, the past year has turned a Q1 loss into a profit. The case is similar for German company BioNTech, which collaborated with Pfizer on its COVID vaccine. While Q1 2021 brought in a profit of $1.1 billion, the company ran a deficit since its founding in 2008 up until Q4 2020, when it posted a profit for the first time. The $446 million earned stood in contrast to losses of almost $428 million accrued in the first nine months of the year.

**Strong IP protection spurs innovation by encouraging risk-taking and incentivizing knowledge sharing -- prefer statistical analysis of multiple studies**

**Ezell and Cory 19** [Stephen Ezell, vice president & global innovation policy @ ITIF, BS Georgetown School of Foreign Service. Nigel Cory, associate director covering trade policy @ ITIF, MA public policy @ Georgetown. "The Way Forward for Intellectual Property Internationally," Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 4-25-2019, accessed 8-25-2021, https://itif.org/publications/2019/04/25/way-forward-intellectual-property-internationally] HWIC

IPRs Strengthen Innovation

Intellectual property rights power innovation. For instance, analyzing the level of intellectual property protections (via the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness reports) and creative outputs (via the Global Innovation Index) shows that counties with stronger IP protection have more creative outputs (in terms of intangible assets and creative goods and services in a nation’s media, printing and publishing, and entertainment industries, including online), even at varying levels of development.46

IPR reforms also introduce strong incentives for domestic innovation. Sherwood, using case studies from 18 developing countries, concluded that poor provision of intellectual property rights deters local innovation and risk-taking.47 In contrast, IPR reform has been associated with increased innovative activity, as measured by domestic patent filings, albeit with some variation across countries and sectors.48 For example, Ryan, in a study of biomedical innovations and patent reform in Brazil, found that patents provided incentives for innovation investments and facilitated the functioning of technology markets.49 Park and Lippoldt also observed that the provision of adequate protection for IPRs can help to stimulate local innovation, in some cases building on the transfer of technologies that provide inputs and spillovers.50 In other words, local innovators are introduced to technologies first through the technology transfer that takes place in an environment wherein protection of IPRs is assured; then, they may build on those ideas to create an evolved product or develop alternate approaches (i.e., to innovate). Related research finds that trade in technology—through channels including imports, foreign direct investment, and technology licensing—improves the quality of developing-country innovation by increasing the pool of ideas and efficiency of innovation by encouraging the division of innovative labor and specialization.51 However, Maskus notes that without protection from potential abuse of their newly developed technologies, foreign enterprises may be less willing to reveal technical information associated with their innovations.52 The protection of patents and trade secrets provides necessary legal assurances for firms wishing to reveal proprietary characteristics of technologies to subsidiaries and licensees via contracts. Counties with stronger IP protection have more creative outputs (in terms of intangible assets and creative goods and services in a nation’s media, printing and publishing, and entertainment industries, including online), even at varying levels of development. The relationship between IPR rights and innovation can also be seen in studies of how the introduction of stronger IPR laws, with regard to patents, copyrights, and trademarks, affect R&D activity in an economy. Studies by Varsakelis and by Kanwar and Evenson found that R&D to GDP ratios are positively related to the strength of patent rights, and are conditional on other factors.53 Cavazos Cepeda et al. found a positive influence of IPRs on the level of R&D in an economy, with each 1 percent increase in the level of protection of IPRs in an economy (as measured by improvements to a country’s score in the Patent Rights Index) equating to, on average, a 0.7 percent increase in the domestic level of R&D.54 Likewise, a 1 percent increase in copyright protection was associated with a 3.3 percent increase in domestic R&D. Similarly, when trademark protection increased by 1 percent, there was an associated R&D increase of 1.4 percent. As the authors concluded, “Increases in the protection of the IPRs carried economic benefits in the form of higher inflows of FDI, and increases in the levels of both domestically conducted R&D and service imports as measured by licensing fees.”55 As Jackson summarized, regarding the relationship between IPR reform and both innovation and R&D, and FDI, “In addition to spurring domestic innovation, strong intellectual property rights can increase incentives for foreign direct investment which in turn also leads to economic growth.”56

**Biopharmaceutical innovation is key to prevent future pandemics and bioterror**

**Marjanovic and Feijao 20** [Sonja Marjanovic Ph.D., Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Carolina Feijao, Ph.D. in biochemistry, University of Cambridge; M.Sc. in quantitative biology, Imperial College London; B.Sc. in biology, University of Lisbon. "How to Best Enable Pharma Innovation Beyond the COVID-19 Crisis," RAND Corporation, 05-2020, accessed 8-8-2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA407-1.html] HWIC

As key actors in the healthcare innovation landscape, pharmaceutical and life sciences companies have been called on to develop medicines, vaccines and diagnostics for pressing public health challenges. The COVID-19 crisis is one such challenge, but there are many others. For example, MERS, SARS, Ebola, Zika and avian and swine flu are also infectious diseases that represent public health threats. Infectious agents such as anthrax, smallpox and tularemia could present threats in a bioterrorism context.1 The general threat to public health that is posed by antimicrobial resistance is also well-recognised as an area in need of pharmaceutical innovation. Innovating in response to these challenges does not always align well with pharmaceutical industry commercial models, shareholder expectations and competition within the industry. However, the expertise, networks and infrastructure that industry has within its reach, as well as public expectations and the moral imperative, make pharmaceutical companies and the wider life sciences sector an indispensable partner in the search for solutions that save lives. This perspective argues for the need to establish more sustainable and scalable ways of incentivising pharmaceutical innovation in response to infectious disease threats to public health. It considers both past and current examples of efforts to mobilise pharmaceutical innovation in high commercial risk areas, including in the context of current efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. In global pandemic crises like COVID-19, the urgency and scale of the crisis – as well as the spotlight placed on pharmaceutical companies – mean that contributing to the search for effective medicines, vaccines or diagnostics is essential for socially responsible companies in the sector. 2 It is therefore unsurprising that we are seeing industry-wide efforts unfold at unprecedented scale and pace. Whereas there is always scope for more activity, industry is currently contributing in a variety of ways. Examples include pharmaceutical companies donating existing compounds to assess their utility in the fight against COVID19; screening existing compound libraries in-house or with partners to see if they can be repurposed; accelerating trials for potentially effective medicine or vaccine candidates; and in some cases rapidly accelerating in-house research and development to discover new treatments or vaccine agents and develop diagnostics tests.3,4 Pharmaceutical companies are collaborating with each other in some of these efforts and participating in global R&D partnerships (such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative effort to accelerate the development of potential therapies for COVID-19) and supporting national efforts to expand diagnosis and testing capacity and ensure affordable and ready access to potential solutions.3,5,6 The primary purpose of such innovation is to benefit patients and wider population health. Although there are also reputational benefits from involvement that can be realised across the industry, there are likely to be relatively few companies that are ‘commercial’ winners. Those who might gain substantial revenues will be under pressure not to be seen as profiting from the pandemic. In the United Kingdom for example, GSK has stated that it does not expect to profit from its COVID-19 related activities and that any gains will be invested in supporting research and long-term pandemic preparedness, as well as in developing products that would be affordable in the world’s poorest countries.7 Similarly, in the United States AbbVie has waived intellectual property rights for an existing combination product that is being tested for therapeutic potential against COVID-19, which would support affordability and allow for a supply of generics.8,9 Johnson & Johnson has stated that its potential vaccine – which is expected to begin trials – will be available on a not-for-profit basis during the pandemic.10 Pharma is mobilising substantial efforts to rise to the COVID-19 challenge at hand. However, we need to consider how pharmaceutical innovation for responding to emerging infectious diseases can best be enabled beyond the current crisis. Many public health threats (including those associated with other infectious diseases, bioterrorism agents and antimicrobial resistance) are urgently in need of pharmaceutical innovation, even if their impacts are not as visible to society as COVID-19 is in the immediate term. The pharmaceutical industry has responded to previous public health emergencies associated with infectious disease in recent times – for example those associated with Ebola and Zika outbreaks.11 However, it has done so to a lesser scale than for COVID-19 and with contributions from fewer companies. Similarly, levels of activity in response to the threat of antimicrobial resistance are still low.12 There are important policy questions as to whether – and how – industry could engage with such public health threats to an even greater extent under improved innovation conditions.

**That causes extinction, which outweighs.**

**Millett & Snyder-Beattie ‘17**. Millett, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; and Snyder-Beattie, M.S., Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 08-01-2017. “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” Health Security, 15(4), PubMed

In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could **threaten human existence**. Although the **probability** of human extinction from bioweapons **may** be low, the **expected value** of **reducing** the risk could **still** be **large**, since such risks jeopardize the existence of **all future generations**. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. **Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls** on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to **remote populations**, overcome **rare genetic resistances**, and **evade detection**, cures, and **countermeasures**. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: **Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off**, and so **evolutionary pressures** could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they **do not rule** the possibility **out** entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of **species going extinct due to disease**—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also **historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out** by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include **native American tribes** exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But **many diseases are proof** of principle that **each worst-case attribute can be realized independently**. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, **natural evolution** would be an **unlikely** source for pathogens with the **highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach**. But **advances in biotech**nology might allow the creation of diseases that **combine such traits**. Recent controversy has **already emerged** over a number of **scientific experiments** that resulted in viruses with enhanced **transmissibility**, **lethality**, and/or the ability to overcome **therapeutics**.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a **long historical track record** of**state-run bioweapon research** applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and **m**utually **a**ssured **d**estruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 The **possibility of a war** between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27

## K

#### Their criticisms of the “West” only reify the metageographic concept that the world can be compartmentalized into neat sections of West and Rest, and that certain ideals of rationality, control, militarism, etc can be properly spatialized and contained by a simplified set of geographical coordinates —Ultimately rhetorics that disparage the West and celebrate the rest end up reinforcing the colonizer’s model of the world.

Lewis and Wigen 97.

[Martin W. and Karen E., The Myth of Continents 6-7]

The North-South distinction, like that between the first, second, and third Worlds, is essentially defined in economic terms. Cultural and political matters are more often framed as East versus West: a far older and more important division. Indeed, the notion of a First World is itself deeply rooted in the idea of distinctive Western realm; in many works, the Third World is thus contrasted, not to the First or Second Worlds, but rather simply to the West. When such a scheme is carried to its logical extreme, the world is again divided into two sections: the West and the non-West. As Bernard Cohn remarks, this maneuver entails “a neat ethnocentrism which defines nine-tenths of the people of the world in a single negative term.” ¶ While the “west is often contrasted simply with the “rest,” its historical counterpart is of course the “east.” The myth of continents is also implicated in this binary longitudinal division, for the West is conventionally defined as Europe (plus its direct colonial offshoots), while the East in many instances is simply a proxy for Asia- with Africa, in this view, threatening to fall of the map altogether,. The East-West opposition maps a huge array of human attributes onto a stupendously simplified set of geographical coordinates but its staple feature has historically been the linking of the West with reason and progress and the East with spirituality and stagnation. Baseless though it may be, this purported corresponds ultimately forms a central structure of our metageographical mythology.¶ Like other metageographical concepts, the East-West split is remarkably protean, and on certain occasions a completely different referent system is implicated by these terms: one differentiating eastern from Western Europe. Inevitably, however, these two referents of *East* tend to be conflated, implying that Eastern Europe is somehow Asian in its essence. While one can argue that Russia shares certain characteristics with Central Asia, no criterion of Asianess can reasonably be extended to Slovenia, Bohemia, of Thuringia. Yet the geopolitical category East does precisely this, riding roughshod over previous cultural divisions by giving undue weight to a political grouping that existed on only between 1946 and 1989.¶ The metageographical distinction between the West and the rest of the world is particularly debilitating when married to a key metahistorical concept: the notion that the West is coincident with modernity and that the non-West can enter the modern world only to the extent that it emulates the norms established in Europe and northern North America. In a powerful expose, J. M. Blaut labels these linked constructs “the colonizer’s model of the world” and shows that they rest on a rarely acknowledged substrate of “geographical infusionism: (where progress is seen as flowering endlessly out of the center [Europe] toward the otherwise sterile as flowering endlessly out of the center [Europe] toward the otherwise sterile periphery.) But while Blaut convincingly argues that this is a central geographical myth of the modern age, it is hardly the only one. Ultimately, all received metageographical constructs need to be subjected to similarly sustained geographical and historical scrutiny. Likewise, while Blaut is to be commended for showing that the “colonizer’s model” has often been embraced by Marxists no less than by liberals and conservatives, we would add that similar geohistorical visions of the world are not commonly encountered even in post-Marxist social theory. Like the classical Left, the cultural Left of poststructuralists, postmodernists, and racial environmentalists often perpetuates the West-rest binarism- only in the form of rhetoric that disparages the West and celebrates the rest.

#### Reject the Aff--it uncritically embraces the geographical myth of the “West”. This is not a naïve mistake, but is rather an instrument of ideological power that maintains American exceptionalism while ignoring the rootedness of such concepts as the “West” in military thinking. These systems of thought must be actively challenged and thrust into academic scholarship and debates.

Lewis and Wigen 97.

[Martin W. and Karen E., The Myth of Continents xi-xii]

Whatever their differences, all of these approaches share one attribute: a profound skepticism toward received metageographical constructs. Such skepticism is merited for two reasons. First, our guiding vision of the basic spatial patterning of human societies is dearly flawed, with problematic consequences for study after study, in every field of human inquiry. Second, beyond considerations of sheer accuracy in spatial representation, metageographies also constitute ideological structures. It is no coincidence that sea changes in ideology are generally accompanied by a questioning of metageographical categories-or that those attempting consciously to formulate new visions of the globe often do so as part of a campaign to promote new patterns of belief. Precisely because of their ideological power, however, hoary geographical ideas about the earth's division have proved remarkably tenacious, **even among those who are trying to shake them off**. Moreover, while it may be increasingly recognized that particular concepts are inadequate, the problem has only been addressed in an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion; metageography *as a system* has yet to emerge as a topic of sustained intellectual discussion and debate. In the absence of a systematic and forceful effort to expose their inadequacies and to replace them with something better, the old geographical concepts continue to hold our imagination in thrall. If metageography has not been prominent on the national agenda, one important cause lies in the institutional weakness of geography as a discipline. The neglect of geography in this country is so pervasive that the crumbling of our global geographical concepts is obscured by sheer geographical illiteracy." Since the reigning consensus in postwar American education has held geography of minor account, it is hardly surprising that so many know so little about the world and stumble so quickly when attempting to understand its basic structures. Sensational headlines in the American press decrying our students' fundamental ignorance of the world map are not exaggerated. Even at prestigious universities one can find seniors who, when provided with an outline map of the world, will unwittingly locate Asia in the Iberian Peninsula." Students are not entirely to blame. Most college-aged Americans have never explicitly studied geography, since most primary and secondary schools discontinued teaching the subject in the 1960s on the theory that memorization would stultify young minds. The sorry results of this misguided experiment are now fully evident, and broad-based efforts at reform are under way. Thanks in part to the National Geographical Society and the Association of American Geographers, basic geographical education is gradually returning to American elementary and high schools. Parents also seem to be responding, and cartographic toys and games now form a minor growth industry. At the university level, however, the situation remains grim. Geography is a marginalized discipline, absent from many of this country's top-ranked universities and threatened at others. In consequence, the need to reconceive our basic vision of world geography comes at a time when geography as an academic discipline lacks the institutional support to respond effectively. When one runs to world regional or "global" geography, the sub discipline that ought to be directly concerned with how we conceive the globe, the problem is particularly acute. Except at the lowest level of pedagogy, world geography is simply not viewed as an intellectually defensible academic subject. It does not merit inclusion in the Association of American Geographers' lengthy roster of specialty groups-a roster that serves as a guide to the active frontiers of geographical research. While such subfields as "the geography of aging and the aged," "Bible geography," and "the geography of recreation, tourism, and sport" are institutionalized as legitimate research areas, global geography is not. In most of the country's top-ranked geography departments, world regional courses are viewed as suitable only for remedial instruction to beginning students; in a few schools' bulletins, they do not exist at all. And because global geography is ignored as a research field, even when the subject *is* offered to students it tends to be taught in an outmoded fashion. World regional geography textbooks are, at their worst, repositories of the discipline's past mistakes, constructing 1950S-Style catalogs of regional traits over unacknowledged substrata of environmental determinism. It is little wonder that most American college graduates have such a fuzzy conception of the world. Institutional failures of this order are not easily addressed. **What is possible, however, is to expose the fault lines in Americans' guiding notions of the world**: **to trace how conventional merageographies emerged and developed, and to explore how they continue to lead us astray.** That is what has been attempted here. Our Starting point is the premise that **laypersons and scholars alike have uncritically accepted a series of convenient but stultifying geographical myths**, based on unwarranted, simplifications of global spatial patterns. In particular, we identify four related errors that lie at the root of metageographical confusion in the English-speaking world: the myth of continents, the myth of the nation-state, **the myth of East and West**, and the myth of geographical concordance (i.e., the idea that disparate phenomena exhibit the same variation in space). We further argue that such notions **survive not merely as naive "mistakes," but often as instruments of ideological power**. **Diplomats, politicians, and military strategies employ a metageographical framework no less than do scholars and journalists**. Such political actors have also had a far larger role in formulating global constructs fix the public imagination than scholars have cared to recognize; as we shall see some of **the most basic and taken-for granted "regions" of the world were first framed by military thinkers.**

## Extinction O/W

#### 1. Probability doesn’t mean disregard extinction. It means make us explain why it’s likely.

#### 2. Future generations have intrinsic value that make preventing extinction the most important goal of policy.

Matheny, PhD, ‘07 (Jason G., **PhDAppliedEcon@JohnHopkins**, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction,” Risk Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2007, DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2007.00960.x) BW

We may be poorly equipped to recognize or plan for extinction risks (Yudkowsky, 2007). We may not be good at grasping the significance of very large numbers (catastrophic outcomes) or very small numbers (probabilities) over large timeframes. We struggle with estimating the probabilities of rare or unprecedented events (Kunreuther et al., 2001). Policymakers may not plan far beyond current political administrations and rarely do risk assessments value the existence of future generations.18 We may unjustifiably discount the value of future lives. Finally, extinction risks are market failures where an individual enjoys no perceptible benefit from his or her investment in risk reduction. Human survival may thus be a good requiring deliberate policies to protect.

It might be feared that consideration of extinction risks would lead to a reductio ad absurdum: we ought to invest all our resources in asteroid defense or nuclear disarmament, instead of AIDS, pollution, world hunger, or other problems we face today. On the contrary, programs that create a healthy and content global population are likely to reduce the probability of global war or catastrophic terrorism. They should thus be seen as an essential part of a portfolio of risk-reducing projects.

Discussing the risks of “nuclear winter,” Carl Sagan (1983) wrote:

Some have argued that the difference between the deaths of several hundred million people in a nuclear war (as has been thought until recently to be a reasonable upper limit) and the death of every person on Earth (as now seems possible) is only a matter of one order of magnitude. For me, the difference is considerably greater. Restricting our attention only to those who die as a consequence of the war conceals its full impact. If we are required to calibrate extinction in numerical terms, I would be sure to include the number of people in future generations who would not be born. A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill “only” hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss—including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise.

In a similar vein, the philosopher Derek Parfit (1984) wrote:

I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: 1. Peace 2. A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population 3. A nuclear war that kills 100% 2 would be worse than 1, and 3 would be worse than 2. Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between 1 and 2. I believe that the difference between 2 and 3 is very much greater . . . . The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between 2 and 3 may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.

Human extinction in the next few centuries could reduce the number of future generations by thousands or more. We take extraordinary measures to protect some endangered species from extinction. It might be reasonable to take extraordinary measures to protect humanity from the same.19

#### 3. Magnitude first- epistemic perfection is impossible because the nature of risk-calculus is imperfect, but still necessary because we can’t afford to be wrong once

-precautionary principle= default

Jablonowski 10

(Mark, April, Lecturer in Economics at the University of Hartford, “Implications of Fuzziness for the Practical Management of High-Stakes Risks,” International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems, Vol.3, No. 1, JKS)

“Danger” is an inherently fuzzy concept. Considerable knowledge imperfections surround both the probability of high-stakes exposures, and the assessment of their acceptability. This is due to the complex and dynamic nature of risk in the modern world. ¶ Fuzzy thresholds for danger are most effectively established based on natural risk standards. This means that risk levels are acceptable only to the degree they blend with natural background levels. This concept reflects an evolutionary process that has supported life on this planet for thousands of years. By adhering to these levels, we can help assure ourselves of thousands more. While the level of such risks is yet to be determined, observation suggest that the degree of human-made risk we routinely subject ourselves to is several orders of magnitude higher. ¶ Due to the fuzzy nature of risk, we can not rely on statistical techniques. The fundamental problem with catastrophe remains, in the long run, there may be no long run. That is, we can not rely on results “averaging out” over time. With such risks, only precautionary avoidance (based on the minimax’ing of the largest possible loss) makes sense. Combined with reasonable natural thresholds, this view allows a very workable approach to achieving safe progress.

## Case

#### Don’t solve their args about colonization

#### ROB plan good idea

#### 1. No epistemology indicts — all empirical measures show market epistemology is superior to their utopian project

**Boetke, 03** – professor of economics at George Mason (Peter, Review of “Economics as Ideology”, published in Revue de Philosophie economique, <http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/pboettke/pubs/recenstion_douvrage.pdf>)

In fact, economic history is a long record of government policies that failed because they were designed with a bold disregard for the laws of economics. It is impossible to understand the history of economic thought if one does not pay attention to the fact that economics as such is a challenge to the conceit of those in power. An economist can never be a favorite of autocrats and demagogues. With them he is always the mischief-maker, and the more they are inwardly convinced that his objections are well founded, the more they hate him. Ludwig von Mises Is this statement of Mises one of ideology or science? The politically cor-rect answer would be that this is just another example of Mises's exces- sive ideological commitment to *laissez faire.* But as with much in modern intellectual life, the desire not to offend produces polite but flawed argu-ment at the expense of the harsh truth of the matter. The choice of eco-nomic policy may be a matter of democratic decision making, but the consequences of economic policy on human well-being certainly is not. And once we recognize that, then the analysis of the development of eco-nomic doctrine and evolution of political economy in the 20th century looks totally different. The breakdown of the Keynesian consensus in the 1970s, the collapse of communism in the 1980s and the wide-spread reco-gnition of the failure of development planning in the 1990s, point 21st century political economy in a direction that would be a radical depar-ture from the path it was set on at the beginning of the 20th, when an almost blind-faith in the ability of democratic government to correct social ills captured the imagination of the intellectual elites. The lesson of the 20th century for political economy should be one of humility and restraint. The *fatal conceit* of the 20th century which sought to unleash the power of the government elites to do "good" in the name of the masses must give way to a contemporary version of the 18th and 19th century pro-ject of constraining the power of the state and its elites, and unleashing the productive potential of the masses. "The curious task of economics," Hayek has written, "is to demons- trate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design." [(1988, p. 76]. But if economic science doesn't exist inde- pendently from the democratic will of the citizens, then such a task is not just curious, but absurd. Enter Kenneth Hoover's Economics as Ideology. At one level this is a fascinating book, dealing with an important subject, and approaching it in a unique way. The role of ideology in science, and how different thinkers of the past can shape the contemporary political climate is indeed a worthy subject of serious study. Moreover, the attempt to explain how the personal biographies of thinkers shape their own iden- tity and thus ideology is also important. Unfortunately, there is also the problem of truth in scientific discovery. All the good will in the world doesn't matter if the theory advocated is simply in conflict with reality. William Easterly, for example, in dealing with the post-WWII era efforts to orchestrate economic development in the 3rd world refers to the "car-tel of good intentions." (2002) One of the first principles of political eco- nomy is that intentions do not equal results - this is true for the central mystery of political economy (how individuals pursuing their own inter-ests, and only their own interests, can within certain institutional envi-ronments generate outcomes which are socially desirable) and for the central tragedy (how individuals can in striving to promote the public good generate unintended undesirable consequences). There are syste-mic forces that are in operation in political economy and they exist inde-pendent of the wishful thinking of participants in the political-economic nexus. Hoover doesn't appear to recognize this fundamental point in political economy and thus his effort to understand the development of modern political economy is flawed from the start. Let me focus on my criticism first and then I will end highlighting aspects which I think the reader can benefit from in reading his book nevertheless. First, the selection of subjects is bizarre from the beginning if we are going to talk about economic science and its relation to public policy debates. Certainly Keynes and Hayek belong, but Laski has no claim whatsoever to being an original thinker in economics. He was a political theorists and political activist and had little to nothing to say about technical economics. Keynes and Hayek, however, were first and foremost skilled technical economists who utilized the knowledge they had gleaned from technical economics to make policy relevant contribu- tions. In short, it is on the basis of sound economic reasoning that they were able to make policy relevant arguments to their contemporaries. But except for a paragraph here or there, the technical economics of Keynes and Hayek are passed over in this book to focus instead on their political affiliations and political influence (Keynes with the democratic center, Hayek with the hard right - Laski is given the hard left) and we are treated to asserted arguments about how personal psychology impac- ted their position.1 We are treated to these figures as political theorists or rather political icons of movements that identified with them. This enables Hoover's choice of thinkers to have some coherence, though the reason for both Keynes's and Hayek's influence are going to get inadequate treat- ment as a consequence. Second, Hoover is only apparently asking a question about the evolu- tion of ideas and ideological influence. But a reader can sense from the second paragraph of the preface where Hoover's sympathies personally lay on the policy questions of the day. He laments that the ideological pendulum has swung too far to the right and then he states plainly that "On a moment's reflection, it is clear that governments do good things, as well as bad. And markets likewise are Janus-faced, sometimes provi- dent, other times the wastrel." (p. xi) In other words, Hoover has an ans- wer to his question before he asks it. Political economy is to serve as a means for human betterment within the context of democratic delibera- tion among citizens. These deliberations must be rational and not prone to ideological excess if they are going to generate understanding among citizens of "the need for a complex interweaving of institutions, processes, and constitutional safeguards so that the excesses of any one institution may be limited, while its virtues are brought to the service of society." (p. 270) Who, the reader must ask, could ever be against limiting abuse and encouraging virtue? Nobody can be against the exercising of wisdom, courage and public spiritedness in making political decisions. But in Hoover's treatment both Laski and Hayek are going to be found wanting in this regard because ideological theorizing in their name can be abused by politicians on the left and right - as Hoover argues we have seen2 - and thus only Keynes is left to rationally mediate between the two extremes of socialism and libertarianism. Overly ideological thinking is what causes problems in democratic deliberation, according to Hoover. Third, Hoover relies on psycho-historical analysis, rather than an exa- mination of economic doctrine and empirical studies, to explain how Keynes, Laski and Hayek came to adopt the ideological positions they represented in public debate. There is no denying that personal expe- rience shapes the way individuals form their identity and thus their ideo- logy. There is also no denying that reading personal histories can be engaging and intellectually rewarding. But can we really say that Hayek's libertarianism has as much to do with his desire to justify his divorce as his life-long commitment to the ideals of liberty? ! (p. 229) Did Keynes's supreme belief in the power of his own intellect and his flaunting of tra- ditional morality all prepare him for the advocacy of rational delibera- tion over values in a democratic manner that came to be the hallmark of progressive politics in the contemporary world? This is all fun to read, but I would rather see the answer to Keynes and Hayek in the different philosophical doctrines they adhered to as reflected in their writings from early on, and the technical arguments in economics they put forth and what they learned as theorists during debates with colleagues in the 1920s- 1940s. Their understanding of the teachings of the science of economics, not the personal psychologies of Keynes and Hayek, explain their res- pective positions in contemporary politics, and the lack of understan- ding ofbasic economics explains Laski's policy positions. Not is all is lost in reading this book. It does benefit the reader. First, it is well written and the personal histories are interesting — though any serious scholar of the different thinkers would have already encountered the material either in primary documents or in previous biographies. In short, no new biographical information is unearthed in Hoover's book. But the way he weaves it with the development of doctrine and in parti- cular in the clash between these different thinkers during the 1930s and 1940s provides a rewarding read. Second, putting the question of ideology and its role in political eco- nomy on the table is welcomed. But here again, I think Hoover could have benefited from examining what economists have had to say about this and in particular the work of Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (1954). Schumpeter argued that ideology is often indispensable to science because it provides the raw material for scientific analysis. Ideological vision in Schumpeter's terminology is a pre-analytic cogni- tive act that is a necessary though not sufficient step in economics analy- sis. Ideology is capable of providing the analyst with questions to be worked through in a non-ideological manner with economic reasoning. But without the ideological vision in the first place the questions would not be raised and the science of economics may well stall.3 In Hoover's presentation, however, ideology exerts its power only in a negative man- ner - by distorting rational discourse and clouding reality. This is too easy, and it also overlooks the basic fact that science needs raw material to work with if it is going to make progress. Moreover, the act of clai- ming that one occupies the sane rational middle is an ideological trick in its own right to present ones intellectual opponents as irrational extre- mists. Rational assessment of the logic of an argument and differing empi- rical interpretations offered is dismissed in favor of a rhetorical strategy that classifies opponents rather than engages them. As with many of the arguments in this book, it is my assessment that Hoover often believes a position (e.g., the effectiveness of Keynesian consensus policies) is sett- led when in fact it is precisely that position which is under contestation in the scientific community of economists. It is my belief that Hoover is led to this, and other positions in his book that I find objectionable, because he fails to see economics as a discipline which can provide us with knowledge equivalent in ontological stature to the law of gravity and that democratic deliberations often produce economic policies that are the equivalent of engineering proposals for human beings to float rather than walk or drive to their next destination.4 If my characterization is correct, then as we saw in the quote from Mises, the economists will find themselves in opposition to proposed policy solutions to right this or that perceived social wrong. The economist is put in the unenviable position of reminding fellow citizens that wishing it so doesn't necessarily make it so. The science of economics puts para-meters on our utopias, and those who advocate Utopian solutions cannot stand any suggestion that their plan for the future is unworkable. The discipline of economics in addition to providing a critique, also suggests that any alternative arrangement being proposed must specify the insti-tutional mechanisms by which incentives between actors will become aligned and the correct information will flow to right actors in time for them to make appropriate decisions or learn from their previous decisions that mistakes were made so the appropriate adjustments will be made. If no mechanism is in place, then incentive incompatibilities and coordination failures will result so that no matter how beautiful the proposed policy might appear on paper the solution will be one of economic waste and political opportunism. Because Hoover's book doesn't deal with econo- mic science in such a sustain way, it cannot at the end of the day explain the evolution of modern economic thought and without that there is no way to understand the creation of contemporary politics in the wake of the breakdown of the Keynesian consensus in the 1970s, the collapse of communism in the 1980s and the realization of the tragic failure of deve-lopment planning in the third world in the 1990s. Economic reality, it turns out, more than psycho-history is the best way to understand the way the world work. **(footnote 4):** 4. The distinction between ontology and epistemology are often forgotten in discussions of the methodology and philosophy of the social sciences. We come to know the laws of gravity in a manner different than we come to know the law of demand (question of epistemology), but the forces at work that are described by the law of gravity and the law of demand are nevertheless real in the same way (question of ontology). The argu- ment for methodological dualism between the natural and social sciences that was made by Mises and then Hayek crucially relies on this distinction between ontology and epistemology. In other words, economics is capable of establishing laws that have the same ontological claim as those derived in physics, but they are arri-ved at through procedures of inquiry entirely different from those employed in the natural sciences.

#### Capitalism makes the world go round —

#### 1. War: Cap solves war on a massive scale – it creates lock-in mechanisms that bind countries together and economically dampens conflict – robust studies

Dafoe & Kelsey, Political Science and International Economics, ’14 (Allan & Nina; assistant professor in political science at Yale & research associate in international economics at Berkeley; Journal of Peace Research, “Observing the capitalist peace: Examining market-mediated signaling and other mechanisms,” <http://jpr.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/51/5/619.full>)

1. Interdependence, 2. Resolve through economic costs, 3. Third parties intervene, 4. Want to avoid costs b/c $$$

Countries with liberal political and economic systems rarely use military force against each other. This anomalous peace has been most prominently attributed to the ‘democratic peace’ – the apparent tendency for democratic countries to avoid militarized conflict with each other (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995; Dafoe, Oneal & Russett, 2013).More recently, however, scholars have proposed that the liberal peace could be partly (Russett & Oneal, 2001) or primarily (Gartzke, 2007; but see Dafoe, 2011) attributed to liberal economic factors, such as commercial and financial interdependence. In particular, Erik Gartzke, Quan Li & Charles Boehmer (2001), henceforth referred to as GLB, have demonstrated that measures of capital openness have a substantial and statistically significant association with peaceful dyadic relations. Gartzke (2007) confirms that this association is robust to a large variety of model specifications. To explain this correlation, GLB propose that countries with open capital markets are more able to credibly signal their resolve through the bearing of greater economic costs prior to the outbreak of militarized conflict. This explanation is novel and plausible, and resonates with the rationalist view of asymmetric information as a cause of conflict (Fearon, 1995). Moreover, it implies clear testable predictions on evidential domains different from those examined by GLB. In this article we exploit this opportunity by constructing a confirmatory test of GLB’s theory of market-mediated signaling. We first develop an innovative quantitative case selection technique to identify crucial cases where the mechanism of market-mediated signaling should be most easily observed. Specifically, we employ quantitative data and the statistical models used to support the theory we are probing to create an impartial and transparentmeans of selecting cases in which the theory – as specified by the theory’s creators –makes its most confident predictions.We implement three different case selection rules to select cases that optimize on two criteria: (1) maximizing the inferential leverage of our cases, and (2) minimizing selection bias. We examine these cases for a necessary implication of market-mediated signaling: that key participants drew a connection between conflictual events and adverse market movements. Such an inference is a necessary step in the process by which market-mediated costs can signal resolve. For evidence of this we examine news media, government documents, memoirs, historical works, and other sources. We additionally examine other sources, such as market data, for evidence that economic costs were caused by escalatory events. Based on this analysis, we assess the evidence for GLB’s theory of market mediated costly signaling. Our article then considers a more complex heterogeneous effects version of market-mediated signaling in which unspecified scope conditions are required for the mechanism to operate. Our design has the feature of selecting cases in which scope conditions are most likely to be absent. This allows us to perform an exploratory analysis of these cases, looking for possible scope conditions. We also consider alternative potential mechanisms. Our cases are reviewed in more detail in the online appendix.1 To summarize our results, our confirmatory test finds that while market-mediated signaling may be operative in the most serious disputes, it was largely absent in the less serious disputes that characterize most of the sample of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). This suggests either that other mechanisms account for the correlation between capital openness and peace, or that the scope conditions for market-mediated signaling are restrictive. Of the signals that we observed, strategicmarket-mediated signals were relatively more important than automatic market-mediated signals in the most serious conflicts. We identify a number of potential scope conditions, such as that (1) the conflict must be driven by bargaining failure arising from uncertainty and (2) the economic costs need to escalate gradually and need to be substantial, but less than the expected military costs of conflict. Finally, there were a number of other explanations that seemed present in the cases we examined and could account for the capitalist peace: capital openness is associated with greater anticipated economic costs of conflict; capital openness leads third parties to have a greater stake in the conflict and therefore be more willing to intervene; a dyadic acceptance of the status quo could promote both peace and capital openness; and countries seeking to institutionalize a regional peace might instrumentally harness the pacifying effects of liberal markets. The correlation: Open capital markets and peace The empirical puzzle at the core of this article is the significant and robust correlation noted by GLB between high levels of capital openness in both members of a dyad and the infrequent incidence of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars between the members of this dyad (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). The index of capital openness (CAPOPEN) is intended to capture the ‘difficulty states face in seeking to impose restrictions on capital flows (the degree of lost policy autonomy due to globalization)’ (Gartzke & Li, 2003: 575). CAPOPEN is constructed from data drawn from the widely used IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Controls; it is a combination of eight binary variables that measure different types of government restrictions on capital and currency flow (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 407). The measure of CAPOPEN starts in 1966 and is defined for many countries (increasingly more over time). Most of the countries that do not have a measure of CAPOPEN are communist.2 GLB implement this variable in a dyadic framework by creating a new variable, CAPOPENL, which is the smaller of the two dyadic values of CAPOPEN. This operationalization is sometimes referred to as the ‘weak-link’ specification since the functional form is consonant with a model of war in which the ‘weakest link’ in a dyad determines the probability of war. CAPOPENL has a negative monotonic association with the incidence of MIDs, fatal MIDs, and wars (see Figure 1).3 The strength of the estimated empirical association between peace and CAPOPENL, using a modified version of the dataset and model from Gartzke (2007), is comparable to that between peace and, respectively, joint democracy, log of distance, or the GDP of a contiguous dyad (Gartzke, 2007: 179; Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 412). In summary, CAPOPENL seems to be an important and robust correlate of peace. The question of why specifically this correlation exists, however, remains to be answered. The mechanism: Market-mediated signaling? Gartzke, Li & Boehmer (2001) argue that the classic liberal account for the pacific effect of economic interdependence – that interdependence increases the expected costs of war – is not consistent with the bargaining theory of war (see also Morrow, 1999). GLB argue that ‘conventional descriptions of interdependence see war as less likely because states face additional opportunity costs for fighting. The problem with such an account is that it ignores incentives to capitalize on an opponent’s reticence to fight’ (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 400.)4 Instead, GLB (see also Gartzke, 2003; Gartzke & Li, 2003) argue that financial interdependence could promote peace by facilitating the sending of costly signals.

As the probability of militarized conflict increases, states incur a variety of automatic and strategically imposed economic costs as a consequence of escalation toward conflict. Those states that persist in a dispute despite these costs will reveal their willingness to tolerate them, and hence signal resolve. The greater the degree of economic interdependence, the more a resolved country could demonstrate its willingness to suffer costs ex ante to militarized conflict. Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s mechanism implies a commonly perceived costly signal before militarized conflict breaks out or escalates: if market-mediated signaling is to account for the correlation between CAPOPENL and the absence of MIDs, then visible market-mediated costs should occur prior to or during periods of real or potential conflict (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). Thus, the proposed mechanism should leave many visible footprints in the historical record. This theory predicts that these visible signals must arise in any escalating conflict, involving countries with high capital openness, in which this mechanism is operative Clarifying the signaling mechanism Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s signaling mechanism is mostly conceptualized on an abstract, game-theoretic level (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). In order to elucidate the types of observations that could inform this theory’s validity, we discuss with greater specificity the possible ways in which such signaling might occur. A conceptual classification of costly signals The term signaling connotes an intentional communicative act by one party directed towards another. Because the term signaling thus suggests a willful act, and a signal of resolve is only credible if it is costly, scholars have sometimes concluded that states involved in bargaining under incomplete information could advance their interests by imposing costs on themselves and thereby signaling their resolve (e.g. Lektzian & Sprecher, 2007). However, the game-theoretic concept of signaling refers more generally to any situation in which an actor’s behavior reveals information about her private information. In fact, states frequently adopt sanctions with low costs to themselves and high costs to their rivals because doing so is often a rational bargaining tactic on other grounds: they are trying to coerce their rival to concede the issue. Bargaining encounters of this type can be conceptualized as a type of war-of-attrition game in which each actor attempts to coerce the other through the imposition of escalating costs. Such encounters also provide the opportunity for signaling: when states resist the costs imposed by their rivals, they ‘signal’ their resolve. If at some point one party perceives the conflict to have become too costly and steps back, that party ‘signals’ a lack of resolve. Thus, this kind of signaling arises as a by-product of another’s coercive attempts. In other words, costly signals come in two forms: self-inflicted (information about a leader arising from a leader’s intentional or incidental infliction of costs on himself) or imposed (information about a leader that arises from a leader’s response to a rival’s imposition of costs). Additionally, costs may arise as an automatic byproduct of escalation towards military conflict or may be a tool of statecraft that is strategically employed during a conflict. The automatic mechanism stipulates that as the probability of conflict increases, various economic assets will lose value due to the risk of conflict and investor flight. However, the occurrence of these costs may also be intentional outcomes of specific escalatory decisions of the states, as in the case of deliberate sanctions; in this case they are strategic. Finally, at a practical level, we identify three different potential kinds of economic costs of militarized conflict that may be mediated by open capital markets: capital costs from political risk, monetary coercion, and business sanctions.