# 1NC

## 1

#### A] interpretation -- the aff must implement a plan

#### B] Violation –

#### Resolved means a policy

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### 2---Unjust.

Black’s Law [The Law Dictionary Featuring Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed. No Date. <https://thelawdictionary.org/unjust/>] brett

What is UNJUST?

Contrary to right and justice, or to the enjoyment of his rights by another, or to the standards of conduct furnished by the laws.

#### C. Fairness-

#### 1. Debate is a game: there’s a winner and loser, competitive norms, the tournament invite proves. Alternative impacts like activism or education can be pursued in other places. This makes fairness the most important impact

#### 2. Not defending the topic is not fair

#### A. Preparation- altering the topic gives the aff a huge edge, they can prepare for half a year on an issue that catches us by surprise. Preparation is better than thinking on your feet- research demonstrates pedagogical humility and research skills are the only portable debate training

#### B. Limits- there are a finite amount of government restrictions, but an infinite number of non topical affs. Consider this our “library disad”- not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months.

#### C. Causality- debating the resolution forces the affirmative to defend a cause and effect relationship, the state doing x results in y. Non topical affs establish their own barometer “I think x is good for me” that aren’t negateable. Only the neg promotes switch side debate.

#### D. Exclusionary rule- you can’t vote on the case outweighs T because lack of preparation prevents rigorous testing of the AC claims and inflates the credence of their arguments. If we win fairness we don’t have to “outweigh” other impacts

## 2

#### Realism assumes the perspective of a neutral, rational calculator divorced from the gendered nature of nationalism and international relations – their account of state behavior is ahistorical and props up hegemonic masculinities.

Sjobert 12 Sjoberg, Laura (2012). Gender, structure, and war: what Waltz couldn't see. International Theory, 4(1), 1–38. doi:10.1017/S175297191100025X SM

This theme in feminist theorizing in IR suggests that there might be something to the idea that international structures are theorized as genderneutral because men take their perspectives to represent the human. Feminists have characterized conventional knowledge in IR as problematic because it is constructed only by those in a position of privilege, which affords them only distorted views of the world.14 As such, it has been a crucial part of the feminist project in IR to ‘not only add women but also ask how gender – a structural feature of social life – has been rendered invisible’ by working to ‘distinguish ‘‘reality’’ from the world as men know it’ (Peterson and True 1998, 23). Often, in disciplinary knowledges, ‘gender’ is seen as a proxy for ‘women’ because ‘women’ are perceived to have gender, where men are not. Another element of a gendered international system structure would be that, when it is acknowledged that gender plays a role in global politics, 14 Scheman 1993; Garry and Pearsall 1996; Harding 1998. There is a sociology to what is understood as central to the discipline, where what counts as ‘IR’ matches what men do more than it matches what women do at least in part because the perspectives of male scholars have defined the boundaries of the discipline (Sjoberg 2008). 16 LAURA SJOBERG it is often discussed as a corruption of a gender-neutral system rather than a product of a gendered system. For example, work like that of Inglehart and Norris (2002) and Hudson et al. (2009)15 argues that it is states that treat their women the worst that corrupt not only the gender order but the potential for interstate peace, cooperation, and development. This logic is replicated in many discussions of gender in the policy world as well. For example, ‘gender mainstreaming’ agendas (see True and Mintrom 2001; Shepherd 2008) engage in a process of integrating gender concerns into the structures that already exist in governments and organizations. The scenario derived from Acker’s theorizing suggests that when gender subordination is characterized as the exception, rather than the rule, in international political interactions, gender is difficult to see because the masculine is at once assumed and invisible. The recurrent focus in feminist work on the need to ask IR theory ‘where are the women?’ (Enloe 1983) and ‘where is gender?’ (Bell and O’Rourke 2007) suggests that it is plausible that gender is difficult to see in IR because the masculine dominates our visions of the international system. It is important to note that the masculine here involves and implicates, but is not reducible to, men. Waltz ‘tests’ his idea of structure primarily by its predictive power and its indirect manifestations (1986, 72). He argues that, since the anarchical nature of the international system is invisible and thus cannot be directly verified or proven, it must be verified by its manifestations and implications (Waltz 1986, 73). This verification, to Waltz, comes by examining unit function, distribution of capabilities across units, and political processes of unit interaction. The remainder of this section considers whether there is evidence in those three observable parts of global politics that the international system may be gender-hierarchical. Unit function: does state identity have gendered components? In Waltz’s account, ‘a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units’ where ‘the structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think about the system as a whole’ and ‘the arrangement of units is a property of the system’ (1986, 70, 71). Waltz sees the system as an anarchy, which by definition specifies that units have the same function. Still, Waltz gives a sense of what would be different if the system was a hierarchy, since ‘hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation’ (1986, 87). Calling states ‘like units’ in Waltz’s terms is ‘to say that each state is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit’ (Waltz 1986, 89). Waltz sees states as performing fundamentally similar tasks in similar ways, and argues that the differences between states are in capabilities not in function or task (1986, 91). This section explores two arguments about gender and the function of the units of the international system. First, it argues that gender can be seen as constituting unit ‘function’ in the international system, whether the units are ‘like’ or differentiated. Second, it proposes that gender hierarchy actually differentiates unit function in the international system. The argument that gender constitutes the function of all units in the international system is supported by the degree to which states define their identities (and therefore the tasks of domestic and foreign policy) in gendered ways. A growing literature on ontological security (e.g. Mitzen 2006; Steele 2008) characterizes state identity in terms of ‘sense of self,’ a language that has long been used in feminist accounts of nation and nationalism. Feminists who have worked on nationalism have argued that national identity and gender are inextricably linked, and that ‘all nationalism are gendered, all nationalisms are invented, and all are dangerous’ (McClintock 1993).16 Feminists have shown that gendered imagery is salient in the construction national identities, particularly when, often, women are the essence of, the symbols of, and the reproduction of state and/or national identity (Yuval-Davis 1997; Wilcox 2009). A number of examples illustrate the link between national identity and gender. Feminist studies have demonstrated that gender has been essential to defining state identity in Korea (Moon 1997), modernizing Malaysia (Chin 1998), Bengal (Sen 1993), Indonesia (Sunindyo 1998), Northern Ireland (Porter 1998), South Africa (Meintjes 1998), Lebanon (Schulze 1998), Armenia (Tachjian 2009), and a number of other states. For example, Niva has noted that, during the First Gulf War, the United States’ identity was understood as a ‘tough but tender’ masculinity where it was expected that the United States military would courageously defeat the Iraqi military, but would at the same time rescue the feminine state of Kuwait from the hypermasculine clutches of the Iraqi state (1998). On the other hand, responding to the United States’ and United Nations’ threats of military intervention in Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq consistently used gendered references to hypermasculine understandings of state identity (Sjoberg 2006b). Gendered nationalisms, however, do not just arise in conflict situations. Bannerji has noted that Canadian national identities are constructed through ‘race,’ class, gender, and other relations of power, where subordinate classes and ‘races’ are feminized in relation to the dominant image of Canadian identity, not only within the Canadian state but also in Canada’s external projection of nationalist identity (2000, 173). Taylor’s analysis of the ‘Dirty War’ in Argentina characterizes identity in the conflict as ‘predicated on the internalization of a rigid hierarchy’ of gender and argues that ‘the struggle, as each group aimed to humiliate, humble, and feminize its other, was about gender’ (1997, 92, 34). A brief look at one example recently used in the literature might further illustrate the point. In his book, Ontological Security in International Relations, Steele (2008) notes that honor and shame shape states’ selfperception of their identities. Contrary to the realist logic that state prioritizes prudence and survival over honor and justice, Steele sees honor as a universal part of state self-identity, where states look for honor even sacrificing physical integrity. To illustrate the role of honor in state selfidentity, Steele uses the example of the Belgian choice to fight a losing war against the Germans in 1914 rather than allow Germany access to Belgian territory and avoid the casualties and terror involved in their inevitable defeat. Steele notes that honor was implicated in Belgium’s response to Germany’s ultimatum, given that most policy statements stressed their need to ‘fight for the honor of the flag’ and ‘avenge Belgian honor’ (Steele 2008, 112). Feminist analysis suggests that we cannot understand the role of honor in state self-identity without reference to both masculine and feminine conceptions of honor in the state (Jowkar 1986). Masculine conceptions of honor vary between chivalric and protection-oriented and aggressive and prideful, while feminine conceptions of honor often focus on the purity and innocence of the territory of the state and/or the women and children inside (see Elshtain 1985). Through gender lenses, the Belgian discussion of national honor in 1914 was one where the leaders’ (masculine) honor was tied to not giving in to, and even resisting, the would-be violators of the territory’s (feminine) honor, which was tied to purity. The ‘honor’ of the Belgian government then was tied to unwillingness to sacrifice the ‘honor’ of the innocent, neutral, vulnerable, and untouchable identity and position of Belgium vis a vis its neighboring Germany. It is no coincidence that the following attack was referred to as the ‘Rape of Belgium’ (Niarchos 1995). In the ‘Rape of Belgium’ narrative, the German invasion spoiled the feminine elements of Belgian state identity, and emasculated Belgian leaders as protectors of its feminized territory. Survival or prudence cannot account for Belgium’s actions in 1914; in fact, as Steele pointed out, Belgium acted contrary to both. Honor can explain the Gender, structure, and war 19 behavior, but neither the form nor function of that honor is clear without accounting for the gendered elements of Belgian state identity. The story about gendered state identity can also be read onto Germany (as a hypermasculine aggressor) and Britain (as a chivalrous protector). While some might see the influence of gender on state or national identity as a ‘second-image’ or unit-level explanation,17 Waltz explains that a factor is structural if it is not influencing state identity (and therefore state function) in states individually, but instead influencing the identities (and therefore functions) of states generally. In other words, forces that define one state’s identity or five states’ identities are secondimage; forces that influence all states identities are third-image. Feminist scholars have shown that ‘nationalism is naturalized, and legitimated, through gender discourses that naturalized the domination of one group over another through the disparagement of the feminine’ (Peterson 1999). These gender hierarchies are always present even if specific genders and their orders in hierarchies are fungible. In other words, it is not particular nationalisms that are gendered (and some nationalisms that are not), it is that gender hierarchy as a structural feature of global politics defines the properties and functions of the system’s constituent units, including their national identities. All nationalisms being gendered does not mean that all nationalisms are the same, however. The mechanism through which gender hierarchy can be seen to influence national identity and state function is through the link between any given state’s national identity and the ‘hegemonic masculinity,’ or particular ideal-typical gender that is on top of the gender hierarchy that state ‘units’ are situated in at any given time and place (Hooper 1998, 34). The argument that states’ structures and functions are often defined by masculinities (see Peterson 1992) is not based on the observation that states are (mostly) governed by men. Instead, as Connell explains, ‘the state organizational practices are structured in relation to the reproductive arena’ (1995, 73). Some states’ hegemonic masculinities are aggressive and projected, others are tough but tender, and still others are stoic and reserved. All hegemonic masculinities relate to a feminized other, but they do so in different ways: some encourage violating it, some define themselves in 20 LAURA SJOBERG opposition to it, some understand it as treasured and to be protected, and some mix elements of all of the above. The gendered nature of national identities influences the function of states, particularly in the areas of warmaking and war-fighting, but also in terms of citizenship, economic organization, diplomatic relations, and involvement in international organizations.18 For example, feminists have catalogued throughout the history of the modern state system a relationship between military service, masculinity, and full citizenship (either de jure or de facto) in states (Moscovici 2000). Though the relationship between gender and nationalism generally (and genders and nationalisms specifically) influences the function of units whether they are like units (in anarchy) or not like units (indicative of a hierarchical system in Waltz’s terms), evidence of different gendered nationalisms suggests that gender hierarchy in global politics differentiates between functions of units in the system rather than dictating that all units function similarly. Units in the system (even defined in the narrow realist terms where only states count as units) do have many similar functions in terms of governance, education, health care, and the like. But especially in their external relations, states also have a number of differentiated functions. Some states were/are colonizers, some states were colonized and still deal with remaining markers of colonization. Some states are aggressors, while other states are the victims of aggression. Some states are protectors, while other states require protection. Some states provide peacekeeping troops, international humanitarian aid, and other public goods, while other states do not serve those functions, depending on state identity (e.g. Savery 2007). Some states serve to facilitate international cooperation while others act as cogs in cooperation’s wheels. Some states see their masculinity as affirmed in the interstate equivalent of rape and pillage, while other states see it in chivalry, honor, and a sense of the genteel. While Waltz might classify these differences as merely capabilities gaps, different state functions in the community of states do not map one-toone onto capabilities. Instead, I propose that they map onto the ways that gender shapes state identities and functions. As Peterson (2010) notes, ‘not only subjects but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, ways of knowing y can be [masculinized or] feminized,’ such that states’ ontological security is related to their gendered identities. For example, a number of feminist analyses of the United States during the first Gulf War identify its policy choices and military strategies as consonant with a new, post-Cold War ‘tough-but-tender’ image of the United States’ masculinity, which maintained the Cold War-era projection of strength, but added an element of sensitivity and a chivalric conception of protecting the weak (e.g. Niva 1998; Sjoberg 2006a). Seemingly inconsonant functions for the US military as at once an attack force and a tool for protection then make sense, because the state does function differently based on its self-perception of identity, which might be seen as (at least in part) a product of structural gender hierarchy in the international arena.

#### The impact is hypermasculine war-making- claims of objectivity are patently flawed because they are based in gendered decision-making

Sjoberg 13

(Laura, total bae, associate professor of Political Science @ University of Florida, University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Southern California School of International Relations; J.D. Boston College Law School, Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War Chapter: “Relations International and War(s),” Gendered Lenses Look at War(s), googlebooks, JKS)

Feminist scholars have also interrogated the unitary nature of the state, pointing out that efforts to maximize the state's security interests often threaten the security of people inside the state. Specifically, as I discussed in the previous section, the state's most marginalized citizens are often made insecure by state security-seeking, making it clear that a state does not have a single interest in interstate interaction but many that conflict. J. Ann Tickner contends that "an explanation of the historical development of state sovereignty and state identities as they have evolved over time does indeed suggest deeply gendered constructions that have not included women on the same terms as men." This is because, according to Tickner:¶ From the time of their foundation, states have sought to control the right to define political identity. Since their legitimacy has constantly been threatened by the undermining power of subnational and transnational loyalties, states' survival and success have depended on the creation and maintenance of legitimating national identities; often these identities have depended on the manipulation of gendered representation. . . . Drawing on metaphors that evoke matrimonial and familial relations, the nation has been portrayed as both male and female. . . . The sense of community implicit in these family metaphors is deeply gendered in ways that not only legitimate foreign policy practices but also reinforce inequalities between men and women.”¶  ¶ Using these gendered metaphors, the state can, while shoring up its "national interest," both threaten the interest of marginalized citizens inside it and reinforce power inequalities among its groups. Catherine MacKinnon has explained that the "state's structures and actions are driven by and institutionalize strategy based on an epistemic angle of vision" that can "distinguish public from private, naturalize dominance as difference, hide coercion beyond consent, and conceal politics beyond morality.” These structures require a certain standard of behavior from some members of the state,” while suppressing the voices of others altogether.”¶ With these tools, the state can appear unitary by suppressing its diversity and presenting one concept of national interest, autonomous of and not necessarily representative of its citizens. In this understanding, the sovereign state can be "an extension of the separation-minded realist man, also autonomous to various degrees from the diverse 'domestic' interests he-it allegedly exists to protect.” Additionally, states are complicit with gender subordination when they fail to intervene in domestic violence, perpetuate a heterosexist bias in education, exercise discrimination in welfare policies, and operate on patriarchal laws.” ¶ In this conception, the unitary state is a misleading and malignant construction. Two implications for the process of state interaction follow; states that interact often promote unrepresentative interests, and those unrepresentative interests exclude gender, racial, and cultural minorities. In this sense, states' elites often make wars (or fail to) "representing" a limited group or groups among their populations, while claiming full representativeness, effectively rendering a significant portion of their supposed "constituency" invisible in the process of interacting with other states. Empirically, this means that there are a number of levels of interstate interaction, many of which are omitted from process-based notions of dyadic war theorizing. Normatively, it suggests that our conceptions of how states interact (and the content of those interactions) are problematically skewed.¶ Rationality in Interaction This skew is particularly evident in the assumption of rationality." The rationality assumption implies that the knower/actor can separate himself/herself from the “other” in interactions with that other. Feminists have argued that knowledge is always perspectival and political; therefore, states and their leaders’ decisions about how to interact with others are not rational, but informed by their situational and political biases. In this view, the rationality assumption may be seen as at once itself a political bias and obscuring other political biases. As Naomi Scheman argues, perceived rational cost-beneﬁt analysis about war-making and war-fighting should “always be seen as especially problematical when... constructed only by those in positions of privilege... [which provide] only distorted views about the world.”78 In this view, rational calculation is not an objective, attainable, and desirable end, but a partial representation of both interest and actors’ representation of those interests. In this way, through gender lenses, rationality has been seen as importantly incomplete, leaving out signiﬁcant (if not the most significant) factors that go into decision-making.79 In addition to understanding the rationality assumption as partial (and therefore unrepresentative), feminist research has pointed out links between rationality and mascuIinism.8° As Karen Jones notes, advocates of rationality as a guide for interstate interactions“ assume: 1. Available... conceptions of rationality and reason represent genuinely human norms and ideals; 2. The list of norms and ideals contained within available conceptions of rationality and reason are sufficiently complete; and 3. The external normative functions assigned to reason and rationality are unproblematic.82 Looking through gender lenses shows problems with each of these assumptions. Feminists have argued that “the identity of the modern subject-in models of human nature, citizenship, the rational actor, the knowing subject, economic man, and political agency-is not gender-neutral but masculine (and typically European and heterosexua|).”83 This impacts not only how we see the rational subject, but how we predict and understand his decisions, at the state level as well as at the individual level. According to Margaret Atherton, the possibility of rationality has “been used in a disturbing fashion to mark a gender distinction. We have, for example, on the one hand, the man of reason, and, on the other, the woman of passion.”84 In rationality assumptions, traits associated with masculinity are normalized and traits associated with femininity are excluded. The impact is compounded because (masculinized) rationality and its (feminized) alternatives are not on equal playing ﬁelds. As a result, Karen Jones notes that “women’s assumed deficiency in rationality” has been used to exclude both women and knowledge associated with femininity from accepted views of the world.85 The alleged gender neutrality of rationality, then, “is often a covert form of privileging maleness”85 and omission of “what has traditionally counted as ‘feminine.’”87 Still, adding women and values associated with femininity to current concepts of rationality is unlikely to create a gender-neutral concept of rationality.88 This is because, epistemologically, the sovereign rational subject constructs artificial gendered boundaries between rationality and emotion, male and female, and knower and known.89 Among states, those boundaries are not benign. Instead, they breed competition and domination that inspire and foster war(s) and conﬂict(s).90 This competition frequently relies on contrasting the state’s own masculinity to the enemy’s (actual or perceived) femininity. This cycle of genderings is not a series of events but a social continuum. In these gendered relationships, as Zillah Eisenstein argues, “gender differentiation will be mobilized for war and peace,” especially moving forward into the age of an American empire focused on manliness.9‘ Feminists have long argued that competitions between hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in causing war(s).92 Hidden beneath the assumed independence, rationality, and unity of state interaction leading to war are gendered interstate interactions that cause, constitute, and relate to war and wars. Feminist scholars have recognized the extent to which the preeminence of masculine values dominates (particularly conﬂictual) accounts of interstate interactions, wherein “rational” interactions often become “a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and violence” in which “force is used to checkmate force.”93 Interstate interactions leading to wars often show the gendered nature of war narratives, war logics, and war languages, which produce (and reproduce) gendered cycles of violence.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of an ontological revisionism that deconstructs the myth of the masculine western subject. This is a politics that destabilizes the masculine subject by revealing how its false universality underwrites gender violence globally

Youngs 04

(Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in\*, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80, JKS)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. ¶ While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and ¶ economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. ¶ Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. ¶ When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed ¶ the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 ¶ Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 ¶ The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. ¶ The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ ¶ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. ¶ The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 ¶ Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 ¶ The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

#### The K comes first - policies are constituted by and produce subjects, not blanket assessments of outcomes and impacts. The ROB is to interrogate the gendered nature of the 1AC as a research project.

Bacchi 16

(Carol, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia, (2016): Policies as Gendering Practices: Re-Viewing Categorical Distinctions, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, DOI: 10.1080/1554477X.2016.1198207, JKS)

One important constitutive effect is how we are produced as subjects through the problematizations implicit in such texts, a process described as “subjectification” (Bacchi 2009, 16–17). For example, Foucault (1980) argues that specific problematizations of sexuality (e.g., sexuality as moral code, sexuality as biological imperative) create “subject positions” that enjoin people to become particular kinds of sexual subjects (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 308). Marston and McDonald (2006) describe how individual subjects are produced in specific policy practices “as worker-citizens in workfare programs, as parent-citizens in child and family services or consumer-citizens in a managerial and marketized mixed economy of welfare” (3). Given the proliferation of practices, the formation of one’s subjectivity is an ongoing and always incomplete process: “the doer/subject/person is never fixed, finally as a girl or a woman or whatever, but always becoming or being” (Jones 1997, 267). Subjectification effects therefore are neither deter- mined nor predictable. People sometimes take up subject positions in ways that challenge hierarchical relations. For example, the discourse of rights creates as one possible positioning that of the human rights advocate. Moreover, as practices “through which things take on meaning and value” (Shapiro 1988, xi), policies have material (lived) effects, shaping the possibilities for people’s and peoples’ lives (Bacchi 2009, 16–18). Policies achieve these constitutive effects through discursive practices, which comprise the “conditions of emergence, insertion and functioning” of discourses (Foucault 1972b, 163), and hence bridge a material-symbolic distinction (Bacchi and Bonham 2014). A particular conception of power underpins an understanding of policies as constitutive practices. Power is conceptualized as productive rather than as simply repressive. Power is not considered to be something people possess (e.g., “he or she has power”) but as a capacity exercised in the production of subjects and objects (Heller 1996, 83). This productive or generative view of power does not conclude that power and resistance are necessarily equal in their effects, however. Such a conclusion would deny the hierarchies by which the organization of discourse takes effect (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 310). This understanding of policy as constitutive of subjects and objects sits in sharp contrast to conventional views of the policy process, which, in the main, can be characterized as reactive. That is, in general, policy is considered to be a response to some condition that needs to be ameliorated or “fixed.” Policies are conceived as “reactions” to “problems.” By contrast, the understanding of policy offered in this article portrays policies as constitutive or productive of (what are taken to be) “problems,” “subjects,” and “objects” (Allan 2010, 14). It follows that it is no longer adequate to think in terms of conventional policy “outcomes,” understood as the results or “impacts” of government actions. New questions are required, such as the following: What does the particular policy, or policy proposal, deem to be an appropriate target for intervention? What is left out? How does the shape of the proposal affect how people feel about themselves and the issue? And how does it produce them as particular kinds of subjects?

## case

### rob

#### Counter-Interpretation: The 1AC is an object of research. The role of the neg should be to disprove the various meanings of that object. They should be responsible for the way their knowledge is constructed and used because that produces the best model for activism and ethics in the context of the topic since representations affect policy implementation which is a unique educational net benefit to our interpretation

#### Any link is sufficient to win: framework means prioritize gender violence and ethical subject formation - the only real benefit of debate is we learn about issues that remain at the margins of public discourse and become effective advocates. Our links prove the aff sustains masculinity that allow gender violence - reject it even under consequentialism

#### -- Truth testing forces us into extremist philosophical stances that no one actually defends. This makes research meaningless and divorces our discussions from how they take place in academia.

#### B. Reciprocity – truth testing justifies multiple NIBS like skep and a prioris which gives them a 2:1 advantage

#### C. And even if they win truth testing, our offense links and they beg the question of the framework. We prove the resolution false that we are obligated to keep pb to prevent terrorism

#### D. Topics generate their meaning through context specific debates. Truth testing allows the neg to recycle the same generic NC’s without engaging the topic, which kills the entire point of debate and gives them infinite prep against our aff.

### Underview

AT AFC

#### CI- The violation 1] Negative testing- we should get to test the affirmative from multiple angles and sides that o/w’s since it’s the constitutive and inescapable role of the negative 2] Phil Ed- Reading an alternative framework is key to clashing over core philosophical issues and learning the nuances of them. That outweighs A] Uniqueness- it’s the only thing unique to LD debate B] Time frame- philosophical knowledge helps us make ethical decisions in the future outside debate.

1-- defending the squo is literally so absuvie and destroys any competitive equity – we have a wiki that allows you to see us as predictable and you also get to read infinite stuff – spec affs exist

**2. Interpretation: The negative may not use private actor fiat.**

**Standard:**

**Infinite Abuse: When you can fiat stuff like mindset shifts you can just fiat trivially true advocacies like “everyone stops being racist” which is impossible for the aff to contest so I lose every round.**

#### No impact to economic decline.

Davis and Pelc, PhDs, ’17 (Christina L., **Prof&PhDGov’t@Harvard**, and Krzysztof**, ProfPoliSci@McGill, PhDGov’t@Gtown**, “Cooperation in Hard Times: Self-restraint of Trade Protection,” p. 25-26, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 61, Issue 2) BW

Political economy theory would lead us to expect rising trade protection during hard times. Yet empirical evidence on this count has been mixed. Some studies find a correlation between poor macroeconomic conditions and protection, but the worst recession since the Great Depression has generated surprisingly moderate levels of protection. We explain this apparent contradiction. Our statistical findings show that under conditions of pervasive economic crisis at the international level, states exercise more restraint than they would when facing crisis alone. These results throw light on behavior not only during the crisis, but throughout the WTO period, from 1995 to the present. One concern may be that the restraint we observe during widespread crises is actually the result of a decrease in aggregate demand and that domestic pressure for import relief is lessened by the decline of world trade. By controlling for product-level imports, we show that the restraint on remedy use is not a byproduct of declining imports. We also take into account the ability of some countries to manipulate their currency and demonstrate that the relationship between crisis and trade protection holds independent of exchange rate policies.

Government decisions to impose costs on their trade partners by taking advantage of their legal right to use flexibility measures are driven not only by the domestic situation but also by circumstances abroad. This can give rise to an individual incentive for strategic self-restraint toward trade partners in similar economic trouble. Under conditions of widespread crisis, government leaders fear the repercussions that their own use of trade protection may have on the behavior of trade partners at a time when they cannot afford the economic cost of a trade war. Institutions provide monitoring and a venue for leader interaction that facilitates coordination among states. Here the key function is to reinforce expectations that any move to protect industries will trigger similar moves in other countries. Such coordination often draws on shared historical analogies, such as the Smoot–Hawley lesson, which form a focal point to shape beliefs about appropriate state behavior. Much of the literature has focused on the more visible action of legal enforcement through dispute settlement, but this only captures part of the story. Our research suggests that tools of informal governance such as leader pledges, guidance from the Director General, trade policy reviews, and plenary meetings play a real role within the trade regime. In the absence of sufficiently stringent rules over flexibility measures, compliance alone is insufficient during a global economic crisis. These circumstances trigger informal mechanisms that complement legal rules to support cooperation. During widespread crisis, legal enforcement would be inadequate, and informal governance helps to bolster the system.

Informal coordination is by nature difficult to observe, and we are unable to directly measure this process. Instead, we examine the variation in responses across crises of varying severity, within the context of the same formal setting of the WTO. Yet by focusing on discretionary tools of protection—trade remedies and tariff hikes within the bound rate—we can offer conclusions about how systemic crises shape country restraint independent of formal institutional constraints. Insofar as institutions are generating such restraint, we offer that it is by facilitating informal coordination, since all these instruments of trade protection fall within the letter of the law. Future research should explore trade policy at the micro level to identify which pathway is the most important for coordination. Research at a more macro-historical scope could compare how countries respond to crises under fundamentally different institutional contexts.

In sum, the determinants of protection include economic downturns not only at home but also abroad. Rather than reinforcing pressure for protection, pervasive crisis in the global economy is shown to generate countervailing pressure for restraint in response to domestic crisis. In some cases, hard times bring more, not less, international cooperation.

#### Stopping growth solves extinction from eco collapse.

Hickel, PhD, ’18 (Jason, **ProfAnthropology@LSE/Goldsmiths, PhDAnthropology@UVA**, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/why-growth-cant-be-green/>, September 12) BW

Warnings about ecological breakdown have become ubiquitous. Over the past few years, major newspapers, including the Guardian and the New York Times, have carried alarming stories on soil depletion, deforestation, and the collapse of fish stocks and insect populations. These crises are being driven by global economic growth, and its accompanying consumption, which is destroying the Earth’s biosphere and blowing past key planetary boundaries that scientists say must be respected to avoid triggering collapse.

Many policymakers have responded by pushing for what has come to be called “green growth.” All we need to do, they argue, is invest in more efficient technology and introduce the right incentives, and we’ll be able to keep growing while simultaneously reducing our impact on the natural world, which is already at an unsustainable level. In technical terms, the goal is to achieve “absolute decoupling” of GDP from the total use of natural resources, according to the U.N. definition.

It sounds like an elegant solution to an otherwise catastrophic problem. There’s just one hitch: New evidence suggests that green growth isn’t the panacea everyone has been hoping for. In fact, it isn’t even possible.

Green growth first became a buzz phrase in 2012 at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. In the run-up to the conference, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the U.N. Environment Program all produced reports promoting green growth. Today, it is a core plank of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals.

But the promise of green growth turns out to have been based more on wishful thinking than on evidence. In the years since the Rio conference, three major empirical studies have arrived at the same rather troubling conclusion: Even under the best conditions, absolute decoupling of GDP from resource use is not possible on a global scale.

A team of scientists led by the German researcher Monika Dittrich first raised doubts in 2012. The group ran a sophisticated computer model that predicted what would happen to global resource use if economic growth continued on its current trajectory, increasing at about 2 to 3 percent per year. It found that human consumption of natural resources (including fish, livestock, forests, metals, minerals, and fossil fuels) would rise from 70 billion metric tons per year in 2012 to 180 billion metric tons per year by 2050. For reference, a sustainable level of resource use is about 50 billion metric tons per year—a boundary we breached back in 2000.

The team then reran the model to see what would happen if every nation on Earth immediately adopted best practice in efficient resource use (an extremely optimistic assumption). The results improved; resource consumption would hit only 93 billion metric tons by 2050. But that is still a lot more than we’re consuming today. Burning through all those resources could hardly be described as absolute decoupling or green growth.

In 2016, a second team of scientists tested a different premise: one in which the world’s nations all agreed to go above and beyond existing best practice. In their best-case scenario, the researchers assumed a tax that would raise the global price of carbon from $50 to $236 per metric ton and imagined technological innovations that would double the efficiency with which we use resources. The results were almost exactly the same as in Dittrich’s study. Under these conditions, if the global economy kept growing by 3 percent each year, we’d still hit about 95 billion metric tons of resource use by 2050. Bottom line: no absolute decoupling.

Finally, last year the U.N. Environment Program—once one of the main cheerleaders of green growth theory—weighed in on the debate. It tested a scenario with carbon priced at a whopping $573 per metric ton, slapped on a resource extraction tax, and assumed rapid technological innovation spurred by strong government support. The result? We hit 132 billion metric tons by 2050. This finding is worse than those of the two previous studies because the researchers accounted for the “rebound effect,” whereby improvements in resource efficiency drive down prices and cause demand to rise—thus canceling out some of the gains.

Study after study shows the same thing. Scientists are beginning to realize that there are physical limits to how efficiently we can use resources. Sure, we might be able to produce cars and iPhones and skyscrapers more efficiently, but we can’t produce them out of thin air. We might shift the economy to services such as education and yoga, but even universities and workout studios require material inputs. Once we reach the limits of efficiency, pursuing any degree of economic growth drives resource use back up.

These problems throw the entire concept of green growth into doubt and necessitate some radical rethinking. Remember that each of the three studies used highly optimistic assumptions. We are nowhere near imposing a global carbon tax today, much less one of nearly $600 per metric ton, and resource efficiency is currently getting worse

, not better. Yet the studies suggest that even if we do everything right, decoupling economic growth with resource use will remain elusive and our environmental problems will continue to worsen.

Preventing that outcome will require a whole new paradigm. High taxes and technological innovation will help, but they’re not going to be enough. The only realistic shot humanity has at averting ecological collapse is to impose hard caps on resource use, as the economist Daniel O’Neill recently proposed. Such caps, enforced by national governments or by international treaties, could ensure that we do not extract more from the land and the seas than the Earth can safely regenerate. We could also ditch GDP as an indicator of economic success and adopt a more balanced measure like the genuine progress indicator (GPI), which accounts for pollution and natural asset depletion. Using GPI would help us maximize socially good outcomes while minimizing ecologically bad ones.

But there’s no escaping the obvious conclusion. Ultimately, bringing our civilization back within planetary boundaries is going to require that we liberate ourselves from our dependence on economic growth—starting with rich nations. This might sound scarier than it really is. Ending growth doesn’t mean shutting down economic activity—it simply means that next year we can’t produce and consume more than we are doing this year. It might also mean shrinking certain sectors that are particularly damaging to our ecology and that are unnecessary for human flourishing, such as advertising, commuting, and single-use products.

But ending growth doesn’t mean that living standards need to take a hit. Our planet provides more than enough for all of us; the problem is that its resources are not equally distributed. We can improve people’s lives right now simply by sharing what we already have more fairly, rather than plundering the Earth for more. Maybe this means better public services. Maybe it means basic income. Maybe it means a shorter working week that allows us to scale down production while still delivering full employment. Policies such as these—and countless others—will be crucial to not only surviving the 21st century but also flourishing in it.

#### Crisis now solves the transition to a sustainable society.

Loorbach et al, PhDs, ‘16

(Derk, Flor Avelino, Alex Haxeltine, Julia M. Wittmayer, Tim O'Riordan, Paul Weaver, and René Kemp, “The economic crisis as a game changer? Exploring the role of social construction in sustainability transitions.” Ecology and Society 21(4):15) BW

The continuing economic crisis has spurred debates about the inadequacies of our current financial and economic systems (Loorbach and Lijnis-Huffenereuter 2013). It has drawn fresh attention to alternative economic narratives and arguably has generated an acceleration of social innovations (Haxeltine et al. 2013). In the years following the start of the recession, concern over the various repercussions on social values has waned, but concerns expressed by countermovements such as Occupy live on and are combined with other frustrations about inequality and feelings of losing out, anxieties over tax evasion by the wealthy few and multinational companies, the social and environmental damage caused by production systems, the social and budgetary costs of an aging population, and the poor employment prospects of the emerging labor force.

Meanwhile, many political and public debates seem to be primarily concerned with standard, relatively short-term, economic issues, such as monetary losses, stop-and-start economic growth, increasing unemployment, falling real estate prices, failing banks, virtually bankrupt nations, and how to get back on course to economic growth. The standard responses when national governments are struggling to get their economies healthy again are mostly about inducing more money, austerity measures, and introducing financial regulations, all often part of a broader financial–economic logic (Stiglitz 2010). The dominant focus on fighting economic deficits and problems at the expense of investing in social and ecological deficits—thereby failing to address persistent problems in these areas—can be argued to be a short-term strategy to prop up an inherently unmanageable system. Examples are the support of system banks with public money and the green growth strategy (OECD 2009, 2013a). Transition theory (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012) suggests that such short-term fixes are typical regime-based strategies to sustain existing structures, cultures, and practices, and to fend off the threats of more radical systemic change.

The transition perspective suggests that most regular policy and governance strategies essentially reproduce existing systems and, by definition, do not address the root causes of problems that are embedded in the same structures and cultures that determine how solutions are framed and implemented. Such path-dependent development optimizing existing institutional structures will inevitably lead to recurring crises and ultimately a more disruptive, shock-wise structural change of an incumbent regime. Transition studies thus argue that solutions that address symptoms rather than the underlying structural causes tend to reinforce a lock-in and result in further emergent problems (Rotmans and Loorbach 2010, Schuitmaker 2012). We argue that the underlying causes and mechanisms of the economic crises have not been thoroughly analyzed, let alone addressed through effective policies. In a globalized economy, fundamental changes will not likely come from actions by (national) governments or incumbent businesses, as these are inherently intertwined with and dependent upon the currently still dominant financial–economic systems and their governance. The need for alternative economic approaches, discourses, and systems is increasingly emphasized (Schor 2010, Simms 2013, Jackson 2013, van den Bergh 2013, Schor and Thompson, 2014). Even though the benefits of liberalization are still significant, it seems that the transfer of control from government to markets has substantially diminished possibilities for top-down policy making, adding to brittleness, complexity, and lock-in (Loorbach and Lijnis-Huffenreuter 2013).

In this paper, we take a transition perspective on transformative social innovation to conceptualize and map the systemic dynamics that have caused the economic crisis, as well as how it influences the dynamics of social transformation. We explore how the economic crisis might be considered as a phase in a broader economic transition and which types of changes coincide to develop into this direction. We thus view the economic crisis not as a phenomenon in isolation within a relatively short time frame, but as an intrinsic part, or perhaps a symptom, of deeper underlying structural societal changes over the longer term. The question we seek to address is how the economic crisis interacts with broader societal changes as well as which dynamics might accelerate or hamper more structural (sustainability) transitions. To this end, we ask when and how a macrolevel or landscape development like the economic crisis fundamentally changes the dominant logic, rules, and conditions of incumbent regimes. In other words, when does a macrodevelopment become a game changer (cf. Avelino et al. 2014)?

The paper builds upon theoretical work from the European FP7 project TRANSIT, which draws on transition theory to develop an empirically grounded theory on transformative social innovation. In this paper, we introduce the analytical perspective that we developed on transformative social innovation and two empirical examples. Although our analytical perspective suggests that alternatives and breakthroughs can come from any sector or actor, in this paper, we focus on the agency of social innovation and civil-society-led initiatives in providing and producing alternatives. The paper was developed through a number of iterations, workshops, and theoretical synthesizing. To develop our arguments, we build upon insights from sustainability transitions literature (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012), social innovation research (Mulgan 2006, Murray et al. 2010, Franz et al. 2012, Westley 2013, Moulaert et al. 2013) and other fields aiming to understand the economic crisis. In addition, we include two empirical cases, transnational networks of social innovation, time banks, and the transition movement. For both cases, we draw upon a general literature review.

The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, “Economic change or transition?,” we introduce the economic crisis as a multifarious phenomenon, how we understand it from a transition perspective, and how it is understood from an economist’s point of view. We illustrate that it is an ambiguous phenomenon that is simultaneously seen as part of regular changes in that it is part of disruptive or transformative change. In the section “Making sense of the economic crisis?,” we present a number of alternative perspectives on the economic crisis that put forward particular fundamental and systemic causes of the economic crisis and how these are translated in so called “narratives of change.” In “Transformative social innovations,” we highlight two specific social innovation initiatives, time banks and transition towns, which have an evident transformative claim and potential, and reflect upon how such transformative social innovations relate (themselves) to the economic crisis. In “Reconceptualizing societal transformations and the role of the economic crisis,” we synthesize our findings and argue that the concepts of game changers and narratives could help to unpack the landscape and better understand how macro- and microlevels interact to trigger transformative changes at the mesolevel. In conclusion, we address the need for a better understanding of the transformative impacts of the different shades of change (in coevolution) vis-é-vis the restorative dynamics associated with incumbent regimes.

ECONOMIC CHANGE OR TRANSITION?

The economic crisis has an empirical basis in factual events and economic statistics, but is also a social construct. In a narrow sense, the term economic crisis refers to the worldwide recession of 2007–2008, which changed economic circumstances and investors’ outlooks and caused governments to nationalize and/or invest in failing banks and to stimulate the economy inter alia through bail outs, expansion of the money supply (quantitative easing), and low interest rates. It changed the lives of many whose employment or work conditions were drastically affected (Melike 2014). It also made many observers much more critical about capitalism and the stability of markets, especially financial markets (Murphy 2011, Stephan and Weaver 2011, Rifkin 2014, Weaver 2014). In Europe, the economic crisis was accompanied by (perceptions of) a debt crisis, a banking crisis, and a euro crisis, all interrelated. The financial crisis, debt crisis, bank crisis, neo-liberal crisis, and global financial collapse are not just different names but also refer to different, albeit closely related, empirical phenomena. Importantly, the perception and representation of such phenomena in crisis terms can give scope for motivating and/or justifying responses.

This economic crisis has led to measures and dynamics with profound impacts on society. Impacts that hardly could have been predicted or anticipated proactively in an objective and neutral way. As most of the formal and institutional measures originate from either governmental or financial institutes, it is to be expected that these favor nondisruptive and reinforcing measures that shift the cost of recovery toward society and strengthen even more the potential for financial–economic growth. The resulting austerity measures and state budget cuts put pressure on public sector employment, transfer payments, and social welfare systems, contributing to rising unemployment and underemployment among young and old, and lower disposable incomes for many in society. The state investments in the recovery of the banking system as well as budget cuts in welfare, health care, and education have been put forward as necessary to restabilize the economy and return to economic growth as before. Although the economy now seems on a path to recovery, many of the social and ecological tensions and challenges still persist.

From a countermovement perspective, the dominant measures have mainly strengthened incumbent regimes and even made more apparent the need for structural change. This becomes apparent by a growing dissatisfaction with capitalism, a lack of trust in financial institutions, and an increasing pressure on democratic political institutions (Castells 2010, Murphy 2011, Rifkin 2014, Weaver 2014). These in turn focus attention on the meaning and quality of life, which can intensify individuals’ desires to live in a more responsible and meaningful way as citizens, workers, and consumers, which again are accompanied by an increasing attention to social value creation (based on the attention to these issues in magazines and business literature) (see O’Riordan 2013).

Over 70 years ago, Polanyi (1944) described countermovements as critical responses to the rise of liberal market economies in the interwar period. Polanyi argued that countermovements tend to include both progressive and regressive forces, and he related the rise of fascism as part of a double countermovement in reaction to the rise of liberal market economy (Worth 2013). Similarly, contemporary counternarratives do not only include progressive sustainability-oriented ideas, but also more regressive ideas as manifested in populist and/or extremist political parties. Moreover, counternarratives and grassroots movements are also not always easily discernible from mainstream discourses. Although discourses on, e.g., solidarity economy can be constructed as counternarratives, they have considerable overlaps with mainstream policy discourses on the “Big Society” (UK) and “the participation society” (The Netherlands). When comparing discourses on the circular economy and the sharing economy, one can find differences in the former being partly associated with a corporate movement (see, e.g., McKinsey and the Ellen McArthur Foundation) the latter being more associated with grassroots social movements (e.g., Peerby). Different discourses are intermingled, changing over time, forming double movements (Polanyi 1944), or rather multilayered narratives of change.

We use here narratives of change as an accessible and short summary of discourses on change and innovation (Avelino et al. 2014). Social (counter)movements, such as the environmental movement or the antiglobalization movement, can be experienced as counternarratives of change. These social movements “struggle against pre-existing cultural and institutional narratives and the structures of meaning and power they convey” (Davies 2002:25). They achieve this partly through counternarratives, which “modify existing beliefs and symbols and their resonance comes from their appeal to values and expectations that people already hold” (Davies 2002:25). This challenges us to expand beyond the hegemonic mainstream narrative on, e.g., the economic crisis, by including a discussion of counternarratives around the new economy.

Thus, we see a double device of addressing the economic crisis through measures to prevent the breakdown and restabilization of the existing system, and the rise of counternarratives and movements that find legitimacy in exactly these processes and measures. From antiglobalization or Occupy movements, we can discern a loss of trust in the dominant economic model of the growth society and its associated livelihood model where most material needs are satisfied through impersonal market exchange. The formalized and impersonal market exchange is questioned, resulting in concepts such as sharing, reciprocity, generalized exchange, or restricted exchange (see Befu 1977, Peebles 2010 for an overview). Although the mainstream discourse is still about how to regain adequate rates of economic growth, an underlying longer-sighted discourse (i.e., counternarrative) is emerging about alternatives for this growth model. This includes (longstanding and more recent) ideas on degrowth (Schumacher 1973, Fournier 2008), green growth (OECD 2009, 2013a), or postgrowth (Jackson 2009). These (counter)narratives also question the market logic that constructs human beings as well as nature as resources and commodities in the production of goods (Freudenburg et al. 1995).