# 1NC

## 1

#### A] the aff must implement a plan

#### B] Violation –

#### Resolved means a policy

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### C. Fairness-

#### 1. Debate is a game: there’s a winner and loser, competitive norms, the tournament invite proves. Alternative impacts like activism or education can be pursued in other places. This makes fairness the most important impact

#### 2. Not defending the topic is not fair

#### A. Preparation- altering the topic gives the aff a huge edge, they can prepare for half a year on an issue that catches us by surprise. Preparation is better than thinking on your feet- research demonstrates pedagogical humility and research skills are the only portable debate training

#### B. Limits- there are a finite amount of government restrictions, but an infinite number of non topical affs. Consider this our “library disad”- not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months.

#### C. Causality- debating the resolution forces the affirmative to defend a cause and effect relationship, the state doing x results in y. Non topical affs establish their own barometer “I think x is good for me” that aren’t negateable. Only the neg promotes switch side debate.

#### D. Exclusionary rule- you can’t vote on the case outweighs T because lack of preparation prevents rigorous testing of the AC claims and inflates the credence of their arguments. If we win fairness we don’t have to “outweigh” other impacts

## 2

#### Any attempt to decolonize without an analysis of gender is just a new type of colonization.

Ladner, 2008

(Kiera L. – Associate Professor and Canada Research Chair in Indigenous Politics and Governance in the Department of Political Science @ the University of Manitoba, “Gendering Decolonization, Decolonizing Gender”, draft of a paper presented at the 80th Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/ladner.pdf, shae)

**The process of decolonizing**, and in turn creating ‘post-colonial’ thinkers and societies, **must be grounded in Indigenous thought**, traditions and language **but in so doing, the decolonization project must also be protected from would be dominators and oppressors. Decolonization must, therefore, be a gendered project**. It must be a project that is grounded in Indigenous understandings of gender - understandings that often speak of multiple genders and understandings that often reify strict understandings of gender roles and responsibilities but do so within a context of respect and gender neutrality (or even one which is gender positive as was the case among the Blackfoot). These understandings may have to be rediscovered or they may simply need to dusted off which ever the case, they must be grounded in language and tradition; language and tradition that will have to be understood from within and disentangled from the penetrating forces of colonialism (a process which began with contact as traders and missionaries began the process of transforming Indigenous understandings of gender when they refused to accept Indigenous women as their equal in negotiations or in every day life). This will be an onerous task, but as Henderson reminds, it is one that is absolutely necessary. **Decolonization must also be a project protected from constructions of the past or ideas of today that are used to dominate and oppress women**. Facilitating this process may take great leadership, leaders that ‘construct models to help them take their bearings’ (Henderson, 2000:254) as **there will be pressure to recreate gender as it is within western-eurocentric thought or how it has become imbedded in colonial institutions and Indigenous societies**. Indigenous languages and histories (oral traditions which speak to creation and tell of a people’s life within a territory both prior to and post-colonization) will assist in this process as they will serve as a guide and will enable leaders to take their bearings as Indigenous languages and histories speak of an entirely different understanding of the world and can be used to begin the process of destabilizing, disentangling and decolonizing gender. Such would be the case among Nehiyaw (Plains Cree) where language is not gendered (it is next to impossible to speak of gender without speaking in terms of ones roles or responsibilities which in turn allows for multiple genders) and histories speak about respecting diversity and inclusion (Innes, 2007). While Henderson’s work speaks to the need to decolonize gender as part of the post-colonial ghost-dance (his vision of decolonization), **it is in fact necessary to both gender decolonization and decolonize gender**. The works of scholars such as Smith, Turpel-Lafond, Green, Monture, and Voyager highlight the need for decolonizing gender, and to some extent have begun the process of constructing those models necessary to gain bearings and journey forward. A tremendous amount of work is still needed to effectively decolonize gender in a manner that both holds true to Henderson’s vision and Indigenous language and heritage. In doing this work, **scholars must not simply focus on women for predominant constructions of masculinity also have to be decolonized and constructions of masculinity grounded in language and heritage must be part of the gendering of decolonization. It is necessary to both decolonize gender and gender decolonization as these two projects are**, or at very least should be, **a unified project of decolonization** culminating in Henderson’s post-colonial ghost dance (see Henderson 2000a and 2000b). As it stands, it is absolutely necessary to reframe decolonization as a gendered project. That is to say, to challenge the masculinist ideas that now dominate organizations such as band councils and the corresponding discourses of sovereignty and nationalism, and to reframe with gender as a central consideration. This will not be easy, but **gender cannot and should not be separated from considerations of sovereignty and nationhood – to do so is to perpetuate colonization. Is not the purpose to end colonization? The truth of the matter is, you cannot do one without the other, and it will be too late to rectify the situation once Indigenous sovereignty is (re)affirmed and (re)established, as this process may only serve to solidify and institutionalize colonial understandings of gender.**

#### Their gender-neutral approach to decolonization maintains the masculine privilege which sustains colonialism.

Snyder, 2014 (Emily – received a PhD from the Department of Sociology @ the University of Alberta, “Indigenous Feminist Legal Theory”, *Canadian Journal of Women and the Law* 26.2, shae)

Decolonization or self-governance politics that do not acknowledge gender overlook serious, lived, gendered specificities. Gender “neutral” can translate into an assumed and invisible norm of maleness (as whiteness also exists as an invisible norm in Western societies).68 Accordingly, concerns exist that Indigenous politics work to reinforce male privilege (intentionally or not) and exclude the context of Indigenous women’s lives.69 For example, land claims often focus on that which gets deemed to be traditionally male activities such as hunting, trapping, and fishing.70 While these are represented as “Aboriginal practices,” they are actually focused on men’s practices and erase women’s traditional practices, such as berry picking,71 as well as fluidity and variation with gendered labour. Smith explains that when gender is made “visible” in decolonization strategies, it is often focused on men and on concerns that they have been displaced from their traditional economies. The economic focus on survival is problematic, as is the assumption that what men do is most important and most at risk.72 Furthermore, this focus on men is not perceived as divisive to the nation (land claims are “for” the nation), whereas when women put forth gendered concerns they are accused of dividing the collective in favour of individual rights.73 Many Indigenous feminists call into question the common assertion that Indigenous societies did not have gender problems prior to contact and that, therefore, gender does not need to be talked about since the achievement of self-government would solve the problem.74 Whether Indigenous societies had gender-based oppression prior to contact is a contentious issue.75 There are many Indigenous women— feminist and non-feminist—who maintain that pre-contact societies were respectful and had balanced gender roles,76 but, as Verna St. Denis, Joyce Green, and others insist, the reality is that colonialism (which includes patriarchy) has had an impact, and sexism in settler society and in Indigenous communities is rampant today.77 Ladner maintains that “[i]t is necessary to both decolonise gender and gender decolonisation.”78 Indigenous feminisms can be advantageous for all genders, as the focus is on empowering communities and fighting for the dignity that all citizens deserve.79 For Indigenous feminists, decolonization must be explicitly gendered in order to target the sexism that presently exists internally (and externally) as well as the patriarchal, heteronormative violence that helps to sustain and propel colonialism.80 So too must notions of self-governance,81 self-determination, nationhood,82 and, as this article argues, Indigenous law be approached as gendered in order to take up anti-oppressive politics.

#### Gender violence should be understood as being constitutive of the hegemonic projects that underwrite the aff

Nayak and Suchland 06

(Meghana Nayak & Jennifer Suchland, Pace University and Southwestern University, (2006) Gender Violence And Hegemonic Projects, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 8:4, 467-485, DOI: 10.1080/14616740600945024, JKS)

For the purposes of this project, we define gender violence as systematic, institutionalized and/or programmatic violence (sexual, physical, psychological) that operates through the constructs of gender and often at the intersection of sexuality, race and national identity. Gender violence comprises the acts and practices that systematically target a person, group or community in order to dictate what ‘men’ and ‘women’ are supposed to be and to discipline marginalized communities or any other perceived threats to dominant political structures and practices. In addition, we fundamentally conceive of ‘gender violence’ as a contested concept that may only represent specific practices and experiences. While certain behaviors or practices are commonly associated with gender violence (such as violence against some women) we do not claim that it is a ‘ready’ category. It is not a static or non-normative category particularly since naming certain experiences/practices as examples of gender violence may in fact delimit those experiences. We want to de-naturalize the category of gender violence to show how dominant representations are imbricated in national and global politics and exist at the intersections of racial, class and international politics. Similarly, in the context of this Special Issue, we understand hegemonic projects as constituted through systematic power relationships that privilege certain ways of knowing, being and acting and that give voice to only certain people’s experiences and agendas in the realm of families, communities and political entities. The processes, practices and discourses that demarcate a hegemonic project are not homogeneous, uncontested or settled. Because sociopolitical forces of actors participate in normalizing power relationships they can potentially pose different ways of knowing, being and acting that could rupture and reshape those relationships. Thus, hegemonic projects are not free-floating monolithic phenomena but rather contextually specific and historically produced, defining the realm of political possibilities. We situate our understanding of hegemony within the context of critical theorists such as Roxanne Doty (1996) and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001). As distinct from narrow (neo)realist understandings of hege- mony as a preponderance of resources or Gramscian understandings of how the ruling class maintains its position of power, these critical theorists see hegemony as the discursive linkage of particular ideas (Doty 1996: 8): The hegemonic dimension of global politics is inextricably linked to representational practices ... Hegemony involves the very production of categories of identity and the society of which they are a part. Hegemonic practices . . . seek to create the fixedness of meaning that . . . is ultimately impossible. For example, current hegemonic practices of neoliberalism and neocolonialism circumscribe what democracy and rights are supposed to look like in terms of their appropriate forms and definitions, the legitimate actions taken in the name of democracy and rights as well as the parameters of justice and political participation. In this way, hegemonic actors (political elites and privileged acti- vists for example) deflect criticism by feigning neutrality or ubiquity and, as we argue, require and shape discourses and practices of gender violence. While there may be identifiable actors, this does not mean that domination is sufficiently challenged by ‘cutting off the oppressor’s head’ because of how domi- nation is imbricated in interpersonal, local, global, cultural, economic and social dynamics. As noted above, gender violence accomplishes certain things and fixes particular meanings and practices. Given that hegemonic pro- jects also attempt to create a particular world of meaning and being, both gender violence and hegemonic projects can help each other ‘succeed’. Although it is not only the epistemic that generates hegemonic projects, we pay particular attention in this Special Issue to the hegemonic projects of ‘the state’. We do not conceive of the state as an actor but rather as an idea or what Pierre Bourdieu (1994) calls a ‘bureaucratic field’ that wields symbolic power and centralizes power. It is possible that the principal hegemonic project of the modern world is the project of ‘the state’. Our predominant focus on the state as a hegemonic project, then, is not to affirm state-centrism but to acknowledge that the state is still a central organizing political category of our lives. The politics of opposition, categories of identity and contemporary forms of dom- ination work through the state in many ways. Our focus is on hegemonic pro- jects – such as economic development (and its proxy neoliberalism), women’s rights activism, nation-building and national security – that are implicitly executed in the name of ‘the state’. These issues of gender, violence and power have been dealt with to some extent in feminist IR scholarship on the issues of gender, violence and power. Whereas traditional IR theory often views power as an ability to leverage material resources to get others to do what is not in their interests, feminists have exposed the gendered context of power thereby revealing more nuanced dimensions of hegemonic projects such as nationalism, militarism and globalization. The militarization of daily life when states promote military apparatuses as the solution for stability, security and development, the use of rape as a tool of war and the disproportionate effects of violence on particular women are three examples of a gendered conception of power (Enloe 2000; Jacobs, Jacobson and Marchbank 2000; Giles and Hyndman 2004). Feminist understandings of power have also exposed how gender is used to legitimize the operations of hegemonic projects. One example is the use of gendered conceptions of ‘protecting family and nation’ to promote military operations; another is the gender hierarchy that grounds, enables or cements the separation of public and private spheres (Peterson and Runyan 1998). While the issue of gender violence is indeed more prominent now because of the growth of feminist IR theory, we want to push for a further examination of the constitutive role gender violence plays in hegemonic projects. The scholar- ship on gender violence in IR certainly shows how hegemonic projects, such as nationalism or war, are deeply gendered and thus result in violence against women. But, while this vantage point is critical and often gets at the construction of gender, this framework generally only sees gender violence as primar- ily an example of hegemonic projects – one effect of power through the register of gender, rather than as contested, productive and coterminous with power. If we, as feminist theorists, respond to the obsessive focus on war in the mainstream IR field by documenting power relationships in terms of ‘Man’ over ‘Woman’/State over Citizen, we may inadvertently reaffirm understandings of violence as a ‘tool’ for particular goals of power. We acknowledge that power itself is an understudied political concept, par- ticularly regarding the multiple and layered forms that it takes. It would be easy to set up the realist, masculinist conceptualization of power as a ‘straw- person’ against which to posit the importance of feminist scholarship. However, we are pushing for feminist intervention in various discussions of power, whether it takes the form of compulsory control over others, indirect control via institutions and rules, structural ‘constitution of social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation’, particularly in terms of ‘producing social positions of capital and labor’, or ‘the socially diffuse production of sub- jectivity in systems of meaning and signification’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 3–4). Therefore, building on the work of feminist challenges to traditional IR views on power and of feminist scholarship on the gendered effects and pro- duction of various forms of power, we seek more nuanced understandings on this topic through the examination of the relationship between hegemony, gender and violence. It is often the case that the very contours of what constitutes gender violence in feminist IR scholarship are drawn by the issue of ‘violence against women’. Keck and Sikkink (1998) rightly explain how a transnational advocacy network actively developed the ‘violence against women’ frame, coalescing several campaigns worldwide into a platform that gets at the politics of pain which disproportionately targets women. The approach has raised awareness, galvanized support, given rise to much professional and political activity and enabled women’s groups to secure funding. But these political goals may have been secured at a certain cost. In the first place, the ‘violence against women’ approach relies on representational understandings of gender violence. In other words, the focus on violence against women also potentially ignores vio- lence against men and against groups in ways that are gendered, raced and internationalized. For example, feminist IR scholars invoke the presumably disproportionate targeting of women during conflict in ways that emphasize particular gendered effects of conflict and the masculinized state; the general effect is the lack of due attention to what it means to ‘make’ gender through violence or to the way codes of masculinity negatively affect men. Second, we also note that responses to gender violence, in many ways more so than any other political category, have sanctified racism, imperialism and Orientalism among feminists and critical theorists. For example, the obsession with ‘Islamism’ as the explanation par excellence for gender troubles around the world as well as the romanticization and infantilization of indigenous and/or marginalized women, belie feminist concerns about hierarchy (Nayak 2006; Shepherd 2006). Feminists participate in these problematic dis- cussions about gender violence when we presume that the only reason a woman may die elsewhere is because of her (monolithically) oppressive culture in contrast to the choices and freedom of women in the West. Ironically, it may be such limited understandings of gender violence that unintentionally keep the topic of gender on the sidelines of political science. If gender violence is just an effect of power and does not substantively contri- bute to how we understand the operations of power, then the issues that gender violence raises may be dismissed as ‘women’s issues’ rather than instrumental to knowledge in political science. This dynamic also increases the ghettoi- zation of feminist IR scholarship and scholars (cf. Weber 1994).1 The current lacuna in IR scholarship on hegemony as well as on gender violence is not accidental but rather signals the production of knowledge in this field. Work on gender violence is not predominant in political science or the IR field pre- cisely because it is conceived as ‘just’ violence against women. In other words, in order to further our understandings of violence, we must interrogate gender violence as constitutive of power, and to understand power, we must go beyond current understandings that see ‘it’ in terms of tools or phenomena that act on gender. And, as we do so, we simultaneously ask why the questions we examine in this Special Issue are left on the margins of scholarship. Thus, we come to the following: why does our argument that gender violence is more than a case study of the effects of hegemony and, rather, is constitutive of hegemonic projects, matter? By re-orienting the relationship between gender violence and hegemonic projects we challenge the ‘natural- ness’ of the category of gender violence and assert it as constitutive of the productive forces of hegemonic projects. This framework provides a fresh and critical approach to understanding hegemonic projects and the construction of difference(s). We reference the work of postcolonial and critical race feminists who explain how neocolonial and neoimperial state formations are productive of and reliant upon gendered and racialized conceptualizations of citizens, immigrants and of ‘us/them’ dichotomies (McClintock 1995; Chatterjee and Jeganathan 2000; Stoler 2002). Postcolonial theory also explains how a fix- ation on violence ‘over there’ sidesteps how power works via international hierarchy (Chowdhry and Nair 2002). Similarly, we also believe that gender violence, rather than simply a result of war or culture, is vital and pivotal to the possibility of political violence and hegemony in the first place. Recent critical feminist engagements with international political economy (IPE) have also shown how the exploitation of women, and particularly women of color, is not simply an unintended consequence of global capitalism. Rather, the advancement of global capitalism under the dominant ideological ration- ale of neoliberalism depends on women’s secondary gendered status and global class hierarchy (Mies 1998; Peterson 2003; Agathangelou 2004). Drawing on these important literatures, we seek with this Special Issue to push the connections between gender violence and hegemonic projects beyond the ‘effects of power’ view towards an understanding that places the constitutive function of gender violence at the forefront.

#### That means framework is a new link- the call for a neutral point of deliberation is an attempt to androgynize our argument

Hooper 2k

(Charlotte, PhD, ‘Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations and Gender Politics’ (for which she thanks the Economic and Social Science Research Council for financial support) and is currently involved in developing and teaching a new master’s degree in gender and international relations in the Politics Department of Bristol University. Recent and forthcoming publications include focus on the relationships among masculinist practices, multiple masculinities and international relations. Youngs, Gillian. Political Economy, Power & the Body. New York, NY, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. ProQuest ebrary., JKS)

The fantasy of disembodiment is another key feature of bourgeois rational masculinity which derives from the mind/body split and depends on the apparent invisibility or absence of bodies in social discourse, so that masculine reason could be separate from and untainted by the body. This apparent invisibility has been assisted by a huge investment in the general social sanitization of bodies and bodily functions, particularly in public spaces. There has been a gradual loss of vulgar and feminine orifices and excretions since the 17th century so that the body becomes a mere container of rationality (Rose 1993). Even sensory perception has been altered. Take, for example, the sense of smell. Leonard Duroche (1990) argues that with the exception of one or two designatedly ‘masculine’ smells such as tobacco and sweat, olfactory sensibilities have gradually been increasingly associated with femininity or with ‘degeneration’ since the 18th century. This process has been accompanied by the sanitization of smells from public places, which has led to an impoverishment of perception conducive to impersonal relations between men. The fantasy of disembodiment is sustained by large-scale social and institutional practices as much as by discursive conventions. Bourgeois rational masculinity employs a selective biology both to possess and repress bodies (Rose 1993). The fantasy of disembodiment is not only produced through powerful social practices, it also sustains bourgeois masculine privilege and makes bourgeois men appear natural leaders or rulers. Impersonal relations are associated with objectivity and science, and the exnominated or unauthored ‘view from nowhere’ of modernity, which appears as the disembodied ‘truth’ of power and authority.Closely coupled to the mind/body split and the fantasy of disembodiment is the rational/emotional divide. Emotions and desires are perceived as threatening to a bourgeois masculine subjectivity organized around reason and control. Both Kantian thought and Protestant culture posit an inner freedom from emotionally-driven inclinations as the ideal (Seidler 1987). Just as the body, with its involuntary processes and frailties, poses a threat to masculinity and pure reason, so too do emotions and desires. Acting only from reason and duty serves to strengthen the autonomy of men, otherwise they are in a position of servitude, when reason becomes a slave to the passions. Therefore, selfcontrol over one’s emotions has come to be one of the hallmarks of masculinity. Feelings and emotions are seen as both imperilling masculine superiority and questioning the sources of masculine identity. Because of this, as Victor Seidler (1987: 86– 90) argues, emotional and dependency needs as well as sexual desires are transformed into issues of performance and control. With their identity defined in opposition to ‘feminine’ dependency, emotionality and bodily enslavement, men have become by and large instrumentalist in thought and goal-oriented in action (Seidler 1989: 12).

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of an ontological revisionism that deconstructs the myth of the masculine western subject. This is a politics that destabilizes the masculine subject by revealing how its false universality underwrites gender violence globally

Youngs 04

(Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in\*, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80, JKS)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. ¶ While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and ¶ economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. ¶ Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. ¶ When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed ¶ the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 ¶ Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 ¶ The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. ¶ The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ ¶ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. ¶ The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 ¶ Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 ¶ The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

## case

#### Counter-Interpretation: The 1AC is an object of research. The role of the neg should be to disprove the various meanings of that object. They should be responsible for the way their knowledge is constructed and used because that produces the best model for activism and ethics in the context of the topic since representations affect policy implementation which is a unique educational net benefit to our interpretation

#### Any link is sufficient to win: framework means prioritize gender violence and ethical subject formation - the only real benefit of debate is we learn about issues that remain at the margins of public discourse and become effective advocates. Our links prove the aff sustains masculinity that allow gender violence

#### Their land studies fail – they reify the binary between native and non-indigenous, create fatalism, displace indigenous scholarship and resistance, and ignore co-constituents.

Snelgrove et al, 14 - Master’s Candidate in Indigenous Governance at the University of Victoria (Corey, Rita Kaur Dhamoon University of Victoria Jeff Corntassel University of Victoria Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 3, No. 2, 2014, pp. 1-32 Unsettling settler colonialism: The discourse and politics of settlers, and solidarity with Indigenous nations)//jml

In the tradition of critical approaches, scholars of (or engaging with) settler colonialism have also identified several challenges or weaknesses of this burgeoning field of study. Joanne Barker (2011), on the blog Tequila Sovereign, questioned the specificity of settler colonialism. Drawing on the etymological origins of “settle” as ‘to reconcile’, as well as in light of settler state apologies, Barker warns that settler colonialism may signal a nation-state that has moved “beyond its own tragically imperial and colonial history to be something else, still albeit colonial, but not quite entirely colonial.” Second, Macoun and Strakosch (2013) note that settler colonial theory “is primarily a settler framework” that is largely about settler intentions to think through colonial relations (p. 427). This in itself may not be a problem, but as Macoun and Strakosch warn, settler colonial studies can re-empower non-Indigenous academic voices while marginalizing Indigenous resistance (2013, p. 436). Third, while settler colonialism is posited as both a condition of possibility (Rifkin, 2013) and a site of potential hope (Barker, 2012), there is an underlying “colonial fatalism” (Macoun and Strakosch, 2013, p. 435) that posits a structural inevitability to settler colonial relations. Macoun and Strakosch (2013) in particular note that settler colonialism is unable to transcend itself precisely because it is conceptualized as a structure, where the only polarizing choices available to Indigenous peoples are either to be co- opted or hold a position of resistance/sovereign, while anti-colonial action by settlers is foreclosed. Fourth, the framework of settler colonialism has fostered over-characterizations of binary positions. Saranillio (2013), for instance, notes two common charges against settler colonial studies: that it affirms a binary of Indigenous and non-Indigenous, and that it leads to a neo-racist form of politics that requires non-Natives leave Indigenous territories (arguments that Sarinillo rejects). Moreover, we note that this binary, at times, has the effect of treating settler colonialism as a meta-structure, thus erasing both its contingency and the dynamics that co- constitute racist, patriarchal, homonationalist, ablest, and capitalist settler colonialism. The institutionalization of settler colonial studies is quite remarkable. While some Indigenous journals have struggled to receive institutional support and funding, the journal Settler Colonial Studies – first published in 2011 in an open access format (entirely run on volunteer labour) to bring together critical scholarship on settler colonialism as a distinct social, cultural and historical formation with ongoing political effects (Edmonds and Carey, 2013, p. 2) – moved to a large academic publishing house, Taylor & Francis, within two years of being established. This institutionalization has been coupled with a proliferation of academic conferences, workshops, courses, and has also moved beyond academic confines through blogs, websites, workshops and teach-ins. The institutionalization of settler colonial studies (rather than Indigenous studies) is on the one hand a significant shift in the academy. On the other hand, as de Leeuw, Greenwood, and Lindsay (2013) rightly argue, even when (and perhaps because) there are good intentions to decolonize and to “cultivate a culture of ‘doing the right thing,’” there are no “fundamental shifts in power imbalances between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples or the systems within which we operate” (p. 386). Settler colonialism and the study of settler colonialism, in other words, cannot be decolonized because of good intentions. Following this, paradoxically and in deeply troubling ways, settler colonial studies can displace, overshadow, or even mask over Indigenous studies (for example, see Veracini, 2013) and variations within Indigenous studies, especially feminist and queer Indigenous work that is centred on Indigenous resurgence. Indeed the link between Indigenous studies and settler colonial studies is still in process. The synergies between the literature by/on two-spirited Indigenous identities, queer theory, Indigenous studies more broadly, and settler colonial studies are notable in their interwoven conversations across fields of study. But at times, Indigenous peoples and issues are de-centred in settler colonial studies (for example, Rifkin, 2013, p. 323). Furthermore, while Rifkin is right to argue that settler colonial practices and processes operate in everyday ways, are these practices really in the “background” (2013, p. 331), and for whom? Is settler colonialism “largely invisible”, as Barker (2012) claims?