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#### Realism assumes the perspective of a neutral, rational calculator divorced from the gendered nature of nationalism and international relations – their account of state behavior is ahistorical and props up hegemonic masculinities.

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This theme in feminist theorizing in IR suggests that there might be something to the idea that international structures are theorized as genderneutral because men take their perspectives to represent the human. Feminists have characterized conventional knowledge in IR as problematic because it is constructed only by those in a position of privilege, which affords them only distorted views of the world.14 As such, it has been a crucial part of the feminist project in IR to ‘not only add women but also ask how gender – a structural feature of social life – has been rendered invisible’ by working to ‘distinguish ‘‘reality’’ from the world as men know it’ (Peterson and True 1998, 23). Often, in disciplinary knowledges, ‘gender’ is seen as a proxy for ‘women’ because ‘women’ are perceived to have gender, where men are not. Another element of a gendered international system structure would be that, when it is acknowledged that gender plays a role in global politics, 14 Scheman 1993; Garry and Pearsall 1996; Harding 1998. There is a sociology to what is understood as central to the discipline, where what counts as ‘IR’ matches what men do more than it matches what women do at least in part because the perspectives of male scholars have defined the boundaries of the discipline (Sjoberg 2008). 16 LAURA SJOBERG it is often discussed as a corruption of a gender-neutral system rather than a product of a gendered system. For example, work like that of Inglehart and Norris (2002) and Hudson et al. (2009)15 argues that it is states that treat their women the worst that corrupt not only the gender order but the potential for interstate peace, cooperation, and development. This logic is replicated in many discussions of gender in the policy world as well. For example, ‘gender mainstreaming’ agendas (see True and Mintrom 2001; Shepherd 2008) engage in a process of integrating gender concerns into the structures that already exist in governments and organizations. The scenario derived from Acker’s theorizing suggests that when gender subordination is characterized as the exception, rather than the rule, in international political interactions, gender is difficult to see because the masculine is at once assumed and invisible. The recurrent focus in feminist work on the need to ask IR theory ‘where are the women?’ (Enloe 1983) and ‘where is gender?’ (Bell and O’Rourke 2007) suggests that it is plausible that gender is difficult to see in IR because the masculine dominates our visions of the international system. It is important to note that the masculine here involves and implicates, but is not reducible to, men. Waltz ‘tests’ his idea of structure primarily by its predictive power and its indirect manifestations (1986, 72). He argues that, since the anarchical nature of the international system is invisible and thus cannot be directly verified or proven, it must be verified by its manifestations and implications (Waltz 1986, 73). This verification, to Waltz, comes by examining unit function, distribution of capabilities across units, and political processes of unit interaction. The remainder of this section considers whether there is evidence in those three observable parts of global politics that the international system may be gender-hierarchical. Unit function: does state identity have gendered components? In Waltz’s account, ‘a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units’ where ‘the structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think about the system as a whole’ and ‘the arrangement of units is a property of the system’ (1986, 70, 71). Waltz sees the system as an anarchy, which by definition specifies that units have the same function. Still, Waltz gives a sense of what would be different if the system was a hierarchy, since ‘hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation’ (1986, 87). Calling states ‘like units’ in Waltz’s terms is ‘to say that each state is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit’ (Waltz 1986, 89). Waltz sees states as performing fundamentally similar tasks in similar ways, and argues that the differences between states are in capabilities not in function or task (1986, 91). This section explores two arguments about gender and the function of the units of the international system. First, it argues that gender can be seen as constituting unit ‘function’ in the international system, whether the units are ‘like’ or differentiated. Second, it proposes that gender hierarchy actually differentiates unit function in the international system. The argument that gender constitutes the function of all units in the international system is supported by the degree to which states define their identities (and therefore the tasks of domestic and foreign policy) in gendered ways. A growing literature on ontological security (e.g. Mitzen 2006; Steele 2008) characterizes state identity in terms of ‘sense of self,’ a language that has long been used in feminist accounts of nation and nationalism. Feminists who have worked on nationalism have argued that national identity and gender are inextricably linked, and that ‘all nationalism are gendered, all nationalisms are invented, and all are dangerous’ (McClintock 1993).16 Feminists have shown that gendered imagery is salient in the construction national identities, particularly when, often, women are the essence of, the symbols of, and the reproduction of state and/or national identity (Yuval-Davis 1997; Wilcox 2009). A number of examples illustrate the link between national identity and gender. Feminist studies have demonstrated that gender has been essential to defining state identity in Korea (Moon 1997), modernizing Malaysia (Chin 1998), Bengal (Sen 1993), Indonesia (Sunindyo 1998), Northern Ireland (Porter 1998), South Africa (Meintjes 1998), Lebanon (Schulze 1998), Armenia (Tachjian 2009), and a number of other states. For example, Niva has noted that, during the First Gulf War, the United States’ identity was understood as a ‘tough but tender’ masculinity where it was expected that the United States military would courageously defeat the Iraqi military, but would at the same time rescue the feminine state of Kuwait from the hypermasculine clutches of the Iraqi state (1998). On the other hand, responding to the United States’ and United Nations’ threats of military intervention in Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq consistently used gendered references to hypermasculine understandings of state identity (Sjoberg 2006b). Gendered nationalisms, however, do not just arise in conflict situations. Bannerji has noted that Canadian national identities are constructed through ‘race,’ class, gender, and other relations of power, where subordinate classes and ‘races’ are feminized in relation to the dominant image of Canadian identity, not only within the Canadian state but also in Canada’s external projection of nationalist identity (2000, 173). Taylor’s analysis of the ‘Dirty War’ in Argentina characterizes identity in the conflict as ‘predicated on the internalization of a rigid hierarchy’ of gender and argues that ‘the struggle, as each group aimed to humiliate, humble, and feminize its other, was about gender’ (1997, 92, 34). A brief look at one example recently used in the literature might further illustrate the point. In his book, Ontological Security in International Relations, Steele (2008) notes that honor and shame shape states’ selfperception of their identities. Contrary to the realist logic that state prioritizes prudence and survival over honor and justice, Steele sees honor as a universal part of state self-identity, where states look for honor even sacrificing physical integrity. To illustrate the role of honor in state selfidentity, Steele uses the example of the Belgian choice to fight a losing war against the Germans in 1914 rather than allow Germany access to Belgian territory and avoid the casualties and terror involved in their inevitable defeat. Steele notes that honor was implicated in Belgium’s response to Germany’s ultimatum, given that most policy statements stressed their need to ‘fight for the honor of the flag’ and ‘avenge Belgian honor’ (Steele 2008, 112). Feminist analysis suggests that we cannot understand the role of honor in state self-identity without reference to both masculine and feminine conceptions of honor in the state (Jowkar 1986). Masculine conceptions of honor vary between chivalric and protection-oriented and aggressive and prideful, while feminine conceptions of honor often focus on the purity and innocence of the territory of the state and/or the women and children inside (see Elshtain 1985). Through gender lenses, the Belgian discussion of national honor in 1914 was one where the leaders’ (masculine) honor was tied to not giving in to, and even resisting, the would-be violators of the territory’s (feminine) honor, which was tied to purity. The ‘honor’ of the Belgian government then was tied to unwillingness to sacrifice the ‘honor’ of the innocent, neutral, vulnerable, and untouchable identity and position of Belgium vis a vis its neighboring Germany. It is no coincidence that the following attack was referred to as the ‘Rape of Belgium’ (Niarchos 1995). In the ‘Rape of Belgium’ narrative, the German invasion spoiled the feminine elements of Belgian state identity, and emasculated Belgian leaders as protectors of its feminized territory. Survival or prudence cannot account for Belgium’s actions in 1914; in fact, as Steele pointed out, Belgium acted contrary to both. Honor can explain the Gender, structure, and war 19 behavior, but neither the form nor function of that honor is clear without accounting for the gendered elements of Belgian state identity. The story about gendered state identity can also be read onto Germany (as a hypermasculine aggressor) and Britain (as a chivalrous protector). While some might see the influence of gender on state or national identity as a ‘second-image’ or unit-level explanation,17 Waltz explains that a factor is structural if it is not influencing state identity (and therefore state function) in states individually, but instead influencing the identities (and therefore functions) of states generally. In other words, forces that define one state’s identity or five states’ identities are secondimage; forces that influence all states identities are third-image. Feminist scholars have shown that ‘nationalism is naturalized, and legitimated, through gender discourses that naturalized the domination of one group over another through the disparagement of the feminine’ (Peterson 1999). These gender hierarchies are always present even if specific genders and their orders in hierarchies are fungible. In other words, it is not particular nationalisms that are gendered (and some nationalisms that are not), it is that gender hierarchy as a structural feature of global politics defines the properties and functions of the system’s constituent units, including their national identities. All nationalisms being gendered does not mean that all nationalisms are the same, however. The mechanism through which gender hierarchy can be seen to influence national identity and state function is through the link between any given state’s national identity and the ‘hegemonic masculinity,’ or particular ideal-typical gender that is on top of the gender hierarchy that state ‘units’ are situated in at any given time and place (Hooper 1998, 34). The argument that states’ structures and functions are often defined by masculinities (see Peterson 1992) is not based on the observation that states are (mostly) governed by men. Instead, as Connell explains, ‘the state organizational practices are structured in relation to the reproductive arena’ (1995, 73). Some states’ hegemonic masculinities are aggressive and projected, others are tough but tender, and still others are stoic and reserved. All hegemonic masculinities relate to a feminized other, but they do so in different ways: some encourage violating it, some define themselves in 20 LAURA SJOBERG opposition to it, some understand it as treasured and to be protected, and some mix elements of all of the above. The gendered nature of national identities influences the function of states, particularly in the areas of warmaking and war-fighting, but also in terms of citizenship, economic organization, diplomatic relations, and involvement in international organizations.18 For example, feminists have catalogued throughout the history of the modern state system a relationship between military service, masculinity, and full citizenship (either de jure or de facto) in states (Moscovici 2000). Though the relationship between gender and nationalism generally (and genders and nationalisms specifically) influences the function of units whether they are like units (in anarchy) or not like units (indicative of a hierarchical system in Waltz’s terms), evidence of different gendered nationalisms suggests that gender hierarchy in global politics differentiates between functions of units in the system rather than dictating that all units function similarly. Units in the system (even defined in the narrow realist terms where only states count as units) do have many similar functions in terms of governance, education, health care, and the like. But especially in their external relations, states also have a number of differentiated functions. Some states were/are colonizers, some states were colonized and still deal with remaining markers of colonization. Some states are aggressors, while other states are the victims of aggression. Some states are protectors, while other states require protection. Some states provide peacekeeping troops, international humanitarian aid, and other public goods, while other states do not serve those functions, depending on state identity (e.g. Savery 2007). Some states serve to facilitate international cooperation while others act as cogs in cooperation’s wheels. Some states see their masculinity as affirmed in the interstate equivalent of rape and pillage, while other states see it in chivalry, honor, and a sense of the genteel. While Waltz might classify these differences as merely capabilities gaps, different state functions in the community of states do not map one-toone onto capabilities. Instead, I propose that they map onto the ways that gender shapes state identities and functions. As Peterson (2010) notes, ‘not only subjects but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, ways of knowing y can be [masculinized or] feminized,’ such that states’ ontological security is related to their gendered identities. For example, a number of feminist analyses of the United States during the first Gulf War identify its policy choices and military strategies as consonant with a new, post-Cold War ‘tough-but-tender’ image of the United States’ masculinity, which maintained the Cold War-era projection of strength, but added an element of sensitivity and a chivalric conception of protecting the weak (e.g. Niva 1998; Sjoberg 2006a). Seemingly inconsonant functions for the US military as at once an attack force and a tool for protection then make sense, because the state does function differently based on its self-perception of identity, which might be seen as (at least in part) a product of structural gender hierarchy in the international arena.

#### Defensive realism can’t explain Chinese international actions like land reclamation- only feminist international relations can effectively analyze China’s masculine policies.

Wang ‘19

(Joy Zhirou, International Studies student at John Hopkins University, <https://jhufar.com/2019/03/02/limits-of-realism-in-understanding-chinese-land-reclamation/>, March 2) BW

Defensive realism shares many of the same beliefs as offensive realism, but believes that excessive power will bring about the fall of the expanding state; the rationale, according to Kenneth Waltz, is that if a state becomes too powerful, other states would feel threatened and would band together to either destroy the aggressor state or restore it to its original power capacity.6 In this case, states do not expand unprovoked, but rather as a response to changing distribution of power since acquiring too much power and thereby upsetting the balance of power would only threaten their security more. Therefore, based on defensive realism, China’s push into the South China Sea was not self-initiated but simply a reaction to escalating security challenges in the region; it will cease expanding once it feels that it has gained enough power to counterbalance the new security threats. Broader historical context of the South China Sea disputes proves defensive realism to be on the side of truth. Contrary to popular assumption, China is in fact the latecomer to the land reclamation game. The Philippines had reclaimed on the Palawan Island and Vietnam has added to Sand Cay and West London Reef 21,000 and 65,000 square meters respectively since 2010.7 Increased territories in the South China Sea means increased military outposts and increased ability to claim more islands in disputed areas, which threatens China’s sovereignty. Therefore, given Vietnam’s island building in the disputed Spratly Islands, China perceived a rise in the relative power of its competitors and had to increase its own power in the region. Defensive realism predicts that China will eventually stop its expansion even though China has yet to slow down land reclamation. This is because as China builds up more capabilities in the region through the construction of airstrips and marine bases on the new artificial islands, so too do its hostile neighbors. Thus, China still feels insecure and will continue to expand until it restores the perceived balance of power to the previous status quo. Omnibalancing, as developed by Steven David, agrees with realism on the prominence of interest and power, but argues that in a developing country the balance of power occurs not on the international level but on the state level. In the developing world, sometimes the biggest threats to the government are not from other states but rather from domestic dissent and unrest (e.g. military coup d’etat or riots). Therefore, to stay in power, countries leaders may choose foreign policies that are not in the best interest of the state but diffuse domestic tension.8 In the case of China, omnibalancing would contend that China’s land reclamation activities in the South China Sea is merely a diversion from domestic discontent with the government. China is an authoritarian regime without free election, so the only source of government legitimacy comes from its ability to keep the people satisfied. In a survey conducted by Pew Research Center in 2015, government corruption tops the list, with 84% respondents considering it a big problem and 44% a very big problem; more than 50% of people believe that air/water pollution, food safety, and income inequality will stay the same or get worse over the next 5 years.9 In 2010 alone, China witnessed 180,000 protests, demonstrations, and riots.10 These data reveal a low level of confidence for the government, so diverting domestic discontent with battling foreign encroachment on sovereignty — that is, the territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines — through island building would allow the Communist leadership to recover its image among the public. A survey in 2013 further confirms the validity of the omnibalancing argument: around 60% of people pay attention to China’s maritime disputes and the majority think that China’s claims are absolutely correct.11 However, despite its immense explanatory power, realism cannot account for the full story of China’s land reclamation. First, it does not explain the timing of the reclamation. Territorial disputes and “island squatting” have existed since the 1970s while Vietnam started land reclamation in 2010, so why did China suddenly decide to build artificial islands in 2014 as opposed to, say, 2011? Second, realism does not fully explain the magnitude of China’s reclamation efforts. Granted, China felt the need to catch up with its competitors, namely Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines, in the game of artificial island construction, but the scale of China’s project dwarfed that of all the others combined: 100 acres over 45 years compared to 3,000 acres over 2 years.12 Defensive realism justifies China’s rationale for initiating and continuing land reclamation, but it does not tell us why China perceives such a big threat from its adversaries’ expansion of a mere 100 acres. Third, island building was not the only viable response for China; negotiations, binding treaties, UN arbitration, or international law were all possible alternatives. Admittedly, omnibalancing necessitates the creation of a common enemy, but asserting national sovereignty does not entail escalating tension; victory over the Paracel Islands in an international court would rally as much national sentiment as would through military buildup. Therefore, in the face of land reclamation by hostile states, why did China decide to resort to the traditional tools of power politics instead of the modern norm of peaceful resolution of conflicts? In the following sections, I shall explain how first and second level analysis, constructivism and feminism answer the questions that realism evades. First level analysis focuses on the natures of individual leaders as the cause for historical events. In this case, it explains the timing of China’s island building activities. In 2013, China witnessed the ascension of Xi Jinping, arguably the most authoritarian and reactionary leader after Mao, to the presidency. Both a “princeling” and a “second-generation red” by birth, Xi Jinping had a very unusual upbringing that greatly shaped his view of China. Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, was among the first generation of Communist revolutionaries that fought alongside Mao and later became the vice premier of the PRC and secretary general of the State Council. As a result, Xi grew up in the exclusive “Zhongnanhai” with the children of other first-generation Communist leaders and with countless tales of the revolution.13 However, in 1962, Xi Zhongxun was purged on grounds of “acting counterrevolutionary.” At the height of the Cultural Revolution, the charge “counterrevolutionary” was such a taboo that the young Xi Jinping was automatically ostracized by virtue of his lineage. Thus, given his childhood immersion in Maoist ideals and teenage experience with brutal politics, it is not surprising that Xi Jinping later became the most authoritarian president after Mao. Foreign policy under Xi has been markedly more assertive than under previous leaders, especially in regards to Sino-Japanese relations and territorial disputes in the South China Sea.14 Therefore, Xi’s “election” to the presidency in 2013 explains why China suddenly turned to land reclamation, a gesture of increased assertiveness in the region, in early 2014. Second level analysis posits states at the center of causation, citing states’ internal culture and structure as the reason behind particular outcomes. It addresses the issue of magnitude in both China’s island building activities and its perception of threat. It is true that the construction of artificial islands would strengthen China’s ability to project its military power at sea, thereby thwarting its adversaries’ attempts to occupy more disputed territories, but reclaiming over 3,000 acres of land seems to be somewhat of an overreaction given the comparatively insignificant size of the other countries’ reclamation projects. So, the question is, why did China perceive such a disproportionate threat from the small increase in territory by Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines? China, or in its native language the “Middle Kingdom,” had always been the absolute dominant power in East Asia until the 19th century. For many Chinese people, the memory of humiliation at the hands of foreigners is still fresh and evokes a strong sense of patriotism. A traditionally nationalist society, the Chinese people to this day still mourn the massive land concessions granted to foreign powers under the Qing Dynasty; a survey from 2013 showed that 83% of people in China see the South China Sea disputes as a continuation of the “Century of Humiliation.”15 As one can see, the Chinese people attach a special emotional significance to the concept of sovereignty, making them inflate the value of territory in an age where territory has been rendered less important by the advancement of technology. Thus, even though land reclamation itself may not carry so much strategic value as to be worth risking international condemnation and spending billions of dollars, the historical and cultural importance of upholding sovereignty makes the Chinese government willing to go the extra mile when it comes to territorial integrity. According to Alexander Wendt, constructivism is an approach to world politics from a social perspective and has two fundamental claims: (1) the structures of international politics are social rather than purely material (2) these structures influence not only states’ behaviors but their identities and interests as well.16 Stripped to its essence, constructivism argues that states with different values and ideologies will perceive, or “socially construct,” the same reality differently and will therefore act differently. This explains why China resorted to land reclamation instead of other more peaceful alternatives when confronted with hostile expansion. China is an authoritarian regime that does not endorse liberal values such as tolerance, rule of law and peaceful resolution of conflicts in its domestic policies; rather, Chinese politics is characterized by purge of dissidents, forceful repression of demonstrations, corruption, abuse of power and ostracization based on lineage or association. The elements of violence, intolerance, distrust, and ruthlessness inherent in Chinese domestic politics shape the lens through which Chinese politicians see the international system, portrayed as a grim world where only old-school Realpolitik provides means of survival. Therefore, the pessimist values fostered by China’s domestic political system translate into its disbelief in modern liberal norms that advocate for international cooperation and resolution of conflicts through negotiation and compromise; the fact that China rejected completely the Hague Tribunal’s ruling on South China Sea disputes testifies the dominance of power politics over liberal international norms in Chinese foreign policy. Thus, given China’s realist ideology, expanding China’s military capability in the region would be the best response to its neighbors’ rise in relative power and land reclamation was deemed a viable option. International relations is arguably a man’s world, dominated by masculine modes of thinking. This is certainly true given that in the US women had been barred from entry until very recently and sex discrimination still abounds.17 Feminist theory believes that women tend to define power in terms of the ability to cooperate (as opposed to the masculine definition of control over others) and discern more opportunities for toleration and coalition-building in spite of differences; this is because females often rely on persuasion and shared understanding in solving domestic disputes and are therefore socialized into a more contextual, narrative-based mode of analysis.18 As a result, feminists argue that global politics would look much different if women were national leaders. This feminist interpretation explains the magnitude and aggressiveness of China’s land reclamation. Despite its communist egalitarian ideals, China is in fact a deeply sexist society. Structurally, the mandatory retirement age for female government workers, including those employed in state-owned enterprises and public universities, is 50 or 55 while the male equivalent is 60.19 This differential treatment not only impedes women’s ability to achieve high leadership positions as most government officials only reach the highest ranks in their 60s, but also perpetuates the gender stereotype that women are less physically vigorous than men. As of now, there are no women in the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest decision-making unit in China, and only one woman in the 25-member Politburo, the next rung after the Politburo Standing Committee.20 Therefore, the lack of female contribution to policies can be construed as the reason why China chose to pursue a more militaristic response (island building) instead of seeking cooperation and a larger scale of operation since males tend to perceive more threats than females and to think in terms of sheer strength as opposed to persuasion. Overall, realism explains a significant part of China’s rationale for land reclamation as relative power and military capability did factor heavily into its calculation. However, first and second level analysis, constructivism and feminism elucidate components that realism fails to incorporate: (1) land reclamation itself as a viable strategy (2) its timing in 2014 and (3) its tremendous scale. This is because realism fails to acknowledge the influence that a state’s culture, structure and history exert on shaping interests and identities and the lenses through which it receives and interprets external realities. Therefore, to fully understand the issue of land reclamation in the South China Sea, a simple look at the balance of power would not suffice; meticulous attention must be paid to the particular circumstances of the countries involved. Peaceful resolution of this conflict depends on an impartial synthesis of different approaches and one day we may hope to see a South China Sea characterized by tranquility and cooperation.

#### The aff’s drive to prevent extinction is a form of masculine survivalism where gendered bodies become the unwilling tools to sustain humanity. You should refuse their obsession with patriarchal reproduction.

Mitchell 15

(Audra Mitchell, Audra Mitchell is a settler scholar who lives and works on the Ancestral and treaty lands of the Neutral (Attawandaron), Haudenosaunee and Mississaugas of the New Credit (please see Honouring the Land). She currently holds the the Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at Wilfrid Laurier University. From 2015-18 she held the CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs Audra is an Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, 8-3-2015, "Gendering extinction," Worldly, <https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/2015/08/03/gendering-extinction/>, JKS)

The reproduction of survival/ the survival of reproduction

Extinction is almost always understood against the horizon of survival and the imperative to sustain it – at least for life forms deemed to be of value to humans. In many cases, this imperative takes the form of deliberate strategies for enforcing existence. Donna Haraway’s influential book When Species Meet devotes considerable attention to the logics, practices and politics of Species Survival Plans. These plans monitor and enforce reproduction amongst ‘endangered’ species, not least by collecting data on populations, genetic profiles and genetic materials to enable selective breeding. This strategy assumes that all organisms can, should, and can be made to exercise their reproductive capacities in order to resist extinction, and it actively mobilizes members of ‘endangered species’ into this project. In so doing, it helps to entrench norms regarding gender, sexuality and reproductive labour that are deeply entrenched in modern, Western human cultures. Attention to these programmes highlights an important way in which extinction is gendered in dominant scientific and policy frameworks. Specifically, strategic breeding programmes share in the belief that reproduction is an imperative for those capable of reproducing if ‘the species’ is at risk’. This belief is directly related to Western norms of the reproductive imperative for women. Indeed, Haraway points out that it is precisely “‘woman’s’ putative self-defining responsibility to ‘the species’ as this singular and typological female is reduced to her reproductive function”. In a similar sense, within SSPs and other strategies of enforced survival, entire life forms are reduced to their reproductive capacities. Moreover, programmes of enforced survival can, in the context of sexual reproduction, disproportionately burden female organisms with the task of avoiding extinction. This logic is particularly fraught in discussions of the possibility of human extinction, in which female fertility (captured in the standard policy language of ‘births per woman’) is framed simultaneously as a threat to survival, and the only hope for escaping extinction (see, for instance, Alan Weisman’s comments on this). In these ways, the securitization of survival entrenches the intersectional categories of gender, species and race discussed above. Dominant discourses of extinction and conservation also entrench and privilege sexual reproduction, in ways that entrench heteronormative assumptions and norms. This is reflected in the way that the subjects of extinction and conservation are framed. The standard object of conservation is the biological ‘species’, a term which is defined by the ability of organisms to reproduce sexually. As Myra Hird has pointed out, this conception of ‘species’ makes it appear as if sexual reproduction is the ‘best’ means of sustaining the existence of a life form. However, Hird’s work demonstrates that Earthly life forms actually engage in myriad forms of reproduction, from the free exchange of DNA between bacteria to the hermaphroditic practices of some fish. The upshot of these arguments is that Earthly life is sustained through a huge variety of reproductive activities that do not conform to biological understandings of life processes or species. Crucially, Hird argues that there is no necessary hierarchy between forms of reproduction. In Darwinian terms, all species that manage to survive are equally successful. However, by conflating survival with sexual reproduction, existing discourses of extinction embed hetero-normative frameworks that devalue other forms of reproduction. They also reduce reproduction to the imperative to survive, ignoring the myriad cultural, political, aesthetic, sensual and other dimensions of reproduction.

#### The impact is hypermasculine war-making- claims of objectivity are patently flawed because they are based in gendered decision-making

Sjoberg 13

(Laura, total bae, associate professor of Political Science @ University of Florida, University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Southern California School of International Relations; J.D. Boston College Law School, Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War Chapter: “Relations International and War(s),” Gendered Lenses Look at War(s), googlebooks, JKS)

Feminist scholars have also interrogated the unitary nature of the state, pointing out that efforts to maximize the state's security interests often threaten the security of people inside the state. Specifically, as I discussed in the previous section, the state's most marginalized citizens are often made insecure by state security-seeking, making it clear that a state does not have a single interest in interstate interaction but many that conflict. J. Ann Tickner contends that "an explanation of the historical development of state sovereignty and state identities as they have evolved over time does indeed suggest deeply gendered constructions that have not included women on the same terms as men." This is because, according to Tickner:¶ From the time of their foundation, states have sought to control the right to define political identity. Since their legitimacy has constantly been threatened by the undermining power of subnational and transnational loyalties, states' survival and success have depended on the creation and maintenance of legitimating national identities; often these identities have depended on the manipulation of gendered representation. . . . Drawing on metaphors that evoke matrimonial and familial relations, the nation has been portrayed as both male and female. . . . The sense of community implicit in these family metaphors is deeply gendered in ways that not only legitimate foreign policy practices but also reinforce inequalities between men and women.”¶  ¶ Using these gendered metaphors, the state can, while shoring up its "national interest," both threaten the interest of marginalized citizens inside it and reinforce power inequalities among its groups. Catherine MacKinnon has explained that the "state's structures and actions are driven by and institutionalize strategy based on an epistemic angle of vision" that can "distinguish public from private, naturalize dominance as difference, hide coercion beyond consent, and conceal politics beyond morality.” These structures require a certain standard of behavior from some members of the state,” while suppressing the voices of others altogether.”¶ With these tools, the state can appear unitary by suppressing its diversity and presenting one concept of national interest, autonomous of and not necessarily representative of its citizens. In this understanding, the sovereign state can be "an extension of the separation-minded realist man, also autonomous to various degrees from the diverse 'domestic' interests he-it allegedly exists to protect.” Additionally, states are complicit with gender subordination when they fail to intervene in domestic violence, perpetuate a heterosexist bias in education, exercise discrimination in welfare policies, and operate on patriarchal laws.” ¶ In this conception, the unitary state is a misleading and malignant construction. Two implications for the process of state interaction follow; states that interact often promote unrepresentative interests, and those unrepresentative interests exclude gender, racial, and cultural minorities. In this sense, states' elites often make wars (or fail to) "representing" a limited group or groups among their populations, while claiming full representativeness, effectively rendering a significant portion of their supposed "constituency" invisible in the process of interacting with other states. Empirically, this means that there are a number of levels of interstate interaction, many of which are omitted from process-based notions of dyadic war theorizing. Normatively, it suggests that our conceptions of how states interact (and the content of those interactions) are problematically skewed.¶ Rationality in Interaction This skew is particularly evident in the assumption of rationality." The rationality assumption implies that the knower/actor can separate himself/herself from the “other” in interactions with that other. Feminists have argued that knowledge is always perspectival and political; therefore, states and their leaders’ decisions about how to interact with others are not rational, but informed by their situational and political biases. In this view, the rationality assumption may be seen as at once itself a political bias and obscuring other political biases. As Naomi Scheman argues, perceived rational cost-beneﬁt analysis about war-making and war-fighting should “always be seen as especially problematical when... constructed only by those in positions of privilege... [which provide] only distorted views about the world.”78 In this view, rational calculation is not an objective, attainable, and desirable end, but a partial representation of both interest and actors’ representation of those interests. In this way, through gender lenses, rationality has been seen as importantly incomplete, leaving out signiﬁcant (if not the most significant) factors that go into decision-making.79 In addition to understanding the rationality assumption as partial (and therefore unrepresentative), feminist research has pointed out links between rationality and mascuIinism.8° As Karen Jones notes, advocates of rationality as a guide for interstate interactions“ assume: 1. Available... conceptions of rationality and reason represent genuinely human norms and ideals; 2. The list of norms and ideals contained within available conceptions of rationality and reason are sufficiently complete; and 3. The external normative functions assigned to reason and rationality are unproblematic.82 Looking through gender lenses shows problems with each of these assumptions. Feminists have argued that “the identity of the modern subject-in models of human nature, citizenship, the rational actor, the knowing subject, economic man, and political agency-is not gender-neutral but masculine (and typically European and heterosexua|).”83 This impacts not only how we see the rational subject, but how we predict and understand his decisions, at the state level as well as at the individual level. According to Margaret Atherton, the possibility of rationality has “been used in a disturbing fashion to mark a gender distinction. We have, for example, on the one hand, the man of reason, and, on the other, the woman of passion.”84 In rationality assumptions, traits associated with masculinity are normalized and traits associated with femininity are excluded. The impact is compounded because (masculinized) rationality and its (feminized) alternatives are not on equal playing ﬁelds. As a result, Karen Jones notes that “women’s assumed deficiency in rationality” has been used to exclude both women and knowledge associated with femininity from accepted views of the world.85 The alleged gender neutrality of rationality, then, “is often a covert form of privileging maleness”85 and omission of “what has traditionally counted as ‘feminine.’”87 Still, adding women and values associated with femininity to current concepts of rationality is unlikely to create a gender-neutral concept of rationality.88 This is because, epistemologically, the sovereign rational subject constructs artificial gendered boundaries between rationality and emotion, male and female, and knower and known.89 Among states, those boundaries are not benign. Instead, they breed competition and domination that inspire and foster war(s) and conﬂict(s).90 This competition frequently relies on contrasting the state’s own masculinity to the enemy’s (actual or perceived) femininity. This cycle of genderings is not a series of events but a social continuum. In these gendered relationships, as Zillah Eisenstein argues, “gender differentiation will be mobilized for war and peace,” especially moving forward into the age of an American empire focused on manliness.9‘ Feminists have long argued that competitions between hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in causing war(s).92 Hidden beneath the assumed independence, rationality, and unity of state interaction leading to war are gendered interstate interactions that cause, constitute, and relate to war and wars. Feminist scholars have recognized the extent to which the preeminence of masculine values dominates (particularly conﬂictual) accounts of interstate interactions, wherein “rational” interactions often become “a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and violence” in which “force is used to checkmate force.”93 Interstate interactions leading to wars often show the gendered nature of war narratives, war logics, and war languages, which produce (and reproduce) gendered cycles of violence.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of an ontological revisionism that deconstructs the myth of the masculine western subject. This is a politics that destabilizes the masculine subject by revealing how its false universality underwrites gender violence globally

Youngs 04

(Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in\*, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80, JKS)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. ¶ While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and ¶ economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. ¶ Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. ¶ When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed ¶ the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 ¶ Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 ¶ The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. ¶ The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ ¶ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. ¶ The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 ¶ Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 ¶ The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

#### The K comes first - policies are constituted by and produce subjects, not blanket assessments of outcomes and impacts. The ROB is to interrogate the gendered nature of the 1AC as a research project.

Bacchi 16

(Carol, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia, (2016): Policies as Gendering Practices: Re-Viewing Categorical Distinctions, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, DOI: 10.1080/1554477X.2016.1198207, JKS)

One important constitutive effect is how we are produced as subjects through the problematizations implicit in such texts, a process described as “subjectification” (Bacchi 2009, 16–17). For example, Foucault (1980) argues that specific problematizations of sexuality (e.g., sexuality as moral code, sexuality as biological imperative) create “subject positions” that enjoin people to become particular kinds of sexual subjects (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 308). Marston and McDonald (2006) describe how individual subjects are produced in specific policy practices “as worker-citizens in workfare programs, as parent-citizens in child and family services or consumer-citizens in a managerial and marketized mixed economy of welfare” (3). Given the proliferation of practices, the formation of one’s subjectivity is an ongoing and always incomplete process: “the doer/subject/person is never fixed, finally as a girl or a woman or whatever, but always becoming or being” (Jones 1997, 267). Subjectification effects therefore are neither deter- mined nor predictable. People sometimes take up subject positions in ways that challenge hierarchical relations. For example, the discourse of rights creates as one possible positioning that of the human rights advocate. Moreover, as practices “through which things take on meaning and value” (Shapiro 1988, xi), policies have material (lived) effects, shaping the possibilities for people’s and peoples’ lives (Bacchi 2009, 16–18). Policies achieve these constitutive effects through discursive practices, which comprise the “conditions of emergence, insertion and functioning” of discourses (Foucault 1972b, 163), and hence bridge a material-symbolic distinction (Bacchi and Bonham 2014). A particular conception of power underpins an understanding of policies as constitutive practices. Power is conceptualized as productive rather than as simply repressive. Power is not considered to be something people possess (e.g., “he or she has power”) but as a capacity exercised in the production of subjects and objects (Heller 1996, 83). This productive or generative view of power does not conclude that power and resistance are necessarily equal in their effects, however. Such a conclusion would deny the hierarchies by which the organization of discourse takes effect (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 310). This understanding of policy as constitutive of subjects and objects sits in sharp contrast to conventional views of the policy process, which, in the main, can be characterized as reactive. That is, in general, policy is considered to be a response to some condition that needs to be ameliorated or “fixed.” Policies are conceived as “reactions” to “problems.” By contrast, the understanding of policy offered in this article portrays policies as constitutive or productive of (what are taken to be) “problems,” “subjects,” and “objects” (Allan 2010, 14). It follows that it is no longer adequate to think in terms of conventional policy “outcomes,” understood as the results or “impacts” of government actions. New questions are required, such as the following: What does the particular policy, or policy proposal, deem to be an appropriate target for intervention? What is left out? How does the shape of the proposal affect how people feel about themselves and the issue? And how does it produce them as particular kinds of subjects?

## Case

#### The space race is a myth and the US is still way ahead – reject the aff’s fearmongering

Grieco 01-19

(Kelly A. Grieco, PhD from MIT; (01-19-22) “The US-China Space Race is a Myth”; <https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/the-china-us-space-race-is-a-myth/>)//ckd

Seventy years later, it is happening again. [Pundits](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/12/31/2022-space-race-china-us-526271), [politicians](https://breakingdefense.com/2021/12/will-strong-actions-follow-words-in-bidens-space-policy/), and [senior military officers](https://spacenews.com/raymond-on-chinas-space-program-its-alive-well-and-concerning/) alike now warn the United States is losing a space race to China. “We are absolutely in a strategic competition with China and space is a part of that,” Gen. David D. Thompson, vice chief of space operations for the U.S. Space Force, [warned recently](https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/04/politics/american-experts-us-china-space-race/index.html). “The fact, that in essence, on average, they are building and fielding and updating their space capabilities at twice the rate we are means that very soon, if we don’t start accelerating our development and delivery capabilities, they will exceed us.” Space alarmism makes great headlines. But the United States is not falling behind China in space – quite the contrary. The United States remains the most advanced space power in the world. Of the more than 4,500 [satellites in orbit today](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database), the United States accounts for more than half of them, some 2,700 satellites and nearly seven times as many as the next competitor, China. True, the Chinese hold the record for the [most space launches in 2021](https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/12/china-tjsw-9/) – a total of 55 launches to the United States’ 51. But the number of launches only tells part of the story, because the United States has more powerful rockets, able to deliver [more payloads](https://aerospace.csis.org/data/space-environment-total-launches-country/) – satellites, space probes, and spacecraft – into orbit. China’s [space funding](https://www.geospatialworld.net/news/euroconsults-flagship-research-shows-government-space-program-budgets-have-maintained-growth-trajectories/) has increased markedly in recent years, to $8.9 billion in 2020, but it still spent a mere fraction of the United States’ $48 billion. The U.S. also boasts a [booming commercial space industry](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/09/05/space-finance-bubble-investors/), with hundreds of startups joining leading firms like Blue Origin and SpaceX, and investors pouring billions of dollars into the U.S. space economy. Meanwhile, [China’s private space industry](https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx) lags behind American companies and, last year, funding trended in the [wrong direction](https://spacenews.com/chinese-commercial-sector-investment-lagging-in-2021/). China’s space program has made significant advances in recent years, from [completing its own global satellite navigation system](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-exploration-china-satellite/china-set-to-complete-beidou-network-rivalling-gps-in-global-navigation-idUSKBN23J0I9) and [collecting lunar samples](https://www.space.com/china-chang-e-6-moon-sample-return-preparations) to [landing a spacecraft on Mars](https://www.nbcnews.com/science/space/china-s-mars-rover-completes-primary-mission-continues-explore-red-n1277363) and [sending astronauts to its own space station](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/10/15/china-space-station-launch-tiangong/). But these milestones should serve as a reality check: The United States is not falling behind in the space race, so much as China is steadily catching up after having started so far behind. Likewise, China’s space ambitions are impressive, with plans to develop [satellite mega-constellations](https://spacenews.com/china-is-developing-plans-for-a-13000-satellite-communications-megaconstellation/) and further explore the [moon](https://www.space.com/china-upcoming-moon-missions-details) and [deep space](https://spacenews.com/china-to-launch-a-pair-of-spacecraft-towards-the-edge-of-the-solar-system/), but each of these Chinese space endeavors will need to first clear significant [technical](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/06/united-states-china-power-influence/612961/) and [other obstacles](https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/17/moon-base-china-russia-lunar-space-nasa/). For example, in June, Beijing released a [roadmap](https://spacenews.com/china-russia-reveal-roadmap-for-international-moon-base/) for an International Lunar Research Station to be developed jointly with Russia. This plan requires China to field the [Long March 9](https://spectrum.ieee.org/china-aims-for-a-permanent-moon-base-in-the-2030s), a super heavy-lift rocket that has been in the research-and-development phase since 2011. The Chinese expect it to make its first test flight around 2030, but their troubles with [other heavy rockets](https://spacenews.com/chinas-moon-mars-and-space-station-missions-may-be-facing-delays/) suggest that ambitious goal could well be pushed back. Even then, China landing its [astronauts on the moon](https://spacenews.com/chinas-new-rocket-for-crewed-moon-missions-to-launch-around-2026/) hardly constitutes a great victory. After all, the United States won that race back in [1969](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/apollo/apollo11.html).

#### No solvency or internal link – Chinese-Russian space alliance is NOT based in space -it’s one out of hundreds of causes for partnership

Jennings 12-3-21

Ralph Jennings (UC berkeley graduate, has covered china since 1988), 12-3-2021, "China Deepens Informal Alliance With Russia," VOA, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-deepens-informal-alliance-with-russia/6338773.html, // HW AW

SAN FRANCISCO — China and Russia have strengthened their political, economic and military relations this year, despite their uneasy history in the past, as both countries say they resent what they call growing pressure from the West. So far this year, the two have held a series of military exercises and issued joint diplomatic statements aimed at Western countries. On November 27, for example, an essay by both countries’ ambassadors to Washington protested the upcoming U.S.-led [Summit for Democracy](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20211127-in-joint-op-ed-china-and-russia-decry-us-democracy-summit) for creating divisions in the world. Neither Russia nor China appeared on the list of 110 invitees. Russia depends on China’s massive industrial economy for oil and gas exports as environmental rules in the European Union complicate energy imports there, said Vassily Kashin, senior fellow at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He said two-way relations were at their strongest since the 1950s. “Most importantly, we have a common position concerning the global order, which is that we don’t like the U.S. global order, so this close partnership is based on common opposition to the U.S.-led global order,” Kashin said. Western democracies from the United States to Australia and throughout Europe have strengthened their own ties this year at a time of concern about China’s policies. Western governments have signaled opposition to Beijing’s aggressive language on Taiwan, its crackdown on dissenters in Hong Kong and its policies targeting a Muslim minority in China's Xinjiang region. Countries, including the West and some in Southeast Asia, further resent China’s [“wolf warrior diplomacy”](https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/sino-asean-relations-and-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/) approach that has seen China’s Communist Party become more vocal about promoting its views among overseas audiences. In foreign relations, experts say Beijing has been using [“increasingly assertive tactics”](https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats-use-and-abuse-twitter/) to “aggressively defend their home country,” often in the cyber world. China and Russia in turn hope to stop a return to U.S.-driven soft power of the Barack Obama-George W. Bush presidencies, when smaller countries saw the United States as “more acceptable leaders” among great powers, said Alan Chong, associate professor at the Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Chinese soft power, Chong said, “has taken a hit” because of President Xi Jinping's comments that make him sound strong at home at the expense of solidarity and friendship overseas. China sees U.S. President Joe Biden as “a very tough opponent,” he added. Western governments have called out China this year particularly over its perceived aggression toward Taiwan, a self-ruled island that Beijing calls its own. A U.S. official also warned Russia last month about troop buildup near Ukraine. Evidence of stronger Sino-Russian ties With the world’s second-strongest military, after the United States, Russia holds occasional military exercises with China — five made public to date — while selling arms to its giant neighbor to the south. In October, China and Russia held their 10th annual "Maritime Interaction” naval drills with the Russian Pacific Fleet’s anti-submarine ship Admiral Panteleyev, the Moscow-based [Sputnik](https://sputniknews.com/20211019/tokyo-closely-watching-naval-activities-near-japan-in-wake-of-russia-china-joint-drills-1090034240.html) news service reported. China's People's Liberation Army Navy sent several destroyers and a diesel submarine. The two navies drill together to strengthen “combat capabilities” in case of “seaborne threats,” Sputnik said. Russia and China held five days of military exercises in a remote region of central China in August, drawing more than 10,000 service personnel, aircraft, artillery and armored vehicles. **China and Russia also began operating a space weather center** this month in Beijing and Moscow, the Chinese state-run China Daily reported. In June, they agreed to extend their 20-year-old Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation to strengthen relations by respecting each other’s interests and sovereignty, the Daily said. Russia looks to China for support of its goal in occupying parts of Ukraine, as well as a conduit to show Moscow can “still play a role” in Asia, in the region,” said Andrew Yang, secretary-general of the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies think tank in Taiwan. China needs Russian weapons, energy and support against Western pressure, Yang said. Russia agreed in 2015 to sell China 24 combat aircraft and four S-400 surface-to-air missile systems for about $7 billion. On the economic side, China became Russia’s [No. 1 trading partner](https://www.rt.com/business/452281-china-top-russia-partners-rating/) in 2017. Two years ago, Xi and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, agreed to fuse each side’s efforts to open trade routes by [building infrastructure in other countries](https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-russia-economic-unequals). “I think this is the traditional, old-fashioned balance of power,” Yang said. “They consider if China and Russia can join together, they can also regulate the regional security issues.” Limits to Sino-Russian cooperation Cold War-era distrust between China and Russia is likely to limit cooperation to broad or informal actions rather than a signed pact, analysts say. Sino-Russian relations faded in the 1960s when the two Communist parties split over ideology and border conflicts ensued. The two sides could set up a military technology sharing deal like the AUKUS pact involving Australia, Britain and the United States, said Nguyen Thanh Trung, a faculty member at Fulbright University Vietnam. Earlier goals haven't been met, he told VOA. “Over the last two years, China and Russia have signed a lot of agreements, but I don’t see a lot of concrete progress in their agreements,” Nguyen said. Western allies need not worry about China-Russia cooperation unless the two powers sign a formal agreement, Chong said. "If you see an MOU [memorandum of understanding] where they would state, explicitly, [that] they would stage X number of military exercises, they would establish some sort of integrated military command or something, then there’s cause for worry, but as they go at the moment, I don’t think there’s anything to worry about,” he said. This week the Pentagon announced as part of a regular review of its forces around the world that it would reinforce deployments and bases directed at China and Russia, while still maintaining forces in the Middle East to deter terrorist groups and Iran.

#### Scenario 1 --

#### No ASAT attack- redundancy, alternate systems and escalation.

Sankaran, PhD, ‘14

(Jaganath, InternationalSecurityPolicy@UniversityOfMaryland, AsstProfPublicAffairs@UTAustin, MEPPEngineering&PublicPolicy@UniversityOfMaryland, “Limits of the Chinese Antisatellite Threat to the United States,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 8(4): 19-46) BW

What benefits might accrue to China from executing an elaborate ASAT operation against US and allied satellites during a Taiwan Straits conflict, assuming such an operation were feasible? How does such an attack impact the outcome of a US-China military engagement? Given existing satellite redundancies and the availability of alternate systems, the benefits to China from attacking US satellites are limited. A Chinese ASAT operation, if successful, would result in differing outcomes depending on the type of satellite targeted. In the case of GPS satellites, the redundancy of the constellation renders any attack fleeting and limited in benefits. As for ISR satellites, the availability of alternate airborne platforms limits the utility of an ASAT attack. Finally, targeting communication satellites imposes the difficulty of managing escalation constraints on an ASAT operation.

#### Ineffectiveness, redundancy and political backlash check ASAT attacks.

Satyanath ‘19

(Pranav R., research analyst at the Takshashila Institution, “Space Power and Space Warfare: A Review,” December 11) BW

For example, China’s ASAT weapon tested in 2007, could only reach LEO where the critical systems of communication and navigation do not operate.23 Even if China can build an ASAT capable of reaching Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) where GPS and intelligence-gathering assets operate, such an offensive operation will face two critical issues. First, in a crisis situation, it would take Chinese ASATs an average of five hours or more to move from LEO to GEO in order to target US strategic space assets.24 Such a delay would give the adversary enough time to relocate the assets to safe distances from attack. Second, even if China manages to take out a few GPS and communication assets, the US would still retain several redundant systems to maintain a functional C4ISR infrastructure. This severely reduces the strategic advantages that ground-based ASATs have to offer. 25 Furthermore, simulations of ASAT attacks by India and China conducted by scholars Gopalaswamy and Kampani demonstrate that even a small skirmish in space will have devastating effects. For example, take a scenario where India and China both target two satellites each. The result shows that the debris created from such a scenario would result in anywhere between 0.7 and 1.2 collisions once every 10 years. According to what is known as the “Kessler syndrome,” the debris created from these collisions would create even more debris, and continue having a cascading effect. 26 At the same time, the political consequences of using ground-based ASATs would also be severe since systems like GPS are used several countries across the globe. Therefore, ASATs are high-risk weapons and yield limited rewards.

#### Satellites are an afterthought – they reflect ongoing conflicts, but don’t cause them. Their ev is media hype.

Bowen, PhD in International Politics, ‘18

(Bleddyn, AberystwythUniversity, LecturerIR@UniversityOfLeicester, MScEcon&SecurityStudies@AberystwythUniversity, <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/>, February 20) BW

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.

#### We’d survive nuclear war – agriculture solves.

Denkenberger, PhD, et al ’17

(David C., BuildingSystems@Boulder, D. Dorothea Cole, Mohamed Abdelkhaliq, Michael Griswold, Allen B. Hundley, Joshua M. Pearce, “Feeding Everyone if the Sun is Obscured and Industry is Disabled,” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, Volume 21) BW

A number of catastrophes could block the sun, including asteroid/comet impact, super volcanic eruption, and nuclear war with the burning of cities (nuclear winter). The problem of feeding 7 billion people would arise (the food problem is more severe than other problems associated with these catastrophes). Previous work has shown this is possible converting stored biomass to food if industry is present. A number of risks could destroy electricity globally, including a series of high-altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMPs) caused by nuclear weapons, an extreme solar storm, and a super computer virus. Since industry depends on electricity, it is likely there would be a collapse of the functioning of industry and machines. Additional previous work has shown that it is technically feasible to feed everyone given the loss of industry without the loss of the sun. It is possible that one of these sun-blocking scenarios could occur near in time to one of these industry-disabling scenarios. This study analyzes food sources in these combined catastrophe scenarios. Food sources include extracting edible calories from killed leaves, growing mushrooms on leaves and dead trees, and feeding the residue to cellulose-digesting animals such as cattle and rabbits. Since the sun is unlikely to be completely blocked, fishing and growing ultraviolet (UV) and cold-tolerant crops in the tropics could be possible. The results of this study show these solutions could enable the feeding of everyone given minimal preparation, and this preparation should be a high priority now.

#### Scenario 2 --

**Turn -- Heg structurally causes interventions that create more instability, prolif, and terror.**

**Ashford, PhD, 19**

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 6, CNAS)

Military intervention abroad is **not a bug, but rather a feature of American primacy**. Certainly, some would argue that disasters like the Iraq war are a momentary aberration in a broader pattern of benevolent foreign policy behavior. Yet supporters of primacy are often schizophrenic about this issue. Hal Brands, for example, has argued both that democracy promotion is a core liberal project, and that the norms of nonaggression and sovereignty are paramount to the U.S.-led order.10 Others describe humanitarian or pro-democracy intervention as a necessary – even core – component of maintaining international order.11 In reality, the broad, sweeping goals of liberal internationalism almost inevitably lead to intervention, at least in an era of unipolarity. The rationale may vary from case to case, but illiberal behavior – military conquest –typically is excused as justifiable in the service of liberal goals,12 from nonproliferation in Iraq, to human rights in Libya or Kosovo, to counterterrorism in Niger and Cameroon. Since the end of the Cold War and the end of bipolarity, such interventions have become substantially more numerous; by one estimate, the United States engaged in four times as many military interventions since 1992 as during the whole of the Cold War.13 American endorsement of problematic norms like the Responsibility to Protect have only added to the problem. The results of the intervention trap have been dire. The **few moderate successes have been largely outweighed by an impressive number of failures**. The war in Iraq upset the balance of power in the Middle East and helped to contribute to the rise of ISIS. The U.S.-installed government of Afghanistan continues to slowly lose ground against a resurgent Taliban. The intervention in Libya produced an ongoing civil conflict. And American actions in these cases may be **driving dictators elsewhere – like North Korea’s Kim Jong Un – to pursue the protection that only nuclear weapons can bring.** Even interventions like Kosovo, typically viewed as more benign, can be problematic. As James Goldgeier notes, “Because it ended with NATO victorious and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic irreversibly weakened, it does not get the same level of attention as the 2003 Iraq War or the 2011 intervention in Libya. But it should.”14 Confrontations with both Russia and China during the Kosovo intervention helped to worsen relations, and the intervention itself later served as a precedent for the Bush administration’s unilateral invasion of Iraq. On a broader level, the exponential growth of U.S. counterterrorism commitments overseas – from drone strikes to special ops forces and the deployment of troops to engage in “train-and-equip” missions – **has driven groups with predominantly local grievances into the arms of global terror groups, and has increased radicalization** in various areas.15 Counterterrorism missions are frequently invisible to the American people, and policymakers rarely debate their missions or cost, continuing to rely on the dated 2001 Authorization to use Military Force. Constant interventions squander blood and treasure, all while **chipping away at U.S. military readiness.**16 As Michael Spirtas of Rand describes, “Almost two decades of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in a generation of American service members with little experience in thinking about or preparing for major power conflict.”17 These outcomes are **not the consequence of a few poor decisions, but rather of the core motivating concepts of primacy** and its expansive aims. If we continue to adhere to a strategy that views America as the world’s policeman and savior, we will remain stuck in **the intervention trap.**

**By every standard American primacy has failed – causes great power competition and hastens multipolarity.**

**Ashford, PhD, 19**

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 5-6, CNAS)

To adjudicate the success or failure of today’s grand strategy, we therefore need to look at the post–Cold War period. The goals set by proponents of liberal internationalism during this period were clearly expansive. Maintaining primacy – military and economic – was in many ways **the least important**.6 Indeed, as Richard Haass put it, America’s purpose was “not to resist multipolarity . . . but to define it,” creating a world with few wars, no proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, an open economic system, and an obligation to humanitarian intervention where necessary.7 **By the standards of its defenders, therefore, America’s current grand strategy has clearly been a failure**. The world has not been reshaped.8 Yet **even by more modest standards, it has largely failed.** Stephen Walt argues that “both the overall condition of the world and America’s status within it had declined steadily

and significantly between 1993 and 2016 . . . . Great power competition had returned with a vengeance, weapons of mass destruction continued to spread, terrorists and other violent extremists were an active force in more places, [and] the Middle East was in turmoil.”9 To put it another way, America entered the 1990s with perhaps the greatest peace dividend ever seen. Today, it limps towards 2020 in **a disordered world with many of those benefits squandered.** American grand strategy cannot be blamed for all of these developments. The rise of China and the slide toward a multipolar world were both **inevitable and widely predicted** two decades ago. **But primacy has worsened many of these trends, or, as in the case of great-power competition, hastened their arrival**. Central to understanding the failures of America’s current grand strategy are three contemporary problems.

#### Space competition good – econ, tech, exploration

**Goswami** **21** (Swish Goswami is a Canadian entrepreneur, author, speaker, and investor. He is the CEO of Trufan, a tech company that builds products to improve brand engagement while directly compensating users for their data. https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/09/14/why-the-billionaire-space-race-is-a-good-thing/?sh=57b8d27a2899)//HWLND

This space race unified a country, created 400,000 jobs across science, technology and manufacturing and inspired a generation to think ambitiously. The impacts of the original Space Race are still felt today. NASA’s 2019 article highlights some of the Apollo technologies still in use more than 50 years after the moon landing. Their list includes things like digital flight controls, food safety, space blankets, quake-proofing, rechargeable hearing aids and more! Positives Area Of Impact While we saw lots of innovation from the previous Space Race, I think we’re going to see even more in this next rendition. Here are five positive impacts I think we’ll see as a result of the Billionaire Space Race. 1. Technology I just listed a handful of technological inventions developed during the 1960s moon landing that are still in use today. Of course, we’re going to see new technology around space travel; SpaceX has already developed the Falcon 9, the “first orbital-class rocket capable of reflight.” But beyond that, CNBC has reported that “hundreds of start-ups have flocked to the space sector, bringing sophisticated technologies that include artificial intelligence, quantum computing, phased array radar, space-based solar power [and] ‘tiny’ satellites and services.” 2. Exploration Man first looked across the seas, and now he looks across the stars. To date, we’ve only explored about 4% of the visible universe — there’s a lot more exploration to be had. One billionaire I’ve yet to mention in this Space Race is Yuri Millner. Yuri is an Israeli-Russian billionaire who funded a $100 million project known as “Breakthrough Starshot,” which, according to Forbes, “aims to send tiny, quarter-inch by quarter-inch devices containing cameras and transmitters to the closest star system to Earth, Alpha Centauri” in hopes of helping to answer the question, “Are we alone in the universe?” Fellow billionaire and Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg is also a board member. 3. Travel All three of the main players in privatized space travel are aiming to make the option of going to space a reality for civilians. Virgin Galactic shares the following quote from Richard Branson on its website: “I really hope that there will be millions of kids all over the world who will be captivated and inspired about the possibility of them going to space one day.” Furthermore, all three companies have pages on their websites where you can indicate you would like to be on one of their future missions. SpaceX has their “Ridesharing Tab,” Blue Origin allows you to “Reserve A Seat” and Virgin Galactic has a tab where you can “Become an Astronaut.” 4. Sustainability In my previous article, I explored how nature is changing thanks to tech in order to help reduce the impact humans have had on Earth. As opposed to using technology to reduce the impact here on Earth, Jeff Bezos believes we need to leave Earth in order to reduce our impact. We can see this in Blue Origin’s vision statement: “In order to preserve Earth, Blue Origin believes that humanity will need to expand, explore, find new energy and material resources, and move industries that stress Earth into space.” 5. Colonization In addition to taking certain industries off Earth, we’ll also be taking people off of the Earth. Bezos was recently quoted in a recent Politico article, where he says, “We will have to leave this planet.” Jeff Bezos has declared, “[W]e’re going to leave it, and it’s going to make this planet better.” SpaceX’s mission is to ultimately colonize Mars and make people an interplanetary species as the company’s founder, Elon Musk, said at SXSW in 2018, “It’s important to get a self-sustaining base on Mars because it’s far enough away from earth that [in the event of a war] it’s more likely to survive than a moon base.” What This Means For Tech This means jobs and opportunities. Investment in space companies hit an all-time high in 2020, with $8.9 billion being invested. We can assume that that number would’ve been higher had there not been a global pandemic as well. 400,000 jobs were created in the ‘60s, and I expect even more jobs to be created this time around. This presents a great opportunity for companies hoping to get involved in any of the infrastructure and technology necessary in the race. It’s an exciting time for technology and the world — not only do we get to watch history being made before our eyes, but we get to be a part of making it as well.

#### Non-state actors in space are conflict dampeners – they avoid geopolitical tension and have financial incentives to keep conflict low

Frankowski 17 (Pawel, Assistant Professor at the Faculty of National Security. His current research interests include space policy, labour standards in free trade agreements, and theories of international relations, Jagiellonian University in Kakow, “OUTER SPACE AND PRIVATE COMPANIES CONSEQUENCES FOR GLOBAL SECURITY”, <https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.14.2017.50.06>)

In the terms of privatization and space security, space remains relatively untapped, but commercial and military benefits from space exploration/exploitation could even lead to ‘privatization of space’. Such privatization will result from growing pressure on spacefaring countries to defect from cooperation, since is less viable with good number of multiple actors who entered the space.36 However, space policy and space research are characterized by very high costs, which are rather impossible to bear by private companies, limited by economic calculation. As pointed out earlier, under-investment in technological development by private companies it is related to the fact that these actors are not focused on profits of a social nature, such as improving the quality of life of the recipient of the product.37 This makes some technology, potentially beneficial to society, not developed or introduced into use, because the profit margin is too small to make this viable for commercial players. To conclude, privatization of space security can develop in unexpected ways, but in today’s space environment private actors would rather play the role of security regulators than security providers. When investment in space technologies is less profitable than other areas of economy, private actors would focus on soft law and conflict prevention in space, and new private initiatives will appear. For example, apart from important space companies, as SpaceX or Blue Origin active in outer space, other private actors as Secure World Foundation (SWF), who focus on space sustainability, will play more important role in crafting international guidelines for space activities.38 This path the way for future solutions and projects, as cleaning the space debris, extracting resources from asteroids and planetoids, refuelling satellites, providing payload capabilities for governmental entities on market-based logic, will be based on activity non-state actors, providing soft law and regulatory solutions, where space faring states are unable to find any compromise. Therefore private companies will be in fact global (or space) regulators, as part of UNCOPUS, being involved in space activities.39 The last argument for private involvement in space security comes from an approach based on common good and resilience of space assets, emphasized by the Project Ploughshares, as an important part of space security. As of 2017 there are more than 700,000 man-made objects on the Earth’s orbit bigger than 1 cm, while 17,000 of them are bigger than 10 cm.40 Some of them are traced by SSA systems, both American and European, but these systems are public-military owned, and private operators are not granted any access to this data. Any collision of space object with space debris, even with small particles, might result in a chain reaction, called Kessler’s syndrome, and not only private but public, and military assets will be destroyed or impaired. In such conditions, a reluctant cooperation between the public and private sector, and unwillingness to share vulnerable data by public actors seem to confirm that private space activity is more than necessary. This is an apparent case when logic of mistrust between state powers must be overcome by private actors, perhaps by suggesting common preferences for debris mitigation, and space situational awareness. In the case of space debris, Space Data Association, an initiative supported by private sector, with its main aim to enhance data sharing between commercial satellite operators, could be an example of nascent public good provided by private actors for the sake of global security.