# 1NC

## 1

#### A] the aff must implement a plan

#### B] Violation –

#### Resolved means a policy

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### C. Fairness-

#### 1. Debate is a game: there’s a winner and loser, competitive norms, the tournament invite proves. Alternative impacts like activism or education can be pursued in other places. This makes fairness the most important impact

#### 2. Not defending the topic is not fair

#### A. Preparation- altering the topic gives the aff a huge edge, they can prepare for half a year on an issue that catches us by surprise. Preparation is better than thinking on your feet- research demonstrates pedagogical humility and research skills are the only portable debate training

#### B. Limits- there are a finite amount of government restrictions, but an infinite number of non topical affs. Consider this our “library disad”- not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months.

#### C. Causality- debating the resolution forces the affirmative to defend a cause and effect relationship, the state doing x results in y. Non topical affs establish their own barometer “I think x is good for me” that aren’t negateable. Only the neg promotes switch side debate.

#### D. Exclusionary rule- you can’t vote on the case outweighs T because lack of preparation prevents rigorous testing of the AC claims and inflates the credence of their arguments. If we win fairness we don’t have to “outweigh” other impacts

## 2

#### Three specific links to their 1AC

#### A. Historical Amnesia- their historiography totally ignores that class was the central element, historical, of the ascriptive hierarchies that marginalize Asian identity and experience

#### B. Intertextuality- their focus on linguistic critique/spoken word reinforces a postmodern strategy of obscuring materiality

#### C. Personal experience- individual oppression as a lens occludes class struggle

**San Juan Jr.PhD 91** (E, Beyond Identity Politics: The Predicament o f the Asian American Writer in Late Capitalism American L ite ra r y H isto ry , Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 542-565 )

With the presumed collapse of the transcendental grounds for universal standards of norms and values, proponents of the postmodern “revolution” in cultural studies in Europe and North America have celebrated differance, marginality, nomadic and decentered identities, indeterminacy, simulacra and the sublime, undecidability, ironic dissemination, textuality, and so forth. A multiplicity of power plays and **language games supposedly abounds.** The intertextuality of power, desire, and interest begets **strategies of positionalities**. So take your pick. Instead of the totalizing master narratives of Enlightenment progress, postmodern thinkers valorize the local, the heterogeneous, the contingent and conjunctural. Is it still meaningful to speak of truth? Are we still permitted to address issues of class, gender, and race? What are the implications of this postmodern “transvaluation” of paradigms for literary studies in general and minority/ ethnic writing in particular? One salutary repercussion has been the questioning of the Eurocentric canonical archive by feminists, peoples of color, dissenters inside and outside. The poststructuralist critique of the self-identical Subject (by convention white, bourgeois, patriarchal) **has inspired a perspectivalist revision** of various disciplinary approaches in history, comparative aesthetics, and others. To cite three inaugural examples: Houston Baker’s text-specific inventory of the black vernacular “blues” tradition presented in Blues, Ideology and Afro-American Literature (1984), Arnold Krupat’s foregrounding of oral tribal allegory in American Indian autobiographies enabled by a “materially situated historicism” in The Voice in the Margin (1989), and Ramon Saldivar’s dialectical assessment of Chicano narrative as an “oppositional articulation” of the gaps and silences in American literary history, a thesis vigor ously argued in Chicano Narrative (1990). Premised on the notion that everything is socio-discursively constructed, these initiatives so far have not been paralleled by Asian American intellectuals. Who indeed will speak for this composite group? One would suspect that the rubric “Asian American,” itself an artificial hypostasis of unstable elements, would preemptively vitiate any unilateral program of systematization. In addition, Asian Americans’ being judged by media and government as a “model minority,” some allegedly whiter than whites (see Themstrom 252; Lee), makes their marginality quite problematic. Perhaps more than other peoples of color, Asian Americans find themselves trapped in a classic postmodern predicament: essentialized by the official pluralism as formerly the “Yellow Peril” and now the “Superminority,” they nevertheless seek to reaffirm their complex internal differences in projects of hybrid and syncretic genealogy. Objectified by state-ordained juridical exclusions (Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos share this historically unique commonality), they pursue **particularistic agendas** for economic and cultural autonomy. Given these antinomic forces at work, can Asian American writers collectively pursue **a “molecular micropolitics” of marginality**? What is at stake if a well-known authority on ethnic affairs like Ronald Takaki (whose recent book affords a point of departure for my metacommentary) tries to articulate the identity-in-difference of this fragmented and dispersed ensemble of ethnoP. (see Grigulevich and Kozlov 17-44). How does a postmodern politics of identity refract the innovative yet tradition-bound performances of the Chinese American Maxine Hong Kingston and the Filipino American Carlos Bulosan? Given the crisis of the postmodern politics of identity, can we legitimately propose an oppositional “emergency” strategy of writing whose historic agency is still on trial or, as it were, on reprieve? **My inquiry begins with remarks on Asian American history’s textuality as prelude to its possible aesthetic inscription**. In composing Strangers from a Different Shore in a period when the planet is beginning to be homogenized by a new pax EuroAmericana, a “New World Order” spawning (as I write) from the Persian Gulf, Takaki has performed for us the unprecedented task of unifying the rich, protean, intractable diversity of Asian lives in the US without erasing the specificities, the ramifying genealogies, the incommensurable repertoire of idiosyncrasies of each constituent group—a postmodern feat of reconciling incommensurables, to say the least. There are of course many discrete chronicles of each Asian community, mostly written by sympathetic Euro-American scholars before Takaki’s work. But what distinguishes Takaki’s account, aside from his empathy with his subject and documentary trustworthiness, is its claim to represent the truth based on the prima facie **experiences** of individuals. At once we are confronted with the crucial problem plaguing such claims to veracity or authenticity: Can these subalterns represent themselves (to paraphrase Gayatri Spivak) as self-conscious members of a collectivityfor-itself? **Or has Takaki mediated the immediacy of naive experience with a theory of representation that privileges the homo economicus as the founding subject of his discourse**?1 No one should underestimate Takaki’s achievement here in challenging the tenability of the received dogma (espoused by Nathan Glazer and other neoconservative pundits) that the European immigrant model of successful assimilation applies to peoples of color in the US (see Takaki, “Reflections”). Europe’s Others, hitherto excluded from the canonical tradition, are beginning to speak and present themselves so as to rectify the mystifying re-presentation of themselves. In this light, Takaki is to be credited above all for giving Asian Americans a synoptic view of their deracinated lives by making them (as protagonists who discover their roles and destinies in the process) perform the drama of their diverse singularities. This is stage-managed within the framework of a chronological history of their **ordeals in struggling to survive**, adapt, and multiply in a hostile habitat, with their accompanying rage and grief and laughter. By a montage of personal testimony—anecdotes, letters, songs, telegrams, eyewitness reports, confessions, album photographs, quotidian fragments, cliches and banalities of everyday life—juxtaposed with statistics, official documents, reprise of punctual events, Takaki skillfully renders a complex drama of Asians enacting and living their own history. We can perhaps find our own lives already anticipated, pantomimed, rounded off, and judged in one of his varied “talk stories”—a case of life imitating the art of history. Granted the book’s “truth-effects,” I enter a caveat. For all its massive accumulation of raw data and plausible images of numerous protagonists and actions spanning more than a century of wars and revolutions, Takaki’s narrative leaves us wondering whether the collective life-trajectory of Asian Americans imitates the **European immigrant success** story, spiced with quaint “Oriental” twists—which he clearly implies at the end. If so, it is just one thread of the national fabric, no more tormented nor pacified than any other. If not, then this history is unique in some way that escapes the traditional emplotment of previous annals deriving from the master narrative of hu mankind’s continuous material improvement, self-emancipation, and techno-administrative mastery conceived by the philosophes of the European Enlightenment. Either way, there is no reason for Asian Americans to feel excluded from the grand March of Progress. Our puzzlement, however, is not clarified by the book’s concluding chapter, which exposes the myth of the “model minority” in an eloquent argument, assuring us that Asian Americans did not “let the course of their lives be determined completely by the ‘necessity’ of race and class” (473). In the same breath Takaki warns of a resurgent tide of racially motivated attacks against Asian Americans manifested in the media, in campus harassments, in the 1982 murder of Vincent Chin mistaken for a Japanese by unemployed Detroit autoworkers (and, I might add here, in the January 1989 massacre of Vietnamese and Cambodian schoolchildren in Stockton, California, by a man obsessed with hatred for Southeast Asian refugees). During this same period, in contrast, the judicial victory of the Japanese concentration camp internees’ demand for redress and reparations as well as the growing visibility of Asian American artists furnishes convincing proof that what David Harvey calls the post-Fordist post-Keynesian system (173-78) still allows dreams to come true, that is, allows Asian Americans the opportunity in particular “to help America accept and appreciate its diversity.” Calculating the losses and gains, Takaki prudentially opts for a meliorative closure. In retrospect, the telos of Strangers from a Different Shore can be thematized as the Asian immigrants’ almost miraculous struggle for survival and recognition of their desperately won middle-class status. What is sought is the redemption of individual sacrifices by way of conformity to the utilitarian, **competitive ethos of a business society.** Reversing the dismaying prospect for Asian Americans forecast in an earlier survey, American Racism (1970) by Roger Daniels and Harry Kitano, Takaki offers a balance sheet for general consumption: Asian Americans are no longer victimized by legislation denying them naturalized citizenship and landownership. They have begun to exercise their political voices and have representatives in both houses of Congress as well as in state legislatures and on city councils. They enjoy much of the protection of civil rights laws that outlaw racial discrimination in employment as well as housing and that provide for affirmative action for racial minorities. They have greater freedom than did the earlier immigrants to embrace their own “diversity”—their own cultures as well as their own distinctive physical characteristics, such as their complexion and the shape of their eyes. (473-74) It now becomes clear that despite its encyclopedic scope and archival competence, Takaki’s somewhat premature synthesis is a learned endeavor to deploy a strategy of **containment.** His rhetoric activates a mode of comic emplotment where all problems are finally resolved through hard work and individual effort, inspired by past memories of clan solidarity and intuitive faith in a gradually improving future. **What is this if not a refurbished version of the liberal ideology of a market-centered, pluralist society where all disparities in values and beliefs**—nay, even the sharpest contradictions implicating race, class, and gender—can be harmonized within the prevailing structure of power relations? This is not to say that such attempts to empower disenfranchised nationalities are futile or deceptive. But **what needs a more than gestural critique is the extent to which such reforms do not eliminate the rationale for the hierarchical, invidious categorizing of people by race** (as well as by gender and class) and their subsequent deprivation. Lacking such self-reflection, unable to problematize his theoretical organon, Takaki has superbly accomplished the articulation of the **hegemonic doctrine of acquisitive/possessive liberalism** as the informing principle of Asian American lives. Whether this is an effect of postmodern tropology or a symptom of “bad faith” investing the logic of elite populism, I am not quite sure. My reservations are shared by other Asian American observers who detect an apologetic agenda in such **liberal historiography.** At best, Takaki’s text operates an ironic, if not duplicitous, strategy: to counter hegemonic Eurocentrism, which erases the Asian American presence, a positivist-empiricist **valorization of “lived experience” is carried out within the master narrative of evolutionary, gradualist progress**. The American “Dream of Success” is thereby ultimately vindicated. This is not to suggest that historians like Takaki have suddenly been afflicted with amnesia, forgetting that it is the totalizing state practice of this ideology of market liberalism that underlies, for one, the violent colonial domination of peoples of color and the rape of the land of such decolonizing territories as the Philippines (my country of origin) and Puerto Rico in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. It is the social practice of an expansive political economy which converts humans to exchangeable commodities (African chattel slavery in the South) and commodified labor power, thus requiring for its industrial take-off a huge supply of free labor—hence the need for European immigrants, especially after the Civil War, and the genocidal suppression of the American Indians. It is the expansion of this social formation that recruited Chinese coolies for railroad construction (the “fathers” poignantly described in Kingston’s China Men) and Japanese and Filipino labor (and Mexican braceros later) for agribusiness in Hawaii and California and for the canneries in Alaska. It is this same hegemonic worldview of free monopoly enterprise, also known as the “civilizing mission” of Eurocentric humanism, that forced the opening of the China market in the Opium Wars of the nineteenth century and the numerous military interventions in China and Indochina up to the Vietnam War and the coming of the “boat people.” Of course it is also the power/knowledge episteme of the modernization process in Kenya, South Korea, Mexico, Indonesia, Egypt, Grenada, and all the neocolonial or peripheral dependencies of the world-system named by Immanuel Wallerstein as “historical capitalism” (13-43; see Amin). **It is now generally acknowledged that we cannot understand the situation of Asian Americans in the US today or in the past without a thorough comprehension of the global relations of power, the capitalist world-system that “pushed” populations from the colonies and dependencies and “pulled” them to terrain where a supply of cheap labor was needed**. These relations of power broke up families, separating husbands from wives and parents from children; at present they motivate the “warm body export” of cheap labor from Thailand, the Philippines, and elsewhere. They legitimate the unregulated market for brides and hospitality girls, the free trade zones, and other postmodern schemes of capital accumulation in Third World countries. The discourse of the liberal free market underpins these power relations, constructing fluid georacial boundaries to guarantee the supply of cheap labor. Race acquires salience in this world-system when, according to John Rex, “the language of racial difference. . . becomes the means whereby men allocate each other to different social and economic positions. . . . The exploitation of clearly marked groups in a variety of different ways is integral to Capitalism.. . . Ethnic groups unite and act together because they have been subjected to distinct and differentiated types of exploitation” (406-07). The colonization and industrialization of the North American continent epitomize the asymmetrical power relations characteristic of this world-system. The sociocultural formation of global apartheid has been long in the making. Studies like Eric Wolf’s Europe and the People Without History (1982) or Richard Bamet and Ronald Muller’s Global Reach (1974), to mention only the elementary texts, show that the migration of peoples around the world, the displacement of refugees, or the forced expulsion and exile of individuals and whole groups (the Palestinian diaspora is the most flagrant) have occurred not by choice or accident but by the complex interaction of political, economic, and social forces from the period of mercantile capitalism to colonialism, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, continuing into the imperialism of the twentieth century. **This genealogy of domination, the self-reproduction of its mechanisms and the sedimentation of its effects, is what is occluded in Takaki’s narrative** (see Nakanishi).

#### The aff’s focus on ridding racism against Asian American serves to exacerbate the oppression of capitalism—the alt is a prerequisite—only by addressing the issues of capitalism and class stratification can we engage racism as a whole

**Koshy, 1** Ph.D. @ UCLA Associate Professor of Asian American Studies, English @ University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign,

[Susan, “Morphing Race into Ethnicity: Asian Americans and Critical Transformations of Whiteness”, Boundary 2 , Vol. 28.1, pg 191-93, Duke University Press, Project Muse]

Virulent political rhetoric and widespread anti-immigrant sentiment has resulted (most of the public is not watching when the hysteria periodically whipped up by media and politicians dies down) not in signiﬁcant curtailment of immigration but in the prioritizing and expansion of skilled worker categories that offer quick, low-cost solutions to corporate demands for labor. On 3 October 2000, Congress passed a bill increasing the cap from 115,000 to 195,000 for H1-B visas for specialized workers, such as computer programmers, over the next three years.72 The change in immigration laws, by expanding skilled-worker categories and establishing new cate- gories of investment-based citizenship, has resulted in a signiﬁcant number of incoming middle- and upper-class Asian immigrants.73 Their class status often insulates them from the harshest effects of the experiences from which the antiracist discourses of the civil rights movement derive, and their educational (generally in the sciences) and career paths often bypass the arenas where the politics of race is engaged in a sustained way. This is not to suggest that middle-class Asian Americans are no longer subject to racism or discrimination, nor is it to ignore the existence of a segment of the Asian American population itself (illegal immigrants, refugee groups, sweatshop workers) that remains trapped in poverty. Signiﬁ cant economic disparities exist across the various Asian American national groups, and underemployment remains a persistent problem. Indeed, without foregrounding the effects of class stratiﬁcation and differential minoritization, we will be unable to engage the problem of Asian Americans as the agents of exploitation and its victims, especially in instances where invocations of ethnic and national loyalties form the conduits for coercion and control. Furthermore, scholars of transnationalism and globalization have pointed to the emergence of a transnational capitalist class in the global triad of Europe, North America, and East Asia, which is now rapidly integrating the South within its circuits. As William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris observe, ‘‘Transnationalization of the capital circuit implies as well the transnationalization of the agents of capital. As national circuits of capital become transnationally integrated, these new transnational circuits become the sites of class formation worldwide.’’74 The rapid growth of East and some Southeast Asian economies, the dramatic increase in foreign direct investment into and from these countries, and the intensiﬁed transnationalization and externalization of many Asian economies as a result of the structural adjustments following the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis require that we move away from an implicit model of chromatic capitalism, in which oppressors are white and their victims are nonwhite. Since the 1990s, the value of the transnationality index for the top ﬁfty transnational corporations (TNCs) from developing countries has been increasing steadily, and they have built up their foreign assets almost seven times faster than the world’s top one hundred TNCs between 1993 and 1996.75 Of the top twenty ﬁve TNCs from developing countries, more than 55 percent are headquartered in East Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Taiwan);76 Japan is ranked with developing countries and has four out of the top twenty-ﬁve TNCs.77 The transpaciﬁc and transatlantic integration of capital circuits in this era requires us to rethink concepts of agency and minoritization, because global capitalism has been characterized by its ability to use and deploy multiculturalism and cultural difference. In the present context, the agency of Asian Americans is imbricated in differentiated relationships to domination in the uneven terrain of transnationalism and requires a theorization of Asian American agency in complicity and in resistance. We cannot assume that ‘‘outsideness’’ to the nation is inherently subversive when it can be deﬁned very differently in the ‘‘guerilla transnationalism’’ of ﬂexible citizenship adopted as a business strategy by an Asian American capitalist78 and in the working conditions of an undocumented Asian American restaurant worker.

#### Capitalism is the root cause of the model minority myth – it explains the criteria we use and Why white society views Asians that way.

Gans 05 (Herbert J., merican sociologist who has taught at Columbia University between 1971 and 2007, “Race as Class”, Contexts 4:4, November 2005, University of Michigan Libraries)//AS

In fact, the skin colors and facial features commonly used to define race are selected precisely because, when arranged hierarchically, they resemble the country’s class-and-status hierarchy. Thus, whites are on top of the socioeconomic pecking order as they are on top of the racial one, while variously shaded nonwhites are below them in socioeconomic position (class) and prestige (status). The darkest people are for the most part at the bottom of the class-status hierarchy. This is no accident, and Americans have therefore always used race as a marker or indicator of both class and status. Sometimes they also use it to enforce class position, to keep some people “in their place.” Indeed, these uses are a major reason for its persistence. Of course, race functions as more than a class marker, and the correlation between race and the socioeconomic pecking order is far from statistically perfect: All races can be found at every level of that order. Still, the race-class correlation is strong enough to utilize race for the general ranking of others. It also becomes more useful for ranking dark-skinned people as white poverty declines so much that whiteness becomes equivalent to being middle or upper class. The relation between race and class is unmistakable. For example, the l998–2000 median household income of non- Hispanic whites was $45,500; of Hispanics (currently seen by many as a race) as well as Native Americans, $32,000; and of African Americans, $29,000. The poverty rates for these same groups were 7.8 percent among whites, 23.1 among Hispanics, 23.9 among blacks, and 25.9 among Native Americans. (Asians’ median income was $52,600—which does much to explain why we see them as a model minority.)

#### Focus on rhetoric as a locus of reform is ivory tower theorizing that sanitizes material neoliberal exploitation.

McLaren 04 Scatamburl D’Annibale, V. [University of Windsor, Ontario] & McLaren, P. [University of California] (2004). Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ”difference” Philosophy and Theory, 36(2), 183–199. doi:10.1111/j.1469-5812.2004.00060.x

It is remarkable, in our opinion, that so much of contemporary social theory has largely abandoned the problems of labor, capitalist exploitation, and class analysis at a time when capitalism is becoming more universal, more ruthless and more deadly. The metaphor of a contemporary ‘tower of Babel’ seems appropriate Class Dismissed? 193 © 2004 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia here—academics striking radical poses in the seminar rooms while remaining oblivious to the possibility that their seemingly radical discursive maneuvers do nothing to further the struggles ‘against oppression and exploitation which continue to be real, material, and not merely “discursive” problems of the contemporary world’ (Dirlik, 1997, p. 176). Harvey (1998, pp. 29–31) indicts the new academic entrepreneurs, the ‘masters of theory-in-and-for-itself’ whose ‘discourse radicalism’ has deftly side-stepped ‘the enduring conundrums of class struggle’ and who have, against a ‘sobering background of cheapened discourse and opportunistic politics,’ been ‘stripped of their self-advertised radicalism.’ For years, they ‘contested socialism,’ ridiculed Marxists, and promoted ‘their own alternative theories of liberatory politics’ but now they have largely been ‘reduced to the role of supplicants in the most degraded form of pluralist politics imaginable.’ As they pursue the politics of difference, the ‘class war rages unabated’ and they seem ‘either unwilling or unable to focus on the unprecedented economic carnage occurring around the globe.’ Harvey’s searing criticism suggests that post-Marxists have been busy fiddling while Rome burns and his comments echo those made by Marx (1978, p. 149) in his critique of the Young Hegelians who were, ‘in spite of their allegedly “worldshattering” statements, the staunchest conservatives.’ Marx lamented that the Young Hegelians were simply fighting ‘phrases’ and that they failed to acknowledge that in offering only counter-phrases, they were in no way ‘combating the real existing world’ but merely combating the phrases of the world. Taking a cue from Marx and substituting ‘phrases’ with ‘discourses’ or ‘resignifications’ we would contend that the practitioners of difference politics who operate within exaggerated culturalist frameworks that privilege the realm of representation as the primary arena of political struggle question some discourses of power while legitimating others. Moreover, because they lack a class perspective, their gestures of radicalism are belied by their own class positions.10 As Ahmad (1997a, p. 104) notes: One may speak of any number of disorientations and even oppressions, but one cultivates all kinds of politeness and indirection about the structure of capitalist class relations in which those oppressions are embedded. To speak of any of that directly and simply is to be ‘vulgar.’ In this climate of Aesopian languages it is absolutely essential to reiterate that most things are a matter of class. That kind of statement is … surprising only in a culture like that of the North American university … But it is precisely in that kind of culture that people need to hear such obvious truths.

#### The neoliberal system feeds on transgression and their symbolic rupture. The aff’s politics creates feedback loops which fuel interventionism and the dead-end politics of debate

James 15

(Robin James- Associate Professor of Philosophy @ UNC Charlotte, Resilience & Melancholy: Pop Music, Feminism, Neoliberalism, Publisher: Zero Books, p. 97-103)//TR

\*\*MRWaSP=Multi-Racial White Supremacist Patriarchy

Neoliberalism upgrades regulatory systems into deregulated ones. In economics, this means controlling the market’s background conditions, rather than market activities themselves; market activities thus appear to operate “free” of direction98 For example, instead of instituting a single-payer health care system, one that ostensibly gives individuals no “choice,” the Affordable Care Act (aka “Obamacare”) allows people to “choose” among a highly circumscribed range of options (huge corporation A versus huge corporation B)—superficially this appears as ‘free choice,’ when in effect background constraints are basically a mode of soft coercion. In the same way that it restructures political economy, neoliberalism revamps the basic organizing principles of art. Regulatory, cinematic practices of objectification, fragmentation, and disavowal have been upgraded into deregulatory post-cinematic resilience.

Section (a) addresses the difference between the male gaze/controlling images and deregulated MRWaSP visualization- Objectification and fragmentation are techniques with which the male gaze and controlling images regulate and exclude femininity in order to control the negative effects of damage. Compositional processes, on the other hand, are deregulatory techniques for producing feminized damage as a resource. Section (b) addresses the difference between the kinds of aesthetic pleasure produced by gazing/controlling, on the one hand, and visualization, on the other. Whereas the “visual pleasure” (a.k.a. “scopophilia”) in the title of Mulvey’s article on the male gaze comes from conquering feminized damage, the pleasure in post-cinematic media comes from resiliently overcoming damage—that Is, from making oneself into something like Tiqqun’s “Young Girl” (the ideal form of neoliberal human capital). 1. Compositional Processes: “Post-cinematic” media upgrades the logic and methods of classical narrative (tonality, the novel, Hollywood cinema) and modernist counter-narrative (like New Wave cinema or hip hop), reworking them into deregulatory practices like open works or generative processes. Regulatory techniques (like narrative, cinematic suturing, the male gaze, and controlling images) damage women for the purpose of excluding them from the undamaged work of art. Radical modernist and post-modernist works recuperate feminized damage as a means of deconstructrng regulations (i.e., as a means of anti-art practice). In both modernist and post-modernist aesthetics, there is a preestablished formal logic, and femininity is instrumentalized in both constructing and deconstructing that logic” Deregulatory techniques, on the other hand, liberate feminized damage so it can be directly put to work. Deregulatory works are organized so they don’t seem organized. Instead of following a pre-given formula, like narrative or tonality, visualization reveals the emergent order in an otherwise anarchic swarm. Structure “can only be apprehended bit by bit…and from moment to moment, through the constructive action of ‘linking’ one space to another” (Shaviro PCA 37). I call this technique “compositional process,” because it shares aspects of Bruno Latour’s concept of “compositionism” and composer Steve Reich’s notion of “gradual process.” “Musical processes,” Reich explains, “determine all the note-to note (sound-to-sound) details and the overall form simultaneously. (Think of a round or infinite canon.) (Reich, 34). Or, as Latour puts It the “micro- and macrocosm are now literally and not simply symbolically connected (HL 381). Unlike improvisation, which happens on top of a strictly regular format architecture (e.g.. a soloist Improvising over fixed chord changes and phrase-lengths), this “just-in-time’ production” (Shaviro PCA 53) is a method of generating emergent order: the moment-to- moment details unfold simultaneously with and as the overarching structure. Compositional processes are flexible and irregular. ‘Looseness or arbitrariness...Is in fact the very point” (Shaviro PCA 74) of structures designed to generate visual (or sonic) damage. “Engineered so as to maximize shock” (Shaviro PCA 80), compositional processes are designed to cultivate aesthetic damage, which manifests, for example, as fragmentation, disjunction, lack of narrative/tonal center or goal, and lack of regular meter or temporality. As I discussed in chapter one, deregulated works can be “entirely incoherent, yet immediately legible to anyone” (Shaviro PC 80) because the superficial chaos is , intentionally produced and controlled for by the work’s immanent structure. If regulation limits and prohibits irrationality and incoherence, deregulated visualization leverages and exploits It. “Things don’t need to harmonize, or fit together” (PCA 53) because deregulatory MRWaSP visualization explicitly affirms the damage that harmonization or integration is designed to obscure. In this way, MRWaSP visualization naturalizes feminized fragmentation, objectification, and incoherence. MRWaSP visualization “controls” feminized damage by amplifying it and putting it to work generating resilient aesthetic/human capital. So, following Shaviro’s analysis, if the cinematic gaze controls by organizing its visual field into active/passive, motion/stillness, subject/object hierarchies, MRWaSP visualization uses compositional processes. “modulation,” and “feedback” to do its work (PCA 16). 101 Sonic and visual “events, like a sample or a post-production effect. “interpenetrate and feed back upon one another” (Shaviro PCA 52) so that a “film’s sheer density of Incidents and references baffles our efforts to ‘translate’ what we see and hear into something more abstract, more metaphorically palatable and easily manageable” (Shaviro 78; emphasis mine). It’s like a DDOS for our eyes, ears, nerves, and brains. We’re given more sensory data than we’re capable of processing, so we have difficulty separating the signal from the noise. As Shaviro puts it, “the headlong rush...is all” (80). Dissonance, then, is the effect of overwhelming “noise” —either literal noise, or biopolitical/statistical “noise.” Being overwhelmed by something too big and/or strong to resist is a feature of conventional femininity and feminine sexuality (especially in rape culture); for example, there’s the fantasy of being swept off one’s Feet. Traditional European aesthetics strive to contain and domesticate overwhelming affects and sensations. For example, Kant’s feeling of sublimity is, as Christine Battersby and other feminist aestheticians have argued, a masculine conquest of potentially overwhelming, and thus feminizing, feelings.102 MRWaSP visualization, on the other hand, treats the experience of overwhelming sensory-affective experience as a net gain, not as a loss of control (because, in a deregulatory scheme, there’s no ‘control’ to lose). Feminized damage is now a resource, not a deficiency, a form of subjectivity and value-production, not a type of objectification and aesthetic/economic devaluation. Or rather, feminized damage is a resource and not a type of devaluation and desubjectification for otherwise privileged women, like professional white women who can “Lean In.” Damage that isn’t explicitly situated in a LIO narrative is treated as evidence of pathology. Persistent, unproblematized objectification are attributes of supposedly “voiceless” or “invisible” women who need to be saved and spoken for. MRWaSP visualization separates out resilient populations who can bounce back from sensory overload from precarious ones who can’t. MRWSSP visualization banks on sensory overload. This overload is the aesthetic equivalent of the “shock” in what Naomi Klein calls “shock capitalism”.’° ‘A variation on Machiavelli’s advice that injuries should be inflicted ‘all at once” (7; emphasis ,mine), Klein explains, this idea of crisis or shock is the foundation for contemporary practices of (re)development, privatization, arid investment. In post-cinematic media, shock- doctrine methods generate a surplus of pleasure. Post-cinematic media are designed to generate, amplify, and transmit damage so that we can hear, see and feel the damage we (or the characters we watch and identify with) ought to overcome. All that damage “makes sense” to audiences as fodder for a spectacular therapeutic narrative: Look, it must be overcome Whereas the male gaze and controlling images create the effect of coherence by blurring ‘damaged’ (feminized, blackened) elements out of focus, deregulated MRWaSP visualization puts damage at the center of our attention. The damage doesn’t just make sense, it feels good. ii. Pleasure: Without the security of universal structures, one must resiliently craft functional resource out of any and everything. Performing or viewing compositional processes, you never know what you’re going to get, what material you’ll have to work with, or what output performers will present you with. Thus, performers and audiences need to be flexible—they must turn damage (incoherence, accidents, chance occurrences) into a performative resource and/or listening pleasure.10’ Resilient subjects take pleasure in “feeling the burn,” as the saying goes. For example, Taio Cruz’s 2O12 single “Hangover” treats a hangover as something to gleefuly celebrate, evidence of one’s “work hard/play hard” cred. Don’t get me wrong—hangovers hurt. But resilient subjects savor and crave that damage like vampires do human blood, because it’s their fuel. It feels good to avow damage as what can be or has been overcome. Resilience discourse habituates us to affirm and avow our damage. In the same way that Pavlov’s dog is just following his programming when he or she drools upon hearing the sound of a bell (because he or she has been trained to associate that sound with the pleasure of eating), we’re just following our programming when we find aesthetic pleasure in being overwhelmed by dissonance—we’ve learned to associate that feeling of overwhelming damage with the pleasure of, feeding our human capital, our “selves,” if you will. This is a very different model of pleasure than the pleasure in gazing or controlling, which comes from avoiding damage. “Visual pleasure” as Muhey argues, is generated by the narrative devices that resolve or obscure challenges to the subject’s autonomy. Failing to acknowledge the work done by the camera allows the protagonist/gazer to feel more powerful and autonomous than he is. Subject/object binaries have the same effect, allowing the gazing subject to feel like he isn’t also the fragmented object of someone else’s gaze. The gaze is the means by which a classically liberal, modernist subject identifies and abjects objects from himself, as subject, and from society. Because the exclusion of the object is what constitutes the subject as such, this exclusion—in, for example, the form of resolution or closure—is invested as the site of traditional aesthetic pleasure. Modernist avant-gardes, on the other hand, produce “damaged goods,” works or subjects whose imperfections critique and oppose dominant aesthetic and ethical norms. In post- or critical-modernity, transgression of exclusionary boundaries is the site of aesthetic pleasure. Examples of this include Dada artists’ exquisite corpses, Afro-modernist antiphony, and feminist art’s use of ugliness and disgust (e.g., in Orlan’s work). Such practices transgress norms of coherence, homophony, and beauty as a means to critique them. This is why Mulvey argues that feminist film and film criticism ought to “make way for a total negation of the ease and plenitude of the narrative fiction film” (835). MRWaSP visualization avows and normalizes visual, compositional, and affective damage, recycling modernist transgression into raw materials for the neoliberal culture industry. Damage isn’t something subjects avoid, or which subjects do to objects — damage is the means and medium of subectification. Post- cinematic looking is a feedback loop in which we make visible, for others, our own self-objectification. To be recognized as a resilient subject, one must be seen by others as actively monitoring oneself (e.g., through quantified self practices like diet or exercise tracking). Because these practices collapse Image” and “bearer of the look” into the same role, conventional subject/object distinctions don’t make much sense. So, instead of producing conventionally gendered male gazers and feminine objects, post-cinematic visualization produces both resilient MRWaSP visualizers and pathological, toxic black holes (i.e., vampiric drains of light, energy, momentum, and so on). The next section focuses on this toxicity and the role of non-resilient women of color in MRWaSP visualization.

#### The alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only party organizing can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct chauvinist tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for global liberation.

Escalante, Philosophy @ UOregon, 18

[Alyson, M.A., is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/>] rVs

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

#### K First - There is no material world that we can separate from the lens through which we view it. Deconstructing the AFF scholarship is a prior question that has material effects.

#### Therefore the ROB is one of deconstruction – vote for the side which best challenges neoliberal scholarship

Springer ‘12

Simon Springer - Department of Geography, University of Otago. “Neoliberalism as discourse: between Foucauldian political economy and Marxian poststructuralism.” Routledge. May 2012. JJN from file \*bracketing in original

Conclusion In arguing for an understanding of neoliberalism as discourse, I do not presume that comprehending neoliberalism separately as a hegemonic ideology, a policy and program, a state form, or as a form of governmentality is wrong or not useful. Rather I have simply attempted to provoke some consideration for the potential reconcilability of the different approaches. My argument should accordingly be read as an effort to destabilize the ostensible incompatibility that some scholars undertaking their separate usage seem keen to assume. Without at least attempting to reconcile the four approaches we risk being deprived of a coherent concept with which to work, and thus concede some measure of credibility to Barnett’s (2005) claim that ‘there is no such thing as neoliberalism’. Such a position renders the entire body of scholarship on neoliberalism questionable, as scholars cannot be sure that they are even discussing the same thing. More perilously, to accept such a claim throws the project of constructing solidarities across space into an uneasy quandary, where the resonant violent geographies of our current moment may go unnoticed, a condition that plays perfectly into the ideological denial maintained by the current capitalist order (Zizek, 2011). In ignoring such relational possibilities for resistance to the contemporary zeitgeist, Barnett (2005) seems keen to engage in disarticulation ad nauseam. Yet deconstruction is meant to be interruptive not debilitating. As Spivak (1996, p. 27) contends, ‘Deconstruction does not say there is no subject, there is no truth, there is no history. ... It is constantly and persistently looking into how truths are formed’. It is about noticing what we inevitably leave out of even the most searching and inclusive accounts of phenomena like neoliberalism, which opens up and allows for discursive understandings. Rather than making nice symmetrical accounts of the ‘real’ at the meeting point of representational performance and structural forces, neoliberalism understood as a discourse is attuned to processual interpretation and ongoing debate. While there are inevitable tensions between the four views of neoliberalism that are not entirely commensurable, their content is not diametrically opposed, and indeed a considered understanding of how power similarly operates in both a Gramscian sense of hegemony and a Foucauldian sense of governmentality points toward a dialectical relationship. Understanding neoliberalism as discourse allows for a much more integral approach to social relations than speech performances alone. This is a discourse that encompasses material forms in state formation through policy and program, and via the subjectivation of individuals on the ground, even if this articulation still takes place through discursive performatives. By formulating discourse in this fashion, we need not revert to a presupposed ‘real-world’ referent to recognize a materiality that is both constituted by and constitutive of discourse. Instead, materiality and discourse become integral, where one cannot exist without the other. It is precisely this understanding of discourse that points to a similitude between poststructuralism and Marxian political economy approaches and their shared concern for power relations. I do not want to conclude that I have worked out all these tensions, my ambition has been much more humble. I have simply sought to open an avenue for dialogue between scholars on either side of the political economy/ poststructuralist divide. The importance of bridging this gap is commensurate with ‘the role of the intellectual ... [in] shaking up habits, ways of acting and thinking, of dispelling commonplace beliefs, of taking a new measure of rules and institutions ... and participating in the formation of a political will’ (Foucault, quoted in Goldstein, 1991, pp. 11– 12). Such reflexivity necessarily involves opening ourselves to the possibility of finding common ground between the epistemic and ontological understandings of political economy and poststructuralism so that together they may assist in disestablishing neoliberalism’s rationalities, deconstructing its strategies, disassembling its technologies, and ultimately destroying its techniques. In changing our minds then, so too might we change the world.

## Case

**Prefer our role of the ballot –**

**1] cap is a prereq to challenging structural oppression**

**Accessibility – framework args come first because fairness is a prereq – we are being accessible by making sure that the round is predictable**

#### The k outweighs and is a DA to the alt – capitalism is a superstructure that controls root cause of what they are melancholic about, the need for melancholia comes from a lack of true joy and capitalism causes that lack

#### Weigh the K against the aff – use scope of solvency to judge the alt – if the aff can’t resolve the impacts of the alt then case is a 6 minute disad