# round 2 1NC

## T

#### INTERPRETATION - the aff can't defend that one country ought to recognize a right to strike. The article “a” implies a nonspecific or generic reading of “a just government”

Walden 20 Walden University [The Writing Center provides a broad range of writing instruction and editing services for students at Walden University, including writing assistance for undergraduates, graduate students, and doctoral capstone writers], “"A" or "An"” last modified July 14 2020, <https://academicguides.waldenu.edu/writingcenter/grammar/articles> SM

When to Use "A" or "An" "A" and "an" are used with singular countable nouns when the noun is nonspecific or generic. I do not own a car. In this sentence, "car" is a singular countable noun that is not specific. It could be any car. She would like to go to a university that specializes in teaching. "University" is a singular countable noun. Although it begins with a vowel, the first sound of the word is /j/ or “y.” Thus, "a" instead of "an" is used. In this sentence, it is also generic (it could be any university with this specialization, not a specific one). I would like to eat an apple. In this sentence, "apple" is a singular countable noun that is not specific. It could be any apple.

#### “Just governments” is a generic bare plural.

Leslie and Lerner 16 Leslie, Sarah-Jane [Sarah-Jane Leslie (Ph.D., Princeton, 2007) is the dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy. She has previously served as the vice dean for faculty development in the Office of the Dean of the Faculty, director of the Program in Linguistics, and founding director of the Program in Cognitive Science at Princeton University. She is also affiliated faculty in the Department of Psychology, the University Center for Human Values, the Program in Gender and Sexuality Studies, and the Kahneman-Treisman Center for Behavioral Science and Public Policy], and Adam Lerner, Ph.D, Postgraduate Research Associate in the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University, 4-24-2016, "Generic Generalizations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/> SM

Isolating the Generic Interpretation Consider the following pairs of sentences: (1) a. Tigers are striped. b. Tigers are on the front lawn. (2) a. A tiger is striped. b. A tiger is on the front lawn. (3) a. The tiger is striped. b. The tiger is on the front lawn. The sentence pairs above are prima facie syntactically parallel—both are subject-predicate sentences whose subjects consist of the same common noun coupled with the same, or no, article. However, the interpretation of first sentence of each pair is intuitively quite different from the interpretation of the second sentence in the pair. In the second sentences, we are talking about some particular tigers: a group of tigers in (1b), some individual tiger in (2b), and some unique salient or familiar tiger in (3b)—a beloved pet, perhaps. In the first sentences, however, we are saying something general. There is/are no particular tiger or tigers that we are talking about. The second sentences of the pairs receive what is called an existential interpretation. The hallmark of the existential interpretation of a sentence containing a bare plural or an indefinite singular is that it may be paraphrased with “some” with little or no change in meaning; hence the terminology “existential reading”. The application of the term “existential interpretation” is perhaps less appropriate when applied to the definite singular, but it is intended there to cover interpretation of the definite singular as referring to a unique contextually salient/familiar particular individual, not to a kind. There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In (1b), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” salva veritate, but in (1a) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, “tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. (1a) does not entail that animals are striped, but (1b) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995). Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in (1a) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in (1b) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.) 1.2 Stage Level and Individual Level Predicates Having distinguished two quite different meanings of these seemingly similar sentence pairs, the question arises: what is the basis of these two interpretations? This is of course a matter of debate, but one important thesis is that it is the predicate that determines which of the two readings the subject will receive, particularly in the case of bare plural generics. In his 1977 dissertation, Greg Carlson argued that the distinction between “stage level” and “individual level” predicates is key here, and proposed that stage level predications give rise to existential readings of bare plurals and indefinite singulars, while individual level ones give rise to generic readings. The distinction between the two types of predicates can be drawn intuitively, and also on the basis of linguistic patterns (Milsark 1974; Carlson 1977; Stump 1985). Semantically, individual level predicates express properties that normally are had by items for quite extended periods, often comprising the items’ whole existence. Stage-level predicates, on the other hand, express properties normally had by items for relatively short time intervals. Some examples of both types are as follows: Individual level predicates “is tall”; “is intelligent”; “knows French”; “is a mammal”; “is female”; “is a singer”; “loves Bob”; “hates Bob” Stage level predicates “is drunk”; “is barking”; “is speaking French”; “is taking an exam”; “is sober”; “is sick”, “is sitting”; “is on the lawn”, “is in the room”. Clearly the semantic distinction is not hard and fast: a teetotaler may be sober for the entire course of his existence, and the chronically ill may be sick for the entire course of theirs, and Alice in Wonderland is tall at some times but short at others. In the normal course of affairs, individual level predicates express more stable and less temporally intermittent properties than stage level ones do. The distinction also manifests itself linguistically. Stage level predicates are permissible in the following constructions, while individual level ones are not: (4) John saw Bill drunk/sober/sick/naked. (5) John saw Bill speaking French/taking an exam/smoking cigarettes. (6) John saw Bill on the lawn/in the room. (7) \*John saw Bill intelligent/tall/a mammal/male. (8) \*John saw Bill knowing French/hating Bob. There-insertion constructions behave similarly: (9) There are men drunk/sober/sick/naked. (10) There are men speaking French/taking an exam/smoking cigarettes. (11) There are men on the lawn/in the room. (12) \*There are men intelligent/tall/mammals/male. (13) \*There are men knowing French/hating Bob. Stage level predicates can be modified by locatives, while individual level ones cannot: (14) John is drunk/speaking French/smoking in 1879 Hall. (15) \*John is a mammal/intelligent/male in 1879 Hall. (16) \*John knows French/hates Bob in 1879 Hall. Carlson noted the difference in syntactic behavior between individual and stage level predicates, and proposed that the distinction between the classes of predicates underlies the distinction between existential and generic readings of bare plurals: (17) Students are drunk/speaking French/on the lawn. (existential) (18) Students are intelligent/mammals/tall/male. (generic) (19) Students know French/hate Bob. (generic) Stage level predicates appear to give rise to the existential reading of bare plurals, while individual level ones give rise to generic readings. Carlson also took the distinction to underwrite the difference between existential and generic readings of the indefinite singular:

#### Violation – they only defend the CHina

#### Vote neg—

#### 1] Semantics outweigh:

#### a] Topicality is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden, they agreed to debate the topic when they came to the tournament

#### b] Jurisdiction -- you can’t vote affirmative if they haven’t affirmed

#### c] It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it.

#### 2] Limits:

#### a] Education – they overexplode the topic making it impossible to negate and we need ground for us to prep – their interpretation allows them to basically cherry pick out of any resolution – skirts the topic from core to the fringes of the literature which kills topic education

#### b] Fairness – we would have to prep for over 195 affs + more subsets which kills fairness because there’s infinite affs it’s literally impossible to prep for everything

#### 3] TVA solves – read the aff as advantage

#### 4] Extra T – the aff is extra-topical

#### They've said the plan results in a law that changes strikes- that’s literally not a right. This goes beyond the scope of the resolution-- extra T is an independent voter because it allows the aff to add on ANY extra mechanism or policy to the plan to solve capitalism and IP, which allows them to gain extra T advantages and better solvency. thats unpredictable and explodes limits because we cant be prepared to answer the things they decide to tack on. It also takes away my ability to read those arguments as alt causes or advantage counterplans, which destroys competitive equity.

#### Paradigm Issues –

#### 1] T is DTD

#### a] their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### b] DTA is incoherent because we indict their advocacy

#### 2] Comes before 1AR theory –

#### a] If we had to be abusive it’s because it was impossible to engage their aff

#### b] T outweighs on scope because their abuse affected every speech that came after the 1AC

#### c] Topic norms outweigh on urgency – we only have a few months to set them

#### 3] Use competing interps on T –

#### a] topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical

#### b] only our interp sets norms -- reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention

#### c] reasonability causes a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### 4] No RVIs –

#### a] Forcing the 1NC to go all in on the shell kills substance education and neg strat

#### b] discourages checking real abuse

#### c] Encourages baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly

## K

#### The aff’s strike-focused politics privatizes and atomizes worker struggle – it channels it towards specific employers rather than class domination as a whole while ensuring the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie by privileging alternative modes of settlement outside and in spite of the specifics of the law itself.

Feldman, 94

[George, Assistant Prof. @ Wayne State Law: “Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law,” Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, Volume 15, No. 2, 1994. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/berkjemp15&div=14&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=&collection=journals#]//AD

In other ways, however, the liberal vision of labor law that Justice Brennan exemplified has been severely limited. 19 One obvious limitation, for instance, has been the Court's preference for arbitration.20 \*\*\*FOOTNOTE 20 STARTS HERE\*\*\* 20. The Court's tendency to privilege arbitration has led it to impose legal limitations on the right to strike that are unsupported by the language, policy, or history of the labor laws. See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368 (1974), discussed infra at part III.C. For criticism of the Court's weakening of the right to strike, see Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 548-49; JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES & AssuMiPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW \*\*\*FOOTNOTE 20 ENDS HERE\*\*\* (1983). Yet a different kind of limit also has been present in the labor jurisprudence of the Court's liberal wing-a limit that is less obvious, usually has less immediate impact, but that is perhaps more deeply seated. The Court's privileging of arbitration restricts the means by which unions legally may act in response to concerns that are concededly legitimate. The limits discussed here, by contrast, define the legitimate boundaries of collective actions and collective concerns. The cases discussed here reflect the liberal doctrine that labor law protects unions only insofar as they limit their role to that of representative of the employees of an individual employer, and that the law will resist any union attempt to move beyond this limitation. That doctrine rejects protection when the underlying issue implicates the proper role of unions in American society. That question emerges in a variety of contexts. In some, a broad definition of unions' societal function may require, or may seem to require, limiting individual rights;21 in others, the Court's conclusion, or something very similar to it, is so clearly required by statute that the conclusion cannot be ascribed to the conscious or unconscious ideological views of the Justices.22 \*\*\*FOOTNOTE 21 STARTS HERE\*\*\* 21. When such a conflict is actually present, the proper place to draw the line is fairly subject to debate; a judge determined to protect both strong unions and individual employee rights might resolve apparent conflicts between the two in different ways without forfeiting a claim of taking each seriously. See infra notes 237-41; cf Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). \*\*\*FOOTNOTE 21 ENDS HERE\*\*\* At other times, however, liberal members of the Court have narrowed the range of permissible union concerns and therefore of unions' social role in contexts in which the law would have allowed a broader understanding, and in which the danger of conflict with individual rights was either absent or too attenuated to serve as a reasonable justification. In some cases this desire to narrow the sphere of union activity is central to the Court's reasoning; in others, it is a subsidiary theme, or is present only as an underlying assumption, unstated and perhaps unconscious, whose presence helps account for the result reached. This article examines what the members of the Supreme Court who have been identified with its liberal wing have said explicitly or by necessary implication about what is the legitimate sphere of union activity in American life. This vision of the role that unions should play in society has both practical and ideological consequences. Modern labor law, faithful to the Wagner Act's premises, aims to particularize rather than generalize workers' struggles; it directs them towards their specific relationship to their employer, rather than to the larger relationship of their class to employers and to work; it privatizes and depoliticizes those struggles.23 \*\*\*FOOTNOTE 23 STARTS HERE\*\*\* 23. It is in this sense that I think the frequently voiced point of authors associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement is correct. It is not that workers' struggles are channeled to arbitration rather than to a public body like the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981). but rather that whatever method workers employ-even including a strike or other collective job actions-the locus of the struggle remains the particular workplace or employer. It is in this sense that workers' struggles are channeled away from "political" dimensions. \*\*\*FOOTNOTE 23 ENDS HERE\*\*\* Given the contextual limitations mentioned, this analysis necessarily must be cautious. It must take account of the constraints of statutory language and congressional intent and, where applicable, of judicial deference to the decisions of the NLRB. 24 This analysis also must recognize the presence of other policy or ideological considerations that are unrelated to the theme of limiting the breadth of union concerns. Nonetheless, this theme is demonstrably present in a wide variety of legal settings, transecting the doctrinal categorizations that abound in labor law.

#### Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause goes unquestioned. Farbod 15

( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)

Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6% per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800%.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85% of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50% of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1% will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80% of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return**.**

#### Capitalism is incompatible with feminism – we can’t create true equality without a complete removal of this superstructure

Aschoff 19

Nicole Aschoff; Nicole Aschoff is on the editorial board at Jacobin, writer, editor and sociologist, John Hopkins PhD; Why Capitalism and Feminism Can’t Coexist (09-24-2019); <https://jacobinmag.com/2019/09/capitalism-socialist-feminism-inequality-sexism>)//hwckd

A difficult calculation to be sure. But if we were to attempt it, we would certainly have to temper the sunny claims of global capitalism’s recent successes with the stark [reality](https://jacobinmag.com/2019/02/steven-pinker-global-poverty-neoliberalism-progress) that more than two billion people suffer from malnutrition, that the bottom 60 percent of people worldwide miss out on 95 percent of new income from global growth, and the absolute number of people living in poverty has risen by a billion people over the past few decades. I’m willing to say, in agreement with Marx, that capitalism is better than feudalism. We can also point to data that suggests aggregate progress, for example, toward the fulfillment of the [Millennium Development Goals](https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/) on life expectancy, mortality, and education. Middle- and upper-class women in much of the world enjoy access and rights that would have been the envy of their sisters a century and a half ago. But in celebrating these gains, and we should celebrate them, we must be cautious about the causal arrows we draw. While some of these gains can be attributed to development and rationalization — which are correlated with capitalism — many of these gains are the result of dogged political struggle, not capitalism itself. Laws and norms against discrimination, the right to not be our husbands’ property, the right to vote, the right to be able to protect ourselves and our children from domestic violence — these and so many other rights weren’t handed down from on high by the Chamber of Commerce. They were won by social movements, many of which were [led](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/02/aschoff-socialism-feminism-clinton-sandberg-class-race-wage-gap-care-work-labor) by socialists and feminists, who [fought tooth and nail](https://jacobinmag.com/2019/01/second-wave-feminism-kristen-swinth) and suffered many defeats on the way to getting them. In this moment, however, I think it is important to look forward. Even if we were to concede that capitalism has been a net gain for women — which I don’t — it is much more important to ask whether capitalism will lead to gains in the future. Feminism is not just about eliminating gender-based discrimination. It’s about fighting for and creating equality and a good life for everyone, regardless of their sex, gender, race, ethnicity, education, income, religion, or where they live. This is what’s great about feminism — it’s why I’m a feminist. Simply put, we can’t achieve these goals in capitalism. This week is the [climate strike](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/09/why-greta-is-good), so let’s consider the example of climate change. Nothing demonstrates the failure of the so-called free market better than the looming climate catastrophe. While capitalism may be rational for individuals, on a systemic level it is highly irrational. The reckless pursuit of profits by individual capitalists, who have been empowered by elites and governments, has created the massive collective problem of global warming, not to mention resource depletion and habitat destruction. But instead of addressing this problem head on — a problem we roughly understood decades ago — for the past forty years elites and business owners have insisted on the healing power of free markets. They have argued that markets [are natural](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/04/free-market-conscious-capitalism-government/) and part of a spontaneous order, that rational individuals operating with perfect information create optimal outcomes, that externalities are trivial. We know what needs to be done, yet the imperatives of profit-making and the entrenched prerogatives of elites have prevented countries from adopting projects and programs to free ourselves from our destructive fossil-fuel based economies, from developing and instituting sustainable solutions to meeting our needs. Only a collective project, rooted in solidarity and cooperation, and organized around the principle of taking back our planet from rapacious corporations, will offer us a fighting chance of altering our current trajectory.

#### Capitalism is the cause of prolonged suffering – we have all of the resources necessary to reduce global inequity but we don’t because cap is only directed towards profit growth. Only a full replacement will enable us to attack the root problems and fight against structural inequalities.

Aschoff 19

Nicole Aschoff; Nicole Aschoff is on the editorial board at Jacobin, writer, editor and sociologist, John Hopkins PhD; Why Capitalism and Feminism Can’t Coexist (09-24-2019); <https://jacobinmag.com/2019/09/capitalism-socialist-feminism-inequality-sexism>)//hwckd

Money equals power. If American women today are lucky enough to have rich parents, or be born with fantastic abilities or intelligence that land them in a well-paid, fulfilling job, they will be empowered. More than that, they will be able to empower others in their social networks, such as their own children. But observing that some women are quite empowered in capitalism does not imply that the path has been laid and that if we just follow it the goals of feminism will be reached. The fabulous wealth of the relative few at the top is not an accident, or a harmless peak over a healthy floor of people living a good life. The market-friendly reforms of the past few decades have made a handful of people (mostly men) unimaginably wealthy while the vast majority of people have seen their livelihoods stagnate and their opportunities narrow. The incredible technological and scientific advances of the past forty years could have been channeled toward dramatically reducing poverty, improving health care outcomes and the ecological sustainability of our production processes, and ensuring security in the supply and distribution of clean water, nutritious food, and adequate housing. These are things that all people value. These are also things that would greatly empower women who suffer disproportionately from the lack of these things. We have the tools to vastly improve the lives of the world’s women, and all people for that matter. Yet we haven’t directed our resources, knowledge, and energy toward achieving this goal. Why? Because the goal of capitalism is not to better the world — it’s to make a profit.

#### The patriarchy and capitalism are linked at the core – getting rid of just one is applying bandaids as a temporary fix that is bound to collapse

Shukla 6-24

(Aarushee Shukla; Journalist focusing on intersectional feminism; Feminism and Capitalism: The Ideological Dilemma of Coexistence (06-24-2021); https://feminisminindia.com/2021/06/24/feminism-and-capitalism-the-ideological-dilemma-of-coexistence/)//hwckd

The position of an individual along the production and supply chain ultimately determines their bargaining power. Upon looking at different types of industries in informal sectors, a common feature across them is the [employment of women in the lowest levels of the supply chains](https://www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/1960-women-working-at-the-bottom-of-global-supply-chains.html). This strips them off their negotiating power to begin with. The governments, institutions and structures overall have to start by acknowledging and accepting that there is gender inequality plaguing our society. This has to be followed by gender mainstreaming across all the stages and levels of planning, policy designing and decision making. Gender mainstreaming is a transformative approach which has immense potential in challenging the status quo and skewed resource allocation Feminism advocates for economic freedom and while money equals power, we cannot guarantee that the goals of feminism will be reached with it alone. Economic empowerment undoubtedly prepares the road to individual liberation but one needs to understand that capitalism promotes individualism over collective action. Bell Hooks, known for her intersectional feminist theory, argued how focus on striving for equal pay and claiming top-jobs is reflective of the ‘bourgeoise class bias’. It fails to acknowledge and is not representative of diverse needs and aspirations of [‘](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1394725.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae21bff0b1a4d3a2c518061062e4db40b)[women of color’](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1394725.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae21bff0b1a4d3a2c518061062e4db40b). Capitalism structurally oppresses, restricts and inhibits the access of marginalised individuals, minority communities, and differently abled persons by regulating the opportunities available to them. Based on such structures of inequities, it further exacerbates sexism, casteism, ableism and racism. [Patriarchy and capitalism are intricately linked](http://oaji.net/articles/2014/1159-1407945733.pdf) at the core. Commodification of women’s labour is at its peak courtesy the unequal power structures normalised by capitalism.

#### The alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only party organizing can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct chauvinist tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for global liberation.

Escalante, Philosophy @ UOregon, 18

[Alyson, M.A., is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/>] rVs

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

## case

#### Degrowth key---technological innovation is too slow, leads to rebound effects and isn’t sufficient to stop climate change which outweighs their nuke war impact – timeframe and probability

John Wiseman 17, Professorial Research Fellow at the Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute and with the Climate and Energy College, University of Melbourne, Adjunct Professor at the Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, Research Fellow at the Centre for Policy Development and Climate Change Policy Adviser, Sustainability Victoria, Ph.D. from Latrobe University, Samuel Alexander, lecturer with the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne, and research fellow, Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, 2017, “The Degrowth Imperative: Reducing Energy and Resource Consumption as an Essential Component in Achieving Carbon Budget Targets,” in Transitioning to a Post-Carbon Society, p. 95-97

The first heroic assumption underpinning techno-optimist solutions is the ongoing reliance in many of the most influential large scale decarbonization strategies on CCS (carbon capture and storage). While CCS may play a valuable, albeit modest, long term role, the current state of knowledge suggests that we are still a very long way from affordable and scalable CCS deployment. Even the Global CCS Institute (2013: 5) has recently reported that, “while CCS projects are progressing, the pace is well below the level required for CCS to make substantial contribution to climate change mitigation”. The growing “emissions gap” is also providing increasing impetus for speculation about the “necessity” of geoengineering “solutions” with all their attendant concerns about ethical implications and unintended consequences (see Hamilton 2013).

The second debatable assumption is that technological innovation will necessarily and rapidly translate into global reductions in energy consumption. Important questions remain about the speed with which 100% renewable energy can realistically be achieved (see e.g. Smil 2010, 2014); the extent of fossil fuel energy consumption required to drive the initial massive expansion in renewable energy infrastructure; and the full life cycle energy return on investment (EROI) outcomes of solar and wind energy—particularly if these calculations factor in the full costs of energy storage (see e.g. Palmer 2013; Prieto and Hall 2013). Noting that emissions reductions of 4% p.a. in an economy growing at 2% p.a. are likely to require carbon intensity improvements of around 6% p.a., Anderson (2013) notes that he has yet to find any credible mainstream economist prepared to argue that prolonged emissions reductions of 3% or 4% or more are compatible with economic growth.

Indeed, as Lord Stern (2006: 231) himself has noted: There is likely to be a maximum practical rate at which global emissions can be reduced. At the national level, there are examples of sustained emissions cuts of up to 1% per year associated with structural change in energy systems... whilst maintaining strong economic growth. However, cuts in emissions greater than this have historically been associated only with economic recession

or upheaval, for example, the emissions reduction of 5.2% per year for a decade associated with the economic transition and strong reduction in output in the former Soviet Union. These magnitudes of cuts suggest it is likely to be very challenging to reduce emissions by more than a few percent per year while maintaining strong economic growth.

The third reason for caution in assuming overly optimistic relationships between technological innovation, carbon intensity and emissions reductions is the impact of the “rebound effect” (see Jevons 1865; Herring and Sorrell 2009; Holm and Englund 2009; Jackson 2009). This phenomenon refers to the tendency for innovation and efficiency gains to be rapidly overwhelmed as cheaper unit costs combined with the formidable reach and power of the global advertising industry enable and encourage individuals to consume more of the same or alternative services and products. The harsh reality remains that global emissions continue to grow (IPCC 2013)—along with the global trends in the consumption of energy and resources—with apparent improvements in developed economy energy efficiency often masking the reality of energy intensive production being offshored to developing economies.

The likelihood of full and fast deployment of new technologies is the fourth problematic assumption that needs to be addressed given the formidable political and social obstacles standing in the way of rapid implementation. As noted in the recent Post Carbon Pathways review of learning from the implementation of large-scale decarbonization strategies (see Wiseman et al. 2013), experienced climate scientists and policymakers consistently come to the conclusion that the key obstacles standing in the way of rapid decarbonization are political and social rather than technological. Key roadblocks include the following.

#### No diversionary war – they use rhetoric instead

* Evidence on diversionary war is mixed at best
* They use hostile rhetoric instead of war to have their cake and eat it too – achieves same benefits without conflict
* Prefer our study because its based on 50,000 US diplomatic events classified by interstate interactions across economic crises

Carter 18 [Erin Baggott Carter, Assistant Professor, School of International Relations, University of Southern California. Diversionary Cheap Talk: Unemployment and US Foreign Policy Rhetoric, 1945-2010. August 29, 2018. www.erinbcarter.org/documents/diversionUS.pdf]

There is a large literature on diversionary conflict in international relations, but it focuses on material conflicts like militarized interstate disputes rather than foreign policy rhetoric. It is based in social identity theory, which suggests that leaders can increase ingroup affinity by making intergroup distinctions more salient (Closer, 1950; Simmel, 1955; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). A recent review concludes that though the internal logic of diversionary conflict is “compelling and theoretically well supported,” the empirical evidence is “decidedly mixed” (Baum and Potte r, 2008, 48). Several studies find evidence of diversionary aggression in US foreign policy (Clark, 2003; DeRouen, 2000; DeRouen and Peake, 2002; Fordham, 1998a, 6; Hess and Orphanides, 1995; Howell and Pevehouse, 2005; James and Hristoulas, 1994; James and Oneal, 1991; Levy, 1989«,fc; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; Ostrom and Job, 1986) and elsewhere (Bennett, 2000; Dassel and Reinhardt, 1000; Davies, 2002; Enterline and Gleditsch, 2000; Gelpi, 1997; Heldt, 1999; Lebow, 1981; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Oneal and Tir, 2006; Russett, 1990; Sobek, 2007; Tir, 2010). Yet skeptics have amassed opposing evidence (Chiozza and Gormans, 2003, 2004; Foster and Palmer, 2006; Gowa, 1998; Johnston, 1998; Leeds and Davis, 1997; Lian and Oneal, 1993; Meernik, 2000, 2004; Meeraik and Waterman, 1996; Moore and Lanoue, 2003; Potter, 2007). Some cases are hard to reconcile with the theory: in Britain, there were rallies in the Falklands War and the Gulf War but not in other cases in which rallies would be expected, such as the Korean, Suez, and Kosovo wars (Lai and Reiter, 2005). Some go so far as to call diversionary aggression a “myth” (Meernik and Waterman, 1996).

Others have developed scope conditions for diversionary aggression. It is more likely between states with pre-standing rivalries (McLaughlin and Prins, 2004), when leaders are accountable (Carter, 2018; Kisangani and Pickering, 2011), and in mature democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities (Pickering and Kisangani, 2005). It is less likely when states avoid provoking troubled adversaries (Clark, 2003; Fordham, 2005; Leeds and Davis, 1997; Miller, 1999). Diversion appears more likely to produce a rally when supported by Security Council authorization (Chapman, 2011; Chapman and Reiter, 2004), when the White House draws attention to a dispute (Baker and Oneal, 2001), and in conditions of media attention, popular leadership, divided government, non election years, and first terms (Colaresi, 2007). Most recently, scholars have asked whether diversion occurs outside democracies. They find some autocracies, especially single party regimes, divert as well (Carter, 2018; Pickering and Kisangani, 2011).

This study extends the logic of diversionary conflict to foreign policy rhetoric. There is surprisingly little research on rhetoric in international relations. The international relations literature deems talk “cheap” (Fearon, 1995; Kydd, 2005). The audience cost literature considers rhetoric meaningful, but only if it invokes audience costs through explicit, public threats (Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 2001; Smith, 1998; Tomz, 2007). However, if foreign policy rhetoric can activate ingroup identity, then it may be appealing for leaders who wish to improve their ratings without incurring the substantial risks of militarized interstate disputes. While it might be “outlandish” for presidents to engage in the impeachable exercise of diversionary war (Meernik and Waterman, 1996), hostile foreign policy rhetoric is far less outlandish a risk.

To develop a theory of diversionary cheap talk, this paper draws upon research in political psychology and political communication. These literatures find persuasive evidence that elite statements influence citizen beliefs (Behr and Iyengar, 19s."); Bennett. Lawrence and Livingston, 2006; Brody, 1991; Cohen, 1995; Jentleson, 1992; Zaller and Chiu, 2000). I draw on social identity theory to argue that diversionary cheap talk highlights intergroup differences between nations and leads citizens to evaluate their leader favorably. When a leader criticizes foreigners, she cues ingroup identity, which increases citizens’ social attachment to the nation and to herself as its leader. This is a “solidarity mechanism,” through which “[c]ollective group goals and common group identity are highlighted, norms of group-based altruism are strengthened, punishment and rejection of defectors are increased, and perceptions of the in-group and out-group are manipulated” (Halevy, Bernstein and Sagiv, 2008, 405).

The theory generates observable implications about when leaders use diversionary cheap talk and who they target. I follow the consensus in the diversionary conflict literature in focusing on poor economic conditions as the most important source of public disapproval for leaders. Low approval ratings limit leaders’ ability to advance their domestic agenda. Therefore, when the economy deteriorates, leaders will criticize foreign nations to improve their approval ratings and restore the political capital necessary for them to govern. Second, a key observation from social identity theory is that the depth of intergroup differences is important for group attachment. Therefore, consonant with recent empirical findings in the diversionary conflict literature (McLaughlin and Prins, 2004), I expect diversionary rhetoric to be most effective when it targets threatening outgroups. In the context of foreign policy, these are best represented by historical adversaries. And finally, because diversionary cheap talk shifts the focus of political competition from the partisan to the international level, it has differential partisan effects. Because national identity cues widen the tent of the political ingroup, diversionary cheap talk is most effective at boosting support among the leader’s nonpartisans: liberal citizens for conservative leaders, and conservative citizens for liberal leaders.

I test these hypotheses with the American Diplomatic Dataset, an original record of over 50,000 US diplomatic events between 1945 and 2010 drawn from New York Times articles on foreign affairs. I used tools from computational social science to classify bilateral interstate interactions into hundreds of specific types and four aggregate categories: verbal cooperation, verbal conflict, material cooperation, and material conflict. This is by far the most historically extensive event dataset. As such, it allows an exploration of US foreign policy behavior across a variety of administrations and economic crises.

I find robust evidence of diversionary cheap talk in US foreign policy. First, I establish that US presidents face incentives to divert verbally rather than materially: while militarized interstate dispute initiation does not affect presidential approval ratings, critical rhetoric about other nations is associated with increased ratings, especially among nonpartisans. Responding to this incentive, presidents between 1945 and 2010 typically diverted in the form of words, not deeds. Simulations indicate that as unemployment varied from its minimum to its maximum observed value, hostile foreign policy rhetoric nearly doubled, depending on the administration. Throughout this study, estimates are conservative: I operationalize conflict as events the United States initiated, although findings are robust to a redefinition of conflict as events the United States participated in. The verbal statements in the dataset are high profile and likely to be noticed by the American public: all appeared in the headlines of the New York Times.

This study contributes to existing scholarship in several ways. First, it demonstrates that US foreign policy rhetoric responds significantly to domestic economic conditions. International relations scholars should therefore continue to focus more seriously on the communicative aspects of foreign policy, and in particular its relationship to domestic politics (Johnston, 2001, 2008; Kurizaki, 2007; Ramsay, 2011; Sartori, 2002, 2005; Trager, 2010, 2011, 201(i). The American Diplomacy Dataset will enable researchers to further explore the communicative aspects of foreign policy, and their relationships to material and economic factors, in more detail than existing datasets permit.

Second, this study contributes to the diversionary conflict literature by showing that in many cases where diversionary theory predicts conflict initiation, leaders instead choose rhetorical hostility. In this sense, leaders may have their cake and eat it too: They benefit from an ingroup rally without inviting an international crisis. The mixed empirical findings in the diversionary conflict literature may be partly due to the fact that existing scholarship considers only the most serious forms of diversion like militarized interstate disputes. It is possible that a wide range of diversionary behavior takes place at less extreme levels, such as the rhetorical hostility documented in this paper.1

**\*\*\*BEGIN FOOTNOTE 1\*\*\***

In the language of the foreign policy substitutability literature (Bennett and Nordstrom, 2000; Clark, Nordstrom and Reed, 2008; Most and Starr, 1984, 1989; Oakes, 2012), rhetorical hostility, like the development of new economic policies, may be seen as a substitute for diversionary conflict.

**\*\*\*END FOOTNOTE 1\*\*\***