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they’re only attempting to save satellites to help the US military – look at their Johnson card

Satellite information is critical to all aspects of US intelligence and military planning. Spy satellites are used to monitor compliance with international arms treaties and to assess the military activities of countries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Figure 1.2 shows the capability of modem unclassified space-based imaging. The capability of the classified systems is presumed to be significantly better, providing much more detail. Losing these satellites would place global militaries on high alert and have them operating, literally, in the blind. Our military would suddenly become vulnerable in other areas as well. GPS, a network of 24-32 satellites in medium-Earth orbit, was developed to provide precise position information to the military, and it is now in common use by individuals and industry. The network, which became fully operational in 1993, allows our armed forces to know their exact locations anywhere in the world. It is used to guide bombs to their targets with unprecedented accuracy, requiring that only one bomb be used to destroy a target that would have previously required perhaps hundreds of bombs to destroy in the pre-GPS world (which, incidentally, has resulted in us reducing our stockpile of non-GPS-guided munitions dramatically). It allows soldiers to navigate in the dark or in adverse weather or sandstorms. Without GPS, our military advantage over potential adversaries would be dramatically reduced or eliminated

#### Realism assumes the perspective of a neutral, rational calculator divorced from the gendered nature of nationalism and international relations – their account of state behavior is ahistorical and props up hegemonic masculinities.

Sjobert 12 Sjoberg, Laura (2012). Gender, structure, and war: what Waltz couldn't see. International Theory, 4(1), 1–38. doi:10.1017/S175297191100025X SM

This theme in feminist theorizing in IR suggests that there might be something to the idea that international structures are theorized as genderneutral because men take their perspectives to represent the human. Feminists have characterized conventional knowledge in IR as problematic because it is constructed only by those in a position of privilege, which affords them only distorted views of the world.14 As such, it has been a crucial part of the feminist project in IR to ‘not only add women but also ask how gender – a structural feature of social life – has been rendered invisible’ by working to ‘distinguish ‘‘reality’’ from the world as men know it’ (Peterson and True 1998, 23). Often, in disciplinary knowledges, ‘gender’ is seen as a proxy for ‘women’ because ‘women’ are perceived to have gender, where men are not. Another element of a gendered international system structure would be that, when it is acknowledged that gender plays a role in global politics, 14 Scheman 1993; Garry and Pearsall 1996; Harding 1998. There is a sociology to what is understood as central to the discipline, where what counts as ‘IR’ matches what men do more than it matches what women do at least in part because the perspectives of male scholars have defined the boundaries of the discipline (Sjoberg 2008). 16 LAURA SJOBERG it is often discussed as a corruption of a gender-neutral system rather than a product of a gendered system. For example, work like that of Inglehart and Norris (2002) and Hudson et al. (2009)15 argues that it is states that treat their women the worst that corrupt not only the gender order but the potential for interstate peace, cooperation, and development. This logic is replicated in many discussions of gender in the policy world as well. For example, ‘gender mainstreaming’ agendas (see True and Mintrom 2001; Shepherd 2008) engage in a process of integrating gender concerns into the structures that already exist in governments and organizations. The scenario derived from Acker’s theorizing suggests that when gender subordination is characterized as the exception, rather than the rule, in international political interactions, gender is difficult to see because the masculine is at once assumed and invisible. The recurrent focus in feminist work on the need to ask IR theory ‘where are the women?’ (Enloe 1983) and ‘where is gender?’ (Bell and O’Rourke 2007) suggests that it is plausible that gender is difficult to see in IR because the masculine dominates our visions of the international system. It is important to note that the masculine here involves and implicates, but is not reducible to, men. Waltz ‘tests’ his idea of structure primarily by its predictive power and its indirect manifestations (1986, 72). He argues that, since the anarchical nature of the international system is invisible and thus cannot be directly verified or proven, it must be verified by its manifestations and implications (Waltz 1986, 73). This verification, to Waltz, comes by examining unit function, distribution of capabilities across units, and political processes of unit interaction. The remainder of this section considers whether there is evidence in those three observable parts of global politics that the international system may be gender-hierarchical. Unit function: does state identity have gendered components? In Waltz’s account, ‘a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units’ where ‘the structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think about the system as a whole’ and ‘the arrangement of units is a property of the system’ (1986, 70, 71). Waltz sees the system as an anarchy, which by definition specifies that units have the same function. Still, Waltz gives a sense of what would be different if the system was a hierarchy, since ‘hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation’ (1986, 87). Calling states ‘like units’ in Waltz’s terms is ‘to say that each state is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit’ (Waltz 1986, 89). Waltz sees states as performing fundamentally similar tasks in similar ways, and argues that the differences between states are in capabilities not in function or task (1986, 91). This section explores two arguments about gender and the function of the units of the international system. First, it argues that gender can be seen as constituting unit ‘function’ in the international system, whether the units are ‘like’ or differentiated. Second, it proposes that gender hierarchy actually differentiates unit function in the international system. The argument that gender constitutes the function of all units in the international system is supported by the degree to which states define their identities (and therefore the tasks of domestic and foreign policy) in gendered ways. A growing literature on ontological security (e.g. Mitzen 2006; Steele 2008) characterizes state identity in terms of ‘sense of self,’ a language that has long been used in feminist accounts of nation and nationalism. Feminists who have worked on nationalism have argued that national identity and gender are inextricably linked, and that ‘all nationalism are gendered, all nationalisms are invented, and all are dangerous’ (McClintock 1993).16 Feminists have shown that gendered imagery is salient in the construction national identities, particularly when, often, women are the essence of, the symbols of, and the reproduction of state and/or national identity (Yuval-Davis 1997; Wilcox 2009). A number of examples illustrate the link between national identity and gender. Feminist studies have demonstrated that gender has been essential to defining state identity in Korea (Moon 1997), modernizing Malaysia (Chin 1998), Bengal (Sen 1993), Indonesia (Sunindyo 1998), Northern Ireland (Porter 1998), South Africa (Meintjes 1998), Lebanon (Schulze 1998), Armenia (Tachjian 2009), and a number of other states. For example, Niva has noted that, during the First Gulf War, the United States’ identity was understood as a ‘tough but tender’ masculinity where it was expected that the United States military would courageously defeat the Iraqi military, but would at the same time rescue the feminine state of Kuwait from the hypermasculine clutches of the Iraqi state (1998). On the other hand, responding to the United States’ and United Nations’ threats of military intervention in Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq consistently used gendered references to hypermasculine understandings of state identity (Sjoberg 2006b). Gendered nationalisms, however, do not just arise in conflict situations. Bannerji has noted that Canadian national identities are constructed through ‘race,’ class, gender, and other relations of power, where subordinate classes and ‘races’ are feminized in relation to the dominant image of Canadian identity, not only within the Canadian state but also in Canada’s external projection of nationalist identity (2000, 173). Taylor’s analysis of the ‘Dirty War’ in Argentina characterizes identity in the conflict as ‘predicated on the internalization of a rigid hierarchy’ of gender and argues that ‘the struggle, as each group aimed to humiliate, humble, and feminize its other, was about gender’ (1997, 92, 34). A brief look at one example recently used in the literature might further illustrate the point. In his book, Ontological Security in International Relations, Steele (2008) notes that honor and shame shape states’ selfperception of their identities. Contrary to the realist logic that state prioritizes prudence and survival over honor and justice, Steele sees honor as a universal part of state self-identity, where states look for honor even sacrificing physical integrity. To illustrate the role of honor in state selfidentity, Steele uses the example of the Belgian choice to fight a losing war against the Germans in 1914 rather than allow Germany access to Belgian territory and avoid the casualties and terror involved in their inevitable defeat. Steele notes that honor was implicated in Belgium’s response to Germany’s ultimatum, given that most policy statements stressed their need to ‘fight for the honor of the flag’ and ‘avenge Belgian honor’ (Steele 2008, 112). Feminist analysis suggests that we cannot understand the role of honor in state self-identity without reference to both masculine and feminine conceptions of honor in the state (Jowkar 1986). Masculine conceptions of honor vary between chivalric and protection-oriented and aggressive and prideful, while feminine conceptions of honor often focus on the purity and innocence of the territory of the state and/or the women and children inside (see Elshtain 1985). Through gender lenses, the Belgian discussion of national honor in 1914 was one where the leaders’ (masculine) honor was tied to not giving in to, and even resisting, the would-be violators of the territory’s (feminine) honor, which was tied to purity. The ‘honor’ of the Belgian government then was tied to unwillingness to sacrifice the ‘honor’ of the innocent, neutral, vulnerable, and untouchable identity and position of Belgium vis a vis its neighboring Germany. It is no coincidence that the following attack was referred to as the ‘Rape of Belgium’ (Niarchos 1995). In the ‘Rape of Belgium’ narrative, the German invasion spoiled the feminine elements of Belgian state identity, and emasculated Belgian leaders as protectors of its feminized territory. Survival or prudence cannot account for Belgium’s actions in 1914; in fact, as Steele pointed out, Belgium acted contrary to both. Honor can explain the Gender, structure, and war 19 behavior, but neither the form nor function of that honor is clear without accounting for the gendered elements of Belgian state identity. The story about gendered state identity can also be read onto Germany (as a hypermasculine aggressor) and Britain (as a chivalrous protector). While some might see the influence of gender on state or national identity as a ‘second-image’ or unit-level explanation,17 Waltz explains that a factor is structural if it is not influencing state identity (and therefore state function) in states individually, but instead influencing the identities (and therefore functions) of states generally. In other words, forces that define one state’s identity or five states’ identities are secondimage; forces that influence all states identities are third-image. Feminist scholars have shown that ‘nationalism is naturalized, and legitimated, through gender discourses that naturalized the domination of one group over another through the disparagement of the feminine’ (Peterson 1999). These gender hierarchies are always present even if specific genders and their orders in hierarchies are fungible. In other words, it is not particular nationalisms that are gendered (and some nationalisms that are not), it is that gender hierarchy as a structural feature of global politics defines the properties and functions of the system’s constituent units, including their national identities. All nationalisms being gendered does not mean that all nationalisms are the same, however. The mechanism through which gender hierarchy can be seen to influence national identity and state function is through the link between any given state’s national identity and the ‘hegemonic masculinity,’ or particular ideal-typical gender that is on top of the gender hierarchy that state ‘units’ are situated in at any given time and place (Hooper 1998, 34). The argument that states’ structures and functions are often defined by masculinities (see Peterson 1992) is not based on the observation that states are (mostly) governed by men. Instead, as Connell explains, ‘the state organizational practices are structured in relation to the reproductive arena’ (1995, 73). Some states’ hegemonic masculinities are aggressive and projected, others are tough but tender, and still others are stoic and reserved. All hegemonic masculinities relate to a feminized other, but they do so in different ways: some encourage violating it, some define themselves in 20 LAURA SJOBERG opposition to it, some understand it as treasured and to be protected, and some mix elements of all of the above. The gendered nature of national identities influences the function of states, particularly in the areas of warmaking and war-fighting, but also in terms of citizenship, economic organization, diplomatic relations, and involvement in international organizations.18 For example, feminists have catalogued throughout the history of the modern state system a relationship between military service, masculinity, and full citizenship (either de jure or de facto) in states (Moscovici 2000). Though the relationship between gender and nationalism generally (and genders and nationalisms specifically) influences the function of units whether they are like units (in anarchy) or not like units (indicative of a hierarchical system in Waltz’s terms), evidence of different gendered nationalisms suggests that gender hierarchy in global politics differentiates between functions of units in the system rather than dictating that all units function similarly. Units in the system (even defined in the narrow realist terms where only states count as units) do have many similar functions in terms of governance, education, health care, and the like. But especially in their external relations, states also have a number of differentiated functions. Some states were/are colonizers, some states were colonized and still deal with remaining markers of colonization. Some states are aggressors, while other states are the victims of aggression. Some states are protectors, while other states require protection. Some states provide peacekeeping troops, international humanitarian aid, and other public goods, while other states do not serve those functions, depending on state identity (e.g. Savery 2007). Some states serve to facilitate international cooperation while others act as cogs in cooperation’s wheels. Some states see their masculinity as affirmed in the interstate equivalent of rape and pillage, while other states see it in chivalry, honor, and a sense of the genteel. While Waltz might classify these differences as merely capabilities gaps, different state functions in the community of states do not map one-toone onto capabilities. Instead, I propose that they map onto the ways that gender shapes state identities and functions. As Peterson (2010) notes, ‘not only subjects but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, ways of knowing y can be [masculinized or] feminized,’ such that states’ ontological security is related to their gendered identities. For example, a number of feminist analyses of the United States during the first Gulf War identify its policy choices and military strategies as consonant with a new, post-Cold War ‘tough-but-tender’ image of the United States’ masculinity, which maintained the Cold War-era projection of strength, but added an element of sensitivity and a chivalric conception of protecting the weak (e.g. Niva 1998; Sjoberg 2006a). Seemingly inconsonant functions for the US military as at once an attack force and a tool for protection then make sense, because the state does function differently based on its self-perception of identity, which might be seen as (at least in part) a product of structural gender hierarchy in the international arena.

#### The aff’s trust in distinctions between the “private” and “common” strengthens patriarchal binaries where nature and resources are feminized, leading to never ending abuse and destruction

Sotiropoulou 17

(Irene Sotiropoulou, PhD (Economics), Postgrad Diploma (Development Economics), MA (International & European Studies), LLB (Law); (09/2017 accessed 12-29-2021) “Commons and Private Property as a Patriarchal Trap”; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323259615\_COMMONS\_AND\_PRIVATE\_PROPERTY\_AS\_A\_PATRIARCHAL\_TRAP)//ckd

What is important: in patriarchy, the propertied thing, that “something” that the owner can use, harvest and abuse or dispose, is by priority the human body and nature, i.e. alive creatures, in many cases very similar to the creature that an owner can be. Well, not all human creatures are very similar according to patriarchy. The patriarchal binaries come into force when ownership and property emerge as an issue: women are supposed to be owned by men, children are supposed to be owned by fathers, black workers are supposed to be owned by the white-owned factory that imposes quasi-slavery working conditions or an entire river ecosystem is supposed to be owned by the state or by the corporation that rules the use of the water that runs through the river (Fraser 2013a, Federici 2004, Borneman 1975, Cassano 2009, Dallacosta & James 1975, Graeber 2006). Particularly, nature in patriarchy is not only objectified and understood as existing for humans and for satisfying their own agenda for survival, artistic expression or for beauty seeking. It is also feminised, so that it can be much easier treated the way women are treated in patriarchy: nature can be propertied by men, used, harvested, abused and then destroyed, as there is “plenty of nature” to proceed with more property owners being receiving what their privilege tells them to expect (BennholdtThomsen et al 1986, Mies & Shiva, Von Werlhof 2007, Sotiropoulou 2017a). 4.2. Common and private property Private property, therefore, is the property that belongs to one person or to one household or to one group of people who, as individuals, have agreed among themselves to own a thing by excluding all other people (like a corporation), and the property is passed down to their patrilineal descendants or relatives with the exclusion of other people or the community. Within this context, I understand the distinction between common and private property as being one more patriarchal binary. In addition, common property is never common enough, either for legal or de facto reasons: a river can be regulated as a common for the people living around or for the state that the river runs through, but not all people have access to the river or even if they have, they do not control what happens with the river, with its fish, with the water used for agricultural or industrial purposes. Even when something is deemed to be a “true” common, like the open sea or open space, the use of the common is practically available to those who have the means to navigate through the open sea or open space and to those who use both the sea and space for disposing their garbage and technological externalities, like accidents with environmental impact. It is not a coincidence that those who are practically able to use the global commons usually belong to social groups that are white, European/AngloSaxon, male, middle or upper class, with ownership of capital and land (Agathangelou & Ling 2006). 6 Why is that? Because even if we “all own the open sea”, the open sea is owned truly by those who have the means of production to travel, fish, extract oil or dispose their waste there. Means of production are owned privately in capitalism and in patriarchy. That is, private property is everywhere, even when the condition or the control of a common is under consideration. Moreover, the common property as an institution and as an idea, allows the establishment of property over nature and bodies. It does not matter that the property is not private or that it is not private yet. Even if it remains common, it is still a property with owners and excluded people, with rights to use, harvest and abuse for some, even if those “some” can be the entire humanity. In addition, it is the “common” that makes private property acceptable at the first place. It is not only that in practice (and in history), we have seen in many cases that the norms and/or legislation turned from regulating the common-propertied bodies (human/nonhuman) to allowing or instituting the exclusive right of the patriarch to those bodies, whether human or nonhuman. The patriarch or the private owner, even if it is a patriarchal substitute like a state, has the right, once a common property comes into existence, to distribute or retain that common property, to exclude from that common property social groups or everyone whom the patriarch/patriarchal substitute does not want to have access to (previously) common or (now) private thing, and to include to its control whomever supports patriarchal rights, like a corrupt politician who gets his share of profit for turning a blind eye to environmental destruction in his area (Mies & Shiva, Bennholdt-Thomsen et al 1988, Pateman 1988, Sugden & Punch 2014). 4.3. Property in patriarchy Historically we have not found any social and economic systems other than patriarchy where land and humans become (common or private) property (Lerner 1986, Mayes 2005, Brosius 2004). However, one would think of patriarchy as a system with property, just for the analytical need to avoid essentialism (like saying that property and patriarchy are the same thing and cannot exist otherwise). In patriarchy, most lands and means of production are owned by men or by patriarchal substitutes, like the state, corporations or women who serve patriarchy in all its aspects. That at some point, ownership might reach a person (man or woman) who is not so patriarchal as patriarchy expects them to be, that does not change the structure of the system as such, despite of the cracks or subversive possibilities that such “unfortunate” coincidence might create (Mayes 2005). Moreover, private property is the default institution concerning economic sharing or economic arrangements. Despite of what the discourse of the commons declares now and then, common property is not the default of a patriarchal system and even if it is at some point in history due to historical conditions that go beyond the usual patriarchal structures, patriarchy will make sure that the common property will be patriarchalised and privatised. 7 Sometimes, the process of patriarchalisation and privatisation go hand in hand. An example is the miri system of common/state lands in the Ottoman Empire, that degenerated as time went by, and as the Empire got more and more patriarchal, militarised and capitalised (Dönmez-Atbaşı & Sotiropoulou 2017). Therefore, privatisation is a systemic trait of patriarchy. Patriarchy is not just the economic system that has private property, but the system that has private property which is aggressively expanding. Privatisation expands formally, informally and through interpretation of the commons as spaces serving private property. Aggressiveness of privatisation is not theoretical only: it uses all types of physical violence to be established, increased, deepened and disseminated (Sotiropoulou 2015, Demsetz 1964, Bennholdt-Thomsen et al 1988, Von Werlhof 2007). Even in the construction of non-tangible properties over previously common goods one can see the violence that was a prerequisite for the private property to be instituted. Knowledge, especially medical knowledge, required a massive witchhunt in Western Europe and United States. The patenting of agricultural genetic material and biopiracy required and still requires colonial violence to exist. The construction of arts and culture or of production of know-how as private properties or even as common properties that need to be managed by certain managers and controlled by certain controllers required the violent exclusion or destruction of artists, communities or entire societies that produced goods, arts or entire cultures in ways that were not compatible with private property and patriarchy (Federici 2004, Mies 1998, Peterson 2003, Ehrenreich & English 1973).

#### Their use of gendered language proves our point- GOEHRING -- masculinity is so pervasive that it is embedded into language- gendered language in IR scholarship discourages women to enter the field and naturalizes patriarchal norms

Mendenhall 15

(Beth, 2-26-25, Elizabeth Mendenhall is a PhD candidate at Johns Hopkins University, working with Daniel Deudney on a dissertation about the challenge of scientific and technological change for global commons regimes., THE BADASS HERSELF, [What You Say is What You Get: The Gender Problem in IR](http://www.e-ir.info/2015/02/26/what-you-say-is-what-you-get-the-gender-problem-in-ir/), <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/02/26/what-you-say-is-what-you-get-the-gender-problem-in-ir/>, JKS)

“Gendered language” refers to words that carry unnecessary masculine connotations, but are purportedly gender-neutral according to users and dictionaries. But the intention of the speaker and the denotation of a word [do not control the meaning](http://www.e-ir.info/2015/02/26/what-you-say-is-what-you-get-the-gender-problem-in-ir/books.google.com/books#v=onepage&q&f=false) that is received and internalized by listeners. Research in psychology suggests that word choice influences our [perception](https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=27+Okla.+City+U.L.+Rev.+297&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=1564c455f2b7f916d000d5ea2fd5c01a) and [cognition](http://books.google.com/books/about/Language_Mind_and_Culture_A_Practical_In.html?id=rvgafOskC6gC), such that gendered language actually reinforces patriarchal attitudes about [who](http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145041) is qualified or expected to be a “congressman” or “statesman.” In other words, the connotation shapes the meaning of words, which shapes our understanding of concepts. Many gendered words, like “mankind,” have perfectly good alternatives that eschew any reference to gender, like “humankind” or “humanity.” These linguistic options, in addition to the [decreasing popularity of gendered words](https://www.academia.edu/1597246/The_extinction_of_masculine_generics) in the social sciences, present a puzzle for IR: why are so many IR academics still using gendered language, when they don’t have to, and when they should know better?¶ The list of gendered IR terms is long: “statesman,” “brinksmanship,” “man-made,” “mankind,” “manning,” and “manpower” are some of the most common. As a young woman pursuing a career in mainstream IR, and with an interest in security studies, these words add insult to the injury of seeing panels, syllabi, and the [TRIPS survey](https://trip.wm.edu/reports/2014/rp_2014/) dominated by men. These discouragements to women entering a male-dominated field are often overlooked because they are psychological. Being one of few women in an ISA panel makes one feel highly visible at best, and unwelcome at worst. Gendered language sends the message that I am not expected to be a foreign policymaker (because authors choose “statesman”) or the chair of a committee (because authors choose “chairman”). These kinds of daily exclusions weigh on my psyche.¶ I am often told, in response to such complaints, that I should take a class, attend a panel, or contact a scholar who works on Feminist IR theory. I am a materialist, a theorist of geopolitics. I should not have to change my scholarly interest in order to find an inclusive community. No subject or topic is inherently male-dominated, so there must be something discouraging women from pursuing the most masculinized areas of study. It is the responsibility of all IR scholars to help identify and extirpate the reasons young women are deterred from particular topics. The best places to look are those where we make active choices, choices that can be re-thought and re-directed to neutralize the highly gendered spaces we create with our words and actions.¶ Replacing “man-made” with “anthropogenic,” or coining “brinkship” to replace “brinksmanship,” will not solve the gender problem in International Relations, but it will increase the visibility of [our quotidian contributions to patriarchy](http://search.proquest.com/docview/1530414732?accountid=11752). What we read reinforces what we see, and what we write [reflects what we want to see](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FB%3ASERS.0000037757.73192.06). I do not see myself in most of the texts that I study and engage with. I do not see people who look like me on the Presidential Theme Panels at the ISA. Affirmative action in admissions, hiring, and panel placement can only do so much because there is problem of “self selection.” We need to seriously consider the idea that women select their field at least partially because of the “man-made” social environment that surrounds it.¶ My power is not “manpower,” but it is just as strong.

#### The impact is hypermasculine war-making- claims of objectivity are patently flawed because they are based in gendered decision-making

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Feminist scholars have also interrogated the unitary nature of the state, pointing out that efforts to maximize the state's security interests often threaten the security of people inside the state. Specifically, as I discussed in the previous section, the state's most marginalized citizens are often made insecure by state security-seeking, making it clear that a state does not have a single interest in interstate interaction but many that conflict. J. Ann Tickner contends that "an explanation of the historical development of state sovereignty and state identities as they have evolved over time does indeed suggest deeply gendered constructions that have not included women on the same terms as men." This is because, according to Tickner:¶ From the time of their foundation, states have sought to control the right to define political identity. Since their legitimacy has constantly been threatened by the undermining power of subnational and transnational loyalties, states' survival and success have depended on the creation and maintenance of legitimating national identities; often these identities have depended on the manipulation of gendered representation. . . . Drawing on metaphors that evoke matrimonial and familial relations, the nation has been portrayed as both male and female. . . . The sense of community implicit in these family metaphors is deeply gendered in ways that not only legitimate foreign policy practices but also reinforce inequalities between men and women.”¶  ¶ Using these gendered metaphors, the state can, while shoring up its "national interest," both threaten the interest of marginalized citizens inside it and reinforce power inequalities among its groups. Catherine MacKinnon has explained that the "state's structures and actions are driven by and institutionalize strategy based on an epistemic angle of vision" that can "distinguish public from private, naturalize dominance as difference, hide coercion beyond consent, and conceal politics beyond morality.” These structures require a certain standard of behavior from some members of the state,” while suppressing the voices of others altogether.”¶ With these tools, the state can appear unitary by suppressing its diversity and presenting one concept of national interest, autonomous of and not necessarily representative of its citizens. In this understanding, the sovereign state can be "an extension of the separation-minded realist man, also autonomous to various degrees from the diverse 'domestic' interests he-it allegedly exists to protect.” Additionally, states are complicit with gender subordination when they fail to intervene in domestic violence, perpetuate a heterosexist bias in education, exercise discrimination in welfare policies, and operate on patriarchal laws.” ¶ In this conception, the unitary state is a misleading and malignant construction. Two implications for the process of state interaction follow; states that interact often promote unrepresentative interests, and those unrepresentative interests exclude gender, racial, and cultural minorities. In this sense, states' elites often make wars (or fail to) "representing" a limited group or groups among their populations, while claiming full representativeness, effectively rendering a significant portion of their supposed "constituency" invisible in the process of interacting with other states. Empirically, this means that there are a number of levels of interstate interaction, many of which are omitted from process-based notions of dyadic war theorizing. Normatively, it suggests that our conceptions of how states interact (and the content of those interactions) are problematically skewed.¶ Rationality in Interaction This skew is particularly evident in the assumption of rationality." The rationality assumption implies that the knower/actor can separate himself/herself from the “other” in interactions with that other. Feminists have argued that knowledge is always perspectival and political; therefore, states and their leaders’ decisions about how to interact with others are not rational, but informed by their situational and political biases. In this view, the rationality assumption may be seen as at once itself a political bias and obscuring other political biases. As Naomi Scheman argues, perceived rational cost-beneﬁt analysis about war-making and war-fighting should “always be seen as especially problematical when... constructed only by those in positions of privilege... [which provide] only distorted views about the world.”78 In this view, rational calculation is not an objective, attainable, and desirable end, but a partial representation of both interest and actors’ representation of those interests. In this way, through gender lenses, rationality has been seen as importantly incomplete, leaving out signiﬁcant (if not the most significant) factors that go into decision-making.79 In addition to understanding the rationality assumption as partial (and therefore unrepresentative), feminist research has pointed out links between rationality and mascuIinism.8° As Karen Jones notes, advocates of rationality as a guide for interstate interactions“ assume: 1. Available... conceptions of rationality and reason represent genuinely human norms and ideals; 2. The list of norms and ideals contained within available conceptions of rationality and reason are sufficiently complete; and 3. The external normative functions assigned to reason and rationality are unproblematic.82 Looking through gender lenses shows problems with each of these assumptions. Feminists have argued that “the identity of the modern subject-in models of human nature, citizenship, the rational actor, the knowing subject, economic man, and political agency-is not gender-neutral but masculine (and typically European and heterosexua|).”83 This impacts not only how we see the rational subject, but how we predict and understand his decisions, at the state level as well as at the individual level. According to Margaret Atherton, the possibility of rationality has “been used in a disturbing fashion to mark a gender distinction. We have, for example, on the one hand, the man of reason, and, on the other, the woman of passion.”84 In rationality assumptions, traits associated with masculinity are normalized and traits associated with femininity are excluded. The impact is compounded because (masculinized) rationality and its (feminized) alternatives are not on equal playing ﬁelds. As a result, Karen Jones notes that “women’s assumed deficiency in rationality” has been used to exclude both women and knowledge associated with femininity from accepted views of the world.85 The alleged gender neutrality of rationality, then, “is often a covert form of privileging maleness”85 and omission of “what has traditionally counted as ‘feminine.’”87 Still, adding women and values associated with femininity to current concepts of rationality is unlikely to create a gender-neutral concept of rationality.88 This is because, epistemologically, the sovereign rational subject constructs artificial gendered boundaries between rationality and emotion, male and female, and knower and known.89 Among states, those boundaries are not benign. Instead, they breed competition and domination that inspire and foster war(s) and conﬂict(s).90 This competition frequently relies on contrasting the state’s own masculinity to the enemy’s (actual or perceived) femininity. This cycle of genderings is not a series of events but a social continuum. In these gendered relationships, as Zillah Eisenstein argues, “gender differentiation will be mobilized for war and peace,” especially moving forward into the age of an American empire focused on manliness.9‘ Feminists have long argued that competitions between hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in causing war(s).92 Hidden beneath the assumed independence, rationality, and unity of state interaction leading to war are gendered interstate interactions that cause, constitute, and relate to war and wars. Feminist scholars have recognized the extent to which the preeminence of masculine values dominates (particularly conﬂictual) accounts of interstate interactions, wherein “rational” interactions often become “a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and violence” in which “force is used to checkmate force.”93 Interstate interactions leading to wars often show the gendered nature of war narratives, war logics, and war languages, which produce (and reproduce) gendered cycles of violence.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of an ontological revisionism that deconstructs the myth of the masculine western subject. This is a politics that destabilizes the masculine subject by revealing how its false universality underwrites gender violence globally

Youngs 04

(Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in\*, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80, JKS)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. ¶ While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and ¶ economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. ¶ Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. ¶ When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed ¶ the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 ¶ Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 ¶ The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. ¶ The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ ¶ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. ¶ The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 ¶ Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 ¶ The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

#### The K comes first - policies are constituted by and produce subjects, not blanket assessments of outcomes and impacts. The ROB is to interrogate the gendered nature of the 1AC as a research project.

Bacchi 16

(Carol, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia, (2016): Policies as Gendering Practices: Re-Viewing Categorical Distinctions, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, DOI: 10.1080/1554477X.2016.1198207, JKS)

One important constitutive effect is how we are produced as subjects through the problematizations implicit in such texts, a process described as “subjectification” (Bacchi 2009, 16–17). For example, Foucault (1980) argues that specific problematizations of sexuality (e.g., sexuality as moral code, sexuality as biological imperative) create “subject positions” that enjoin people to become particular kinds of sexual subjects (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 308). Marston and McDonald (2006) describe how individual subjects are produced in specific policy practices “as worker-citizens in workfare programs, as parent-citizens in child and family services or consumer-citizens in a managerial and marketized mixed economy of welfare” (3). Given the proliferation of practices, the formation of one’s subjectivity is an ongoing and always incomplete process: “the doer/subject/person is never fixed, finally as a girl or a woman or whatever, but always becoming or being” (Jones 1997, 267). Subjectification effects therefore are neither deter- mined nor predictable. People sometimes take up subject positions in ways that challenge hierarchical relations. For example, the discourse of rights creates as one possible positioning that of the human rights advocate. Moreover, as practices “through which things take on meaning and value” (Shapiro 1988, xi), policies have material (lived) effects, shaping the possibilities for people’s and peoples’ lives (Bacchi 2009, 16–18). Policies achieve these constitutive effects through discursive practices, which comprise the “conditions of emergence, insertion and functioning” of discourses (Foucault 1972b, 163), and hence bridge a material-symbolic distinction (Bacchi and Bonham 2014). A particular conception of power underpins an understanding of policies as constitutive practices. Power is conceptualized as productive rather than as simply repressive. Power is not considered to be something people possess (e.g., “he or she has power”) but as a capacity exercised in the production of subjects and objects (Heller 1996, 83). This productive or generative view of power does not conclude that power and resistance are necessarily equal in their effects, however. Such a conclusion would deny the hierarchies by which the organization of discourse takes effect (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 310). This understanding of policy as constitutive of subjects and objects sits in sharp contrast to conventional views of the policy process, which, in the main, can be characterized as reactive. That is, in general, policy is considered to be a response to some condition that needs to be ameliorated or “fixed.” Policies are conceived as “reactions” to “problems.” By contrast, the understanding of policy offered in this article portrays policies as constitutive or productive of (what are taken to be) “problems,” “subjects,” and “objects” (Allan 2010, 14). It follows that it is no longer adequate to think in terms of conventional policy “outcomes,” understood as the results or “impacts” of government actions. New questions are required, such as the following: What does the particular policy, or policy proposal, deem to be an appropriate target for intervention? What is left out? How does the shape of the proposal affect how people feel about themselves and the issue? And how does it produce them as particular kinds of subjects?

## case

#### uv – fem ir is not a state bad case – no offense. their cards aren’t about gender, it’s about state being bad – prefer the k

### solvency

#### Plan fails –

#### Global commons still allow for private appropriation

#### China inevitably undermines solvency

#### Too many private actors ensure conflict

#### Turn – limitations on commons access such as private entity restrictions lead to backlash

Stang 13

Gerald Stang (associate fellow at the EUISS) , 2013, "Global Commons: between cooperation and competition" European Institute for security studies, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief\_17.pdf, // HW AW

Rapid economic development and increasing international trade are leading to a more crowded international stage and raising new challenges in the ‘global commons’ – those domains that are not under the control or jurisdiction of any state but are **open for use by countries, companies and individuals from around the world**. Their management involves increasingly complex processes to accommodate and integrate the interests and responsibilities of states, international organisations and a host of non-state actors. Shared rules regarding the usage of - and access to - the global commons encourage their peaceful and cooperative use. Over the last seven decades, the US has led in the creation of a liberal international order which has attempted to define these rules in such a way as to make it easier and more beneficial to join the order and follow the rules than it does to operate outside of (or undermine) it. With the rise of nonWestern, less liberal powers - particularly **China - questions must be asked regarding the durability of the existing processes for managing the global commons,** along with the potential for developing effective new processes that can address new threats and challenges. The EU is uniquely positioned to play an important role in giving value to existing multilateral frameworks and in developing new ones for international cooperation in these domains. But with a multitude of competing interests among stakeholders, much work remains to be done. What exactly are the global commons? Security analysts generally identify **four domains as global commons: high seas, airspace, outer space** and, now, cyberspace. From a security perspective, the primary concern is safeguarding ‘access’ to these domains for commercial and military reasons. It is important to highlight that this language differs from the discourse on commons developed by environmental analysts: their arguments focus on damage to the ‘condition’ of the commons from overuse by actors who do not have to pay direct costs. They worry about the depletion of shared resources such as ocean fish stocks, or the damage to shared domains such as Antarctica or the atmosphere. A third strand of analysis looks not at the need for ‘access’ to or preservation of the ‘condition’ of the commons, but at the capacity of the commons to provide ‘global public goods’. As there is no accepted definition of a global public good (a functioning trading system, peace, clean water, electricity, the internet, and many other things are often included), it may be wiser to focus on the four global commons relevant to security analysts mentioned above. While there are major differences between the ‘access’ views of security analysts and the ‘condition’ views of environmentalists, both are concerned about how the Global commons: Between cooperation and competition by Gerald Stang Photo by NASA / Rex Features (1568628a) European Union Institute for Security Studies April 2013 2 rules for use of the commons are set and enforced. In today’s interconnected world, **any limitations on access to the commons would be highly disruptive**. Militaries rely on access to the commons to pursue security goals in domains outside their sovereign control. Economic actors rely on the commons to trade and conduct business. **Changes to the condition of the commons can therefore disrupt commerce and security, not to mention the status of the global environment.** Each of the four commons discussed below possesses unique attributes and poses unique challenges for international cooperation and governance. Sea As the primary avenue for international commerce since ancient times, norms for access to and passage on the seas have developed and evolved over many years. Only in recent decades, however, have there been agreed regulatory frameworks and institutions to manage them. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), first initiated in 1956 though not legally in force until 1994, is the primary international treaty regarding the sea, laying out rules for territorial boundaries (22km from shore), resource management and the rights of states within their exclusive economic zones (370km from shore). The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), created by UNCLOS, has the power to resolve disputes by States Parties. Except for the US, most countries and all global powers - including the EU-27 - have signed and ratified UNCLOS. The UN International Migratory Organization (IMO), created in 1948, regulates international shipping and rulings on safety, environmental and technical cooperation issues (the EU has observer status). As the world’s only global sea power, the United States has historically seen itself as the protector of free movement on the seas. With 11 carrier groups (Russia has one, rarely used) and hundreds of naval bases and allied ports throughout the globe, the US has a naval footprint that dwarfs all its allies and competitors. While countries such as Iran and China may be uncomfortable with US capacity to deny others access to the sea, US support for the creation and respect of transparent international regulations for use of the sea (which they adhere to themselves despite not having ratified UNCLOS), has allowed for the stable management of access to the seas. Except for the disruptive (but still rare) threat of piracy, access to the seas is generally a smooth and well-regulated process. The massive and relatively effective, if ad hoc, global response to the localised piracy problem off the coast of Somalia (for which the EU launched Atalanta, its own anti-piracy mission under the CSDP) highlighted the world’s impressive capacity to handle disruptions of this type. Territorial disputes exist in places like the South China Sea, but relate to historical boundary disagreements rather than conflict over rules of sea access. Normally, no state has an interest in disrupting sea trade. Even in times of crisis, while individual states may wish to deny their opponents access to certain regions, they are unlikely to harm their own interests by disrupting traffic on the world’s oceans. Environmental ‘condition’ issues in the sea commons are disconnected from ‘access’ issues. No single international treaty or body addresses pollution, overfishing or the various challenges in the melting Arctic. A confusing patchwork of sea basin cooperation groupings, regional fisheries management organisations and pollution monitoring agreements is in place. The integrated marine policy of the EU recognizes the need to improve governance of the seas while avoiding treaty congestion. While no unifying treaty or body to manage maritime issues is likely to appear, years of patient discussion in a variety of venues (of the type that the EU excels at) may lead to greater coherence and cooperation in managing environmental threats. Air International air travel requires the use of national airspace for continuous transit and involves detailed agreements that define transit rights. The UN International Civil Aviation Organisation, established in 1947, is the leading institution for regulating air travel. All EU countries are members, while the EU has observer status. As with piracy at sea, any potential disruption of access to the air commons is likely to come from non-state actors. While terrorist events can disrupt air traffic, however, intergovernmental cooperation between national police and security agencies is well established. Any systemic threat to the air commons appears so unlikely that some security analysts do not even include air as a one of the commons. Also like the sea commons, issues of management of environmental ‘condition’ are disconnected from ‘access’ issues. The accumulation of greenhouse gases is a form of pollution of the atmosphere, but the alarm stems from their effects on the biosphere rather than from the risk that the atmosphere may become unbreathable or inaccessible. The EU is a global leader on climate change, with the world’s most comprehensive emissions trading scheme and intense efforts to regulate and limit emissions. The Union has set the tone at the international level but has been unable to win agreement for an internal carbon tax or stronger emissions targets from external partners. European Union Institute for Security Studies April 2013 3 Space More than a thousand orbiting satellites facilitate communications in both the military and the civilian spheres, regulated by a mix of UN guidelines, bilater- al Cold War agreements and industry standards. The UN International Telecommunications Union (ITU) allocates radio spectrum and satellite orbits and develops international technical standards. Established in 1869, the ITU has almost universal membership among existing states, including all EU countries - though not the EU itself. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, signed by all spacefaring nations, provides the minimal framework for activities in space, banning weapons of mass destruction and preventing states from claims to celestial bodies. The Treaty does not establish infrastructure for coordination, and consultation among party states is ad hoc. Following China’s destruction of one of its own satellites in 2007, there has been increasing concern about protection of satellites from attack. During the later stages of the Cold War, the US and the USSR tacitly agreed to a moratorium on testing anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) - but there are no binding rules in place. The satellite’s destruction also created a debris cloud which could have damaged other satellites or spacecraft. Unlike the sea and air domains, the problem of debris management in space indicates an overlap between ‘access’ and ‘condition’ issues. While access to space has previously been limited to a small number of states, **the increasing role of new actors (including from the private sector) suggests that the creation of comprehensive and binding regulations for the space commons may become more difficult.** The EU has pushed to become a key actor in space matters, working with the European Space Agency (ESA) - an intergovernmental body - on Galileo, Europe’s civilian satellite navigation system. In an effort to get ahead of the curve and manage uncertainty, the European Council approved a voluntary Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities in late 2008 (revised in 2010) to address both space operations and space debris. It has only limited operational requirements but develops important cooperation, consultation, and notification mechanisms. To make it more palatable to the US and other states, it is not binding and has no enforcement mechanism. As with many efforts in multilateral regulation of the global commons, the US has been hesitant to agree to the Code for fear of diminishing its own freedom of manoeuvre. It may be an important step, however, in setting the groundwork for future space cooperation if the EU can follow up on the Code’s development with diplomatic action by bringing other space-faring countries on board. Cyberspace Cyberspace differs from the other commons because it is not a physical domain and because of the preponderant role of the private sector in both the infrastructure and the management of the domain. All of the physical nodes of the internet also exist within states and are subject to national law, rather than existing physically outside of national control as for the other commons. The American and security-related roots of the internet are reflected in how technical internet standards are managed. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a private non-profit entity under contract with the US government, has ensured the coordination of internet addresses and registries since 1998. While ICANN operations have been stable - and their inclusive governance style has won imitators for handling technical issues - many countries prefer a formal international body to manage technical internet issues. The ITU has been suggested as a neutral management body, but this idea has been resisted by most Western states. Interestingly, non-Western states are pushing for international management of the internet within a framework that provides individual countries with rights and roles, rather than leaving it to the nonprofit sector to decide how the internet works. All EU-27 countries are members of the ITU and, following a European Parliament deliberation, voted as a bloc against the measures granting more power to the ITU, concerned over states wishing to regulate, control, and limit internet use. The UN Internet Governance Forum (IGF) has become the leading multi-stakeholder platform for states and other actors to debate internet governance. Regardless of the ICANN/ITU issue, states can filter and censor within their territories, and for the time being, efforts to protect against cyber attacks remain within the national sphere. Cyberspace allows for the spread of information, creating pressures for transparency in both democratic and non-democratic states. Discussions on the management of cyberspace, therefore, have become connected with those on the power of states to control information. Finally, although there is no environmental constitu- ency for cyberspace, there are constituencies of users and providers - private and public - who play a similar role in pushing for the protection of certain conditions in cyberspace. Unlike for sea and air domains, therefore, there is overlap between ‘access’ and ‘condition’ discussants. With worries about Cold War-style espionage and cyber conflict between states, cyber security problems European Union Institute for Security Studies April 2013 4 QN-AK-13-017-2A-N | ISSN 2315-1110 are expected to grow worse and are unlikely to be addressed through multilateral fora. Problems with hackers of various types make problems of attribution, response and coordination of policing very difficult. Cyber conflict involving states will ebb and flow along with the quality of the relationship between those states and competing states will continue to test each other’s cyber defences.

#### The term global commons leads to a false sense of security when in actuality makes whatever is supposedly being protected exploited

**Clancy 98** (The Tragedy of the Global Commons, Spring 1998, <https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1136&context=ijgls> pecial Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State, Indiana Journal of global legal studies)//HWLND

The inherent problem in this communal property is the idea put forth byGarrett Hardin in his 1968 article entitled The Tragedy of the Commons." Hardin theorized that in communal property systems, each individual enjoys the benefit of exploiting the resource to its maximum, while the cost of this increased utilization is spread out over all users. Consequently, there is incentive for individual over exploitation. Applying this theory to global expanses shows that "the disadvantage inherent in this doctrine is that nations are free to make maximum use of resources because no outside mechanism exists to force their acceptance of external costs, either the cost of resource degradation or the cost of resource depletion."'" Much like the herding commons depicted in Hardin's essay, global commons are susceptible to overuse. 19 This problem is indeed a serious one. Global commons become, in effect, a target for over exploitation. Moreover, critics have addressed the problems of free riders and the Prisoner's Dilemma in dealing with commons.2 " The end result is the same, however. These global commons fall victim to the predatory interest of individual exploiting nations.