# 1NC

## 1

#### Environmental management is underpinned by patriarchal relations to nature. The very concept of environmental extinction is intrinsic to gendered conceptions of humanity and conservation.

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Extinction and mass extinction are complex phenomena that entangle multiple dimensions of life, ethics, politics, economics and art. But how do they relate to gender and sexuality? A few months ago, I was asked to write a chapter for a textbook on gender and nature that would address this question. This was a welcome and stimulating challenge, which gave me the opportunity to dig more deeply into the crossings between feminism, gender studies, queer theory and studies of extinction – fields which are connected in multiple, sometimes not-so-obvious ways. In many ways, this is a project of bridging, extending and teasing out resonances between literatures. Decades of eco-feminisms, feminist environmentalisms and environmental feminisms have produced rich discussions on the relationships between gender sexuality and the ecosphere. However, with the notable exception of Claire Colebrook, very few scholars of gender and queer theory have engaged directly with extinction. The concept does appear in eco-feminist works, but it is almost always invoked rhetorically, as an opaque worst case scenario used to underscore the enormity of destructive power structures and relations. In these discourses (like many others), the concept of extinction is something of a black box, and it most often treated as a non sequitur: it is assumed to mean “the death of every member of a species”, and there is rarely discussion of its many other dimensions, relations and implications. At the same time, emerging work in the humanities on extinction and mass extinction holds great potential for exploring the links between gender, sexuality, survival and extinction that can be nurtured further. Reflecting on the connections between these fields is not only a promising way of theorising extinction in a more robust and plural way, but it can also contribute to feminist, gender and queer scholarship in rich ways. To this end, I’ve tried to tease out some of the most potent intersections between these fields, bringing them into direct confrontation with extinction, and with existing modes of response to it. Here are a few of the nodes that I think have great potential for further development. Feminist critiques of neo-liberal conservation One of the most integral arguments within ecological feminisms is that patriarchal, extractive logics underpin the destruction of ‘nature’. Carolyn Merchant popularized this argument by tracing the roots of the current ecological crisis to the scientific revolution and the rise of capitalism in the early modern period of European history. For Merchant, the transition from a belief system in which the Earth was understood to be a living ‘mother’ to one in which it was refigured as a passive female body removed constraints on destructive activity. From this perspective, the logics and resulting cultures of extractive patriarchy underpin destructive relations between humans and the Earth. Subsequently, authors such as Kay Warren and Val Plumwood have argued that the converse is also true. That is, that the separation of ‘man’ and ‘Earth’ entrenches relations of superiority, subordination and instrumentality that have helped to sustain oppressive gender categories – along with other exclusive categories such as race and species (see the work of Greta Gaard on this subject). These arguments provide an important basis for critiquing dominant political framings of and responses to extinction and prospect of mass extinction, in particular neoliberal logics of conservation. They suggest that the androcentric, extractive logics that gave rise to early capitalism undergird human activities that may lead to extinction. Yet, as Sian Sullivan’s excellent work attests to, the very same logics of accumulation, extraction and financialization are central to contemporary conservation efforts. In fact, since the inception of the term ‘biodiversity’ in the late 1980s, conservationists have sought to incentivize the protection of diverse life forms by emphasizing their resource value. In these discourses, even non-monetary forms of value – for instance, spiritual, scientific or aesthetic value – are treated as dwindling resources. Conservation, in this context, is framed as a means of accumulating, securing and managing capital in the hopes of a future profit. This logic has become particularly pronounced in discourses of ‘ecosystems services’, which attempt to re-evaluate ecosystems in terms of the ‘free’ services they provide to economies, and incentivise forms of development based on leveraging this ‘capital’. Ecological feminist arguments focus attention on the cultures, norms and logics that underpin destructive human activity. They also historicize the convergence of the rise of capitalist economic organization, modern patriarchy, the separation of ‘humans’ and ‘nature’ and cultural frameworks that produce the destruction of ecosystems. This line of analysis helps to identify how neoliberal forms of conservation that understand ‘biodiversity’ in terms of capital and resources, in the nature of creative/destructive flows of capital, propel the exact same forces they resist. As a result, extinction is becoming an important propellor of neo-liberal capitalism. So, existing discourses and practices around extinction and the ‘management’ of biodiversity need to be understood as being enfolded in the processes of capitalism, sometimes quite literally. Emerging financial instruments such as ‘biodiversity banking’ and biodiversity derivatives epitomize this framing, but it is also reflected in the broader language and political economy of conservation. By highlighting the historicity, continuities and transformations of the central logics of capitalism and its embeddedness in relations of hierarchy, feminist critiques have an important role to play in re-thinking dominant frames of extinction and the commodification of biodiversity.

#### Their seemingly critical approach to climate justice is steeped in Western modernity’s narrative of “developing nations” as inherently vulnerable and ‘primitive’-

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(Nancy, Department of Philosophy, Penn State University, Chapter 2

Gendering Climate Knowledge for Justice: Catalyzing a New Research Agenda, M. Alston and K. Whittenbury (eds.), Research, Action and Policy: Addressing 17 the Gendered Impacts of Climate Change, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-5518-5 2, JKS)

In her study of the intersections between feminist and postcolonial science studies, Science from Below, Sandra Harding focuses her analysis on the knowledge projects and practices of Western modernity, arguing that modernity “remains haunted by anxieties about the feminine and the primitive, both of which are associated with the traditional” (2008, 1). She reminds us that any account of the development and expansion of Western science, as well as of Western society, must understand their deep connection to empires and colonization. The “development and modernization of the West were materially as well as ideologically built on the exploitation, de- development, and “constructed traditionalism” of the societies which European expansion encountered, from 1492 through the events in today’s newspapers” (2008, 68). Furthermore, Harding details how Western scientific and technological¶ development have gone hand-in-hand with widespread environmental destruction, the de-skilling and consequent alienation of labor, a steadily increasing gap between the resources available to rich and poor both locally and globally, and the continuing resources these provide for sexist and racist projects.¶ Harding claims that feminist and postcolonialist theorizing provide three impor- tant resources for understanding the complex interconnections between power and knowledge that are essential to practices of science that are more just. First, they reveal the processes and institutions that led to indigenous knowledge practices, other than those of Western science,2 being ignored or suppressed. Second, through careful investigation of the co-constitution of gender with class, race, and other social hierarchies these forms of theorizing serve as an important reminder of the various others whose participation is essential to the emergence of science as a truly democratic practice. Third, they focus attention on women as active agents in the processes of scientific and technological change.¶ While these insights provide a powerful lens through which to render trans- parent the workings of power/knowledge-ignorance couplings in the study of the geophysical basis of climate change, my examples in this section turn instead on the social science narratives, particularly those dealing with impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability (the domain of Working Group II of the IPCC). Here, albeit briefly, I would like to add to our research agenda and provide an example of the ways in which the narratives surrounding global climate change are informed by and reinforce the framework Harding labeled “Western modernity.” What Harding’s work has so clearly revealed is that the interests that structure knowledge and determine what is known, as well as what is ignored, are those of the more powerful nations and those that matter to powerful organizations and corporations. She documents how science “from above” enacts a linked set of dualisms in which the first term is privileged. What I add to this insight is that this same dualism structures the dominant frameworks for thinking about global climate change as well (Fig. 2.2).¶ My focus in this section concerns how these same dualisms circulate in climate discourses to link agency with the “Global North” and vulnerability with the “Global South.3” And just as the dualisms are gender coded, I will argue that the discourses themselves carry gendered biases. Not only is the “Global South” viewed as vulnerable, but gendered tropes of this same dualism work to render women in the “Global South” as victims. The “Global North” is depicted as having agency and assigned responsibility both for causing the problem of climate change, but also for responding to it with technological and policy solutions.¶ This dual trope of the “Global South” as victims of climate change in need of the resources of the “Global North” to survive is prevalent in climate science literature. Let me be clear, a justice perspective does require acknowledging the differential impacts of climate change on regions, as well as recognizing that some groups have more resources for adaptation than others. While not intending to deny either of these points, the recurring trope of conceptualizing the “Global South” as vulnerable and less able to act in the face of climate impacts, repeats and is informed by centuries of discourses regarding these countries as lessor—less developed, less modern, less technologically advanced, less stable, less capable of self-governance. The problem is that while the rhetoric reflects certain truths, it plays into and perpetuates systematic prejudices about these countries embedded in the ontology of Western modernity.¶ To give just one example, in the course of one page, Stephen H. Schneider and Janica Lane in their essay, “Dangers and Thresholds in Climate Change,” mention the vulnerability of what they refer to as “the poorer, warmer nations of the world” nine times. Just a few illustrative quotes reveal the persistence of the above dualisms: developing nations “will experience more and more severe climate change impacts;” “the developing nations will most likely experience predominately detrimental effects;” “there is an imbalance between rich and poor nations’ ability to cope with climate impacts;” “less developed countries tend to have lower adaptive capacities, as they are often limited by financial, technological, and governmental constraints;” “the uneven distribution of climate change impacts leaves the hotter, poorer nations—the countries that have less adaptive capacity—more vulnerable and more in need of adaptation” (2006, p. 28). Schneider’s and Lane’s aim is to argue that justice concerns must take these differences into account. Despite their good intentions, the same discourse that Harding warns us about haunts this text. The “less developed” are framed as less modern, less capable, less technologically advanced. This same rhetorical repetition frames women in these countries. We are told that:¶ • Women constitute the largest percentage of the world’s poorest people.¶ • Because of the “feminization of poverty,” women are most likely to experience the greatest negative impacts of shifting weather patterns, resulting in further¶ deprivations.¶ • Gender roles render women more vulnerable.¶ • Women have little voice in climate policy debates.¶ What is particularly worrisome is that these same tropes of lack and passivity inflect even feminist discourses. While calling for greater attention to the impact of climate change on women and for the greater participation of women in climate policy, the same rhetorical linkages between women-poverty-vulnerability circulate in feminist discourses.¶ An early essay on gender and climate change by Fatima Denton (2002) serves as illustration. We find multiple repetitions of the above themes throughout a paper that is calling for mainstreaming gender issues into debates on climate change and sustainable development, and the inclusion of women in decision-making. Consider the following quotes:¶ On the link between women and poverty:¶ Climate change is likely to accentuate the gaps between the world’s rich and poor. It is widely accepted that women in developing countries constitute one of the poorest and most disadvantaged groups in society (p. 11).¶ Women are already paying huge prices for globalisation, economic depression, and environmental degradation. Climate change is likely to worsen their already precarious situation, and leave them even more vulnerable (p. 18).¶ On the interaction between poverty and climate harms:¶ women and their livelihoods activities are particularly vulnerable to the risks posed by environmental depletion (p. 11).¶ On the relation between gender roles and women’s vulnerability:¶ poor women are generally on the receiving end of the effects of increasing environmental degradation and depletion of natural resources, because of their involvement in, and reliance on, livelihoods activities which depend directly on the natural environment (p.12).¶ Gender inequalities continue to exist in terms of access to land, control over resources, abil- ity to command and access paid labour, capacity, and strategies for income diversification, as well as time spent on agricultural or forestry-based activities (p. 17).¶ And on the absence of women from climate policy development:¶ Women are patently absent from the climate change decision-making process (p. 11).¶ Climate negotiations could be seen as a parody of an unequal world economy, in which men, and the bigger nations, get to define the basis on which they participate and contribute to the reduction of growing environmental problems, while women, and smaller and poorer countries, look in from the outside, with virtually no power to change or influence the scope of the discussions (p. 10). Power dynamics characterise the relationships between richer and poorer nations, and these have gendered implications. If poorer nations are finding it difficult to get richer nations to meet their obligations and work towards climate mitigation, poor women have an even bigger problem in promoting their agenda. If smaller and poorer nations have difficulties in mounting the necessary infrastructure to take advantage of CDM projects, poorer women have even fewer means and less scope to diversify their livelihood and look after their families (p. 17).¶ My point is that even in the context of arguing for gender differentiated impacts and solutions that will adequately address them, even feminist attention to gender and climate change can get caught in the logic of dualisms and aggregate women, or more specifically, women from the less developed nations, and the poor, and depict them, all of them, as more vulnerable.¶ While selecting only one text to reveal the pattern of this discourse to illustrate the women-poverty-vulnerability linkages for women in developing countries, these associations have been and continue to be prevalent in the literature (cf. Cannon 2002; Dankelman 2002; Demetriades and Esplen 2008; Hannan 2009; Nelson et al. 2002; Terry 2009). And as noted by Arora-Jonsson (2011) the trope of the North as agential has resulted in a corresponding image of Northern women as more environmentally virtuous, namely, “more sensitive to risk, more prepared for behavioural change and more likely to support drastic policies and measures on climate change.”¶ Once again, we see the trope of Western modernity so clearly depicted by Harding (2008) at work in these texts. The strength of the linkages between the “Global South” and the “primitive” or, as we say, “less developed,” and the related women4-poverty-vulnerability linkage have such a strong hold on our conceptual framework that we uncritically accept statements such as “70% of all poor people are women,” as well as repeat and reinforce the message through labels like “the feminization of poverty.” Sherilyn MacGregor, to cite just one example, in an important analysis of the need for research on “the ways in which gendered discourses, roles and identities shape the political and material aspects of climate change,” unwittingly participates in this trope of repetition:¶ There is widespread agreement among climate change analysts and policy makers that the more socially and economically marginalized people are, the more vulnerable they are to the effects of global warming. The poor will be hurt the most. However, few other than feminists put the global feminization of poverty into the frame. In his analysis, for example, Giddens (2009) refers to ‘the poor’ as a homogenous group, with no attention to the fact that women are more likely to be poor, and to be responsible for the care of poor children, than men. This is a problematic blindness. Approximately 70 per cent of the world’s poor are women; rural women in developing countries are among the most disadvantaged groups on the planet. They are therefore unlikely to have the necessary resources to cope with the changes brought by climate change, and very likely to suffer a worsening of their everyday conditions (2010, 130).

#### The impact is hypermasculine war-making- claims of objectivity are patently flawed because they are based in gendered decision-making

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(Laura, total bae, associate professor of Political Science @ University of Florida, University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Southern California School of International Relations; J.D. Boston College Law School, Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War Chapter: “Relations International and War(s),” Gendered Lenses Look at War(s), googlebooks, JKS)

Feminist scholars have also interrogated the unitary nature of the state, pointing out that efforts to maximize the state's security interests often threaten the security of people inside the state. Specifically, as I discussed in the previous section, the state's most marginalized citizens are often made insecure by state security-seeking, making it clear that a state does not have a single interest in interstate interaction but many that conflict. J. Ann Tickner contends that "an explanation of the historical development of state sovereignty and state identities as they have evolved over time does indeed suggest deeply gendered constructions that have not included women on the same terms as men." This is because, according to Tickner:¶ From the time of their foundation, states have sought to control the right to define political identity. Since their legitimacy has constantly been threatened by the undermining power of subnational and transnational loyalties, states' survival and success have depended on the creation and maintenance of legitimating national identities; often these identities have depended on the manipulation of gendered representation. . . . Drawing on metaphors that evoke matrimonial and familial relations, the nation has been portrayed as both male and female. . . . The sense of community implicit in these family metaphors is deeply gendered in ways that not only legitimate foreign policy practices but also reinforce inequalities between men and women.”¶  ¶ Using these gendered metaphors, the state can, while shoring up its "national interest," both threaten the interest of marginalized citizens inside it and reinforce power inequalities among its groups. Catherine MacKinnon has explained that the "state's structures and actions are driven by and institutionalize strategy based on an epistemic angle of vision" that can "distinguish public from private, naturalize dominance as difference, hide coercion beyond consent, and conceal politics beyond morality.” These structures require a certain standard of behavior from some members of the state,” while suppressing the voices of others altogether.”¶ With these tools, the state can appear unitary by suppressing its diversity and presenting one concept of national interest, autonomous of and not necessarily representative of its citizens. In this understanding, the sovereign state can be "an extension of the separation-minded realist man, also autonomous to various degrees from the diverse 'domestic' interests he-it allegedly exists to protect.” Additionally, states are complicit with gender subordination when they fail to intervene in domestic violence, perpetuate a heterosexist bias in education, exercise discrimination in welfare policies, and operate on patriarchal laws.” ¶ In this conception, the unitary state is a misleading and malignant construction. Two implications for the process of state interaction follow; states that interact often promote unrepresentative interests, and those unrepresentative interests exclude gender, racial, and cultural minorities. In this sense, states' elites often make wars (or fail to) "representing" a limited group or groups among their populations, while claiming full representativeness, effectively rendering a significant portion of their supposed "constituency" invisible in the process of interacting with other states. Empirically, this means that there are a number of levels of interstate interaction, many of which are omitted from process-based notions of dyadic war theorizing. Normatively, it suggests that our conceptions of how states interact (and the content of those interactions) are problematically skewed.¶ Rationality in Interaction This skew is particularly evident in the assumption of rationality." The rationality assumption implies that the knower/actor can separate himself/herself from the “other” in interactions with that other. Feminists have argued that knowledge is always perspectival and political; therefore, states and their leaders’ decisions about how to interact with others are not rational, but informed by their situational and political biases. In this view, the rationality assumption may be seen as at once itself a political bias and obscuring other political biases. As Naomi Scheman argues, perceived rational cost-beneﬁt analysis about war-making and war-fighting should “always be seen as especially problematical when... constructed only by those in positions of privilege... [which provide] only distorted views about the world.”78 In this view, rational calculation is not an objective, attainable, and desirable end, but a partial representation of both interest and actors’ representation of those interests. In this way, through gender lenses, rationality has been seen as importantly incomplete, leaving out signiﬁcant (if not the most significant) factors that go into decision-making.79 In addition to understanding the rationality assumption as partial (and therefore unrepresentative), feminist research has pointed out links between rationality and mascuIinism.8° As Karen Jones notes, advocates of rationality as a guide for interstate interactions“ assume: 1. Available... conceptions of rationality and reason represent genuinely human norms and ideals; 2. The list of norms and ideals contained within available conceptions of rationality and reason are sufficiently complete; and 3. The external normative functions assigned to reason and rationality are unproblematic.82 Looking through gender lenses shows problems with each of these assumptions. Feminists have argued that “the identity of the modern subject-in models of human nature, citizenship, the rational actor, the knowing subject, economic man, and political agency-is not gender-neutral but masculine (and typically European and heterosexua|).”83 This impacts not only how we see the rational subject, but how we predict and understand his decisions, at the state level as well as at the individual level. According to Margaret Atherton, the possibility of rationality has “been used in a disturbing fashion to mark a gender distinction. We have, for example, on the one hand, the man of reason, and, on the other, the woman of passion.”84 In rationality assumptions, traits associated with masculinity are normalized and traits associated with femininity are excluded. The impact is compounded because (masculinized) rationality and its (feminized) alternatives are not on equal playing ﬁelds. As a result, Karen Jones notes that “women’s assumed deficiency in rationality” has been used to exclude both women and knowledge associated with femininity from accepted views of the world.85 The alleged gender neutrality of rationality, then, “is often a covert form of privileging maleness”85 and omission of “what has traditionally counted as ‘feminine.’”87 Still, adding women and values associated with femininity to current concepts of rationality is unlikely to create a gender-neutral concept of rationality.88 This is because, epistemologically, the sovereign rational subject constructs artificial gendered boundaries between rationality and emotion, male and female, and knower and known.89 Among states, those boundaries are not benign. Instead, they breed competition and domination that inspire and foster war(s) and conﬂict(s).90 This competition frequently relies on contrasting the state’s own masculinity to the enemy’s (actual or perceived) femininity. This cycle of genderings is not a series of events but a social continuum. In these gendered relationships, as Zillah Eisenstein argues, “gender differentiation will be mobilized for war and peace,” especially moving forward into the age of an American empire focused on manliness.9‘ Feminists have long argued that competitions between hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in causing war(s).92 Hidden beneath the assumed independence, rationality, and unity of state interaction leading to war are gendered interstate interactions that cause, constitute, and relate to war and wars. Feminist scholars have recognized the extent to which the preeminence of masculine values dominates (particularly conﬂictual) accounts of interstate interactions, wherein “rational” interactions often become “a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and violence” in which “force is used to checkmate force.”93 Interstate interactions leading to wars often show the gendered nature of war narratives, war logics, and war languages, which produce (and reproduce) gendered cycles of violence.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of an ontological revisionism that deconstructs the myth of the masculine western subject. This is a politics that destabilizes the masculine subject by revealing how its false universality underwrites gender violence globally

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(Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in\*, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80, JKS)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. ¶ While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and ¶ economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. ¶ Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. ¶ When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed ¶ the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 ¶ Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 ¶ The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. ¶ The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ ¶ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. ¶ The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 ¶ Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 ¶ The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

#### The K comes first - policies are constituted by and produce subjects, not blanket assessments of outcomes and impacts. The ROB is to interrogate the gendered nature of the 1AC as a research project.

Bacchi 16

(Carol, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia, (2016): Policies as Gendering Practices: Re-Viewing Categorical Distinctions, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, DOI: 10.1080/1554477X.2016.1198207, JKS)

One important constitutive effect is how we are produced as subjects through the problematizations implicit in such texts, a process described as “subjectification” (Bacchi 2009, 16–17). For example, Foucault (1980) argues that specific problematizations of sexuality (e.g., sexuality as moral code, sexuality as biological imperative) create “subject positions” that enjoin people to become particular kinds of sexual subjects (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 308). Marston and McDonald (2006) describe how individual subjects are produced in specific policy practices “as worker-citizens in workfare programs, as parent-citizens in child and family services or consumer-citizens in a managerial and marketized mixed economy of welfare” (3). Given the proliferation of practices, the formation of one’s subjectivity is an ongoing and always incomplete process: “the doer/subject/person is never fixed, finally as a girl or a woman or whatever, but always becoming or being” (Jones 1997, 267). Subjectification effects therefore are neither deter- mined nor predictable. People sometimes take up subject positions in ways that challenge hierarchical relations. For example, the discourse of rights creates as one possible positioning that of the human rights advocate. Moreover, as practices “through which things take on meaning and value” (Shapiro 1988, xi), policies have material (lived) effects, shaping the possibilities for people’s and peoples’ lives (Bacchi 2009, 16–18). Policies achieve these constitutive effects through discursive practices, which comprise the “conditions of emergence, insertion and functioning” of discourses (Foucault 1972b, 163), and hence bridge a material-symbolic distinction (Bacchi and Bonham 2014). A particular conception of power underpins an understanding of policies as constitutive practices. Power is conceptualized as productive rather than as simply repressive. Power is not considered to be something people possess (e.g., “he or she has power”) but as a capacity exercised in the production of subjects and objects (Heller 1996, 83). This productive or generative view of power does not conclude that power and resistance are necessarily equal in their effects, however. Such a conclusion would deny the hierarchies by which the organization of discourse takes effect (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 310). This understanding of policy as constitutive of subjects and objects sits in sharp contrast to conventional views of the policy process, which, in the main, can be characterized as reactive. That is, in general, policy is considered to be a response to some condition that needs to be ameliorated or “fixed.” Policies are conceived as “reactions” to “problems.” By contrast, the understanding of policy offered in this article portrays policies as constitutive or productive of (what are taken to be) “problems,” “subjects,” and “objects” (Allan 2010, 14). It follows that it is no longer adequate to think in terms of conventional policy “outcomes,” understood as the results or “impacts” of government actions. New questions are required, such as the following: What does the particular policy, or policy proposal, deem to be an appropriate target for intervention? What is left out? How does the shape of the proposal affect how people feel about themselves and the issue? And how does it produce them as particular kinds of subjects?

## Case

**Exploitation on earth will continue – ev isnt reverse causal**

#### Belief in apocalyptic space impacts diverts focus away from solutions we need on Earth, voids any progress towards solving the climate crisis and unleashes planetary doom

Williams 10

(Lynda, professor of engineering and physics at Santa Rosa Junior College, “Irrational Dreams of Space Colonization”, Peace Review, a Journal of Social Justice 22:1, Spring 2010, http://www.scientainment.com/lwilliams\_peacereview.pdf)//AS

If we direct our intellectual and technological resources toward space exploration without consideration of the environmental and political consequences, what is left behind in the wake?The hype surrounding space exploration leaves a dangerous vacuum in the collective consciousness of solving the problems on Earth. If we accept the inevitability of Earth’s destruction and its biosphere, we are left looking toward the heavens for our solutions and resolution. Young scientists, rather than working on serious environmental challenges on Earth, dream of Moon or Martian bases to save humanity, fueling the prophesy of our planetary destruction, rather than working on solutions to solve the problems on Earth. Every space faring entity, be they governmental or corporate, face the same challenges.Star Trek emboldened us all to dream of space, the final frontier. The reality is that our planet Earth is a perfect spaceship. We travel around our star the sun once every year, and the sun pull us with her gravitational force around the galaxy once every 250 million years through star systems, star clusters and all the possible exosolar planets that may host life or be habitable for us to colonize. The sun will be around for billions of years and we have ample time to explore the stars. It would be wise and prudent for us as a species to focus our intellectual and technological knowledge now into preserving our spaceship for the long voyage through the stars, so that once we have figured out how to make life on Earth work in an environmentally and politically sustainable way, we canthen venture off the planet into the final frontier of our dreams. (continued) **–** Williams 10Life on Earth is more urgently threatened by the destruction of the biosphere and its life sustaining habitat due environmental catastrophes such as climate change, ocean acidification, disruption of the food chain, bio-warfare, nuclear war, nuclear winter, and myriads of other man-made doomsday prophesies. If we accept these threats as inevitabilities on par with real astronomical dangers and divert our natural, intellectual,political and technological resources from solving these problems into escaping them, will we playing into a self-fulfilling prophesy of our own planetary doom?Seeking space based solutions to our Earthly problems may indeed exacerbate the planetary threats we face. This is the core of the ethical dilemma posed by space colonization: should we put our recourses and bets on developing human colonies on other worlds to survive natural and man-made catastrophes or should we focus all of our energies on solving the problems that create these threats on Earth?

#### Public and private companies must work together to overcome blockages that each industry face, only together can the process be expedited

Houser 17 (Kristin Houser is a writer for Futurism , where she covers science and tech. Her written work has appeared in Business Insider, NBC News, and the World Economic Forum’s Agenda, among other publications https://futurism.com/private-companies-not-governments-are-shaping-the-future-of-space-exploration) //HWLND

Private companies may be in the lead, but the finish line for this Space Race isn’t exactly clear. The first iteration was arguably “won” when Neil Armstrong took his first steps on the Moon, so does this sequel end when we establish the first Moon base? When a human walks on Mars? When we leave the solar system? Truthfully, the likelihood of humanity ever calling it a day on space exploration is slim to none. The universe is huge, with galaxy estimates in the trillions, so the goalpost will continue moving back (to bring another sport into the analogy). Rather than focusing on competing in what is ultimately an unwinnable race, private and government-backed space agencies can actually benefit from collaboration thanks to their inherent differences. “The way that SpaceX, Planetary Resources, or Virgin Galactic approaches space exploration is going to be very different from NASA or the Air Force,” explains Lewicki. Private companies aren’t beholden to the same slow processes that often stall government projects, and they can secure or reallocate funding much more swiftly if need be. However, unlike agencies like NASA, they do have shareholders to keep happy and a need to constantly pursue profitability. The two sectors, therefore, have a tremendous opportunity to help one another. Private companies can generate revenue through government contracts —for example, NASA has contracted Boeing to transport astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), and SpaceX just closed a deal with the U.S. Air Force to launch its secretive space drone. This leaves the government agencies free to pursue the kind of forward-thinking, longer-term research that might not immediately generate revenue, but that can be later streamlined and improved upon in the private sector.

#### Also huge amount of alt causes to ozone depletion

#### Private programs are K2 successful methane reduction— MethaneSAT is due to launch late 2022 but the plan halts progression Environmental Defense Fund, 9-23-21

{Environmental Defense Fund, November 23, 2021. Authors: Steven Hamburg, Mark Brownstein, Ritesh Gautam PhD. Hamburg has been actively involved in biogeochemistry, forest ecology and climate change impacts research for more than 35 years, and has published more than 100 scientific papers. Brownstein is an adjunct professor of law at New York University Law School and has also taught energy policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA). Gautam, PhD works in the Office of Chief Scientist where his current research focuses on remote sensing of methane and other pollutant emissions from oil and gas sector. Ritesh is based in EDF’s Washington DC office, and provides scientific guidance for EDF’s emerging studies on international methane emissions from global oil and gas sector, primarily using satellite observations. “This space technology can cut climate pollution on Earth”, <https://www.edf.org/climate/space-technology-can-cut-climate-pollution-earth>, //HWNL}

The latest science warns that the window for preventing the most catastrophic global warming is closing fast. But we have a crucial opportunity to slow the rate of warming right now, even as we continue the transition to clean energy as quickly as possible. Deep reductions in carbon dioxide emissions remain critical over the long term. But it turns out that methane emissions from fossil fuel operations, livestock production and other industries is responsible for more than 25% of current temperature rise. **Cutting these emissions is the fastest way to put the brakes on climate change**. But tracking these invisible emissions can be hard. That’s the reason for MethaneSAT, a compact new satellite being built by a specially created new arm of EDF. MethaneSAT is specifically designed to locate, measure and track reductions in methane emissions virtually anywhere on Earth with greater precision than any other satellite. First-of-its-kind satellite gets key data The oil and gas industry is a leading source of methane emissions. From remote wellheads to gas utility lines, companies release at least 75 million metric tons a year — enough gas to produce electricity for all of Africa twice over. Extensive research led by EDF suggests that oil and gas methane emissions in the U.S. are 60% higher than official EPA estimates. To fully understand the problem — and drive the solutions — we need more and better data about: How large methane emissions are. Where they're coming from. The biggest potential reductions. Progress of those reductions over time. MethaneSAT will provide high-precision global coverage, measuring not just methane concentrations but the rate it’s escaping, from where and who is responsible. It will **fill gaps left by other satellite systems, measuring large emission sources as well as those too small for other satellites to see.** Because it will focus only on methane, MethaneSAT will be quicker and less expensive to launch than the complex, multi-function satellites built by government space agencies, so we can get data sooner. We're sharing the data to drive action Like EDF’s efforts using technological innovation to drive environmental change, the MethaneSAT mission is about turning data into action. That data will be available to the public free of charge, so that stakeholders and the public can see and compare methane emissions by country or company. This unprecedented transparency will both enable and motivate faster reductions. And it will give the public objective assurance that both industry and government are delivering reductions. Fred Krupp, EDF's president, unveiled the idea for MethaneSAT in a 2018 TED Talk at TED’s flagship event, as part of The Audacious Project, successor to the TED Prize. The purpose of MethaneSAT is to serve as a critical resource for realizing our goal of reducing methane emissions from a diversity of sources, especially global oil and gas. A 45 percent reduction in oil and gas methane emissions by 2025 would deliver the same 20-year climate benefit as closing one-third of the world’s coal-fired power plants. Cutting these emissions is the fastest, cheapest thing we can do to slow the rate of warming today, even as we continue to attack carbon dioxide emissions. Drawing from expertise and research **MethaneSAT is due to launch in 2022**. The team responsible for getting it off the ground includes Tom Ingersoll, a successful satellite entrepreneur with three decades of experience, and a long list of experts in spaceflight, remote sensing and atmospheric sciences. Steven Hamburg and Tom Ingersoll Steven Hamburg, left, EDF's chief scientist, and Tom Ingersoll, MethaneSAT project director, pictured at Harvard University And the MethaneSAT team has partnered with Harvard University and the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory to develop the science required for the mission. We’ve learned that emissions are much higher than either industry or government previously recognized, and occur across the supply chain. The challenge is, the sources are intermittent, unpredictable and widespread, making it hard to predict where they’ll occur. That means ongoing monitoring and measurement are essential. By providing reliable, fully transparent data on a worldwide scale, **MethaneSAT will help transform a serious climate threat into a crucial opportunity.**

#### Private companies are driven to revert humanity’s climate crisis and have the capability to do it within the time crunch— government programs are held back by lengthy legislative processes Hsu ‘19

{Jeremy Hsu, July 31, 2019. HSU has a master’s in journalism is from NYU’s Science, Health and Environmental Reporting Program. Undergrad at the University of Pennsylvania, where he majored in History and Sociology of Science. He is a NYC-based journalist contributing to publications such as Scientific American, Discover Magazine, Backchannel, Wired.com and IEEE Spectrum. Wrote for Popular Science, Scientific American Mind, Motherboard, Mosaic, Reader’s Digest Asia and other publications. “Private Space Race Targets Greenhouse Gas Emitters”, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/private-space-race-targets-greenhouse-gas-emitters/ //HWNL}

Although carbon dioxide is the most abundant greenhouse gas, **methane has 80 times the warming power of CO2. More than a quarter of the earth’s 0.8 degree Celsius temperature rise since the Industrial Revolution is blamed on methane—**generated by oil and gas production, fossil fuel–burning power plants and vehicles, millions of belching cows on industrial-scale farms, and landfills. To be able to take action, companies and state regulators need to know precisely where these sources are located and how much methane each one is emitting. Ground-based sensors, like those used to produce the map Lauvaux showed the Pennsylvania officials, cannot practically be deployed on a wide enough scale to pinpoint in detail all the various sources. Satellites, on the other hand, can monitor large areas but take less detailed measurements. The respective limitations of these methods leave a gap in methane-monitoring efforts. But improved, cheaper satellite technology is starting to marry the broad coverage of satellites with something closer to the precision of ground-based measurements. This development could make it easier to spot currently unrecognized emissions sources and get more accurate measurements of known ones. Several startups and nonprofit organizations are capitalizing on this technological shift with the goal of helping companies understand the emissions levels of their business operations, and holding the worst polluters accountable. “Once we have this type of methane-tracking microsatellite actually pinpointing the emission source down to the [oil or gas] wellhead, then there are no questions” about where the methane is coming from, says Yotam Ariel, founder and CEO of Bluefield Technologies in Palo Alto, Calif., one of the companies involved in this effort. Historically, if scientists wanted detailed readings of emissions, ground-based sensors placed close to a source were the only option. Yet these are limited to particular sites unless teams of scientists drive around conducting time-consuming surveys, which are impractical on a large scale and are only deployed to measure known emitters. Satellites, however, survey large swaths of the planet. Their use of a single sensor also provides more consistency, making measurements from different spots directly comparable. Until recently, though, satellites have been prohibitively expensive and their spectroscopic sensors have lacked the precision of those closer to the ground, says Laure Brooker Lizon-Tati, an engineer with Airbus Defence and Space in Toulouse, France. That dynamic started to change within the past decade, as broader industry demands drove the miniaturization of electronics and shrank the costs of rocket launches. This made it possible to develop smaller, cheaper satellites that carry sensors capable of zooming in on individual sites to capture high-resolution methane measurements. Companies and one environmental group have leaped at harnessing such satellite capabilities for industries and policymakers eager to pinpoint individual local methane sources. **But governments and large aerospace companies, encumbered by lengthy planning processes, have been slower to pivot away from a focus on measuring methane emissions on a regional and global scale.** In 2016 the Montreal-based company GHGSat was the first to get off the ground with a proof-of-concept satellite called Claire, which successfully detected methane emissions from specific sites.

#### Cutting methane emissions turns over the entire climate crisis Maizland 5-21

{Lindsay Maizland, 5-21-2021, Lindsay Maizland writes about Asia for CFR.org. Before joining CFR, she covered breaking news for TEGNA’s central digital team and reported on world news for Vox. She holds a BA in international relations and journalism from American University, "How Cutting Methane Emissions Can Move the Needle on Climate Change," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-cutting-methane-emissions-can-move-needle-climate-change>, //HWNL}

What would cutting methane emissions accomplish? It could have some fairly immediate benefits. Reducing methane emissions—in tandem with efforts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions—would quickly lower the concentrations of the gas in the atmosphere, helping to mitigate some of the harmful effects of climate change in the coming years. The UN-supported report’s authors say that **cutting methane emissions by nearly half within the next decade would prevent a 0.3°C rise in**

**the average global temperature** by the 2040s. Such cuts are necessary to achieve the Paris Agreement’s goal of preventing a temperature rise of 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. Methane Emissions and the Environment. The report also lays out some ways lowering emissions could **improve public health**. Cutting one million metric tons of methane—roughly the equivalent of Estonia’s annual methane emissions—would prevent an estimated 1,430 premature deaths, 90 hospital visits, and 145,000 tons of crop losses every year. In economic terms, every ton of methane reduced would provide $4,300 in benefits.

#### Diseases – there are 1 million and one ways diseases would kill us – hello corona, and the wet animal market another – aff cannot solve