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#### Realism assumes the perspective of a neutral, rational calculator divorced from the gendered nature of nationalism and international relations – their account of state behavior is ahistorical and props up hegemonic masculinities.

Sjoberg 12 Sjoberg, Laura (2012). Gender, structure, and war: what Waltz couldn't see. International Theory, 4(1), 1–38. doi:10.1017/S175297191100025X SM

This theme in feminist theorizing in IR suggests that there might be something to the idea that international structures are theorized as genderneutral because men take their perspectives to represent the human. Feminists have characterized conventional knowledge in IR as problematic because it is constructed only by those in a position of privilege, which affords them only distorted views of the world.14 As such, it has been a crucial part of the feminist project in IR to ‘not only add women but also ask how gender – a structural feature of social life – has been rendered invisible’ by working to ‘distinguish ‘‘reality’’ from the world as men know it’ (Peterson and True 1998, 23). Often, in disciplinary knowledges, ‘gender’ is seen as a proxy for ‘women’ because ‘women’ are perceived to have gender, where men are not. Another element of a gendered international system structure would be that, when it is acknowledged that gender plays a role in global politics, 14 Scheman 1993; Garry and Pearsall 1996; Harding 1998. There is a sociology to what is understood as central to the discipline, where what counts as ‘IR’ matches what men do more than it matches what women do at least in part because the perspectives of male scholars have defined the boundaries of the discipline (Sjoberg 2008). 16 LAURA SJOBERG it is often discussed as a corruption of a gender-neutral system rather than a product of a gendered system. For example, work like that of Inglehart and Norris (2002) and Hudson et al. (2009)15 argues that it is states that treat their women the worst that corrupt not only the gender order but the potential for interstate peace, cooperation, and development. This logic is replicated in many discussions of gender in the policy world as well. For example, ‘gender mainstreaming’ agendas (see True and Mintrom 2001; Shepherd 2008) engage in a process of integrating gender concerns into the structures that already exist in governments and organizations. The scenario derived from Acker’s theorizing suggests that when gender subordination is characterized as the exception, rather than the rule, in international political interactions, gender is difficult to see because the masculine is at once assumed and invisible. The recurrent focus in feminist work on the need to ask IR theory ‘where are the women?’ (Enloe 1983) and ‘where is gender?’ (Bell and O’Rourke 2007) suggests that it is plausible that gender is difficult to see in IR because the masculine dominates our visions of the international system. It is important to note that the masculine here involves and implicates, but is not reducible to, men. Waltz ‘tests’ his idea of structure primarily by its predictive power and its indirect manifestations (1986, 72). He argues that, since the anarchical nature of the international system is invisible and thus cannot be directly verified or proven, it must be verified by its manifestations and implications (Waltz 1986, 73). This verification, to Waltz, comes by examining unit function, distribution of capabilities across units, and political processes of unit interaction. The remainder of this section considers whether there is evidence in those three observable parts of global politics that the international system may be gender-hierarchical. Unit function: does state identity have gendered components? In Waltz’s account, ‘a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units’ where ‘the structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think about the system as a whole’ and ‘the arrangement of units is a property of the system’ (1986, 70, 71). Waltz sees the system as an anarchy, which by definition specifies that units have the same function. Still, Waltz gives a sense of what would be different if the system was a hierarchy, since ‘hierarchy entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts, and that implies their differentiation’ (1986, 87). Calling states ‘like units’ in Waltz’s terms is ‘to say that each state is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit’ (Waltz 1986, 89). Waltz sees states as performing fundamentally similar tasks in similar ways, and argues that the differences between states are in capabilities not in function or task (1986, 91). This section explores two arguments about gender and the function of the units of the international system. First, it argues that gender can be seen as constituting unit ‘function’ in the international system, whether the units are ‘like’ or differentiated. Second, it proposes that gender hierarchy actually differentiates unit function in the international system. The argument that gender constitutes the function of all units in the international system is supported by the degree to which states define their identities (and therefore the tasks of domestic and foreign policy) in gendered ways. A growing literature on ontological security (e.g. Mitzen 2006; Steele 2008) characterizes state identity in terms of ‘sense of self,’ a language that has long been used in feminist accounts of nation and nationalism. Feminists who have worked on nationalism have argued that national identity and gender are inextricably linked, and that ‘all nationalism are gendered, all nationalisms are invented, and all are dangerous’ (McClintock 1993).16 Feminists have shown that gendered imagery is salient in the construction national identities, particularly when, often, women are the essence of, the symbols of, and the reproduction of state and/or national identity (Yuval-Davis 1997; Wilcox 2009). A number of examples illustrate the link between national identity and gender. Feminist studies have demonstrated that gender has been essential to defining state identity in Korea (Moon 1997), modernizing Malaysia (Chin 1998), Bengal (Sen 1993), Indonesia (Sunindyo 1998), Northern Ireland (Porter 1998), South Africa (Meintjes 1998), Lebanon (Schulze 1998), Armenia (Tachjian 2009), and a number of other states. For example, Niva has noted that, during the First Gulf War, the United States’ identity was understood as a ‘tough but tender’ masculinity where it was expected that the United States military would courageously defeat the Iraqi military, but would at the same time rescue the feminine state of Kuwait from the hypermasculine clutches of the Iraqi state (1998). On the other hand, responding to the United States’ and United Nations’ threats of military intervention in Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq consistently used gendered references to hypermasculine understandings of state identity (Sjoberg 2006b). Gendered nationalisms, however, do not just arise in conflict situations. Bannerji has noted that Canadian national identities are constructed through ‘race,’ class, gender, and other relations of power, where subordinate classes and ‘races’ are feminized in relation to the dominant image of Canadian identity, not only within the Canadian state but also in Canada’s external projection of nationalist identity (2000, 173). Taylor’s analysis of the ‘Dirty War’ in Argentina characterizes identity in the conflict as ‘predicated on the internalization of a rigid hierarchy’ of gender and argues that ‘the struggle, as each group aimed to humiliate, humble, and feminize its other, was about gender’ (1997, 92, 34). A brief look at one example recently used in the literature might further illustrate the point. In his book, Ontological Security in International Relations, Steele (2008) notes that honor and shame shape states’ selfperception of their identities. Contrary to the realist logic that state prioritizes prudence and survival over honor and justice, Steele sees honor as a universal part of state self-identity, where states look for honor even sacrificing physical integrity. To illustrate the role of honor in state selfidentity, Steele uses the example of the Belgian choice to fight a losing war against the Germans in 1914 rather than allow Germany access to Belgian territory and avoid the casualties and terror involved in their inevitable defeat. Steele notes that honor was implicated in Belgium’s response to Germany’s ultimatum, given that most policy statements stressed their need to ‘fight for the honor of the flag’ and ‘avenge Belgian honor’ (Steele 2008, 112). Feminist analysis suggests that we cannot understand the role of honor in state self-identity without reference to both masculine and feminine conceptions of honor in the state (Jowkar 1986). Masculine conceptions of honor vary between chivalric and protection-oriented and aggressive and prideful, while feminine conceptions of honor often focus on the purity and innocence of the territory of the state and/or the women and children inside (see Elshtain 1985). Through gender lenses, the Belgian discussion of national honor in 1914 was one where the leaders’ (masculine) honor was tied to not giving in to, and even resisting, the would-be violators of the territory’s (feminine) honor, which was tied to purity. The ‘honor’ of the Belgian government then was tied to unwillingness to sacrifice the ‘honor’ of the innocent, neutral, vulnerable, and untouchable identity and position of Belgium vis a vis its neighboring Germany. It is no coincidence that the following attack was referred to as the ‘Rape of Belgium’ (Niarchos 1995). In the ‘Rape of Belgium’ narrative, the German invasion spoiled the feminine elements of Belgian state identity, and emasculated Belgian leaders as protectors of its feminized territory. Survival or prudence cannot account for Belgium’s actions in 1914; in fact, as Steele pointed out, Belgium acted contrary to both. Honor can explain the Gender, structure, and war 19 behavior, but neither the form nor function of that honor is clear without accounting for the gendered elements of Belgian state identity. The story about gendered state identity can also be read onto Germany (as a hypermasculine aggressor) and Britain (as a chivalrous protector). While some might see the influence of gender on state or national identity as a ‘second-image’ or unit-level explanation,17 Waltz explains that a factor is structural if it is not influencing state identity (and therefore state function) in states individually, but instead influencing the identities (and therefore functions) of states generally. In other words, forces that define one state’s identity or five states’ identities are secondimage; forces that influence all states identities are third-image. Feminist scholars have shown that ‘nationalism is naturalized, and legitimated, through gender discourses that naturalized the domination of one group over another through the disparagement of the feminine’ (Peterson 1999). These gender hierarchies are always present even if specific genders and their orders in hierarchies are fungible. In other words, it is not particular nationalisms that are gendered (and some nationalisms that are not), it is that gender hierarchy as a structural feature of global politics defines the properties and functions of the system’s constituent units, including their national identities. All nationalisms being gendered does not mean that all nationalisms are the same, however. The mechanism through which gender hierarchy can be seen to influence national identity and state function is through the link between any given state’s national identity and the ‘hegemonic masculinity,’ or particular ideal-typical gender that is on top of the gender hierarchy that state ‘units’ are situated in at any given time and place (Hooper 1998, 34). The argument that states’ structures and functions are often defined by masculinities (see Peterson 1992) is not based on the observation that states are (mostly) governed by men. Instead, as Connell explains, ‘the state organizational practices are structured in relation to the reproductive arena’ (1995, 73). Some states’ hegemonic masculinities are aggressive and projected, others are tough but tender, and still others are stoic and reserved. All hegemonic masculinities relate to a feminized other, but they do so in different ways: some encourage violating it, some define themselves in 20 LAURA SJOBERG opposition to it, some understand it as treasured and to be protected, and some mix elements of all of the above. The gendered nature of national identities influences the function of states, particularly in the areas of warmaking and war-fighting, but also in terms of citizenship, economic organization, diplomatic relations, and involvement in international organizations.18 For example, feminists have catalogued throughout the history of the modern state system a relationship between military service, masculinity, and full citizenship (either de jure or de facto) in states (Moscovici 2000). Though the relationship between gender and nationalism generally (and genders and nationalisms specifically) influences the function of units whether they are like units (in anarchy) or not like units (indicative of a hierarchical system in Waltz’s terms), evidence of different gendered nationalisms suggests that gender hierarchy in global politics differentiates between functions of units in the system rather than dictating that all units function similarly. Units in the system (even defined in the narrow realist terms where only states count as units) do have many similar functions in terms of governance, education, health care, and the like. But especially in their external relations, states also have a number of differentiated functions. Some states were/are colonizers, some states were colonized and still deal with remaining markers of colonization. Some states are aggressors, while other states are the victims of aggression. Some states are protectors, while other states require protection. Some states provide peacekeeping troops, international humanitarian aid, and other public goods, while other states do not serve those functions, depending on state identity (e.g. Savery 2007). Some states serve to facilitate international cooperation while others act as cogs in cooperation’s wheels. Some states see their masculinity as affirmed in the interstate equivalent of rape and pillage, while other states see it in chivalry, honor, and a sense of the genteel. While Waltz might classify these differences as merely capabilities gaps, different state functions in the community of states do not map one-toone onto capabilities. Instead, I propose that they map onto the ways that gender shapes state identities and functions. As Peterson (2010) notes, ‘not only subjects but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, ways of knowing y can be [masculinized or] feminized,’ such that states’ ontological security is related to their gendered identities. For example, a number of feminist analyses of the United States during the first Gulf War identify its policy choices and military strategies as consonant with a new, post-Cold War ‘tough-but-tender’ image of the United States’ masculinity, which maintained the Cold War-era projection of strength, but added an element of sensitivity and a chivalric conception of protecting the weak (e.g. Niva 1998; Sjoberg 2006a). Seemingly inconsonant functions for the US military as at once an attack force and a tool for protection then make sense, because the state does function differently based on its self-perception of identity, which might be seen as (at least in part) a product of structural gender hierarchy in the international arena.

#### The aff obscures gendered violence through their over-simplified analysis of resource wars – their discourse creates unidimensional and ineffective responses that further amplify inequalities and fail to address the root causes of conflict.

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“The paradox of plenty and its impact on gendered policy”; LSE Women, Peace and Security; <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2019/10/17/the-paradox-of-plenty-and-its-impact-on-gendered-policy/>)//ckd

The resource curse theory expounds a ‘paradox of plenty’ whereby states rich with natural resources experience poor economic growth and an increased likelihood of violent conflict. Within this context, natural resources (oil, minerals, diamonds, timber) are defined in terms of their role in increasing the risk of conflict or acting as an obstacle to peace The resource curse theory and its critique Since the end of the 1980s, there has been a significant body of research proposing a link between natural resource wealth and various socio-political ills. While acknowledging the competing explanations for the resource-conflict correlation, it is possible to identify three main strands within this vast literature. The first is the ‘greed versus grievances’ debate. In The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What can be Done? Collier claims that ‘[some societies are more prone to conflict than others because they offer more inviting economic prospects for rebellion](https://www.sfu.ca/content/sfu/dean-gradstudies/events/dreamcolloquium/SpringColloquium/Readings/Readings/_jcr_content/main_content/download_47/file.res/Paul%20Collier)’ such as large deposits of valuable natural resources. A focus on institutional weaknesses is what characterises the grievances theory, [which regards undemocratic and dysfunctional governance by corrupt political elites as a factor potentially leading to armed conflict](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/working/Ross%20-%20Politics%20of%20the%20resource%20curse.pdf). Second, [resource curse scholars maintain](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237040476_Natural_Resource_Types_and_Conflict_Termination_Initiatives) that the availability of ‘lootable’ natural resources can prolong the duration of hostilities because resource commodities provide rebel groups with the revenues to sustain their military campaign and represent an economic incentive to prolong the fighting. The outbreak of an armed conflict would generate a new “[political economy of war”](https://www.rienner.com/title/The_Political_Economy_of_Armed_Conflict_Beyond_Greed_and_Grievance), where belligerents accumulate wealth through the exploitation of valuable commodities. Third, valuable natural resources can act as a disincentive for the peace process. The literature on environmental peacebuilding emerged more recently to reduce the risks associated with bad resource governance in post-conflict settings. A key concern for this groups of scholars is [to reform how natural resources are managed to improve transparency and accountability, kick start the economy](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303324645_Engines_for_Peace_Extractive_Industries_Host_Countries_and_the_International_Community_in_Post-Conflict_Peacebuilding), and thus reinforce the peace process. While some of the early claims associated with the resource curse theory have been revisited, its main propositions have entered [NGO](https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/14461/the_sinews_of_war.pdf) and [government](https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13540.doc.htm) debates on armed conflict. In the collective imaginary, conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia (to name a few) have been associated with brutal wars waged by rebels driven by the lust for ‘blood diamonds’. Support for this narrative has resulted in internationally-supported interventions to reinforce governmental control over resource-rich areas, to secure extraction sites, promote ‘good governance’ and responsible business conduct, fight public corruption, and mitigate selected human rights abuses (often committed by rebel groups). Briefly, the resource curse thesis has profoundly shaped our understanding of the problem of conflict resources and legal and policy solutions to address it. By accepting its main propositions, however, the silences and contradictions of the theory have been sidelined. According to postcolonial scholars, a limitation of the resource curse thesis is that it is based upon a ‘commodity determinism’, which ignores the historical and structural dimensions of resource scarcity, maldistribution, and poverty in the Global South. By focusing on local actors (corrupt elites, rebel/military groups), the role of external actors, such as former colonial powers, transnational corporations, and international organisations in producing scarcity, poverty and thus violence is obscured. Cyril Obi argues that “[blind spots in hegemonic discussions of the oil curse in Africa include the place of Africa’s oil in the global political economy, and how transnational actors and structures are deeply implicated in the corruption and armed conflicts in oil-rich states”](https://www.jstor.org/stable/25767298?seq=1/analyze). Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt claims that the resource curse thesis is predicated upon on a colonial fantasy, which sees the Global South as a place of “[complete lack of control and disorder…whose inhabitants – by some irrational logic of nature – have found themselves endowed with resources that cannot or do not know how to deal with an orderly manner”](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5219744_%27May_God_Give_Us_Chaos_So_That_We_Can_Plunder%27_A_critique_of_%27resource_curse%27_and_conflict_theories). In the collective imaginary, conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia (to name a few) have been associated with brutal wars waged by rebels driven by the lust for ‘blood diamonds’ These critiques call attention to some generalisations and biases of the resource curse theory, and its incapacity to grasp the broader causes and dynamics of resource wars.

Given its dominance in international policy and academic circles, the question that needs to be engaged concerns the effects of the theory on global legal responses to ‘conflict resources’. What becomes seen and what is hidden by the current focus on security, transparency, and good governance? What harms and forms of violence receive international attention and what are marginalised? The effects of normative and policy solutions to conflict resources on women and girls Women may be part of a community affected by conflict-related resource extraction, while at the same time [suffering differentiated impacts to those of men](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332204208_Resource_Extraction_and_the_Human_Rights_of_Women_and_Girls_). These impacts include contamination of lands and water, its effect on biodiversity, and the increased burdens on women who may be responsible for food production and finding clean water; gender specific health impacts of resource extraction; loss of livelihood; and increased risks of sexual violence due to the influx of male workers or the presence of the military and private security forces to protect extractive projects. Yet, [dominant approaches](https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/111/443/202/16975) to conflict resources focus on rape and sexual violence as the main negative consequences suffered by women and on rebel groups/local actors as the key perpetrators. In other words, sexual violence [has been understood](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276112335_Natural_Resources_and_Gender_in_Conflict_Settings) as the primary manifestation of violence against women in these contexts. The emphasis on sexual violence has resulted in the failure to take seriously the structural forms of gendered violence linked to resource extraction in conflict and post-conflict scenarios. Notably, [as observed by Catherine Macdonald](http://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/openaccess/9780198817369.pdf), women in mining communities may suffer economic inequalities in relation to accessing the benefits of extractive projects, while disproportionately bearing the costs. Economic inequality, like gender inequality, is a form of structural violence, which can be understood as violence against those whose economic marginalisation maintains their situation of vulnerability. Economic inequality can be exacerbated by situational factors such as violent conflict. Inequality in access to natural resources is also recognised as one of the drivers of conflict. However, current international approaches to conflict resources [fail to address the root-causes of these wars, including distributive justice concerns](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282238196_Governing_Natural_Resources_for_Peace_Lessons_from_Liberia_and_Sierra_Leone). The emphasis on sexual violence has resulted in the failure to take seriously the structural forms of gendered violence linked to resource extraction in conflict and post-conflict scenarios Based upon the connection between resource extraction and sexual violence, the conflict resources narrative assumes that women need to be parted from these settings to be ‘saved’ or ‘rescued’. This approach negates women’s agency, reinforces the same gender stereotypes that help fuel sexual violence (notably, representing men as sexually dominant/aggressive and women as submissive/passive), and becomes the justification for paternalistic and imperial responses, [especially when the ‘victims’ are women in the Third World](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228143416_The_Tragedy_of_Victimization_Rhetoric_Resurrecting_the_Native_Subject_in_InternationalPost-Colonial_Feminist_Legal_Politics). [As noted by Lahiri-Dutt](https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/cjwl.31.1.02), this denies women’s active choices to pursue employment in the extractive industry, by constructing women living near extractive sites as ‘homogenous groups’ and labelling them as powerless, exploited and sexually harassed. Although women living closely to mines may be more likely to be subject to sexual violence and rape than other women, it does not mean that removing them from the mining scene will improve their situation. The ‘[exit strategy](http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1110346/FULLTEXT01.pdf)’ is a way of treating the symptoms, instead of tackling the causes, like patriarchy, structural inequality, and subordination. Given the scarcity of alternative means of income, legislation and policies aimed at protecting women by excluding them from mining/extractive areas [may actually be counterproductive](http://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/openaccess/9780198817369.pdf) as they reinforce the male-dominated nature of extractive industry. Integrating a gender perspective Informal normative processes, like the Kimberley Process and EITI, which have been the mainstream solution to conflict resources, do not sufficiently integrate a gender perspective. Further, measures aimed at reinforcing state control over mines often include the prohibition of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). ASM is the conventional extraction method employed in developing countries (especially in conflict zones), where the workers use simple tools, often digging by hand. [Data shows](https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/igf-women-asm-challenges-opportunities-participation.pdf) that women account for up to 30 per cent of the global ASM workforce, reaching 50 per cent in Africa. As such, the ban on ASM has a negative impact on women livelihoods and socio-economic rights The UN Group of Experts on the DRC [found that](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1259339.pdf) due diligence requirements, combined with commodity sanctions imposed by Western states, have resulted in extractive companies to turn to ‘safer’ sources of origin, such as Asia. The decline in production not only affects local miners but also numerous small businesses in mining areas. Although women are not in a majority in the mining industry, many depend on the demand of services connected to the industry. The side effects of these policies have been raising unemployment and poverty, including among women. Simplified discourses, premised upon the resource curse thesis, have created one-dimensional and often ineffective responses, which leave unaddressed the complex root-causes and dynamics of resource wars. Global efforts to address the resource-conflict nexus and its gender dimensions have done little more than perpetuating inequalities, stereotypes, and the status quo. Moving forward, a deeper engagement with structural forms of gendered violence linked to resource extraction in conflict and post-conflict countries is needed. [As feminist legal scholars](https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2017/01/09/women-peace-and-security-a-critical-analysis-of-the-security-councils-vision/) have argued, paying attention to the underlying causes of violent conflict, in particular unequal distribution of natural resources, may eventually lead to a different conceptualisation of peace, as something more than just the absence of war.

#### International law is inherently structured to benefit elite men and is a form of Western bullying- decades of empirics proves that women can rarely access these channels

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(Christopher, Fall, Professor of International Law, Department of Government, Georgetown University. Ph.D., University of Virginia—AND—George Little—University Graduate Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Government, Georgetown University, It's not Nice to Fool Mother Nature! The Mystique of Feminist Approaches to International Environmental Law, 14 B.U. Int'l L.J. 223)

Western governments have perceived and explained international law as a universal normative order. 29 It is often viewed as a consensual system, one that is binding only if its members agree. 30 This understanding implies that the language of international law is one which is capable of coordinating multilateral consensus and applying the law universally. The traditional Western perspective is that international law is state-based, human-based, and "people"-focused. 31 Feminists reject this understanding of international law. They believe that international law merely masquerades as universal. They criticize international law for its failure to recognize distinctions and remedy disparities between different groups of humans, especially between males and females. Feminism has several distinguishing earmarks. Among the most fundamental are the distinctions between "masculine" and "feminine" modes of thought. Feminist analysis flows from an experiential perspective. Feminists conclude that the international legal system is sustained and propagated by "male elites" for the political, social and economic benefit of men. Thus, a fundamental assumption in the feminist approach to international law can be summed up by the assertion that "both the structures of international lawmaking and the content of the rules of international law privilege men; if women's interests are acknowledged at all, they are marginalized. International law is a thoroughly gendered system." 32 Empirical data tend to support this disturbing, yet compelling assertion. In 1996, women head only seven U.N. missions. 33 There are only three women presidents and [three] women prime ministers in the [\*232] world. 34 Women account for a paltry eleven percent of legislators worldwide. 35 Women head only four of the United Nations thirty-two specialized agencies and programs. 36 Only four of twenty-nine senior officials at the United Nations Children's Fund are women, and most glaringly, no woman holds any of the Food and Agriculture Organization's top fifty-one jobs. 37 If institutional male power were measured solely in numbers, it would easily overwhelm female power. The methodology for feminist legal thought rests, however, on much more than gender calculations of government personnel. It operates within a complex matrix of normative structures and principles that yield useful gauges for depicting the gendered philosophical and theoretical foundations of standard law. The remainder of this study undertakes to provide a clearer explanation of this nuanced matrix. The normative framework is first set out by examining the essential assumptions embraced by feminist approaches to international law. The article then analyzes and assesses feminism's substantive criticisms of international law. Finally, the intellectual essence of these ideas are configured in order to distill a distinctly feminist understanding of international environmental law. A. Feminist Reconstruction of International Law While several assumptions motivate the operation of feminist jurisprudence, three appear most fundamental to gendered perspectives on international law, namely: (1) the inherent bias of international law; (2) the rejection of objectivity in feminist legal theory; and (3) the distinction in moral reasoning between males and females. Each of these merit further comment, with a view to appreciating the general implications for international environmental law. 1. The Inherent Bias of International Law The prism of international law does not appear to offer a female-friendly manner of jurisprudential thinking. 38 The law of nations, which traditionally mirrors many practices in municipal law, seeks to establish agreed upon rules, norms, principles, regimes, and institutions in order to fix regularized patterns of behavior for sovereign actors engaged in international intercourse. 39 These legal entities, called states, are viewed by feminists as promoting a dominance of men over women in law on the global level. A leading international legal scholar in the early Cold War period described international law as "the system of assumptions and logical deductions that have characterized modern civilization." 40 Feminists would likely revise this formulation to read something more akin to "international law is the male system of gendered assumptions and male-oriented logical deductions that have characterized modern biased civilization." Until only recently, men have contributed nearly everything to the philosophy and creation of international law. Men founded, developed, and interpreted the theoretical foundations and historical tradition of international law. Francisco de Vitoria, 41 Francisco Suarez, 42 Hugo Grotius, 43 Samuel Pufendorf, 44 Emerich de Vattel, 45 Hans Kelsen, 46 Michael Akehurst, 47 Ian Brownlie, 48 Louis Henkin, 49 and Myres McDougal 50 stand out as some of international law's many giant scholars. Contributions of female scholars are conspicuous by their absence. The past four hundred years of international legal thought clearly suggest that men have cornered the market on the law of nations--as statesmen and legal practitioners, as well as scholars. This is not to say that male international law scholars are incapable of understanding female concerns. Nor is it to imply that these male-oriented tendencies were out-of-sync with their times. Rather, it merely points to a bold historical fact that gives feminists reason to question the nature and philosophical bases of international law, and thus to view it with gendered skepticism. [\*234] Within the past four decades, however, women have made considerable and important contributions to international legal discourse. 51 Feminists no doubt are pleased with this development. Still, they continue to question a worldwide legal order that men ensconced long ago. International law, feminists presume, still contains many traces of sex-based bias and partiality in favor of males. Not surprisingly, the same fatal flaws can be inferred to taint international environmental law, which has been negotiated, agreed upon, and promulgated by men, through an inherently male-biased international legal system. Feminists criticize the normative structure and rhetoric of international law as reflecting and reinforcing a system that serves the priorities of men in power and subordinates women. 52 Notwithstanding this indictment, feminists believe that international law can be expanded to incorporate a feminist perspective. 53 The initial step in a feminist reconstruction of the international legal system is to achieve equal representation in the decision-making roles within states and international organizations. Attaining a one-to-one ratio of female-to-male representatives, some feminists assert, would bring women's concerns more readily to the table for discussion. The current proportion in which male representatives greatly outnumber female representatives provides a political environment in which "female" issues (e.g., sex discrimination, domestic violence and socio-economic inequity) are relegated to a separate sphere and tend to be set aside. 54 The reason why is clear: saliency of such issues is low for men, who have little vested interest in pursuing drastic policies of change. Thus, a paramount goal of feminist legal thought is to create an international legal system that represents not just women and the concerns of women, but rather one that addresses the concerns of both women and men as human beings. [\*235] 2. Rejection of Objectivity in Feminist Theory It may well be that feminist legal analysis is launched by the premise that objective reality is fiction. 55 Objectivity--the condition of being real and actually existing within the realm of sensual experience, as opposed to existing only in the mind of the subject--is seen to function as a silent suppressor of the feminine voice. Women traditionally have been seen, but not heard, or at least not listened to. Such objectivity, be it in law, economics, politics, or social institutions, essentially acts to legitimize the normative edifices that males have traditionally erected to maintain legal control over society. 56 The ironic consequence is that objectivity becomes a means for instilling bias and prejudice in the construction of law for social regulation. Feminist legal theorists therefore, are loath to consider the so-called "objective perspective" as being legitimate, principally because it represents and ingrains expressions of masculinity. 57 To enforce particulars of international law as currently defined, feminists contend, is to enhance and further entrench the male perspective, notwithstanding the law's espoused intent to do precisely the opposite. To accept objectivity as a fiction, or at least a myth, permits feminist thinkers to question the abstract rationality that focuses the world's legal vision along male trajectories. 58 It allows feminist critics to reject the normative roots of notions that reinforce the gendered bias of international law, such as the "rule of law" and "neutrality." 59 Precepts like these might purport objectivity, but in reality they act as legal constraints on more than one-half of society. Such legal notions promote the dominance of men as a social group [\*236] by giving privilege to certain perceptions of power in social life. Feminist consciousness has traditionally inferred that general perceptions of power are predominantly male. 60 How does such objectivity influence international law? As commonly defined, international law is "a body of rules which binds states and other agents in world politics in their relations with one another and is considered to have the status of law." 61 The "rule of law" precept that earmarks many political systems, especially in the Western democratic world, permeates not only domestic law; it typifies international law as well. 62 It is similar to the "body of rules" notion in the above definition. Both constructs set limits on what states or individuals can or cannot do. The "body of rules" presumes that the law functions as an autonomous delineator of the boundaries which states cannot cross in their international interactions. According to feminist scholars, autonomy is associated with men. In feminist theory, the normative separation of international law, as an autonomous force, from gendered sources of the law, acts to legitimize the law of nations on male grounds. 63 The separation also distinguishes legal analysis from the political, social, economic, and cultural contexts in which people live. 64 Men can point to the "body of rules" as an independent, "objective" platform on which to construct and preserve their gendered vision of law. 65 Dissent from the international "rule of law" enables those men who control governments to coerce other states or non-state actors with forceful or non-forceful means, and without fear of subsequent guilt or retribution. These male leaders can claim that they are simply protecting the consent-based "rule of law" in the international system. 66 Advocates of feminist approaches to international law lack both opportunity and capability to effect great change in the nature and structure of international law. They also lack the normative and tangible coercive means through which their ideas can penetrate male legal discourse and state-directed action. Consequently, prevailing gendered structures of international law tend to discount feminist approaches for their lack of [\*237] "objectivity" and for their challenge to the "body of rules" and the "rule of law." Contemporary international law, like domestic law, tends to conceal governmental and social hierarchies, as well as distributions of power. 67 Women's ideas on law, if they are to successfully influence legal thought, must pass a litmus test created and appraised by male institutions. In effect, this amounts to a gender-based catch-22 for international norm creation. Both international law itself, as well as the criteria for its inherent validation and global legitimization, are conceived as socially-biased constructs rather than universal standards. 68 Hence the entire range of international legal rules and the "objective" sources from which they derive have become ripe for feminist criticism on grounds of gender bias. 69¶

#### The OST is structurally flawed due to the gender imbalance in space law.

Steer, 21

(Cassandra Steer (Feb, 26, 2021) “The Province of all Humankind” – A Feminist Analysis of Space Law. In: de Zwart M., Henderson S. (eds) Commercial and Military Uses of Outer Space. Issues in Space. Springer, Singapore. Dr. Cassandra Steer is a Mission Specialist with the ANU Institute of Space (InSpace), and a Senior Lecturer at the ANU College of Law specialising in space law, space security and international law. Dr. Steer has more than a decade of international experience teaching at universities in Australia, Europe, North America and South America, and brings a comparative perspective to all her research and teaching. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8924-9\_12 //](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8924-9_12%20//) GirlsDebate)

It is clear, therefore, that the pretenses of international law as being neutral, objective, and universal are false, and that space law is as much an expression of power dynamics as is any other area of law. There is no equality between countries, despite the notion of formal equality as a value underpinning international law, and the status quo is determined by interests of a small handful of countries which have managed to institutionalize the power they held at the close of the Second World War. There is no equal access to space, nor is there distribution of the benefits derived from space, despite this being a promise of the OST. Space is far from being the “province of all mankind”. Indeed, space is even further from being the province of all humankind. Access to, benefits from, and governance over space is the province of an elite few, and within those few there is a gender imbalance which mirrors the geographical imbalance. At the time that the OST was drafted, not only were there no women at the negotiating table, but under the U.S. programme, women were excluded from being able to become astronauts. To become an astronaut, one had to be a military test pilot, a profession from which women were banned (Koren, 2017). There was a strong lobbying campaign, led by highly qualified women pilots, to convince NASA and the White House to allow women to become astronauts (Klein, 2017), and a clandestine “Women in Space” program was bankrolled by the pioneering pilot Jackie Cochran (Weitekamp, 2004). In this program, a number of women were selected by Dr. Randolph Lovelace, a contractor to NASA who led the physical tests and training for astronauts, to undergo the exact same training as the men, because he suspected women would be better candidates for space travel, due to our generally lighter weights and lower need for oxygen. A higher percentage of women passed the tests than men, and many of the women performed better than the male trainee astronauts. However, despite the test results, the deeply engrained sexism of the time prevailed. Apparently Lovelace’s motives may have been focused on the need for women as secretaries and assistants in future long-term space habitations (Weitekamp, 2004). When “Women in Space” candidate Jerrie Cobb testified before a congressional subcommittee in 1962, she stated “we seek, only, a place in our nation’s space future without discrimination” (Klein, 2017), but astronaut John Glenn testified that creating a programme to train women astronauts would compromise the race to land on the Moon before the Soviets. Moreover, he argued “the men go off and fight the wars and fly the airplanes and come back and help design and build and test them. The fact that women are not in this field is a fact of our social order.” (Weitekamp, 2004; Klein, 2017). Ultimately the lobbying campaign failed, and the Women in Space program was shut down because NASA did not sponsor it. One year later, the first woman in space was a Soviet woman, Valentina Tereshkova, in March 1963. The Soviets had beaten the Americans in yet another milestone in the space race, ostensibly breaking the glass ceiling for women’s participation. However, she was not to be followed by another woman until 1982, when Svetlana Savitskaya flew on a mission to the Soviet Salyut Space Station. Upon her arrival, Savitskaya was handed an apron by her crewmates, who “joked” that she should get to work in the kitchen. Despite this rude welcome, she went on to perform a series of highly skilled engineering tasks for which she had been trained, including testing a tool for welding in space, and becoming the first woman to undertake a spacewalk (Lewis, 2018). Women are still vastly underrepresented in all STEM careers, and in the entire space sector generally, as well as at all international negotiating tables and in national law-making. It matters, then, a great deal, who has the power to determine the laws and norms applicable to human activity in space. If we are at all serious about the promises of the OST, then this power balance must shift. We must take into account the interests of many more players than just the most geopolitcally influential as we seek new space law and governance solutions to today’s and tomorrow’s space activities. It starts with making explicit that space is not at all “the province of all mankind”, let alone the province of all humanity.

#### The aff’s drive to prevent extinction is a form of masculine survivalism where gendered bodies become the unwilling tools to sustain humanity. You should refuse their obsession with patriarchal reproduction.

Mitchell 15

(Audra Mitchell, Audra Mitchell is a settler scholar who lives and works on the Ancestral and treaty lands of the Neutral (Attawandaron), Haudenosaunee and Mississaugas of the New Credit (please see Honouring the Land). She currently holds the the Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at Wilfrid Laurier University. From 2015-18 she held the CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs Audra is an Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, 8-3-2015, "Gendering extinction," Worldly, <https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/2015/08/03/gendering-extinction/>, JKS)

The reproduction of survival/ the survival of reproduction

Extinction is almost always understood against the horizon of survival and the imperative to sustain it – at least for life forms deemed to be of value to humans. In many cases, this imperative takes the form of deliberate strategies for enforcing existence. Donna Haraway’s influential book When Species Meet devotes considerable attention to the logics, practices and politics of Species Survival Plans. These plans monitor and enforce reproduction amongst ‘endangered’ species, not least by collecting data on populations, genetic profiles and genetic materials to enable selective breeding. This strategy assumes that all organisms can, should, and can be made to exercise their reproductive capacities in order to resist extinction, and it actively mobilizes members of ‘endangered species’ into this project. In so doing, it helps to entrench norms regarding gender, sexuality and reproductive labour that are deeply entrenched in modern, Western human cultures. Attention to these programmes highlights an important way in which extinction is gendered in dominant scientific and policy frameworks. Specifically, strategic breeding programmes share in the belief that reproduction is an imperative for those capable of reproducing if ‘the species’ is at risk’. This belief is directly related to Western norms of the reproductive imperative for women. Indeed, Haraway points out that it is precisely “‘woman’s’ putative self-defining responsibility to ‘the species’ as this singular and typological female is reduced to her reproductive function”. In a similar sense, within SSPs and other strategies of enforced survival, entire life forms are reduced to their reproductive capacities. Moreover, programmes of enforced survival can, in the context of sexual reproduction, disproportionately burden female organisms with the task of avoiding extinction. This logic is particularly fraught in discussions of the possibility of human extinction, in which female fertility (captured in the standard policy language of ‘births per woman’) is framed simultaneously as a threat to survival, and the only hope for escaping extinction (see, for instance, Alan Weisman’s comments on this). In these ways, the securitization of survival entrenches the intersectional categories of gender, species and race discussed above. Dominant discourses of extinction and conservation also entrench and privilege sexual reproduction, in ways that entrench heteronormative assumptions and norms. This is reflected in the way that the subjects of extinction and conservation are framed. The standard object of conservation is the biological ‘species’, a term which is defined by the ability of organisms to reproduce sexually. As Myra Hird has pointed out, this conception of ‘species’ makes it appear as if sexual reproduction is the ‘best’ means of sustaining the existence of a life form. However, Hird’s work demonstrates that Earthly life forms actually engage in myriad forms of reproduction, from the free exchange of DNA between bacteria to the hermaphroditic practices of some fish. The upshot of these arguments is that Earthly life is sustained through a huge variety of reproductive activities that do not conform to biological understandings of life processes or species. Crucially, Hird argues that there is no necessary hierarchy between forms of reproduction. In Darwinian terms, all species that manage to survive are equally successful. However, by conflating survival with sexual reproduction, existing discourses of extinction embed hetero-normative frameworks that devalue other forms of reproduction. They also reduce reproduction to the imperative to survive, ignoring the myriad cultural, political, aesthetic, sensual and other dimensions of reproduction.

#### The impact is hypermasculine war-making- claims of objectivity are patently flawed because they are based in gendered decision-making

Sjoberg 13

(Laura, total bae, associate professor of Political Science @ University of Florida, University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Southern California School of International Relations; J.D. Boston College Law School, Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War Chapter: “Relations International and War(s),” Gendered Lenses Look at War(s), googlebooks, JKS)

Feminist scholars have also interrogated the unitary nature of the state, pointing out that efforts to maximize the state's security interests often threaten the security of people inside the state. Specifically, as I discussed in the previous section, the state's most marginalized citizens are often made insecure by state security-seeking, making it clear that a state does not have a single interest in interstate interaction but many that conflict. J. Ann Tickner contends that "an explanation of the historical development of state sovereignty and state identities as they have evolved over time does indeed suggest deeply gendered constructions that have not included women on the same terms as men." This is because, according to Tickner:¶ From the time of their foundation, states have sought to control the right to define political identity. Since their legitimacy has constantly been threatened by the undermining power of subnational and transnational loyalties, states' survival and success have depended on the creation and maintenance of legitimating national identities; often these identities have depended on the manipulation of gendered representation. . . . Drawing on metaphors that evoke matrimonial and familial relations, the nation has been portrayed as both male and female. . . . The sense of community implicit in these family metaphors is deeply gendered in ways that not only legitimate foreign policy practices but also reinforce inequalities between men and women.”¶  ¶ Using these gendered metaphors, the state can, while shoring up its "national interest," both threaten the interest of marginalized citizens inside it and reinforce power inequalities among its groups. Catherine MacKinnon has explained that the "state's structures and actions are driven by and institutionalize strategy based on an epistemic angle of vision" that can "distinguish public from private, naturalize dominance as difference, hide coercion beyond consent, and conceal politics beyond morality.” These structures require a certain standard of behavior from some members of the state,” while suppressing the voices of others altogether.”¶ With these tools, the state can appear unitary by suppressing its diversity and presenting one concept of national interest, autonomous of and not necessarily representative of its citizens. In this understanding, the sovereign state can be "an extension of the separation-minded realist man, also autonomous to various degrees from the diverse 'domestic' interests he-it allegedly exists to protect.” Additionally, states are complicit with gender subordination when they fail to intervene in domestic violence, perpetuate a heterosexist bias in education, exercise discrimination in welfare policies, and operate on patriarchal laws.” ¶ In this conception, the unitary state is a misleading and malignant construction. Two implications for the process of state interaction follow; states that interact often promote unrepresentative interests, and those unrepresentative interests exclude gender, racial, and cultural minorities. In this sense, states' elites often make wars (or fail to) "representing" a limited group or groups among their populations, while claiming full representativeness, effectively rendering a significant portion of their supposed "constituency" invisible in the process of interacting with other states. Empirically, this means that there are a number of levels of interstate interaction, many of which are omitted from process-based notions of dyadic war theorizing. Normatively, it suggests that our conceptions of how states interact (and the content of those interactions) are problematically skewed.¶ Rationality in Interaction This skew is particularly evident in the assumption of rationality." The rationality assumption implies that the knower/actor can separate himself/herself from the “other” in interactions with that other. Feminists have argued that knowledge is always perspectival and political; therefore, states and their leaders’ decisions about how to interact with others are not rational, but informed by their situational and political biases. In this view, the rationality assumption may be seen as at once itself a political bias and obscuring other political biases. As Naomi Scheman argues, perceived rational cost-beneﬁt analysis about war-making and war-fighting should “always be seen as especially problematical when... constructed only by those in positions of privilege... [which provide] only distorted views about the world.”78 In this view, rational calculation is not an objective, attainable, and desirable end, but a partial representation of both interest and actors’ representation of those interests. In this way, through gender lenses, rationality has been seen as importantly incomplete, leaving out signiﬁcant (if not the most significant) factors that go into decision-making.79 In addition to understanding the rationality assumption as partial (and therefore unrepresentative), feminist research has pointed out links between rationality and mascuIinism.8° As Karen Jones notes, advocates of rationality as a guide for interstate interactions“ assume: 1. Available... conceptions of rationality and reason represent genuinely human norms and ideals; 2. The list of norms and ideals contained within available conceptions of rationality and reason are sufficiently complete; and 3. The external normative functions assigned to reason and rationality are unproblematic.82 Looking through gender lenses shows problems with each of these assumptions. Feminists have argued that “the identity of the modern subject-in models of human nature, citizenship, the rational actor, the knowing subject, economic man, and political agency-is not gender-neutral but masculine (and typically European and heterosexua|).”83 This impacts not only how we see the rational subject, but how we predict and understand his decisions, at the state level as well as at the individual level. According to Margaret Atherton, the possibility of rationality has “been used in a disturbing fashion to mark a gender distinction. We have, for example, on the one hand, the man of reason, and, on the other, the woman of passion.”84 In rationality assumptions, traits associated with masculinity are normalized and traits associated with femininity are excluded. The impact is compounded because (masculinized) rationality and its (feminized) alternatives are not on equal playing ﬁelds. As a result, Karen Jones notes that “women’s assumed deficiency in rationality” has been used to exclude both women and knowledge associated with femininity from accepted views of the world.85 The alleged gender neutrality of rationality, then, “is often a covert form of privileging maleness”85 and omission of “what has traditionally counted as ‘feminine.’”87 Still, adding women and values associated with femininity to current concepts of rationality is unlikely to create a gender-neutral concept of rationality.88 This is because, epistemologically, the sovereign rational subject constructs artificial gendered boundaries between rationality and emotion, male and female, and knower and known.89 Among states, those boundaries are not benign. Instead, they breed competition and domination that inspire and foster war(s) and conﬂict(s).90 This competition frequently relies on contrasting the state’s own masculinity to the enemy’s (actual or perceived) femininity. This cycle of genderings is not a series of events but a social continuum. In these gendered relationships, as Zillah Eisenstein argues, “gender differentiation will be mobilized for war and peace,” especially moving forward into the age of an American empire focused on manliness.9‘ Feminists have long argued that competitions between hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in causing war(s).92 Hidden beneath the assumed independence, rationality, and unity of state interaction leading to war are gendered interstate interactions that cause, constitute, and relate to war and wars. Feminist scholars have recognized the extent to which the preeminence of masculine values dominates (particularly conﬂictual) accounts of interstate interactions, wherein “rational” interactions often become “a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and violence” in which “force is used to checkmate force.”93 Interstate interactions leading to wars often show the gendered nature of war narratives, war logics, and war languages, which produce (and reproduce) gendered cycles of violence.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of an ontological revisionism that deconstructs the myth of the masculine western subject. This is a politics that destabilizes the masculine subject by revealing how its false universality underwrites gender violence globally

Youngs 04

(Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in\*, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80, JKS)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. ¶ While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and ¶ economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. ¶ Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. ¶ When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed ¶ the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 ¶ Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 ¶ The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. ¶ The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ ¶ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. ¶ The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 ¶ Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 ¶ The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

#### The K comes first - policies are constituted by and produce subjects, not blanket assessments of outcomes and impacts. The ROB is to interrogate the gendered nature of the 1AC as a research project.

Bacchi 16

(Carol, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia, (2016): Policies as Gendering Practices: Re-Viewing Categorical Distinctions, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, DOI: 10.1080/1554477X.2016.1198207, JKS)

One important constitutive effect is how we are produced as subjects through the problematizations implicit in such texts, a process described as “subjectification” (Bacchi 2009, 16–17). For example, Foucault (1980) argues that specific problematizations of sexuality (e.g., sexuality as moral code, sexuality as biological imperative) create “subject positions” that enjoin people to become particular kinds of sexual subjects (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 308). Marston and McDonald (2006) describe how individual subjects are produced in specific policy practices “as worker-citizens in workfare programs, as parent-citizens in child and family services or consumer-citizens in a managerial and marketized mixed economy of welfare” (3). Given the proliferation of practices, the formation of one’s subjectivity is an ongoing and always incomplete process: “the doer/subject/person is never fixed, finally as a girl or a woman or whatever, but always becoming or being” (Jones 1997, 267). Subjectification effects therefore are neither deter- mined nor predictable. People sometimes take up subject positions in ways that challenge hierarchical relations. For example, the discourse of rights creates as one possible positioning that of the human rights advocate. Moreover, as practices “through which things take on meaning and value” (Shapiro 1988, xi), policies have material (lived) effects, shaping the possibilities for people’s and peoples’ lives (Bacchi 2009, 16–18). Policies achieve these constitutive effects through discursive practices, which comprise the “conditions of emergence, insertion and functioning” of discourses (Foucault 1972b, 163), and hence bridge a material-symbolic distinction (Bacchi and Bonham 2014). A particular conception of power underpins an understanding of policies as constitutive practices. Power is conceptualized as productive rather than as simply repressive. Power is not considered to be something people possess (e.g., “he or she has power”) but as a capacity exercised in the production of subjects and objects (Heller 1996, 83). This productive or generative view of power does not conclude that power and resistance are necessarily equal in their effects, however. Such a conclusion would deny the hierarchies by which the organization of discourse takes effect (see Howarth and Griggs 2012, 310). This understanding of policy as constitutive of subjects and objects sits in sharp contrast to conventional views of the policy process, which, in the main, can be characterized as reactive. That is, in general, policy is considered to be a response to some condition that needs to be ameliorated or “fixed.” Policies are conceived as “reactions” to “problems.” By contrast, the understanding of policy offered in this article portrays policies as constitutive or productive of (what are taken to be) “problems,” “subjects,” and “objects” (Allan 2010, 14). It follows that it is no longer adequate to think in terms of conventional policy “outcomes,” understood as the results or “impacts” of government actions. New questions are required, such as the following: What does the particular policy, or policy proposal, deem to be an appropriate target for intervention? What is left out? How does the shape of the proposal affect how people feel about themselves and the issue? And how does it produce them as particular kinds of subjects?

## Case

#### 1 --- yes death is bad but

#### a] their logic would justify forcing people to reproduce in order to ensure the continuation of humanity – if bodily security is sooo important then this just fits more into our f/w

#### b] destroying the subject is incoherent because it’s just a justification for their extinction scenarios which we o/w scope, timeframe and probability which implicates their f/w – ethics will work because we are here and alive now

#### c] We are’t just critiquing “extinction matters” but their view of it as the worst thing EVER is bad – the 7 billion vs everyone model doesn’t make sense in this case because it’s about reps

#### Peach 04 is incoherent – pragmatics can only work with the correct world view first which means that it will never solve

#### WE ARE’T REJECTING EMPRICISM -- Caprioli is wrong- the permutations acceptance of existing masculine theories stifles creation of new knowledge – the alts engagement outside existing theorization solves

Sjoberg 13

(Laura, associate professor of Political Science @ University of Florida, University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Southern California School of International Relations; J.D. Boston College Law School, “Conclusion: (A) Feminist Theory/ies of War(s),” Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War, online book, CMR)

Particularly, contra Mary Caprioli’s claims, Wibben argues that “it is, above all, feminists’ methodological commitments that distinguish FSS from other approaches.”17 Working methodologically within, or methodologically engaging, (positivist) security studies is, in Wibben’s view, not only limiting to but destructive of feminist thinking about war(s). This is, in Wibben’s terms, because asking feminist research questions and answering them using feminist methods necessarily looks different than traditional war studies. Doing work within the confines of the mainstream therefore takes a signiﬁcant amount of what is unique about feminist analysis away. Consequently, Wibben argues, “feminist security scholars cannot let traditionalists have the uncontested say about what the concept of security refers to, especially because security is so powerful when evoked.”18

#### No nuke winter- science and history.

Kroenig, PhD, ‘18

(Matthew, PoliSci@UCBerkeley, AssocProfGov’t&ForeignService@Gtown, SeniorFellowInt’lSecurity@AtlanticCouncil, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters, Oxford University Press) BW

At this point, some may object to the above attempt to measure gradations of nuclear war by claiming that the effects of any nuclear war would be unimaginable and could potentially even result in “nuclear winter” and complete human extinction. The possibility of nuclear winter, however, has long been dismissed by leading scientists.14 In the early 1980s, the scientist and public intellectual Carl Sagan and colleagues popularized the idea of “nuclear winter.”15 He and other experts argued that the heat from a nuclear explosion would set ablaze wooden structures and other flammable material in cities, sending large quantities of smoke into the Earth’s atmosphere, thus blocking out the sun’s rays. This would have the effect of reducing the Earth’s temperature and wiping out global agricultural production. Crude climate models at the time estimated that the effect could be so large as to result in mass starvation and possibly even human extinction. The arguments had a profound effect on elites and the general public on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Then–Soviet Premier Mikael Gorbachev later admitted that fear of nuclear winter was a factor motivating him to end the Cold War.16 Subsequent research employing more sophisticated climate modeling has demonstrated, however, that early fears about nuclear winter resulting in human extinction were overblown.17 Even scientists who initially proposed the idea, including the physicist Richard P. Turco

(the person who coined the phrase “nuclear winter”) disavowed these arguments just a few years later. Climate scientists working in this area today sometimes refer instead to the possibility of “nuclear autumn.” The smoke from a large-scale nuclear exchange could indeed obstruct sunlight and reduce agricultural production, but the effects would be milder than Sagan and others warned in the early 1980s. Evidence against nuclear winter comes not only from better climate models but also from data obtained from analysis of other events that emitted large quantities of smoke into the Earth’s atmosphere, such as the firebombing of Dresden and Tokyo during World War II, Saddam Hussein’s ignition of 600 oil wells in Iraq during the first Gulf War, and the volcanic eruptions at Krakatoa and Tambora.18 Tambora, for example, was a 33-gigaton explosion, equivalent to the simultaneous detonation of 2.5 million Hiroshima-size bombs. These events all spewed large amounts of soot into the Earth’s atmosphere, but only Tambora resulted in a noticeable decrease in the Earth’s temperature, and the effects were not catastrophic. (Indeed, it is said that Mary Shelly was inspired to write Frankenstein during an unusually gloomy European summer in 1816 that, unbeknownst to her, was the result of the Tambora volcano in faraway Indonesia).19 Depending on the size, timing, and location of a nuclear attack, agricultural production could be affected and this could result in disruptions to food supplies in vulnerable populations around the world. As such, “nuclear autumn” is included as a possible source of casualties in the above discussion. Most importantly for our purpose in this section, however, nuclear war, at least with nuclear forces heretofore accumulated, would not mean nuclear winter, human extinction, or the end of the world.

#### We’d survive nuclear war – agriculture solves.

Denkenberger, PhD, et al ’17

(David C., BuildingSystems@Boulder, D. Dorothea Cole, Mohamed Abdelkhaliq, Michael Griswold, Allen B. Hundley, Joshua M. Pearce, “Feeding Everyone if the Sun is Obscured and Industry is Disabled,” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, Volume 21) BW

A number of catastrophes could block the sun, including asteroid/comet impact, super volcanic eruption, and nuclear war with the burning of cities (nuclear winter). The problem of feeding 7 billion people would arise (the food problem is more severe than other problems associated with these catastrophes). Previous work has shown this is possible converting stored biomass to food if industry is present. A number of risks could destroy electricity globally, including a series of high-altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMPs) caused by nuclear weapons, an extreme solar storm, and a super computer virus. Since industry depends on electricity, it is likely there would be a collapse of the functioning of industry and machines. Additional previous work has shown that it is technically feasible to feed everyone given the loss of industry without the loss of the sun. It is possible that one of these sun-blocking scenarios could occur near in time to one of these industry-disabling scenarios. This study analyzes food sources in these combined catastrophe scenarios. Food sources include extracting edible calories from killed leaves, growing mushrooms on leaves and dead trees, and feeding the residue to cellulose-digesting animals such as cattle and rabbits. Since the sun is unlikely to be completely blocked, fishing and growing ultraviolet (UV) and cold-tolerant crops in the tropics could be possible. The results of this study show these solutions could enable the feeding of everyone given minimal preparation, and this preparation should be a high priority now.