# 1NC

### Cap K

#### Rights-focus on labor organizing represents legislative capture – it reinscribes the ontological domination of the state through cooption and interpretation of revolutionary struggle by the law – that alienates movement organizers from each other, demobilizing radical struggle.

Gabel, 84

[Peter, Prof. Law @ New College of California School of Law, San Francisco: “The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves,” Texas Law Review 62, no. 8 (May 1984). [https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/tlr62&div=65&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=&collection=journals]//AD](https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/tlr62&div=65&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals%5d//AD)

\*edited for offensive language

B. The Strategy of State Officials: Pseudo-Recognition and Containment by Interpretation

Rights-victories can facilitate a movement's cooptation by tempting the movement to "return" its power to the State in exchange for what I will call a pseudo-recognition of the movement's particular demands. I use the term "the State" here, just as I have earlier, to refer not to a collection of officials conceived as a conceptual unit, but to the projected image of authority that these officials "speak for" and that alienated consciousness "believes in" to provide itself with an illusory political foundation. This collectively believed-in authority serves as the political vehicle for opposing the internal development of the movement precisely to the degree that the group as a whole feels the need to resist the sense of possibility awakened by the movement's energy.

During the movement's rising period, the need to remain alienated continues to exist in each of us, including those at the movement's core, but its intensity is distributed throughout the group as a whole according to "social position," understood in a strictly experiential sense. For insofar as the movement initially finds the conviction to discover itself and "arise" through an affirmation of its difference from the rest of the group, it provokes a complex reaction in the group as a whole that depends in part upon how each person feels "positioned" in relation to the movement's particularity. While each movement as a movement aims at universality, the demands that emerge from its alienated particularity are aimed against others in their alienated particularity in a way that both [silences] ~~mutes~~ (in some locations) and accentuates (in other locations) the movement's transformative appeal. For example, a workers' movement may cause "management" and all those who identify with managerial "differentness" to want to "defend themselves"; yet the very fact that the workers have at first defined themselves against management may allow students who are beginning to discover themselves through their difference from teachers to "hear" the movement's deeper meaning. [Black people] ~~Blacks~~ who organize against whites may cause whites to rigidify behind their difference, while striking a chord among women who are also coming to experience each other in a new way through their discovery of the social meaning of a common physical difference. While any true account of a movement's impact would require a narrative description with much greater phenomenological texture than I can produce here, it is through the totality of these ontological resonances, each acquiring its quality from the unique way that the movement aims at the disalienating universal through the alienated particular, that the movement influences the "consciousness-war" occurring within each one of us between the need to remain alienated and the desire to surpass this alienation.

In this early period it is virtually inevitable that the balance of forces within the group as a whole ("society") will tilt in favor of the loyalty to substitute connection that forms the inertia of the status quo, and the group tacitly will rely upon its State officials to cope with the heightened conflict that the movement has generated within it. The "social position" of these officials is somewhat unique because they are called upon to represent the constitution of the group to itself as it actually is (in the sense that their perceived legitimacy as "representatives" extends no further than the group's own dominant self-understanding), and yet they also help to constitute the balance of forces that forms this understanding in their capacity as real people who are part of the group. And as people they are likely to be relatively unavailable to the movement's transformative appeal because this appeal threatens the very "belief in the State" upon which their existing identities depend; they will be inclined to defend themselves against any movement, because movements by their very nature pose a challenge to the alienated universality that in their case constitutes their particularity. As a result, State officials are likely to play the part of "barometers on the side of alienation," seeking to recognize the movement's presence within the group to the extent necessary to maintain their legitimacy, but doing so in a way that sides with the tilt in the group as a whole toward preserving the collective belief in the authority of the State.

The cooptation strategy that these officials adopt-a strategy that may or may not be conscious as regards its form, but remains unconscious as regards its experiential meaning-is to calibrate their responses to the movement's demands so as to encourage the tendency already present in the movement to return to a state of quiescence. This strategy seems to involve roughly three stages37 that take place across a time-span (often decades) dictated by the pulse of the movement itself. At first, these officials refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the movement's demands at all because they are inconsistent with existing law. This risks increasing the anger that forms part of the movement's strength and it may provoke destabilizing confrontations and demonstrations that increase the movement's visibility and appeal (for example, it may create a dispersed group of "sympathizers"). But this risk is a calculated one because it shores up the resolve of those who are opposed to the movement by backing up this resolve with an affirmation of what "the people" believe, while also tempting those within the movement to warp their own understanding of how the movement itself is constituted. Because the movement has achieved its disalienating reciprocity in part on the basis of a "surface recognition" of its common difference within the alienated social order, and because this new feeling of connection is as yet somewhat weak in light of the movement's incomplete internal confidence in its own autonomous and transcendental constitution, the movement suffers from an internal tendency to turn itself back into a group that is constituted "from the outside" on the basis of the inert particularity that as a movement it is seeking to surpass. When State officials refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the movement's demands, the movement may partially give in to this tendency by seeing itself less through its own eyes and more through the "eyes of the State," as if "the State" were the source of its being and for that reason ought to recognize it. The initial refusal of recognition by State officials, in other words, may begin to seduce the movement into deciding that "getting our rights" is the movement's ultimate objective rather than being but a moment of its own internal development. To that extent the movement's anger at the State may reveal a tendency toward compliance rather than transformation.

As the movement gathers momentum in this double direction-the one toward itself, the other away from itself and toward "the State"- the forces of alienation will begin to realign themselves to prepare for the second stage of the State's strategy, the stage of pseudo-recognition. Through a real intuition that spreads through the withdrawn selves on the basis of their existing organization of reciprocity (a phenomenological definition of "the social structure"), some people remain staunchly opposed to the movement because of their particular social relationship to it, while others begin to mediate the movement's relationship to the group as a whole (through "the media," for example) by recasting the movement's demands as a legitimate "rights-debate" with "difficult arguments on both sides." As leaders of collective experience, these oracles of the center seek to "mold public opinion" in a way that secures its anonymous or empty character against the risk that the desire unleashed by the movement could become a genuinely public force; their efforts are nervously aimed at reassuring the group as a whole that the images supporting our substitute connection can be reorganized to accommodate the movement's demands. These efforts are a measure of the movement's authentic impact. But they are also aimed at bombarding the movement itself with a false picture of its public success by suggesting that the movement is making headway because of its compatibility with the political foundations of the status quo (when exactly the reverse is the case). To the degree that the State's original refusal of recognition has already encouraged the movement to experience its own reciprocity as deriving from its external and role-based particularity, this shift toward mediation may further this temptation by implying that the "bad State" may be willing to back down and atone for its wrongs if the movement will abandon its transformative ambitions, or at least postpone them until an unrealizable future when these ambitions will be "allowed."

When State officials subsequently begin to recognize the movement's specific demands in the form of rights-victories, they do so with the hope that the movement will "trick itself' into equating these victories with its own internal ends. As State officials know perfectly well, it is not necessary or even conceivable that the movement will accept the acquisition of a few rights as all that it means to accomplish. It is necessary only that the movement divert itself from its authentic self-understanding enough to deceive itself into thinking that its objectives could eventually be realized through existing law, as if alienation could ever be overcome with its own agreement. For State officials comprehend in their being that once this diversion occurs, the movement will tend increasingly to see its own capacity to realize itself'as located outside of itself in "the State," and to that degree its transformative momentum will tend to collapse from within for reasons described earlier: "belief in the State" itself derives from the reciprocal denial of desire that divides us from each other by our role-performances and that secures the apparent reality of these performances through our collective obedience to a projected authority. Thus the recognition of the movement's demands by State officials is actually a pseudo-recognition because it intends to strip these demands of their universal and transformative meaning and to induce the movement to grasp itself as a "recognized particularity," playing its part along with all of the others in the circle of collective denial that forms the alienated whole.

But just as the State's original refusal to recognize the movement may partly strengthen as well as weaken the movement's internal solidarity, the eventual recognition of the movement also has this dual potential: it runs the risk of giving the movement the foothold in public consciousness that partly inspired its struggle for rights in the first place. The consciousness-war can be quite fluid at the moment of recognition, with each side struggling over the meaning of what is happening, and struggling not only against each other but among themselves and within everyone insofar as these "sides" are lived as a universal conflict that pervades each person's relationship to others. When bluecollar workers win the right to strike, the bank teller may or may not be happy depending upon countless resonations that overdetermine each other in both directions without absolutely determining anything in advance (including her relationship to her mother, her husband's job, her loyalty to the bank, her "white-collar" identity, her sense of how women should respond to conflict, her vision of her children's prospects, and including what, if anything, happens in the bank that day). To control this fluidity, State officials, to the extent that they remain on the side of alienation, must rely on the third stage of their strategy, the stage of "interpretation," to stabilize a situation that they have had no choice but to help create.

This third stage has been discussed extensively in those critical legal studies writings38 that have traced in specific historical instances how these officials attempt, through a process of doctrinal interpretation and legislative compromise elaborated over many years, to reconcile the movement's rights-victories with the pact of the withdrawn selves (as expressed through the intent of the framers, of the legislature, of the parties, of "the people"), and to distinguish these victories from their true social origins in the intent of the movement. During this extended period while the consciousness-war is waged with fluctuating intensity in countless microphenomenological contexts that mutually influence and totalize each other, these officials play a unique and constitutive role in equilibrating the conflict as a whole by purporting to universalize the meaning of each shift in direction through successive case-by-case revisions of what the Constitution says.39 They absorb what they can of the social texture of these shifts, test it for available alienated image-content, write it up as a fantasy narrative that is vaguely consistent with prior chapters, and then feed it back into the group as a whole as the official interpretation of how they, the people, believe it should "come out."' 40 But I think it is a mistake to understand this process as something that one group does to another, as if the State were trying to manipulate the movement into internalizing false consciousness by acting upon it in a one-way fashion. It is rather the final phase of a reciprocal and intersubjective struggle over the possibilities of social connection itself, as this struggle is mediated through a contest over the ontological meaning of legal concepts in their universal or constitutional dimension.

To the degree that the movement is successful in this universal sense, it can use a rights-strategy as part of its effort to leverage itself into public space with the ultimate aim of creating an experience of public community that could dissolve people's belief in and obedience to the State itself-it is only then that the judge can appear as a man in a tunic and "the law" can appear as something like his speech-impediment. But to the degree that the State is successful in using its rightsstrategy to tempt the movement to substitute rights-consciousness for its own critical self-understanding, the movement's members will gradually find themselves losing each other in their legal reflection and becoming attached to this reflection as the medium through which they recognize one another. By their efforts they will have changed their material and cultural circumstances to the degree that their particular demands can be "balanced" with the common commitment to maintaining the stability of the hierarchical order. But they will experience a hemorrhage of being that will allow them to be reabsorbed into this order, first by depriving them of their unique public appeal in a way that will lead public space to reenclose around them, and finally by hierarchizing themselves to secure the denial of desire upon which their continued acceptance within the group as a whole seems to depend.

#### The right-to-strike increases criminalization of worker organizing – it provides cover for police raids under the guise of testing the strike’s lawfulness, which criminalizes the most effective forms ex-post-facto by claiming they were “too militant” and disturbed otherwise-peaceful relations of property – these demarcations will always be drawn along racialized, gendered, and classed lines.

* Police and courts are created to defend private property
* NLRB wants nothing to do with strike arbitration – defers to police and courts, who moot the progressive effects of the NLRB
* Supreme Court ruled that property rights come before labor law
* “Unconditional” right-to-strike does not take precedent over either state OR federal criminal laws, which strip all defense from strikers against being fired

White, 18

[Ahmed, Nicholas Rosenbaum Professor of Law Chair @ U-Colorado Law: “Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike,” 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 1065. https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/1261/.]//AD

Neither the text of the Wagner Act nor its legislative history addressed the question of sit-down strikes, or even the broader issue of the limits of strike militancy. Instead, there are a couple of relevant passages in the legislative history that deal with the question of coercion and criminality in general.153 Among these is a statement by the act’s main sponsor, Senator Wagner himself, in which Wagner denied that the statute should have been seen as establishing a separate police function.154 “To saddle upon the National Labor Relations Board the duty to prevent ‘coercion’ by labor unions or employees would create a superfluous remedy for wrongs simply dealt with today by police courts and by injunctive relief in Federal and State courts,” he said.155 Moreover, such a move would threaten to overwhelm the NLRB and give “new congressional sanction to those many old decisions which have banned peaceful picketing, the mere threat to strike, and even the circularization of banners, on the ground that they were ‘coercive.’”156 And, he said, referring to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it would force the worker back into the “bondage that existed before that humane piece of legislation was enacted.”157 But by the same token, Wagner and other sponsors of the legislation also insisted that the Wagner Act would do nothing to displace the authority of police and courts to deal with violence and unrest. Both House and Senate reports on the legislation subscribed to the view that “[t]he remedies against such acts in the State and Federal courts and by the invocation of local police authorities are now adequate, as arrests and labor injunctions in industrial disputes throughout the country will attest.”158

It requires but little critical judgment to see in this active deferral to the authority of police and courts a deference as well to the sanctity of property and order, at least in every practical sense. For the defense of these institutions has always been at the very center of what police and courts evolved to do. Such functions had defined what police and courts had done in the fields of labor conflict in the half-century preceding the New Deal. And despite limits imposed on courts by the Norris-LaGuardia Act,159 this continued to be the case in the years immediately surrounding the enactment of the Wagner Act. Senator Wagner and his liberal colleagues no doubt knew this, just as they had to know that, if not the Wagner Act or the NLRB, nothing else was positioned to divert the police and the courts from these functions.

The full implications of these notions would soon be made evident. For several years in the late 1930s, the NLRB walked a thin line. It refused to categorically condemn the strikes as unlawful or to give them broad sanction.160 Instead, deferring to the notion that it was not the agency’s business to censure the misconduct inherent in such strikes, it typically ordered fired sit-down strikers reinstated, provided their actions had been sufficiently provoked or were otherwise not excessively violent.161 The key example of this was a relatively extended and disorderly, though not especially bloody and altogether innocuous, sit-down strike at a small specialty steel manufacturer called Fansteel Metallurgical in suburban Chicago, in the winter of 1937.162 As was so often the case, the strikers seized the company’s property in a desperate bid to compel the company to abide their rights under the Wagner Act.163 Armed with an injunction and a small army of police to enforce it, the employer eventually ousted them, fired many of them, and cooperated with the court in having dozens found in criminal contempt and thrown in jail.164

What the strikers had done was wrong, the agency notably conceded; but a balancing of the equities and the need to effectuate the purposes of the Wagner Act and abide its prohibition on firing workers for going out on strike, mandated that it order the strikers’ reinstatement. In line with its usual approach, the agency disclaimed giving any general sanction to sit-down strikes.165 It admitted refusing to reinstate strikers in other cases involving criminal behavior, including some sit-down strike cases, but insisted those were more serious cases than the one at hand. That thirty-seven strikers (and two union organizers) in this instance were jailed and fined for criminal contempt of a judge’s order to quit the plant was, in the agency’s view, not really its business—even though this concession made it someone else’s business to moot everything the NLRB might do for these workers.166

The case made its way to the Supreme Court.167 In an opinion by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the Court rejected the NLRB’s attempt to justify the strikers’ reinstatement.168 Hughes’ decision was a comprehensive defeat for the strikers and the NLRB.169 They were not entitled to reinstatement and their firing deprived the union of any claim to represent a majority of workers at the plant, putting to rest any claim that the employer was bound to recognize and bargain with the union— the very things that led to the strike in the first place.170 Hughes’ reasoning rested firmly on the inviolate nature of the employer’s property rights and the importance of order, which he used to brush aside the NLRB’s reasoning that its decision to order the reinstatement of the strikers rested on its expertise and its careful balancing of the equities in a case involving two sides that had done wrong.171 In Hughes’ view,

the ousting of the owner from lawful possession is not essentially different from an assault upon the officers of an employing company, or the seizure and conversion of its goods, or the despoiling of its property, or other unlawful acts in order to force compliance with demands. To justify such conduct because of the existence of a labor dispute or of an unfair labor practice would be to put a premium on resort to force, instead of legal remedies, and to subvert the principles of law and order which lie at the foundations of society.172

“Nor is it questioned that the seizure and retention of respondent’s property were unlawful,” he wrote.173 “It was a high-handed proceeding without shadow of legal right.”174

NLRB v. Fansteel was not unanimous.175 But Justice Stanley Reed’s dissent, which attempted to uphold the NLRB’s reinstatement of the strikers, actually represented a different way of deferring to similar values.176 For Reed, the issue in Fansteel was not whether the strikers had acted legally, for they had not, but rather whether the Court should second-guess the NLRB’s authority to sort out the equities in cases, like this one, where both parties had “erred grievously.”177 As Reed appreciated, there could be no justifying what the strikers had done— not in law, at least, and not before courts that deferred, above all, to the sanctity of property and order.178 Although the question of how far state and local authorities could go in regulating strikes without being preempted by the federal labor law was also not quite settled in these early years, there was little doubt that they enjoyed considerable authority to suppress the sit-down strikes by police action. By the 1950s, it would be completely clear that states faced almost no impediments at all in this regard—not when dealing with threats to property and order.179

Above all, Fansteel established the illegality and unprotected character of sit-down strikes. In its wake, employers fired hundreds of strikers and police and other authorities accelerated their suppression of the strike.180 But Fansteel also had a broader relevance. It made clear that strikes in violation of state law, particularly those in violation of state criminal laws, were illegitimate and that those who participated in them were at least presumptively unprotected from discharge. Likewise, beyond extending the ruling in Fansteel to seamen, the Court’s decision in Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB181 three years later had the broader effect of establishing that strikes in violation of federal laws or “policies”—in this instance, an archaic mutiny statute, enacted a century before the Wagner Act and invoked (the strikers never faced any charges of this kind) in the case of peaceful, dockside strikers who, in protesting their employer’s flagrant violation of their labor rights, simply refused to make the ship ready to sail—were also illegal and unprotected.182

#### Framing strikes as a “right” to be granted instead of a “freedom” cements state power over the working class and destroys class solidarity.

Dimick 19

Matthew Dimick, Professor @ University at Buffalo School of Law, 12-13-2019, "Labor Rights Will Not Save the Labor Movement," Jacobin, <https://jacobinmag.com/2019/12/labor-rights-movement-freedom-nlra-nlrb-mass-picketing> //MLT

Everyone agrees that labor law is broken. Under the auspices of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) — which was passed in 1935 at the height of the New Deal and laid the foundation for our current regime of collective bargaining — union membership rates have declined to existentially low levels. Though the weaknesses in labor law have been glaringly apparent for some time, and intermittent attempts have been made to reform it, discussion about labor law reform is now reaching a critical mass. Labor law reform has been central to the campaign promises of both Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren. There is much in common between the Sanders and Warren plans, though the level of detail in the Warren plan burnishes her reputation as a technocrat. Liberal think tanks have jumped on board. Left-leaning publications have also directed their attention to labor law reform. What unites most of these proposals is the idea of strengthening labor rights. I wrote an essay recently in Catalyst arguing that this approach is wrong. The labor movement should be wary of labor rights and instead seek to expand labor freedoms. A right is some legally enforceable claim, backed through the coercive machinery of the state (fines, injunctions, imprisonment, etc.), that one legal subject has against another because of some interference caused or threatened by that other. A freedom, in contrast, is the absence of a legally enforceable duty to refrain from some action. A “right to strike,” for example, means that workers are protected from any interference an employer might take against an employee for engaging in a strike. During a strike, hiring permanent replacement workers counts as the most obvious form of interference, and indeed such replacements have had a devastating impact on the effectiveness of strikes. A fully recognized right to strike would prohibit the hiring of permanent replacements and legally compel employers to discharge their replacements when striking workers decide to call off the strike and return to work. All well and good, except that this rights approach overlooks the most important reason employers get away with hiring permanent replacements: labor law effectively bans mass picketing, the picketing of large numbers of workers near the struck business. Before mass picketing was banned, it was the most potent weapon in labor’s arsenal in the 1940s, and its repeated use established an “unofficial norm” against hiring permanent replacements, a norm that lasted until employers started defying it in the 1980s. Elimination of the ban on mass picketing would give workers a labor freedom rather than a labor right. With the labor freedom, it is workers themselves, through mass picketing, who enforce their strike power; with the labor right, it is the state, through the ban on permanent replacements, that does the enforcement. One might ask, “What’s the difference, if workers win the strike in the end?” Part of the answer comes from asking yourself, “Which of the two will build stronger and longer-term working-class solidarity?” The other part of the answer is that in numerous other cases, the effect of labor rights has been far more insidious. Labor rights, unfortunately, have been frequently used by judges, politicians, and bureaucrats as reasons for prohibiting or eliminating protection for strikes and other forms of collective activity. One example of this is the NLRA’s ban on organization and recognition picketing. Labor law prohibits any picketing (or even threats of picketing) “where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees.” This provision exists not because of some cynical, ideologically motivated, anti-union impulse. Rather, it exists because the NLRA already provides workers with a “fair” and “neutral” administrative method for choosing a bargaining representative and establishing a bargaining relationship: the National Labor Relations Board’s election procedure. In practice, however, these provisions virtually compel workers to make use of the board’s election procedure, which is characterized by legal-bureaucratic delay and employer intimidation.

#### Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause goes unquestioned. Farbod 15

( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)

Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6% per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800%.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85% of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50% of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1% will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80% of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return**.**

## Police PIC

#### Plan: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right to strike, except for law enforcement officers.

#### Allowing police strikes causes massive unrest and crime and exacerbates corruption within police unions

DiSalvo 20 (Daniel, Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute and professor of political science in the Colin Powell School at the City College of New York, Manhattan Institute, "The Trouble with Police Unions," https://www.manhattan-institute.org/the-trouble-with-police-unions )

In the first two decades of the 20th century, the question of whether police associations belonged in the labor movement at all was also debated. Some in the movement were concerned about the "divided loyalty" of police officers in situations where they were tasked with handling strikes by other unionists. Consequently, Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor claimed to have "held off" on chartering police unions for years despite receiving numerous applications, beginning with a group of Cleveland police in 1897. The ability of police to exercise political power in their own right came to national attention with the Boston police strike of 1919. After World War I, Boston police officers — complaining of low pay, lousy working conditions, and autocratic bosses — sought to organize a union and affiliate themselves with the AFL. The city's commissioner denied the officers' right to unionize. In response, about 80% of Boston's police force went on strike. Over the following three days, lawlessness reigned, resulting in many injured persons and much property damage. Calvin Coolidge, the Massachusetts governor at the time, took a firm stand, declaring, "There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime." He sent in 7,000 state militiamen to restore order. To disperse rioters, the state guards shot directly into crowds, killing nine and wounding 23. When order was finally restored, all 1,147 striking officers were fired and replaced. As Joseph Slater of the University of Toledo College of Law has shown, the strike proved disastrous for police unions and public-sector unions more generally. President Woodrow Wilson called the strike "a crime against civilization." From the 1920s through the 1940s, bipartisan opposition to the unionization of public employees was widespread. State- and local-government workers were not even considered for inclusion in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (often called the "Wagner Act"). In a 1937 letter to the leader of the National Federation of Federal Employees, President Franklin Roosevelt bluntly stated that "the process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service" and that strikes by public employees were "unthinkable and intolerable." It was not until a wave of state legislation in the 1960s and 1970s — which granted state- and local-government employees collective-bargaining rights — that most police officers gained them as well. The transformation was swift and dramatic. Collective-bargaining rights were extended from 2% of the state- and local-government workforce in 1960 to 63% in 2010. The changes in state laws were spurred by President John Kennedy's 1962 Executive Order 10988, which gave federal employees "the right...to form, join and assist any employee organization or to refrain from any such activity." The new state laws facilitated the conversion of police-officer associations, lodges, and orders into unions. "Hard pressed to defend the invidious distinction between police officers and other public employees on either ideological or political grounds," wrote professor of labor relations Marvin Levine in his history of police unions, "many elected officials realized that it was pointless to resist the rank-and-file demands any longer." The result was the formal recognition of police unions and the extension of collective-bargaining rights to law enforcement in many jurisdictions. In the 1960s, police associations became more politically active, especially since they were gaining labor rights during a period of urban unrest and public hostility to the police. In a 1977 book, Stanford University political scientist Margaret Levi described police unions as a "bureaucratic insurgency" that overcame police-commissioner opposition in several major cities. In some instances, the unions even served as platforms for launching the political careers of former officers and officials. POLICE UNIONS AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT Today, police enjoy collective-bargaining rights in 41 states and the District of Columbia, and union locals are dispersed across the roughly 18,000 police departments nationwide. Only Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia prohibit bargaining for public employees, while Alabama, Colorado, Mississippi, and Wyoming lack statutes to either advance or oppose police unions. Even where collective bargaining is prohibited, police associations provide members with legal services, political advocacy, and insurance policies. In terms of raw numbers, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Current Population Survey found that in 2019, 57.5% of the nation's 712,336 police officers were covered by collective-bargaining contracts, and 55% of officers were union members. In addition, there were 80,802 police supervisors and detectives, 40.6% of whom were union members and 43.3% of whom were covered by union contracts. Police unions are present throughout the labor movement, but their relationship with it remains tense. Ronald DeLord, a Texas attorney and leading expert on police unions, describes the police labor movement as "a maze of different affiliations." Indeed, police unions are notorious for switching affiliations and shifting back and forth from independent status to affiliation with a larger labor federation. The largest police organization, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), boasts some 354,000 members, though it does not affiliate with any of the major labor federations. The second largest is the National Association of Police Organizations, with some 236,000 members. Though independent, it maintains ties to the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, which is chartered by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), to work on federal legislation. When it comes to organized labor as traditionally understood, only 15% to 20% of law-enforcement employee organizations affiliate with the AFL-CIO. One estimate is that between 100,000 and 150,000 law-enforcement officers belong to locals that affiliate with the AFL-CIO. This helps explain why many police officers don't think of themselves as members of a labor union but instead as part of a lodge or association. Other major union federations also count police locals among their affiliates. These include the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), which has between 10,000 and 15,000 police members; the Service Employees International Union (over 10,000 police members); the Communications Workers of America (26,000 police members); and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (15,000 police members). Bizarrely, if one counts the total number of police-union members reported by the major labor federations, one finds that there are more members than there are police officers in the country. Moreover, not all officers are members of a union. The reason for the discrepancy is that many officers and local unions affiliate with multiple union federations, which is illegal in the private-sector union context. Police unions are also known for inflating their membership figures. A complete picture of police-union membership and their affiliations, therefore, remains elusive. Today, tensions between police unions and the labor movement are at an all-time high. A threat of expulsion hangs over police unions, as the labor movement has previously excommunicated unions deemed reprobate. (Excluded unions have included those with links to the Communist Party and organized crime, as well as locals that were racially segregated.) Progressive unionists want police reform — and to distance themselves from unions that oppose such efforts. In fact, after the events of this past spring, several unions sought to excise police from their ranks. The Association of Flight Attendants, for instance, passed a resolution calling on police unions to support reform "or be removed from the Labor movement." A union representing 100,000 workers in Seattle voted to expel the Seattle Police Officers Guild. Other labor leaders, especially at the national level, are concerned that ousting police unions could set a bad precedent. Patrick Lynch, president of the Police Benevolent Association of New York City, offered the clearest statement of the underlying reasoning for keeping police unions within the house of labor: "The rhetoric that [opponents of police unions] are using now is the same rhetoric that has been used to strip union protections from teachers, bus drivers, nurses and other civil servants across this country." The concern is that if collective-bargaining rights for police unions are constricted, similar arguments could be applied to other public-sector unions. It is unsurprising, then, that the leaders of several major federations have come out strongly in favor of police unions. AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka favors keeping police unions in the fold. In his view, it is better to keep police unions in the tent and work with them than to push them out and potentially work against them. Instead, he has called for congressional action to prohibit choke holds, expand the use of body cameras, limit no-knock warrants, and prevent the transfer of military-grade equipment to law enforcement. AFSCME president Lee Saunders, meanwhile, has flatly denied that police-union contracts provide a "shield for misconduct or criminal behavior." He has gone so far as to analogize police unions today to the striking African-American sanitation workers in Memphis with whom Martin Luther King, Jr., was marching when he was shot. As Saunders put it, "just as it was wrong when racists went out of their way to exclude black people from unions, it is wrong to deny this freedom to police officers today." COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND POLICE CONTRACT Like other public-sector unions, police unions influence the structure and operations of police departments in two ways: from the bottom up, through collective bargaining, and from the top down, through political activity. Collective bargaining concerns the power and interests of workers and management. It gives police unions a hand in shaping the departments in which their members work. By circumscribing the rights of management, police unions partially determine the structure and operation of police bureaucracies. Labor unions are largely in the business of protecting members' job security and winning members better salaries and benefits. Collective-bargaining statutes applying to state- and local-government employees thus stipulate that agency managers (and elected officials behind them) must negotiate with unions representing those employees over pay, benefits, and conditions of employment. These statutes, along with union organizational incentives like leadership elections, force union leaders to prioritize such issues at both the bargaining table and in political advocacy. And in fact, research finds that collective bargaining tends to increase the pay, benefits, and job protections of public employees who enjoy such rights. Pay and benefits are not the subject of today's controversies, however. Rather, current concerns focus on the rules inscribed in collective-bargaining contracts negotiated under the rubric of "conditions of employment." In many jurisdictions, these conditions establish disciplinary, grievance, and arbitration procedures for officers accused of misconduct. Such job protections are said to shield incompetent or abusive officers, as union leaders have a legal duty to defend all members equally. To be sure, many of the protections police unions demand reflect the unique challenges of policing. Given the nature of law enforcement, police necessarily develop a somewhat adversarial relationship with the communities they serve. Officers are sometimes faced with unpleasant, high-tension, and even dangerous situations on the job, and are granted considerable discretion in determining when the use of force is necessary to address them. False or exaggerated citizen complaints are unavoidable. Therefore, labor representatives often prioritize protecting their members against these threats. These safeguards are especially important to officers insofar as the skills they develop on the job are not easily transferrable to other employment, which makes dismissal especially costly. A recent study of police misconduct by Ben Grunwald of the Duke University School of Law and John Rappaport of the University of Chicago Law School found that in Florida, officers fired from their preceding job find new law-enforcement work at about half the rate of officers who voluntarily leave their preceding job. Moreover, fired officers take longer to find new jobs than those who leave voluntarily, and they tend to go to smaller departments with fewer resources.

#### Stronger police unions actively prevent meaningful criminal justice reform

Matthews 20 (Dylan, Vox, "How Police Unions Became So Powerful - and How They Can Be Tamed," <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/21290981/police-union-contracts-minneapolis-reform>)

In Buffalo, the city’s Police Benevolent Association president John Evans has actively defended officers who pushed 75-year-old protester Martin Gugino to the ground. When the officers who pushed Gugino were seen leaving their arraignment on felony assault charges, a large crowd of police union members and sympathizers was seen cheering them on. In New York State broadly, police unions led opposition to newly signed legislation that prevents police from hiding misconduct complaints and criminalizes chokeholds. These are hardly aberrations. Police unions in general have become the most vocal interest group opposing criminal justice reforms and especially reforms to police discipline and use of force. Historically, they have, unlike most unions, been profoundly conservative institutions that uphold a particular white ethnic, “law and order”-focused variant of right-wing politics. They have been among Donald Trump’s most fervent allies; Kroll spoke at a Trump rally in 2018, and the International Union of Police Associations has already endorsed Trump for reelection. The foregrounding of police unions’ role in the warping of American law enforcement has also prompted some difficult conversations on the left. The presence of a segment of a union movement that’s unapologetically right-wing and hostile to Black communities has tested the limits of solidarity from more left-wing unionists. As long as police forces exist, police unions will exist in some form as well, even if just as political pressure groups. It is therefore natural to think that reforming police unions in some way must be part of the broader agenda of changing policing in America. They are among the biggest stakeholders in the way the system works now; without addressing their power, other reforms may never get off the ground.

#### CJR strengthens communities, combats injustice, and bolsters the economy

Policy Link 18 (National research and action institute advancing racial and economic equity, "Criminal Justice Reform: Good for Families, Communities, and the Economy," <https://www.policylink.org/resources-tools/casey-equal-voice-series-criminal-justice-reform>)

The Economic Benefits of an Equitable Criminal Justice System The current criminal justice system relies on punitive measures to deter or prevent crime and tends to reinforce social structures of inequity; focusing instead on preventing crime and reducing recidivism would make communities safer and more able to thrive economically. An equitable criminal justice system would prioritize community safety, prevention, just sentencing, and alternatives to detention. Such a system would not only make communities stronger, it would also provide strong economic benefits, including the following. • Substantial state and local savings from alternatives to incarceration. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency estimates that if 80 percent of people incarcerated for nonviolent offenses were sentenced to effective alternative programming rather than prison, states and localities across the nation could save at least $7.2 billion annually.7 In California, Proposition 47 reduced the sentencing for nonviolent and nonserious offenses such as simple drug possession from felonies to misdemeanors. With this change, the state is expected to save more than $1 billion over the next five years, which will be directed to substance abuse and mental health programs, among other key services.8 Research suggests that using probation and alternative sentences for low-level, nonviolent offenses could reduce annual per capita corrections costs by an average of $22,250.9 A more productive workforce and stronger economy. Separate from reducing incarceration rates, huge gains could be made in economic productivity by enacting stronger supports for those with arrest and conviction histories. These supports include sealing the records on minor and nonviolent offenses and providing antidiscrimination protections in employment, housing, and public benefits. Such measures would yield economic benefits by increasing earnings, producing higher income tax revenues, and reducing the costs associated with recidivism. The RAND Corporation recently reported that for every dollar spent on education programs in prisons, taxpayers save $4 to $5 in recidivismrelated incarceration costs over the next three years.10 The Center for Economic and Policy Research has estimated that annual GDP would be $65 billion stronger if not for employment losses among people with criminal records.11 • Decreased poverty and unemployment, especially among communities of color. In 2008, barriers to employment for people with criminal records accounted for almost a full percentage point of the nation’s unemployment rate, representing 1.7 million Americans who were willing and able to work but unable to find jobs.12 Researchers have calculated that the U.S. poverty rate would have dropped by 20 percent between 1980 and 2004 if not for mass incarceration and the substantial social obstacles faced by people with criminal records.13

#### Continued inequality creates multiple escalation scenarios – it’s an existential threat

**Mavvak 21** [Mathew Mavak Author at Atlas Institute for International Affairs, external researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University in Vilnius, Lithuania, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?,” Salus Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, April 2021, pp 2-17]

But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998). // The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020). // An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity. // COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). // As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach. // METHODOLOGY // An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020): // • Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006); // • Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012); // • Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and // • Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) // Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources. // ECONOMY // According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid-2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity. // The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak. // The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). // As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007). // Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit. // According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019): // “You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author). // President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period. // A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016). // In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade. // ENVIRONMENTAL // What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation: // The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs. // Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated. // Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity. // Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021). // Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications. // On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabria-based ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008). // The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section. // Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade. // GEOPOLITICAL // The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic. // Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interactionadaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.

## AT: Beller ‘21

#### Beller’s “derivative communism” is inherently anti-communist. A better blockchain is not the answer to racial capitalism- it just changes the *form* extraction.

Galloway 21

(Alexander R. Galloway is a writer and computer programmer working on issues in philosophy, technology, and theories of mediation. Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, he is author of several books on digital media and critical theory, including The Interface Effect (Polity, 2012). 3-22-2021, "The World Computer," <http://cultureandcommunication.org/galloway/the-world-computer>, JKS)

I'm intrigued by Beller's proposal that there might be “communist algorithms" and "communist derivatives” (193). Yet the two ought to be differentiated. An algorithm is merely a step by step process, a recipe to follow. But a derivative, defined as a form of financial speculation designed to manage risk, seems inherently anti-communist in the sense that it works to eliminate socio-political uncertainty. The political is the condition in which one does not know how the future will unfold. In other words I'm not convinced by Beller's proposal for “revolutionary finance,” a proposal taken up more fully at the end of the book. Beller cites the Economic Space Agency (ECSA) and recent attempts to develop crypto currencies. A number of theorists and computer scientists are also wrapped up in this movement, including Brian Massumi, the Deleuzian who recently published 99 Theses on the Revaluation of Value: A Postcapitalist Manifesto (which I discussed previously).

For Beller, the prospect of revolutionary finance is part of an historical development toward the decentralization of authority:

"Bitcoin...[is] part of an insurrectionary history of the decentralization of authority that includes the French Revolution, decolonization, suffrage, 8 mm film, the portapak, the cheap digital camera, and the easy access to publication on the World Wide Web" (243).

Beller thinks that the redesign of economic media has something to offer social struggle. Still, he is nothing like a Bitcoin "maximalist," those staking it all on a technical miracle. Bitcoin “is not the revolution--far from it” (250), as Beller unambiguously puts it. Yet I suspect there is nothing inherently insurrectionary about decentralization--if by "insurrectionary" Beller means politically progressive--decentralization merely marking a shift in the architectonics of power that might favor reactionary tendencies as much as progressive ones. My own contribution to this debate as been around the question of "protocol," a network design style that is both decentralized and distributed, if not also collapsing more and more into centralization with each passing day. Is there a toxic form of money and a non-toxic form of money, our job being merely to distinguish between the two? Beller's book hinges on a political discrimination, where the "good" money is elevated over the bad. Yet if Marx bequeathed anything to us, it was the notion that the money-form itself is toxic. Money is extractive abstraction in hyperbolic form. The solution is not better money built on the blockchain. The solution is the suspension of the infrastructure of extractive abstraction. Indeed blockchain is an ecological abomination if not also a socio-political one; these machines should be nuked forthwith.