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#### Security is a psychological construct- the aff’s scenarios for conflict from the space race are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other. Claims of war and conflict create a false dichotomy between the good us and the evil them, ignoring our role in provoking the aggression.

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(John, former Professor of Psychology at Harvard and Pulitzer Prize Winner, <http://johnemackinstitute.org/1988/08/the-enemy-system-short-version/>) BW

The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the “enemy system”[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding man as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: “I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness”. This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and one’s own contribution to that threat-by distortions of perception, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy, or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. “We never see our enemy’s motives and we never labor to assess his will, with anything approaching objectivity”.[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us. In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: “War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy.”[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation’s leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the psychological mechanisms that impel individuals to kill or allow killing in their name, often with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war “The enemy is seen as less than human? He’s faceless. He’s an animal”.” Keen tries to answer his question: “The image of the enemy is not only the soldier’s most powerful weapon; it is society’s most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to participate in acts of violence they would never consider doing as individuals”.[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process. The image of the enemy as less than human may be hard to dislodge. For example, a teacher in the Boston area reported that during a high school class on the Soviet Union a student protested: “You’re trying to get us to see them as people”. Stephen Cohen and other Soviet experts have noted how difficult it is to change the American perception of the Soviet Union, despite the vast amount of new information contradicting old stereotypes.” Bernard Shaw in his preface to Heartbreak House, written at the end of World War I, observed ironically: “Truth telling is not compatible with the defense of the realm”. Nations are usually created out of the violent defeat of the former inhabitants of a piece of land or of outside enemies, and national leaders become adept at keeping their people’s attention focused on the threat of an outside enemy.[14] Leaders also provide what psychiatrist Vamik Volkan called “suitable targets of externalization”[10] – i.e., outside enemies upon whom both leaders and citizens can relieve their burdens of private defeat, personal hurt, and humiliation.[15] All-embracing ideas, such as political ideologies and fixed religious beliefs act as psychological or cultural amplifiers. Such ideologies can embrace whole economic systems, such as socialism or capitalism, or draw on beliefs that imply that a collectivity owes its existence to some higher power in the universe. It was not Stalin as an individual whom Nadezhda Mandelstam blamed for the political murder of her poet husband Osip and millions of other citizens but the “craving for an all-embracing idea which would explain everything in the world and bring about universal harmony at one go”.[16] Every nation, no matter how bloody and cruel its beginnings, sees its origins in a glorious era of heroes who vanquished less worthy foes. One’s own race, people, country, or political system is felt to be superior to the adversary’s, blessed by a less worthy god. The nuclear age has spawned a new kind of myth. This is best exemplified by the United States’ strategic defense initiative. This celestial fantasy offers protection from attack by nuclear warheads, faith here being invested not in a god but in an anti-nuclear technology of lasers, satellites, mirrors, and so on in the heavens.

#### Catastrophe scenarios program us affectively to accept violence and dehumanization

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Anybody who has experienced immunization will appreciate the violence of the encounter. The whole process begins with the awareness of some vaguely looming threat which promises in the worst case an extremely violent ending. To pre-empt this happening, the subject is physically penetrated by the alien body with a controlled level of the lethal substance which, although producing violent sickness, is a fate less than death. Such violence unto oneself offers to counter violence with violence such that life may carry on living in spite of the dangers we are incapable of securing ourselves against. It is to give over to a form of self-harm albeit in a way that is actively desired and positively conceived. How else may we live otherwise? Resilience follows a similar logic. It encourages that we partake in the violence of the world to keep death at bay. For in the process of learning to live through the insecurity of the times, the subject is asked to incorporate the catastrophic intellectually, viscerally and affectively, thereby providing certain immunization against a more endangering fate. Indeed, since the ultimate litmus test is to bring to question the worst case scenario, the future cannot appear to us as anything other than completely monstrous. What, however, is actually slain as the future is wagered by the violence of the present may only become revealed with the passage of time. None of this operates outside of the realm of power politics. We only have to consider here (a) the moral judgements and political stakes associated with HIV as a pandemic that is more than simply biological, and (b) the development of viral analogies to explain more generally the problems ‘infecting’ societies from terror to criminality to evidence the point. Immunization is precisely about exposing oneself to something that is potentially lethal, thereby raising the threshold level for existence such that violence is normalized on account of our vulnerabilities to that which may be tempered but remains undefeatable. We are drawn here to Stellan Rye's (1913) silent horror movie The Student from Prague (Der Student von Prag) which has inspired a number of compelling literary and cinematic classics. In this tragic tale of poverty and violence, the impoverished student, Balduin, makes a bargain with the Devil as he exchanges the reﬂection of image for more immediate compensations. Upon eventually seeing himself, however, the student is avenged by an angry double that begins to wreak havoc as it seeks out revenge in light of its betrayal. Following an eventual violent confrontation the student has with his double, Balduin shatters the mirror that is central to the plot, and invariably destroys the fantasy of endangerment which also became the source of his afflicted curse. Inevitably, however, since the double was an essential element of this Faustian agreement, in killing the violent double, so the student kills himself. Otto Rank famously related this to the narcissistic self whose very sense of loneliness and alienation is caused by an anguish of a fear of death; even though it is precisely the violence of the pact which pushes the subject further towards the precipice. Whilst it is tempting to read this in familiar dialectical terms, there is a more sophisticated double move at work here, as the violence is already encoded within the initial act of demonic violation before the tragic encounter. For the double merely highlights the self-propelling tendency, from the fantasy of endangerment to the reality of the catastrophic. There is also a semantic interchange at work in Rye's Doppelganger as it stakes out the choice between a violated/violent life and eventual death. Since reason or logic prove utterly incapable of explaining the condition of Balduin's existence, let alone offering any promise of salvation from the oppressive situation to which he is fatefully bound, the double serves as an important metaphor for the narcissism of the times, as the subject wilfully accepts a violation and all the violence this entails in exchange for an illusion or fantasy of security which proves in the end to have been imbued with the catastrophic from the outset. Our understanding of the fundamental tenets of violence is invariably transformed such that we are forced to think about forms of violation/ intervention prior to any sense of dialectical enmity. Premetic Violence René Girard's thesis Violence and the Sacred offers a theory of violence that is exclusively bound to the desire to ‘overcome’ tragedy. To develop this theory, Girard speciﬁcally relates to the classic Greek play by Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, which he uses to illustrate the relationship between tragic dispossession and violence. It is through the tale of Oedipus and his return to reclaim the realm from which he was abandoned that we uncover a genesis of sacriﬁcial violence that is linked to some ‘past tragedy’.3\_9 Oedipus thus epitomizes the motif of the lost prince whose modes of contestation can be understood through competing claims to the ‘same object of desire: The story follows that when two uncompromising entities vie over the same object of desire, violence necessarily erupts. Through Girard's decoding of the Oedipus myth, what we therefore ﬁnd is any attempt to re-possess the object of desire necessarily requires the guilt of those currently in possession - a sacriﬁcial victim. Thus, to overcome tragedy one must come from the ‘outside’ - a violently destined return that can only be justiﬁed by making a claim to the original sin, or what Girard terms a return to the ‘original scene: However, as Sophocles tells it, such violence is more than simply a reclamation of that which has been taken. The violence of the already dispossessed desires to re-establish the authentic order which has been falsely appropriated - the paradise lost. Importantly, for Girard, such violence is not a relation of difference but is more deﬁned by the logic of mimesis: ‘At ﬁrst, each of the protagonists believes that he can quell the violence; at the end each succumbs to it. All are drawn unwittingly into a violent reciprocity - which they always think they are outside of, because they all initially came from outside and mistake this positional and temporary advantage for a permanent and fundamental superiority.40 Plunging into an opposition which ‘reduces the protagonists into a uniform condition of violence’, all claims to ‘difference’ are effectively ‘eclipsed’ by ‘a resurgence of reciprocity.41 It has been common to read Rye's doubling as a clear example of mimetic behaviour. This has found clear applications from Hegelian-inspired revolutionary accounts of dialectical reasoning, to Frantz Fanon's theory of (post)colonial brutality, onto the exceptional violence of Schmitt's sovereign decisionism. While accepting how this logic has played a structural role in the demar- cation of certain regimes of violence which came to hallmark distinct marks of separation, we need to depart from this logic if we are to make sense of the violence of the catastrophic imaginary. What, in other words, becomes of violence once we reconceptualize the idea of the original scene and its logics of exposure such that violence itself becomes virtually ordained? That is to say, what becomes of violence once it begins to precede any dialectical arrangement? Mimetic violence, we have noted, is obj ectiﬁable. Based upon establishing various forms of mystical foundations, it has a distinct materiality to it that permits clear lines of demarcation and embodiment. These work both spatially and temporally. The object for violence is locatable, while the time of its occurrence offers clear (if sometimes contested) conceptions as to its beginning and ending. It beneﬁts, then, from the guarantees of identiﬁcation and the ability to represent that which must be vanquished at a given moment ‘in timei The virtual nature of the violence endured by the resilient subject offers no such guarantees. Collapsing the space-time continuum of mimetic rivalry, it is merely projected into the future without the prospect of bounce-back. Internalized, however, into the very living conditions of the subject now permanently under siege, the violence is no less real. As any author of horror ﬁction will tell, the mind can be a terrifying place to inhabit. Once the source of endangerment becomes unknowable by deﬁnition, everything becomes the potential source of a violent encounter. Resilience challenges the logic of mimetic violence, therefore, in two fundamental ways. Firstly, it shows us that our only way of dealing with endangerment is to absorb its lethal tendencies. That which has the potential to destroy must become part ofsociety's make-up and its epistemic fabric. We too, in the process, become more lethally endowed as a result. Invariably, the more lethal we become, the more we end up embracing the biophysical conditions of our potential undoing as a principle form of human conditioning. The body accepts the lethality on account of preparedness. Secondly, there is an outward projection against that which could potentially threaten our existence. But this projection doesn't connect to any mimetic rival. We have no clear sense of what it is that so endangers in its particular guise, only a generalizable indication that something which is part of the integral whole will eventually bring about our ﬁnal demise. Deprived, then, of the potential to ‘at last stand’ upon a terrain whose forms of endangerment were known in advance, we continue to walk through a veritable mineﬁeld of potential disasters of a multi-dimensional nature, not knowing when the explosion will happen, with little comfort provided by the intellectual comforts of the past, and with no fence on the horizon beyond which relative security may be achieved and freedom from endangerment realized. The only solution, we are told, remains to expose oneself to all its disastrous permutations so that we may be better prepared against those already charged and yet to detonate, along with those yet to even be inserted into this catastrophic topography. But what does it mean to say that violence is now beyond representation? And what type of reality are we producing if we are calling into question the depths of ﬁeld that once gave qualitative and quantitative meaning to our relations to violence? For Paul Virilio, whose work we may connect to the premetic, this inaugurates ‘the futurism of the instant’ whose kairos shatters all metaphysical meaning: This spells disorientation in knowledge acquired over the course of millennia regarding the spatial environment and the cycle of seasons; an integral accident in knowledge of history as well as of the usual concrete geography that goes with it, the unity of place and time of a secular history. No doubt this is the fatal novelty of the historic tragedy befalling humanity and a progress that will no longer be exclusively technologistical and extra-planetary, but merely human, ‘all too human’. Masochism vis-a-vis an abhorred past that no longer passes muster is now symmetrically doubled with a masochism in relation to a future where, for want of fear, we will, this time, have space, all the space of a miniscule planet reduced to nothing, or as good as, by the progress of our discoveries.2 Nihilism Unbound Writing in the nineteenth century, Nietzsche argued that nothing was more deeply characteristic of the modern world than the power of nihilism.E Nietzsche's intervention here allowed us to move beyond the well-rehearsed attack upon Platonic reason or Christian faith, to focus instead upon ‘the radical repudiation of value, meaning and desirabilityiﬁ Nihilism, thus understood, referred to the triumph of reactive thinking. It was all about the negation of life as it appeared to be incapable of afﬁrming that which is properly and creatively different to human existence. Hence, for Nietzsche, nihilism was not simply reducible to some historical event in time, i.e. an exceptional moment in history which could be shamefully written into annals of human suffering. Nihilism was the recurring motor of history as the operation of power leads to a will to nothingness that strips life of any purposeful meaning. Crucially, as Nietzsche understood, this repudiation of the afﬁrmative realm of experience is something we create for ourselveaﬁ Nihilism, in other words, is to be understood through a sophisticated manipulation of desires such that the individual subject depreciates itself to such an extent that it actively participates in a custom of political self- annihilation. Central to Nietzsche's thinking on the perpetuation of nihilism is the notion of ressentiment. In his On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche explains this in terms of the slave mentality. This produces a feeling of impotence which not only translates into vengefulness, but more problematic still, teaches the slave that the only way it can become free is to give over to the prevailing reason mastery has set in place. Sloterdijk equates this ressentiment with rage, the basis of all great theisms.4i Such a condition, as Nietzsche understood, was ‘paralysing’ insomuch as it annuls the possibility of thinking and acting otherwise, and it was ‘exhausting’ insomuch as life was forced to compromise with the very lethality that put its condition originally into question. Through a ‘spirit of revenge’ what is lacking is therefore produced in a double movement, for lack is not some original gesture, it derives out of the ressentiment to deny us the opportunity to bring something different into the world. This raises a number of pressing questions: Could it be that not only have we become slaves to our biological existence, but in claiming false mastery of the earth we have given to ourselves an illusionary sovereignty? For how can we have mastery if that which we claim to be able to dominate as the principle force makes us increasingly vulnerable with each passing moment? Have we not, then, become slaves to ourselves and slaves to the earth, and resentful of them as a result? Nihilism has never been alien to liberal biopolitics. It is arguably its most potent expression. Its early development can be traced to Kant's Copernican revolution of the mind. Placing life at the centre of its universe, Kant forced us to look for meaning beyond the realms of theological destiny. Whilst this moved us beyond the suffering and lament of the Christian subject which so irked Nietzsche, Kant's universal substitute proved to be no substitute at all. The universal was actually denied to us due to the limits of our reason and our imperfections as ﬁnite beings - imperfections that signiﬁcantly proved incapable of moving us beyond the reductionism of metaphysical idealism and its crude representations, towards a more afﬁrmative form of meta- physics that worked in practice. As Drucilla Cornell writes, ‘Martin Heidegger famously wrote that Kant takes us to the limit of the very notion of critique and ultimately raises, but does not fully address, the question of ‘who’ is this ﬁnite being that must think through the transcendental imaginationfﬂ In a remarkably potent yet tragic stroke, Kant wrote the death of the omnipotent God and the types of docile subjects it produced who were rendered immobile due to its vengeance and fury, while putting in its place a fallen subject that was fated to be forever incomplete because of the burdens of its own actions. While Kant's thinking paved the way for new eschatological forms of power to emerge that took leave of traditional sovereign moorings, the fallen subject was compelled to become resentful of its biological existence. Bios were to remain forever imperfect by design and fated to be judged accordingly. With life fated to live a biologically endowed existence, it is stripped of its capacity to have a meaningful existence beyond the limits of its bodily formations, while political strategies operate by governing through the problem of ﬁnitude, even though the ﬁnite inevitably became a philosophical problem too difﬁcult to comprehend. As a result, forced to endure a growing resentment of its unfolding drama, liberalism slowly became morally equipped to continually intervene upon the souls of the living simply by offering to prolong the subject's existence better than any other political rationality. Such was the realization of our ﬁnite entrapment in the bodily form that the ability to philosophically transgress the injunction between life and death became increasingly impossible. Indeed, as we shall point out later, while liberal societies have a particular relationship to the question of dying as our existence is continually put into question, such that with each passing second we learn to survive until we become truly meaningless in the end, the idea of death remains incommensurable to the liberal subject. No longer does the resilient subject solely project its resentfulness onto the souls of ‘Others’. It resents the living world, for it too is radically endangering. It is here that catastrophic imaginaries begin to truly thrive. The resilient subject is shaped and anxiously mobilized by the prospect of the coming catastrophe. It fears the transformation of the subject, just as it fears the transformation of the ecosystem that gives sustenance to life. Our rage as such, to borrow from Sloterdijk, has become truly limitless. As everything becomes the source of our endangerment, we internalize the ressentiment and proliferate our impotence with unrivalled intensity and absolute necessity. Hence this produces a form of nihilism which is ‘unbounded: For no longer do we simply resent the teleological unfolding of history as we phase shift from masters to slaves to masters; there is no mastery to speak of and as a result all our lament ﬁlters into a politics of ressentiment as we are left to simply govern through our continually unfolding state of unending emergency. (111-17)

#### Threat imagery impoverishes scholarship and policy making- their claims can't be evaluated outside of the project of security that created them. Self Fulfilling prophecy outweighs aff predictions offense

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Where, then, does this leave us—in an elevated state of awakening or in a depressed state of confusion and resentment? It is, admittedly, burdensome and intimidating to face a deluge of questions without being afforded the intellectual crutch of an authoritative answer or two. That is the price we pay, though, for having allowed our minds to be crippled by Cold War dogma. Possessed of truth, we ignored, we denied, we disdained anyone or anything that contradicted our certainty. We did not question, we did not seek answers other than the ones we already had. To do so would have been superfluous, and clearly suspect. Now we must undergo corrective surgery. Whatever answers might emerge from the questions posed here, three fundamental issues deserve our attention. The first concerns the very language—the terminology—we use in public discourse. In his rather well-known 1946 essay, "Politics and the English Language," George Orwell drew the link between the debasement of language and the decline of civilization. He was convinced that both conditions were taking place in tandem at the time he wrote. By the same token, he believed the problem could be reversed. By ridding oneself of the many bad habits of English usage we have adopted, one can think more clearly, he said, and thereby take the first step toward political regeneration.74 The use of the word "threat" certainly seems to fit here. Although it is not a new word, the Cold War gave it heightened visibility, broadened and obscured its meaning, and made it part of the lingua franca of contemporary international politics. What should be all too obvious is the adversarial image the term conveys and the Manichean world view it engenders. Threattalk becomes threatthink. The resultant paranoia and intolerance invariably blind us to emerging developments and conditions that truly threaten our well-being but fall outside the bounds of our distorted perception. This brings us to a second fundamental issue: the effect our image of threat has on reality. The late Kenneth Boulding made the astute observation that there is a reciprocal, escalatory dynamic associated with threat imagery. For example, Country A, feeling itself threatened (however and for whatever reasons) by Country B, increases its armaments to reduce its insecurity. This makes B feel threatened, and so B increases its armaments to bolster its security. This makes A feel even more threatened, so A again increases its armaments. This growing threat "forces" B to further increase its armaments. And so on until either war breaks out or some other change (such as internal economic collapse) reverses the process.75 This is how threatthink becomes threat. If there is a single, documentable truth to be derived from an assessment of threat-based thinking, it is that the perception of threat— at least where that threat has a human component—almost invariably becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. For this reason alone—the fact that we have shown ourselves perversely capable of creating unwanted inevitability—we must face up to a third fundamental issue: the more general failure of our overall approach to envisioning the future. Most of us justifiably consider ourselves unqualified to divine the future. We therefore typically defer to experts and authorities—futurists and assorted government technocrats presumably possessed of special powers or information the rest of us do not have—who end up thereby dictating not only our future but our present as well. These are the individuals who tell us not only that there are threats, but what they are and how we must deal with them. What we refuse to recognize is that the future these purported visionaries are able to see is invariably nothing more imaginative than a simple projection of what already is happening. It also is an assured way for them to solidify and perpetuate their own power over us. The future they see, because the rest of us accept it on authority as all but inevitable, closes out any perceived need to pursue other potentially fruitful possibilities; it provides an excuse for ignoring present needs that, if fulfilled, might well produce a markedly different future; it ensures nothing more enlightened or progressive than creeping incrementalism and evolutionary drift; it creates false expectations about what can and will be; and when it fails to materialize—as it so often does because of the unexpected-it produces feelings of helplessness, not among the purveyors of the deception, but among those of us who have so carelessly relinquished our fate to them.76 Threats are in the future. Threat assessment is about the future. Vision is of the future. The Cold War clouded our vision and crippled our ability to determine, objectively, whether there are threats that should concern us, what they are, why they are important, and how we should deal with them. Our future will depend in large measure on our willingness to overcome our Cold War myopia and to demonstrate a newfound degree of individual and collective vision. Whether vision is a gift or an acquired skill, we will have to seek out the visionaries in our midst who can either lead the rest of us less gifted out of our self-imposed darkness or at least stand as models on which we can pattern ourselves. And how will we know vision when we see it? We need not doubt that its presence will be so unlike anything we are used to, we will know. But if we are searching for a standard against which to judge, we could do no better than to recall the surpassing insight Abraham Lincoln demonstrated on at least one occasion at the height of the US Civil War. At an official reception, the president referred to Southerners rather as erring human beings than as foes to be exterminated. An elderly lady, a fiery patriot, rebuked him for speaking kindly of his enemies when he ought to be thinking of destroying them. "Why, madam," said Lincoln, "do I not destroy my enemies when I make them my friends?',77 (86-88)

#### Representations must precede policy discussion. Thus, the role of the ballot should be to assume the position of a critical intellectual- debate is primarily an academic activity. The signal sent intellectually outweighs any specific policy proposal

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Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

#### The alternative is to reject the AFF’s security representations as a critical intellectual labor that makes imagination of a more peaceful future possible. Neocleous 08

(Neocleous 8 — Prof of Government @ Brunel University; London (Mark, Critique of Security, pg. 184-5)

Anyone well versed in history or with experience of university life will know about the shameful ways in which large numbers of academics have elevated venality into the cardinal academic virtue, complying with the demands of those in power and the wishes of those with money: witness the political scientists, historians, anthropologists, geographers, cartographers, sociologists, linguists and many others who reworked their disciplines according to the principles and myths, and the principle myths, of fascism.' 'Academic life under fascism', notes Christopher Hutton, 'is a dismal ... episode in an unedifying story of relations between the modem academic and the state, and between academics and power both within and outside the university. But this part of the history of fascism is merely the worst moment in the wider and equally unedifying story of relations between academics and the state more generally, merely one way m which intellectuals have kowtowed to the principles and myths, and the principle myths, concerning security and the state. Spouting the jargon of security and enthralled by the trappings of power, their intellectual labour consists of nothing less than attempts to write hand-books for the princes of the new security state. The death of countless numbers in a more 'efficient' bombing of a city, the stationing of troops halfway around the World in order to bring to an end any attempt at collective self-determination, the use of military machines against civilians, the training of police forces in counter-insurgency practices, but more than anything the key concepts and categories used to explain and justify these things - all defended, supported and even ‘improved” by security intellectuals for whom, ultimately, intelIecua1 labour boils down to little more than the question of the most efficient manner. In which to achieve the security demanded by the state and bourgeois order. In rationalizing the political and corporate logic of security, the security intellectual conceals the utter irrationality of the system as a whole. The security intellectual then is nothing less than the security ideologue, peddling the fetish of our time. The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up, That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do, but it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalizes all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritizing of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end - constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,” dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state, and legitimizes state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole. The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modem politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitizing of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centered on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognizing that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that securitizing an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.

**Interpretation: The 1AC is an object of research. The role of the neg should be to disprove the various meanings of that object.**

**1] Plan focus restricts the debate to a ten second statement and leaves the rest of the aff unquestioned. They should be responsible for the way their knowledge is constructed and used because that produces the best model for activism and ethics in the context of the topic which is a unique education net benefit to our interpretation**

**2] Debate doesn't pass policies but it does alter the way we think about the world and about systems of power – turns their policy research standards because it's a question of how their research is oriented and whether it's for an ethical purpose – only our model of engagement accesses that education**

**3] Begs the question – if we win their justifications are repugnant that necessarily implicates the conclusion which means defense of their research model is a prior question to weighing the material consequences of the aff – also solves plan focus because the links necessarily implicate aff solvency**

## Case

### Framework

#### Pragamtism fails and collapses to util:

#### 1. The inevitability of misusing a theory is a reason to prefer praxis over theory - basing morality on easily known truths like we should stop oppression versus abstract, idealized principles leads to less error than a complex hypothetical decision procedure in which every single citizens adopts their own, contradictory form of ethics.

#### 2. There’s no way of knowing what is absolutely true, but we have to draw a line in the sand when we know it’s bad enough. If you believe it’s more likely child beating is more wrong than right then there’s risk of truth that child beating is wrong even if we might not know for sure that it’s absolute, universal wrong.

#### 3. There’s a heuristic value in believing in truth – even having a conversation requires believing in the truth of what a word means even if it has different connotations.

#### 4. disagreements about the world require incorporating those disagreements through cost benefit analysis. This is an epistemologically sound way to approach the CJS. Their f/w results in cognitive biases.

Darryl K. Brown, JD, Prof of law @ Virginia Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 323 (2004)

Consider how the observations from the previous two sections fit together. The structure of American criminal law makes it easy to increase and perpetuate excessive punishment. Interest group lobbying is unbalanced, and key players are direct political actors responsive to an electorate sensitive about crime. Legislators face few constitutional constraints on crime and punishment policy, and prosecutors have unregulated discretion. Nonetheless, administrative decision making generally, with CBA as a component of that process, provides a model to moderate and rationalize the political dynamics of government action in criminal justice. CBA can help counter the structural features of criminal justice that lead to ignoring substantial costs of government action and to valuing poorly the full range of interests at stake. CBA can rationalize decision making in criminal law by correcting biases that lead to poor public policy and accounting for costs that criminal law neglects. This Part first examines how CBA can be useful in countering cognitive biases that skew judgments. Next, it argues that CBA can improve decision making in criminal law by revealing its full social costs in areas such as employment and marital attachment, family, and community. Finally, it turns to some of the limited ways in which CBA has already been implemented in crime-prevention policy and shows that these theoretical benefits have been realized in practice. A. Correcting Cognitive Biases in Criminal Law The current generation of CBA scholarship and policy application recognizes that CBA can serve goals beyond efficiency. It can be a tool for disciplining agencies' shirking, policy bias, or capture.78 It can serve as a central component in a regulatory decision procedure oriented toward welfare rather than solely towards efficiency.79 Further, CBA can help counter several well-established cognitive biases that skew judgments about criminal law policy and how it may be improved.8 " Several of these concerns, developed in administrative law contexts, map well onto criminal enforcement. These include the availability heuristic, inaccurate estimations of risk, and the inability to foresee complex effects of interventions. One source of bias is the "availability heuristic": events seem more probable if we can easily recall examples of them. People tend to overestimate vivid risks, such as car and plane accidents, school shootings, nuclear accidents, and underestimate less visible or publicized risks, such as heart disease.8 Without full information and a reflective decision process, such mental shortcuts lead to errors, and the risk of this is especially high with politically responsive government action.8 2 In criminal law, street crime (theft and violent crime) is especially vivid and frightful for most people. In contrast, white collar crimes, such as financial frauds in which many victims lose small amounts, seem much less threatening. Compared to corporate crime risks, street crime risks are more vivid. Thus, theft and violent crime induce more frequent public demand for harsh punishment,83 making it harder for prosecutors to address such wrongdoing by means other than full prosecution. A second and related cognitive bias is the inaccurate estimation of risks and benefits when the risks or benefits are particularly large. People often underestimate risks when the benefits of an activity seem clear and high, such as x-rays or coal-fired power plants. Conversely, people underestimate benefits when risks are perceived as high, such as pesticides or nuclear power.84 In criminal law, prosecution of offenders has obvious and vivid benefits, but its costs are diffuse, externalized, and largely off-screen. These biases are linked to another: people often cannot foresee complex, systemic effects of particular interventions. It is hard to anticipate unintended consequences, though they are common in complex systems regulated by social policy." With the aid of CBA, regulatory statutes are often (and increasingly) attuned to these effects. For example, regulating auto emissions may result in increased demand for smaller cars, which in turn can lead to the unintended consequence of increased injury in accidents. Criminal law also entails unintended effects, and, with our current rates of incarceration, they reach significant magnitudes. Finally, criminal law costs and benefits are rarely linked. We tend to place them in different categories of social thinking. We do not readily connect, say, distressed communities and family structure to the collateral consequences of punishment" so much as to the consequences of crime. People tend to put very different values on preferences when each is considered in isolation from when those concerns are assessed together, across categories. Questions about how much people would pay for cleaner air, preschool for poor children, or workplace safety from toxic chemicals elicit very different answers from when asked in isolation than when they are posed to require cross-category comparisons.87 Criminal law suffers the same bias: we consider the risks criminal law responds to separately from the other policies and aspects of social life that criminal punishment impacts. CBA can correct the cognitive disconnect between costs and benefits in criminal law by linking them together in policy making.

**disclosure**

* topicality isn’t good
* counter interpretation
* good is good enough
* Explain why you’re sufficient

## Underview

Theory stuff is just a ton and underexplained so give me leeway if I drop something

**1AR Theory:**

**not doing an rvi but I can do competing framework**

**No actual warrants about how the neg would abuse they shouldn’t just auto get a win bc they say so**

**Don’t let them win one layer and get the win after the 1ar – not how this format of debate works if you have a problem don’t debate in this style – all speeches should be taken into account how is it fair that I only get one speech and you get two – also creates a time skew**

**- extending – only reading one off and the k isn’t condo**

**- analytics – you can’t just avoid analytics isn’t fair and avoids logical arguments – how am I supposed to find a card that says you turned yourself – creates less in round strat and avoids acc clash don’t evaluate.**