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**Settlerism is an everyday process shaped by affective investments in institutions that claim jurisdiction over native land. Legal and political action is inextricably dependent on the elimination of the native.**

Mark **Rifkin**, **PhD**, Director of the Women's and Gender Studies Program and Professor of English at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro. “Settler common sense.” Settler Colonial Studies, 20**13** Vol. 3, Nos. 3–4, 322–340, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2013.810702>. JJN

In Walden (1854), Henry David Thoreau offers a vision of personhood divorced from the state, characterizing his experience of “Nature” during his time at Walden Pond as providing him with a sense of his own autonomous embodiment and a related set of ethical resources that enable him to reject the demands of contemporary political economy.1 The invocation of “Nature” appears to bracket the question of jurisdiction, opening into a different conceptual and phenomenological register that displaces the problem of locating oneself in relation to the boundaries of the state. However, the very feeling that one has moved beyond geopolitics, that one has entered a kind of space that suspends questions of sovereignty or renders them moot, depends on the presence of an encompassing sovereignty that licenses one’s access to that space. If the idea of “Nature” holds at bay the question of jurisdiction so as to envision a kind of place for cultivating a selfhood that can oppose state logics/politics, it also effaces the ways that experience/vision of personhood itself may arise out of the legal subjectivities put in play by the jurisdictional claiming/clearing of that space as against geopolitical claims by other polities, specifically Native peoples. Thoreau offers an example of how settlement – the exertion of control by non-Natives over Native peoples and lands – gives rise to modes of feeling, generating kinds of affect through which the terms of law and policy become imbued with a sensation of everyday certainty. This affective experience productively can be characterized as an instantiation of what more broadly may be characterized as settler common sense. The phrase suggests the ways the legal and political structures that enable non-Native access to Indigenous territories come to be lived as given, as simply the unmarked, generic conditions of possibility for occupancy, association, history, and personhood. Addressing whiteness in Australia, Fiona Nicoll argues that “rather than analysing and evaluating Indigenous sovereignty claims..., we have a political and intellectual responsibility to analyse and evaluate the innumerable ways in which White sovereignty circumscribes and mitigates the exercise of Indigenous sovereignty”, and she suggests that “we move towards a less coercive stance of reconciliation with when we fall from perspective into an embodied recognition that we already exist within Indigenous sovereignty”. 2 Addressing the question of how settlement as a system of coercive incorporation and expropriation comes to be lived as quotidian forms of non-Native being and potential, though, may require tactically shifting the analytical focus such that Indigenous sovereignties are not at the center of critical attention, even as they remain crucial in animating the study of settler colonialism and form its ethical horizon. “An embodied recognition” of the enduring presence of settler sovereignty, as well as of quotidian non-Native implication in the dispossession, effacement, and management of indigeneity, needs to attend to everyday experiences of non-relation, of a perceptual engagement with place, various institutions, and other people that takes shape around the policies and legalities of settlement but that do not specifically refer to them as such or their effects on Indigenous peoples. In order to conceptualize the mundane dynamics of settler colonialism, the quotidian feelings and tendencies through which it is continually reconstituted and experienced as the horizon of everyday potentiality, we may need to shift from an explicit attention to articulations of Native sovereignty and toward an exploration of the processes through which settler geographies are lived as ordinary, non-reflexive conditions of possibility. In Marxism and Literature, Raymond Williams argues for the necessity of approaching “relations of domination and subordination” as “practical consciousness” that saturat[es] ... the whole substance of lived identities and relationships, to such a depth that the pressures and limits of what can ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political, and cultural system seem to most of us the pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense.3 Understanding settlement as, in Williams’s terms, such a “structure of feeling” entails asking how emotions, sensations, psychic life take part in the (ongoing) process of realizing the exertion of non-Native authority over Indigenous peoples, governance, and territoriality in ways that saturate quotidian life but are not necessarily present to settlers as a set of political propositions or as a specifically imperial project of dispossession. In the current scholarly efforts to characterize settler colonialism, the contours of settlement often appear analytically as clear and coherent from the start, as a virtual totality, and in this way, the ongoing processes by which settler dominance actively is reconstituted as a set of actions, occupations, deferrals, and potentials slide from view. We need to ask how the regularities of settler colonialism are materialized in and through quotidian non-Native sensations, inclinations, and trajectories. Moreover, administrative initiatives and legalities become part of everyday normalizations of state aims and mappings but in ways that also allow for an exceeding of state interests that potentially can be turned back against the state, giving rise to oppositional projects still given shape and momentum by the framings that emerge out of the ongoing work of settler occupation – such as in Walden. The essay will close with a brief reading of Thoreau’s text that illustrates how its ethical framing emerges out of, and indexes, everyday forms of settler feeling shaped by state policy but not directly continuous with it. 1. The figure of the vanishing Indian still remains prominent within US popular and scholarly discourses, both explicitly and implicitly. Within this narrative, Native peoples may have had prior claims to the land, but they, perhaps tragically, were removed from the area, or died out, or ceased to be “really” Indian, or simply disappeared at some point between the appearance of the “last” one and the current moment, whenever that may be.4 As against this tendency, scholars who seek to track the workings of settler colonialism face an entrenched inattention to the ways non-Native conceptions and articulations of personhood, place, property, and political belonging coalesce around and through the dispossession of Native peoples and normalization of (the) settler (-state’s) presence on Native lands. Insistence on the systemic quality of such settler seizures, displacements, identifications responds to this relative absence of acknowledgment by emphasizing its centrality and regularity, arguing that the claiming of a naturalized right to Indigenous place lies at the heart of non-Native modes of governance, association, and identity. However, such figurations of the pervasive and enduring quality of settler colonialism may shorthand its workings, producing accounts in which it appears as a fully integrated whole operating in smooth, consistent, and intentional ways across the socio-spatial terrain it encompasses. Doing so, particularly in considering the exchange between the domains of formal policy and of everyday life, may displace how settlement’s histories, brutalities, effacements, and interests become quotidian and common-sensical. Looking at three different models, I want to sketch varied efforts to systemize settler colonialism, highlighting some questions that emerge when they are read in light of issues of process and affect. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay – invasion is a structure not an event.” 5 Offering perhaps the most prominent definition of settler colonialism, Wolfe’s formulation emphasizes the fact that it cannot be localized within a specific period of removal or extermination and that it persists as a determinative feature of national territoriality and identity. He argues that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence”, adding, “Settler colonialism destroys to replace.” 6 Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/period of conquest, however, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler-colonial society” (390), and “the process of replacement maintains the refractory imprint of the native counter-claim” (389). Yet, when and how do projects of elimination and replacement become geographies of everyday non-Native occupancy that do not understand themselves as predicated on colonial occupation or on a history of settler-Indigenous relation (even though they are), and what are the contours and effects of such experiences of inhabitance and belonging? In characterizing settlement as a “structure”, “logic”, and a “will”, Wolfe seeks to integrate the multivalent aspects of ongoing processes of non-Native expropriation and superintendence, but doing so potentially sidesteps the question of how official governmental initiatives and framings become normalized as the setting for everyday non-Native being and action in ways that cannot be captured solely by reference to “the murderous activities of the frontier rabble” (392–3).

**Space management cannot be understood outside of settler colonialism. The infrastructure, institutions, and Eurocentric values of space policy are considered the hallmarks of science and progress, which become weaponized against Indigenous resistance.**

**Matson and Nunn 17**

**(Zannah Mae Matson is a PhD student in Human Geography at the University of Toronto, Neil Nunn is a PhD candidate in the Department of Geography and Planning at the University of Toronto, 10-3-17, SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE, EMPIRE, AND THE FINAL FRONTIER: WHAT THE MAUNA KEA LAND DEFENDERS TEACH US ABOUT COLONIAL TOTALITY, Society and Space,** [**https://societyandspace.org/2017/10/03/space-infrastructure-empire-and-the-final-frontier-what-the-mauna-kea-land-defenders-teach-us-about-colonial-totality/**](https://societyandspace.org/2017/10/03/space-infrastructure-empire-and-the-final-frontier-what-the-mauna-kea-land-defenders-teach-us-about-colonial-totality/)**, JKS)**

Mauna Kea is a dormant volcano and the highest point on the archipelago of Hawai’i. When measured from its base at seafloor, it is the tallest mountain on earth. These towering heights, in a region of the world with minimal light pollution has also earned Mauna Kea recognition of being one of the best spots on the planet for examining the cosmos. Long before the development of modern space infrastructure, however, the peak of Mauna Kea was regarded by native Hawaiians as among the most sacred places on the archipelago of Hawai’i. The place where earth meets the heavens. These divergent perspectives are embedded within a larger relationship of imperial domination that has seeded a century of unrest. While the primary focus of the protest was to challenge a half-century disregard for this sacred site by numerous entities and interests, the Battle for Mauna Kea cannot be understood outside Hawaii’s 125 year-long history of colonial occupation. In 1893, the Hawaiian Kingdom and its Queen, Lydia Kamaka’eha Lili’uokalani, were overthrown by a US led military coup (Long, 2017). Speaking to a spirit of resistance that has existed on the islands since the coup, scholar-activist K. Kamakaoka’ilima Long (2017: 15) states: “four decades of land struggles and cultural historical recovery... have grown a Hawaiian sovereignty movement... playing out in both land defense and as a movement to re-realize Hawaiian political independence as a sovereign state.” This recent assertion of self-determination, now known as the battle for Mauna Kea, has grown to become a global movement with broad support from high-profile figures and the hashtags #Wearemaunakea, #ProtectMaunaKea, and #TMTshutdown trending widely on social media. More than just a source of inspiration for the groundswell anti-colonial movements around the world, this story provides **a context to better understand ongoing colonial occupation that is reinforced through the constitutive power of space infrastructure**. Working from decades of resistance that culminated in the “battle for Mauna Kea,” we engage the notion of colonial totality to conceptualize the resistance to space infrastructure and the ongoing US occupation of Hawaii, reflecting on what this movement provides for better understanding totality and the relationship between space infrastructure and the shifting nature of colonial occupation more broadly. The notion of totality describes the process by which occupied spaces are coded with Western values in the form of normalized cultures, epistemologies, and institutions that produces an “atomistic image of social existence” (Quijano, 2007: 174). **The institutions, ideologies and systems that advocate for the construction of space infrastructure exemplify this process**. Astronomers frame the building of the observatory infrastructure as an essential piece in advancing our knowledge of outer space and ultimately achieving ‘universal’ progress. The resistance to development of these infrastructural systems is an invitation to consider **the relationship between space as a frontier of discovery and ongoing questions of settler colonialism**; the blockade has made visible the inherent relationship between the infrastructure of scientific exploration and the logic of totalizing colonial rationality that enables the development of massive telescopes on occupied land. While these perspectives of colonial totality provide a useful understanding of power and institutions that shape this conflict, we suggest that the Hawaiian land defenders’ refusal of the normalizing force of space infrastructure demonstrates the complexities and conditions relating to the notion of totality and ultimately the inadequacies of the concept. During a public comment period at 2015 University of Hawai‘i Board of Regents meeting, Dr. Pualani Kanaka’ole Kanahele gestures to both the totalizing colonial discourse that suppresses her cultural beliefs and the importance of fighting back against these systems: ... we believe in the word of our ancestors...they say we are the products of this land and that is our truth...and that is what we are fighting for. This is our way of life. This is not our job. We don’t earn money from doing this. But for generations after generations, we will continue to be doing what we are doing today. What Dr. Kanahele speaks of goes beyond the physical destruction of the sacred ancestral site, to describe a hegemonic normalization and occupation that actively effaces traditional Hawaiian ways of being in the world. The words and actions of the land defenders challenge totalizing structures that classify space according to a narrow set of beliefs about the world. Working from these acts of resistance, we want to suggest that the Hawaiian sovereignty movement illuminates how **systems of scientific thought and the project of space exploration rely on Euro-western values being the standard by which all other values are measured**. It is this wide acceptance of these structures and principles of reasoning that serve to justify the construction of infrastructure that at once reproduces and fortifies these myths. This self-reinforcing relationship between the production of space infrastructure and the logics that justify it speaks to a powerful aspects of colonial totality: the way it gains power by rendering illegible the very elements relied upon to actively produce the other. The generally unquestioned salience of space infrastructure is a powerful example of this. As Quijano (2007: 174) describes, the relationship between colonialism and scientific discourse is a mutually reinforcing and “part of, a power structure that involved the European colonial domination over the rest of the world.” In Hawai’i, we see the settler colonial process of cultural attrition operating through a totalizing force of colonial knowledge systems that extend beyond physical occupation of land to include an erasure of Indigenous Hawaiian ways of knowing. Although the spatialities and technologies associated with this form of stellar navigation are radically dissimilar, we suggest that on a basic level, this form of space exploration is continuous with a lineage of Euro-western projects of discovery. In short, space as the **‘final frontier’** is not simply a metaphor but speaks to the role of astronomy in upholding the ongoing projection of values onto new territories and extending power and acquisition of territory to those complicit in colonial processes. This extends both to the world’s highest peaks and into the heavens. Space infrastructure is central to this ongoing frontier process that seeks to code ‘new’ territories as knowable according to certain values and, as a result, casts inhabitants who fall outside this paradigm as irrational, less-than-human, and exploitable. However, as Lowe (2015: 2) warns, these abstract promises of human freedoms and rational progress are necessarily discordant with the “global conditions on which they depend.” Which is to say that these atomistic systems dispose of the very relationships and elements of life that make them possible. A belief in respecting the sacredness of the world is just one example of this. It is also essential to recognize the process of establishing colonial totality is one that imperial forces have worked tirelessly to instill. Recognizing this helps to disrupt an appearance of givenness that colonial occupation relies upon. The land defenders have been vocal about this, reminding of us of the fact that since the arrival of James Cook to the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, settler colonial campaigns have been advancing longstanding patterns of cultural removal, fueled by beliefs in colonial supremacy. Following the coup and overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy by US-led forces, a colonial oligarchy banned Hawaiian languages from schools and formalized English as the official language for business and government relations (Silva, 2004: 2-3). This legislation eroded language, culture, and sacred practice; and is an example of what Ngugi wa Thiong’o (cited in Silva, 2004: 3) describes as a “cultural bomb” of settler colonialism that serves to “annihilate a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves.” According to Chickasaw theorist Jodi Byrd, continually reflecting on the historical and ongoing work that maintains the conditions of settler colonialism is essential to resisting the tendency for colonial constraint to appear inevitable, unresolvable, and complete (Byrd, 2011; see also Simpson, 2014). There was nothing, easy, given, or natural about processes of colonial occupation. While we acknowledge the usefulness of totality for thinking about colonial supremacy, we have concerns about its tendency to inscribe an inaccurate depiction of Euro-western superpower with total ideological control over subjugated Indigenous population. Put differently, we are cautious of the work that the notion of totality does to reinforce a too widely accepted view of Indigenous populations as helplessly dominated, or even anachronistic. The Hawaiian sovereignty movement demonstrates that this is not the case. What the battle at Mauna Kea has shown—akin to other efforts of refusal, such as those at Standing Rock—is that the war against colonialism is ongoing. At present, it appears the land protectors have been successful in their goals of halting construction, as the development team behind the project has begun considering secondary sites for the telescope. The resistance at Mauna Kea, then, is a powerful symbol of the possibility of rupturing the normative totality of Modernist scientific rationality, but it also underscores the recalcitrance of the structures of control and the challenges of pushing back against colonial occupation. However, despite this rupturing of hegemonic ideas of science and progress through the resistance movement, the dominant response from the scientific community has been largely one of confusion and perplexity. This reaction to the uprising speaks to the power of the narratives that cement the Western framework as ‘truth,’ ‘natural,’ and ‘given.’ **For these representatives of state and international institutions, violent control is re-framed as co-existence to achieve Modernist notions of progress, while the claims of Indigenous people are reduced to frivolous demands with primitive and irrational connections to the past.** This, of course, exists with little consideration of the irony of how this frenzy to build infrastructure that works to “know” the cosmos may be read as equally irrational. This essay has sought to consider the relationship between infrastructure and colonialism, emphasizing that even the most futuristic space telescopes have embedded within them a lineage of Euro-western cultural supremacy. It is important to recognize the extant materiality of these infrastructures as a manifestation of hegemonic systems that perpetuate myths of rationality and Euro-western cultural supremacy. The battle for Mauna Kea movement highlights the importance of remembering the long historical processes and extensive exertion of colonial constraint and cultural removal that has been necessary to maintain control of the land. Despite the social processes that naturalize colonial infrastructure, there is nothing essential, necessary, or pre-ordained about enormous telescopes. The success of the land defenders at Mauna Kea, and the support the movement gained around the world, shows us that Euro-western forces and the infrastructure that is central to maintaining their normative influence, are replete with fissures and contradictions worth pushing against. In spite of the hegemonic forces of modernity and rationality behind the construction of the TMT and a continued attempt to assert colonial totality, the battle at Mauna Kea indicates these hegemonic forces have been far from totalizing. The colonial powers do not have the final word. The land defenders at Mauna Kea have demonstrated a powerful vision for disrupting normative ways of occupying land and knowing the cosmos inspiring us to think further on the complexities of mobilizing infrastructure to resist colonialism. It is within these ruptures that we see a potential for a continued learning from the stars and our social existence.

**Treatymaking is a form of settler diplomacy that seeks to legitimize colonial authority through legal justifications. Native Nations are rendered primitive and lawless as the plan eliminates any trace of indigenous sovereignty.**

**Bauerkemper and Stark 12**

**(Joseph Bauerkemper Assistant Professor, American Indian Studies, Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark. Turtle Mountain Ojibwe, received her Ph.D. in American Studies from the University of Minnesota, 2012, The Trans/National Terrain of Anishinaabe Law and Diplomacy, Journal of Transnational American Studies, 4(1), JKS)**

Throughout the ongoing and always transnational processes of interpolitical negotiations, obligations, and interactions, Native nations continue to retain and express their own ideas of nationhood and exercise their long-standing diplomatic traditions. Whether by establishing or renewing political, economic, and other strategic alliances across the transnational terrains of Native North America and colonialist North America, Anishinaabe diplomacy asserts Native nationhood and disrupts colonizing narratives of discovery and conquest that have served to legitimize settler-state establishment and expansion. Thus, an examination of Anishinaabe diplomacy as illustrated in the opening story of Maudjee-kawiss and the Bear Nation can reveal a particular instance in which Native American Studies challenges, critiques, and contributes to transnational scholarly frameworks. By centering Anishinaabe nationhood, diplomacy, and intellectual traditions, we inherently enter into the realm of the transnational. The Anishinaabeg, whose homelands span the Great Lakes and the Plains, have since time immemorial entered into intranational alliances among Anishinaabe bands as well as international treaties with other indigenous nations and colonial states. For example, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Anishinaabeg tracked how treaty practices were carried out across their bands and utilized this knowledge to their advantage whenever possible.22 Through their engagement across bands, the Anishinaabeg were able to discuss various issues pertinent to their treaty relations with colonial nations, such as how much land was retained, the amount paid for ceded lands, and which hunting and fishing rights had been preserved. Thus, various bands informed one another’s political thought and practices when they engaged in treaties with Canada and the United States. In addition, the Anishinaabeg often used treatymaking, especially along the border regions, to both protest and utterly disregard US and Canadian border constructions that would affect the internal affairs of these nations. Native peoples have long been reckoning with what it means to live in a multicultural and multinational world. Well before the arrival of Europeans, Native nations were participating in social, economic, and political alliances that required engagement across national borders, kinship networks, and differing epistemologies. Carried out through stories told, customs practiced, and commitments fulfilled, these diplomatic interactions were themselves sites of nation-building in which communities articulated their understandings of what they were and imagined what they hoped to become. On their arrivals in the Americas, European nations—all of which depended on political and economic alliances with Native nations—would find themselves needing to engage with and employ indigenous diplomatic practices and discourses.23 Such diplomatic discourses were thus ironically fundamental to settler-state formation. **Treaty-making served as the main practice through which the existence of colonial nations as sovereign states was legitimized**. Diplomatic engagements were sites in which nations asserted, negotiated, and recognized competing conceptions of and claims to sovereignty, nationhood, and land rights. For example, **the United States could assert to European nations that it was a sovereign state because it had acted as such by making treaties with indigenous nations.** These assertions had weight because these indigenous nations had already been recognized through the European states’ own treaty-making practices. This treaty-making rationale combined with discourses of “discovery” and “conquest” in a logically fallible but politically expedient pursuit of US and Canadian state-formation. US and Canadian cultural discourses position Native peoples as “savage” while political discourses concurrently acknowledge (even if reluctantly and inconsistently) the sovereignty of Native nations. Even while such trajectories might appear opposed, the legal discourses of both nation-states selectively apply the sentiment of savagery and the recognition of sovereignty toward settler colonial purposes. Robert Williams argues that “**these divergent discourses on Indian legal status and rights were all derivative of the larger and more direct question . . . regarding the rationalization of the land-acquisition process on the colonial frontier**.” 24 Ultimately, colonial legal theory, which sometimes asserts the sovereignty and property rights of Native peoples, **is often overridden by cultural discourses that fabricate legal justifications for US** and Canadian **assertions of settler sovereignty.** Practical realities and processes on the ground, such as treaty-making, that recognized the status of Native nations compete with national mythologies that derogate Indians as “savages” and justify land acquisition through discovery. The newly formed states were conscious of their need to deal with Native nations as sovereign political entities.25 Nonetheless, as decades passed and treaties continued to be made, national mythologies of conquest, at times, overrode earlier discourses that recognized Native sovereignty because it supported the sovereignty of the young states.

**Cooperation assumes that space is a unique area that can transcend Earthly politics. This naive assumption ignores the settler power dynamics that shape the process of cooperation.**

**Genovese 16**

**(Genovese, Taylor R. Doctoral student in the Human and Social Dimensions of Science and Technology (HSD) program at Arizona State University, where he is pursuing his interest in the social imaginaries of human futures on Earth and in outer space. 2016. “Fear and Loathing in Truth or Consequences: Neoliberalism, Colonialism and the Lineage of the Frontier at Spaceport America.” Space+Anthropology, JKS)**

“This isn’t the government space age,” the tour guide continues. “This is the commercial space age. As a space corporation, you have two choices: cede the business and die...or innovate. There will be no more government hand-outs and that forces innovation.” I knew that I would be confronted with the neoliberal, capitalist mythos eventually; the NewSpace mantra of “pull yourself up by the spaceboot-straps.” However, what the tour guide said is not entirely true, considering the New Mexico General Fund Plus Special Appropriation is slated to give Spaceport America $2,262,000 in the 2017 budget. That means that 35% of the spaceport’s operating budget next year will be taxpayer money—“government hand-outs,” if you will. However, this is not a novel situation, corporate subsidies are an important tradition within the capitalist system. “Movement of people and goods is a natural progression,” preaches the tour guide. “The goal of humanity is to make the world a smaller place. Space travel can do that. For example, take what happened at Benghazi. Imagine we could deploy a SEAL team on rocket planes anywhere in the world within minutes!” I can barely take it. This is my first time visiting any NewSpace facility and—as an anthropologist—I want to remain a fly-on-the-wall for this initial visit. But the activist in me begins screaming and clawing its way up my throat. I was about to burst when a voice calls out from behind me. “**OK, but wouldn’t it be great if we all worked together in space? Shouldn’t space be without a military application?”** I breathe a sigh of relief as my activist personality begins to settle down. The tour guide begins with the double-speak that continues throughout the remainder of the tour. “That’s the good thing about space,” he says, floundering slightly at the tourist’s audacity to challenge corporate policy. “It transcends politics. The good thing about space is it’s a Trump- free zone. A Hillary-free zone.” Except that is obviously not true; and not just in the Foucauldian “everything is political” sense (i.e. **that power dynamics exist in every facet of human interaction**). Abu Dhabi’s Aabar Investments has a 37.8% stake in Virgin Galactic. SpaceX has put in unsolicited bids to launch American spy satellites. **The metaphysical ideal of outer space may be a place beyond politics, but the reality in this “second space age” is that globalized capitalism**—and all the politics that are inherently intertwined within it—are alive and well in the commercial space industry. The tour guide turns to the launching capabilities of the Boeing 747, especially as it pertains to Virgin Galactic’s LauncherOne program which hopes to strap a rocket to one of the wings of a 747, fly up to around 50,000 feet, and release the rocket to be launched the rest of the way to space. “Does anyone else see a problem with this photograph?” asks the tour guide—holding his iPad out for us to see— referencing the fact that there exists only one missile on one of the wings. “What about a 747 carrying missiles on both wings? What about bomb bay doors? There’s a lot of volume inside of a 747! It carried the Space Shuttle on its back, it seems like a waste to only carry a single missile.” He holds his hand flat and horizontal to us, as if his fingers are a 747 and then uses the index finger of his other hand to simulate spacecraft dropping from the belly of the aircraft—his palm. Almost a neoliberal haiku. I begin to feel sick. The tour guide continues with the double- speak. “But it’s not about spaceports. It’s not about spaceships. It’s about how can space better humanity?” We finally disembark the shuttle and head to the visitor exhibits inside of the terminal and hanger facility. A large mural—titled The Journey Upward—is adorned on one of the walls. This mural served as a summation of the NewSpace worldview and ideology. A natural, inescapable, linear progression toward human beings spreading into the cosmos: from dinosaurs (?) to Anglo-looking Paleo Indians to settler-colonists to space migration. This romanticized “lineage of the frontier” is tied to the capitalist dream—and mythology—of untold profits and constantly expanding markets. Of course, the capitalist mythology also likes to ignore the horrendous inequality and violence that tends to attach itself to the frontier mentality. **When frontiers are seen as limitless, uninhabited and uncivilized, it encourages doctrines like slavery and Manifest Destiny.** Yet NewSpace corporations seem to be overlooking the bigger picture and instead focus on the “glory of the frontier” as endless profit potential and romantic adventure.

**This debate is not private space good/bad, but instead a question of Native sovereignty and the power to invoke the plan. The 1AC eclipses the authority of Native nations, so in response we affirm the long tradition of Indigenous internationalism across colonial borders.**

**Estes 19**

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The Treaty Council, however, was not the first or only version of what historian Daniel Cobb calls a “global Indigenous identity.” Rather, it belonged to and drew from a long tradition of **Indigenous internationalism**.5 Prior to European contact, Indigenous nations had often entered into relations with each other for alliance, kinship, war, peace, or trade. As shown in previous chapters, agreements were made not solely between human nations, but also among nonhuman nations as well, such as the buffalo and the land. Such treaties were, and continue to be, the basis of diplomacy and the evidence of a prior and continuing status of Indigenous nationhood. **Sovereign nations do not enter into international relations or treaties with domestic or “internal” populations.** On the contrary, the very basis of sovereignty is the power to negotiate relationships between those who are seen as different— between other sovereigns and nations. But concepts of “sovereignty” and “nation” possess different meanings for Indigenous peoples than for their European-derived counterparts. And they are not entirely consistent, either, with the aspirations for a nation-state that came to define decolonization movements in the Third World. While doing important defensive work, on face value these Western and Third World concepts only partially reflect traditions of Indigenous resistance. **Far beyond the project of seeking equality within the colonial state, the tradition of radical Indigenous internationalism imagined a world altogether free of colonial hierarchies of race, class, and nation**. This vision allowed revolutionary Indigenous organizations such as the Treaty Council to make relatives, so to speak, with those they saw as different, **imagining themselves as part of Third World struggles and ideologies**, and entirely renouncing the imperialism and exceptionalism of the First World (while still living in it). They were in the First World but not of it—much like American Indians are in, but not entirely of, the United States. Indigenous peoples across North America and the world have fought, died, and struggled to reclaim, restore, and redefine these powerful ideas. **Their goal has been to take their proper place in the family of nations.** Radical Indigenous internationalism, however, predates AIM and the Treaty Council. Contemporary pan-Indigenous movements were a result of more than a decade of Red Power organizing that began in the early 1960s, nearly a decade before the creation of AIM. Earlier, in the 1950s, Flathead scholar and writer D’Arcy McNickle and the National Congress of American Indians had explored a similar intellectual and political terrain of internationalism. And before that, the Society of American Indians advocated for a seat at the table during the 1919 Paris peace talks and representation at the League of Nations. Each distinct instance posed a similar question: **If Indigenous peoples are nations, why are they not afforded the right to self-determination?** Two strands of thinking about self-determination for the colonial world prevailed following the First World War. In the first, US President Woodrow Wilson argued for self-determination with a limited set of rights that would not radically upset the colonial order. Such liberal internationalism, however, glaringly omitted Indigenous peoples, as they understood themselves as nations that existed prior to the formation of settler states. Rarely were Wilson’s principles applied to North America or the United States; nor were they ever intended to extend to Indigenous peoples. A second, more radical vision put forward by Communist revolutionary V. I. Lenin argued for the right of colonized nations to secede and declare independence from their colonial masters. This view was echoed by the Third World decolonization movement, as part of a global Socialist and Communist revolution, and it has frequently been applied in the Asian, African, and South American contexts. But this view remained almost entirely absent in North America, except among radical Indigenous, Black, Asian, Caribbean, and Chicanx national liberation movements. The Treaty Council advocated Indigenous nationhood as part of this global anti-colonial movement and in line with Third World liberation movements. After decades of experiencing land loss, enduring bare survival, attempting to work with federal programs, filing court cases, defeating termination legislation, and facing mass relocation, an assertion of Oceti Sakowin sovereignty went from ambition to prescription. Few avenues remained other than the pursuit of international treaty rights. Treaties made with the United States were proof of nationhood. But what legal institution would uphold this position if the United States refused to? If the goal was to reverse the unjust occupation of an entire continent, the advancement of Indigenous rights through the very legal and political systems that justified that occupation in the first place had proven limited in some instances, and hopeless in others. To survive, AIM and the Treaty Council therefore had to look elsewhere to make their case—beyond the confines of the most powerful political construct in world history, the nation-state. Prior to and during colonization, Indigenous nations had self-organized into deliberate confederacies, alliances, and governments. The Nation of the Seven Council Fires (the Oceti Sakowin), for instance, is a confederacy of seven different nations of Lakota-, Dakota-, and Nakota-speaking peoples in the Northern Plains and Western Great Lakes. They are hardly unique; in North America alone there are the Creek Confederacy in the Southeast, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy of Six Nations in the Northeast, the Council of Three Fires (made up of Ojibwes, Odawas, and Potawatomis) in the Great Lakes region, the United Indian Nations in the Ohio River valley (under the Shawnee leadership of Tecumseh), the All Indian Pueblo Council of the Southwest, and the Iron Confederacy of the Northern Plains. Many other political confederacies also flourished prior to, alongside, and in spite of settler states in North America. And their legacies are hardly relegated to the primordial past. Modern Oceti Sakowin internationalism, for instance, traces its origins to the early twentieth century, an era generally viewed as a low point for Indigenous activism and resistance. In North America alone, an estimated precolonial population of tens of millions of Indigenous peoples had been reduced to about 300,000, and for Flathead historian D’Arcy McNickle, writing in 1949, two processes contributed greatly to this decimation: the institution of private property and the destruction of Indigenous governance that once held land in common. Indigenous nations at the time also possessed little in the way of either collective property or political power, as Indigenous territory had been drastically diminished, and the reservation system had overthrown or almost entirely dissolved customary governments. If Indigenous peoples once constituted the tree of the Americas, whose roots deeply entwined in the land, the cultivation of “growth from the severed stump,” McNickle argued, was the pivotal challenge of the twentieth century.7 Physical extermination and the repression of Indigenous political power verified the United States’ genocidal intent, but these had not accomplished their purpose. And despite otherwise stating pluralistic claims to inclusion, McNickle concluded that **the United States simply “can not tolerate a nation within a nation.” I**f Natives were to be assimilated, they would be assimilated as individuals and not as nations. In the popular imaginary, Natives disappeared into the wilderness of history, were never truly nations, and had been overpowered by a superior civilization. If they were nations, they were eclipsed and **replaced by the real nation—the United States**. Such erasure notwithstanding, vibrant Indigenous political traditions persisted. But to the untrained eye, nothing was awry. From the severed stump began to regrow the tree of life—the tree of resistance that would blossom into revolt decades later.

**Criticizing security strategy is a mode of settler recuperation which takes for granted the very terms of their expression. The aff operationalizes the presumed normality of settler colonialism to obfuscate their reproduction of genocidal politics in spite of their opposition to standard IR.**

**Hendershot and Mutimer 18**

**(Chris Hendershot, York University, David Mutimer Professor and Chair of Department Political Science, LA&PS. Editor, Critical Studies on Security., 2018, Critical Security Studies, Chapter 5 in: The Oxford Handbook of International Security, edited by Alexandra Gheciu, William C. Wohlforth, JKS)**

**CSS= Critical Security Studies**

Despite avowed commitments to critique concepts and practices that sustain militarized, carbon dependent, or zero-sum security relations, critical security scholars must also imagine the possibility that criticality can still affect domination and exploitation. That is to say, CSS needs to more thoughtfully consider its ongoing complicity with the settler-colonial and imperial ordering of global relations. As two scholars who live and work on the traditional territory of the Haudenosaunee, the Métis, and most recently, the territory of the Mississauga of the Credit River (CAUT 2016) and are thus sustained through the occupation of this territory, we must immediately confront our complicity in settler-colonialism. Or to paraphrase Sundberg (2014: 35), as citizens of a settler-colonial state, we “have a profound obligation and responsibility to confront the widespread implications of colonialism in [our] scholarship and to ask what [security] thought has to become to face the political, philosophical, and ethical challenges of decolonizing.” **Without a vigorous un-settling, CSS will be incapable of working for and with “Indigenous sovereignty in its material, psychological, epistemological, and spiritual forms**” (Sium et al. 2012: v). What must be more readily confronted is that **criticality does not obviate complicity with colonialism, imperialism, and racialized domination**. Expansive referents, nonpositivistic metatheories, and openness to difference can certainly create the intellectual space to read and cite the work of Patrick Wolfe (2006) or Glen Coulthard (2014) or Sarah Hunt (2014). Or to consider how the Asubpeeschoseewagong First Nation, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, and/or Native Hawaiians are affected by and affect security politics. Critical scholars who focus on the security politics of the Arctic are already including Indigenous concerns and knowledge in their analysis. Using securitization theory, Greaves (2016) engages with Inuit and Sami discourses “in order to explain variation in different understandings of (in)security” among Indigenous Peoples as well as recognizing how colonial agendas constrain the capacities of Indigenous Peoples “to advance a conception of (in)security that is distinct from those of settler governments” (2016: 462-3). Harrington and Lecavalier (2014) work through an emancipatory approach in order to understand how Inuit discourse, particularly that which is articulated by and through the Inuit Circumpolar Council, and traditional knowledge “offers an important emancipatory alternative to traditional practices of environmental security” (2014: 114). Yet, inclusion and recognition of Indigenous Peoples and knowledge does not necessarily un-settle the academy (Ahenakew 2016). Greater inclusion need not contest the fact that the academic study of security, whether it be traditional or critical, is not possible without (settler) colonialism/imperialism. Ontologically, the world of nation states, citizens, consumers, the environment, water, and food cannot exist as referents of security because they do not exist as such without colonial rearrangements of economics, geographies, and politics (see Byrd 2011; Samson and Gigoux 2017). Epistemologically, notions of threat and danger are entwined with colonial determinations of the civilized, productive, and/or human (see Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez 2013). Methodologically, the Anglo-European “modernization” of academic knowledge production does not occur without the discovery, classification, and collection of “native” people, flora, and fauna (Tuhiwai Smith 2012). Politically, the educational authority of Anglo-European universities rests, in many instances literally, on the coercive disposition of land, suppression of language, and spiritual and creative practice, as well as the ignorance of traditional knowledge (see Todd 2016). **Only through honestly confronting this (ongoing) complicity with colonialism can critical security scholarship sincerely consider, support, and enact decolonial possibilities**. As **decolonization is not a metaphor “for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools”** (Tuck and Yang 2012: 3) we, the settler/imperial scholars, cannot assume that openness to differing modes of thought, extra-disciplinary meaning, and reflexive accountability (that is, holding ourselves accountable for our complicities with structures and practices of domination) can assure decolonial possibilities. **They may be necessary, but cannot be considered sufficient.** Nor are indigenizing curricula, acknowledging occupied land, and/or calling for/echoing calls for the decolonization of CSS enough. **As settler scholars, we must support** the work of **Indigenous scholars to conduct and present their research “on its own terms”** (Ahenakew 2016: 327)—that is, not filtered “through the frames of Western Epistemology” (Ahenakew 2016: 327). One method for supporting Indigenous knowledge sovereignty is the transformation of peer adjudication processes, particularly those which determine which research projects are funded. Settler scholars cannot assume to be the only or even appropriate peers. Colonial disposition, not comprehension of a universal or modern understanding of the world, is what secured and secures the knowledge authority of settlers over and above Indigenous Peoples. Un-settling CSS will require exercises that work to support the knowledge authority of Indigenous thinkers—thinkers who may or may not work in or for the Anglo-European academy. **Un-settling CSS will** also **require performing nonacademic work. Settler scholars must provide material support to protest and advocacy movements.** Universities located on occupied land must make longer-term financial investments in Indigenous-led economic, social, cultural, and educational efforts. To do this decolonial work will require settler scholars to consult and collaborate with Indigenous thinkers, activists, and elders. Un-settling CSS will require both the making and giving back of time, space, and sustenance to permit Indigenous thinkers and activists to sustain and safeguard their pasts, presents, and futures. Non-Indigenous CSS scholars must understand that “decolonization is a messy, dynamic, and a contradictory process” (Sium et al. 2012: ii) in order never to suggest that we know a better way. **We as settler scholars working through unsettling security must also seriously entertain the possibility that decolonization means no future for CSS.**

**Off Sutch and Roberts – don't let them use this to justify a perm – they claim to oppose colonialism and reframe discussions of IR but reassert the colonial history of international relations by not including indigenous nations in any negotiations or treatymaking – means only the alt can solve – the card literally says we should debate about how we govern the commons**

**1NC – FW**

**Interpretation: The 1AC is an object of research. The role of the neg should be to disprove the various meanings of that object.**

**1] Plan focus restricts the debate to a ten second statement and leaves the rest of the aff unquestioned. They should be responsible for the way their knowledge is constructed and used because that produces the best model for activism and ethics in the context of the topic which is a unique education net benefit to our interpretation**

**2] Debate doesn't pass policies but it does alter the way we think about the world and about systems of power – turns their policy research standards because it's a question of how their research is oriented and whether it's for an ethical purpose – only our model of engagement accesses that education**

**3] Begs the question – if we win their justifications are repugnant that necessarily implicates the conclusion which means defense of their research model is a prior question to weighing the material consequences of the aff – also solves plan focus because the links necessarily implicate aff solvency**

**Case**

**public alt cause**

**Even though the OST doesn’t bind private entities, governments still already restrict and regulate them to ensure just compliance in the squo**

**Eijk 20** [Cristian van Eijk is finishing an accelerated BA in Law at the University of Cambridge. He holds a BA cum laude in International Justice and an LLM in Public International Law from Leiden University, and has previously worked at the T.M.C. Asser Institute and the International Commission on Missing Persons. “Sorry, Elon: Mars is not a legal vacuum – and it’s not yours, either.” Voelkerrechtsblog. May 11, 2020. <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/sorry-elon-mars-is-not-a-legal-vacuum-and-its-not-yours-either/>] HW AL

Two provisions of the Outer Space Treaty (OST), both also customary, are particularly relevant here. OST article II: “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” OST article III: “States... shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including (...) celestial bodies, in accordance with international law”. SpaceX is a private entity, and is not bound by the Outer Space Treaty – but that does not mean it can opt out. Its actions in space could have consequences for the United States in three ways. First, the US, as SpaceX’s launch state, bears fault-based liability for injury or damage SpaceX’s space objects cause to other states’ persons or property (OST article VII, Liability Convention articles I, III). Second, the US, as SpaceX’s state of registry, is the sole state that retains jurisdiction and control over SpaceX objects (OST article VIII, Registration Convention article II). Both refer to objects in space and are irrelevant. According to article VI OST, States “bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space”, including Mars, including those by “non-governmental entities”. The US, as SpaceX’s state of incorporation, must authorise and continuously supervise SpaceX’s actions in space to ensure compliance with the OST (OST article VI) and international law (OST article III). In practice, this task is done by the US Federal Communications Commission, which licenses and regulates SpaceX. Article VI OST sets a specific rule of attribution, supplementing the customary rules of state responsibility (Stubbe 2017, pp. 85-104). SpaceX acts with US authorisation, and its conduct in space within and beyond that authorisation is attributable to the US (ARSIWA articles 5, 7). In the absence of circumstances precluding wrongfulness, the result is straightforward. If SpaceX breaches a US obligation under international law, the US bears responsibility for an internationally wrongful act.

**Space debris creates existential deterrence and a taboo**

Bowen 18 [(Bleddyn, lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester) “The Art of Space Deterrence,” European Leadership Network, February 20, 2018, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/] TDI

Fourth, the ubiquity of space infrastructure and the fragility of the space environment may create a degree of existential deterrence. As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be a natural caution against a wholesale assault on a state’s entire space capabilities because the consequences of doing so approach the mentalities of total war, or nuclear responses if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the problem of space debris and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations mean that even a handful of explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone. This could caution a country like China from excessive kinetic intercept missions because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on outer space, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space. The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect. China’s catastrophic anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a valuable lesson for all on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.

**Alt cause – broad space privatization and existing debris.**

**Muelhapt et al 19** [(Theodore J., Center for Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies, Center for Space Policy and Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation, 30 year Space Systems Analyst and Operator, Marlon E. Sorge, Jamie Morin, Robert S. Wilson), “Space traffic management in the new space era,” Journal of Space Safety Engineering, 6/18/19, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2019.05.007] TDI

The last decade has seen rapid growth and change in the space industry, and an explosion of commercial and private activity. Terms like NewSpace or democratized space are often used to describe this global trend to develop faster and cheaper access to space, **distinct from more traditional government-driven activities** focused on security, political, or scientific activities. The easier access to space has opened participation to many more participants than was historically possible. This new activity could profoundly worsen the space debris environment, particularly in low Earth orbit (**LEO**), but there are also signs of progress and the outlook is encouraging. Many NewSpace operators are actively working to mitigate their impact. Nevertheless, NewSpace represents a significant break with past experience and business as usual will not work in this changed environment. New standards, space policy, and licensing approaches are powerful levers that can shape the future of operations and the debris environment.

2. Characterizing NewSpace: a step change in the space environment

In just the last few years, commercial companies have proposed, funded, and in a few cases begun deployment of very large constellations of small to medium-sized satellites. These constellations will add much more complexity to space operations. Table 1 shows some of the constellations that have been announced for launch in the next decade. Two dozen companies, when taken together, have proposed placing well over ~~20,000~~ [twenty thousand] satellites in orbit in the next ~~10~~ [10]years. For perspective, fewer than ~~8100~~[eight thousand one hundred] payloads have been placed in Earth orbit in the entire history of the space age, only 4800 [1] remain in orbit and approximately 1950 [2] of those are still active. And it isn't simply numbers – the mass in orbit will increase substantially, and long-term debris generation is strongly correlated with mass.

[Table 1 Omitted]

This table is in constant flux. It is based largely on U.S. filings with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and various press releases, but many of the companies here have already altered or abandoned their original plans, and new systems are no doubt in work. Although many of these large constellations may never be launched as listed, the **traffic created if just half are successful would be more than double the number of payloads launched in the last 60 years and more than 6 times the number of currently active satellites.**

Current space safety, space surveillance, collision avoidance (COLA) and debris mitigation processes have been designed for and have evolved with the current population profile, launch rates and density of LEO space.

By almost **any metric** used to measure activity in space, whether it is payloads in orbit, the size of constellations, the rate of launches, the economic stakes, the potential for debris creation, the number of conjunctions, NewSpace represents a **fundamental change.**

3. Compounding effects of better SSA, more satellites, and new operational concepts

The changes in the space environment can be seen on this figurative map of low Earth orbit. Fig. 1 shows the LEO environment as a function of altitude. The number of objects found in each 10 km “bin” is plotted on the horizontal axis, while the altitude is plotted vertically. Objects in elliptical orbits are distributed between bins as partial objects proportional to the time spent in each bin. Some notable resident systems are indicated in blue text on the right to provide an altitude reference. The (dotted) red line shows the number of objects in the current catalog tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN). All the COLA alerts and actions that must be taken by the residents are due to their neighbors in the nearby bins, so the currently visible risk is proportional to the red line.

The red line of the current catalog does not represent the complete risk; it indicates the risk we can track and perhaps avoid. A rule of thumb is that the current SSN LEO catalog contains objects about 10 cm or larger. It is generally accepted that an impact in LEO with an object 1 cm or larger will cause damage likely to be fatal to a satellite's mission. Therefore, there is a large latent risk from unobserved debris. While we cannot currently track and catalog much smaller than 10 cm, experiments have been performed to detect and sample much smaller objects and statistically model the population at this size [3]. The (solid) blue line represents the model of the 1 cm and larger debris that is likely mission-ending, usually called lethal but not trackable. If LEO operators avoid collisions with all the objects in the red line, they are nonetheless inherently accepting the risk from the blue line. This risk is already present.

The (dashed) orange line is an estimate of the population at 5 cm and larger and is thus an estimate of what the catalog might conservatively be a few years after the Space Fence, a new radar system being built by the Air Force, comes on line (currently planned for 2019) [4]. Commercial companies offering space surveillance services, such as LeoLabs, ExoAnalytics, Analytic Graphics Inc., Lockheed, and Boeing, might also add to the number of objects currently tracked. Space Policy Directive 3 (SPD-3) [13] specifically seeks to expand the use of commercial SSA services.

Existing operators can expect a sharp increase in the number of warnings and alerts they will receive because of the increase in the cataloged population. Almost all the increase will come from newly detected debris [5].

The pace of safety operations for each satellite on orbit will significantly change because of the increase in the catalog from the Space Fence. This effect is compounded because the NewSpace constellations described in Table 1 will drastically change the profile of satellites in LEO. The green bars in Fig. 1 represent the number of objects that will be added to the catalog (red or orange lines) from only the NewSpace large LEO constellations at their operational altitudes. This does not include the rocket stages that launch them, or satellites in the process of being phased into or removed from the operational orbits. Neighbors of one of these new constellations may face a radically different operations environment than their current practices were designed to address.

Satellites in these large LEO constellations typically have planned operational lifetimes of 5–10 years. Some companies have proposed to dispose of their satellites using low thrust electric propulsion systems, which would spiral satellites down over a period of months or years from operating altitudes as high as 1500 km through lower orbits where the Hubble Space Telescope, the International Space Station, and other critical LEO satellites operate [6]. Similar propulsive techniques would raise replacement satellites from lower launch injection orbits to higher operational orbits. These disposal and replenishment activities will add thousands of satellites each year transiting through lower altitudes and posing a risk to all resident satellites in those lower orbits. More importantly, failures will occur both among transiting satellites and operational constellations, potentially leaving hundreds more stranded along the transit path.