**1NC**

**1**

**Interpretation – the affirmative must only garner offense from a defense of the resolutional statement.**

**“Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum**

**Army Officer School 4** (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation—The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

**The appropriation of outer space means permanently taking property**

**Gorove, LLM, 69** [Stephen Gorove, LLM & PhD Philsophy@Yale. "Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty." Fordham L. Rev. Vol. 37, Issue 3, pp. 349, published 1969, https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1966&amp;context=flr] HWIC

With respect to the concept of appropriation the basic question is what constitutes "appropriation," as used in the Treaty, especially in contradistinction to casual or temporary use. The term "appropriation" is used most frequently to denote the taking of property for one's own or **exclusive use with a sense of permanence**. Under such interpretation the establishment of a permanent settlement or the carrying out of commercial activities by nationals of a country on a celestial body may constitute national appropriation if the activities take place under the supreme authority (sovereignty) of the state. Short of this, if the state wields no exclusive authority or jurisdiction in relation to the area in question, the answer would seem to be in the negative, unless, the nationals also use their individual appropriations as cover-ups for their state's activities.5 In this connection, it should be emphasized that the word "appropriation" indicates a taking which involves something more than just a casual use. Thus a temporary occupation of a landing site or other area, just like the temporary or nonexclusive use of property, would not constitute appropriation. By the same token, any use involving consumption or taking with intention of keeping for one's own exclusive use would amount to appropriation.

**A private entity is**

<https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=6-USC-625312480-168358316&term_occur=999&term_src=title:6:chapter:6:subchapter:I:section:1501>

(A) In general Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.

**"To be" is a linking verb of description**

**GU no date** [Gallaudet University. "ACTION VERBS AND LINKING VERBS," https://www.gallaudet.edu/tutorial-and-instructional-programs/english-center/grammar-and-vocabulary/verbs/action-verbs-and-linking-verbs/] HWIC

A linking verb is a verb that links (connects) the subject of the sentence to **information about that subject**. Linking verbs **do not describe action**. When using linking verbs, the sentence structure will be : SUBJECT--->LINKING VERB---> INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT (noun)(verb)(adjective, noun, or complement)

Some verbs are ALWAYS linking verbs because they never describe an action. Other verbs can be linking verbs in some sentences and action verbs in other sentences.

The following three verbs are ALWAYS linking verbs:

to be (is, am, are, was, were, has been, have been, had been, is being, are being, was being, will have been, etc.) to become (become, becomes, became, has become, have become, had become, will become, will have become, etc.) to seem (seemed, seeming, seems, has seemed, have seemed, had seemed, is seeming, are seeming, was seeming, were seeming, will seem) Here are some examples of linking verbs that are ALWAYS linking verbs in sentences: “The ball is red.” 'Is' is a linking verb that connects the subject, ball, to information about that subject (that it is red). “The children are smart.” 'Are' is a linking verb that connects the subject, children, to information about that subject (that they are smart). “The child will be tall five years from now.” 'Will be' is the linking verb connecting 'child' to the fact that he will be 'tall five years from now.'“The cat seems fine.”'Seems' links the subject, cat, with information about the cat (that it is fine). “The dog became thin after his surgery.” 'Became' links the subject, the dog, with information about him (that he became thin).

**Unjust means unfair or immoral**

**OED no date** ["unjust, adj. and n." Oxford English Dictionary, https://www-oed-com.proxy.hw.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/214856] HWIC

A. adj.

1. Not fair or equitable.

Thesaurus »

a. That does not observe the principles of justice or fair dealing; not acting justly, fairly, or impartially, esp. in administering justice; not behaving in an equitable manner with regard to a person or thing.

c1384—2011(Show quotations)

Thesaurus »

b. That is not in accordance with justice or fairness; inequitable, unfair; characterized by unfairness; esp. (of a punishment, reward, etc.) not merited; undeserved.

c1384—2010(Show quotations)

Thesaurus »

Categories »

2. Lacking integrity or moral rectitude; characterized by this; not acting in accordance with what is morally right or just; wicked, sinful; dishonourable. Also: unfaithful or untrue to (†of) a promise, obligation, etc. (cf. just adj. 11b). Now rare.

c1400—1976(Show quotations)

Thesaurus »

3. Not proper or appropriate; not justified or warranted.

c1443—1996(Show quotations)

Thesaurus »

Categories »

4. Not accurate; incorrect; inexact, imprecise; (formerly also) †irregular (obsolete). Now rare.

In later use frequently with implication of unfairness or injustice.

1554—1986(Show quotations)

**Violation: they don't**

**TVA: Our interp is compatible with them reading a cybernetics aff about how space accelerates technological development**

**Standards –**

**They destroy engagement – predictable stasis ensures research accessibility and negative ground. Even if public policy isn’t the best focus for activism, it’s crucial for dialogue because it’s grounded in consistent reporting and academic work.**

**Two impacts -**

**1] Changing the topic post facto structurally favors the aff by manipulating balance of prep – vote neg because debate is a competitive game that’s meaningless without substantive constraints.**

**2] Also key to have well-prepared opponents. Exclusionary rule: They transform debate into a monologue which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subjected to well researched scrutiny.**

**Their model creates a structural disincentive to substantial research. Failure to defend the actor and mechanism of the resolution allows them to shift their advocacy to the terms most favorable to them – causes dogmatism and forces the neg into generics at the margins of the literature – destroys good scholarship.**

**C] Drop the debater on T, we’ve proven in-round abuse – the round is already skewed from the beginning because their advocacy excluded my ability to generate NC offense– letting them sever doesn’t solve any of the abuse**

**Theory is an issue of competing interpretations because reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters will exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.**

**Independently, extra-topicality is a voting issue – lets them infinitely spike out of disads/cps and kills predictability**

**Filter their impacts through predictable testability and model comparison---debate inherently judges relative truth value by whether or not it gets answered---a combination of a less predictable case neg, the burden of rejoinder, and them starting a speech ahead will always inflate the value of their impacts, which makes non-arbitrarily weighing whether they should have read the 1ac in the first place impossible within the structure of a debate round so even if we lose framework, vote neg on presumption. They also create a moral hazard that leads to affs only about individual self-care so even if you think this aff is answerable, the ones they incentivize are not, so assume the worst possible affirmative when weighing our impacts.**

**2**

**Interp: The affirmative must disclose the plan text and advantage area 30 minutes before the round**

**violation –**

A screenshot of a phone

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

**1] Clash – having no idea what the debate will be about makes being neg impossible – the aff gets plan text choice and infinite prep to craft the most strategic case. No disclosure makes this impossible to overcome b/c it means the neg only gets 5 mins of prep to answer a strategy that the AFF had 5 months to prep. they’ll say generics, but their model of debate means the neg has no time to cut an update to their generics specific to the AFF and we’ll lose every debate.**

**2] Education – plan text disclosure discourages cheap shot aff’s. If the aff isn’t inherent or easily defeated by 20 minutes of research, it should lose. The neg is entitled to some research time to make sure the AFF is inherent, topical, and controversial. Otherwise bad AFF’s can win on purely surprise factor, which is a bad model b/c it encourages finding the most fringe surprising case possible instead of a well researched and defensible aff.**

**dtd: Their lack of disclosure makes substance irreparable b/c our entire argument is that we couldnt engage**

**use ci – they should have to defend their norm – reasonability is arbitrary and invites intervention and race to the bottom**

**No RVIs – incentivizes theory baiting, illogical, chilling effect**

**Case**

**Cede the political- outright rejection of hegemonic practices means the aff fails, coalitions break down, and hawks seize the political – only engagement solves**

**Mouffe 2009** (Chantal Mouffe is Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, “The Importance of Engaging the State”, *What is Radical Politics Today?*, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pp. 233-7)

The way we envisage social criticism has very important consequences for radical politics. Radical politics today is often characterised in terms of desertion, exodus and refusal to engage with existing institutions. Whereas I believe that radical politics should instead be concerned with building political engagement, through developing competing, antagonistic political claims. My aim here is to highlight the main differences between these two characterisations. The first could roughly be described as ‘critique as withdrawal’; the second as ‘critique as engagement’. I will argue that, ultimately, the problem with the form of radical politics advocated by ‘critique as withdrawal’ is that it has a flawed understanding of the very nature of ‘the political’ itself. Critique as withdrawal The model of social criticism and radical politics put forward by Michel Hardt and Antonio Negri in their books Empire (2000) and Multitude (2004) is a good illustration of ‘critique as withdrawal’. Empire is often referred to as the Communist manifesto for the twenty-first century in academic and activist conferences. In this book, the authors call for a total break with modernity and the elaboration of a postmodern approach. In their view such a break is required because of the crucial transformations of globalisation and the subsequent workers’ struggle experienced by our society during the last decades of the twentieth century. According to Hardt and Negri, these transformations can be broadly summarised in the following way: 1. Sovereignty has taken a new form: there is a new global sovereignty, which Hardt and Negri call ‘Empire’. They argue that this Empire is a new imperialism that replaces the attempt by nation states to extend their own sovereignty beyond their borders. In contrast to old-style imperialism, the current Empire has no territorial centre of power and no fixed boundaries; it is decentred and deterritorialised, progressively incorporating the entire global realm with open, expanding frontiers. 2. This transformation corresponds, they say, to the transformation of the capitalist mode of production. The role of industrial factory labour has been reduced. Priority is instead given to communicative, cooperative and affective labour. In the postmodernisation of the global economy, the creation of wealth tends towards regulating and mediating life itself. It permeates every aspect of our life. The scope of the rule of Empire is social life in its entirety. All aspects of our life are controlled – from the way we work and exchange ideas across international borders, through to how we think about our body image. 3. We are witnessing the passage from a ‘disciplinary society’ to a ‘society of control’ characterised by a new paradigm of power. In the disciplinary society, which corresponds to the first phase of capitalist accumulation, command is constructed through diffuse networks of apparatus. These produce and regulate customs, habits and productive practices with the help of disciplinary institutions like prisons, factories, asylums, hospitals, schools and others. The society of control, in contrast, is a society in which mechanisms of command are less obvious. The society of control is dominated by the many mechanisms of the globalised, postmodern capitalist society, which seek to directly organise the brain and body (from the internet, through to complex global systems of trade). What is directly at stake is the regulation of life itself. This is what they call ‘biopower’. 4. Hardt and Negri produce new terms to help explain this situation. These are ‘mass intellectuality’, ‘immaterial labor’ and ‘general intellect’. The central role previously occupied by the labour-power of mass factory workers in the production of surplus-value is today said to be increasingly filled by intellectual, immaterial and communicative labour-power. For Hardt and Negri, the figure of immaterial labour involved in communication, cooperation and the reproduction of affects occupies an increasingly central position in the schema of capitalist production. 5. A new term is needed to refer to this collective worker that Hardt and Negri call the ‘Multitude’. They believe that the transition to Empire – where territorial state sovereignty is less important – has opened up new possibilities for the liberation of this Multitude. The Multitude have shaped a new form of globalisation, which means that previous systems and structures of exploitation and control, such as the state, are no longer needed. This is why their book Empire is so often referred to as the Communist manifesto of the twenty-first century. According to this manifesto, the creative forces of the Multitude are capable of constructing a counter-empire, of overthrowing the state apparatus of control. The present systems of control are no longer necessary. An alternative political organisation of the global flows of exchange now dominates in this era of globalisation. We can, therefore, get rid of territorial sovereignty because it only serves to oppress our creativity. Hardt and Negri therefore clearly illustrate what I previously called, in my introduction to this chapter, ‘critique as withdrawal’: a refusal to engage with existing institutions. At this point it is worth introducing the work of Paolo Virno to complement the picture. Virno’s analyses in his book Grammar of the Multitude (2004) dovetail in many respects with those of Hardt and Negri. But there are also some significant differences. For instance, he is much less sanguine about the future. While Hardt and Negri have a messianic vision of the role of the Multitude, which will necessarily bring down Empire and establish an ‘Absolute Democracy’, Virno does not. For Virno, the present conditions are not right for a communist future. It is unlikely that the sort of ‘Absolute Democracy’ that Hardt and Negri envisage will actually take place. Instead of seeing the generalisation of immaterial labour as a type of ‘spontaneous communism’ like Hardt and Negri, Virno tends to see post-Fordism as a manifestation of the ‘communism of capital’. Under post-Fordism, consumers pursue different goals, with services responding accordingly. This means that today, for Virno, capitalistic initiatives orchestrate material and cultural conditions for their own benefit. And the role of political action should be to create a sphere of common affairs – which he calls the ‘Republic of the Multitude’ – to challenge this situation. Virno proposes two key terms to describe the type of political action which he thinks is necessary. These are ‘exodus’ and ‘civil disobedience’. And for me, they again illustrate what I call ‘critique as withdrawal’: something which is an important and influential trend in radical politics today because exodus advocates mass defection from the state. This requires the development of a non-state public sphere and a radically new type of democracy. It involves experimenting in new forms of nonrepresentative and extra-parliamentary democracy, organised around leagues, councils and soviets. The Multitude never aspire to transform themselves into a majority. They develop a power that refuses to become government. This is why, according to Virno, civil disobedience needs to be emancipated from the liberal tradition. He does not just want to ignore specific laws if they do not conform to the principles of a given territorial constitution or state. For Virno, like Hardt and Negri, radical disobedience goes much further – it puts the existence of the state itself in question. In both Hardt and Negri, and Virno, there is therefore emphasis upon ‘critique as withdrawal’. They all call for the development of a non-state public sphere. They call for self-organisation, experimentation, non-representative and extra-parliamentary politics. They see forms of traditional representative politics as inherently oppressive. So **they do not seek to engage** with them, in order to challenge them. They seek to get rid of them altogether. This disengagement is, for such influential personalities in radical politics today, the key to every political position in the world. The Multitude must recognise imperial sovereignty itself as the enemy and discover adequate means of subverting its power. Whereas in the disciplinary era I spoke about earlier, sabotage was the fundamental form of political resistance, these authors claim that, today, it should be desertion. It is indeed through desertion, through the evacuation of the places of power, that they think that battles against Empire might be won. Desertion and exodus are, for these important thinkers, a powerful form of class struggle against imperial postmodernity. According to Hardt and Negri, and Virno, radical politics in the past was dominated by the notion of ‘the people’. This was, according to them, a unity, acting with one will. And this unity is linked to the existence of the state. The Multitude, on the contrary, shuns political unity. It is not representable because it is an active self-organising agent that can never achieve the status of a juridical personage. It can never converge in a general will, because the present globalisation of capital and workers’ struggles will not permit this. It is anti-state and anti-popular. Hardt and Negri claim that the Multitude cannot be conceived any more in terms of a sovereign authority that is representative of the people. They therefore argue that new forms of politics, which are non-representative, are needed. They advocate a withdrawal from existing institutions. This is something which characterises much of radical politics today. The emphasis is not upon challenging the state. Radical politics today is often characterised by a mood, a sense and a feeling, that the state itself is inherently the problem. Critique as engagement I will now turn to presenting the way I envisage the form of social criticism best suited to radical politics today. I agree with Hardt and Negri that it is important to understand the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. But I consider that the dynamics of this transition is better apprehended within the framework of the approach outlined in the book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). What I want to stress is that many factors have contributed to this transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, and that it is necessary to recognise its complex nature. My problem with Hardt and Negri’s view is that, by putting so much emphasis on the workers’ struggles, they tend to see this transition as if it was driven by one single logic: the workers’ resistance to the forces of capitalism in the post-Fordist era. They put too much emphasis upon immaterial labour. In their view, capitalism can only be reactive and they refuse to accept the creative role played both by capital and by labour. To put it another way, they deny the positive role of political struggle. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics we use the word ‘hegemony’ to describe the way in which meaning is given to institutions or practices: for example, the way in which a given institution or practice is defined as ‘oppressive to women’, ‘racist’ or ‘environmentally destructive’. We also point out that every hegemonic order is therefore **susceptible to being challenged** by counter-hegemonic practices – feminist, anti-racist, environmentalist, for example. This is illustrated by the plethora of new social movements which presently exist in radical politics today (Christian, anti-war, counter-globalisation, Muslim, and so on). Clearly not all of these are workers’ struggles. In their various ways they have nevertheless attempted to influence and have influenced a new hegemonic order. This means that when we talk about ‘the political’, we do not lose sight of the ever present possibility of heterogeneity and antagonism within society. There are many different ways of being antagonistic to a dominant order in a heterogeneous society – it need not only refer to the workers’ struggles. I submit that it is necessary to introduce this hegemonic dimension when one envisages the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. This means abandoning the view that a single logic (workers’ struggles) is at work in the evolution of the work process; as well as acknowledging the pro-active role played by capital. In order to do this we can find interesting insights in the work of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello who, in their book The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005), bring to light the way in which capitalists manage to use the demands for autonomy of the new movements that developed in the 1960s, harnessing them in the development of the post-Fordist networked economy and transforming them into new forms of control. They use the term ‘artistic critique’ to refer to how the strategies of the counter-culture (the search for authenticity, the ideal of selfmanagement and the anti-hierarchical exigency) were used to promote the conditions required by the new mode of capitalist regulation, replacing the disciplinary framework characteristic of the Fordist period. From my point of view, what is interesting in this approach is that it shows how an important dimension of the transition from Fordism to postFordism involves rearticulating existing discourses and practices in new ways. It allows us to visualise the transition from Fordism to postFordism in terms of a hegemonic intervention. To be sure, Boltanski and Chiapello never use this vocabulary, but their analysis is a clear example of what Gramsci called ‘hegemony through neutralisation’ or ‘passive revolution’. This refers to a situation where demands which challenge the hegemonic order are recuperated by the existing system, which is achieved by satisfying them in a way that **neutralises their subversive potential**. When we apprehend the transition from Fordism to postFordism within such a framework, we can understand it as a hegemonic move by capital to re-establish its leading role and restore its challenged legitimacy. We did not witness a revolution, in Marx’s sense of the term. Rather, there have been many different interventions, challenging dominant hegemonic practices. It is clear that, once we envisage social reality in terms of ‘hegemonic’ and ‘counter-hegemonic’ practices, radical politics is not about withdrawing completely from existing institutions. Rather, we have no other choice but to engage with hegemonic practices, in order to challenge them. This is crucial; otherwise we will be faced with a chaotic situation. Moreover, if we do not engage with and challenge the existing order, if we instead choose to simply escape the state completely, we leave the door open **for others to take** control of systems of **authority** and regulation. Indeed there are many historical (and not so historical) examples of this. When the Left shows little interest, Right-wing and authoritarian **groups are only too happy to take over the state**. The strategy of exodus could be seen as the reformulation of the idea of communism, as it was found in Marx. There are many points in common between the two perspectives. To be sure, for Hardt and Negri it is no longer the proletariat, but the Multitude which is the privileged political subject. But in both cases the state is seen as a monolithic apparatus of domination that cannot be transformed. It has to ‘wither away’ in order to leave room for a reconciled society beyond law, power and sovereignty. In reality, as I’ve already noted, others are often perfectly willing to take control. If my approach – supporting new social movements and counterhegemonic practices – has been called ‘post-Marxist’ by many, it is precisely because I have challenged the very possibility of such a reconciled society. To acknowledge the ever present possibility of antagonism to the existing order implies recognising that heterogeneity cannot be eliminated. As far as politics is concerned, this means the need to envisage it in terms of a hegemonic struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects attempting to incarnate the universal and to define the symbolic parameters of social life. A successful hegemony fixes the meaning of institutions and social practices and defines the ‘common sense’ through which a given conception of reality is established. However, such a result is **always contingent**, precarious and susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic interventions. Politics always takes place in a field **criss-crossed by antagonisms**. A properly political intervention is always one that engages with a certain aspect of the existing hegemony. It can never be merely oppositional or conceived as desertion, because it aims to challenge the existing order, so that it may reidentify and feel more comfortable with that order. Another important aspect of a hegemonic politics lies in establishing linkages between various demands (such as environmentalists, feminists, anti-racist groups), so as to transform them into claims that will challenge the existing structure of power relations. This is a further reason why critique involves engagement, rather than disengagement. It is clear that the different demands that exist in our societies are often in conflict with each other. This is why they need to be **articulated politically**, which obviously involves the creation of **a collective will**, a ‘we’. This, in turn, requires the determination of a ‘them’. This obvious and simple point is missed by the various advocates of the Multitude. For they seem to believe that the Multitude possesses a natural unity which does not need political articulation. Hardt and Negri see ‘the People’ as homogeneous and expressed in a unitary general will, rather than divided by different political conflicts. Counter-hegemonic practices, by contrast, do not eliminate differences. Rather, they are what could be called an ‘ensemble of differences’, all coming together, only at a given moment, against a common adversary. Such as when different groups from many backgrounds come together to protest against a war perpetuated by a state, or when environmentalists, feminists, anti-racists and others come together to challenge dominant models of development and progress. In these cases, the adversary cannot be defined in broad general terms like ‘Empire’, or for that matter ‘Capitalism’. It is instead contingent upon the particular circumstances in question – the specific states, international institutions or governmental practices that are to be challenged. Put another way, the construction of political demands is dependent upon the specific relations of power that need to be targeted and transformed, in order to create the conditions for a new hegemony. This is clearly not an exodus from politics. It is not ‘critique as withdrawal’, but ‘critique as engagement’. It is a ‘war of position’ that needs to be launched, often across a range of sites, involving the coming together of a range of interests. This can only be done by establishing links between social movements, political parties and trade unions, for example. The aim is to create a common bond and collective will, engaging with a wide range of sites, and often institutions, with the aim of transforming them. This, in my view, is how we should conceive the nature of radical politics.

**Debate turns communication or they link**

**Fiat and scenario analysis are good -- apocalyptic images challenge dominant power structures by contesting the implausibility that inequitable structures can produce catastrophe and generates the imagination to create futures of social justice outside of current narratives**

Jessica **Hurley 17**, Assistant Professor in the Humanities at the University of Chicago, “Impossible Futures: Fictions of Risk in the Longue Durée”, Duke University Press, https://read.dukeupress.edu/american-literature/article/89/4/761/132823/Impossible-Futures-Fictions-of-Risk-in-the-Longue

If contemporary ecocriticism has a shared premise about environmental risk it is that genre is the key to both perceiving and, possibly, correcting ecological crisis. Frederick Buell’s 2003 From Apocalypse to Way of Life: Environmental Crisis in the American Century has established one of the most central oppositions of this paradigm. As his title suggests, Buell tells the story of a discourse that began in the apocalyptic mode in the 1960s and 70s, when discussions of “the immanent end of nature” most commonly took the form of “prophecy, revelation, climax, and extermination” before turning away from apocalypse when the prophesied ends failed to arrive (112, 78). Buell offers his suggestion for the appropriate literary mode for life lived within a crisis that is both unceasing and inescapable: new voices, “if wise enough….will abandon apocalypse for a sadder realism that looks closely at social and environmental changes in process and recognizes crisis as a place where people dwell” (202-3). In a world of threat, Buell demands a realism that might help us see risks more clearly and aid our survival.¶ Buell’s argument has become a broadly held view in contemporary risk theory and ecocriticism, overlapping fields in the social sciences and humanities that address the foundational question of second modernity: “how do you live when you are at such risk?” (Woodward 2009, 205).1 Such an assertion, however, assumes both that realism is a neutral descriptive practice and that apocalypse is not something that is happening now in places that we might not see, or cannot hear. This essay argues for the continuing importance of apocalyptic narrative forms in representations of environmental risk to disrupt conservative realisms that maintain the status quo. Taking the ecological disaster of nuclear waste as my case study, I examine two fictional treatments of nuclear waste dumps that create different temporal structures within which the colonial history of the United States plays out. The first, a set of Department of Energy documents that use statistical modeling and fictional description to predict a set of realistic futures for the site of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico (1991), creates a present that is fully knowable and a future that is fully predictable. Such an approach, I suggest, perpetuates the state logics of **implausibility** that have long undergirded settler colonialism in the United States. In contrast, Leslie Marmon Silko’s contemporaneous novel Almanac of the Dead (1991) uses its apocalyptic form to deconstruct the claims to verisimilitude that undergird state realism, transforming nuclear waste into a prophecy of the end of the United States rather than a means for imagining its continuation. In Almanac of the Dead, the presence of nuclear waste introjects a deep-time perspective into contemporary America, transforming the present into a **speculative space** where environmental catastrophe produces not only **unevenly distributed damage** but also revolutionary forms of social justice that insist on a truth that probability modeling cannot contain: that the future will be **unimaginably different** from the present, while the present, too, might yet be utterly different from the real that we think we know.¶ Nuclear waste is rarely treated in ecocriticism or risk theory, for several reasons: it is too manmade to be ecological; its catastrophes are ongoing, intentionally produced situations rather than sudden disasters; and it does not support the narrative that subtends ecocritical accounts of risk perception in which the nuclear threat gives rise to an awareness of other kinds of threat before reaching the end of its relevance at the end of the Cold War.2 In what follows, I argue that the failure of nuclear waste to fit into the critical frames created by ecocriticism and risk theory to date offers an opportunity to expand those frames and overcome some of their limitations, especially the impulse towards a paranoid, totalizing realism that Peter van Wyck (2005) has described as central to ecocriticism in the risk society. Nuclear waste has durational forms that dwarf the human. It therefore dwells less in the economy of risk as it is currently conceptualized and more in the blown-out realm of deep time. Inhabiting the temporal scale that has recently been christened the Anthropocene, the geological era defined by the impact of human activities on the world’s geology and climate, nuclear waste unsettles any attempt at realist description, unveiling the limits of human imagination at every turn.3 By analyzing risk society through a heuristic of nuclear waste, this essay offers a critique of nuclear colonialism and environmental racism. At the same time, it shows how the apocalyptic mode in deep time allows narratives of environmental harm and danger to move beyond the paranoid logic of risk. In the world of deep time, all that might come to pass will come to pass, sooner or later. The endless maybes of risk become certainties. The impossibilities of our own deaths and the deaths of everything else will come. But so too will other impossibilities: talking macaws and alien visitors; the end of the colonial occupation of North America, perhaps, or a **sudden human determination** to let the world live. The end of capitalism may yet become more thinkable than the end of the world. Just wait long enough. Stranger things will happen.¶

**IR scenario analysis unlocks an intellectual openness to overcome cognitive biases and incorporate complementary theories while making research policy-relevant**

**Sus 20**—Postdoctoral Fellow at the Hertie School of Governance and works in the Dahrendorf Forum, which is a joint initiative by the Hertie School, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Stiftung Mercator [Monika Sus and Marcel Hadeed (Dahrendorf Research Associate at the Hertie School of Governance), February 2020, “Theory-infused and policy-relevant: On the usefulness of scenario analysis for international relations”, Contemporary Security Policy, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library] AMarb

Added-**value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship**

As Tomé and Açıkalın (2019) point out, in order to **fill the gap** between **IR theory** and **real-world problems**, “an increasing number of scholars have come to embrace a spirit of **intellectual openness**, recognizing both the need for **greater flexibility** in the **theoretical formulations** and the **possibility of complementarity** by **other theories** and approaches” (p. 12). This section discusses the added value of scenario analysis as a **complementary approach** to **traditional IR methods**. The most obvious advantage of **scenario analysis as a methodology**, grounded in the reservoir of foresight studies, lies by definition in its ability to **tackle future events**. As mentioned before, there are no specified instruments within traditional IR methods which would allow scholars to go beyond past and present. The only exception is forecasting, one of the formal methods in IR, which is, however, distinctly different from foresight.

The underlying logic of forecasting is to provide predictions about the future by drawing on mathematical models and big data-sets based on known patterns. Thus, it is not particularly suitable to accommodate discontinuities. Foresight, as described above, aims at going beyond existing patterns by developing alternative futures based on an innovative combination of multiple driving forces. Its goal is to capture a set of possible futures and learn from them by examining the causal relations between driving forces and their different evolutions. By applying scenario approaches, scholars can thus account for evolving dynamics and discuss such timely issues as the consequences of Brexit for both British and EU-security, economics and politics (Brakman, Garretsen, & Kohl, 2018; Martill & Sus, 2018; Musolff, 2017; Verschueren, 2017; Ziv et al., 2018). Yet, scenario analysis offers more than the possibility to talk about the future. We see a fourfold merit of adding scenario analysis to the range of methods applied by IR scholars.

Confronting enduring assumptions

As we presented in the previous section, the main feature of explorative scenarios, which are the subject of this paper, is to **stimulate creative thinking** by **challenging** the **deeply held assumptions of their authors**. In other words, this method is helpful for **overcoming** enduring **cognitive biases**—mental errors such as **linearity**, **presentism**, and **group think** caused by the **subconscious** and **simplified information processing of humans** (Heuer, 1999, pp. 111– 112). Humans have the tendencies to focus on the present at the expense of the future and to think about the future in linear terms by extrapolating past trends into the future. As Gaddis (1992) points out, “we tend to bias our historical and our theoretical analyses too much toward continuity (…) we rarely find a way to introduce **discontinuities into theory**, or to attempt to determine what causes them to happen” (p. 52). Even if Gaddis does not explicitly mention scenarios, he refers to the concepts underlying scenario approaches (Han, 2011, p. 51). Scenario analysis attends to “**deeper**, otherwise left **implicit**, **assumptions** about **continuous** and **linear patterns of development**” (Wilkinson et al., 2013, p. 707). The **process of scenario development** invites the participants to **reveal** and **question convictions** which have **so far remained unchallenged**, and to **question the linearity of world developments**.

The ability of **reexamining one’s own assumptions** and going **beyond linear patterns** of development is **essential** for **IR scholarship**. To illustrate it with two examples: IR scholars and historians did not think that the Soviet Union could collapse and were startled by its fall, the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the transformation of the bipolar system (Davis, 2005; Gaddis, 1992). In a similar vein, United States scholars were for decades so convinced of China’s economic, political, and cultural limitations that they neglected the possibility of its sudden ascent and were taken by surprise when it happened (Hundley, Kenzer, & Peterson, 2015). Interestingly, since the rise of China became evident, the United States debate on its future has been marked by a similar linearity of thought, leading to single-outcome predictions of China’s long-term future (Kerbel, 2004). In both cases, the discipline proved incapable of anticipating events of such importance, because scholars took for granted the status quo instead of confronting their bias towards linearity and detect manifestations of upcoming change. As a result, two major geopolitical surprises—the end of the Cold War and the rise of China have at first been neglected, forcing academia to catch up.

Against this backdrop, foresight helps IR scholars to **exit** the **tunnel vision** on world affairs and discover potentially valuable nonlinear lines of development. These can be both **innovative** in terms of **scholarship**, and **policy-relevant** by offering a **reflection** on **unexpected discontinuities**. Thus, it can facilitate the **intellectual capability** to **think the unthinkable** (Porter, 2016, p. 259).

Bringing forward new research questions

Scenario analysis starts with **confronting one’s enduring assumptions** and **developing multiple causal possibilities**, through which scholars can potentially discover topics that have not been examined before. One of the greatest challenges for any scholar is to identify innovative venues for research that might bring the discipline forward and advance publicity for one’s work. In Lakatosian terms, such an ability is often considered an evidence of a progressive research program.10 Since the prime feature of scenario analysis is to **detect rapid and significant shifts** in **trajectories**, or the **forces behind them**, this method succors when defining new pressing topics for academia. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, scenario analysis enables the detection of both weak signals and wild cards. By drawing attention to these hitherto overlooked but potentially pressing issues, scenario analysis can identify research agendas for **further investigation** (Barma et al., 2016). Therefore, scenario analysis seems to be the right tool to **advance innovative research** since it helps scholars **drive their research into new areas**, away from moribund topics that have been followed for many decades. By “identifying questions of likely future significance” (Barma et al., 2016, p. 6), scenario analysis can contribute to combatting the proliferation of researchers in fields occupying the political status quo, such as Soviet or Japan studies in the United States in the 1980s. At the same time, innovative research topics **confront the uncertainties** that are **crucial for policymakers** to be monitored closely.

Dealing with the complexity and interdisciplinarity of real-world issues

Another added value of the scenario analysis for IR scholarship lies in its ability to provide **comprehensive causal reasoning** and thus to **tackle complex issues**. As mentioned in the introduction, the **world’s complexity** combined with **abrupt shifts** poses a challenge for IR scholarship. The possibility to **accommodate multiple driving forces**, to **take into account different values** they might take and finally to **combine them with each other** and **see how they affect the dependent variable**, makes the scenario approach quite unique. Traditional IR methods work with a limited number of independent variables, formulate and test hypotheses usually based on the relation between a single causal variable and the dependent variable. Investigating complex causal trajectories is therefore not possible. Against this background, we agree with Barma et al. (2016) and his colleagues who argue that **scenarios are highly apt** for **dealing with complexity** and **uncertainty** and providing academia with a tool for “**actionable clarity** in **understanding contemporary global issues**” (p. 1).

Moreover, the scenario approach helps to tackle the challenges of interdisciplinarity that is tied to complexity. By drawing on the active participation of people from different disciplines, backgrounds, and with different expertise in the scenario development process, it brings interdisciplinarity to the table by default. The key advantage of the approach is that this interdisciplinary conversation takes place prior to and during the research phase, rather than after it. This distinguishes the scenario approach from other methods that bring interdisciplinary perspectives together but do not facilitate a discussion between them, rather letting them passively co-exist. By exploring the dynamics between seemingly unrelated vectors of change (key drivers), scenario analysis can be useful for shedding light on developments that would have been overlooked by narrower research designs. In **security studies**, for example, scenario analysis can **connect the dots** between hard, soft, traditional and non-traditional understandings of security and capture the **interplay of economic-societalenvironmental** and **technological changes**. Imposing interdisciplinarity also helps to **counter** the “**hyper-fragmentation of knowledge**” that “makes it difficult for even scholars in different disciplines to understand each other, much less policy-makers and general public” (Desch, 2015, p. 381).

Complex real-world issues that were tackled using scenario analysis include the Israel-Palestine conflict (Stein et al., 1998), Turkey’s geopolitical environment (Çelik & Blum, 2007), the prospects of the United States– China conflict (Friedberg, 2005) and the consequences of Brexit for EU foreign and security policy (Martill & Sus, 2018). An examination of these topics without the application of interdisciplinary approaches would not be possible precisely due to their multifaceted character.

Stepping out of the ivory tower

Finally, scenario analysis also enables **IR scholars** to **establish** a **channel of communication with policy-makers** other than conducting interviews for their own research or providing ad-hoc consultations. A participatory scenario process forges “**deep and shared understanding** between its participants” (Ramírez & Wilkinson, 2016, p. 21). In scenario workshops, academics and policy-makers work together, confront their world visions and assumptions and arrive at an agreement upon which they develop narratives for alternative futures. Hence, scenario analysis can be perceived as a tool towards **more exchange between academia and policy-making** that can contribute to a **better understanding between the two** worlds. For policymakers, it provides the opportunity to consider **long-term trends** (an occasion not often found in the day-to-day nature of politics). For academics, it provides insight into which trends are most concerning for policy-makers, allowing them to check and ultimately enhance the **relevance of their research agendas**.

We acknowledge the difficulty to engage policy-makers in foresight exercises caused by their time-constrains and possible lack of interest. Yet, in our experience, this problem mostly refers to high-level policy-makers. Mid-level and former officials and policy-makers have more time and willingness to participate in foresight exercises and contribute equally valuable perspectives. The participatory character of foresight exercises facilitates the exchange of views from different stakeholders on an equal level. In our case, as the evaluation has shown, it has proven to be stimulating for each of the engaged groups.

Moreover, the **policy dialogue** benefits from **scenarios’ accessibility** to a **broader audience**. Scenario publications tend to be shorter and easier to read than the average academic publication and as Nye (2008) rightly notes “a premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures” of academia and policy-making. Since scenario publications are **more suitable** to the **time- and attention-constraints** of many policy-makers, they improve the accessibility of research findings for the policy world (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). An illustrative example is offered by a foresight exercise conducted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in 2017. A group of academics, think tank experts and policy-makers developed scenarios on the future of the liberal world order that served as raw material for a newspaper from the future titled “The Aspen Insight” and dated October 21, 2025. Not only did the presentation of the newspaper catch the attention of many Berlin-based policy-makers but the “The Aspen Insight” was also attached as a supplement to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, and reached more than 300,000 readers.11

We acknowledge that the four aspects of the added value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship are interrelated and that their boundaries are not clear-cut. Yet, we believe, they highlight distinct benefits of this approach for academics that want to **tackle the challenges of today’s world via their research**.

**Nuanced debates about the necessity of internationalism lock in deep engagement---the public is primed to ignore the benefits of great-power peace in favor of shallow indictments of its cost.**

---Card is the 5th of a list of things to help heg ---- here are the other 4

1. Sustain grand strategy
2. Fund/maintain primacy
3. Sustain alliances
4. Use relative restraint

**Brands 18** [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 21-23]

Fifth and finally, sustaining America’s post–Cold War strategy entails **persuading the American public** to **recommit** to that strategy and the investments it requires. The state of American opinion on that subject is currently ambiguous. Polling data indicates that public support for most key aspects of American internationalism has recovered somewhat from where it was in 2012–13, and is again at or near postwar averages.32 But the 2016 election cycle and its eventual outcome revealed **strong support** for candidates who advocated **rolling back key elements of post–Cold War (**and post–World War II) **grand strategy**, from free trade to U.S. alliances. This atmosphere reflects **discontent** with the **failures** and **frustrations** of U.S. grand strategy in the post–Cold War era, no doubt, yet it also reflects the fact that American strategy seems at risk of becoming a **victim of its own success**.33 By helping to foster a comparatively stable and congenial environment, American policies have made it more difficult for Americans to **remember** why **significant investments in the global order are needed** in the first place.

Today, this **ambivalence** is becoming increasingly **problematic**, for the simple reason that properly resourcing American strategy requires making politically difficult trade-offs with respect to entitlements and other ballooning domestic costs. It is also becoming problematic, of course, because even if the American public seems to support particular aspects of American grand strategy, the **public** has shown itself **willing to elect a president who appears to care little** for the successful postwar and post–Cold War tradition, even if he has, so far, maintained more aspects of that tradition as president than his campaign rhetoric might have led one to expect. In the future—and indeed, looking beyond Trump’s presidency— sustaining American grand strategy will thus require more **intensive political efforts**.

American leaders will need to more effectively make the case for **controversial** but **broadly beneficial policies** such as **free trade**, while also addressing the inevitable socioeconomic dislocations such policies cause.34 They will need to more fully articulate the **underlying logic** and **value of alliances** and other **commitments** whose costs are often more **visible—not to say greater—than their benefits.** They will need to remind Americans that their country’s leadership has not been a **matter of charity**; it has helped produce an international order that is exceptional in its stability, liberalism, and benefits for the United States. Not least, they will need to make the case that the **costs that the country has** borne in support of that order are designed to avoid the necessity of bearing **vastly higher costs if the international scene returned to a more tumultuous state**. After all, the success of American statecraft is often reflected in the **bad things** that **don’t happen** as well as in the **good things that do.** Making this point is **essential to reconsolidating domestic support now and in the future**—and to **preserving a grand strategy** that has delivered **pretty good results for a quarter century**.

**Militarization of space is good –**

**US REM mining is key to beat China and protect against Chinese REM gatekeeping**

Stavridis 21 [(James, retired US Navy admiral, chief international diplomacy and national security analyst for NBC News, senior fellow at JHU Applied Physics Library, PhD in Law and Diplomacy from Tufts) “U.S. Needs a Strong Defense Against China’s Rare-Earth Weapon,” Bloomberg Opinion, March 4, 2021, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-04/u-s-needs-a-strong-defense-against-china-s-rare-earth-weapon>] TDI

You could be forgiven if you are confused about what’s going on with rare-earth elements. On the one hand, news reports indicate that China may increase production quotas of the minerals this quarter as a [goodwill gesture](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3122501/china-raises-rare-earth-quotas-goodwill-trade-signal-us) to the Joe Biden administration. But other sources say that China may ultimately ban the export of the rare earths altogether on “[security concerns](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-19/china-may-ban-rare-earth-technology-exports-on-security-concerns?sref=QYxyklwO).” What’s really going on here?

There are 17 elements considered [rare earths](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-16/why-rare-earths-are-achilles-heal-for-europe-u-s-quicktake) — lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium — and while many aren’t actually rare in terms of global deposits, extracting them is difficult and expensive. They are used across high-tech manufacturing, including smartphones, fighter aircraft and components in virtually all advanced electronics. Of particular note, they are essential to many of the clean-energy technologies expected to come online in this decade.

I began to focus on rare-earth elements when I commanded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence in Afghanistan, known as the International Security Assistance Force. While Afghans live in an extremely poor country, [studies](https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/afghanistans-mineral-resources-are-a-lost-opportunity-and-a-threat/) have assessed that they sit atop $1 trillion to $3 trillion in a wide variety of minerals, including rare earths. Some [estimates](https://www.fraserinstitute.org/article/afghanistans-rare-earth-element-bonanza) put the rare-earth levels alone at 1.4 million metric tons.

But every time I tried to visit a mining facility, the answer I got from my security team was, “It’s too dangerous right now, admiral.” Unfortunately, despite a great deal of effort by the U.S. and NATO, those security challenges remain, deterring the large foreign-capital investments necessary to harvest the lodes. Which brings us back to Beijing.

China controls roughly 80% of the rare-earths market, between what it mines itself and processes in raw material from elsewhere. If it decided to wield the weapon of restricting the supply — something it has repeatedly [threatened](https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-trade-fight-raises-specter-of-rare-earth-shortage-11559304000) to do — it would create a significant challenge for manufacturers and a geopolitical predicament for the industrialized world.

It could happen. In 2010, Beijing threatened to cut off exports to Japan over the disputed Senkaku Islands. Two years ago, Beijing was reportedly considering restrictions on exports to the U.S. generally, as well as against specific companies (such as defense giant Lockheed Martin Corp.) that it deemed in violation of its policies against selling advanced weapons to Taiwan.

President Donald Trump’s administration issued an executive order to spur the production of rare earths domestically, and created an [Energy Resource Governance Initiative](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Energy-Resource-Governance-Initiative-ERGI-Fact-Sheet.pdf) to promote international mining. The European Union and Japan, among others, are also aggressively seeking newer sources of rare earths.

Given this tension, it was superficially surprising that China announced it would boost its mining quotas in the first quarter of 2021 by nearly 30%, reflecting a continuation in strong (and rising) demand. But the increase occurs under a shadow of uncertainty, as the Chinese Communist Party is undertaking a “review” of its policies concerning future sales of rare earths. In all probability, the tactics of the increase are temporary, and fit within a larger strategy.

China will go to great lengths to maintain overall control of the global rare-earths supply. This fits neatly within the geo-economic approach of the [One Belt, One Road](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-30/china-is-determined-to-reshape-the-globe) initiative, which seeks to use a variety of carrots and sticks — economic, trade, diplomatic and security — to create zones of influence globally. In terms of rare earths, the strategy seems to be allowing carefully calibrated access to the elements at a level that makes it economically less attractive for competitors to undertake costly exploration and mining operations. This is similar to the oil-market strategy used by Russia and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries for decades.

Some free-market advocates believe that China will not take aggressive action choking off supply because that could [precipitate retaliation](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-02-22/china-weaponizing-rare-earths-technology-will-probably-backfire) or accelerate the search for alternate sources in global markets. What seems more likely is a series of targeted shutdowns directed against specific entities such as U.S. defense companies, Japanese consumer electronics makers, or European industrial concerns that have offended Beijing.

The path to rare-earth independence for the U.S. must include: Ensuring supply chains of rare earths necessary for national security; promoting the exploitation of the elements domestically (and removing barriers to responsibly doing so); mandating that defense contractors and other critical-infrastructure entities wean themselves off Chinese rare earths; sponsoring research and development to find alternative materials, especially for clean energy technology; and creating a substantial stockpile of the elements in case of a Chinese boycott.

This is a bipartisan agenda. The Trump administration’s [strategic assessment](https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/06/department-commerce-releases-report-critical-minerals) of what needs to be done (which goes beyond just 17 rare earths to include a total of 35 critical minerals) is thoughtful, and should serve as a basis for the Biden administration and Congress.

**REM access key to military primacy and tech advancement – alternatives fail**

Trigaux 12 (David, University Honors Program University of South Florida St. Petersburg) “The US, China and Rare Earth Metals: The Future Of Green Technology, Military Tech, and a Potential Achilles‟ Heel to American Hegemony,” USF St. Petersberg, May 2, 2012, <https://digital.stpetersburg.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1132&context=honorstheses>] TDI

The implications of a rare earth shortage aren’t strictly related to the environment, and energy dependence, but have distinct military implications as well that could threaten the position of the United States world’s strongest military. The United States place in the world was assured by powerful and decisive deployments in World War One and World War Two. Our military expansion was built upon a large, powerful industrial base that created more, better weapons of war for our soldiers. During the World Wars, a well-organized draft that sent millions of men into battle in a short amount of time proved decisive, but as the war ended, and soldiers drafted into service returned to civilian life, the U.S. technological superiority over its opponents provided it with sustained dominance over its enemies, even as the numerical size of the army declined. New technologies, such as the use of the airplane in combat, rocket launched missiles, radar systems, and later, GPS, precision guided missiles, missile defense systems, high tech tanks, lasers, and other technologies now make the difference between victory and defeat.

The United States military now serves many important functions, deterring threats across the world. The United States projects its power internationally, through a network of bases and allied nations. Thus, the United States is a powerful player in all regions of the world, and often serves as a buffer against conflict in these regions. US military presence serves as a buffer against Chinese military modernization in Eastern Asia, against an increasingly nationalist Russia in Europe, and smaller regional actors, such as Venezuela in South America and Iran in the Middle East. The U.S. Navy is deployed all over the world, as the guarantor of international maritime trade routes. The US Navy leads action against challenges to its maritime sovereignty on the other side of the globe, such as current action against Somali piracy. Presence in regions across the world prevents escalation of potential crisis. These could result in either a larger power fighting a smaller nation or nations (Russia and Georgia, Taiwan and China), religious opponents (Israel and Iran), or traditional foes (Ethiopia and Eretria, Venezuela and Colombia, India and Pakistan). US projection is also key deterring emerging threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation. While not direct challenges to US primacy, both terrorism and nuclear proliferation can kill thousands.

The US Air Force has a commanding lead over the rest of the world, in terms of both numbers and capabilities. American ground forces have few peers, and are unmatched in their ability to deploy to anywhere in the world at an equally unmatched pace.

The only perceived challenge to the United States militarily comes from the People’s Republic of China.76 While the United States outspends all other nations in the world put together in terms of military spending, China follows as a close second, and has begun an extensive modernization program to boot.77 The Chinese military however, is several decades behind the United States in air power and nuclear capabilities.78 To compensate, China has begun the construction of access-denial technology, preventing the US from exercising its dominance in China’s sphere of influence.79 Chinese modernization efforts have a serious long-term advantage over the United States; access to rare earth metals, and a large concentration of rare earth chemists doing research.80 This advantage, coupled with the U.S. losing access to rare earth metals, will even the odds much quicker than policymakers had previously anticipated. 81

The largest example is US airpower. With every successive generation of military aircraft, the U.S. Air Force becomes more and more dependent on Rare Earth Metals.82 As planes get faster and faster, they have to get lighter and lighter, while adding weight from extra computers and other features on board.83 To lighten the weight of the plane, scandium is used to produce lightweight aluminum alloys for the body of the plane. Rare Earth metals are also useful in fighter jet engines, and fuel cells.84 For example, rare earths are required to producing miniaturized fins, and samarium is required to build the motors for the F-35 fighter jet.85 F-35 jets are the next generation fighter jet that works together to form the dual plane combination that cements U.S. dominance in air power over the Russian PAK FA.86

Rare earth shortages don’t just affect air power, also compromising the navigation system of Abrams Tanks, which need samarium cobalt magnets. The Abrams Tank is the primary offensive mechanized vehicle in the U.S. arsenal. The Aegis Spy 1 Radar also uses samarium.87 Many naval ships require neodymium. Hell Fire missiles, satellites, night vision goggles, avionics, and precision guided munitions all require rare earth metals. 88

American military superiority is based on technological advancement that outstrips the rest of the world. Command and control technology allows the U.S. to fight multiple wars at once and maintain readiness for other issues, as well as have overwhelming force against rising challengers. This technology helps the U.S. know who, where, and what is going to attack them, and respond effectively, regardless of the source of the threat.

Rare Earth Elements make this technological superiority possible.

To make matters worse, the defense industrial base is often a single market industry, dependent on government contracts for its business. If China tightens the export quotas further, major US defense contractors will be in trouble.89 Every sector of the defense industrial base is dependent on rare earth metals. Without rare earths, these contractors can’t build anything, which collapses the industry.90

Rare Earth shortages are actually already affecting our military, with shortages of lanthanum, cerium, europium and gadolinium happening in the status quo. This prevents us not only from building the next generation of high tech weaponry, but also from constructing more of the weapons and munitions that are needed in the status quo. As current weapon systems age and they can’t be replaced, the US primacy will be undermined. Of special concern is that U.S. domestic mining doesn’t produce “heavy” rare earth metals that are needed for many advanced components of military technologies. Given the nature of many military applications, substitutions aren’t possible. 91

**Primacy and allied commitments solve arms races and great power war – unipolarity is sustainable, and prevents power vacuums and global escalation**

Brands 18 [(Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump," Page 129-133]

Since World War II, the United States has had a military **second to none**. Since the Cold War, America has **committed** to having **overwhelming military primacy**. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6

From the early 1990s, for example, the United **S**tates consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained **peerless global power-projection capabilities**.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas **strategic regions**—**Europe, East Asia, the Middle East**. From **thrashing Saddam** Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power **superior** to anything a **regional rival** could employ even **on its own geopolitical doorstep.**

This **military dominance** has constituted the **hard-power backbone** of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the **unstable multipolarity** of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing **liberal political values** and an open international **economy**, and to **suppressing** international scourges such as **rogue states**, **nuclear proliferation**, and catastrophic **terrorism**. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the **centrality** of military preponderance.

Washington would **need** the **military power** necessary to **underwrite** worldwide **alliance commitments**. It would have to preserve **substantial overmatch** versus any potential **great-power rival.** It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global **norms** generally reflect **hard-power realities**, America would need the superiority to assure that its own **values remained ascendant**. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “**strengths beyond challenge**,” but it was not at all inaccurate.

American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap.

Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. **Alliances** would **lose credibility**; the stability of key **regions** would be **eroded**; **rivals would be emboldened**; **international crises would go unaddressed**. American primacy was thus like a **reasonably priced insurance policy**. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled.

THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by **remarkably low levels of great-power competition,** high levels of **security** in key theaters such as **Europe** and **East Asia**, and the **comparative weakness** of those “**rogue” actors**—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, **the strategic horizon is darkening**, due to four factors.

First, **great-power military competition is back**. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—**China** and **Russia**—are seeking **regional hegemony**, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the **military punch** to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military **modernization** emphasizing **nuclear weapons**, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a **buildup of historic proportions,** with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of **power-projection** and antiaccess/area denial (A2/**AD) tools** necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a **far more competitive environment.**

**Pursuit inevitable---decline causes global war**

**Beckley 15** (Michael Beckley is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs., “The Myth of Entangling Alliances Michael Beckley Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts”, <http://live.belfercenter.org/files/IS3904_pp007-048.pdf>)

The finding that U.S. entanglement is rare **has important implications for international relations scholarship** and U.S. foreign policy. For scholars, **it casts doubt on classic theories of imperial overstretch** in which great powers exhaust their resources by accumulating allies that free ride on their protection and embroil them in military quagmires.22 The U.S. experience instead suggests that **great powers can dictate the terms of their security commitments and that allies often help their great power protectors avoid strategic overextension.**

For policy, the rarity of U.S. entanglement suggests that the United States’ current grand strategy of deep engagement, which is centered on a network of standing alliances, does not preclude, and may even facilitate, U.S. **military restraint**. Since 1945 the United States has been, by some measures, the most militarily active state in the world. The most egregious cases of U.S. overreach, however, **have stemmed not from entangling** alliances, but from the penchant of American leaders **to define national interests expansively**, to overestimate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention. Scrapping alliances will not correct these bad habits. In fact, disengaging from alliances may unleash the **U**nited **S**tates **to intervene recklessly** abroad while **leaving it without partners** to share the burden **when those interventions go awry**.