**1NC**

**T**

**Interpretation: the affirmative may only garner offense from the hypothetical enactment of the resolution.**

**“Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum**

**Army Officer School 4** (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation—The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

**Definition of medicines**

**MRS 20** [(MAINE REVENUE SERVICE SALES, FUEL & SPECIAL TAX DIVISION) “A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE SALES AND USE TAX LAW” <https://www.maine.gov/revenue/sites/maine.gov.revenue/files/inline-files/Reference%20Guide%202020.pdf> December 2020] SS

[Medicines](https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/medicines) means antibiotics, analgesics, antipyretics, stimulants, sedatives, antitoxins, anesthetics, antipruritics, hormones, antihistamines, certain “dermal fillers” (such as BoTox®), injectable contrast agents, vitamins, oxygen, **vaccines and other substances that are used in the prevention, diagnosis or treatment of disease or injury and that eithe**r (1) require a prescription in order to be purchased or administered to the retail consumer or patient; or (2) are sold in packaging

**Definition of WTO**

**Investopedia ND** https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/wto.asp

What Is the World Trade Organization (WTO)?

Created in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international institution that oversees the global trade rules among nations. It superseded the 1947 [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gatt.asp) (GATT) created in the wake of World War II.

**Here's a list of its member nations – https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/tif\_e/org6\_e.htm**

**Violation:**

**TVA: Our interp is compatible with them reading**

**1] a topical k aff about vaccine imperialism and anti-Asian violence during the time of COVID which solves their offense and predictable limits.**

**2] a policy mrna-based china heg good aff with orientalism/security framing**

**B] Standards –**

**They destroy engagement – predictable stasis ensures research accessibility and negative ground. Even if public policy isn’t the best focus for activism, it’s crucial for dialogue because it’s grounded in consistent reporting and academic work.**

**1] Changing the topic post facto structurally favors the aff by manipulating balance of prep and obliterating limits – vote neg because debate is a competitive game that’s meaningless without substantive constraints.**

**2] Also key to have well-prepared opponents. Exclusionary rule: They transform debate into a monologue which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subjected to well researched scrutiny. Switch-side debate is good for portable skills and the TVA solves critical engagement on both sides**

**3] Their model creates a structural disincentive to substantial research. Failure to defend the actor and mechanism of the resolution allows them to shift their advocacy to the terms most favorable to them – causes dogmatism and forces the neg into generics at the margins of the literature – destroys good scholarship.**

**4] Moral hazard – they allow truisms like "racism bad" which are impossible to negate ethically – that makes debate unsafe**

**C**] **Drop the debater on T – the round is already skewed from the beginning because their advocacy excluded my ability to generate NC offense – letting them sever doesn’t solve**. **Debate is a game- forced winner/loser, speech times etc prove. Other impacts like activism or education can also be pursued in other forums, you can only win competitive debates at a debate tournament. Game recognition makes fairness the most important impact – both teams should have equal access to the ballot.**

**D] Use competing interpretations – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters will exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.**

**DA**

**Nuanced debates about the necessity of internationalism lock in deep engagement---the public is primed to ignore the benefits of great-power peace in favor of shallow indictments of its cost.**

**Brands 18** [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 21-23]

Fifth and finally, sustaining America’s post–Cold War strategy entails **persuading the American public** to **recommit** to that strategy and the investments it requires. The state of American opinion on that subject is currently ambiguous. Polling data indicates that public support for most key aspects of American internationalism has recovered somewhat from where it was in 2012–13, and is again at or near postwar averages.32 But the 2016 election cycle and its eventual outcome revealed **strong support** for candidates who advocated **rolling back key elements of post–Cold War (**and post–World War II) **grand strategy**, from free trade to U.S. alliances. This atmosphere reflects **discontent** with the **failures** and **frustrations** of U.S. grand strategy in the post–Cold War era, no doubt, yet it also reflects the fact that American strategy seems at risk of becoming a **victim of its own success**.33 By helping to foster a comparatively stable and congenial environment, American policies have made it more difficult for Americans to **remember** why **significant investments in the global order are needed** in the first place.

Today, this **ambivalence** is becoming increasingly **problematic**, for the simple reason that properly resourcing American strategy requires making politically difficult trade-offs with respect to entitlements and other ballooning domestic costs. It is also becoming problematic, of course, because even if the American public seems to support particular aspects of American grand strategy, the **public** has shown itself **willing to elect a president who appears to care little** for the successful postwar and post–Cold War tradition, even if he has, so far, maintained more aspects of that tradition as president than his campaign rhetoric might have led one to expect. In the future—and indeed, looking beyond Trump’s presidency— sustaining American grand strategy will thus require more **intensive political efforts**.

American leaders will need to more effectively make the case for **controversial** but **broadly beneficial policies** such as **free trade**, while also addressing the inevitable socioeconomic dislocations such policies cause.34 They will need to more fully articulate the **underlying logic** and **value of alliances** and other **commitments** whose costs are often more **visible—not to say greater—than their benefits.** They will need to remind Americans that their country’s leadership has not been a **matter of charity**; it has helped produce an international order that is exceptional in its stability, liberalism, and benefits for the United States. Not least, they will need to make the case that the **costs that the country has** borne in support of that order are designed to avoid the necessity of bearing **vastly higher costs if the international scene returned to a more tumultuous state**. After all, the success of American statecraft is often reflected in the **bad things** that **don’t happen** as well as in the **good things that do.** Making this point is **essential to reconsolidating domestic support now and in the future**—and to **preserving a grand strategy** that has delivered **pretty good results for a quarter century**.

**Collapsing public support and emerging protectionism demands an engaged electorate motivated to stabilize the global order**

**Peinhardt 17** [Clint, associate Professor at The University of Texas at Dallas. His research investigates treaty formation and its effects, as well as the broader politics of investment disputes, and he teaches Global Politics in Business in the GLEMBA program. "Why the globalization backlash?" 3/3. http://jindal.utdallas.edu/blog/why-globalization-backlash]

Globalization is **under threat**. Companies that rely heavily on imports and/or global value chains may have to rethink their business models if current trends continue. After decades in which trade grew faster than the world economy, it is now slightly behind overall economic growth. The end of an amazing run of trade growth can be traced in part to increasing trade restrictions, which in 2015 achieved record levels since the World Trade Organization was created. Recently elected governments are **increasingly restricting trade** because **voters**, particularly those in many rich countries, have begun to question whether free trade is a **good idea**.

Why is the support for free trade declining? The conventional story in the news media and some social science research points to the costs of globalization. Workers who lose their jobs due to foreign competition oppose globalization due to the personal harm they have suffered. Particular attention has focused on the dramatic growth in Chinese imports since that country's admission to the WTO. In a widely publicized paper, several economists led by David Autor of MIT argue that competition from Chinese imports is responsible for increasing polarization of American voters. Other recent research findings paint a **different**, more **complex** picture of the reaction to globalization.

First of all, survey respondents often answer questions about free trade based on their beliefs about trade’s benefits for the country as a whole, not based on their personal economic situation. That phenomenon, called **socio-tropic preferences**, implicates personal beliefs and information as important factors in attitudes toward trade. For example, more highly educated individuals tend to respond more positively, but recent research has shown that they do not favor trade just because their economic prospects are better, but because they are more likely to have studied the **theory of comparative advantage** or to have a more **cosmopolitan worldview**. In contrast, Americans who dislike foreign intervention or who believe in American exceptionalism tend to oppose trade.

Second, many people do not possess strong opinions about trade and are therefore **easily swayed** by the wording of survey questions or by political elites. Survey respondents tend to oppose specific trade agreements if they appear in questions even as those same respondents provide broad support for vague notions of international trade. When primed with expert opinions, such as the fact that the vast majority economists support free trade, people are more likely to mimic those attitudes. As a result, support for trade may appear to **vary wildly** and is **difficult to measure**.

But does it even matter that voters are becoming more skeptical of globalization? **It does**, and not just because they are also consumers. The underpinnings of globalization ultimately depend on **national policies**. If the citizens of a country **sour on globalization**, then **borders** can **quickly close**, preventing exports and profit repatriation, and foreign governments can expropriate foreign investments to popular acclaim. The decline of a previous wave of globalization during the Great Depression sets a **clear precedent**.

So can anything be done to reverse the current backlash? If voters are simply responding to rising inequality and job loss, then **redistributing** the **economic gains** that trade generates should **shore up support** for globalization. However, if the other research I have highlighted is correct, then **corporations have a role to play**. Businesses that benefit from globalization must be more proactive in **trumpeting its benefits** for their local communities. How many jobs are directly related to trade? How has your firm reduced the price of consumer goods from global value chains? Being “pro-market” is not enough; the legitimacy of the rules underpinning globalization is at stake.

**Primacy solves arms races, land grabs, rogue states, and great power war – reject old defense that ignores emerging instability and compounding risk**

**Brands 18** [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 129-133]

Since World War II, the United States has had a military **second to none**. Since the Cold War, America has **committed** to having **overwhelming military primacy**. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6

From the early 1990s, for example, the **U**nited **S**tates consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained **peerless global power-projection capabilities**.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas **strategic regions**—**Europe, East Asia, the Middle East**. From **thrashing Saddam** Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power **superior** to anything a **regional rival** could employ even **on its own geopolitical doorstep.**

This **military dominance** has constituted the **hard-power backbone** of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the **unstable multipolarity** of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing **liberal political values** and an open international **economy**, and to **suppressing** international scourges such as **rogue states**, **nuclear proliferation**, and catastrophic **terrorism**. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the **centrality** of military preponderance.

Washington would **need** the **military power** necessary to **underwrite** worldwide **alliance commitments**. It would have to preserve **substantial overmatch** versus any potential **great-power rival.** It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global **norms** generally reflect **hard-power realities**, America would need the superiority to assure that its own **values remained ascendant**. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “**strengths beyond challenge**,” but it was not at all inaccurate.

American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap.

Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. **Alliances** would **lose credibility**; the stability of key **regions** would be **eroded**; **rivals would be emboldened**; **international crises would go unaddressed**. American primacy was thus like a **reasonably priced insurance policy**. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled.

THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by **remarkably low levels of great-power competition,** high levels of **security** in key theaters such as **Europe** and **East Asia**, and the **comparative weakness** of those “**rogue” actors**—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, **the strategic horizon is darkening**, due to four factors.

First, **great-power military competition is back**. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—**China** and **Russia**—are seeking **regional hegemony**, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the **military punch** to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military **modernization** emphasizing **nuclear weapons**, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a **buildup of historic proportions,** with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of **power-projection** and antiaccess/area denial (**A2/AD) tools** necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a **far more competitive environment.**

Second, the **international outlaws** are no longer so **weak**. **North Korea’s** conventional forces have atrophied, but it has amassed a growing **nuclear arsenal** and is developing an intercontinental delivery capability that will soon allow it to threaten not just America’s regional allies but also the **continental United States**.12 **Iran** remains a **nuclear threshold state,** one that continues to develop ballistic missiles and A2/AD capabilities while employing **sectarian** and **proxy forces** across the Middle East. The Islamic State, for its part, is headed for defeat, but has displayed military capabilities **unprecedented** for any **terrorist group**, and shown that **counterterrorism** will continue to place **significant operational demands** on U.S. forces whether in this context or in others. Rogue actors have long preoccupied American planners, but **the rogues are now more capable** than at any time in decades.

Third, the **democratization of technology** has allowed more actors to **contest American superiority** in dangerous ways. The spread of **antisatellite** and **cyberwarfare** capabilities; the proliferation of man-portable air defense systems and ballistic missiles; the increasing availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex— these phenomena have had a **military leveling effect** by giving weaker actors **capabilities** which were **formerly unique** to technologically advanced states. As such technologies “**proliferate worldwide**,” Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein commented in 2016, “the **technology** and **capability gaps** between America and our adversaries are **closing dangerously fast**.”13 Indeed, as these capabilities spread, fourth-generation systems (such as F-15s and F-16s) may provide **decreasing utility** against even **non-great-power competitors**, and **far more fifth-generation capabilities may be needed to perpetuate American overmatch**.

Finally, the number of challenges has **multiplied**. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Washington faced rogue states and jihadist extremism—but not intense great-power rivalry. America faced conflicts in the Middle East—but East Asia and Europe were comparatively secure. Now, the old threats still exist—but the more **permissive conditions** have **vanished**. The **U**nited **S**tates confronts **rogue states**, lethal **jihadist organizations**, and **great-power competition**; there are severe challenges in all **three Eurasian theaters**. “I don’t **recall a time** when we have been confronted with a **more diverse array of threats**, whether it’s the nation state threats posed by **Russia** and **China** and particularly their substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation states of the likes of ISIL, Al Qaida, etc.,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper commented in 2016. Trends in the strategic landscape constituted a veritable “**litany of doom**.”14 The United States thus faces not just more significant, but also more numerous, challenges to its **military dominance** than it has for at least a **quarter century**.

**Vote neg to reaffirm U.S. global leadership – it's key to a new policy of containment that preserves the LIO and prevents global war but American popular support and commitment is key.**

**Mandelbaum, PhD, 19**

(Micheal, PoliSci@Harvard, ProfAmericanFoPo@JohnsHopkins, 2-12, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-02-12/new-containment)

The quarter century following the Cold War was the most peaceful in modern history. The world’s strongest powers did not fight one another or even think much about doing so. They did not, on the whole, prepare for war, anticipate war, or conduct negotiations and political maneuvers with the prospect of war looming in the background. As U.S. global military hegemony persisted, the possibility of developed nations fighting one another seemed ever more remote. **Then history began to change course**. In the last several years, three powers have launched active efforts to revise security arrangements in their respective regions. [**Russia**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2018-06-14/russia-it) has invaded Crimea and other parts of Ukraine and has tried covertly to destabilize European democracies. [**China**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning)has built artificial island fortresses in international waters, claimed vast swaths of the western Pacific, and moved to organize Eurasia economically in ways favorable to Beijing. And the [Islamic Republic of **Iran**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-07-26/how-us-empowering-iran-yemen) has expanded its influence over much of Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen and is pursuing nuclear weapons. This new world requires a new American foreign policy. Fortunately, the country’s own not-so-distant past can offer guidance. During the Cold War, the United States chose to contain the Soviet Union, successfully deterring its military aggression and limiting its political influence for decades. The United States **should apply containment once again,** now to Russia, China, and Iran. The contemporary world is similar enough to its mid-twentieth-century predecessor to make that old strategy relevant but different enough that it needs to be modified and updated. While success is not guaranteed, a new containment policy offers the best chance to defend American interests in the twenty-first century. Now as before, the possibility of armed conflict exerts a major influence on the foreign policies of the United States and countries throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The Cold War divided the world into rival camps, with regions and even countries split in two. Today, similar cleavages are developing, with each revisionist power seeking its own sphere of influence separate from the larger U.S.-backed global order. Now as before, the revisionist powers are dictatorships that challenge American values as well as American interests. They seek to overturn political, military, and economic arrangements the United States helped establish long ago and has supported ever since. Should [Vladimir Putin’s](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2018-06-14/peoples-authoritarian) Russia succeed in reasserting control over parts of the former Soviet Union, [Xi Jinping’s](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-05-10/how-xi-jinping-views-world) China gain control over maritime commerce in the western Pacific, or Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s Iran dominate the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf, the United States, its allies, and the global order they uphold would suffer a major blow. The China-occupied Subi Reef in the disputed South China Sea, April 2017But today’s circumstances differ from those of the past in several important ways. During most of the Cold War, Washington confronted a single powerful opponent, the Soviet Union—the leader of the international communist movement. Now it must cope with three separate adversaries, each largely independent of the other two. Russia and China cooperate, but they also compete with each other. And while both have good relations with Iran, both also have large and potentially [restive Muslim populations](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-06-20/reeducation-returns-china), giving them reason to worry about the growth of Iranian power and influence. Cold War containment was a single global undertaking, implemented regionally. Contemporary containment will involve three separate regional initiatives, implemented in coordination. The Soviet Union, moreover, presented a strong ideological challenge, devoted as it was to advancing not just Moscow’s geopolitical interests but also its communist principles. Neither Russia nor China has such a crusading ideology today. Russia has abandoned communism completely, and China has done so partially, retaining the notion of party supremacy but shedding most of the economics and the messianic zeal. And although the Islamic Republic represents a cause and not just a stretch of territory, the potential appeal of its ideology is largely limited to the Muslim world and, primarily, its Shiite minority. None of today’s revisionist powers possesses the Soviet Union’s fearsome military capabilities. Russia is a shrunken version of its older self militarily, and Iran lacks formidable modern military forces. China’s economic growth may ultimately allow it to match the United States in all strategic dimensions and pose a true peer threat, but to date, Beijing is concentrating on developing forces to exclude the United States from the western Pacific, not to project power globally. Moreover, the initiatives each has launched so far—Russia’s seizure of Crimea and Middle East meddling, [China’s island building](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-06-05/vanishing-borders-south-china-sea), Iran’s regional subversion—have been limited probes rather than all-out assaults on the existing order. Lastly, the Soviet Union was largely detached from the U.S.-centered global economy during the Cold War, whereas today’s revisionist powers are very much a part of it. Russia and Iran have relatively small economies and export mostly energy, but China has the world’s second-largest economy, with deep, wide, and growing connections to countries everywhere. Economic interdependence will complicate containment. China, for example, may be a political and military rival, but it is also a crucial economic partner. The United States depends on China to finance its deficits. China depends on the United States to buy its exports. Containment in Asia will thus require other policies as well, because although a Chinese military collapse would enhance Asian security, a Chinese economic collapse would bring economic disaster. Together, these differences make today’s containment a less urgent challenge than its Cold War predecessor. The United States does not have to deal with a single mortal threat from a country committed to remaking the entire world in its own image. It must address three serious but lesser challenges, mounted by countries seeking not heaven on earth but greater regional power and autonomy. But if today’s challenges are less epic, they are far more complicated. The old containment was simple, if not easy. The new containment will have to blend a variety of policies, carefully coordinated with one another in design and execution. This will tax the ingenuity and flexibility of the United States and its allies. STRONGER TOGETHER As during the Cold War, containment today requires **American military deployments abroad.** In Europe, ground troops are needed to deter Russian aggression. The Putin regime has already sent forces into Georgia and Ukraine. The United States is committed to protecting its NATO allies. These include the Baltic states, tiny countries on Russia’s border. By defending them, the United States could encounter some of the same difficulties it did defending West Berlin, including, in the worst case, having to decide whether to bring nuclear weapons into play rather than accept military defeat. East Asia requires a robust U.S. naval presence to fend off China’s campaign to dominate the western Pacific. The United States is committed to protecting allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and maintaining open sea-lanes, and it conducts what it calls “freedom-of-navigation operations” in international waters newly claimed by China to make clear that the rest of the world does not accept Chinese claims and Chinese dominance there. And in the Middle East, American naval and air forces are needed to safeguard shipments of Persian Gulf oil to Europe and Asia and to support a successful rollback of the [Iranian nuclear program](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2019-01-11/year-living-dangerously-nuclear-weapons), should that become necessary. American troops on the ground are not required; it is local forces that must check Iranian efforts at regional subversion (which are carried out by local militias). Diplomatically, Washington needs to maintain or assemble broad coalitions of local powers to oppose each revisionist challenge. In Europe, NATO was created to carry out this very mission and so should be the pillar of the United States’ strategy there. In Asia and the Middle East, the “hub and spoke” pattern of American Cold War alliances still exists, even as regional powers have begun to collaborate among themselves. Working with partners exploits Washington’s greatest strength: its ability to **attract allies and create powerful coalitions against isolated opponents**. Coordinating with other countries also endows American foreign policy with a legitimacy it would otherwise lack, showing that the United States is not simply acting for itself but defending broad principles of international order that many others support. The dependence of the revisionists on access to the global economy gives the United States and its coalition partners a potential source of leverage. Washington and its allies have tried to exploit this through sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, tariffs on China for its trade practices, and sanctions on Iran for its nuclear weapons program. But interdependence cuts both ways. Russia has tried to pressure Ukraine by restricting Ukrainian access to Russian energy. China has placed targeted embargoes on Japan and Norway to express displeasure with specific Japanese and Norwegian policies. Moreover, economic instruments have at best a mixed record in achieving political goals; the broader the sanctioning coalition is, the greater its impact will be. MAKING IT OFFICIAL The prospect of a twenty-first-century triple containment strategy raises several questions. Since the United States is already doing much of what is required, how much change in American foreign policy is needed? Is it necessary or feasible to confront all three revisionist powers at once? And how does all this end? As for the first, explicitly committing the United States to containment would build on many existing policies while reframing them as part of a **coherent national strategy** rather than the products of inertia or inattention. A public commitment to containment would enhance the credibility of American deterrence and lower the chance of opportunistic attacks by opponents hoping for easy gains (as happened in Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1990). That, in turn, would reassure actual and potential allies and increase their willingness to join the effort. Adopting containment as a strategic frame would also help restrain Washington’s occasional impulses to do more (try to transform other societies) or less (retreat from global engagement altogether). As for confronting all three at once, geopolitical logic and historical experience suggest that reducing the number of threats is the best course, as the United States did by joining with the Soviet Union to defeat the Nazis and then aligning with Mao Zedong’s China to defeat the Soviet Union. Post-Soviet Russia would have been a natural partner for the West. But Moscow was needlessly alienated from its logical geopolitical partnership by NATO expansion, which brought foreign armies to its doorstep over its objections. At this point, all three revisionist regimes rely for domestic support on nationalist hostility to the United States specifically and Western democracies more generally and reject being part of a U.S.-led coalition. Fortunately, Russia is much weaker than the Soviet Union, China is restrained by both deterrence and the knowledge that military conflict would damage its economy, and Iran is a regional power. So the United States **can afford to pursue the containment of all three simultaneously** (so long as it does so as part of robust coalitions). Cold War containment was an open-ended policy with a hoped-for eventual outcome. The same will be true for the new version: the policy should continue as long as the threats it is intended to counter continue, and ideally it will end similarly. Constructive regime change, for example, especially the advent of democracy, would alter the foreign policy orientations of the revisionist powers. Such a change would have to come about through internal processes and is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Still, none of the regimes can be confident of its longevity; repeated outbreaks of political turbulence over the years have shown that each faces significant domestic opposition, maintains itself in power through coercion, and fears its people rather than trusts them. Situations like that can shift rapidly. A well-executed policy of containment could increase the chances of disruption by creating an external context that would encourage it. But when or, indeed, if it would bear fruit is impossible to predict. BEWARE OF FREE RIDERS The biggest obstacles to a new policy of containment come, ironically, not from the powers being contained but from the countries doing the containing. The United States needs to relearn how to manage durable coalitions of allies and persuade its own citizenry that the exercise of global leadership is still worth the effort required. Coalitions are difficult to manage in the best of circumstances. It was hard to hold the Western alliance together during the Cold War, even though it faced a single powerful threat. Building and maintaining comparable coalitions today, confronted by diverse smaller threats, will be more difficult still. In Europe, although all countries are wary of Russia, some are more so than others. Those closest to Russia’s borders most strongly support an enhanced Western military presence. Years of crisis over Europe’s common currency, meanwhile, have taken a political toll, increased intra-European tensions, and made cooperation of all kinds more difficult. The continuing Brexit drama will only compound the problems. Coalitions are difficult to manage in the best of circumstances. In Asia, the Philippines and South Korea have sometimes taken a more benign view of Chinese power than other countries in the region. And among those agreeing on the need to check Chinese ambitions (including Australia, India, Indonesia, and Japan), developing common policies is difficult because they are an amorphous, heterogeneous group. In the Middle East, crucial American allies, such as Qatar (which hosts a U.S. air base) and [Saudi Arabia](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/opinion/saudi-arabia-mohammed-bin-salman-trump-khashoggi.html), are sharply at odds. The government of Turkey, a member of NATO, identifies with the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt and Saudi Arabia regard as a mortal enemy. Ironically, the one unproblematic member of the anti-Iran coalition is Israel, a country that for decades was anathematized as the root of all the problems in the Middle East but that is now recognized as a dependable counterweight to Persian power. All coalitions encounter [free-rider problems](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-08-15/pay-europe), and the dominant members usually pay more than their fair share of the costs involved. So it will be with the new containment. The imbalance will be most glaring in Europe, where a tradition of letting Washington carry much of the burden of collective defense has persisted for too long; it originated when U.S. allies were weak and poor but continued even after they became strong and rich. During the Cold War, every American president tried, without much success, to get European countries to pay more for NATO, but none pushed the issue hard because the priority was to maintain a common front against the Soviet threat. There may be a lower tolerance for such free-riding today, as U.S. President Donald Trump’s comments make clear. The Asian countries wary of China have increased their spending on defense. Still, the United States is destined to take the lead in opposing China because the most pressing threat the People’s Republic presents is a maritime one—one that requires major naval forces to contest, of the kind that only the United States commands. In the Middle East, Israel has capable armed forces. Saudi Arabia has purchased expensive military hardware from the United States but has not demonstrated the capacity to use it effectively. Turkey has a formidable military, but the present Turkish government cannot be counted on to use it to contain Iran. WILL AMERICA LEAD? The weakest link in the chain **may be the most powerful country itself**. There are reasons to expect the American public to support a leading role in the containment of Russia, China, and Iran. The United States has a long history with such a foreign policy. The approach has geopolitical logic behind it, promising to protect American interests in crucial parts of the world at a reasonable price. But there are also reasons for skepticism. Today’s threats appear less urgent, coping with them will be more complicated, and the country’s attitude toward foreign entanglements has understandably soured over the last two decades. The weakest link in the chain may be the most powerful country itself. The United States was pulled into both world wars by external attacks, and Americans gave their support to a foreign policy of global reach during the Cold War because they were persuaded it would head off yet another world war. After the Soviet collapse, many of the Cold War arrangements persisted through inertia and gained support because they seemed to entail little expense or risk. Now that the expenses and risks of such a policy have increased, **many Americans may reconsider their support.** The skepticism has deepened because of the county’s recent misadventures abroad. The interventions in [Afghanistan](https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/donald-trumps-chance-to-bring-peace-to-afghanistan-and-end-americas-longest-war), Iraq, and Libya turned out poorly, and the public has little taste for more. This view has much to recommend it. But it need not threaten the prospects of a new containment, because that course is quite different from the failed crusades of recent decades. Those involved efforts to transform the internal politics and economies of weak states. Containment involves the opposite, checking the external conduct of strong states. If national leaders can appreciate and explain the difference, **they may be able to bring the public along.**

**Case**

**FW**

**The ROB is to tell tab who won the debate – nothing spills up past this round and you should ask yourself what voting for "Asian agency" when the other debater's also Asian does for their liberation movement**

**Case Proper**

**Vote neg on presumption –**

**1] The aff has no reason why the ballot is necessary for you to affirm their narratives or method. You don’t have to vote aff to affirm that violence against Asians is bad —They should have to win a unique reason why the ballot is key – goes double if they impact turn fairness because if that doesn't matter you should vote for us regardless if they don't prove the ballot's key**

**2] Voting aff just leads to passivity because it makes you think you’ve done something radical to solve for inclusion in debate when in reality nothing changes—means voting aff just leads to cruel optimism**

**3] They don't solve offense about the law or the WTO — voting aff doesn’t get rid of it or solve imperialism**

**The vast majority of their topic bad offense is not contextualized to the WTO or IP but the law at large – using the state is not equivalent to an endorsement, I can say police brutality should stop without endorsing the police as an actor – our TVAs prove that discussions do not have to be violent**

**Voting Neg is a legal bridge between aggrieved communities and existing institutions. Becoming role-literate participants in legal debates builds public momentum for social change.**

**Guinier, JD, 09**

(Lani, Law@Harvard, “BEYOND LEGISLATURES: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF DEMOSPRUDENCE” 89 B.U. L. Rev. 539 2009 p.544-554)

In her Ledbetter dissent and subsequent remarks, Justice Ginsburg was courting the people to reverse the decision of a Supreme Court majority and thereby limit its effect. In Robert Cover's "**jurisgenerative**" sense,36 she claimed a space for citizens to **advance alternative interpretations** of the law. Her oral dissent and public remarks represented a set of *demosprudential* practices for instantiating and reinforcing the relationship between public engagement and institutional legitimacy. In Justice Ginsburg's oral dissent we see the possibilities of a more **democratically-oriented** jurisprudence, or what Gerald Torres and I term demosprudence. 37 Demosprudence builds on the idea that lawmaking is a **collaborative enterprise** between formal elites - whether judges, legislators or lawyers - and ordinary people. The foundational hypothesis of demosprudence is that the wisdom of the people should inform the lawmaking enterprise in a democracy. From a demosprudential perspective, the Court gains a new source of democratic authority when its members engage ordinary people in a productive dialogue about the potential role of "We the People" in lawmaking.38 Demosprudence is a term Professor Torres and I initially coined to describe the process of **making and interpreting law** from an **external** - not just internal - perspective. That perspective emphasizes the role of informal democratic mobilizations and wide-ranging social movements that serve to make formal institutions, including those that regulate legal culture, more democratic. 39 Demosprudence focuses on the ways that "the demos" (especially through social movements) can contribute to the meaning of law. Justice Ginsburg acted demosprudentially when she invited a wider audience into the conversation about one of the core conflicts at the heart of our democracy. 40 She grounded her oral dissent and her public remarks in a set of demosprudential practices that linked public engagement with institutional legitimacy. Those practices are part of a larger demosprudential claim: that the Constitution belongs to the people, not just to the Supreme Court. The dissenting opinions, especially the oral dissents, of Justice Ginsburg and other members of the Court are the subject of my 2008 Supreme Court foreword, *Demosprudence Through Dissent.41* The foreword was addressed to judges, especially those speaking out in dissent, urging them to "engage dialogically with nonjudicial actors and to encourage them to act democratically. '42 The foreword focuses on oral dissents because of the special power of the spoken word, but Justices can issue demosprudential concurrences and even majority opinions, written as well as spoken.43 Moreover, true to its origins, demosprudence is not limited to reconceptualizing the judicial role. Lawyers and nonlawyers alike can be demosprudential, a claim that I foreshadow in the foreword and which Torres and I are developing in other work on law and social movements. 44 Supreme Court Justices can play a democracy-enhancing role by expanding the audience for their opinions to include those unlearned in the law. Of the current Justices, Justice Antonin Scalia has a particular knack for attracting and holding the attention of a nonlegal audience. His dissents are "deliberate exercises in advocacy" that "chart new paths for changing the law."'45 Just as Justice Ginsburg welcomed women's rights activists into the public sphere in response to the Court majority's decision in *Ledbetter,* Justice Scalia's dissents are often in conversation with a conservative constituency of accountability. 46 By writing dissents like these, both Justices have acknowledged that their audience is not just their colleagues or the litigants in the cases before them. Both exemplify the potential power of demosprudential dissents when the dissenter is aligned with a social movement or constituency that "mobilizes to change the meaning of the Constitution over time. '47 Thus, Justice Ginsburg speaks in her "clearest voice" when she addresses issues of gender equality.48 Similarly, Justice Scalia effectively uses his originalist jurisprudence as "a language that a political movement can both understand and rally around. 4 9 Both Justices Ginsburg and Scalia are at their best as demosprudential dissenters when they encourage a "social movement to fight on." 50 Robert Post, writing in this symposium, reads my argument exactly right: "[C]ourts do not end democratic debate about the meaning of rights and the law; they are participants within that debate." 51 As Post explains, I argue that the "meaning of constitutional principles are forged within the cauldron of political debate," a debate in which judges are often important, though not necessarily central, actors. 52 Law and politics are in continuous dialogue, and the goal of a demosprudential dissenter is to ensure that the views of a judicial majority do not preempt political dialogue. When Justice Ginsburg spoke in a voice more conversational than technical, she did more than declare her disagreement with the majority's holding. By vigorously speaking out during the opinion announcement, she also appealed to citizens in terms that laypersons could understand and to Congress directly. 53 This is demosprudence. Robert Post eloquently summarizes and contextualizes the argument I make about demosprudence. He also corrects the misunderstanding of the law/politics divide that beats at the heart of Gerald Rosenberg's criticisms of that argument.54 Post neatly restates my premise: "Law inspires and provokes the claims of politically engaged agents, as it simultaneously emerges from these claims. '55 In his companion essay, Professor Rosenberg polices the law/politics distinction to create a false binary. Rosenberg dismisses the possibility of an ongoing and recursive conversation between law and politics that *may* produce changes in the law and eventually in our "constitutional culture," meaning changes in the popular as well as elite understanding of what the law means. Constitutional culture is the fish tank in which the beliefs and actions of judicial as well as nonjudicial participants swim. It is the "dynamic sociopolitical environment" in which ideas about legal meanings circulate, ferment, compete and ultimately surface in formal venues such as legal advocacy or legislative actions.56 As political scientist Daniel HoSang explains, the goal of demosprudence is "to open up analytic and political possibility to build and sustain more dynamic and politically potent relationships between [**legal elites**] and **aggrieved communities**. 57 Professor Rosenberg's critique of demosprudence rests on several misunderstandings of my work and that of other legal scholars.58 First, Professor Rosenberg wrongly assumes that my claims are descriptive rather than **aspirational**.5 9 Second, Professor Rosenberg's concern about my "Courtcentric" analysis overlooks the occasion for my argument;60 that is, the traditions associated with the Supreme Court foreword published every year in the November issue of the *Harvard Law Review.* Third, he orients his entire critique around polling data and other social science research to trivialize the relationship of **narrative to culture**, to exaggerate the predictive capacity of a data-driven approach to quantify causation and to preempt other useful analytic approaches. 6 1 First, my foreword posits that judges *can* play a demosprudential role and that oral dissents are one *potential* vehicle for allowing them to do so. 6 2 While it is true that oral dissents *currently* face obstacles to their demosprudential efficacy, those obstacles need not be insurmountable. Moreover, Rosenberg's critique arguably makes my point. He is saying "people don't pay attention, 63 while **I** am saying "yes, they can!" Indeed, they might pay more attention if Justices took the time to talk to them.64 He characterizes the past; I aim to sketch out the contours of a different future. Rosenberg is absolutely right that one next step might be to deploy the tools of social science to explore the extent to which this claim has been realized.65 But the foreword is suggestive, not predictive. Justices of the Supreme Court can be demosprudential when they use their opinions to engage nonlegal actors in the process of making and interpreting law over time. They have democratically-based reasons to seek to inspire a mobilized constituency; it is not that they invariably *will* cause a social movement to emerge. Similarly, the idea that Court opinions do not invariably inspire social movements does not mean they cannot have this effect. Nor do I argue that oral dissents are the only, or even the single most important, communication tool at the Court's disposal. When the Supreme Court announced *Brown v. Board of Education66* in 1954, there were no dissents. Moreover, the orality of the opinion announcement was not a central feature of the event. No one heard the voice of Earl Warren reading his decision on the radio. Nevertheless, the decision had a powerful effect, in part because it was purposely drafted to speak to "the people. '67 Justice Warren consciously intended that the *Brown* opinion should be short and readable by the lay public. 68 In his work, Professor Rosenberg focuses on the white backlash the Brown decision inspired.69 But a demosprudential analysis also focuses on the frontlash, the way that Brown helped inspire the civil rights movement. *Brown's* accessibility and forcefulness helped inspire a social movement that in turn gave the opinion its legs. 70 In 1955, Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a bus in Montgomery. She was arrested. Four days later, when she was formally arraigned and convicted, a one-day bus boycott by the black citizens of Montgomery was unexpectedly, amazingly, successful. 71 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered a sermon that evening before a mass meeting of 5000 people gathered at and around Holt Street Baptist Church. 72 He prepared his audience to take the bold step of continuing the boycott indefinitely. He did so by brilliantly fusing two great texts: the Supreme Court's pronouncement a year earlier in *Brown* and the Bible.73 Dr. King roused the crowd at that first mass meeting in Montgomery with a spirited refrain: "If we are wrong - the Supreme Court of this nation is wrong. If we are wrong God Almighty was wrong. In the foreword, I argue that Dr. King was a classic example of a "**role literate participant**. '75 His theological and strategic acumen enabled him to invoke Brown as "authorization" and "legitimation" to sustain the actions that 50,000 blacks in Montgomery, Alabama would take for over thirteen months when they refused to ride the city's buses.76 But as Robert Post rightly points out, the word "authorize" meant something more like embolden or encourage. 77 My point is that Brown shows judicial actors can inspire or provoke "mass conversation." It is when the legal constitution is narrated through the experience of ordinary people in conversation with each other that legal interpretation becomes sustainable as a **culture shift.**78 And if a majority opinion can rouse, so too can a dissenting one. Thus, demosprudence through dissent emphasizes the use of narrative techniques and a clear appeal to shared values that make the legal **claims transparent and accessible**. Although demosprudence through dissent is **prescriptive** rather than descriptive, it was never my intent to suggest that the Court should be central to any social movement. Like Justice Ginsburg, I am not a proponent of juridification (the substitution of law for politics). 79 In Justice Ginsburg's words, "[t]he Constitution does not belong to the Supreme Court." 80 At the same time, I recognize that the Court has been deeply influential, albeit unintentionally at times, in some very important social movements. Studying the 1960s student movement in Atlanta, Tomiko Brown-Nagin argues that the lunch counter sit-ins were, in fact, a reaction to the Supreme Court's decision not because of what the Supreme Court said, but because of what it did not say. 81 The Court initially raised, then dashed expectations. It was the disappointment with "all deliberate speed" **-** the legal system's failure to live up to the promise of the Court's initial ruling- that inspired students to take to the streets and initiate some of the bold protest demonstrations at lunch counters and in streets in the 1960s.8 2 Brown-Nagin emphasizes the multiple ways in which courts, lawyers and social movement actors are engaged in a dialogic and recursive discourse.83 Rosenberg's second misunderstanding deserves both a concession and a clarification. Rosenberg's criticism that my argument is too Court-centric is fair as far as it goes.84 I appreciate (and to a great extent share) Rosenberg's skepticism regarding courts as the primary actors in forging the path of social change. Gerald Torres and I argue that social change involves denaturalizing prior assumptions, a process that must be continuously monitored under the watchful eye of engaged political and social actors. 85 Moreover, social change is only sustainable if it succeeds in changing cultural norms, is **institutionalized** through policy decisions and the oversight of administrative actors, and develops an internal and external **constituency of accountability**. I concede that courts are not necessarily central to social movement activism. Why then do I focus on the dialogic relationship between the Supreme Court and other essential social change actors in the foreword? The foreword is designed to be, and has always been, *about the Court's Term.86* In this venue, I developed the idea of demosprudence *in application* to this particular organ of government. The inherent structural limitation of this particular art form was challenging but ultimately, in my view, productive. It pushed me to explore the ways that judicial actors, in conjunction with mobilized constituencies, can redefine their roles consistently with ideas of democratic accountability. Indeed, because the format of the foreword encouraged me to approach demosprudence from this angle, I discovered something important about demosprudence: judges, not just lawyers or legislators, speak to constituencies of accountability in a democratically accountable and democracy-inspired legal system. I argued that oral dissents (like Justice Ginsburg's in *Ledbetter)* reveal the existence of an alternative, and relatively unnoticed, source of judicial authority.87 The Court's legitimacy in a democracy need not depend on the Court speaking with an "institutional voice" (that is, unanimously). Here I am influenced by Jane Mansbridge's idea that democratic power can be held to account through two-way interactions, a source of authority rooted in "deliberative accountability. '88 The demosprudential dissenter ideally provides greater transparency to the Court's internal deliberative process. 89 At the same time, the dissenter may disperse power "by appealing to the audience's own experience and by drafting or inspiring them to participate in a form of collective problem solving." 9° Thus, the Court gains constitutional authority when dissenters speak in a "democratic voice," potentially expanding their audience beyond legal elites. In Mark Tushnet's words, "the Constitution belongs to all of us collectively, *as we act together."9'* Third, Rosenberg's argument that oral dissents are ineffectual, are unlikely to ever be effectual, and should not be considered relevant, reflects his disciplinary allegiances. 92 His perspective depends on empirical evidence of causation. It has a substantive, a methodological and a technological dimension. Rosenberg's substantive argument seems to rest on the assumption that law almost never influences politics or vice versa. His skeptical certitude reduces to insignificance the recursive interactions between the courts and the activists in the 1950s and '60s over civil rights, in the 1970s over the meaning of gender equality, in the 1990s over affirmative action, and in the 2000s over the meaning of marriage. In addition, Professor Rosenberg's certitude goes well beyond the evidence he cites. He believes demosprudential dissents "are not necessary because if there is an active social movement in place then no judicial help is needed. '93 At the same time, he quotes McCann approvingly despite the fact that McCann concludes law can in fact make a difference under the right circumstances. 94 There is more than a friendly misunderstanding at work. Within Professor Rosenberg's critique of demosprudence lurks a deep disciplinary tension about the nature of causation and the primacy of uniform metrics of measurement, as well as the meaning of political participation and influence. 95 What I value about political engagement cannot simply be reduced to what can be measured. When judges participate openly in **public discussion**, whether through book tours or oral dissents, their words or ideas may have traction **without causing measureable changes** in public opinion. As Robert Post notes, I am of the school that values "the texture and substance of dialogue. '96 I do not define politics, more generally, primarily by election outcomes or polling data. As I write elsewhere, opportunities for participation enhance democratic legitimacy in part because "democracy involves justice-based commitments to voice, not just votes: participation cannot be reduced to a single moment of choice. '97 Opportunities for formal and informal deliberation are important because of "the texture and meaning of the relationships among political actors, as well as the texture and substance of the values that emerge from public discussion." 98 The methodological aspect of Rosenberg's critique involves his taste for numbers and other metrics of certainty. 99 Rosenberg would prefer that I treat the format of a dissent as something to be studied by literary critics but as irrelevant to political or public relationships.100 The notion that storytelling is not the stuff of politics ignores the important work of social psychologists and linguists who write at length about the processes by which the brain hears and evaluates information. For example, what people say they believe is not necessarily predictive of what they do.' 01 Indeed, attitudes are not recalled like USB memory sticks, but are reconstructed in relationship to the environment. 102 My argument assumes that **the river of social change has many tributaries**, from the strategic mobilization of diverse resources that Marshall Ganz identifies to the narratives of resistance that Fred Harris explores. 0 3 No single institution of government, acting alone, successfully controls or enables these mighty currents. For example, the Supreme Court, when it wields law to establish relationships of power and control, primarily legitimates rather than destabilizes existing relationships of power and control. 104 Thus I agree with Rosenberg that the Court rarely functions as the central power source for fundamental structural change. Nevertheless, I argue that members of the Court can catalyze change when they help craft or expand the narrative space in which mobilized constituencies navigate the currents of democracy. That role may be hard to measure, especially when demosprudential politics do not use the same language or framing devices as ordinary politics. 0 5 That role may also be inaccurately interpreted if the evaluation tool is survey data that asks open-ended questions or miscodes respondents' answers. 10 6 For example, after recalibrating the measurement tools on which conventional wisdom relies, Professors Gibson and Caldeira conclude that the American people may not be as woefully ignorant about the Court as has been consistently reported. 07 In addition, when members of the Court direct their dissents to social movement actors and other role-literate participants, the recursive nature of that discourse would be difficult to capture in national survey instruments.10 8

**Essentialism turns the case- alienates allies within and outside of “Asian american” identity**

**Lin, JD Yale, 04**

(Elbert, IDENTIFYING ASIAN AMERICA Southwestern University Law Review 2004 33 Sw. U. L. Rev. 217)

Coalition building is also under-inclusive. Just because a coalition brings together diverse voices, it does not mean a coalition champions diverse causes. The very nature of coalition building is a funneling effect. Coalitions bring together diverse voices under a single tent for a single purpose. As Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic have warned, "Some observers hold that all minority races should compromise their differences and form a united front against racism in general. The danger in this essential approach is that certain minority groups, socioeconomic classes, and sexual orientations may end up better off and others worse." n91 Those who argue that the asian American movement should be a smaller part of a larger anti-subordination agenda have drawn their own boundaries. They have created a "progressive," anti-white movement with a stylized view of the oppressed asian American. Glenn Omatsu, for instance, shuns those who "have nothing to offer to immigrant workers in sweatshops, the homeless, Cambodian youth in street gangs, or community college youth." n92 At the end of the day, even Chris Iijima, who recognizes the importance of asian American identity, argues for a "progressive Asian Pacific American [\*240] identity." n93 Iijima contends "that there also must be a coherent and "essential' political viewpoint for peoples of color" n94 that "focuses on the effects of white supremacist ideology." n95 But, the economically oppressed asian American is an under-inclusive view. It leaves out many non-asian Americans and asian Americans who wish to fight anti-asian American discrimination. For instance, many white Americans find themselves alienated. It is true that many (indeed, most) white Americans believe asian Americans do not face discrimination, and tend to see us as "successful," a model minority. "Progressive" asian American scholars have argued that this is merely another form of oppression - that "model minority" really means "different." n96 In response, white Americans have lashed out at asian Americans who claim to face discrimination. These white Americans feel falsely accused. n97 The problem is the under-inclusive asian American agenda. The "progressive" agenda has but one conclusion: white Americans must be oppressive; the "model minority" must be sub-textual. Perhaps, however, there is an actual misunderstanding. Perhaps white Americans truly believe that we are successful and, therefore, that we do not face discrimination. n98 After all, there is some truth to the model minority "myth." The numbers may not tell the whole truth, but asian America has had some success, n99 especially when compared to other racial minorities. Miranda McGowan and James Lindgren, in fact, have found no evidence to confirm that those who hold "model minority-type views fear or hold negative opinions about Asian Americans." n100 In short, many white Americans are in favor of an anti-discrimination agenda, but, the current "**progressive" approach does not leave room for that**. As Neil Gotanda has stated, "if a real class privilege is [\*241] emerging for Asian Americans, then long-term political coalitions cannot turn on simple calls for recognizing a common history of racial oppression by a white majority." n101 Many asian Americans who struggle against discrimination are also **left out by the "progressive" agenda**. Asian American Marxists and socialists **find themselves outside the mainstream asian American movement**. n102 Conservative-leaning asian Americans (neoconservatives or neocons) are also actively excluded. Yet, both groups have the same purpose as the "progressive" asian American movement: the elimination of anti-asian American discrimination. The exclusion of neocon asian Americans is particularly important because **a large number** of asian Americans fit that category. For instance, many first generation asian Americans hold neoconservative beliefs. They believe that hard work and assimilation are the way to equality. And recently, it is the growing number of neoconservative asian Americans who have caught the public eye as the standard-bearers for the asian American movement. n103 Neoconservative asian Americans also participate in the political process at a much higher rate and with a much stronger sense of asian American identity than do other asian Americans. n104 And neocons dominate the practice of asian American law. n105 Finally, many of today's young professional asian Americans are neocons, and it is these young professionals with fancy degrees who recently arrived immigrants tend to trust. n106 As is becoming clear, the ramifications of leaving out neocon asian Americans are many. I take up a further discussion of neocons and the "progressive" asian American agenda in the next Section.