**1NC**

**T**

**Interpretation: Reduce means permanent reduction – it’s distinct from “suspend”**

**Reynolds 59** – Judge (In the Matter of Doris A. Montesani, Petitioner, v. Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department 9 A.D.2d 51; 189 N.Y.S.2d 695; 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7391 August 13, 1959, lexis)

Section 83's counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his "tour" and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway.  [\*\*\*13]  The section says "reduced", does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The **plain dictionary meaning** of the word is to diminish, lower or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate **permanency**.

**Violation: "during pandemics" means theyre reinstated later**

**Vote neg for limits and ground – they cause a race to the bottom of unpredictable affs that reduce IP protections for a short period of time and don’t link to neg disads.**

**CP**

**Text: The People’s Republic of China should increase production and distribution of Chinese developed vaccines and medical technology related to COVID-19.**

**The CP massively ramps up Chinese “vaccine diplomacy” which solves the case**

**Juecheng and Yuwei 8-13-21**

(Zhao and Hu, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231387.shtml)

One of China’s most valued contributions to the global fair accessibility to COVID-19 vaccines is to enable more developing countries to hone their ability to **produce vaccines by themselves,** Zha Daojiong, professor of International Political Economy from Peking University, who closely studies the global vaccine equitable allocation framework, told the Global Times in a recent exclusive interview. Sharing his insights on widely discussed “vaccine nationalism,” “wavering vaccine intellectual property,” and “COVAX operation challenges,” Zha believes that China is advocating negotiations among countries on equitable global distribution of vaccines from a humanitarian, and global perspective. China has vowed to make efforts to provide the world with 2 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines this year and donate $100 million to COVAX to promote global vaccine provision. This commitment comes amid the rampaging Delta variant, which is bringing more challenges for developing countries to access vaccines and combat the pandemic while the West continues to drag its heels in fulfilling its promises. The promise was made at the first meeting of a forum on international cooperation on COVID-19 vaccines held on August 5. Zha suggested that the forum, alongside the Initiative for Belt and Road Partnership on COVID-19 Vaccine Cooperation, reflect China’s efforts to support long-term cooperation in the vaccine industry globally. However, some Western media have labeled China and Russia as the pioneers of the global "vaccine diplomacy" campaign. The choice of vaccines by countries has become the epitome of global geopolitics.   Foreign comments on China using "vaccine diplomacy" in a narrow geopolitical sense reflect the real competition among COVID-19 vaccine providers, Zha told the Global Times. **Due to China’s mature vaccine technologies, longer shelf life and lower requirement for storage and transportation, Chinese made vaccines are a more preferable choice for many developing countries with relatively weak vaccination infrastructure** . This has been reflected in the approval of Chinese vaccines in more than 100 countries. But the phenomenon of “vaccine nationalism” was never absent in the decision by governments to choose vaccines, Zha suggested. “For example, some countries and regions would include geopolitical factors in choosing vaccines. These countries would reject certain vaccines. Moreover, some media outlets refuse to accept the fact that the professional assessment of vaccine efficacy is also a scientific process. Instead, they made comments on potential vaccines based on their geopolitical interests. This is also a kind of “vaccine nationalism”. Voices blaming “vaccine nationalism” have long been present in developed countries. For instance, Zha recalled how, during the H1N1 pandemic of 2009 which affected more than 200 countries and regions for more than a year, certain developed countries bought out entire stocks of vaccines against H1N1 once they were developed. Though some of those countries had promised to donate vaccines to others after they met their vaccination needs, the virus had long disappeared before their donations were made. Therefore, many in other nations lost the opportunity of a timely vaccination. Providing assistance from one country to another in the field of infectious or non-infectious diseases is often referred to as "health diplomacy." Some international public health research literature support "health diplomacy" because cooperation in this field is **conducive to the improvement of political, economic and diplomatic relations**, Zha said. China has taken important steps to close the global vaccine gap, including the acceleration of large-scale production, boosting fair distribution, and licensing local production in more countries.

**Successful vaccine diplomacy is key to overall Chinese Soft Power**

**Huang, PhD, 3-11-21**

(YANZHONG HUANG is Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations, a Professor at Seton Hall University’s School of Diplomacy and International Relations, and Director of the school’s Center for Global Health Studies. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-03-11/vaccine-diplomacy-paying-china )

Vaccines have had a place in diplomacy since the Cold War era. The country that can manufacture and distribute lifesaving injections to others less fortunate sees a return on its investment in the form of **soft power**: prestige, goodwill, perhaps a degree of indebtedness, even awe. Today the country moving fastest toward consolidating these gains may be China, under President Xi Jinping, who proclaimed last May that Chinese-made vaccines against COVID-19 would become a “**global public good.”** Since that time, top officials have promised many developing countries priority access to Chinese vaccines, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry has announced that the country is providing free vaccines to 69 countries and commercially exporting them to 28 more. China’s competitors worry that where Beijing’s inoculations go, **its influence will follow.** But the field of COVID-19 vaccination is still a largely uncharted one and scattered with barriers, whether logistical, scientific, psychological, or geopolitical. China’s path through this labyrinth is neither obvious nor assured. The country faces stiffening competition from Russia and India. Now the United States, too, has entered the global stakes for equitable distribution of safe and effective vaccines. China has yet to prove that it can fulfill the role it has taken on or win the trust of those it has offered to aid. CHINA'S STAKE The Chinese government dislikes the term “vaccine diplomacy.” The implication that China would distribute vaccine doses in order to broaden its global political influence is a “sinister” one, according to the official Xinhua News Agency. Rather, the Chinese government contends that “in promoting cooperation in combating the pandemic, China does not seek any geopolitical goals or have any economic interest considerations, and it has never attached any political strings.” Xi has further stressed that by distributing necessary goods in a crisis, China is merely acting as a responsible great power should. In this regard, China may seek to succeed with vaccines where it failed with masks: last spring, quality-control issues and clumsy propaganda tarnished the country’s efforts to supply medical products to the developed world. Now China is looking to **showcase its global health leadership** to lower- and middle-income countries, where it is distributing vaccines. But Beijing surely has additional foreign policy objectives in mind. China began its vaccine development projects early last spring, and state media made quite clear that through them, China hoped to demonstrate its technological prowess and the **superiority of its authoritarian model of governance**. “We are not lagging behind the United States as far as the technology is concerned,” a Chinese virologist told the state-backed Global Times. Another scientist highlighted China’s “system advantages”: “The United States is no match for China in terms of concentrating power to accomplish big things.” Indeed, unlike in the United States, vaccine development in China was a highly state-driven process. The Chinese government simultaneously pushed several technological approaches, including inactivated vaccines, mRNA vaccines, and adenovirus vector vaccines. It mobilized at least 22 institutes and firms to work on 17 vaccine development projects. And until last summer, China was leading the global race in vaccine development. It developed a vaccine (Ad5-nCoV) as early as February 2020, started Phase 1 clinical trials on March 16, and published results of the trials in late May. General Chen Wei, the face of China’s vaccine development operation, celebrated such achievements as “an embodiment of our country’s S&T progress, an embodiment of China’s great-power image and responsibility, and, even more, a contribution to humankind.” Behind such lofty goals lie commercial objectives, too. Health-related development assistance has long offered Chinese pharmaceutical companies a low-cost means of expanding their market share in the developing world. In March 2020, President Xi explicitly linked the shipment of medical supplies overseas to the “Health Silk Road,” now an important component of the Belt and Road Initiative. Xiaofeng Liang, a former deputy director of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, has publicly called for prioritizing BRI countries for access to Chinese vaccines. But the opportunity hardly ends there. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, few Chinese pharmaceutical companies had received World Health Organization prequalification to supply medical products to international organizations and donor funds. In 2019, China’s share in the value of UN-procured medical products was only 1.9 percent, compared with 21.9 percent for India. Chinese media lamented that of the 155 WHO-prequalified vaccines, only four were from China, compared with 44 from India. Indeed, Indian pharmaceutical firms produced more than 60 percent of the vaccines sold worldwide. The huge global demand for COVID-19 vaccines and “vaccine nationalism” in wealthy nations have created a great opportunity for China to break into a market that Indian and Western pharmaceutical firms have long dominated. If the vaccine were priced at $10 per dose with a 40 percent net profit margin, even a 15 percent share of the vaccine market in lower- and middle-income countries would generate total sales of $10.8 billion and a profit of $4.32 billion for the Chinese economy. In reality, Chinese vaccines are often priced higher than $10.

**Chinese leadership stops global secessionist conflict**

**Griffiths 16 -** Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney (Ryan, States, Nations, and Territorial Stability: Why Chinese Hegemony Would Be Better for International Order, Security Studies, 25:3, 519-545, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2016.1195628)

I began the article by claiming that the **Pax Sinica would be better for international order**. In making this claim I define “better” in narrow terms emphasizing territorial stability, which can be assessed in several ways. How often do either external aggressors or internal separatists shift sovereign borders through violence? What is the frequency of secessionist civil war? How much international discord is there on the topic of secession and recognition? This is the ledger I use when comparing the Pax Sinica with the post-1945 American-led order. There are many other factors, to be sure, and critics might point to a number of ways in which Chinese hegemony would be worse. For example, they may question the support for human rights under Chinese leadership. I do not argue that Chinese hegemony would be better in all ways—there are pros and cons to any order—but I contend that there are net benefits where **territorial stability is concerned**. Analyzed under these terms the key differences between the American order and the imagined Chinese order have to do with the politics of secession and sovereign recognition. International order matters because it determines diplomatic practices and shapes behavior. It sets the rules of the game. The American-led order over the last seventy years has attempted to balance the norms of territorial integrity and self-determination by establishing rules for what nations are eligible for independence. But, as Fabry notes, that is an enormously challenging project because developing clear rules that separate the lucky from the unlucky requires that states derive agreed-upon criteria in a constitutive process.73 Given the politics and conflicting principles of international life (and the evolving nature of normative arguments), inconsistency, ambiguity, and accusations of hypocrisy are unavoidable. The resulting political space creates **uncertainty** for states and nationalist movements over when self-determination applies and when it should be subordinated to territorial integrity. Incidents like the Ukrainian crisis cast a shadow over separatist crises elsewhere. The leadership in Azerbaijan detects double standards in American policy, wondering why it “punishes Russia for annexing Crimea, but not Armenia for similar behavior in Karabakh.”74 Such uncertainly can makes states feel vulnerable, as it has in Azerbaijan, change the incentives for key actors, and **increase the chance of conflict**. Secessionist civil war is a **common** feature of contemporary times. Scholars estimate that at least half of the civil wars since 1945 have involved secessionism, and Barbara F. Walter argues that secessionism is the chief source of violence in the world today.75 Erica Chenowith and Maria Stephan find that secessionism is one of the few (if only) forms of political protest where violent tactics are more effective than nonviolent.76 Meanwhile, Tanisha Fazal and I identify fifty-five secessionist movements as of 2011 and record that many of these movements feel they have a reasonable chance of gaining independence in light of the somewhat flexible practices surrounding recognition.77 Given the strategic environment in which secessionists operate, where violence can be effective and where sovereignty is thought to be obtainable, it should come as no surprise that conflict is common. In regard to territorial stability, the concern of contemporary times is not traditional territorial conquest, but the threat posed by state fragmentation.78 This is where Chinese hegemony ought to **improve international order**.

**DA**

**1NC – Disease**

**Pharma industry innovation is up but profit margins are razor thin**

**Young 9-14-21**

(Peter, CEO and President of Young & Partners, and a member of Pharm Exec’s Editorial Advisory Board. https://www.pharmexec.com/view/fishawack-health-appoints-new-ceo-jonathan-koch)

Business. The business outlook for pharma manufacturers is positive with regard to drug development and the **volume and quality of promising drugs in the pipeline**. The industry’s innovations in drug development and productivity **have improved**. Combined with indirect R&D pursuits through the biotech industry, overall development activity has been **strong and should continue to be strong**. There has been a shift in emphasis toward orphan drugs, oncology therapies, new innovations such as mRNA, gene therapy, CAR-T, immune system solutions, CRISPR, etc. The current pandemic has been a plus for the reputation of the industry, but a negative with regard to the ability to execute clinical trials and to maintain industry supply chains. Generic pharma companies are **under severe profit pressures** and will continue to consolidate, cut costs, and try to push selectively into higher value and more protected product areas. They are under intense pricing and competitive pressure.

**Strong IP protection spurs innovation by encouraging risk-taking and incentivizing knowledge sharing -- prefer statistical analysis of multiple studies**

**Ezell and Cory 19** [Stephen Ezell, vice president & global innovation policy @ ITIF, BS Georgetown School of Foreign Service. Nigel Cory, associate director covering trade policy @ ITIF, MA public policy @ Georgetown. "The Way Forward for Intellectual Property Internationally," Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 4-25-2019, accessed 8-25-2021, https://itif.org/publications/2019/04/25/way-forward-intellectual-property-internationally] HWIC

IPRs Strengthen Innovation

Intellectual property rights power innovation. For instance, analyzing the level of intellectual property protections (via the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness reports) and creative outputs (via the Global Innovation Index) shows that counties with stronger IP protection have more creative outputs (in terms of intangible assets and creative goods and services in a nation’s media, printing and publishing, and entertainment industries, including online), even at varying levels of development.46

IPR reforms also introduce strong incentives for domestic innovation. Sherwood, using case studies from 18 developing countries, concluded that poor provision of intellectual property rights deters local innovation and risk-taking.47 In contrast, IPR reform has been associated with increased innovative activity, as measured by domestic patent filings, albeit with some variation across countries and sectors.48 For example, Ryan, in a study of biomedical innovations and patent reform in Brazil, found that patents provided incentives for innovation investments and facilitated the functioning of technology markets.49 Park and Lippoldt also observed that the provision of adequate protection for IPRs can help to stimulate local innovation, in some cases building on the transfer of technologies that provide inputs and spillovers.50 In other words, local innovators are introduced to technologies first through the technology transfer that takes place in an environment wherein protection of IPRs is assured; then, they may build on those ideas to create an evolved product or develop alternate approaches (i.e., to innovate). Related research finds that trade in technology—through channels including imports, foreign direct investment, and technology licensing—improves the quality of developing-country innovation by increasing the pool of ideas and efficiency of innovation by encouraging the division of innovative labor and specialization.51 However, Maskus notes that **without protection from potential abuse of their newly developed technologies, foreign enterprises may be less willing to reveal technical information associated with their innovations**.52 The protection of patents and trade secrets provides necessary legal assurances for firms wishing to reveal proprietary characteristics of technologies to subsidiaries and licensees via contracts. Counties with stronger IP protection have more creative outputs (in terms of intangible assets and creative goods and services in a nation’s media, printing and publishing, and entertainment industries, including online), even at varying levels of development. The relationship between IPR rights and innovation can also be seen in studies of how the introduction of stronger IPR laws, with regard to patents, copyrights, and trademarks, affect R&D activity in an economy. Studies by Varsakelis and by Kanwar and Evenson found that **R&D to GDP ratios are positively related to the strength of patent rights**, and are conditional on other factors.53 Cavazos Cepeda et al. found a positive influence of IPRs on the level of R&D in an economy, with each 1 percent increase in the level of protection of IPRs in an economy (as measured by improvements to a country’s score in the Patent Rights Index) equating to, on average, a 0.7 percent increase in the domestic level of R&D.54 Likewise, a 1 percent increase in copyright protection was associated with a 3.3 percent increase in domestic R&D. Similarly, when trademark protection increased by 1 percent, there was an associated R&D increase of 1.4 percent. As the authors concluded, “Increases in the protection of the IPRs carried economic benefits in the form of higher inflows of FDI, and increases in the levels of both domestically conducted R&D and service imports as measured by licensing fees.”55 As Jackson summarized, regarding the relationship between IPR reform and both innovation and R&D, and FDI, “In addition to spurring domestic innovation, strong intellectual property rights can increase incentives for foreign direct investment which in turn also leads to economic growth.”56

**COVID exceptions erode IP policies broadly.**

**PRMA 21** The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 2021 <https://phrma.org/-/media/Project/PhRMA/PhRMA-Org/PhRMA-Org/PDF/P-R/PhRMA_2021-Special-301_Review_Comment-1.pdf> SM

Moreover, some countries are using the COVID-19 pandemic opportunistically to advance longstanding industrial policies to further erode intellectual property policies. India and South Africa are key sponsors of a proposal at the WTO TRIPS Council calling to eliminate for an indefinite term certain WTO obligations to grant IP on a wide range of technologies related to COVID-19. The proposal marks a significant escalation in anti-IP global activism and will further polarize legitimate conversations on countries’ engagement to combat the pandemic. The proposal will do nothing to address the production and distribution challenges for making COVID-19 vaccines globally available. If anything the proposals threaten to undermine the ability to respond to another pandemic, and will inevitably affect IP discussions in countries around the world.

**Biopharmaceutical innovation is key to prevent future pandemics and bioterror**

**Marjanovic and Feijao 20** [Sonja Marjanovic Ph.D., Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Carolina Feijao, Ph.D. in biochemistry, University of Cambridge; M.Sc. in quantitative biology, Imperial College London; B.Sc. in biology, University of Lisbon. "How to Best Enable Pharma Innovation Beyond the COVID-19 Crisis," RAND Corporation, 05-2020, accessed 8-8-2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA407-1.html] HWIC

As key actors in the healthcare innovation landscape, pharmaceutical and life sciences companies have been called on to develop medicines, vaccines and diagnostics for pressing public health challenges. The COVID-19 crisis is one such challenge, but there are many others. For example, MERS, SARS, Ebola, Zika and avian and swine flu are also infectious diseases that represent public health threats. Infectious agents such as anthrax, smallpox and tularemia could present threats in a bioterrorism context.1 The general threat to public health that is posed by antimicrobial resistance is also well-recognised as an area in need of pharmaceutical innovation. Innovating in response to these challenges does not always align well with pharmaceutical industry commercial models, shareholder expectations and competition within the industry. However, the expertise, networks and infrastructure that industry has within its reach, as well as public expectations and the moral imperative, make pharmaceutical companies and the wider life sciences sector an indispensable partner in the search for solutions that save lives. This perspective argues for the need to establish more sustainable and scalable ways of incentivising pharmaceutical innovation in response to infectious disease threats to public health. It considers both past and current examples of efforts to mobilise pharmaceutical innovation in high commercial risk areas, including in the context of current efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. In global pandemic crises like COVID-19, the urgency and scale of the crisis – as well as the spotlight placed on pharmaceutical companies – mean that contributing to the search for effective medicines, vaccines or diagnostics is essential for socially responsible companies in the sector. 2 It is therefore unsurprising that we are seeing industry-wide efforts unfold at unprecedented scale and pace. Whereas there is always scope for more activity, industry is currently contributing in a variety of ways. Examples include pharmaceutical companies donating existing compounds to assess their utility in the fight against COVID19; screening existing compound libraries in-house or with partners to see if they can be repurposed; accelerating trials for potentially effective medicine or vaccine candidates; and in some cases rapidly accelerating in-house research and development to discover new treatments or vaccine agents and develop diagnostics tests.3,4 Pharmaceutical companies are collaborating with each other in some of these efforts and participating in global R&D partnerships (such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative effort to accelerate the development of potential therapies for COVID-19) and supporting national efforts to expand diagnosis and testing capacity and ensure affordable and ready access to potential solutions.3,5,6 The primary purpose of such innovation is to benefit patients and wider population health. Although there are also reputational benefits from involvement that can be realised across the industry, there are likely to be relatively few companies that are ‘commercial’ winners. Those who might gain substantial revenues will be under pressure not to be seen as profiting from the pandemic. In the United Kingdom for example, GSK has stated that it does not expect to profit from its COVID-19 related activities and that any gains will be invested in supporting research and long-term pandemic preparedness, as well as in developing products that would be affordable in the world’s poorest countries.7 Similarly, in the United States AbbVie has waived intellectual property rights for an existing combination product that is being tested for therapeutic potential against COVID-19, which would support affordability and allow for a supply of generics.8,9 Johnson & Johnson has stated that its potential vaccine – which is expected to begin trials – will be available on a not-for-profit basis during the pandemic.10 Pharma is mobilising substantial efforts to rise to the COVID-19 challenge at hand. However, we need to consider how pharmaceutical innovation for responding to emerging infectious diseases can best be enabled beyond the current crisis. Many public health threats (including those associated with other infectious diseases, bioterrorism agents and antimicrobial resistance) are urgently in need of pharmaceutical innovation, even if their impacts are not as visible to society as COVID-19 is in the immediate term. The pharmaceutical industry has responded to previous public health emergencies associated with infectious disease in recent times – for example those associated with Ebola and Zika outbreaks.11 However, it has done so to a lesser scale than for COVID-19 and with contributions from fewer companies. Similarly, levels of activity in response to the threat of antimicrobial resistance are still low.12 There are important policy questions as to whether – and how – industry could engage with such public health threats to an even greater extent under improved innovation conditions.

**That causes extinction, which outweighs.**

**Millett & Snyder-Beattie ‘17**. Millett, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; and Snyder-Beattie, M.S., Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 08-01-2017. “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” Health Security, 15(4), PubMed

In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could **threaten human existence**. Although the **probability** of human extinction from bioweapons **may** be low, the **expected value** of **reducing** the risk could **still** be **large**, since such risks jeopardize the existence of **all future generations**. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. **Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls** on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to **remote populations**, overcome **rare genetic resistances**, and **evade detection**, cures, and **countermeasures**. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: **Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off**, and so **evolutionary pressures** could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they **do not rule** the possibility **out** entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of **species going extinct due to disease**—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also **historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out** by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include **native American tribes** exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But **many diseases are proof** of principle that **each worst-case attribute can be realized independently**. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, **natural evolution** would be an **unlikely** source for pathogens with the **highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach**. But **advances in biotech**nology might allow the creation of diseases that **combine such traits**. Recent controversy has **already emerged** over a number of **scientific experiments** that resulted in viruses with enhanced **transmissibility**, **lethality**, and/or the ability to overcome **therapeutics**.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a **long historical track record** of**state-run bioweapon research** applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and **m**utually **a**ssured **d**estruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 The **possibility of a war** between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27

**COVID incentivizes engineered bioterror.**

**Walsh, 20** -- Axios Future correspondent [Bryan Walsh, "The coronavirus pandemic reawakens bioweapon fears," Axios, 5-14-2020, https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-pandemic-pathogen-bioweapon-45417c86-52aa-41b1-8a99-44a6e597d3a8.html, accessed 9-7-2020]

The coronavirus pandemic reawakens bioweapon fears

The immense human and economic toll of the COVID-19 pandemic only underscores the threat posed by pathogens that could be deliberately engineered and released.

Why it matters: **New tech**nology like **gene editing** and **DNA synthesis** has made the creation of more virulent pathogens easier. Yet security and regulation efforts haven't kept pace with the science.

What's happening: Despite some claims by the White House, overwhelming scientific evidence indicates that the novel coronavirus was not accidentally released from a lab or deliberately engineered, but naturally spilled over from an animal source.

That doesn't mean the threat from bioweapons isn't dire. Along with AI, **engineered pandemics** are widely considered the **biggest existential risk facing humanity**.

That's in part because a pathogen could be **engineered** in a lab **for maximum contagiousness and virulence**, well beyond what would arise through natural selection.

Case in point: a 2018 pandemic simulation put on by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security featured a fictional engineered virus called Clade X that combined the contagiousness of the common cold with the virulence of the real-life Nipah virus, which has a mortality rate of 40-75%. The resulting simulated global outbreak killed 150 million people.

COVID-19 isn't anywhere near that fatal, but the pandemic has shown the vulnerability of the U.S. and the world to biological threats both natural and manmade.

"Potential adversaries are of course seeing the same things we’re seeing," says Richard Pilch of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. "Anyone looking for a radical leveling approach — whether a state actor like North Korea or a motivated terrorist organization — may be influenced by COVID-19 to consider pursuing a biological weapons capability."

Background: Bioweapons were officially banned by the Biological Weapons Convention in 1975, though North Korea is suspected of maintaining an offensive bioweapons program.

A particular concern about biowarfare and bioterror, though, is that many of the tools and methods that could be used to create a weaponized virus are largely indistinguishable from those used in the course of legitimate scientific research. This makes biotechnology "dual-use" — and that much more difficult to safely regulate without cutting off research that could be vitally important.

While earlier bioweapons fears focused on the possibility that a state or terror group could try to weaponize a known dangerous agent like smallpox — which would require somehow obtaining restricted pathogens — new technology means that someone could obtain the genetic sequence of a germ online and synthesize it in the lab.

"If you've been trained in a relevant technical discipline, that means you can make almost any potentially harmful agent that you're aware of," says Kevin Esvelt, a biologist at the MIT Media Lab and a member of the CDC's Biological Agent Containment Working Group. That would include the novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19, which was recently synthesized from its genetic sequence in a study published in Nature.

How it works: Currently, synthetic DNA is ordered through commercial suppliers. But while most suppliers screen DNA orders for the sequences of dangerous pathogens, they're not required to — and not all do, which means safety efforts are "incomplete, inaccurate, and insecure," says Esvelt.

Screening efforts that look for the genetic sequences of known pathogens also wouldn't necessarily be able to detect when synthetic DNA was being used to make something entirely novel and dangerous.

In the near future, desktop DNA synthesizers may be able to generate synthetic DNA in the lab, cutting out the need for commercial suppliers — and potential security screenings.

The **democratization of biotech**nology could unleash a **wave of** creativity and **innovation**, just as the democratization of personal computing did. But it also increases the number of people who could potentially make a dangerous engineered virus, whether deliberately or by accident.

**We need innovation to deal with variants**

**Van Etten 07-15**

**(Megan Van Etten; senior director of public affairs at PhRMA, responsible for leading the association’s public affairs efforts on international issues, including trade, intellectual property and access to medicines, was director of media and external communications at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; (07-15-21) Promoting global vaccine equity while protecting innovation; Pharma;** [**https://catalyst.phrma.org/promoting-global-vaccine-equity-while-protecting-innovation**](https://catalyst.phrma.org/promoting-global-vaccine-equity-while-protecting-innovation)**; CKD)**

America’s biopharmaceutical companies have successfully researched, developed and distributed billions of doses of multiple vaccines and therapeutics to halt the spread of COVID-19. The availability of COVID-19 vaccines has shifted the trajectory of the pandemic and is undoubtedly saving lives. Further, the approval of the first ever mRNA vaccines has the potential to usher in an era of groundbreaking mRNA applications beyond COVID-19. But the transformative promise of these vaccines only extends as far as patients’ ability to access them. Equitable distribution worldwide is critical. Despite significant cross-sector and multi-stakeholder efforts like COVAX, we are still seeing vaccine access and distribution challenges across many regions of the world due to complex barriers. Unfortunately, [some have focused](https://catalyst.phrma.org/the-biden-administration-allows-politics-to-upend-a-pragmatic-pandemic-response) their attention on **a short-sighted and misguided “solution” that seeks to waive** international commitments to honor intellectual property (IP) rights for COVID-19 vaccines under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The approach **fails to examine and address the real barriers to equitable vaccine distribution** and could undermine the global pandemic response. Biopharmaceutical manufacturers, governments and non-governmental organizations must work together to take urgent steps to further address this inequity by: Stepping Up Dose Sharing A handful of countries secured contracts for COVID-19 vaccines during the early research and development phases, and as a result, have a larger supply of vaccines than needed. Manufacturers and governments in these countries must continue to work together to urgently and responsibly redirect meaningful proportions of these doses to low- and middle-income countries through COVAX and other established mechanisms. Continuing to Optimize Production The vaccine manufacturing process depends on a complex global network of suppliers of raw materials and equipment. The scale and speed at which these vaccines must be produced to keep up with the current demand is unprecedented. To address this challenge, vaccine manufacturers must work with governments and suppliers to undertake all practicable efforts to maximize COVID-19 vaccine output without compromising safety and quality. Calling out Trade Barriers To ensure supply chains are globally integrated, and for distribution systems to work efficiently, officials must remove trade barriers. It is critical that governments, in coordination with the WTO, work to eliminate all trade and regulatory barriers standing in the way of vaccine distribution and the procurement of the raw materials and components needed for the manufacturing process. Supporting Country Readiness Serious gaps in readiness across a significant number of countries need to be swiftly addressed to ensure that supplied doses are used and not destroyed. We urgently need cross-stakeholder collaboration—particularly in low- and middle-income countries—that supports vaccine roll-out and ensures countries are ready and able to deploy vaccines as efficiently as possible. **Driving Further Innovation While** the development of COVID-19 vaccines has been a remarkable feat, stakeholders must **continue to prioritize policies and legal mechanisms that foster a strong innovation ecosystem, supported by IP incentives**. **Without this commitment to continuous innovation**, **our ability to swiftly address emerging COVID-19 variants and future pandemics is hindered**. The COVID-19 innovations available today **would not have been possible without strong IP systems** that encourage innovation, protect novel ideas, enable critical partnerships and **incentivize continued progress against deadly diseases**. To ensure that patients around the world can access and realize the benefits of this astonishing progress, governments, the biopharmaceutical industry and non-governmental organizations must invest in solutions that comprehensively address the real issues driving inequities in vaccine distribution. America’s biopharmaceutical companies are focused on saving lives. Right now, that means more vaccines in more arms in countries around the world – without sacrificing safety or endangering production supply chains.

**no "strategic patenting" arg we have vaccine bc of ip**

**Case**

**Heg**

**Heg is bad –**

**1] Asian prolif**

**Fettweis 18**

Christopher J. Fettweis, an American political scientist and the Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, “Chapter 2: Unipolarity and Nuclear Weapons,” *Psychology of a Superpower: Security and Dominance in U.S. Foreign Policy,* Columbia University Press, 2018, accessed through Georgetown Libraries

First and most obviously, the second nuclear age is likely to be marked by a **great deal more proliferation** than the first. According to Bracken, the “overarching theme” of the age will be the “**breakdown of the major power monopoly** over the bomb.”6 **Unipolarity** **provides strong incentives** for smaller states, who have no hope of balancing the United States, **to pursue nuclear weapons.** **No matter how much effort** the United States puts into non- and counterproliferation, “nuclear weapons will **nevertheless spread**, with a new member occasionally joining the club,” predicted Kenneth Waltz. 7 “The most likely scenario in the wake of the Cold War,” argued John Mearsheimer, “is further nuclear proliferation in Europe,” and “it is **not likely** the proliferation will be well managed.”8 **Instability** and insecurity **would spread**, as would nuclear weapons, throughout the global South.9 Since new nuclear states were almost inevitable, both Waltz and Mearsheimer felt that it was in the interest of the West to attempt to manage, and indeed even to encourage, gradual proliferation to help stabilize the system.

These chains of proliferation will lead to **new**, potentially **unstable nuclear rivalries**. Were North Korea to be accepted as the ninth nuclearweapons state, Graham Allison warned in 2004, South Korea and Japan would **build their own arsenals** “by the end of the decade.”10 The second nuclear age will be “much more decentralized,” with “many independent nuclear decision centers.”11 A “multipolar nuclear order” is on the horizon, if it has not already arrived.12

The new nuclear powers are not likely to resemble the old. The second major assumption of the SNA literature is that proliferation will reach less enlightened parts of the globe, those led by unpredictable, semirational tyrants. The old rules of **deterrence may not apply**, since the motivations of these actors are not only **less knowable** but often **ruled by passions and nationalism**. “The idea of budding defense intellectuals sitting around computer models and debating strategy in Iran or Pakistan defies credulity,” or at least Bracken’s estimation, since in these states “hysterical nationalism” overrules rationality.13 The “overdetermined” cascades of proliferation across Asia will bring a host of **new, less trustworthy actors** into the nuclear camp, from **rogue states to nonstate actors**, all of whom will be essentially **undeterrable** by traditional means.14 Their motivations will be less rational or simply less transparent to the outside world.

In the second nuclear age, not just an accidental but the **intentional use** of nuclear weapons by new nuclear actors **cannot be ruled out**.15 Rogue states do not seek nuclear weapons for the reasons that motivated earlier proliferants. While all U.S. observers believe that Washington’s arsenal exists for defensive purposes, to deter any attack that our enemies would otherwise contemplate, the primary use of new nuclear weapons will be offensive. The possibility for irrationality in new nuclear powers inspired the United States to scrap the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and begin thinking about how to “tailor” deterrence to target smaller actors.16 A nuclear Iran will use its weapons to **bully or even attack**, **not deter**. In 2017, experts warned that North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles **would be coercive**, to extract concessions from U.S. allies. “North Korea’s contempt for its neighbors suggests that it would hold them hostage with its nuclear weapons,” wrote the widely respected ambassador Chris Hill. “Would proliferation **stop with South Korea and Japan**? **What about Taiwan**?”17 As a result, the basic assumptions of deterrence need to be rethought.

**2] Entanglement, authoritarianism, and Russia-China aggression**

**Ashford, PhD, 19**

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 4, CNAS)

**Humility is a virtue**. Yet in the last quarter century, American policymakers have been far more likely to embrace the notion of America as the “indispensable nation,” responsible for protecting allies, promoting democracy and human rights, tamping down conflicts, and generally managing global affairs. Compare this ideal to the U.S. track record – **endless Middle Eastern wars, the rise of ISIS, global democratic backsliding, a revanchist Russia, resurgent China**, and a world reeling from the election of President Donald Trump – and this label seems instead **the height of hubris.** Many of the failures of U.S. foreign policy speak for themselves. As the daily drumbeat of bad news attests, interventions in Iraq and Libya were **not victories for human rights or democracy, but rather massively destabilizing** for the Middle East as a whole. Afghanistan – despite initial military successes – has become a quagmire, highlighting the futility of nation- building. Other failures of America’s grand strategy are less visible, but no less damaging. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe helped to reignite hostility between Russia and the West. Worse, it has diluted the alliance’s defensive capacity and its democratic character. And even as the war on terror fades from public view, it remains as open-ended as ever: Today, the United States is **at war in seven countries and engaged in “combating terrorism’ in more than 80**.1 To put it bluntly: America’s strategy since the end of the Cold War – **whether it is called primacy or liberal internationalism** – may not be a total failure, but it **has not been successful** either. Many have tried to place blame for these poor outcomes.2 But recrimination is less important than understanding why America’s strategy has failed so badly and avoiding these mistakes in future. Much of the explanation is the natural outcome of changing constraints. **Iraq and Libya should not be viewed as regrettable anomalies, but rather the logical outcome of unipolarity and America’s liberal internationalist inclination to solve every global problem.** It’s also a reliance on **flawed assumptions** – that what is good for America is always good for the world, for example. Support for dangerous sovereignty-undermining norms adds to the problem; just look at the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has proved not to protect populations or stabilize fragile states, but to **provoke chaos, encourage nuclear proliferation, and undermine the international institutions.** Perhaps, if nothing else had changed, a form of watered-down liberal internationalism that foreswore interventionism and drew back from the war on terror might have been possible.3 But international politics are undergoing a period of profound transformation, from unipolarity to regional or even global multipolarity. **Primacy** – and the consistent drumbeat of calls in Washington to do more, always and everywhere – **is neither sustainable nor prudent.** Nor can we fall back on warmed-over Cold War–era strategies better suited to an era of bipolar superpower competition.

**3] Terrorism – it justifies intervention and empirically causes blowback.**

**Bandow 19** (Doug, senior fellow @ Cato Institute and JD Stanford, 6-2-2019, "Understanding the Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Albright Doctrine," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/understanding-failure-us-foreign-policy-albright-doctrine-60477)> AG

Since 9/11, Washington has been extraordinarily active militarily—invading two nations, bombing and droning several others, deploying special operations forces in yet more countries, and applying sanctions against many. Tragically, **the threat of Islamist violence and terrorism only have metastasized**. Although Al Qaeda lost its effectiveness in directly plotting attacks, it continues to inspire national offshoots. Moreover, while losing its physical “caliphate” the Islamic State added further terrorism to its portfolio.

Three successive administrations have ever more deeply ensnared the United States in the Middle East. War with Iran appears to be frighteningly possible. Ever-wealthier allies are ever-more dependent on America. Russia is actively hostile to the United States and Europe. Washington and Beijing appear to be a collision course on far more than trade. Yet the current administration appears convinced that doing more of the same will achieve different results, the best definition of insanity.

Despite his sometimes abusive and incendiary rhetoric, the president has departed little from his predecessors’ policies. For instance, American forces remain deployed in Afghanistan and Syria. Moreover, the Trump administration has increased its military and materiel deployments to Europe. Also, Washington has intensified economic sanctions on Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, and even penalized additional countries, namely Venezuela.

U.S. foreign policy suffers from systematic flaws in the thinking of the informal policy collective which former Obama aide Ben Rhodes dismissed as “The Blob.” Perhaps no official better articulated The Blob’s defective precepts than Madeleine Albright, United Nations ambassador and Secretary of State.

First is overweening hubris. In 1998 Secretary of State Albright declared that “If we have to use force, it is because we are America: **we are the indispensable nation**. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.”

Even then her claim was implausible. America blundered into the Korean War and barely achieved a passable outcome. The Johnson administration infused Vietnam with dramatically outsize importance. For decades, Washington foolishly refused to engage the People’s Republic of China. Washington-backed dictators in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, and elsewhere fell ingloriously. An economic embargo against Cuba that continues today helped turn Fidel Castro into a global folk hero. Washington veered dangerously close to nuclear war with Moscow during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and again two decades later during military exercises in Europe.

U.S. officials rarely were prepared for events that occurred in the next week or month, let alone years later. Americans did no better than the French in Vietnam. Americans managed events in Africa no better than the British, French, and Portuguese colonial overlords. Washington made more than its share of bad, even awful decisions in dealing with other nations around the globe.

Perhaps the worst failing of U.S. foreign policy was ignoring the inevitable impact of **foreign intervention**. Americans would never passively accept another nation bombing, invading, and occupying their nation, or interfering in their political system. Even if outgunned, they would resist. Yet Washington has undertaken all of these practices, with little consideration of the impact on those most affected—hence **the rise of terrorism** against the United States. Terrorism, horrid and awful though it is, became the weapon of choice of weaker peoples against intervention by the world’s industrialized national states.

The U.S. record since September 11 has been uniquely counterproductive. Rather than minimize hostility toward America, Washington adopted a policy—highlighted by launching new wars, killing more civilians, and ravaging additional societies—guaranteed to create enemies, exacerbate radicalism, and spread terrorism. **Blowback is everywhere**. Among the worst examples: Iraqi insurgents **mutated into ISIS**, which wreaked military havoc throughout the Middle East and turned to terrorism.

**WTO**

**1] CP solves – if covid isn't an issue anymore theres no reason the WTO would be viewed as blocking a solution**

**2] The US has structurally undermined WTO legitimacy**

**Baschuk 2/22** [(Bryce, reporter for Bloomberg Economics based in Geneva, Switzerland, has been published in Bloomberg, the Washington Times, United Press International and National Public Radio) “Biden Picks Up Where Trump Left Off in Hard-Line Stances at WTO,” Bloomberg, 2/22/2021] TDI

President Joe Biden’s administration dashed hopes for a softer approach to the World Trade Organization by pursuing a pair of his predecessor’s strategies that critics say risk **undermining the international trading system**.

The U.S. delegation to the WTO, in a statement Monday obtained by Bloomberg, backed the Trump administration’s decision to label Hong Kong exports as “[Made in China](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-30/hong-kong-takes-formal-wto-action-on-u-s-made-in-china-order)” and said the WTO had no right to mediate the matter because the organization’s rules permit countries to take any action to protect their “essential security interests.”

“The situation with respect to Hong Kong, China, constitutes a threat to the national security of the United States,” the U.S. delegation said. “Issues of national security are not matters appropriate for adjudication in the WTO dispute-settlement system.”

Prior to 2016, **WTO members generally steered clear of defending their trade actions on the basis of national security because doing so could encourage other nations to pursue protectionist policies** that have little or nothing to do with hostile threats.

That changed in 2018, when the Trump administration triggered a cold war-era law to justify tariffs on foreign imports of steel and aluminum. In response, a handful of U.S. trade partners, including Canada, the EU, and China filed disputes at the WTO and a ruling in those cases is expected later this year.

Since then, more nations -- including Saudi Arabia, India, Russia and others -- have cited the WTO’s national-security exemption in regional trade fights, leading trade experts to warn that such cases could **erode the organization’s ability to mediate disputes**.

The Biden administration on Monday said the U.S. has consistently argued that national-security disputes are not subject to WTO review because it would infringe on a member’s right to determine what is in its own security interests.

In spite of the U.S. objection, the WTO granted Hong Kong’s dispute inquiry and will establish a panel of experts to deliberate the matter and render a decision, which could take two to three years.

At the same meeting, the Biden administration said it **would not agree to appoint new members to the WTO’s appellate body**, a seven-member panel of experts who until 2019 had the final say on trade disputes involving billions of dollars worth of international commerce.

The Biden administration said it could not do so because **the U.S. “continues to have systemic concerns” with the functioning of the appellate body** as have all previous administrations over the past 16 years.

Though the statement was not entirely unexpected, it confirms America’s bipartisan frustration with the functioning of the WTO appellate body and the new administration’s willingness to block new panelists until changes can be agreed.

Once Katherine Tai is confirmed as the U.S. Trade Representative, her office “looks forward to working with” WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala to tackle the problems with WTO dispute settlement, including the unresolved issues over appellate-body overreach, USTR spokesman Adam Hodge said in an email. “These are long-standing, bipartisan concerns that we hope our trading partners will work with us to address,” he said.

The Trump administration broke precedent when it refused to consider any nominees to fill vacancies on the panel until there weren’t enough to sign off on new rulings. As a result, **the WTO’s dispute-settlement system has been critically damaged** because WTO members are now free to veto any adverse dispute rulings by appealing them into a legal void created by the appellate body’s paralysis.

**3] Trade wars don’t go to hot wars**

**Dayen 17**, New Republic contributor (David “Trump Is Signaling a Trade War, but It’s Not as Disastrous as You May Think”, https://www.thenation.com/article/trump-is-signaling-a-trade-war-but-its-not-as-disastrous-as-you-may-think/)

Can Trump enact tariffs on his own? Though it would appear to contradict the Origination Clause of the Constitution, Congress has delegated that authority in enough pieces of legislation that Trump could probably raise import duties unilaterally. But what would be the practical effect? Hard-core free traders paint a picture of cataclysm. Tariffs will launch trade wars, increase prices, and destroy the economy. This is all hard-wired into the pro-globalization worldview. Thomas Friedman once famously admitted that he wrote a column supporting a free-trade agreement with Central America without knowing a thing about it: “I just knew two words: free trade,” he told an audience. Presumably the opposite is true for Friedman: He sees one word, “tariff,” and immediately screams in horror. Oddly, many of those same proponents of free trade favor a policy that looks very much like a tariff. The Republican corporate-tax revamp includes something called a border-adjustment tax, which would impose a 20 percent tax on imports while eliminating a tax on exports. Like with tariffs, the goal appears to be to encourage domestic production. In fact, the tax would be much higher than the 5-10 percent tariff being floated. (It also might be illegal under the current global trade regime.) Supporters of border adjustment, particularly economists, argue that it will end up trade neutral, because the exchange rate will fluctuate in response to the tax. In other words, though the tax would make American-made goods more attractive, the value of the dollar would increase, leveling that out. Few of these economists seem to carry over the same analysis to the effects of a tariff. I don’t understand why. There’s no reason to doubt the fact that, if Trump imposed an across-the-board tariff, the dollar would strengthen, thus nullifying the desired effect. Indeed, before Trump has even taken office, the dollar has risen to a 14-year high, in anticipation of a more protectionist stance. Incidentally, for all the one-off announcements by Trump (however factually challenged) about hundreds of jobs he has allegedly rescued here or there, this one development—the rise in the dollar—has likely caused the loss of hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs, under standard economic theory. **Looked at this way, higher tariffs wouldn’t cause a recession (as Paul Krugman has acknowledged), but would be somewhat pointless, with currency exchanges shifting to account for any changes. Trade wars might temporarily reduce efficiency, as domestic supply chains would have to be rebuilt, but they’re unlikely to radically alter the balance of trade on their own.** There are other variables here. Importers and exporters who have lived in a world of floating exchange rates for decades **may be fairly nimble in adjusting to them**. On the downside, Krugman explains that raising tariffs could inhibit capital flows, meaning that investors will place less money into US markets. You can see how that might reduce economic growth. **But Jeff Spross points out that America currently has a problem with too much foreign money flowing in; reducing the flow could arguably make the economy more stable. Trump could also seek to prevent unlawful currency manipulation (not necessarily from China, but from other Asian nations) that artificially disadvantages US manufacturing.** The real unknown here is what Trump would do with all that tariff revenue. The border adjustment tax at 20 percent is assumed to bring in $1 trillion over the 10-year budget window. So a tariff of even one-quarter or one-half that size would draw significant funds. What’s the plan for it? Would it get plowed into job-creating investments? Tax cuts for the wealthy? That’s a significant variable as well. We do know that the same pundits who confidently predicted that globalization would be a win-win policy for America repeatedly got it wrong. Those on the losing side saw their jobs shipped out and factories closed down, and weren’t given the kind of assistance needed to offset the disruption. So it’s worth being a little skeptical of the warnings coming from the same corners now. I don’t have a ton of faith in the Trump team to necessarily make their trade agenda work (especially as corporate interests will seek to co-opt the redesigned policies in ways even friendlier to their bottom line). And I think there are smarter ways to balance our trade deficit than a tariff strategy which will just run up against currency exchange rates. But the hysteria accompanying these tariffs (which wasn’t at all present when President Obama imposed his own tariffs on Chinese tires and steel) **seems far beyond what little we can assume about the actual results of such a strategy.**

**4] Hamann – no warrant & no offroad mechanism unique to the WTO**

**Solvency**

**pandemics increase overall communication between countries**

**Relationship between pandemics and conflict unclear but still flows neg—COVID proves**

**Salemi 20** Colette Salemi [microeconomist PhD student in applied economics at the University of Minnesota. Her research focuses on conflict, forced displacement, environmental degradation and their intersections.], 10-15-2020, "Analysis," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/15/does-covid-19-raise-risk-violent-conflict-not-everywhere/> EH

The situation in Iraq illustrates how the coronavirus threat and policy responses to the pandemic could lead to an increase in violent conflict. But elsewhere in the world, **researchers who tally conflict-event counts see** **stagnant or even falling numbers**. And in some countries, **conflict trends don’t appear to be responding to covid**-19 **at all**. My research with Jeff Bloem documents considerable differences in the frequency of conflict events across several countries in recent months. Our findings suggest that the pandemic-conflict relationship seen in Iraq does **not appear to exist in many other countries.** How we did our research We used the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (**ACLED**), a database that counts the number of conflict events daily around the world. For 2019 and 2020, ACLED includes more than 100 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe — and tracks three categories of violent conflict: battles, violence against civilians and explosions/remote violence. We examine trends in the number of conflict events over time. To see whether the trend changes in response to covid-19, we look at what happened after the World Health Organization declared a global pandemic (March 11) or the country declared a lockdown. The **relationship between pandemics and conflict is theoretically unclear.** In some countries, job losses from the covid-19 pandemic mean people have fewer income-generating options — that can make participation in violence seem a more viable alternative. But if market disruptions and reduced global demand are driving down the value of natural resources such as oil wells, then we may see less conflict over control of such resources. We then conducted **case studies** based **on** our **knowledge of countries with high rates of violent conflict before covid**-19. These include countries with active civil wars (such as Syria) as well as countries with violent militia groups (such as the Philippines). **Conflict during the coronavirus pandemic varies greatly Worldwide, we didn’t observe an increase in violent conflict.** **If anything, conflict has decreased**, as the figure below shows.

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

**Violent conflict** between March and August **2020** was **23 percent lower** **than violent conflict during the same period in 2019**. Comparing these time periods, **battles** are **down 20 percent** and **remote violence and bombings are down 40 percent**.

But **violence against civilians** — the deliberate attack of unarmed noncombatants by armed groups — **continued at similar rates globally**. Do these results suggest that covid-19 is fueling reductions in conflict? Probably not — in Syria, for instance, other factors may explain the declines. On March 5, Turkey and Russia brokered a cease-fire agreement covering the Idlib province in Syria. Idlib is the final front of the Syrian government campaign, so this cease fire led to a dramatic decline in violent events nationwide. But the Idlib cease fire wasn’t motivated by covid-19, and would have taken place anyway, pandemic or no pandemic. So even when violence is falling in the covid-19 era, we have to recognize that declines could be driven by events that happened to take place around the same time as the pandemic’s arrival. The same could be true in cases where violent conflict increased — these **upticks in violence** could **have little to do with covid**-19. In the ongoing war between Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), the number of violent events rose steadily in the first half of 2020. **The trend line does not change at all when Libya started to respond to covid-**19 in March. Libya’s daily violent-incident counts began to fall in late spring, which corresponds with the GNA’s successful seizure of critical holdings from the LNA militia. These results suggest that the **GNA and LNA continued their campaigns relatively undeterred by the pandemic**. **Conflict eventually declined** — but this largely reflects the LNA’s retreat. What about **other countries**? In places with active rebel groups and militias, such as the Philippines and Iraq, we find **mixed results**. Reports from both countries suggest that **rebel groups** and government officials (in the Philippines, but not Iraq) are increasing attacks to take advantage of the opportunities in the covid-19 climate. We see **little if any change in the number of violent-conflict events per day in the Philippines**. But we do see evidence of escalating conflict in Iraq (see figure), much of it **attributed to a rise in Islamic State activity**. What happens in the Philippines is not an exception. While violent conflict rose in Nigeria for some time, **trends are relatively unchanged in Somalia and Congo**. These mixed outcomes suggest that there’s still much to learn about pandemics and conflict.