**1NC – R3**

**T**

**Interp – the affirmative must only defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.**

**Violation – creates a leasing regime**

**"To be" is a linking verb of description, not an action verb**

**GU no date** [Gallaudet University. "ACTION VERBS AND LINKING VERBS," https://www.gallaudet.edu/tutorial-and-instructional-programs/english-center/grammar-and-vocabulary/verbs/action-verbs-and-linking-verbs/] HWIC

A linking verb is a verb that links (connects) the subject of the sentence to **information about that subject**. Linking verbs **do not describe action**. When using linking verbs, the sentence structure will be : SUBJECT--->LINKING VERB---> INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT (noun)(verb)(adjective, noun, or complement)

Some verbs are ALWAYS linking verbs because they never describe an action. Other verbs can be linking verbs in some sentences and action verbs in other sentences.

The following three verbs are ALWAYS linking verbs:

to be (is, am, are, was, were, has been, have been, had been, is being, are being, was being, will have been, etc.) to become (become, becomes, became, has become, have become, had become, will become, will have become, etc.) to seem (seemed, seeming, seems, has seemed, have seemed, had seemed, is seeming, are seeming, was seeming, were seeming, will seem) Here are some examples of linking verbs that are ALWAYS linking verbs in sentences: “The ball is red.” 'Is' is a linking verb that connects the subject, ball, to information about that subject (that it is red). “The children are smart.” 'Are' is a linking verb that connects the subject, children, to information about that subject (that they are smart). “The child will be tall five years from now.” 'Will be' is the linking verb connecting 'child' to the fact that he will be 'tall five years from now.'“The cat seems fine.”'Seems' links the subject, cat, with information about the cat (that it is fine). “The dog became thin after his surgery.” 'Became' links the subject, the dog, with information about him (that he became thin).

**They are extra T because they grant the UN leasing authority, which goes beyond the res. This allows them to gain extra offense to get out of disads, impact turns, and counterplans. This is an independent voter because it allows the aff to add on ANY extra mechanism or policy to the plan, which allows them to gain extra T advantages and better solvency. thats unpredictable and explodes limits because we cant be prepared to answer the UN leasing part of the aff and the rest of it. It also takes away my ability to read those arguments as alt causes or advantage counterplans, which destroys competitive equity.**

dtd – 1ar too late – constitutive rule – tells neg what they have to prepare for

ci – arbitrary/judge intervention

no rvis – chilling effect – illogical – substance crowdout

**K**

**1NC – K**

**Settlerism is an everyday process shaped by affective investments in institutions that claim jurisdiction over native land. Legal and political action is inextricably dependent on the elimination of the native.**

Mark **Rifkin**, **PhD**, Director of the Women's and Gender Studies Program and Professor of English at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro. “Settler common sense.” Settler Colonial Studies, 20**13** Vol. 3, Nos. 3–4, 322–340, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2013.810702>. JJN

In Walden (1854), Henry David Thoreau offers a vision of personhood divorced from the state, characterizing his experience of “Nature” during his time at Walden Pond as providing him with a sense of his own autonomous embodiment and a related set of ethical resources that enable him to reject the demands of contemporary political economy.1 The invocation of “Nature” appears to bracket the question of jurisdiction, opening into a different conceptual and phenomenological register that displaces the problem of locating oneself in relation to the boundaries of the state. However, the very feeling that one has moved beyond geopolitics, that one has entered a kind of space that suspends questions of sovereignty or renders them moot, depends on the presence of an encompassing sovereignty that licenses one’s access to that space. If the idea of “Nature” holds at bay the question of jurisdiction so as to envision a kind of place for cultivating a selfhood that can oppose state logics/politics, it also effaces the ways that experience/vision of personhood itself may arise out of the legal subjectivities put in play by the jurisdictional claiming/clearing of that space as against geopolitical claims by other polities, specifically Native peoples. Thoreau offers an example of how settlement – the exertion of control by non-Natives over Native peoples and lands – gives rise to modes of feeling, generating kinds of affect through which the terms of law and policy become imbued with a sensation of everyday certainty. This affective experience productively can be characterized as an instantiation of what more broadly may be characterized as settler common sense. The phrase suggests the ways the legal and political structures that enable non-Native access to Indigenous territories come to be lived as given, as simply the unmarked, generic conditions of possibility for occupancy, association, history, and personhood. Addressing whiteness in Australia, Fiona Nicoll argues that “rather than analysing and evaluating Indigenous sovereignty claims…, we have a political and intellectual responsibility to analyse and evaluate the innumerable ways in which White sovereignty circumscribes and mitigates the exercise of Indigenous sovereignty”, and she suggests that “we move towards a less coercive stance of reconciliation with when we fall from perspective into an embodied recognition that we already exist within Indigenous sovereignty”. 2 Addressing the question of how settlement as a system of coercive incorporation and expropriation comes to be lived as quotidian forms of non-Native being and potential, though, may require tactically shifting the analytical focus such that Indigenous sovereignties are not at the center of critical attention, even as they remain crucial in animating the study of settler colonialism and form its ethical horizon. “An embodied recognition” of the enduring presence of settler sovereignty, as well as of quotidian non-Native implication in the dispossession, effacement, and management of indigeneity, needs to attend to everyday experiences of non-relation, of a perceptual engagement with place, various institutions, and other people that takes shape around the policies and legalities of settlement but that do not specifically refer to them as such or their effects on Indigenous peoples. In order to conceptualize the mundane dynamics of settler colonialism, the quotidian feelings and tendencies through which it is continually reconstituted and experienced as the horizon of everyday potentiality, we may need to shift from an explicit attention to articulations of Native sovereignty and toward an exploration of the processes through which settler geographies are lived as ordinary, non-reflexive conditions of possibility. In Marxism and Literature, Raymond Williams argues for the necessity of approaching “relations of domination and subordination” as “practical consciousness” that saturat[es] … the whole substance of lived identities and relationships, to such a depth that the pressures and limits of what can ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political, and cultural system seem to most of us the pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense.3 Understanding settlement as, in Williams’s terms, such a “structure of feeling” entails asking how emotions, sensations, psychic life take part in the (ongoing) process of realizing the exertion of non-Native authority over Indigenous peoples, governance, and territoriality in ways that saturate quotidian life but are not necessarily present to settlers as a set of political propositions or as a specifically imperial project of dispossession. In the current scholarly efforts to characterize settler colonialism, the contours of settlement often appear analytically as clear and coherent from the start, as a virtual totality, and in this way, the ongoing processes by which settler dominance actively is reconstituted as a set of actions, occupations, deferrals, and potentials slide from view. We need to ask how the regularities of settler colonialism are materialized in and through quotidian non-Native sensations, inclinations, and trajectories. Moreover, administrative initiatives and legalities become part of everyday normalizations of state aims and mappings but in ways that also allow for an exceeding of state interests that potentially can be turned back against the state, giving rise to oppositional projects still given shape and momentum by the framings that emerge out of the ongoing work of settler occupation – such as in Walden. The essay will close with a brief reading of Thoreau’s text that illustrates how its ethical framing emerges out of, and indexes, everyday forms of settler feeling shaped by state policy but not directly continuous with it. 1. The figure of the vanishing Indian still remains prominent within US popular and scholarly discourses, both explicitly and implicitly. Within this narrative, Native peoples may have had prior claims to the land, but they, perhaps tragically, were removed from the area, or died out, or ceased to be “really” Indian, or simply disappeared at some point between the appearance of the “last” one and the current moment, whenever that may be.4 As against this tendency, scholars who seek to track the workings of settler colonialism face an entrenched inattention to the ways non-Native conceptions and articulations of personhood, place, property, and political belonging coalesce around and through the dispossession of Native peoples and normalization of (the) settler (-state’s) presence on Native lands. Insistence on the systemic quality of such settler seizures, displacements, identifications responds to this relative absence of acknowledgment by emphasizing its centrality and regularity, arguing that the claiming of a naturalized right to Indigenous place lies at the heart of non-Native modes of governance, association, and identity. However, such figurations of the pervasive and enduring quality of settler colonialism may shorthand its workings, producing accounts in which it appears as a fully integrated whole operating in smooth, consistent, and intentional ways across the socio-spatial terrain it encompasses. Doing so, particularly in considering the exchange between the domains of formal policy and of everyday life, may displace how settlement’s histories, brutalities, effacements, and interests become quotidian and common-sensical. Looking at three different models, I want to sketch varied efforts to systemize settler colonialism, highlighting some questions that emerge when they are read in light of issues of process and affect. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay – invasion is a structure not an event.” 5 Offering perhaps the most prominent definition of settler colonialism, Wolfe’s formulation emphasizes the fact that it cannot be localized within a specific period of removal or extermination and that it persists as a determinative feature of national territoriality and identity. He argues that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence”, adding, “Settler colonialism destroys to replace.” 6 Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/period of conquest, however, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler-colonial society” (390), and “the process of replacement maintains the refractory imprint of the native counter-claim” (389). Yet, when and how do projects of elimination and replacement become geographies of everyday non-Native occupancy that do not understand themselves as predicated on colonial occupation or on a history of settler-Indigenous relation (even though they are), and what are the contours and effects of such experiences of inhabitance and belonging? In characterizing settlement as a “structure”, “logic”, and a “will”, Wolfe seeks to integrate the multivalent aspects of ongoing processes of non-Native expropriation and superintendence, but doing so potentially sidesteps the question of how official governmental initiatives and framings become normalized as the setting for everyday non-Native being and action in ways that cannot be captured solely by reference to “the murderous activities of the frontier rabble” (392–3).

**Space management cannot be understood outside of settler colonialism. The infrastructure, institutions, and Eurocentric values of space policy are considered the hallmarks of science and progress, which become weaponized against Indigenous resistance.**

**Matson and Nunn 17**

**(Zannah Mae Matson is a PhD student in Human Geography at the University of Toronto, Neil Nunn is a PhD candidate in the Department of Geography and Planning at the University of Toronto, 10-3-17, SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE, EMPIRE, AND THE FINAL FRONTIER: WHAT THE MAUNA KEA LAND DEFENDERS TEACH US ABOUT COLONIAL TOTALITY, Society and Space,** [**https://societyandspace.org/2017/10/03/space-infrastructure-empire-and-the-final-frontier-what-the-mauna-kea-land-defenders-teach-us-about-colonial-totality/**](https://societyandspace.org/2017/10/03/space-infrastructure-empire-and-the-final-frontier-what-the-mauna-kea-land-defenders-teach-us-about-colonial-totality/)**, JKS)**

Mauna Kea is a dormant volcano and the highest point on the archipelago of Hawai’i. When measured from its base at seafloor, it is the tallest mountain on earth. These towering heights, in a region of the world with minimal light pollution has also earned Mauna Kea recognition of being one of the best spots on the planet for examining the cosmos. Long before the development of modern space infrastructure, however, the peak of Mauna Kea was regarded by native Hawaiians as among the most sacred places on the archipelago of Hawai’i. The place where earth meets the heavens. These divergent perspectives are embedded within a larger relationship of imperial domination that has seeded a century of unrest. While the primary focus of the protest was to challenge a half-century disregard for this sacred site by numerous entities and interests, the Battle for Mauna Kea cannot be understood outside Hawaii’s 125 year-long history of colonial occupation. In 1893, the Hawaiian Kingdom and its Queen, Lydia Kamaka’eha Lili’uokalani, were overthrown by a US led military coup (Long, 2017). Speaking to a spirit of resistance that has existed on the islands since the coup, scholar-activist K. Kamakaoka’ilima Long (2017: 15) states: “four decades of land struggles and cultural historical recovery… have grown a Hawaiian sovereignty movement… playing out in both land defense and as a movement to re-realize Hawaiian political independence as a sovereign state.” This recent assertion of self-determination, now known as the battle for Mauna Kea, has grown to become a global movement with broad support from high-profile figures and the hashtags #Wearemaunakea, #ProtectMaunaKea, and #TMTshutdown trending widely on social media. More than just a source of inspiration for the groundswell anti-colonial movements around the world, this story provides **a context to better understand ongoing colonial occupation that is reinforced through the constitutive power of space infrastructure**. Working from decades of resistance that culminated in the “battle for Mauna Kea,” we engage the notion of colonial totality to conceptualize the resistance to space infrastructure and the ongoing US occupation of Hawaii, reflecting on what this movement provides for better understanding totality and the relationship between space infrastructure and the shifting nature of colonial occupation more broadly. The notion of totality describes the process by which occupied spaces are coded with Western values in the form of normalized cultures, epistemologies, and institutions that produces an “atomistic image of social existence” (Quijano, 2007: 174). **The institutions, ideologies and systems that advocate for the construction of space infrastructure exemplify this process**. Astronomers frame the building of the observatory infrastructure as an essential piece in advancing our knowledge of outer space and ultimately achieving ‘universal’ progress. The resistance to development of these infrastructural systems is an invitation to consider **the relationship between space as a frontier of discovery and ongoing questions of settler colonialism**; the blockade has made visible the inherent relationship between the infrastructure of scientific exploration and the logic of totalizing colonial rationality that enables the development of massive telescopes on occupied land. While these perspectives of colonial totality provide a useful understanding of power and institutions that shape this conflict, we suggest that the Hawaiian land defenders’ refusal of the normalizing force of space infrastructure demonstrates the complexities and conditions relating to the notion of totality and ultimately the inadequacies of the concept. During a public comment period at 2015 University of Hawai‘i Board of Regents meeting, Dr. Pualani Kanaka’ole Kanahele gestures to both the totalizing colonial discourse that suppresses her cultural beliefs and the importance of fighting back against these systems: … we believe in the word of our ancestors…they say we are the products of this land and that is our truth…and that is what we are fighting for. This is our way of life. This is not our job. We don’t earn money from doing this. But for generations after generations, we will continue to be doing what we are doing today. What Dr. Kanahele speaks of goes beyond the physical destruction of the sacred ancestral site, to describe a hegemonic normalization and occupation that actively effaces traditional Hawaiian ways of being in the world. The words and actions of the land defenders challenge totalizing structures that classify space according to a narrow set of beliefs about the world. Working from these acts of resistance, we want to suggest that the Hawaiian sovereignty movement illuminates how **systems of scientific thought and the project of space exploration rely on Euro-western values being the standard by which all other values are measured**. It is this wide acceptance of these structures and principles of reasoning that serve to justify the construction of infrastructure that at once reproduces and fortifies these myths. This self-reinforcing relationship between the production of space infrastructure and the logics that justify it speaks to a powerful aspects of colonial totality: the way it gains power by rendering illegible the very elements relied upon to actively produce the other. The generally unquestioned salience of space infrastructure is a powerful example of this. As Quijano (2007: 174) describes, the relationship between colonialism and scientific discourse is a mutually reinforcing and “part of, a power structure that involved the European colonial domination over the rest of the world.” In Hawai’i, we see the settler colonial process of cultural attrition operating through a totalizing force of colonial knowledge systems that extend beyond physical occupation of land to include an erasure of Indigenous Hawaiian ways of knowing. Although the spatialities and technologies associated with this form of stellar navigation are radically dissimilar, we suggest that on a basic level, this form of space exploration is continuous with a lineage of Euro-western projects of discovery. In short, space as the **‘final frontier’** is not simply a metaphor but speaks to the role of astronomy in upholding the ongoing projection of values onto new territories and extending power and acquisition of territory to those complicit in colonial processes. This extends both to the world’s highest peaks and into the heavens. Space infrastructure is central to this ongoing frontier process that seeks to code ‘new’ territories as knowable according to certain values and, as a result, casts inhabitants who fall outside this paradigm as irrational, less-than-human, and exploitable. However, as Lowe (2015: 2) warns, these abstract promises of human freedoms and rational progress are necessarily discordant with the “global conditions on which they depend.” Which is to say that these atomistic systems dispose of the very relationships and elements of life that make them possible. A belief in respecting the sacredness of the world is just one example of this. It is also essential to recognize the process of establishing colonial totality is one that imperial forces have worked tirelessly to instill. Recognizing this helps to disrupt an appearance of givenness that colonial occupation relies upon. The land defenders have been vocal about this, reminding of us of the fact that since the arrival of James Cook to the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, settler colonial campaigns have been advancing longstanding patterns of cultural removal, fueled by beliefs in colonial supremacy. Following the coup and overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy by US-led forces, a colonial oligarchy banned Hawaiian languages from schools and formalized English as the official language for business and government relations (Silva, 2004: 2-3). This legislation eroded language, culture, and sacred practice; and is an example of what Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (cited in Silva, 2004: 3) describes as a “cultural bomb” of settler colonialism that serves to “annihilate a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves.” According to Chickasaw theorist Jodi Byrd, continually reflecting on the historical and ongoing work that maintains the conditions of settler colonialism is essential to resisting the tendency for colonial constraint to appear inevitable, unresolvable, and complete (Byrd, 2011; see also Simpson, 2014). There was nothing, easy, given, or natural about processes of colonial occupation. While we acknowledge the usefulness of totality for thinking about colonial supremacy, we have concerns about its tendency to inscribe an inaccurate depiction of Euro-western superpower with total ideological control over subjugated Indigenous population. Put differently, we are cautious of the work that the notion of totality does to reinforce a too widely accepted view of Indigenous populations as helplessly dominated, or even anachronistic. The Hawaiian sovereignty movement demonstrates that this is not the case. What the battle at Mauna Kea has shown—akin to other efforts of refusal, such as those at Standing Rock—is that the war against colonialism is ongoing. At present, it appears the land protectors have been successful in their goals of halting construction, as the development team behind the project has begun considering secondary sites for the telescope. The resistance at Mauna Kea, then, is a powerful symbol of the possibility of rupturing the normative totality of Modernist scientific rationality, but it also underscores the recalcitrance of the structures of control and the challenges of pushing back against colonial occupation. However, despite this rupturing of hegemonic ideas of science and progress through the resistance movement, the dominant response from the scientific community has been largely one of confusion and perplexity. This reaction to the uprising speaks to the power of the narratives that cement the Western framework as ‘truth,’ ‘natural,’ and ‘given.’ **For these representatives of state and international institutions, violent control is re-framed as co-existence to achieve Modernist notions of progress, while the claims of Indigenous people are reduced to frivolous demands with primitive and irrational connections to the past.** This, of course, exists with little consideration of the irony of how this frenzy to build infrastructure that works to “know” the cosmos may be read as equally irrational. This essay has sought to consider the relationship between infrastructure and colonialism, emphasizing that even the most futuristic space telescopes have embedded within them a lineage of Euro-western cultural supremacy. It is important to recognize the extant materiality of these infrastructures as a manifestation of hegemonic systems that perpetuate myths of rationality and Euro-western cultural supremacy. The battle for Mauna Kea movement highlights the importance of remembering the long historical processes and extensive exertion of colonial constraint and cultural removal that has been necessary to maintain control of the land. Despite the social processes that naturalize colonial infrastructure, there is nothing essential, necessary, or pre-ordained about enormous telescopes. The success of the land defenders at Mauna Kea, and the support the movement gained around the world, shows us that Euro-western forces and the infrastructure that is central to maintaining their normative influence, are replete with fissures and contradictions worth pushing against. In spite of the hegemonic forces of modernity and rationality behind the construction of the TMT and a continued attempt to assert colonial totality, the battle at Mauna Kea indicates these hegemonic forces have been far from totalizing. The colonial powers do not have the final word. The land defenders at Mauna Kea have demonstrated a powerful vision for disrupting normative ways of occupying land and knowing the cosmos inspiring us to think further on the complexities of mobilizing infrastructure to resist colonialism. It is within these ruptures that we see a potential for a continued learning from the stars and our social existence.

**Treatymaking is a form of settler diplomacy that seeks to legitimize colonial authority through legal justifications. Native Nations are rendered primitive and lawless as the plan eliminates any trace of indigenous sovereignty.**

**Bauerkemper and Stark 12**

**(Joseph Bauerkemper Assistant Professor, American Indian Studies, Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark. Turtle Mountain Ojibwe, received her Ph.D. in American Studies from the University of Minnesota, 2012, The Trans/National Terrain of Anishinaabe Law and Diplomacy, Journal of Transnational American Studies, 4(1), JKS)**

Throughout the ongoing and always transnational processes of interpolitical negotiations, obligations, and interactions, Native nations continue to retain and express their own ideas of nationhood and exercise their long-standing diplomatic traditions. Whether by establishing or renewing political, economic, and other strategic alliances across the transnational terrains of Native North America and colonialist North America, Anishinaabe diplomacy asserts Native nationhood and disrupts colonizing narratives of discovery and conquest that have served to legitimize settler-state establishment and expansion. Thus, an examination of Anishinaabe diplomacy as illustrated in the opening story of Maudjee-kawiss and the Bear Nation can reveal a particular instance in which Native American Studies challenges, critiques, and contributes to transnational scholarly frameworks. By centering Anishinaabe nationhood, diplomacy, and intellectual traditions, we inherently enter into the realm of the transnational. The Anishinaabeg, whose homelands span the Great Lakes and the Plains, have since time immemorial entered into intranational alliances among Anishinaabe bands as well as international treaties with other indigenous nations and colonial states. For example, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Anishinaabeg tracked how treaty practices were carried out across their bands and utilized this knowledge to their advantage whenever possible.22 Through their engagement across bands, the Anishinaabeg were able to discuss various issues pertinent to their treaty relations with colonial nations, such as how much land was retained, the amount paid for ceded lands, and which hunting and fishing rights had been preserved. Thus, various bands informed one another’s political thought and practices when they engaged in treaties with Canada and the United States. In addition, the Anishinaabeg often used treatymaking, especially along the border regions, to both protest and utterly disregard US and Canadian border constructions that would affect the internal affairs of these nations. Native peoples have long been reckoning with what it means to live in a multicultural and multinational world. Well before the arrival of Europeans, Native nations were participating in social, economic, and political alliances that required engagement across national borders, kinship networks, and differing epistemologies. Carried out through stories told, customs practiced, and commitments fulfilled, these diplomatic interactions were themselves sites of nation-building in which communities articulated their understandings of what they were and imagined what they hoped to become. On their arrivals in the Americas, European nations—all of which depended on political and economic alliances with Native nations—would find themselves needing to engage with and employ indigenous diplomatic practices and discourses.23 Such diplomatic discourses were thus ironically fundamental to settler-state formation. **Treaty-making served as the main practice through which the existence of colonial nations as sovereign states was legitimized**. Diplomatic engagements were sites in which nations asserted, negotiated, and recognized competing conceptions of and claims to sovereignty, nationhood, and land rights. For example, **the United States could assert to European nations that it was a sovereign state because it had acted as such by making treaties with indigenous nations.** These assertions had weight because these indigenous nations had already been recognized through the European states’ own treaty-making practices. This treaty-making rationale combined with discourses of “discovery” and “conquest” in a logically fallible but politically expedient pursuit of US and Canadian state-formation. US and Canadian cultural discourses position Native peoples as “savage” while political discourses concurrently acknowledge (even if reluctantly and inconsistently) the sovereignty of Native nations. Even while such trajectories might appear opposed, the legal discourses of both nation-states selectively apply the sentiment of savagery and the recognition of sovereignty toward settler colonial purposes. Robert Williams argues that “**these divergent discourses on Indian legal status and rights were all derivative of the larger and more direct question . . . regarding the rationalization of the land-acquisition process on the colonial frontier**.” 24 Ultimately, colonial legal theory, which sometimes asserts the sovereignty and property rights of Native peoples, **is often overridden by cultural discourses that fabricate legal justifications for US** and Canadian **assertions of settler sovereignty.** Practical realities and processes on the ground, such as treaty-making, that recognized the status of Native nations compete with national mythologies that derogate Indians as “savages” and justify land acquisition through discovery. The newly formed states were conscious of their need to deal with Native nations as sovereign political entities.25 Nonetheless, as decades passed and treaties continued to be made, national mythologies of conquest, at times, overrode earlier discourses that recognized Native sovereignty because it supported the sovereignty of the young states.

**Cooperation assumes that space is a unique area that can transcend Earthly politics. This naïve assumption ignores the settler power dynamics that shape the process of cooperation.**

**Genovese 16**

**(Genovese, Taylor R. Doctoral student in the Human and Social Dimensions of Science and Technology (HSD) program at Arizona State University, where he is pursuing his interest in the social imaginaries of human futures on Earth and in outer space. 2016. “Fear and Loathing in Truth or Consequences: Neoliberalism, Colonialism and the Lineage of the Frontier at Spaceport America.” Space+Anthropology, JKS)**

“This isn’t the government space age,” the tour guide continues. “This is the commercial space age. As a space corporation, you have two choices: cede the business and die...or innovate. There will be no more government hand-outs and that forces innovation.” I knew that I would be confronted with the neoliberal, capitalist mythos eventually; the NewSpace mantra of “pull yourself up by the spaceboot-straps.” However, what the tour guide said is not entirely true, considering the New Mexico General Fund Plus Special Appropriation is slated to give Spaceport America $2,262,000 in the 2017 budget. That means that 35% of the spaceport’s operating budget next year will be taxpayer money—“government hand-outs,” if you will. However, this is not a novel situation, corporate subsidies are an important tradition within the capitalist system. “Movement of people and goods is a natural progression,” preaches the tour guide. “The goal of humanity is to make the world a smaller place. Space travel can do that. For example, take what happened at Benghazi. Imagine we could deploy a SEAL team on rocket planes anywhere in the world within minutes!” I can barely take it. This is my first time visiting any NewSpace facility and—as an anthropologist—I want to remain a fly-on-the-wall for this initial visit. But the activist in me begins screaming and clawing its way up my throat. I was about to burst when a voice calls out from behind me. “**OK, but wouldn’t it be great if we all worked together in space? Shouldn’t space be without a military application?”** I breathe a sigh of relief as my activist personality begins to settle down. The tour guide begins with the double-speak that continues throughout the remainder of the tour. “That’s the good thing about space,” he says, floundering slightly at the tourist’s audacity to challenge corporate policy. “It transcends politics. The good thing about space is it’s a Trump- free zone. A Hillary-free zone.” Except that is obviously not true; and not just in the Foucauldian “everything is political” sense (i.e. **that power dynamics exist in every facet of human interaction**). Abu Dhabi’s Aabar Investments has a 37.8% stake in Virgin Galactic. SpaceX has put in unsolicited bids to launch American spy satellites. **The metaphysical ideal of outer space may be a place beyond politics, but the reality in this “second space age” is that globalized capitalism**—and all the politics that are inherently intertwined within it—are alive and well in the commercial space industry. The tour guide turns to the launching capabilities of the Boeing 747, especially as it pertains to Virgin Galactic’s LauncherOne program which hopes to strap a rocket to one of the wings of a 747, fly up to around 50,000 feet, and release the rocket to be launched the rest of the way to space. “Does anyone else see a problem with this photograph?” asks the tour guide—holding his iPad out for us to see— referencing the fact that there exists only one missile on one of the wings. “What about a 747 carrying missiles on both wings? What about bomb bay doors? There’s a lot of volume inside of a 747! It carried the Space Shuttle on its back, it seems like a waste to only carry a single missile.” He holds his hand flat and horizontal to us, as if his fingers are a 747 and then uses the index finger of his other hand to simulate spacecraft dropping from the belly of the aircraft—his palm. Almost a neoliberal haiku. I begin to feel sick. The tour guide continues with the double- speak. “But it’s not about spaceports. It’s not about spaceships. It’s about how can space better humanity?” We finally disembark the shuttle and head to the visitor exhibits inside of the terminal and hanger facility. A large mural—titled The Journey Upward—is adorned on one of the walls. This mural served as a summation of the NewSpace worldview and ideology. A natural, inescapable, linear progression toward human beings spreading into the cosmos: from dinosaurs (?) to Anglo-looking Paleo Indians to settler-colonists to space migration. This romanticized “lineage of the frontier” is tied to the capitalist dream—and mythology—of untold profits and constantly expanding markets. Of course, the capitalist mythology also likes to ignore the horrendous inequality and violence that tends to attach itself to the frontier mentality. **When frontiers are seen as limitless, uninhabited and uncivilized, it encourages doctrines like slavery and Manifest Destiny.** Yet NewSpace corporations seem to be overlooking the bigger picture and instead focus on the “glory of the frontier” as endless profit potential and romantic adventure.

**This debate is not private space good/bad, but instead a question of Native sovereignty and the power to invoke the plan. The 1AC eclipses the authority of Native nations, so in response we affirm the long tradition of Indigenous internationalism across colonial borders.**

**Estes 19**

**(Nick Estes is a citizen of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe. He is an Assistant Professor in the American Studies Department at the University of New Mexico. In 2014, he co-founded The Red Nation, an Indigenous resistance organization. For 2017-2018, Estes was the American Democracy Fellow at the Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History at Harvard University. Chapter 6: Internationalism, Our History Is the Future: STANDING ROCK VERSUS THE DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE, AND THE LONG TRADITION OF INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE, 2019, hardback, JKS)**

The Treaty Council, however, was not the first or only version of what historian Daniel Cobb calls a “global Indigenous identity.” Rather, it belonged to and drew from a long tradition of **Indigenous internationalism**.5 Prior to European contact, Indigenous nations had often entered into relations with each other for alliance, kinship, war, peace, or trade. As shown in previous chapters, agreements were made not solely between human nations, but also among nonhuman nations as well, such as the buffalo and the land. Such treaties were, and continue to be, the basis of diplomacy and the evidence of a prior and continuing status of Indigenous nationhood. **Sovereign nations do not enter into international relations or treaties with domestic or “internal” populations.** On the contrary, the very basis of sovereignty is the power to negotiate relationships between those who are seen as different— between other sovereigns and nations. But concepts of “sovereignty” and “nation” possess different meanings for Indigenous peoples than for their European-derived counterparts. And they are not entirely consistent, either, with the aspirations for a nation-state that came to define decolonization movements in the Third World. While doing important defensive work, on face value these Western and Third World concepts only partially reflect traditions of Indigenous resistance. **Far beyond the project of seeking equality within the colonial state, the tradition of radical Indigenous internationalism imagined a world altogether free of colonial hierarchies of race, class, and nation**. This vision allowed revolutionary Indigenous organizations such as the Treaty Council to make relatives, so to speak, with those they saw as different, **imagining themselves as part of Third World struggles and ideologies**, and entirely renouncing the imperialism and exceptionalism of the First World (while still living in it). They were in the First World but not of it—much like American Indians are in, but not entirely of, the United States. Indigenous peoples across North America and the world have fought, died, and struggled to reclaim, restore, and redefine these powerful ideas. **Their goal has been to take their proper place in the family of nations.** Radical Indigenous internationalism, however, predates AIM and the Treaty Council. Contemporary pan-Indigenous movements were a result of more than a decade of Red Power organizing that began in the early 1960s, nearly a decade before the creation of AIM. Earlier, in the 1950s, Flathead scholar and writer D’Arcy McNickle and the National Congress of American Indians had explored a similar intellectual and political terrain of internationalism. And before that, the Society of American Indians advocated for a seat at the table during the 1919 Paris peace talks and representation at the League of Nations. Each distinct instance posed a similar question: **If Indigenous peoples are nations, why are they not afforded the right to self-determination?** Two strands of thinking about self-determination for the colonial world prevailed following the First World War. In the first, US President Woodrow Wilson argued for self-determination with a limited set of rights that would not radically upset the colonial order. Such liberal internationalism, however, glaringly omitted Indigenous peoples, as they understood themselves as nations that existed prior to the formation of settler states. Rarely were Wilson’s principles applied to North America or the United States; nor were they ever intended to extend to Indigenous peoples. A second, more radical vision put forward by Communist revolutionary V. I. Lenin argued for the right of colonized nations to secede and declare independence from their colonial masters. This view was echoed by the Third World decolonization movement, as part of a global Socialist and Communist revolution, and it has frequently been applied in the Asian, African, and South American contexts. But this view remained almost entirely absent in North America, except among radical Indigenous, Black, Asian, Caribbean, and Chicanx national liberation movements. The Treaty Council advocated Indigenous nationhood as part of this global anti-colonial movement and in line with Third World liberation movements. After decades of experiencing land loss, enduring bare survival, attempting to work with federal programs, filing court cases, defeating termination legislation, and facing mass relocation, an assertion of Oceti Sakowin sovereignty went from ambition to prescription. Few avenues remained other than the pursuit of international treaty rights. Treaties made with the United States were proof of nationhood. But what legal institution would uphold this position if the United States refused to? If the goal was to reverse the unjust occupation of an entire continent, the advancement of Indigenous rights through the very legal and political systems that justified that occupation in the first place had proven limited in some instances, and hopeless in others. To survive, AIM and the Treaty Council therefore had to look elsewhere to make their case—beyond the confines of the most powerful political construct in world history, the nation-state. Prior to and during colonization, Indigenous nations had self-organized into deliberate confederacies, alliances, and governments. The Nation of the Seven Council Fires (the Oceti Sakowin), for instance, is a confederacy of seven different nations of Lakota-, Dakota-, and Nakota-speaking peoples in the Northern Plains and Western Great Lakes. They are hardly unique; in North America alone there are the Creek Confederacy in the Southeast, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy of Six Nations in the Northeast, the Council of Three Fires (made up of Ojibwes, Odawas, and Potawatomis) in the Great Lakes region, the United Indian Nations in the Ohio River valley (under the Shawnee leadership of Tecumseh), the All Indian Pueblo Council of the Southwest, and the Iron Confederacy of the Northern Plains. Many other political confederacies also flourished prior to, alongside, and in spite of settler states in North America. And their legacies are hardly relegated to the primordial past. Modern Oceti Sakowin internationalism, for instance, traces its origins to the early twentieth century, an era generally viewed as a low point for Indigenous activism and resistance. In North America alone, an estimated precolonial population of tens of millions of Indigenous peoples had been reduced to about 300,000, and for Flathead historian D’Arcy McNickle, writing in 1949, two processes contributed greatly to this decimation: the institution of private property and the destruction of Indigenous governance that once held land in common. Indigenous nations at the time also possessed little in the way of either collective property or political power, as Indigenous territory had been drastically diminished, and the reservation system had overthrown or almost entirely dissolved customary governments. If Indigenous peoples once constituted the tree of the Americas, whose roots deeply entwined in the land, the cultivation of “growth from the severed stump,” McNickle argued, was the pivotal challenge of the twentieth century.7 Physical extermination and the repression of Indigenous political power verified the United States’ genocidal intent, but these had not accomplished their purpose. And despite otherwise stating pluralistic claims to inclusion, McNickle concluded that **the United States simply “can not tolerate a nation within a nation.” I**f Natives were to be assimilated, they would be assimilated as individuals and not as nations. In the popular imaginary, Natives disappeared into the wilderness of history, were never truly nations, and had been overpowered by a superior civilization. If they were nations, they were eclipsed and **replaced by the real nation—the United States**. Such erasure notwithstanding, vibrant Indigenous political traditions persisted. But to the untrained eye, nothing was awry. From the severed stump began to regrow the tree of life—the tree of resistance that would blossom into revolt decades later.

**Criticizing security strategy is a mode of settler recuperation which takes for granted the very terms of their expression. The aff operationalizes the presumed normality of settler colonialism to obfuscate their reproduction of genocidal politics in spite of their opposition to standard IR.**

**Hendershot and Mutimer 18**

**(Chris Hendershot, York University, David Mutimer Professor and Chair of Department Political Science, LA&PS. Editor, Critical Studies on Security., 2018, Critical Security Studies, Chapter 5 in: The Oxford Handbook of International Security, edited by Alexandra Gheciu, William C. Wohlforth, JKS)**

**CSS= Critical Security Studies**

Despite avowed commitments to critique concepts and practices that sustain militarized, carbon dependent, or zero-sum security relations, critical security scholars must also imagine the possibility that criticality can still affect domination and exploitation. That is to say, CSS needs to more thoughtfully consider its ongoing complicity with the settler-colonial and imperial ordering of global relations. As two scholars who live and work on the traditional territory of the Haudenosaunee, the Métis, and most recently, the territory of the Mississauga of the Credit River (CAUT 2016) and are thus sustained through the occupation of this territory, we must immediately confront our complicity in settler-colonialism. Or to paraphrase Sundberg (2014: 35), as citizens of a settler-colonial state, we “have a profound obligation and responsibility to confront the widespread implications of colonialism in [our] scholarship and to ask what [security] thought has to become to face the political, philosophical, and ethical challenges of decolonizing.” **Without a vigorous un-settling, CSS will be incapable of working for and with “Indigenous sovereignty in its material, psychological, epistemological, and spiritual forms**” (Sium et al. 2012: v). What must be more readily confronted is that **criticality does not obviate complicity with colonialism, imperialism, and racialized domination**. Expansive referents, nonpositivistic metatheories, and openness to difference can certainly create the intellectual space to read and cite the work of Patrick Wolfe (2006) or Glen Coulthard (2014) or Sarah Hunt (2014). Or to consider how the Asubpeeschoseewagong First Nation, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, and/or Native Hawaiians are affected by and affect security politics. Critical scholars who focus on the security politics of the Arctic are already including Indigenous concerns and knowledge in their analysis. Using securitization theory, Greaves (2016) engages with Inuit and Sámi discourses “in order to explain variation in different understandings of (in)security” among Indigenous Peoples as well as recognizing how colonial agendas constrain the capacities of Indigenous Peoples “to advance a conception of (in)security that is distinct from those of settler governments” (2016: 462-3). Harrington and Lecavalier (2014) work through an emancipatory approach in order to understand how Inuit discourse, particularly that which is articulated by and through the Inuit Circumpolar Council, and traditional knowledge “offers an important emancipatory alternative to traditional practices of environmental security” (2014: 114). Yet, inclusion and recognition of Indigenous Peoples and knowledge does not necessarily un-settle the academy (Ahenakew 2016). Greater inclusion need not contest the fact that the academic study of security, whether it be traditional or critical, is not possible without (settler) colonialism/imperialism. Ontologically, the world of nation states, citizens, consumers, the environment, water, and food cannot exist as referents of security

because they do not exist as such without colonial rearrangements of economics, geographies, and politics (see Byrd 2011; Samson and Gigoux 2017). Epistemologically, notions of threat and danger are entwined with colonial determinations of the civilized, productive, and/or human (see Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández 2013). Methodologically, the Anglo-European “modernization” of academic knowledge production does not occur without the discovery, classification, and collection of “native” people, flora, and fauna (Tuhiwai Smith 2012). Politically, the educational authority of Anglo-European universities rests, in many instances literally, on the coercive disposition of land, suppression of language, and spiritual and creative practice, as well as the ignorance of traditional knowledge (see Todd 2016). **Only through honestly confronting this (ongoing) complicity with colonialism can critical security scholarship sincerely consider, support, and enact decolonial possibilities**. As **decolonization is not a metaphor “for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools”** (Tuck and Yang 2012: 3) we, the settler/imperial scholars, cannot assume that openness to differing modes of thought, extra-disciplinary meaning, and reflexive accountability (that is, holding ourselves accountable for our complicities with structures and practices of domination) can assure decolonial possibilities. **They may be necessary, but cannot be considered sufficient.** Nor are indigenizing curricula, acknowledging occupied land, and/or calling for/echoing calls for the decolonization of CSS enough. **As settler scholars, we must support** the work of **Indigenous scholars to conduct and present their research “on its own terms”** (Ahenakew 2016: 327)—that is, not filtered “through the frames of Western Epistemology” (Ahenakew 2016: 327). One method for supporting Indigenous knowledge sovereignty is the transformation of peer adjudication processes, particularly those which determine which research projects are funded. Settler scholars cannot assume to be the only or even appropriate peers. Colonial disposition, not comprehension of a universal or modern understanding of the world, is what secured and secures the knowledge authority of settlers over and above Indigenous Peoples. Un-settling CSS will require exercises that work to support the knowledge authority of Indigenous thinkers—thinkers who may or may not work in or for the Anglo-European academy. **Un-settling CSS will** also **require performing nonacademic work. Settler scholars must provide material support to protest and advocacy movements.** Universities located on occupied land must make longer-term financial investments in Indigenous-led economic, social, cultural, and educational efforts. To do this decolonial work will require settler scholars to consult and collaborate with Indigenous thinkers, activists, and elders. Un-settling CSS will require both the making and giving back of time, space, and sustenance to permit Indigenous thinkers and activists to sustain and safeguard their pasts, presents, and futures. Non-Indigenous CSS scholars must understand that “decolonization is a messy, dynamic, and a contradictory process” (Sium et al. 2012: ii) in order never to suggest that we know a better way. **We as settler scholars working through unsettling security must also seriously entertain the possibility that decolonization means no future for CSS.**

**1NC – FW**

**Interpretation: The 1AC is an object of research. The role of the neg should be to disprove the various meanings of that object.**

**1] Plan focus restricts the debate to a ten second statement and leaves the rest of the aff unquestioned. They should be responsible for the way their knowledge is constructed and used because that produces the best model for activism and ethics in the context of the topic which is a unique education net benefit to our interpretation**

**2] Debate doesn't pass policies but it does alter the way we think about the world and about systems of power – turns their policy research standards because it's a question of how their research is oriented and whether it's for an ethical purpose – only our model of engagement accesses that education**

**3] Begs the question – if we win their justifications are repugnant that necessarily implicates the conclusion which means defense of their research model is a prior question to weighing the material consequences of the aff – also solves plan focus because the links necessarily implicate aff solvency**

**Case**

**Theory**

[1] If I win one layer vote aff

[a] Time skew--neg has 7 minutes to uplayer and makes the round impossible to win

[b] It forces you to engage with the aff creating substantive discussion on something we both had time to prep for

**1] regress – what defines a layer, Ks implicate case, T definitions affect cp competition etc – 2] irreciprocal – 1ar theory is structurally biased aff cuz they get 3 minutes of new args 3] uplayering solves, they can win w/ one layer it just has to be the highest one**

[2] Neg interps are counterinterps since the AC takes a stance and came lexically prior - means you re-evaluate the AC under their interp and evaluate the debate after the 1ar so both of us get one rebuttal

**no – an interp isnt j a stance its an explicitly proposed norm in response to 1ac abuse**

[3] No neg analytics – I don’t have time to cover 100 blippy arguments in the NC since you can read 7 min of analytics and extend any of them to win.

**yes neg analytics – get good – if you missed it the judge probably did too – we should be able to punish bad aff ev analytically – best for education and quick thinking**

[4] The neg must extend all arguments twice in either the 1nc or 2nr – aff has to waste time extending twice in the 1ar and 2ar so its reciprocal

**each**

[5] Neg may not take prep time--they already have 30 minutes of pre round prep which should compensate--no prep is key to reciprocity

**yes neg prep time – they had infinite pre round prep which means in round prep is k2 neg reciprocity – they also broke a new ptext which means we didnt have time to prep this aff in particular**

[6] Check all K links in cx–key to start the debate early by avoiding incorrect assumptions, check back bidirectional K links, and letting us genuinely learn from our mistake by fixing the 1ac

**debate over the links is good – if the aff is really compatible with the k they can just win the perm which solves any abuse**

**Method**

**Advantage**

**Even though the OST doesn’t bind private entities, governments still already restrict and regulate them to ensure just compliance in the squo**

**Eijk 20** [Cristian van Eijk is finishing an accelerated BA in Law at the University of Cambridge. He holds a BA cum laude in International Justice and an LLM in Public International Law from Leiden University, and has previously worked at the T.M.C. Asser Institute and the International Commission on Missing Persons. “Sorry, Elon: Mars is not a legal vacuum – and it’s not yours, either.” Voelkerrechtsblog. May 11, 2020. <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/sorry-elon-mars-is-not-a-legal-vacuum-and-its-not-yours-either/>] HW AL

Two provisions of the Outer Space Treaty (OST), both also customary, are particularly relevant here. OST article II: “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” OST article III: “States… shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including (…) celestial bodies, in accordance with international law”. SpaceX is a private entity, and is not bound by the Outer Space Treaty – but that does not mean it can opt out. Its actions in space could have consequences for the United States in three ways. First, the US, as SpaceX’s launch state, bears fault-based liability for injury or damage SpaceX’s space objects cause to other states’ persons or property (OST article VII, Liability Convention articles I, III). Second, the US, as SpaceX’s state of registry, is the sole state that retains jurisdiction and control over SpaceX objects (OST article VIII, Registration Convention article II). Both refer to objects in space and are irrelevant. According to article VI OST, States “bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space”, including Mars, including those by “non-governmental entities”. The US, as SpaceX’s state of incorporation, must authorise and continuously supervise SpaceX’s actions in space to ensure compliance with the OST (OST article VI) and international law (OST article III). In practice, this task is done by the US Federal Communications Commission, which licenses and regulates SpaceX. Article VI OST sets a specific rule of attribution, supplementing the customary rules of state responsibility (Stubbe 2017, pp. 85-104). SpaceX acts with US authorisation, and its conduct in space within and beyond that authorisation is attributable to the US (ARSIWA articles 5, 7). In the absence of circumstances precluding wrongfulness, the result is straightforward. If SpaceX breaches a US obligation under international law, the US bears responsibility for an internationally wrongful act.

**REM substitutes solve – multiple breakthroughs**

Adam **Currie**, market writer, 3/18**/13** [“Rare Earth Recycling: Risk to Sector or Investment Opportunity?” Rare Earth Investing News, 2013, http://rareearthinvestingnews.com/9255-rare-earth-recycling-risk-to-sector-or-investment-opportunity.html]

While Honda has impressed investors by succeeding in its recycling goals and its plans to commercialize this recycling process, it is not the only company focused on innovation. Since the industry underwent a severe shake up in 2008, more and more manufacturers have begun seeking alternative solutions aimed at either decreasing their dependence on rare earths, or securing their own REE supply.¶ In 2012, Toyota (TSE:7203) announced that it had developed a method to manufacture hybrid and electric vehicles (EVs) without the use of rare earth metals, while General Motors Company (NYSE:GM) confirmed it was “**close to a breakthrough**” that would reduce its need for dysprosium, a rare earth in especially high demand. Japan’s Hitachi (TSE:6501) has been clear of its intentions to move away from the use of REEs, announcing in April last year a highly-efficient permanent magnet synchronous motor that employs an iron-based amorphous metal in the core – and, crucially, no REEs.¶ Also, Ford (NYSE:F) announced that its nickel-metal-hydride batteries will be replaced with lithium-ion alternatives in a move that could see the company cut 500,000 pounds of REEs from its manufacturing process annually, while the US Department of Energy’s (DOE) Ames Laboratory confirmed that it too is working towards creating a method to remove neodymium from the mix of other materials in magnets.

**Renewables destroy the environment – it collapses the ecosystem which turns all of their impacts**

**Hallosserie, MA, et. al 8/29**

**(Agnès Hallosserie, French Foundation for Research on Biodiversity, MA IR@Paris I Pantheon, Hélène Soubelet, nstitut de Recherche pour le Développement, Hélène Leriche, Association ORÉE, Patricia Savin and Jean-François Silvain, DS Avocat, “Biodiversity Issues Should Be Better Taken into Account in the Energy Transition,” 8/29/19)**

Renewables differ greatly in the sources they rely on (wind, water, sun, biomass, earth) and the technologies they resort to (e.g. floating or fixed-bottom offshore wind turbines). They have smaller coverage than traditional energy (fissile or fuel) and generate less power per production unit. It means that most **renewable energy structures require a wide, dense installation network, affecting ecosystems where they are settled**. The energy transportation and storage network adds up to the resulting **land-use change, a major cause of the erosion of biodiversity worldwide, and is built with a range of non-renewable metals**. Renewables depend on biodiversity for construction (provision of material), energy production, ecosystem services (e.g. water and wood provision), and inspiration through biomimicry. The materials to build the renewable energy infrastructures are transformed through the mining and metallurgy industries which are heavy polluters for ecosystems (Trommetter 2017). The impacts of renewables on biodiversity will therefore **vary along those lines throughout their life cycle, and will also depend on the location of the infrastructure** (in situ impacts). Ex situ impacts are for the larger part caused by the extraction of material for the construction of the infrastructures, including sand (e.g. for concrete, silicon), rare earths and copper, but also during operation phase when no-go areas (e.g. offshore wind farms) lead to the **displacement and higher concentration of pressures** (e.g. fishing) elsewhere in the natural habitats. The dismantling of these infrastructures and the recycling of materials are often complex, costly and limited. They have therefore huge impacts at **end-of-life** (e.g. dams, wind turbines, solar panels) (Trommetter 2017). If all renewables have an impact on biodiversity, those with the highest ones are biomass energy, which may lead to the destruction of a whole ecosystem, and hydroelectricity, which may cut ecological continuums and prevent the circulation of species (Trommetter 2017). Hydroelectricity is expected to increase by 73% in the next decades, with major dam projects planned on the Amazon, Mekong and Congo rivers. Their watersheds are among the most fragile ecosystems on earth and the three rivers together represent 18% of freshwater fish biodiversity (Zarfl et al. 2015). Solar, wind, tidal and geothermal energy mostly impact biodiversity at the species or individual level. Table 1 largely builds on the synthesis by Gasparatos et al. (2017); Trommetter (2017) and UNEP (2016b) to present for each energy source the processes that could impact biodiversity.