**1NC CALRR R1**

**T – Private**

**Interpretation: the affirmative must only defend that the appropriation of space by private entities is unjust.**

**Violation: China's "private" sector companies aren't private**

**Olson 20** [Stephen Olson, research fellow at the Hinrich Foundation. "Are Private Chinese Companies Really Private?" The Diplomat, 9-30-2020, accessed 1-14-2022, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/are-private-chinese-companies-really-private/] HWIC

China has often been criticized for a lack of transparency, especially with regard to its economic and trade policies. While in many cases these criticisms are valid, it belies the fact that in other instances, China is remarkably open and transparent about its intentions and ambitions.

Such is the case with China’s “Opinion on Strengthening the United Front Work of the Private Economy in the New Era,” recently released by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (and further elaborated on by President Xi Jinping himself). This document tells us in no uncertain terms that Chinese private companies will be increasingly called upon to conduct their operations in tight coordination with governmental policy objectives and ideologies. The rest of the world should take note.

A Different Vision of “Private” Business

The 5,000 word “opinion” aims to ratchet-up the role and influence of the CCP within the private sector in order “to better focus the wisdom and strength of the private businesspeople on the goal and mission to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The objective is to establish a “united front” between business and government and facilitate the “enhancement of the party’s leadership over the private economy.” According to the plan, “private economic figures are to be more closely united around the party,” thereby achieving “a high degree of consistency with the Party Central Committee on political stand, political direction, political principles, and political roads.”

All of this stands in stark contrast to long-accepted concepts of how private companies function in a free market. The overriding purpose of business, according to these traditional precepts, is to earn profits through the provision of value-added products and services, in response to marketplace signals and under the constraint of basic economic realities. Government ideology plays no role in that equation.

But China has a very different vision. Government officials and government ideologies are directly infused into business operations. Private sector employees are “educated” on government policies and ideologies, with the expectation that this “enlightenment” will help inform their business decisions. This government-business symbiosis is further cemented by the provision of massive government subsidies (estimated to be about 3 percent of China’s GDP) to Chinese companies.

**Negate: they skirt the core controversy of the topic which is national vs private space activities – kills stasis point and pre-round prep and means we lose access to generics that rely on the motives of private companies differing from national interest proven by the fact that their advantage is functionally China space good/bad – competing interps and DTD on T, it's a question of models and we indict their advocacy**

**At best it means they don't solve their aff bc Xi will just be like "alright the government is now taking over these, they are public entities, time to go to space"**

**No RVIs – you don't win for being fair, topicality is a constitutive rule and basic aff burden – RVIs create chilling effect for checking abusive affs and incentivize theory baiting to read the RVI – also cause substance crowdout bc we either have to split the 2NR or read 7 minutes of T in the 1NC**

**Case**

**1AR Theory**

**Use reasonability for 1AR theory – structurally favors the aff and causes substance crowdout which outweighs on timeframe bc we only have a few months to debate the topic – 10 seconds of the 1ar becomes 3 minutes of new weighing and answers to our standards – that makes the round unfair and irresolvable absent judge intervention. That o/w time skew because the 2AR goes all in on theory but no 2NR spends five minutes on theory – means they can win by lbling the 2NR without a coherent abuse story**

**Space Mil**

**Nonunique – unchecked commercial appropriation will lead to conflict regardless of China**

**Perez 21** Veronica Delgado-Perez. 12/14/21. Argument | The Commercialization of Space Risks Launching a Militarized Space Race. <https://www.theintlscholar.com/periodical/12/14/2020/analysis-commercialization-space-risk-international-law-military-space-race> [Veronica Delgado-Perez is a Staff Writer at The International Scholar.] // CVHS SR

Fundamentals of the Final Frontier It is a **geopolitical imperative to determine what, if any, commercial activities and use of extraterrestrial resources are permitted** within the confines of international law. Without clear-cut agreements on what activity is recognized by international law, **the world will undoubtedly see states push the boundaries ever further in an attempt to gain the edge over geopolitical competitors — even more-so in an era of renewed great power competition.** **Yet to date, there exists no comprehensive treaty or legal reference to commercial activity in space**. However, this should come as no surprise. It has only been since the turn of the century that technology and markets have progressed to the point where commercial space exploration and exploitation has become possible. Only recently have experts and analysts of geopolitics and international law begun to seriously examine questions surrounding the legal framework that would govern extraterrestrial resource-mining and other commercial activities. In the last decade, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) dealt with commercial aspects in outer space. In one of their last reports, the Committee expressed that the era of the commercial utilization of outer space’s resources is intrinsically **linked to the escalation of international competition over resources**, which could **threaten international peace and** **security**. By encouraging the international community to engage in outer space’s activities for the benefit of humankind as a whole, “some delegations” have expressed that states should avoid the promotion of laws and regulations related to the commercialization of outer space, arguing that it should be considered the heritage of all humanity. In that regard, states must then ensure that domestic law on the use of outer space complies with international space law, which means that states should respect the principles outlined in the Outer Space Treaty and ensure that national regulations do not contravene international provisions. Even though the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (which entered into force in 1967), refers to the exploration and use of outer space, it does not address questions of a commercial nature, which compromises the ability of states and international actors to address new challenges to extraterrestrial activities. In several provisions, the treaty highlights that these activities may be carried out for peaceful purposes and the benefit of all people, reaffirming that outer space is not subject to national appropriation. Were outer space not considered a global commons, that would imply that the resources and results of commercial exploration may fall within the jurisdiction of a country. It is thus incumbent upon Washington — and its commercial enterprises — to demonstrate how American commercial exploration of space benefits other countries and complies with international space law, or otherwise to adhere to the spirit of past treaties which emphasize the impartiality of outer space until such time as the law is clarified. International Law is Adrift in Space The potential benefits of commercial space exploration cannot be ignored. From an economic standpoint, the space industry would generate a significant economic boon for both states and private companies, due to the abundance and variety of resources — particularly scarce minerals that are difficult to extract on Earth. As one example of the vastness of resources held in outer space, one asteroid has the potential to contain more than the total supply of platinum extracted throughout the history of mankind. It may very well open the door to an advanced era of space navigation, building extraterrestrial infrastructure that facilitates the exploration and use of space’s resources, and extra-planetary human habitation. Inevitably, **there are significant drawbacks** **to** the **commercialization of space exploration**. These can vary, for instance, from the commercial dominance of space’s natural resources only by those states with the **technical and financial capital** to support space missions, to geopolitical competition over extraterrestrial resources that **threatens world peace and security**, to the potential for the monopolization of extraterrestrial resources by states and private companies. As was the case during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States began a Space Race in which they struggled to achieve supremacy in space exploration and domination of science. Today, the number of space powers has increased thanks to continual advancements in flight, combustion, and fueling technologies. In the three decades since the end of the Cold War, technologically advanced countries like China, Japan, and France which previously had no space program have successfully navigated to the top tier of space-faring agencies and programs. In 2018, the U.S. allocated $41 billion to space programs, followed by China at $5.8 billion, and Russia at $3.1 billion. Collectively, the three major space powers control almost 65% of the global industry, showing space **powers are monopolizing** space and reinforcing the inequality gap between states that do not have sufficient economic and technological capacity to invest. With new actors on the game stage, **conflicts of interest may arise**. **There is a risk that each actor adopts a kind of short-term Realist approach to space policy — one which is driven by self-interest in reaping the greatest benefits of extraterrestrial exploration and commercialization while controlling access to others**. If unmitigated, states may choose to militarize outer space to gain a strategic edge over competitors and adversaries. This process has already begun. Under the Trump administration, the Pentagon established the U.S. Space Force as a new branch of the Armed Forces to protect the country and allied interests in space. Already, Delta 4 — one of the U.S. Space Force’s missions — conducts strategic and theater missile warnings, manages weapon systems, and provides information to missile defense forces. The measure shows that for the U.S., outer space is not only a domain of scientific exploration but has the potential to become increasingly securitized. With the impending expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the U.S. and Russia on February 5, 2021, a number of security dilemmas could arise. If the world’s two largest nuclear powers do not edge toward extending the treaty, Washington and Moscow risk returning to the era of unrestricted expansion of launch platforms and strategically-deployed nuclear warheads — potentially with the aid of military infrastructure in **space**. Although President-elect Biden has expressed his interest in negotiating an extension of New START, how Moscow and Washington might proceed remains an open question. Bilateral progress towards a new arms-control regime would require establishing limits on the number and range of long- and mid-range missiles, establishing measures to limit the expansion of traditional missile deployment to space, and banning the deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in outer space. More than the risk of the securitization of space, state, and private actors could begin to claim exclusive legal rights over the resources they discover. Indeed, the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, which came into force in 2015, expressly recognizes the right of U.S. Citizens to possess, own, transport, use, and sell space resources. By this means, domestic law already acknowledges the legal claim to property by individuals, which is prohibited by international law. Under the Outer Space Treaty, states renounced any traditional form of acquisition of territories and agreed not to foray unilaterally into space to extend their national policies on Earth or to exercise any kind of sovereignty over celestial bodies or resources. The absence of a modern international treaty that addresses these issues should be received with grave concern, as there is significant potential for risk to become reality. Existing UN treaties lack the technological context and foresight to address legal questions regarding the potential for commercial exploration and exploitation of outer space or its resources. During the sixties and seventies, when international instruments like the Outer Space treaty were conceived, the principal aim of states was to support and expand the scale of the state’s national capacity for operation in space and the development of legal instruments to guide state’s international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space. These instruments were never designed to respond to commercial questions over mining or tourism in space, private investment in space activities, or the emergence of non-state private enterprises operating in space. As a result, private enterprises operating in the vacuum of space also **float in an unstable legal vacuum** which **threatens to implode in geopolitical competition**. Beyond Stars and States In an **increasingly commercial outer space** in which there are **no set limits to the exploitation of resources or claim to property**, states and private companies will inevitably pursue the development of new extraterrestrial industries to suit their geoeconomic interests. If unchecked, the legal protection of outer space as a domain of exploration for the benefit of all humanity **would functionally fail**. To protect investments and profit from national space industries, states would likely resort to military force to protect and secure private assets. Over time, space would ultimately become a fourth border domain over which states claim, exercise, and defend sovereignty — including through the use of force. The challenge is thus to prevent the circumstances that could lead to space-borne conflict before it is made possible. Notwithstanding, commercial exploration and the use of natural resources need not lead to predation among actors involved in space. The potential rewards — both technological and environmental — that could come from investment in the harvesting of resources in space are immense. International law cannot afford to wait for the security dilemma posed by commercial activity in space to manifest before addressing it but must anticipate and proactively adopt measures to address future issues that govern extraterrestrial human activity. The **only remedy for the lack of legal governance over commercial activity in space is the creation of new international laws** through a comprehensive international treaty on commercial operations in space. The new treaty must expressly regulate commercial activities by states and private companies, enshrine an international liability and compensation regime covering damages caused with workable sanction provisions, and reinforce norms that restrict any militarization of outer space. The international community should focus its efforts on establishing a legal regime, with mandatory provisions (rather than non-binding resolutions, observations, commentaries, and conclusions) which generate both international responsibility and provide enforceable sanctions in the event of violations. The effort should be borne out by expanding the scope and strengthening the oversight powers of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), rather than creating a new organ with redundant bureaucracy. Beyond the tasks of encouraging space research programs, studying space activities, and addressing legal questions, COPUOS should be granted the necessary powers to perform control and oversight monitoring functions. Experience has taught the international community that cooperative arrangements between states and international organizations can prevent competition for resources from escalating to kinetic conflict. Through cooperation, there is a chance to preserve extraterrestrial resources for future generations, secure an equitable allocation of resources and benefits with a mind to each country’s specific needs, and prevent the expansion of geopolitical conflict to the domain of space. Space powers must recognize the value in partnering with other states to advance the development of space programs more efficiently. It should be clear now that all nations could reap the benefits of collective action, exploration, and commercialization of resources from beyond Earth’s atmosphere while preventing a drawn-out international conflict to the final frontier. The will of states not to jeopardize the fundamental basis of international law must be reflected in coordination and surveillance efforts to ensure that the advantages derived from space exploration allow humanity to continue evolving.

**China already gatekeeps REMs – space just evens the playing field**

Stavridis 21 [(James, retired US Navy admiral, chief international diplomacy and national security analyst for NBC News, senior fellow at JHU Applied Physics Library, PhD in Law and Diplomacy from Tufts) “U.S. Needs a Strong Defense Against China’s Rare-Earth Weapon,” Bloomberg Opinion, March 4, 2021, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-04/u-s-needs-a-strong-defense-against-china-s-rare-earth-weapon>] TDI

You could be forgiven if you are confused about what’s going on with rare-earth elements. On the one hand, news reports indicate that China may increase production quotas of the minerals this quarter as a [goodwill gesture](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3122501/china-raises-rare-earth-quotas-goodwill-trade-signal-us) to the Joe Biden administration. But other sources say that China may ultimately ban the export of the rare earths altogether on “[security concerns](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-19/china-may-ban-rare-earth-technology-exports-on-security-concerns?sref=QYxyklwO).” What’s really going on here?

There are 17 elements considered [rare earths](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-16/why-rare-earths-are-achilles-heal-for-europe-u-s-quicktake) — lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium — and while many aren’t actually rare in terms of global deposits, extracting them is difficult and expensive. They are used across high-tech manufacturing, including smartphones, fighter aircraft and components in virtually all advanced electronics. Of particular note, they are essential to many of the clean-energy technologies expected to come online in this decade.

I began to focus on rare-earth elements when I commanded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence in Afghanistan, known as the International Security Assistance Force. While Afghans live in an extremely poor country, [studies](https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/afghanistans-mineral-resources-are-a-lost-opportunity-and-a-threat/) have assessed that they sit atop $1 trillion to $3 trillion in a wide variety of minerals, including rare earths. Some [estimates](https://www.fraserinstitute.org/article/afghanistans-rare-earth-element-bonanza) put the rare-earth levels alone at 1.4 million metric tons.

But every time I tried to visit a mining facility, the answer I got from my security team was, “It’s too dangerous right now, admiral.” Unfortunately, despite a great deal of effort by the U.S. and NATO, those security challenges remain, deterring the large foreign-capital investments necessary to harvest the lodes. Which brings us back to Beijing.

China controls roughly 80% of the rare-earths market, between what it mines itself and processes in raw material from elsewhere. If it decided to wield the weapon of restricting the supply — something it has repeatedly [threatened](https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-trade-fight-raises-specter-of-rare-earth-shortage-11559304000) to do — it would create a significant challenge for manufacturers and a geopolitical predicament for the industrialized world.

It could happen. In 2010, Beijing threatened to cut off exports to Japan over the disputed Senkaku Islands. Two years ago, Beijing was reportedly considering restrictions on exports to the U.S. generally, as well as against specific companies (such as defense giant Lockheed Martin Corp.) that it deemed in violation of its policies against selling advanced weapons to Taiwan.

President Donald Trump’s administration issued an executive order to spur the production of rare earths domestically, and created an [Energy Resource Governance Initiative](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Energy-Resource-Governance-Initiative-ERGI-Fact-Sheet.pdf) to promote international mining. The European Union and Japan, among others, are also aggressively seeking newer sources of rare earths.

Given this tension, it was superficially surprising that China announced it would boost its mining quotas in the first quarter of 2021 by nearly 30%, reflecting a continuation in strong (and rising) demand. But the increase occurs under a shadow of uncertainty, as the Chinese Communist Party is undertaking a “review” of its policies concerning future sales of rare earths. In all probability, the tactics of the increase are temporary, and fit within a larger strategy.

China will go to great lengths to maintain overall control of the global rare-earths supply. This fits neatly within the geo-economic approach of the [One Belt, One Road](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-30/china-is-determined-to-reshape-the-globe) initiative, which seeks to use a variety of carrots and sticks — economic, trade, diplomatic and security — to create zones of influence globally. In terms of rare earths, the strategy seems to be allowing carefully calibrated access to the elements at a level that makes it economically less attractive for competitors to undertake costly exploration and mining operations. This is similar to the oil-market strategy used by Russia and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries for decades.

Some free-market advocates believe that China will not take aggressive action choking off supply because that could [precipitate retaliation](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-02-22/china-weaponizing-rare-earths-technology-will-probably-backfire) or accelerate the search for alternate sources in global markets. What seems more likely is a series of targeted shutdowns directed against specific entities such as U.S. defense companies, Japanese consumer electronics makers, or European industrial concerns that have offended Beijing.

The path to rare-earth independence for the U.S. must include: Ensuring supply chains of rare earths necessary for national security; promoting the exploitation of the elements domestically (and removing barriers to responsibly doing so); mandating that defense contractors and other critical-infrastructure entities wean themselves off Chinese rare earths; sponsoring research and development to find alternative materials, especially for clean energy technology; and creating a substantial stockpile of the elements in case of a Chinese boycott.

This is a bipartisan agenda. The Trump administration’s [strategic assessment](https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/06/department-commerce-releases-report-critical-minerals) of what needs to be done (which goes beyond just 17 rare earths to include a total of 35 critical minerals) is thoughtful, and should serve as a basis for the Biden administration and Congress.

**Doesn't escalate – vulnerability leads to restraint.**

**Pavur 19** [James, DPhil Researcher at the Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training at Oxford University, and Ivan Martinovic, Professor of Computer Science in the Department of Computer Science at Oxford University, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space”, 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle, <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf>]

A. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the **resources** and **precision required** to **operate a meaningful ASAT capability**. Given this, one possible reason why **space wars have not broken out** is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. **Limited access to orbit** necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the **fragility of an attacker’s own space assets** creates **de-escalatory pressures** due to the **deterrent effect of retaliation**. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination **towards de-escalatory space strategies** [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a **long-standing normative framework** favouring the **peaceful use of space**. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (**OST**), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over **six decades of relative peace** in orbit. Over these six decades, **norms have become deeply ingrained** into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that **states perceive real costs** to breaking this normative tradition and may even **moderate their behaviours** accordingly. One further factor supporting this norms regime is the **high degree of attributability** surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, **plausible deniability** and **stealth** are essentially **impossible**. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes **high diplomatic costs** on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the **orbital debris consequences** of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the **cascade effect** of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

**Heg**

**Heg is structurally unsustainable – political dysfunction, revisionist military-building, and overstretch**

**Ackerman 8-24**-21 [Elliot Ackerman, former U.S. Marine and intelligence officer and a co-author, with James Stavridis, of 2034: A Novel of the Next World War. "Winning Ugly," Foreign Affairs, 8-24-2021, accessed 9-8-2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2021-08-24/winning-ugly] HWIC

But what makes the war on terror different from other wars is that **victory** has never been based on achieving a positive outcome; the goal has been to prevent a negative one. In this war, victory doesn’t come when you destroy your adversary’s army or seize its capital. It occurs **when something does not happen**. How, then, do you declare victory? How do you prove a negative? After 9/11, it was almost as though American strategists, unable to conceptualize a war that could be won only by not allowing a certain set of events to replicate themselves, felt forced to create a war that conformed to more conventional conceptions of conflict. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq represented a [familiar type of war](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-05-04/ashraf-ghani-afghanistan-moment-risk-and-opportunity), with an **invasion** to topple a government and liberate a people, followed by a long **occupation** and **counterinsurgency** campaigns.

In addition to blood and treasure, there is another metric by which the war on terror can be judged: **opportunity cost**. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the depths of American **political dysfunction** and has hinted at the dangers of a civil-military divide. Perhaps even more important from a national security perspective, it has also brought the United States’ complex relationship with China into stark relief. For the past two decades, while Washington was repurposing the U.S. military to engage in massive counterinsurgency campaigns and precision counterterrorism operations, Beijing was busy building a military to **fight and defeat a**[**peer-level competitor**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-12-10/age-great-power-competition).

Today, the Chinese navy is the largest in the world. It boasts 350 commissioned warships to the U.S. Navy’s roughly 290. Although U.S. ships generally outclass their Chinese counterparts**, it now seems inevitable that the two countries’ militaries will one day reach parity**. China has spent 20 years building a chain of artificial islands throughout the South China Sea that can effectively serve as a defensive line of unsinkable aircraft carriers. Culturally, China has become more militaristic, producing **hypernationalist** content such as the Wolf Warrior action movies. In the first, a former U.S. Navy SEAL plays the archvillain. The sequel, released in 2017, became the highest-grossing film in Chinese box-office history. Clearly, Beijing has no qualms about framing Washington as an antagonist.

China isn’t the only country that has taken advantage of a preoccupied United States. In the past two decades, **Russia** has expanded its territory into Crimea and backed separatists in Ukraine; **Iran** has backed proxies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria; and **North Korea** has acquired nuclear weapons. After the century opened with 9/11, conventional wisdom had it that nonstate actors would prove to be the greatest threat to U.S. national security. This prediction came true, but not in the way most people anticipated. **Nonstate actors** have compromised national security not by attacking the United States but by **diverting its attention away from state actors**. It is these [classic antagonists](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/competition-with-china-without-catastrophe)—China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia—that have expanded their capabilities and antipathies in the face of a distracted United States.

How imminent is the threat from these states? When it comes to legacy military platforms—aircraft carriers, tanks, fighter planes—the United States continues to enjoy a healthy technological dominance over its near-peer competitors. But **its preferred platforms might not be the right ones**. Long-range **land-based cruise missiles** could render large aircraft carriers obsolete. Advances in **cyberoffense** could make tech-reliant fighter aircraft too vulnerable to fly. The greatest minds in the U.S. military have now, finally, turned their attention to these concerns, with the U.S. Marine Corps, for example, shifting its entire strategic focus to a potential conflict with China. But **it may be too late.**

WORN OUT

After two decades, the United States also suffers from **war fatigue**. Even though an all-volunteer military and the lack of a war tax have exempted most Americans from shouldering the burdens of war, that fatigue has still manifested. Under four presidents, the American people at first celebrated and then endured the endless wars playing in the background of their lives. Gradually, the national mood soured, and adversaries have taken notice. Americans’ fatigue—and rival countries’ recognition of it—has limited the United States’ strategic options. As a result, presidents have adopted **policies of inaction**, and American **credibility has eroded**.

This dynamic played out most starkly in Syria, in the aftermath of the August 2013 sarin gas attack in Ghouta. When Syrian President Bashar al-Assad crossed Obama’s stated redline by using chemical weapons, Obama found that not only was the **international community no longer as responsive** to an American president’s entreaties for the use of force but also that this **reluctance appeared in Congress**, as well. When Obama went to legislators to gain support for a military strike against the Assad regime, he encountered bipartisan war fatigue that mirrored the fatigue of voters, and he called off the attack. The United States’ **redline had been crossed, without incident or reprisal.**

After two decades, the United States suffers from war fatigue.

Fatigue may seem like a “soft” cost of the war on terror, but it is a glaring strategic liability. A nation exhausted by war has a difficult time presenting a **credible deterrent** threat to adversaries. This proved to be true during the Cold War when, at the height of the Vietnam War, in 1968, the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia, and when, in the war’s aftermath, in 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Because it was embroiled in a war in the first case and reeling from it in the second, the United States could not credibly deter Soviet military aggression. The United States is in a similar spot today, particularly with regard to China. When Americans were asked in a recent poll whether the United States should [defend Taiwan](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-temptation#author-info) if it were confronted with an invasion by China, 55 percent of respondents said that it should not.

Obviously, if the Chinese undertook such an action, particularly if Americans or the citizens of allied countries were killed in the process, public opinion might change swiftly; nevertheless, the poll suggested that the **threshold for the use of force has risen** among Americans. U.S. adversaries understand this. It is no coincidence that China, for instance, has felt **empowered** to infringe on Hong Kong’s autonomy and commit brazen human rights abuses against its minority Uyghur population. When American power recedes, other states fill the vacuum.

U.S. adversaries have also learned to **obfuscate** their aggression. The cyberwar currently being waged from Russia is one example, with the Russian government claiming no knowledge of the spate of ransomware attacks emanating from within its borders. With Taiwan, likewise, Chinese aggression probably wouldn’t manifest in conventional military ways. Beijing is more likely to take over the island through gradual annexation, akin to what it has done with Hong Kong, than stage an outright invasion. That makes a U.S. military response even more difficult—especially as two decades of war have **undermined U.S. military deterrence**.

**1. The risk of entrapment for a hegemon is very high – aff evidence will rely on Cold War data or flawed methodology that mis-defines entrapment**

**Edelstein & Shifrinson 18 [David M. Edelstein - Associate Professor of International Affairs in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Center for Security Studies, and Department of Government at Georgetown University; Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson - BA Brandeis University, PhD Massachusetts Institute of Technology, He has special expertise in great power politics since 1945 and U.S. engagement in Europe and Asia; *U.S. Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case for Restraint*; “Chapter 2: It’s a Trap”; pg. 19-21; Published by *Routledge* // Brower]**

In this chapter, building on the foundational work of Jack Snyder and Thomas J. Christensen (Snyder 1984; Christensen and Snyder 1990), we contend that **the risks of entrapment for the contemporary United States are significant.** More specifically, we make two arguments. First, **much of the entrapment debate thus far has been a game of shadow boxing.** As elaborated below, current efforts to study the frequency and risks of entrapment have virtually defined the problem away by treating entrapment as solely occurring when one ally goes to war for the sake of a partner when the first ally would prefer to avoid conflict. Although this is indeed the most concerning form of entrapment, it **misses that entrapment does not necessarily manifest in an either/ or choice in which a state clearly takes a step it avowedly prefers to avoid. Instead, entrapment can also manifest in critical decisions states make when confronting an adversary that involve the timing of confrontation, the relative resources contributed to the effort, and the objectives involved**. These different decisions on the road to deterrence and reassurance - and war - are crucial, as they help explain why states can be entrapped even if they agree that confronting an opponent is generally in their "national interest."

Second, **all forms of entrapment are more likely to occur in today's unipolar world, and to be especially prevalent if and when unipolarity begins to wane**. This is significant because **evidence that entrapment is uncommon - and thus current US grand strategy sustainable - has almost exclusively been drawn from the bipolar world of the Cold War**. Yet, **because the two great powers in bipolar systems do not need allies to establish a workable balance, the Cold War is among the least likely of all situations for entrapment to occur** (Waltz 1979).

Instead, **alliances in multipolar and unipolar systems are likely to carry greater entrapment risks**. Multipolar entrapment is easily understood (and much studied) - needing allies for a workable balance of power, states are entrapped into costly foreign adventures out of fears of being isolated and left strategically vulnerable. Studies of Europe's pre-World War I system make this point (Snyder 1984: 471-483; Schroeder 1972; Van Evera 1984: 96--101). **Unipolarity**, on the other hand, is less determinant but, on balance, we argue that it **generates entrapment risks falling between unipolar and bipolar systems.** Here, and although unipolarity limits a great power's need for allies for balance-of-power reasons, it reifies the need for allies to forestall the emergence of new great powers. In the process, **unipolar alliances make moral hazard - the tendency for allies to adopt progressively riskier policies in contravention of the formal or informal terms of an alliance with a Stronger actor- particularly likely** (Kuperman 2008). **Unipolar alliances thus carry real entrapment risks**, as a hegemon may need to go to war for allies to sustain its current dominance in the international system. The net result, therefore, is a situation where **the United States' large power advantages over allies and prospective rivals may make it especially vulnerable to entrapment.**

Together, these dynamics bolster the case for a more restrained US grand strategy and help undercut a key prop used by those advocating for primacist or "deep engagement" strategies. **Alliances are not a free lunch** for the United States. **Although the United States' alliances may be good for many things, helping the United States avoid conflicts is not one of them**. Alliances carry greater entrapment risks than often appreciated. Ultimately, even if some crises are deterred or foreclosed, the process of doing so creates new potential conflicts.

**Fear of lost credibility incentivizes US entrapment – it’s fueling aggression towards China which risks great power war in East Asia – direct negotiation or offshore balancing solves conflict**

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Since its 2010- 2011 announcement, **the pivot has inserted the United States into a host of Asian political and military disputes with China involving ownership of contested maritime space and islands in the South and East China Seas.** Though there may be economic resources beneath the surface around some of these locales, **neither the United States nor its allies have an intrinsic interest in ownership of contested areas**. Instead, the contested maritime domains are worrisome to US allies for what they suggest about China's territorial ambitions. **They are therefore important to the United States for the signal American actions send to allies over American credibility. Thus, the United States has moved to back its allies in their disputes with the PRC by rhetorically portraying China as the principal aggressor, clarifying that US commitments to the allies would cover the maritime areas under dispute, and - above all - has dispatched its own military forces to enforce what the US and its allies define as the "status quo" in contravention of China's own interests** (Russell 2014; White House 2014; US Pacific Command 2015;Valencia 2016; LaGrone 2015; Panda 2016).Whatever the legitimacy of these actions, their effect is to create a self-perpetuating cycle: the more the United States stands by its allies in opposing potential Chinese ambitions, the nominally more credible the American resolve to defend its allies, the more the allies are inclined to act aggressively toward China, and the greater the likelihood of a direct US- Chinese confron\*tation. In other words, **treating American support for its allies as a litmus test of the alliances themselves requires the United States to take steps on behalf of its allies that risk conflict with China.**

This is entrapment of the purest sort. The United States could readily provide security to its friends in East Asia, maintain Asia's political status quo, or more generally limit the rise of China without involving itself in Asian maritime disputes. **To the extent that the United States simply wants to preserve East Asian stability, it could negotiate directly with the P.R.C. to settle conflicts of interest on a bilateral basis. To the extent that the United States wants to prevent China from becoming an Asian hegemon or engaging in military action beyond its borders, it could simply surge forces to the region as crises develop or build up the military forces of its clients** (Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Lalwani 2014; Glaser 2015; Mirski 2013). That these options are treated as insufficient suggests entrapment at play. **Even if protecting Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners is in the United States' interest, only entrapment explains the timing and form of the American response.**3

**That causes Asian prolif**

**Fettweis 18**

Christopher J. Fettweis, an American political scientist and the Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, “Chapter 2: Unipolarity and Nuclear Weapons,” *Psychology of a Superpower: Security and Dominance in U.S. Foreign Policy,* Columbia University Press, 2018, accessed through Georgetown Libraries

First and most obviously, the second nuclear age is likely to be marked by a **great deal more proliferation** than the first. According to Bracken, the “overarching theme” of the age will be the “**breakdown of the major power monopoly** over the bomb.”6 **Unipolarity** **provides strong incentives** for smaller states, who have no hope of balancing the United States, **to pursue nuclear weapons.** **No matter how much effort** the United States puts into non- and counterproliferation, “nuclear weapons will **nevertheless spread**, with a new member occasionally joining the club,” predicted Kenneth Waltz. 7 “The most likely scenario in the wake of the Cold War,” argued John Mearsheimer, “is further nuclear proliferation in Europe,” and “it is **not likely** the proliferation will be well managed.”8 **Instability** and insecurity **would spread**, as would nuclear weapons, throughout the global South.9 Since new nuclear states were almost inevitable, both Waltz and Mearsheimer felt that it was in the interest of the West to attempt to manage, and indeed even to encourage, gradual proliferation to help stabilize the system.

These chains of proliferation will lead to **new**, potentially **unstable nuclear rivalries**. Were North Korea to be accepted as the ninth nuclearweapons state, Graham Allison warned in 2004, South Korea and Japan would **build their own arsenals** “by the end of the decade.”10 The second nuclear age will be “much more decentralized,” with “many independent nuclear decision centers.”11 A “multipolar nuclear order” is on the horizon, if it has not already arrived.12

The new nuclear powers are not likely to resemble the old. The second major assumption of the SNA literature is that proliferation will reach less enlightened parts of the globe, those led by unpredictable, semirational tyrants. The old rules of **deterrence may not apply**, since the motivations of these actors are not only **less knowable** but often **ruled by passions and nationalism**. “The idea of budding defense intellectuals sitting around computer models and debating strategy in Iran or Pakistan defies credulity,” or at least Bracken’s estimation, since in these states “hysterical nationalism” overrules rationality.13 The “overdetermined” cascades of proliferation across Asia will bring a host of **new, less trustworthy actors** into the nuclear camp, from **rogue states to nonstate actors**, all of whom will be essentially **undeterrable** by traditional means.14 Their motivations will be less rational or simply less transparent to the outside world.

In the second nuclear age, not just an accidental but the **intentional use** of nuclear weapons by new nuclear actors **cannot be ruled out**.15 Rogue states do not seek nuclear weapons for the reasons that motivated earlier proliferants. While all U.S. observers believe that Washington’s arsenal exists for defensive purposes, to deter any attack that our enemies would otherwise contemplate, the primary use of new nuclear weapons will be offensive. The possibility for irrationality in new nuclear powers inspired the United States to scrap the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and begin thinking about how to “tailor” deterrence to target smaller actors.16 A nuclear Iran will use its weapons to **bully or even attack**, **not deter**. In 2017, experts warned that North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles **would be coercive**, to extract concessions from U.S. allies. “North Korea’s contempt for its neighbors suggests that it would hold them hostage with its nuclear weapons,” wrote the widely respected ambassador Chris Hill. “Would proliferation **stop with South Korea and Japan**? **What about Taiwan**?”17 As a result, the basic assumptions of deterrence need to be rethought.

**2. Pursuit of hegemony leads to Sino-Russia alliance – turns the aff**

**Porter, DPhil, 19**

(Patrick, ModernHistory@Oxford, ProfInternationalSecurityAndStrategy@Birmingham, Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25)

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and **risk escalation on multiple such fronts** would court several dangers. It would **overstretch the country**. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more. Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in **the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself**, and the **failure to balance commitments** with scarce resources. To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would **drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions**. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place. Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: **a hostile Eurasian alliance** leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

**3. Hegemony fails and propagates terrorism – it justifies intervention and empirically causes blowback.**

**Bandow 19** (Doug, senior fellow @ Cato Institute and JD Stanford, 6-2-2019, "Understanding the Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Albright Doctrine," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/understanding-failure-us-foreign-policy-albright-doctrine-60477)> AG

Since 9/11, Washington has been extraordinarily active militarily—invading two nations, bombing and droning several others, deploying special operations forces in yet more countries, and applying sanctions against many. Tragically, **the threat of Islamist violence and terrorism only have metastasized**. Although Al Qaeda lost its effectiveness in directly plotting attacks, it continues to inspire national offshoots. Moreover, while losing its physical “caliphate” the Islamic State added further terrorism to its portfolio.

Three successive administrations have ever more deeply ensnared the United States in the Middle East. War with Iran appears to be frighteningly possible. Ever-wealthier allies are ever-more dependent on America. Russia is actively hostile to the United States and Europe. Washington and Beijing appear to be a collision course on far more than trade. Yet the current administration appears convinced that doing more of the same will achieve different results, the best definition of insanity.

Despite his sometimes abusive and incendiary rhetoric, the president has departed little from his predecessors’ policies. For instance, American forces remain deployed in Afghanistan and Syria. Moreover, the Trump administration has increased its military and materiel deployments to Europe. Also, Washington has intensified economic sanctions on Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, and even penalized additional countries, namely Venezuela.

U.S. foreign policy suffers from systematic flaws in the thinking of the informal policy collective which former Obama aide Ben Rhodes dismissed as “The Blob.” Perhaps no official better articulated The Blob’s defective precepts than Madeleine Albright, United Nations ambassador and Secretary of State.

First is overweening hubris. In 1998 Secretary of State Albright declared that “If we have to use force, it is because we are America: **we are the indispensable nation**. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.”

Even then her claim was implausible. America blundered into the Korean War and barely achieved a passable outcome. The Johnson administration infused Vietnam with dramatically outsize importance. For decades, Washington foolishly refused to engage the People’s Republic of China. Washington-backed dictators in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, and elsewhere fell ingloriously. An economic embargo against Cuba that continues today helped turn Fidel Castro into a global folk hero. Washington veered dangerously close to nuclear war with Moscow during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and again two decades later during military exercises in Europe.

U.S. officials rarely were prepared for events that occurred in the next week or month, let alone years later. Americans did no better than the French in Vietnam. Americans managed events in Africa no better than the British, French, and Portuguese colonial overlords. Washington made more than its share of bad, even awful decisions in dealing with other nations around the globe.

Perhaps the worst failing of U.S. foreign policy was ignoring the inevitable impact of **foreign intervention**. Americans would never passively accept another nation bombing, invading, and occupying their nation, or interfering in their political system. Even if outgunned, they would resist. Yet Washington has undertaken all of these practices, with little consideration of the impact on those most affected—hence **the rise of terrorism** against the United States. Terrorism, horrid and awful though it is, became the weapon of choice of weaker peoples against intervention by the world’s industrialized national states.

The U.S. record since September 11 has been uniquely counterproductive. Rather than minimize hostility toward America, Washington adopted a policy—highlighted by launching new wars, killing more civilians, and ravaging additional societies—guaranteed to create enemies, exacerbate radicalism, and spread terrorism. **Blowback is everywhere**. Among the worst examples: Iraqi insurgents **mutated into ISIS**, which wreaked military havoc throughout the Middle East and turned to terrorism.

**4. Power transitions cause retrenchment, management, and peace, not war – the US-China relationship is not unique.**

**MacDonald and Parent, PhDs in Political Science, 20**

(Paul K., Columbia, Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, and Joseph M., Columbia, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, The Authors Respond, *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 20(2): 176-179) BW

How do great powers respond to decline? Do they tend to embrace policies that raise the risk of war with rising challengers? These were the core questions that we set out to answer in our book Twilight of the Titans. We focused on these questions because there is a growing consensus among many policymakers and pundits that shifts in relative power are particularly perilous. In an influential 2015 Atlantic Monthly article, for example, the political scientist Graham Allison argued that “war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not” (Allison 2015; 2017). In 2017, Allison reportedly briefed these findings, which are derived from his accounting of sixteen historical power transitions, to Trump’s National Security Council (Crowley 2017). For better or worse, academic arguments about rising and falling powers are helping to shape contemporary Sino-American relations. Probably for worse, because the marquee finding in our book is that **power transition theory is wrong.** Ordinal transitions between rising and declining powers tend to be **less—rather than more—conflict prone.** The main reason why this is the case is because great powers tend to respond to decline not by lashing out against their rising rivals, but by adopting policies of strategic retrenchment. These policies do not always work, and different structural conditions can make it easier or harder for declining powers to use retrenchment to effectively manage decline. Yet to the extent that hawks in the United States are drawing on power transition theory to advocate for “confronting” a rising China or for a strategy of “great power competition,” these policy recommendations are based on **flimsy intellectual foundations.** We appreciate the care with which all three of the reviewers have engaged with the arguments and evidence we present in our book. All three seem to accept the basic conclusion: that the impending Sino-American power transition may be turbulent, but that conflict is less likely than not. Yet there are some important areas of dispute. One concerns what the chief source of grand strategy is and how that will affects great power relations. Along with Robert Ross, we tend to rely on structural material factors, while David Kang and Ketian Zhang rely more on domestic and/or non-material factors. The other concerns how conflictual the rise of China will be. Ironically, although we tend to share Ross’s analytical focus on systemic factors, we reach a much more optimistic conclusion about the extent to which conditions in the Asia-Pacific are “ripe for rivalry” (Friedberg 1993). Let us start with the question of what shapes grand strategy. Our book follows realist theory and argues that actors in international politics, typically states, are primarily interested in their security and survival. This is precisely why states tend to be alarmed by relative decline, because it exposes them to potential harm. Yet beyond this simple and spare assumption, we accept that states can define their security needs in a wide variety of ways, and that culture, history, and domestic politics can matter a great deal in how they do so. Here we are in complete agreement with Kang that one should not “unproblematically assume that all states are the same in the contemporary world.” He is absolutely right to be frustrated that international relations scholars know much more about European than Asian history, a regrettable legacy of imperialism and the Cold War, which is getting better too slowly. We accept that China’s conception of its security needs and its role in the Asia-Pacific region will inevitably be shaped by cultural and historical legacies, the same way that Britain’s tradition of “splendid isolation” or French conceptions of “grandeur” influenced their grand strategic responses in the cases we explore in our book. Indeed, although our research finds that shifts in relative power are among the most important factors shaping great power grand strategies, we note that the correlation is imperfect. States routinely retrench less than we expect given the depth of their declines, to highlight one notable exception (pp. 53–55). The question for contemporary US–Chinese relations is the extent to which historical or cultural differences override structural conditions or make it simply impossible to compare cases of rising and declining powers. Here we disagree with Kang that China’s experience is not just distinctive, but fundamentally sui generis. It may be true that “the historical East Asian system was hegemonic,” and that as a result, Chinese foreign policy was traditionally oriented more towards monitoring hierarchic relationships rather than managing shifts in the balance of power. Yet British grand strategy was likewise obsessed with questions of imperial management, while the expansion and contraction of contested frontiers were central preoccupations of Russian grand strategy. Similarly, it may well be the case that East Asian history highlights “the dangers of internal challenges rather than external threats.” Yet French policymakers grappled with a rising Germany amidst a contested transition from royalism to republicanism, while domestic unrest and parliamentary protest provided a fatal backdrop for late-tsarist responses to decline. Great powers are inevitably preoccupied with a range of competing concerns—external threats, imperial entanglements, domestic difficulties—all of which are impacted by decline in different ways to varying degrees. Zhang’s core contention is that the making of grand strategy is more complex than we allow for in the book. She notes that there are multiple ways to measure “rising” and “declining,” that grand strategies are sometimes too complex to capture with a single word such as “retrenchment,” and that diplomatic or economic interests can often trump security concerns. We acknowledge all of these points and do our best to defend our choices in the text. We choose one way to measure decline (relative great power share of GDP) and focus on a particular moment of decline (five year windows around an ordinal transition) not because these are the only measures or moments that matter, but because they match those of power transition theorists and are easiest to implement (pp. 5–6, 45–48). We classify and compare grand strategies based on their relative ambition—do they trend towards expansion or retrenchment—not because this is the only or necessarily the best way to think about grand strategy, but because questions of the bearing burdens and managing costs tend to be particularly salient during moments of decline (pp. 6–9, 48–50). Zhang is certainly correct that there are broader shifts in the character of international politics that may mute our findings. Perhaps globalization has fundamentally transformed the boundaries in which great power competition can take place, thereby rendering the concerns of power transition theorists obsolete (nuclear weapons, international institutions, and the spread of democracy are often cited as having a similar pacifying effect). We try to account for this in our discussion of the “conquest calculus”: when it is harder for states to profit from using force, they will be less likely to choose preventive war in response to decline (pp. 70–71). Yet many of our cases of decline come from nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, when these pacifying forces were relatively weak, and yet **great powers still tended to favor retrenchment over war** (pp. 40–41, 191–192). Even in familiar and favorable cases, the evidence in favor of power transition theory is thin. Now that **trade networks, international institutions, democracy, and nuclear weapons** have remade the global landscape, the implications of our argument tend to be more optimistic. Decline is not destiny, and **great powers have considerable latitude** to manage power transitions using retrenchment, even in seemingly unfavorable circumstances. We were surprised, therefore, that Ross finds our account “especially pessimistic” about the future of Sino-American relations. Ross is right that some of the conditions we emphasize may make the United States reluctant to retrench, notably the United States’ unwillingness to surrender preeminence and the apparent absence of regional allies who are willing or able to balance against a rising China. Nevertheless, there are other conditions that appear to favor accommodation and retrenchment: **vast distances separate the two biggest powers; the conquest calculus appears to favor the defense; American security commitments are relatively independent, easing worries about falling dominos; and the United States is falling gradually, which leaves time for experimentation and for reforms to bear fruit** (pp. 197–198). We concur with Ross’s observation about the importance of geography, which can mute incentives to use force and provide opportunities for retrenchment (pp. 39–41). Still, we think these opportunities are not unique to maritime environments. In the 1880s, the vast and dispersed character of Russia’s imperial commitments provided it with opportunities to pull back from exposed frontiers while reinforcing key strongpoints. Declining powers often see retrenchment not as a strategy that sacrifices security, but as a means to **bolster deterrence and protect vital interests.** If so, then the United States was wise to reorient its defense priorities and devote an increasing share of its resources to the Pacific. As for applications, we would like to consider two: balancing and signaling. Kang builds the case that Asian states are not balancing against China because China is not a threat, is working to reassure its neighbors, and by implication does not much threaten the United States. In contrast, we believe that Kang is excessively optimistic about the intensity of the security dilemma in Asia. At root, balance of power theory proposes that, in a self-help world, great powers generally balance against each other mostly by strengthening their own capabilities; for weaker actors, however, their behaviors are more variable. This is exactly what Kang’s Figure 1 shows and exactly what American policymakers fear: China balancing against the United States and most Asian states failing to balance against China. This has led to a rebalancing of US forces to the Asia-Pacific and increasingly fraught relations between the two superpowers. Moreover, and rather than being a sui generis feature of East Asia, this trend is also consistent with historical practice. Our data suggest that rising powers tend to increase defense spending at a faster rate than other great powers, but that they also tend to **negotiate more alliance agreements and to get involved in fewer militarized disputes** (pp. 64–66). Rising powers often invest in and modernize their militaries, yet also go out of their way to reassure their neighbors. This is a classic balance of power dynamic: great power poles repel each other as weaker states caught in between are generally swept into one orbit or another. Oddly enough, this allows us to close on an ungloomy note. Zhang has pervasive worries about signaling. What if kindness is mistaken for weakness and US defensive measures signal a lack of resolve? We hope our work can dampen some of these anxieties. Over more than a century, the complexities of power and statecraft have changed. **In markedly worse circumstances than** those in **the contemporary Asia-Pacific, great powers have risen and fallen, made contradictory statements, and pursued contradictory policies, yet across many measures, and controlling for many confounding factors, moments of power transition have tended to be peaceful.** For all their manifest imperfections, great powers generally sense power trends accurately, and exchange signals as intended, which has powerfully contributed to peace. While this is no reason for complacency—deterrence can break down, reassurance can fail, historical legacies can cast long shadows—it is no reason for undue alarm either. Contra Allison, the United States and China are not trapped in the same old story of war and change; they remain coauthors of their future.

**Decline has popularized restraint – a bipartisan coalition formed to avoid the failures of liberal hegemony**

**Ashford 21** Emma Ashford is a Senior Fellow at the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, September/October 2021, "Strategies of Restraint," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-24/strategies-restraint> mvp

For nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was characterized by a bipartisan consensus: that as the world’s “indispensable nation” and with no competitor, the United States had little choice but to pursue a transformational agenda on the world stage. Over the last few years, however, that consensus has collapsed. A growing chorus of voices are advocating a strategy of restraint—a less activist approach that focuses on diplomatic and economic engagement over military intervention. And they have found a receptive audience.

In that, they have undoubtedly been helped by circumstance: the United States’ failed “war on terror,” the rise of China, and growing partisan polarization at home have all made it clear that U.S. foreign policy cannot simply remain on autopilot. Even those who continue to argue for an interventionist approach to the world typically acknowledge that their strategy must be shorn of its worst excesses. Where restraint was once excluded from the halls of power and confined largely to academic journals, now some of its positions have become official policy.

Although President Donald Trump’s record was defined by dysfunction more than any coherent strategy, he did wind down the war in Afghanistan, raise doubts about the value of U.S. alliances in Europe and Asia, and question the wisdom of military intervention and democracy promotion. President Joe Biden, for his part, has begun withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan, has initiated a review of the United States’ global military posture, and has taken steps to stabilize the U.S.-Russian relationship. In 2019, Jake Sullivan, now Biden’s national security adviser, wrote, “The U.S. must get better at seeing both the possibilities and the limits of American power.” That this sentiment is now openly embraced at the highest levels of government is nothing short of a win for those who have long called for a more restrained U.S. foreign policy.

Yet victory also raises a question: Where do restrainers go from here? With Washington having dialed down the war on terrorism, the most politically popular of their demands has been achieved. Now, they are liable to face an uphill battle over the rest of U.S. foreign policy, such as how to treat allies or what to do about China—issues that have little public salience or on which the restrainers are divided. Although often bundled together by Washington’s foreign policy elites and derided as isolationists, the members of the restraint community include a diversity of voices, running the gamut from left-wing antiwar activists to hard-nosed conservative realists. It should not be surprising that they disagree on much.

If the restraint camp focuses on what divides them rather than what unites them, then it will find itself consumed with internecine battles and excluded from decision-making at the very moment its influence could be at its height. But there is a viable consensus, a path forward for restraint that can achieve the most important goals, alienate the fewest members of the coalition, and win new converts. This more pragmatic strategy, which would entail the gradual lessening of U.S. military commitments, would not achieve the most ambitious of the restrainers’ goals. But it has the best chance of moving U.S. foreign policy in a more secure and more popular direction.

A DEBATE REBORN

The idea that the United States is uniquely qualified to reshape the world has manifested itself in different ways in the 30 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of a bipolar world. Humanitarian intervention, democracy promotion, and counterterrorism—all were attempts to mold the world according to American preferences. Yet the unipolar moment has largely failed to live up to expectations. Today, democracy is in decline, there are more state-level conflicts than at any time since 1990, the war on terrorism has largely failed, and China’s rise has given the lie to the notion that the United States can prevent the emergence of peer competitors. Washington’s foreign policy community now appears to accept the need for a course correction, although it remains divided on the specifics.

Today, opinion is increasingly coalescing around three distinct views. The first of these is a modified form of liberal internationalism, the school of thought that believes that U.S. leadership is a stabilizing force in the world, emphasizes militarized deterrence, and has faith in a liberal, rules-based international order. Proponents of this approach often frame threats from China and Russia as threats to this order rather than as threats to concrete U.S. security interests. Yet the strain of this view dominant today is also, at least in theory, a softer, reformed version of the post–Cold War consensus, one that takes into account critiques of recent U.S. foreign policy and rejects parts of the war on terrorism.

Because they are more aware of the limits of American power than their predecessors, advocates of this view are best described as liberal internationalists, rather than liberal interventionists. The scholars Mira Rapp-Hooper and Rebecca Lissner—both of whom now serve on the National Security Council—belong to this camp. As they wrote in these pages in 2019, “Rather than wasting its still considerable power on quixotic bids to restore the liberal order or remake the world in its own image, the United States should focus on what it can realistically achieve.”

Restrainers have not offered a coherent alternative to today’s foreign policy.

Another alternative has percolated out of the synthesis of the Republican foreign policy establishment and the Trump administration: a form of belligerent unilateralism that prioritizes maintaining U.S. military primacy. This “America first” approach to the world is also a clear successor to the old consensus, but one that privileges power over diplomacy and U.S. interests over a liberal order. Like their liberal internationalist counterparts, the America firsters—both Trump administration alumni and more mainstream Republican foreign policy hands—have absorbed the notion that U.S. foreign policy has become unpopular, particularly among the GOP base. They have therefore shifted from democracy promotion and nation building toward a militarized global presence more akin to classic imperial policing.

They also reject some of the core liberal components of the old consensus, spurning diplomacy and arms control, fetishizing sovereignty, and preferring American solutions to global problems over multilateral solutions. For them, the liberal order is a mirage. As Nadia Schadlow, a veteran of the Trump White House, wrote in these pages in 2020, “Washington must let go of old illusions, move past the myths of liberal internationalism, and reconsider its views about the nature of the world order.”

Both approaches to the world are still problematic. A rebooted liberal internationalism may succeed at rehabilitating the United States’ image, but it is unlikely to advance democracy or build a unified liberal order through nonmilitary means when military ones have failed. And as the global balance of power shifts, liberal internationalism simultaneously overestimates the contributions that U.S. allies can make to collective defense and underestimates the differences they have with Washington. The “America first” approach, for its part, may yield short-term dividends—Trump, after all, was able to force U.S. allies to abide by sanctions on Iran and renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement—but it has diminishing returns. The more the United States uses coercive tools against other countries, the more they will look for ways to blunt those tools. And both approaches lean heavily on a forward U.S. military presence in ways that could all too easily trigger an unplanned conflict, particularly in Asia.

The remaining alternative, restraint, comes from outside the Washington policymaking world and is largely focused on these flaws. It is far more ideologically diverse than the other two, but most restrainers agree on several core principles. They share a conviction that the United States is a remarkably secure nation, that unlike many great powers in history, it faces no real threat of invasion, thanks to geography and nuclear weapons. They argue that U.S. foreign policy has been characterized in recent years by overreach and hubris, with predictably abysmal results. And they think U.S. foreign policy is overmilitarized, with policymakers spending too much on defense and too quickly resorting to force. Most important, advocates of restraint strike directly at the notion of the United States as the indispensable nation, considering it instead as but one among many global powers.

RESTRAINT’S MOMENT

The most common slap at restrainers is that they focus too much on criticism without offering plausible policy alternatives. That is not an entirely accurate evaluation; individual proponents of restraint have offered detailed prescriptions for everything from the war in Afghanistan to U.S.-Russian relations. But it is true that restrainers have often focused on what draws them together—namely, their shared criticisms of the status quo—rather than what would pull them apart: the question of which specific policies to implement instead. As restraint enters the mainstream conversation, the distinctions within this group are coming to the surface.

Restraint contains several different overlapping ideas. The first (and best defined) of these is an academic theory of grand strategy formulated by the political scientist Barry Posen in his 2014 book, Restraint. His version of restraint envisages a much smaller military based primarily within the United States. Other restrainers—such as the international relations theorists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt—advocate a grand strategy of offshore balancing,

a distinct but related approach that also calls for downsizing the United States’ global military role. (The distinction between the two is one of degree: Posen backs an entirely offshore military presence, whereas Mearsheimer and Walt admit that the United States may occasionally need to intervene to keep a hostile state from dominating a key region.) As grand strategies, both leave many granular policy details unstated, but they present internally coherent and fully formulated approaches to the world.

There is also a looser definition of “restraint.” Increasingly, the term is Washington shorthand for any proposal for a less militarized and activist foreign policy. That includes those put forth not just by academic realists but also by progressive Democrats and conservative Republicans in Congress, as well as various antiwar groups (such as Code Pink and the Friends Committee on National Legislation) and newer entrants into the antiwar space (such as the veterans’ group Common Defense). Thus, the term “restraint” is now used as often to signify this broader political movement as it is to describe a grand strategy.

Any movement that includes Mearsheimer and Code Pink is by necessity a big tent, and indeed, there are many motivations for restraint. For some, it might be a moral consideration: many libertarians believe that war grows the state, and anti-imperialists want to rein in what they see as an overbearing military-industrial complex. For others, the motivation is financial: although conservative deficit hawks are far less vocal on defense than on other issues, they exist, and many progressives and even some mainstream Democrats view cuts to military spending as an easy way to free up resources for infrastructure or social programs. For others in the restraint community, it is personal: some of the recent activism around ending the war on terrorism has been driven by veterans who are concerned about what the conflict has done to their fellow soldiers and to American society writ large. Then there are the strategists, for whom the pursuit of restraint is largely about avoiding the failures and risks of the current approach. There are even those who might be called “restraint-curious,” people who are open to a more restrained foreign policy on specific issues but reject the broader notion.

The result is a coalition that—much like its opposition—is broad and bipartisan, a partnership of the left and the right in which the two sides don’t agree with each other on much else. Consider the congressional activism around ending U.S. support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen, a movement that was spearheaded by two liberals, Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont and Senator Chris Murphy, a Democrat from Connecticut, and two Republicans, Senators Rand Paul of Kentucky and Mike Lee of Utah. Or consider the strange bedfellows made by the war in Afghanistan. In the House of Representatives, advocates of withdrawal included Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York, the standard-bearer of the Democratic Party’s left wing, and Matt Gaetz of Florida, a Republican devotee of Trump. The transpartisan nature of the coalition pushing for restraint is one of its core strengths.