## K

## Framework

#### [ROJ] COPYING IS KEY – since technocratic education stymies critical thought and treats students as means to profit-bearing ends, the Role of the Judge is to be an Anti-Technocratic Educator, which pushes back against harms to critical thought.

#### [Fridland] Next, the imitation-based learning key to technocracy kills student innovation.

Fridland: Fridland, Ellen. [Ph.D., Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy, King’s College London]. “Do as I say and as I do: Imitation, pedagogy, and cumulative culture.” *Mind & Language*, 33(1), March 2018. https://tinyurl.com/yvxbt664 CH

2 | IMITATION IS A CONSERVATIVE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM In this section, I would like to argue that if imitation is going to function as a high-fidelity transmission mechanism of the sort that cumulative culture requires then imitation, by its very nature, has to be conservative. That is, imitation should be in opposition to the innovation and creativity that also appears necessary for cumulative culture. This is because the modifications that would result from innovation could change the details of a demonstrated behavior, thus jeopardizing the faithful transmission of the tradition. In short, if imitation is a method for transmitting causally opaque technologies or conventional practices, customs, and languages and if its function relies on the precise, detailed, high-fidelity transmission of those practices, then changing the details of the practice, as innovation would require, could undermine its function.13 Another way of thinking about this is from the perspective of perceived as opposed to actual relevance. The way in which imitation works is by allowing relevance to be determined by the model or demonstrator rather than grounding relevance in what appears relevant to the observer. The demonstration becomes authoritative. This seems critical for establishing faithful replication of causally opaque and conventional behaviors since apparent relevance or irrelevance will turn out to be an unreliable guide to actual relevance and irrelevance. So much should be clear since what is required for successfully using a tool with an opaque causal structure or repeating a conventional and thus causally arbitrary custom or practice will have little to do with features whose relevance can be observed independently of the procedure or custom modeled. That is, relevance, in these cases, cannot be discerned by individual perceptual, causal, or logical reasoning. As such, in order to acquire a complex tradition, the observer has to default to precisely repeating the observed behavior. After all, relying on one's own sense of relevance can lead one astray: it may lead to an omission of various necessary elements or to the addition of superfluous and possibly mistaken others. These can then undermine successful transmission of the skill or knowledge.

#### [ROB] Thus, the Role of the Ballot is to Resist Imitation Pedagogy, which means rewarding performances that promote authentic learning instead of recycling tired political and educational tropes. To clarify, whichever side’s performance better ruptures replication politics wins – we weigh impacts via normal mechanisms like probability or magnitude.

## A. Links

#### 1. [Bhabha 1] The aff creates a *globally-enforced* policy that all states adhere to – it’s a “one-size-fits-all” approach that every state has to follow. Yet compliance with this policy requires colonial mimicry, as low-income states copy what wealthier states do.

**Bhabha 1:** Bhabha, Homi. [Anne F. Rothenberg Professor of the Humanities, Harvard University] “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse.” *Source: October, Vol. 28, Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis*, Spring, 1984. http://www.marginalutility.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/01.-Bhabha.pdf JP/CH

Within that conflictual economy of colonial discourse which Edward Said describes as the tension between the synchronic panoptical vision of domination-the demand for identity, stasis-and the counter-pressure of the diachrony of history- change, difference - mimicry represents an ironic compromise. **If I may adapt Samuel Weber's formulation of the marginalizing vision of castration, then colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its** difference. The authority of that mode of colonial discourse that I have called mimicry is therefore stricken by an indeterminacy: mimicry emerges as the representation of a difference that is itself a process of disavowal. **Mimicry is, thus, the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation, and discipline, which “appropriates” the Other as it visualizes power. Mimicry is also the sign of the inappropriate, however, a difference or recalcitrance which coheres the dominant strategic function of colonial power, intensifies surveillance, and poses an immanent threat to both “normalized” knowledges and disciplinary** powers. The effect of mimicry on the authority of colonial discourse is profound and disturbing. For in "normalizing" the colonial state or subject, the dream of post-Enlightenment civility alienates its own language of liberty and produces another knowledge of its norms. The ambivalence which thus informs this strategy is discernible, for example, in Locke's Second Treatise which splits to reveal the limitations of liberty in his double use of the word "slave": first simply, descriptively as the locus of a legitimate form of ownership, then as the trope for an intolerable, illegitimate exercise of power. What is articulated in that distance between the two uses is the absolute, imagined difference between the "Colonial" State of Carolina and the Original State of Nature. It is from this area between mimicry and mockery, where the reforming, civilizing mission is threatened by the displacing gaze of its disciplinary double, that my instances of colonial imitation come. What they all share is a discursive process by which the excess or slippage produced by the ambivalence of mimicry (almost the same, but not quite) does not merely "rupture" the discourse, but becomes transformed into an uncertainty which fixes the colonial subject as a “partial presence”. By "partial". I mean both "incomplete" and "virtual." It **is as if the very emergence of the "colonial" is dependent for its representation** up**on some strategic limitation or prohibition within the authoritative discourse itself**. **The success of colonial appropriation depends on a proliferation of inappropriate objects that ensure its strategic failure, so that mimicry is at once resemblance and menace.**

#### 2. [Util] The aff framework assumes a singular conception of the good – pleasure and pain are represented as *one* concept that everyone automatically agrees on – they never justify their conceptions or where they come from.

## B. Impacts

#### 1. [Bhabha 2] First, TREADMILL DISAD: colonizers sustain their power by making others mimic them, promoting hope in a future that will never come so long as wealthy élites have the upper hand.

**Bhabha 2:** Bhabha, Homi. [Anne F. Rothenberg Professor of the Humanities, Harvard University] “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse.” *Source: October, Vol. 28, Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis*, Spring, 1984. http://www.marginalutility.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/01.-Bhabha.pdf JP/CH

**What I have called is not the familiar exercise of colonial mimicry dependent relations through narcissistic identification so that, as Fanon has observed,12 the black man stops being an actional person for only the white man can represent his self-esteem.** Mimicry conceals no presence or identity behind its mask: it is not what Cesaire describes as "colonization-thingification"13 behind which there stands the essence of the presence Africaine. **The menace of mimicry is its double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts its authority. And it is a double-vision that is a result of what I've described as the partial** representation/**recognition of the colonial object.** Grant's colonial as partial imitator, Macaulay's translator, Naipaul's colonial politician as play- actor, Decoud as the scene setter of the opera bouffe of the New World, these are the appropriate objects of a colonialist chain of command, authorized versions of otherness. But they are also, as I have shown, the figures of a doubling, **the part-objects of a metonymy of colonial desire** which **alienates the** modality and **normality of those dominant discourses in which they** emerge as “inappropriate” colonial subjects. A desire that, through the repetition of partial presence, which is the basis of mimicry, articulates those disturbances of cultural, racial, and historical difference that menace the narcissistic demand of colonial authority. It is **a desire that reverses “in part” the colonial appropriation by now producing a partial vision of the colonizer’s presence. A gaze of otherness, that shares the acuity of the genealogical gaze which, as Foucault describes it, liberates marginal elements and shatters the unity of** man's **being** through which he extends his sovereignty**.**

#### 2. [Freiere] Second, ANTI-LIBERATION: mimicry forces the oppressed to rely on the “master’s tools” so they can never truly be free.

Freire: Freire, Paulo. [Ph.D., Brazilian educator and philosopher] *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. New York: Continuum, 1968. https://envs.ucsc.edu/internships/internship-readings/freire-pedagogy-of-the-oppressed.pdf CH

The "fear of freedom" which afflicts the oppressed,3 a fear which may equally well lead them to desire the role of oppressor or bind them to the role of oppressed, should be examined. One of the basic elements of the relationship between oppressor and oppressed is prescription. Every prescription represents the imposition of one individual’s choice upon another transforming the consciousness of the person prescribed to into one that conforms with the preserver’s consciousness. Thus, the behavior of the oppressed is a prescribed behavior, following as it does the guidelines of the oppressor. The oppressed, having internalized the image of the oppressor and adopted his guidelines, are fearing of freedom. Freedom would require them to eject this image and replace it with autonomy and responsibility. Freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift. It must be pursued constantly and responsibly. Freedom is not an ideal located outside of man; nor is it an idea which becomes myth. It is rather the indispensable condition for the quest for human completion. To surmount the situation of oppression, people must first critically recognize its causes, so that through transforming action they can create a new situation, one which makes possible the pursuit of a fuller humanity. But the struggle to be more fully human has already begun in the authentic struggle to transform the situation. Although the situation of oppression is a dehumanized and dehumanizing totality affecting both the oppressors and those whom they oppress, it is the latter who must, from their stifled humanity, wage for both the struggle for a fuller humanity; the oppressor, who is himself dehumanized because he dehumanizes others, is unable to lead this struggle. However, the oppressed, who have adapted to the structure of domination in which they are immersed, and have become resigned to it, are inhibited from waging the struggle for freedom so long as they feel incapable of running the risks it requires. Moreover, their struggle for freedom threatens not only the oppressor, but also their own oppressed comrades who are fearful of still greater repression. When they discover within themselves the yearning to be free, they perceive that this yearning can be transformed into reality only when the same yearning is aroused in their comrades. But while dominated by the fear of freedom they refuse to appeal to others, or to listen to the appeals of others, or even to the appeals of their own conscience. They prefer gregariousness to authentic comradeship; they prefer the security of conformity with their state of unfreedom to the creative communion produced by freedom and even the very pursuit of freedom. The oppressed suffer from the duality which has established itself in their innermost being. They discover that without freedom they cannot exist authentically. Yet, although they desire authentic existence, they fear it. They are at one and the same time themselves and the oppressor whose consciousness they have internalized. The conflict lies in the choice between being wholly themselves or being divided; between ejecting the oppressor within or not ejecting them; between human solidarity or alienation; between following prescriptions or having choices; between being spectators or actors; between acting or having the illusion of acting through the action of the oppressors; between speaking out or being silent, castrated in their power to create and re-create, in their power to transform the world. This is the tragic dilemma of the oppressed which their education must take into account. This book will present some aspects of what the writer has termed the pedagogy of the oppressed, a pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the oppressed (whether individuals or peoples) in the incessant struggle to regain their humanity. This pedagogy makes oppression and its causes objects of reflection by the oppressed, and from that reflection will come their necessary engagement in the struggle for their liberation. And in the struggle this pedagogy will be made and remade. The central problem is this: How can the oppressed, as divided, unauthentic beings, participate in developing the pedagogy of their liberation? Only as they discover themselves to be ‘hosts’ of the oppressor can they contribute to the midwifery of their liberating pedagogy. As long as they live in the duality in which to be is to be like, and to be like is to be like the oppressor, this contribution is impossible. The pedagogy of the oppressed is an instrument for their critical discovery that both they and their oppressors are manifestations of dehumanization.

## Thus, C. Alternative

#### [Marcuse] Reject the aff’s plan in favor of a politics of authentic freedom. To clarify, reject top-down international mandates and let people choose for themselves how they want to be governed.

Marcuse: Marcuse, Herbert. [German philosopher, Frankfurt School] *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*. Beacon, 1964. https://tinyurl.com/2tpwevjk CH

The intensity, the satisfaction and even the character of human needs, beyond the biological level, have always been preconditioned. Whether or not the possibility of doing or leaving, enjoying or destroying, possessing or rejecting something is seized as a need depend on whether or not it can be seen as desirable and necessary for the prevailing societal institutions and interests. In this sense, human needs are historical needs and, to the extent to which the society demands the repressive development of the individual, his needs themselves and their claim for satisfaction are subject to overriding critical standards. We may distinguish both true and false needs. ‘False’ are those which are superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery, and injustice. Their satisfaction might be most gratifying to the individual, but this happiness is not a condition which has to be maintained and protected if it serves to arrest the development of the ability (his own and others) to recognize the disease of the whole and grasp the chances of curing the disease. The result then is euphoria in unhappiness. Most of the prevailing needs to relax, to have fun, to behave and consume in accordance with the advertisements, to love and hate what others love and hate, belong to this category of false needs. Such needs have a societal content and function which are determined by external powers over which the individual has no control; the development and satisfaction of these needs is heteronomous. No matter how much such needs may have become the individual's own, reproduced and fortified by the conditions of his existence; no matter how much he identifies himself with them and finds himself in their satisfaction, they continue to be what they were from the beginning - products of a society whose dominant interest demands repression. 16 The prevalence of repressive needs is an accomplished fact, accepted in ignorance and defeat, but a fact that must be undone in the interest of the happy individual as well as all those whose misery is the price of his satisfaction. The only needs that have an unqualified claim for satisfaction are the vital ones - nourishment, clothing, lodging at the attainable level of culture. The satisfaction of these needs is the prerequisite for the realization of all needs, of the unsublimated as well as the sublimated ones. For any consciousness and conscience, for any experience which does not accept the prevailing societal interest as the supreme law of thought and behaviour, the established universe of needs and satisfactions is a fact to be questioned - questioned in terms of truth and falsehood. These terms are historical throughout, and their objectivity is historical. The judgment of needs and their satisfaction, under the given conditions, involves standards of priority - standards which refer to the optimal development of the individual, of all individuals, under the optimal utilization of the material and intellectual resources available to man. The resources are calculable. “Truth” and “falsehood” of needs designate objective conditions to the extent to which the universal satisfaction of vital needs and, beyond it, the progressive alleviation of toil and poverty, are universally valid standards. But as historical standards, they do not only vary according to area and stage of development, they also can be defined only in (greater or lesser) contradiction to the prevailing ones. What tribunal can possibly claim the authority of decision? In the last analysis, the question of what are true and false needs must be answered by the individuals themselves, but only in the last analysis; that is, if and when they are free to give their own answer. As long as they are kept incapable of being autonomous, as long as they are indoctrinated and manipulated (down to their very instincts), their answer to this question cannot be taken as their own. By the same token, however, no tribunal can justly arrogate to itself the right to decide which needs should be developed and satisfied. Any such tribunal is reprehensible, although our revulsion does not do away with the question: how can the people who have been the object of effective and productive domination by themselves create the conditions of freedom?4 The more rational, productive, technical, and total the repressive administration of society becomes, the more unimaginable the means and ways by which the administered individuals might break their servitude and seize their own liberation. To be sure, to impose Reason upon an entire society is a paradoxical and scandalous idea - although one might dispute the righteousness of a society which ridicules this idea while making its own population into objects of total administration. All liberation depends on the consciousness of servitude, and the emergence of this consciousness is always hampered by the predominance of needs and satisfactions which, to a great extent, have become the individual's own. The process always replaces one system of pre-conditioning by another; the optimal goal is the replacement of false needs by true ones, the abandonment of repressive satisfaction. The distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society is its effective suffocation of those needs which demand liberation - liberation also from that which is tolerable and rewarding and comfortable - while it sustains and absolves the destructive power and repressive function of the affluent society. Here, the social controls exact the overwhelming need for the production and consumption of waste; the need for stupefying work where it is no longer a real necessity; the need for modes of relaxation which soothe and prolong this stupefaction; the need for maintaining such deceptive liberties as free competition at administered prices, a free press which censors itself, free choice between brands and gadgets. Under the rule of a repressive whole, liberty can be made into a powerful instrument of domination. The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen by the individual. The criterion for free choice can never be an absolute one, but neither is it entirely relative. Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves. Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear - that is, if they sustain alienation. And the spontaneous reproduction of superimposed needs by the individual does not establish autonomy; it only testifies to the efficacy of the controls.