# Carbon Copy of an Old Routine AC (COLONIAL MIMICRY AC)

## Part 1: Money in the Bank

#### [Bodnar et al] COPYING IS KEY – the technocratic approach to education stymies critical thought and treats students as means to profit-bearing ends.

Bodnar et al: Bodnar, Alexander [Ural Federal University], Elvira Bodnar [Ural Federal University], Vera Makerova [Ural Federal University]. “Technocratic and Humanistic Trends in Education: New Tunes.” *KnE Life Sciences*, 4(8), 172–181, November 1, 2018. https://knepublishing.com/index.php/KnE-Life/article/view/3274/6903 CH

The relevance of the research problem. The time, in which we live, can be safely called the era of the victorious technocratism. However, the technocratically organized society brings people not only the benefits of high technology but also challenges that humanity is gradually aware of and acknowledges that it does not know how to respond to them. The essence of the challenge lies in the fact that mankind has been excessively carried away by the power of technology, as a result of which, according to J. Ellul, the means turn into a goal, the behavior, interests, and inclinations of people become standardized and are transformed into an object of spiritless manipulation. The technological determinism must be overcome, and it is necessary to start from the ideas of humanism in choosing a path of overcoming [3,16]. Humanism and technocracy have always opposed each other; and technocracy has always won in the confrontation. Today, the question is whether technocracy will finally win, and our mankind will finally lose to itself by having turned into a sort of community in which Pelevin's broiler cockerels, Zatvornik and Shestipaly lived [11]. Or it will find the strength to carry out a humanistic project. An educational sphere is at the forefront of this confrontation as it is known that the world is ruled by those in whose hands the school is. So, the problem lies in the fact that the technocratic projects designed to shape the school and society in the twentieth century failed while humanistic projects have always remained the examples of `abstract humanism' in history. It is necessary to look for ways out of the impasse. Without claiming a comprehensive solution to such a global problem, we propose a way. The purpose of the research is as follows: (1) to introduce the notion that there is a modern humanistically oriented teacher and (2) to design tools for the search and selection of such teachers. It seems that such work can become an essential fragment of the modern humanistic project which is being actively developed in various countries including Russia [5,6]. Technocracy became a seriously discussed topic in the era of the second industrial revolution when a fairly large number of scientific and technical specialists were educated. The technocratic idea was shaped by the middle of the twentieth century [4]. The third industrial revolution is ideologically shaped by the concept of a post-industrial society [15]. It is important to note that one of its main ideologists, E. Toffler, in his books warned of new challenges, social conflicts and global problems that humanity will encounter at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Today, the challenges have become quite obvious, they fit into the fourth industrial revolution that has begun, the symbols and content of which are informatization, digitalization, and robotization. The benefits that this revolution brings to society are obvious and highly attractive. However, all futurists agree that the day is not far off when robots will make abundant at least 50% of the human workforce engaged in various industries today. Therefore, many professions will become extinct [1,14]. The key points in our context are: (1) what will be done by people who do not have and are not expected to have work in a traditional sense; (2) what can be the new meanings of people's employment in the (near) future; (3) who provides answers to these questions today. Regarding the third question, it should be noted that whoever these people are by, for instance, education, profession, political views, they all are divided into two categories: either humanists or technocrats. The fundamental difference between technocracy and humanism is the attitude toward man, for a humanist, man is the goal, for a technocrat s/he is a means. Since the days of the aforementioned books by Toffler and the more so by Galbraith, the philosophical context of the views on engineering and technologies has drastically expanded. This has led to a differentiation of opinions on their role as a social development determinant. Anti-technicist concepts appeared. They highlight the negative consequences of the fascination of people with the power of technology, as a result of which the world begins to be ruled by technological determinism. The book about the creativity of Le Corbusier substantiates the conclusion about the technocratic principles of the architect's worldview, which makes the architectural space it creates hostile to man [10]. In another work, the same author writes, `The solution to the problem of `limiting' the harm caused by technocracy is the development of the humanitarian component of primary, secondary, and higher education, especially the natural and technical education... Satisfactory results can be achieved only with the inclusion of humanitarian courses throughout the training period.... Only outlook can be ecological, and it is formed over a number of years and cannot be limited to passing a test or exam in the corresponding discipline. A technocrat clutching at one obvious decision (in this case, the inclusion of individual disciplines in the educational process) refuses to go further because as s/he sees the person (student) as an information repository’ [9]. The essence of humanism does not change over time, however, various philosophical trends related to humanism highlight the key points differently, which generates the `humanisms' of different metaphysical colors. The humanistic paradigm has various philosophical justification, and this contributes to both its enrichment and overcoming the shortcomings of the historically and morally outdated forms of humanism. [7,8]. With regard to education, today there is an urgent need to reinterpret the concept of humanism in the minds of most people. By true humanism, we should understand only that what really serves the development of man. The development is associated with the effort, stress and needs to force oneself. One should not confuse the actions of the teacher, who motivates a student to force and demands from him/her some effort, with violence over him/her. If a teacher, who declares himself/herself a humanist, cares only about `not touching', then his/her humanism is false, a disguise of avoidance of responsibility [6]. The ideology that prevailed until the end of the 1980s in the Soviet Union led to the idea that in the minds of teachers, parents, and students, the ideas of humanism were considered a manifestation of bourgeois morality. Today, the situation has changed. Today, all, and above all, education officials declare adherence to the humanistic paradigm. But most teachers and certainly officials continue to adhere to technocratic positions. This became especially evident when the education sector was declared a service sector, in which educators sell ‘educational services’ to students, and officials act as intermediaries between them by raising their interest from transactions. The more they earn, the more confidently they declare themselves a pedagogical elite. In the early 1990s we carried out a study on the teacher's pedagogical potential [2]. The work was very relevant because at that time in our country there were revolutionary changes concerning the education sector. The law No 1 of the new Russian government was the law on education, where for the first time at the state level the humanistic character of education was recorded as a principle of state policy. In that work, we argued, in particular, that (1) an essential moment determining the pedagogical potential of the teacher is the humanistic orientation of his/her personality, and (2) the pedagogical elite is the bearer of the pedagogical potential. There is a strange evolution about the concept of `elite': it starts to be attributed not so much to the bearers of higher models of professionalism as to any `effective managers'. In the context of authoritarianism, professional elites experience the destructive influence from the nomenclature and therefore exist mainly in a latent form. This fully applies to the professional and pedagogical elite. A quarter of a century ago, we recorded the need for the transition of the educational elite from the latent state to the actual one but there has been no change for the better so far. The strive for personal self-actualization is at the heart of humanistic concepts. The Skinner's ideas provided the methodological basis for registration of the technocratic concepts of education in the second half of the twentieth century. Although they have lost popularity in academic circles and are sharply criticized, the behavioral norms and the ‘reinforcement’ technique formulated by behaviorism are widely used among practitioners. The reason for their survivability is their obviousness, simplicity, and accessibility. However, first of all, humanistic concepts are not so obvious; second, in order for humanistic techniques to `act', the concepts need not only to be understood but to be made a way of life, which is not easy. Another reason for the popularity of the technocratic worldview is the success of information technology which contributed to a new wave of technocracy in education, especially higher education. Thanks to the technologies, we are witnessing an expansion of the social base of technocracy. The public is attracted by the effects of technology, and intellectuals are attracted by its rationality and logic in decisions. On the other hand, the fact is undeniable, rationalism has been the most traditional philosophical ally of humanism [5]. Therefore, there is an area of overlapping of humanism and technocracy. However, the fundamental consequences of the blindness of technology and telematics are the thingification of human relations and the imitation of education to the production of services. The charm of modern technology is great but technology has always been a tool in the hands of people. Who are these people, what kind of image of the world exists in their minds, what goals do they set for themselves and what are they ready for in order to achieve them? The answer to these questions, and not the questions about what kind of education a person has received and how good s/he is at digital technologies, that is the answer to the question of who is before us, a humanist or a technocrat. The term `technocracy' is polysemantic, we use it in the widest possible sense, according to which holders of arts and humanities degrees can be deep technocrats, while the creator of the hydrogen bomb, the physicist A.D. Sakharov is a true humanist. It is all about the goals and means that are mobilized to achieve them.

#### [ROJ] The Role of the Judge is to be an Anti-Technocratic Educator, since that pushes back against harms to critical thought.

#### [Fridland] And the imitation-based learning key to technocracy kills student innovation.

Fridland: Fridland, Ellen. [Ph.D., Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy, King’s College London]. “Do as I say and as I do: Imitation, pedagogy, and cumulative culture.” *Mind & Language*, 33(1), March 2018. https://tinyurl.com/yvxbt664 CH

All of this should help us to see that if one is learning a custom, complex skill, or language through imitation rather than, say, through individual, trial-and-error learning, then the amount of similarity we would expect to see between the observed behavior and the transmitted behavior must be quite high. That is, imitation must function to constrain the diversity of solutions. As such, it must function conservatively. If this is right, then accounting for the possibility of innovation and creativity in cumulative culture will require substantive explanation. In contrast, if a behavior is learned through a combination of observation and individual, trial-and-error learning then one should expect to see a high degree of variability in arrived at solutions. This is because, in most cases, there are multiple solutions to any given problem. As such, there is no reason to think that the results of trial and error learning will home in on one unique solution. Accordingly, solutions should proliferate. And this is exactly what we see in the nonhuman animal world (Biro et al., 2003; Boesch, 1995; Charbonneau, 2015; Mendes, Hanus, & Call, 2007; Reader & Laland, 2003; Tennie et al., 2009; Tomasello et al., 1993; Weir, Chappell, & Kacelnik, 2002, Whiten et al., 2001). Importantly, however, simply because creativity is the norm in the nonhuman animal world does not mean that the creativity characteristic of human cultural traditions can be taken for granted. This is precisely because imitation, as a high-fidelity mechanism underpinning cultural, normative, and linguistic transmissions, must stand in opposition to the creativity of individual, trial-and-error learning.17 As such, we see that the kind of processes that we must seek to account for the innovation of cumulative culture need to be both conservative and creative.18 And, it should be clear that not any kind of innovation will be able to deliver on these criteria. Accordingly, we cannot simply generalize from the creativity of nonhuman animals to the innovations and improvements of cumulative culture.

They add: Fridland, Ellen. [Ph.D., Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy, King’s College London]. “Do as I say and as I do: Imitation, pedagogy, and cumulative culture.” *Mind & Language*, 33(1), March 2018. https://tinyurl.com/yvxbt664 CH

2 | IMITATION IS A CONSERVATIVE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM In this section, I would like to argue that if imitation is going to function as a high-fidelity transmission mechanism of the sort that cumulative culture requires then imitation, by its very nature, has to be conservative. That is, imitation should be in opposition to the innovation and creativity that also appears necessary for cumulative culture. This is because the modifications that would result from innovation could change the details of a demonstrated behavior, thus jeopardizing the faithful transmission of the tradition. In short, if imitation is a method for transmitting causally opaque technologies or conventional practices, customs, and languages and if its function relies on the precise, detailed, high-fidelity transmission of those practices, then changing the details of the practice, as innovation would require, could undermine its function.13 Another way of thinking about this is from the perspective of perceived as opposed to actual relevance. The way in which imitation works is by allowing relevance to be determined by the model or demonstrator rather than grounding relevance in what appears relevant to the observer. The demonstration becomes authoritative. This seems critical for establishing faithful replication of causally opaque and conventional behaviors since apparent relevance or irrelevance will turn out to be an unreliable guide to actual relevance and irrelevance. So much should be clear since what is required for successfully using a tool with an opaque causal structure or repeating a conventional and thus causally arbitrary custom or practice will have little to do with features whose relevance can be observed independently of the procedure or custom modeled. That is, relevance, in these cases, cannot be discerned by individual perceptual, causal, or logical reasoning. As such, in order to acquire a complex tradition, the observer has to default to precisely repeating the observed behavior. After all, relying on one's own sense of relevance can lead one astray: it may lead to an omission of various necessary elements or to the addition of superfluous and possibly mistaken others. These can then undermine successful transmission of the skill or knowledge.

#### [ROB] Thus, the Role of the Ballot is to Resist Imitation Pedagogy, which means rewarding performances that promote authentic learning instead of recycling tired political and educational tropes. To clarify, whichever side’s performance better ruptures replication politics wins – we weigh impacts via normal mechanisms like probability or magnitude.

## Part 2: We Want More

#### [Bekus 1] SPACE APPROPRIATION IS A TECHNOPOLITICAL FETISH – an attempt by postcolonial states to mimic colonizers.

Bekus 1: Bekus, Nelly. [Ph.D., Associate Research Fellow in the History Department, University of Exeter] “Outer space technopolitics and postcolonial modernity in Kazakhstan.” *Central Asian Survey*, February 25, 2021. https://tinyurl.com/arw3tsry CH

A burgeoning literature on the symptoms of postcolonial politics and identity in post-Soviet space and postcolonial writing in and about various regions of the former Soviet Union has asserted the potential benefits of a productive engagement with the theoretical framework of postcolonialism (Beissinger and Young 2002; Kandiyoti 2002; Adams 2005; Chari and Verdery 2009; Abashin 2015). This article sets out to examine the ambiguity of the Kazakhstani project of becoming modern through the lens of the concept of ‘postcolonial modern’, deploying for this purpose the example of Kazakhstani outer space technopolitics. It shows how the pragmatic assertion of the legacy of the Soviet space exploration programme, rather than the dismissing of it as an imposed colonial venture, has facilitated the development of a specifically future-oriented Kazakhstani techno-nationalism. The Kazakhstani strategy of reappropriating the socialist modernization experience, embodied in Soviet space technology in the guise of a narrative of national development, provides an example of a pragmatic state technopolitics. It recycles the legacy of the Soviet outer space programme in order to produce an image of a global, prosperous and technologically advanced independent nation-state. Advances in the use of space and their growing impact on most aspects of everyday life have not only served to connect the whole world, but have also entrenched divisions between those who have access to technology and those who do not (Kellner 2001). The spacefaring ambitions of semi-peripheral postcolonial nations in this context emerge as a response to this new form of inequality, driven as they are by a desire to escape their underdeveloped status, reinvent their national identity and reassert their position on the global modernity map. ‘Postcolonial’ in this context refers not to a chronological horizon (the period after being a colony) but to a specific moment in modernity that features a need to come to terms with a global condition where the rules of political subjectivity and of statehood, and the criteria of modernity have been defined in advance by other agencies (Abraham 1998). Technopolitics provides a valuable resource for uncovering this complex dynamic in post-Soviet space, one still largely neglected in postcolonial studies of the region, which continue to be dominated by studies of culture, memory and nationalism (Bissenova and Medeuova 2016; Tlostanova 2017; Shelekpayev and Chokobaeva 2020) or, indeed, authoritarianism (Schatz 2008; Heathershaw 2010). Some important aspects of the technopolitics of the former Soviet countries have recently been explored in the literature, however, with the major focus being on environmental policies (Josephson 2006; Koch 2015; Peterson 2019), on the impact of the nuclear programme or radiation (Petryna 2002; Josephson 2005; Stawkowski 2016; Brown 2017) or on social studies of programming and cybernetics (Gerowich 2002; Biagioli and L pinay 2019). The article introduces into this debate the technopolitics of outer space by taking a closer look at how the legacy of Soviet space policy has been recast through state technopolitics in Kazakhstan becoming an element of the nationalizing strategies endorsed by governing elites. The paper also contributes to the field of science and technology studies by examining how the necessity for the development of space technology has been articulated and legitimized in the political and social conditions prevailing in a postcolonial and semi-peripheral state. Studies of space development have traditionally been dominated by issues of geopolitics being projected on to the cosmos, with an emphasis on security and the military use of space (Dolman 2002; Bormann and Sheehan 2009; Moltz 2012; Pfaltzgraff 2013). The emerging field of the social study of outer space (Dunnett et al. 2019) has opened new perspectives on outer space technology and science by examining their political, social and cultural implications (Andrews and Siddiqi 2011; Geppert 2012; Dick 2015). The majority of these studies explore the wider social impact of space programmes within the current context of the Global North, which continues to be understood as the sole source of advances in space technology (Sage 2014). Through an examination of the growing significance of outer space technology and science both in national identity management and the self-assertion of the image of a developed Kazakhstani nation on the global stage, this article emphasizes the need to engage with technopolitics as an important dimension of post-Soviet nation- and statecraft. In order to analyse the manner in which outer space operates socially and politically, the article employs the concept of a postcolonial ‘fetish’ of modernity (Pietz 1993), so as to demonstrate how cosmic technological advancement serves as a proxy for development, being both an embodiment of the desire to become modern and an affirmation of this desired status.

They add: Bekus, Nelly. [Ph.D., Associate Research Fellow in the History Department, University of Exeter] “Outer space technopolitics and postcolonial modernity in Kazakhstan.” *Central Asian Survey*, February 25, 2021. https://tinyurl.com/arw3tsry CH

Much like nuclear technologies in the 1970s and 1980s, space has come to represent ‘modernity’ and the promise of gaining new economic and social benefits from the application of advanced space technologies to current problems. Spacefaring capabilities have long been associated with progressive nationhood, providing spectacular evidence of a nation’s technological prowess and standing on the world stage (Mieczkowski 2013). As in the case of many postcolonial states, the space programme in Kazakhstan initiated by elites embodies complex dilemmas regarding the country’s development and its place on the global map. Official Kazakhstani technopolitics has met with resistance from those who define the realm of Kazakh culture, tradition and science as lying outside the Soviet modernization project, which they deem external and anti-Kazakh by definition due to its intrusive and transformative nature. This confrontation reproduces the postcolonial process of creative tension between ‘modern’ science and technology and vital elements of a socio-cultural heritage that can be observed in many countries of South Asia (Arnold 2000). The Kazakhstani state seeks to equip the retrospective national idea with a technological aspiration – the space programme – which is meant to elevate the landscape of history and tradition and to embody its future. The outer space programme in Kazakhstan emerges as the privileged instrument of identity management and state advancement. In a bid to demonstrate involvement in a scientifically advanced space programme, which can stand in for development, the state seeks to produce a modern fetish. The link between space technology and a refashioning of national selfhood invokes the capacity of the artefact to signal a complex, polyvalent message, what Appadurai (1986) has called the ‘semiotic virtuosity’ of the object. The transformative power characteristic of the fetish is associated with the belief held by ruling elites that becoming a spacefaring nation would bring about affluence, recognition and a respected status on the global stage. The mere possession of something owned by the West, namely, ‘rich world technology’ (Edgerton 2006), is seen as ‘synonymous with the re-creation of the structures of “advanced” production, lifestyles, histories, and societal context within domestic space’ (Krishna 2009, 72). A technologically advanced artefact, such as the space programme in Kazakhstan, is expected to be both integrated into the narrative of national identity and to describe the trajectory of its future development. Space technology and promises of the nation’s bright future thus function as methods to secure this same future (Brown, Rappert, and Webster 2000, 10).

#### [Bekus 2] AND the desire for the colonizer’s gaze has FUELED space appropriation globally.

Bekus 2: Bekus, Nelly. [Ph.D., Associate Research Fellow in the History Department, University of Exeter] “Outer space technopolitics and postcolonial modernity in Kazakhstan.” *Central Asian Survey*, February 25, 2021. https://tinyurl.com/arw3tsry JP/CH

Examining the social and political working of technologies in contexts situated outside the sphere of superpower competition allows us to see how a wider spectrum of mean- ings is attributed to technopolitics. **From the** 19**50s to the** 19**70s, in countries such as India, China, South Africa or Israel, technopolitics offered an answer to multiple concerns, such as anxieties about global status, decol**onization**, the prestige of scientists and engineers, and a strong desire to develop modern scientific and technological infrastructures (Gagliardone 2014).** **This wider transregional perspective on technopolitics reveals how the symbolic and material apparatuses of tech**nological **systems have become intertwined with nations’ search for a coherent and convincing self-image at various stages of consolidating their nation-state profiles in** the global arena. For some countries, postcolonial India in the 1950s and 1960s among them, technological achievements were seen as a means that could be used to bolster a newly emancipated national identity by indicating progress, modernity, independence and national rebirth. Indian scientists and technologists believed in technology as a way to advance their nation’s postcolonial emergence. The primary goal of the Indian nuclear pro- gramme, in spite of all the controversies and moral dilemmas, was to put India on the international scientific and technological map (Perkovich 1999, 282). A similar drive for the affirmative avowal of a nation’s prestige and the obtaining of the status of a technological power in the international arena underpinned the Israeli space pro- gramme. In 1961, when the official announcement of the country’s first rocket launch was made, prime Minister David Ben Gurion declared that this launch ‘proved the ability of Israeli scientists. The entire rocket is made in Israel’ (Haaretz 2010). On the website of the Israeli Space Agency (established in 1983), the history of ‘Blue and White space’ is depicted as the story of the remarkable technological achievements of the Israeli nation, which had become the eighth in the world to launch satellites into space. It also reaffirms that involvement in space has served to ensure Israel’s prominent place in the world. According to Moltz (2012), with the end of the Cold War the world entered ‘the second space age’, which featured new geopolitical taxonomies of space exploration pro- grammes. The international system of the new era is constituted by a multiplicity of greater and smaller actors involved in space exploration, rather than bipolarity. It is also characterized by increased interdependencies and exchange, as the typical space corporations are nowadays multinational, relying on the use of technologies from more than one country, and marketing their products and services worldwide (14). What is also emblematic of the second space age is the fact that a new epicentre of space activity is now situated in Asia: besides the United States, Russia and the countries that make up the European Space Agency (ESA), multiple rapidly developing space programmes are located in this region. Alongside China, India, Japan and South Korea, countries that have traditionally taken the lead in Asia where space is concerned, such as Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, North Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam, all now have significant space plans of their own. **The countries of Central and South America as well as those in the Arab world have also engaged in the development of space science, which has been reinvented as new ground** up**on which national and regional interests intersect with international effects and cosmopolitan thinking about the globe (Determann 2018; Johnson 2020).**

#### [Fernández] Next, states bolster their space appropriation by collaborating with private entities for space expansion – China proves.

Fernández: Fernández, Ray. [Journalist, ScreenRant] “China Opens Space and Unleashes The Power Of Its Private Sector.” ScreenRant, November 27, 2021. https://screenrant.com/chinese-companies-boost-space-development/ CH

In a new move to boost space development, China has opened up space to private companies. China's space program is heavily linked with the military and wrapped up in secrecy. However, recent Chinese space accomplishments, rovers on the Moon and Mars, new satellites and new space stations were primarily developed by government efforts. The U.S. brought in the private sector as a strategy to boost its space program and develop expensive and ambitious new projects. Now China is doing the same. The last time China used national private companies to increase development was when it declared Artificial Intelligence a national priority. Fast forward a few years, Chinese AI dominates globally. At the 7th China (International) Commercial Aerospace Forum, national private companies presented many new and ambitious projects, including spaceplanes, space resources, a massive constellation of satellites and more. One of the companies at the event was the space giant China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. (CASIC). The Ministry of Science and Technology, China National Space Administration, and other government arms sponsored and supervised the event. CASIC said that the Xingyun constellation — made up of 80 satellites is moving full speed ahead. The corporation announced that the intelligent space satellite production factory was operating. They are now launching rockets from their own rocket park in the city of Wuhan. Today the rocket park and smart sat factory produce 20 solid-fuel launches and 100 satellites per year but plans to increase capacities are on their way. CASIC is also working on the Tengyun spaceplane, recently flight-testing an advanced turbine-based combined cycle engine in the Gobi desert. CASIC is not the only private company developing space planes in China. The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. and iSpace also presented their plans for space planes and space crafts. iSpace has designed two missions to the Moon, which they assure will be the first commercial missions to the natural satellite. China is getting some inspiration from U.S. companies. Local companies in China are looking into space tourism with suborbital and orbital flights. And Deep Blue Aerospace is developing a reusable launcher that looks very much like the Heavy Falcon of SpaceX. The event's main themes were IoT space networks, multi-purpose satellite constellations, space resources (mining) and taking the Chinese space sector to a new level with private participation. While the U.S. has its eye on Chinese military space vehicles, it may have overlooked and underestimated the impact that the Chinese private sector will have. Hundreds of new companies have responded to the government’s call to "start a new journey for commercial aerospace" in China. It is only a matter of time until their full power and capabilities are unleashed into space.

## Thus, I affirm:

#### [Bhabha 1] Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. I critique private space appropriation through a rejection of colonial mimicry, the attempt to reform one’s identity by imitating colonizers’ practices.

**Bhabha 1:** Bhabha, Homi. [Anne F. Rothenberg Professor of the Humanities, Harvard University] “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse.” *Source: October, Vol. 28, Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis*, Spring, 1984. http://www.marginalutility.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/01.-Bhabha.pdf JP/CH

Within that conflictual economy of colonial discourse which Edward Said describes as the tension between the synchronic panoptical vision of domination-the demand for identity, stasis-and the counter-pressure of the diachrony of history- change, difference - mimicry represents an ironic compromise. **If I may adapt Samuel Weber's formulation of the marginalizing vision of castration, then colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its** difference. The authority of that mode of colonial discourse that I have called mimicry is therefore stricken by an indeterminacy: mimicry emerges as the representation of a difference that is itself a process of disavowal. **Mimicry is, thus, the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation, and discipline, which “appropriates” the Other as it visualizes power. Mimicry is also the sign of the inappropriate, however, a difference or recalcitrance which coheres the dominant strategic function of colonial power, intensifies surveillance, and poses an immanent threat to both “normalized” knowledges and disciplinary** powers. The effect of mimicry on the authority of colonial discourse is profound and disturbing. For in "normalizing" the colonial state or subject, the dream of post-Enlightenment civility alienates its own language of liberty and produces another knowledge of its norms. The ambivalence which thus informs this strategy is discernible, for example, in Locke's Second Treatise which splits to reveal the limitations of liberty in his double use of the word "slave": first simply, descriptively as the locus of a legitimate form of ownership, then as the trope for an intolerable, illegitimate exercise of power. What is articulated in that distance between the two uses is the absolute, imagined difference between the "Colonial" State of Carolina and the Original State of Nature. It is from this area between mimicry and mockery, where the reforming, civilizing mission is threatened by the displacing gaze of its disciplinary double, that my instances of colonial imitation come. What they all share is a discursive process by which the excess or slippage produced by the ambivalence of mimicry (almost the same, but not quite) does not merely "rupture" the discourse, but becomes transformed into an uncertainty which fixes the colonial subject as a “partial presence”. By "partial". I mean both "incomplete" and "virtual." It **is as if the very emergence of the "colonial" is dependent for its representation** up**on some strategic limitation or prohibition within the authoritative discourse itself**. **The success of colonial appropriation depends on a proliferation of inappropriate objects that ensure its strategic failure, so that mimicry is at once resemblance and menace.**

## Part 3: Keep on Running

#### [Bekus 3] SPACE APPROPRIATION IS AN ADMISSION TICKET TO MODERNITY – a way of proving that low-income states deserve to be in “the club” of the rich.

Bekus 3: Bekus, Nelly. [Ph.D., Associate Research Fellow in the History Department, University of Exeter] “Outer space technopolitics and postcolonial modernity in Kazakhstan.” *Central Asian Survey*, February 25, 2021. https://tinyurl.com/arw3tsry JP/CH

Science and technology are both desired forms of modern practice and privileged instruments ensuring fundamental change, and are central, therefore, to an understanding of the postcolonial condition (Abraham 1998, 20). To facilitate this process of becom- ing truly modern, Kazakhstan has embarked on the idea of creating a mis-en-scène of architectural and technological artefacts that embodies the new rationality of the modern and is vested with the capacity to transform the traditional landscapes of nations. So positive a perception of the potency of technological artefacts in relation to society causes them to operate as a ‘modern fetish’. **The idea of nation and the fact of material objects – space infrastructure – interpenetrate in the guise of what Durkheim (2001, 269) once described as a ‘common sentiment’. The special, even sanctified, aura of a space programme seen as the state fetish produced through the difference it embodied, avowed through its particular rituals of achievement and status becomes a demonstration and, by displacement,** a proof of modernity **in its postcolonial mode (Abraham 1998, 156). Due to a ‘fundamental fetishised inversion’ the object that had been merely the means to achieving some desired end becomes a fixed necessity, the very embodiment of desire, and something imbued with the effective, exclusive power for gratifying it (Pietz 1993, 147).** Since 1998, a central role in building a representational image of Kazakhstan as an open, modern and global-minded country has been given to the capital, Astana (Nur- Sultan). By creating a remarkable cityscape, with multiple architectural masterpieces pro- duced by world-leading ‘starchitects’, Kazakhstani elites produced a site for the ‘consecra- tion of an effort’, of ‘a stress for achievements’ (Baudrillard 1981, 33). The phenomenon of Nur-Sultan has been analysed by scholars from various different perspectives: as the instrument of legitimization of authoritarian rule (Koch 2010; Fauve 2015), as an expression of the government’s determination to obtain greater international recognition (Schatz 2008), and as a way to utilize its imagery for nation-branding (Marat 2009; Bekus and Medeuova 2017). Much as in the case of Brasilia in the 1950s, conceived as a ‘pole of development’ and a source of progress to be spread throughout Brazil’s territory (Holston 1989, 18), Nur-Sultan became a central site for projecting desired images of the future of Kazakhstan (Laszczkowski 2011). The shortcomings of a city intended to serve as a fetish of modernization did nonethe- less perpetuate its ostensible merits, namely, the pre-eminence of exterior forms of material representation that begin to work once they have been completed. The space programme, in contrast, has been used by the Kazakhstani state as a ‘spectacular science’, deployed for the production of a modern fetish through a demonstration of ongoing involvement in a technologically advanced programme, called upon to serve as a proxy for development. These two aspects of postcolonial modernity in Kazakhstan not only complement each other by bridging the material representation of the future (the capital city) with a praxis of innovation (outer space), but also become closely inter- twined through a net of multiple symbolic references. First Kazakhstani Space Complex with launch pad (construction started in 2004) was named after the central elements of the capital cityscape, observation tower and cultural monument ‘Bayterek’ (2002). Shaped in the form of a tree with reference to the legend of the ‘Tree of Life’, a central symbol of Turkic mythology, Bayterek represents not only a notable symbolic intervention in the new state ideology, but also serves as one of the main icons of the capital city. In 2018, to mirror the connections between the capital and the space programme, the Republican Onomastic Commission named the fourth administrative district of the city of Nur-Sultan ‘Baikonur’ (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda 2018). **Construction of the NFC facilities and the Spacecraft Assembly and Testing Complex in Nur-Sultan became a manifestation of a further entanglement between the two major fetishes of Kazakh postcolonial modernity.**

#### [Bhabha 2] Yet this traps states on an endless treadmill of colonial mimicry – colonizing regimes sustain their power by making others mimic them, promoting hope in a future that will never come so long as wealthy élites have the upper hand.

**Bhabha 2:** Bhabha, Homi. [Anne F. Rothenberg Professor of the Humanities, Harvard University] “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse.” *Source: October, Vol. 28, Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis*, Spring, 1984. http://www.marginalutility.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/01.-Bhabha.pdf JP/CH

**What I have called is not the familiar exercise of colonial mimicry dependent relations through narcissistic identification so that, as Fanon has observed,12 the black man stops being an actional person for only the white man can represent his self-esteem.** Mimicry conceals no presence or identity behind its mask: it is not what Cesaire describes as "colonization-thingification"13 behind which there stands the essence of the presence Africaine. **The menace of mimicry is its double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts its authority. And it is a double-vision that is a result of what I've described as the partial** representation/**recognition of the colonial object.** Grant's colonial as partial imitator, Macaulay's translator, Naipaul's colonial politician as play- actor, Decoud as the scene setter of the opera bouffe of the New World, these are the appropriate objects of a colonialist chain of command, authorized versions of otherness. But they are also, as I have shown, the figures of a doubling, **the part-objects of a metonymy of colonial desire** which **alienates the** modality and **normality of those dominant discourses in which they** emerge as “inappropriate” colonial subjects. A desire that, through the repetition of partial presence, which is the basis of mimicry, articulates those disturbances of cultural, racial, and historical difference that menace the narcissistic demand of colonial authority. It is **a desire that reverses “in part” the colonial appropriation by now producing a partial vision of the colonizer’s presence. A gaze of otherness, that shares the acuity of the genealogical gaze which, as Foucault describes it, liberates marginal elements and shatters the unity of** man's **being** through which he extends his sovereignty**.**

#### [Bhabha 3] AND mimicry promotes racist representations, as colonizers can always claim their subjects will never be quite good enough.

**Bhabha 3:** Bhabha, Homi. [Anne F. Rothenberg Professor of the Humanities, Harvard University] “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse.” *Source: October, Vol. 28, Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis*, Spring, 1984. http://www.marginalutility.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/01.-Bhabha.pdf JP/CH

The "unthought" across which colonial man is articulated is that process of classificatory confusion that I have described as the metonymy of the substitutive chain of ethical and cultural discourse. This results in the splitting of colonial discourse so that two attitudes towards external reality persist; one takes reality into consideration while the other disavows it and replaces it by a product of desire that repeats, rearticulates "reality" as mimicry. So Edward Long can say with authority, quoting variously, Hume, Eastwick, and Bishop Warburton in his support, that: Ludicrous as the opinion may seem I do not think that an orangutang husband would be any dishonour to a Hottentot female.22 Such contradictory articulations of reality and desire – seen in racist stereotypes, statements, jokes, myths – are not caught in the doubtful circle of the return of the repressed. They are the effects of a disavowal that denies the differences of the other but produces in its stead forms of authority and multiple belief that alienate the assumptions of “civil” discourse. If, for a while, the ruse of desire is calculable for the uses of discipline soon the repetition of guilt, justification, pseudoscientific theories, superstition, spurious authorities, and classifications can be seen as the desperate effort to “normalize” formally the disturbance of a discourse of splitting that violates the rational, enlightened claims of its enunciatory modality. The ambivalence of colonial authority repeatedly turns from mimicry – a difference that is almost nothing but not quite – to menace – a difference that is almost total but not quite. And in that other scene of colonial power, where history turns to farce and presence to "a part," can be seen the twin figures of narcissism and paranoia that repeat furiously, uncontrollably. In the ambivalent world of the “not quite/not white,” on the margins of metropolitan desire, the founding objects of the Western world become the erratic, eccentric, accidental objets trouves of the colonial discourse – the part-objects of presence. It is then that the body and the book loose their representational authority. Black skin splits under the racist gaze, displaced into signs of bestiality, genitalia, grotesquerie, which reveal the phobic myth of the undifferentiated whole white body. And the holiest of books - the Bible - bearing both the standard of the cross and the standard of empire finds itself strangely dismembered. In May 1817 a missionary wrote from Bengal: Still everyone would gladly receive a Bible. And why? - that he may lay it up as a curiosity for a few pice; or use it for waste paper. Such it is well known has been the common fate of these copies of the Bible. ... Some have been bartered in the markets, others have been thrown in snuff shops and used as wrapping paper.

#### [Freiere] Worse, mimicry makes liberation impossible – it forces the oppressed to rely on the “master’s tools” so they can never truly be free.

Freire: Freire, Paulo. [Ph.D., Brazilian educator and philosopher] *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. New York: Continuum, 1968. https://envs.ucsc.edu/internships/internship-readings/freire-pedagogy-of-the-oppressed.pdf CH

The "fear of freedom" which afflicts the oppressed,3 a fear which may equally well lead them to desire the role of oppressor or bind them to the role of oppressed, should be examined. One of the basic elements of the relationship between oppressor and oppressed is prescription. Every prescription represents the imposition of one individual’s choice upon another transforming the consciousness of the person prescribed to into one that conforms with the preserver’s consciousness. Thus, the behavior of the oppressed is a prescribed behavior, following as it does the guidelines of the oppressor. The oppressed, having internalized the image of the oppressor and adopted his guidelines, are fearing of freedom. Freedom would require them to eject this image and replace it with autonomy and responsibility. Freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift. It must be pursued constantly and responsibly. Freedom is not an ideal located outside of man; nor is it an idea which becomes myth. It is rather the indispensable condition for the quest for human completion. To surmount the situation of oppression, people must first critically recognize its causes, so that through transforming action they can create a new situation, one which makes possible the pursuit of a fuller humanity. But the struggle to be more fully human has already begun in the authentic struggle to transform the situation. Although the situation of oppression is a dehumanized and dehumanizing totality affecting both the oppressors and those whom they oppress, it is the latter who must, from their stifled humanity, wage for both the struggle for a fuller humanity; the oppressor, who is himself dehumanized because he dehumanizes others, is unable to lead this struggle. However, the oppressed, who have adapted to the structure of domination in which they are immersed, and have become resigned to it, are inhibited from waging the struggle for freedom so long as they feel incapable of running the risks it requires. Moreover, their struggle for freedom threatens not only the oppressor, but also their own oppressed comrades who are fearful of still greater repression. When they discover within themselves the yearning to be free, they perceive that this yearning can be transformed into reality only when the same yearning is aroused in their comrades. But while dominated by the fear of freedom they refuse to appeal to others, or to listen to the appeals of others, or even to the appeals of their own conscience. They prefer gregariousness to authentic comradeship; they prefer the security of conformity with their state of unfreedom to the creative communion produced by freedom and even the very pursuit of freedom. The oppressed suffer from the duality which has established itself in their innermost being. They discover that without freedom they cannot exist authentically. Yet, although they desire authentic existence, they fear it. They are at one and the same time themselves and the oppressor whose consciousness they have internalized. The conflict lies in the choice between being wholly themselves or being divided; between ejecting the oppressor within or not ejecting them; between human solidarity or alienation; between following prescriptions or having choices; between being spectators or actors; between acting or having the illusion of acting through the action of the oppressors; between speaking out or being silent, castrated in their power to create and re-create, in their power to transform the world. This is the tragic dilemma of the oppressed which their education must take into account. This book will present some aspects of what the writer has termed the pedagogy of the oppressed, a pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the oppressed (whether individuals or peoples) in the incessant struggle to regain their humanity. This pedagogy makes oppression and its causes objects of reflection by the oppressed, and from that reflection will come their necessary engagement in the struggle for their liberation. And in the struggle this pedagogy will be made and remade. The central problem is this: How can the oppressed, as divided, unauthentic beings, participate in developing the pedagogy of their liberation? Only as they discover themselves to be ‘hosts’ of the oppressor can they contribute to the midwifery of their liberating pedagogy. As long as they live in the duality in which to be is to be like, and to be like is to be like the oppressor, this contribution is impossible. The pedagogy of the oppressed is an instrument for their critical discovery that both they and their oppressors are manifestations of dehumanization.

#### [Marcuse] Further, this doesn’t generate genuine pleasure, just simulacrum – a copy of a copy in which people lack authentic freedom.

Marcuse: Marcuse, Herbert. [German philosopher, Frankfurt School] *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*. Beacon, 1964. https://tinyurl.com/2tpwevjk CH

The intensity, the satisfaction and even the character of human needs, beyond the biological level, have always been preconditioned. Whether or not the possibility of doing or leaving, enjoying or destroying, possessing or rejecting something is seized as a need depend on whether or not it can be seen as desirable and necessary for the prevailing societal institutions and interests. In this sense, human needs are historical needs and, to the extent to which the society demands the repressive development of the individual, his needs themselves and their claim for satisfaction are subject to overriding critical standards. We may distinguish both true and false needs. ‘False’ are those which are superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery, and injustice. Their satisfaction might be most gratifying to the individual, but this happiness is not a condition which has to be maintained and protected if it serves to arrest the development of the ability (his own and others) to recognize the disease of the whole and grasp the chances of curing the disease. The result then is euphoria in unhappiness. Most of the prevailing needs to relax, to have fun, to behave and consume in accordance with the advertisements, to love and hate what others love and hate, belong to this category of false needs. Such needs have a societal content and function which are determined by external powers over which the individual has no control; the development and satisfaction of these needs is heteronomous. No matter how much such needs may have become the individual's own, reproduced and fortified by the conditions of his existence; no matter how much he identifies himself with them and finds himself in their satisfaction, they continue to be what they were from the beginning - products of a society whose dominant interest demands repression. 16 The prevalence of repressive needs is an accomplished fact, accepted in ignorance and defeat, but a fact that must be undone in the interest of the happy individual as well as all those whose misery is the price of his satisfaction. The only needs that have an unqualified claim for satisfaction are the vital ones - nourishment, clothing, lodging at the attainable level of culture. The satisfaction of these needs is the prerequisite for the realization of all needs, of the unsublimated as well as the sublimated ones. For any consciousness and conscience, for any experience which does not accept the prevailing societal interest as the supreme law of thought and behaviour, the established universe of needs and satisfactions is a fact to be questioned - questioned in terms of truth and falsehood. These terms are historical throughout, and their objectivity is historical. The judgment of needs and their satisfaction, under the given conditions, involves standards of priority - standards which refer to the optimal development of the individual, of all individuals, under the optimal utilization of the material and intellectual resources available to man. The resources are calculable. “Truth” and “falsehood” of needs designate objective conditions to the extent to which the universal satisfaction of vital needs and, beyond it, the progressive alleviation of toil and poverty, are universally valid standards. But as historical standards, they do not only vary according to area and stage of development, they also can be defined only in (greater or lesser) contradiction to the prevailing ones. What tribunal can possibly claim the authority of decision? In the last analysis, the question of what are true and false needs must be answered by the individuals themselves, but only in the last analysis; that is, if and when they are free to give their own answer. As long as they are kept incapable of being autonomous, as long as they are indoctrinated and manipulated (down to their very instincts), their answer to this question cannot be taken as their own. By the same token, however, no tribunal can justly arrogate to itself the right to decide which needs should be developed and satisfied. Any such tribunal is reprehensible, although our revulsion does not do away with the question: how can the people who have been the object of effective and productive domination by themselves create the conditions of freedom?4 The more rational, productive, technical, and total the repressive administration of society becomes, the more unimaginable the means and ways by which the administered individuals might break their servitude and seize their own liberation. To be sure, to impose Reason upon an entire society is a paradoxical and scandalous idea - although one might dispute the righteousness of a society which ridicules this idea while making its own population into objects of total administration. All liberation depends on the consciousness of servitude, and the emergence of this consciousness is always hampered by the predominance of needs and satisfactions which, to a great extent, have become the individual's own. The process always replaces one system of pre-conditioning by another; the optimal goal is the replacement of false needs by true ones, the abandonment of repressive satisfaction. The distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society is its effective suffocation of those needs which demand liberation - liberation also from that which is tolerable and rewarding and comfortable - while it sustains and absolves the destructive power and repressive function of the affluent society. Here, the social controls exact the overwhelming need for the production and consumption of waste; the need for stupefying work where it is no longer a real necessity; the need for modes of relaxation which soothe and prolong this stupefaction; the need for maintaining such deceptive liberties as free competition at administered prices, a free press which censors itself, free choice between brands and gadgets. Under the rule of a repressive whole, liberty can be made into a powerful instrument of domination. The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen by the individual. The criterion for free choice can never be an absolute one, but neither is it entirely relative. Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves. Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear - that is, if they sustain alienation. And the spontaneous reproduction of superimposed needs by the individual does not establish autonomy; it only testifies to the efficacy of the controls.