# 1nc v Emi !!

## 1st off – K

## Framework

#### [ROJ] I negate. The Role of the Judge is to Promote Critical Thinking, which means they must enhance our potential to expose dominant, oppressive social biases.

#### [Giroux] Status quo actors use violence to smother critical thought. Fighting oppression requires judges to help make debate a place to *challenge* social norms.

Giroux: Giroux, Henry. [Waterbury Chair Professor, Pennsylvania State University] "The Curse of Totalitarianism and the Challenge of Critical Pedagogy." Philosophersforchange.org, October 13, 2015. CH

The forces of free-market fundamentalism are on the march ushering in a terrifying horizon of what Hannah Arendt once called “dark times.” **Across the globe, the tension between democratic values and market fundamentalism has** reached a breaking point.[1] The social contract is under assault, **neo-Nazism is on the rise, right-wing populism is propelling extremist** political **candidates and social movements into the forefront of political life**, anti-immigrant sentiment is now wrapped in the poisonous logic of nationalism and exceptionalism, **racism has become** a mark of **celebrated** audacity **and a politics of disposability comes dangerously close to its endgame of extermination for those considered excess**. Under such circumstances, it becomes frightfully clear that the conditions fortotalitarianism and state violenceare still with ussmothering critical thought social responsibility, the ethical imagination and politics itself. As Bill Dixon observes: the totalitarian form is still with us because the all too protean origins of totalitarianism are still with us: loneliness as the normal register of social life, the frenzied lawfulness of ideological certitude, mass poverty and mass homelessness, the routine use of terror as a political instrument, and the ever growing speeds and scales of media, economics, and warfare.[2] In the United States, the extreme right in both political parties no longer needs the comfort of a counterfeit ideology in which appeals are made to the common good, human decency and democratic values. On the contrary,power is now concentrated in the hands of relatively few people and corporations while power is global and free from the limited politics of the democratic state. In fact, the state for all intents and purposes has become the corporate state. Dominant power is now all too visible and the policies, practices and wrecking ball it has imposed on society appear to be largely unchecked. Any compromising notion of ideology has been replaced by a discourse of command and certainty backed up by the militarization of local police forces, the surveillance state and all of the resources brought to bear by a culture of fear and a punishing state aligned with the permanent war on terror. Informed judgment has given way to a corporate-controlled media apparatus that celebrates the banality of balance and the spectacle of violence, all the while reinforcing the politics and value systems of the financial elite.[3] Following Arendt, a dark cloud of political and ethical ignorance has descended on the United States creating both a crisis of memory and agency.[4] Thoughtlessness has become something that now occupies a privileged, if not celebrated, place in the political landscape and the mainstream cultural apparatuses. A new kind of infantilism and culture of ignorance now **sh**apes daily **life as agency devolves into a kind of anti-intellectual** foolishness evident in the babble of banality produced by Fox News, celebrity culture, schools modeled after prisons and politicians who support creationism, argue against climate change and denounce almost any form of reason. Education is no longer viewed as a public good but a private right, just as critical thinking is devalued as a fundamental necessity for creating an engaged and socially responsible populace. Politics has become an extension of war, just as systemic economic uncertainty and state-sponsored violence increasingly find legitimation in the discourses of privatization and demonization, which promote anxiety, moral panics and fear, and undermine any sense of communal responsibility for the well-being of others. Too many people today learn quickly that their fate is solely a matter of individual responsibility, irrespective of wider structural forces. This is a much promoted hypercompetitive ideology with a message that surviving in a society demands reducing social relations to forms of social combat. People today are expected to inhabit a set of relations in which the only obligation is to live for one’s own self-interest and to reduce the responsibilities of citizenship to the demands of a consumer culture. Yet, there is more at work here than a flight from social responsibility, if not politics itself. Also lost is the importance of those social bonds, modes of collective reasoning, public spheres and cultural apparatuses crucial to the formation of a sustainable democratic society. With the return of the Gilded Age and its dream worlds of consumption, privatization and deregulation, both democratic values and social protections are at risk. At the same time, the civic and formative cultures that make such values and protections central to democratic life are in danger of being eliminated altogether. As market mentalities and moralities tighten their grip on all aspects of society, democratic institutions and public spheres are being downsized, if not altogether disappearing. As these institutions vanish – from public schools to health-care centers – there is also a serious erosion of the discourses of community, justice, equality, public values and the common good. One consequence is a society stripped of its inspiring and energizing public spheres and the “thick mesh of mutual obligations and social responsibilities to be found in” any viable democracy.[5] This grim reality marks a failure in the power of the civic imagination, political will and open democracy.[6] It is also part of a politics that strips the social of any democratic ideals and undermines any understanding of higher education as a public good and pedagogy as an empowering practice, a practice that acts directly upon the conditions that bear down on our lives in order to change them when necessary. At a time when the public good is under attack and there seems to be a growing apathy toward the social contract, or any other civic-minded investment in public values and the larger common good, education has to be seen as more than a credential or a pathway to a job. It has to be viewed as crucial to understanding and overcoming the current crisis of agency, politics and historical memory faced by many young people today. One of the challenges facing the **current** generation of **educators and students** **is the need to reclaim the role that education has historically played in developing critical literacies and civic** capacities. There is a need to use education to mobilize students to be critically engaged agents attentive to addressing important social issues and being alert to the responsibility of deepening and expanding the meaning and practices of a vibrant democracy.

#### [ROB & Crawford] The Role of the Ballot is to Promote Critical Scholarship. Promoting critical scholarship means REJECTING OPPRESSIVE REPRESENTATIONS, which deny true education. This comes before passing the plan – they DON’T get to weigh the case, since reps are a constraint on debate itself.

Crawford: Crawford, Neta. [Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, Boston University] “Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Cambridge University Press, September 2009. CH

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand (the proper frame or representation) must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames about how we ought to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger Karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively represent situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibilities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representationhow frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

**THAT MEANS WE FILTER ALL ARGUMENTS THROUGH MY FRAMEWORK – THAT PRECLUDES THEIR CASE IMPACTS.**

## A. Link

**[Link]** They rely on **ABSTRACT PHILOSOPHY –** their framework assumes a neutral, universal starting point. I’ll isolate specific links: **[INSERT SPECIFICS –** e.g., “practical reason,” appeals to Kant, etc.]

## B. Impacts

#### 1. [Curry & Curry 1] First, MISDIAGNOSIS: their assertion of universal humanistic principles reduces systemic racism to a problem of recognition that prevents mobilization against White supremacy.

**Curry & Curry 1:** Curry, Tommy J. [Tommy, PhD, Prof. of Philosophy @ TAMU, Gwenetta, PhD, Ass. Prof. of Gender and Race Studies @ Alabama], “On the Perils of Race Neutrality and Anti-Blackness: Philosophy as an Irreconcilable Obstacle to (Black) Thought,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, Nos. 3-4 (May-September 2018). DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12244 GC/CH

We begin with the first author’s reflections on philosophy and its recurring problem of denying the realities of race and racism, reflections that have arisen as a Black (male) philosopher whose life has been threatened for doing Black philosophy. The experience of confronting death, being fearful of being killed doing my job as a critical race theorist, and being threatened with violence for thinking about racism in America has a profound effect on concretizing what is at stake in our theories about anti-Black racism. Whereas my work on race and racism in philosophy earlier in my career was dedicated to the problems created by the mass ignorance of the discipline to the political debates and ethnological history of Black philosophers in the 19th and 20th centuries, I now find myself thinking more seriously about the way that **philosophy**, really theory itself—our present categories of knowledge, such as race, class, and gender, found through disciplines—actually **hastens the deaths of subjugated peoples in the U**nited **S**tates. **Academic philosophy routinely abstracts away from**—directs thought to not attend to the realities of death, dying, and despair created by—**antiBlack racism. Black, Brown, and Indigenous populations are routinely** rationalized as disposable flesh. The deaths of these groups launch philosophical discussions of social injustice and spark awareness by whites , while the deaths of white people direct policy and demand outrage. **Because racialized bodies are confined to inhumane living conditions that nurture violence** and despair **that become attributed to the savage nature of nonwhites and evidence of their inhumanity, the deaths of these** **dehumanized peoples are** often **measured against the dangers they are thought to pose to** others. The **interpretation of the inferior position that racialized groups occupy in the U**nited **S**tates **is grounded in how whites often think of themselves in relation to problem populations. This relationship is** often **rationalized by avoidance and by** the **denials** of whites **about being causally related to the harsh conditions imposed on nonwhites in the world. Philosophy, and its glorification of the rational individual, ignores the complexity of anti-Black racism by blaming the complacency**, if not outright hostility, **towards Blacks on the mass ignorance of white America**. To remedy this problem, Black philosophers are asked to respond by gearing their writings, lectures, and professional presence to further educate and dialogue with white philosophers in order to enable them to better understand anti-Black racism and white supremacy (Curry 2008, 2015). This therapy is often rewarded as scholarship. **Philosophical positions that analyze racism as a problem of miscommunication, misunderstanding, and ignorance** (philosophies predicated on the capacity of whites to change) **are rewarded and praised as the cutting edge and most impactful theories about race and racism. Reducing racism to a problem of recognition** and understanding **allows white philosophers to remain absolved of their contribution to the apathy that white America has to the death** and subjugation **Black Americans endure** at the hands of the white race.

To some readers, speaking about races as different groups with opposite, if not antagonistic, social lives seems to run contrary to the idea that there are no real races, just people, only the human race. This is the core of **race-neutral theory** in academic philosophy. Race neutrality **asserts that while race, class, and gender may** in fact **differentiate bodies, the capacity for reason—the human essence beneath it all—is what is ultimately at stake in the recognition of difference**. While **this mantra** has been offered to whites since the integrationist strategies of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1950s under Chief Justice Earl Warren, it **has had little effect in restructuring the psychology of white individuals or remedying** the **institutional** practices of **racism that continue to exclude** or punish **Black Americans**. How are Black scholars to speak about racism, specifically the violence and death that seem to gravitate towards Black bodies if the rules of philosophy and the fragility of white Americans insist that racism is not the cause of the disproportionate death Black Americans suffer and race is not a significant factor in Black people’s lives? This article is an attempt to debunk the seemingly neutral starting point of academic philosophy. **For decades, Black philosophers have attempted to** educate white philosophers and **reorient the philosophical anthropologies of the discipline. Black, Brown, and Indigenous philosophers have dedicated their lives** and careers **to educating white philosophers** and students, **with little to no effect on the composition** and disposition **of the discipline**. While it is not uncommon for philosophy departments to say they support diversity, the reality is that many, if not most, Black philosophers continue to write about the problem of racism, their experiences of marginalization, and the violence they suffer from white colleagues, disciplinary organizations, and universities. **This article should be read as an attempt not to amend the Western metaphysical tradition but to reveal the obstacles that indicate its perennial** failure. It is the position of the authors that many of the demands for disciplinary change are often expressed as politics, when in reality **there are issues of metaphysics** (the concerns of being) **and philosophical anthropology** (the concerns about the (non)being capable of thinking) **that are unaddressed in much of the current literature**. Section I of this article describes what Black philosophy has taken to be the problem of racism in academic philosophy more broadly. Since the 1970s Black philosophers have criticized, attacked, and attempted to reform the discipline with little effect. This section interrogates why that is the case. Section II argues that the failure of philosophy to change is a problem of metaphysics or the illusion that Blackness is compatible with the idea of the white human. Section III presents the social scientific evidence demonstrating the seeming permanence of anti-Black racism and the dangerous nature of colorblind ideology, which does not recognize that societal organization and racism determine the life chances of Blacks. This article ends with a suggestion of what Black philosophy would look like if its primary mandate were not to persuade whites to remedy their own racist practices, but to diagnose and build strategies against the present problems of racism in philosophy before us.

**2. [Curry & Curry 2] Second, PERPETUATING RACISM:** their philosophy isactively used to rationalize Black deaths.

**Curry & Curry 2:** Tommy J. [Tommy, PhD, Prof. of Philosophy @ TAMU, Gwenetta, PhD, Ass. Prof. of Gender and Race Studies @ Alabama], “On the Perils of Race Neutrality and Anti-Blackness: Philosophy as an Irreconcilable Obstacle to (Black) Thought,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, Nos. 3-4 (May-September 2018). DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12244 GC/CH

Whereas white philosophers often share a similar language with other whites, namely, that all people are human beings and rational individuals, Black philosophers who study race often speak in terms of their negations: non-being. Harris (2018) refers to this as “necro-being.” Curry (2016, 2017, 2018a, 2018b) speaks of the Man-Not. Wilderson (2009) writes of the slave. **To be Black is to render the very grammar of the academy delusional. To speak of impending death and sub-personhood** and explain the experiences of violence and dehumanization that accompany this position to white individuals who only think of their existence in terms of always being human and persons is ineffable. **Perhaps** the theorist Calvin **Warren best captures this problem in his book Ontological Terror**: Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation. Warren (2018: 2) argues: **The human being provides an anchor for the declaration, and since the being of the human is invaluable, then Black life must also matter, if the Black is a human** (the declaration anchors mattering in the human’s Being). **But we reach a point of terror with this syllogistic reasoning. One must take a step backward and ask the fundamental question: is the Black, in fact, a human being?** Or **can Black(ness) ground itself in the being of the human? If** it can**not, then** on what bases can we assert the mattering of Black existence? The consequence of attending to the problem of Blackness and the realities of death is that **the theories that emerge to account for what is taken to be the accidental positionality of whites who are thought to be human**, individuals, citizens, and persons **must make sense of a reality where to be Black is to be nonhuman, savage, alien, and reified and consequently subject to violence and wished dead. As** the late Critical Race Theorist, **Derrick Bell** (1997: 23) **once said**: **We have never understood that the essence of the racism we contended against was not simply that we were exploited in slavery**, degraded by **segregation, and** frustrated by **the unmet promises of equal opportunity. The essence of racism in America was the hope that we who were Black would not exist**. Instead of racism being defined as a set of attitudes or beliefs about racial groups held by biased individuals, the authors prefer to understand racism as a complex nexus, a cognitive architecture used to invent, reimagine, and evolve the presumed political, social, economic, sexual, and psychological superiority of the white races in society, while materializing the imagined inferiority and hastening the death of inferior races. Said differently, racism is the manifestation of the social processes and concurrent logics that facilitate the death and dying of racially subjugated peoples. (Curry 2017a: 4) **Racism is a social process that demands the extinguishing of Black life. Racism craves death**. It is constructed, then legitimized through cultural and individual complacency. **When a young Black boy is killed, the instruments of the state, the authority of the police, and the vulnerability of the Black male body converge in the ultimate expression of violence** that results in death. **The public then rationalizes this exercise of state violence** and the individual will of the police officer who killed the Black boy **through empathy**. The white individual who sees the dead Black male body understands the need to kill the Black boy because Blackness socially expresses criminality, danger, and the possible death of a white life. **This fear of Blackness creates empathy for the officer who killed the Black boy**. He is thought of by the white interpreter who is watching the dead Black male body as a corpse. The fear shared between the officer and white onlooker is legitimated by the state because the state offers its society security from this Black male threat. **This is how populations feared by the society are simultaneously constructed and destroyed**. This brief example describes the depth of the problem involved with racism. **Black philosophers are not simply objecting to the thoughts individuals hold about different groups of people, but how the thoughts that white individuals hold can be supported and expressed in violence against** Black men and women in the world. Because a white supremacist world supports the fears of the white racist, the individual racist’s anti-Blackness is aspirational. It is expressed as a will for there to be no Black bodies there. As such, the human becomes an untenable account of **Black life, given this disposability**. The world is simply not organized in such a way that allows Blackness to not be seen, perceived, and dehumanized in relation to whites. **No amount of evidence** or argument **seems to be able to displace the faith philosophers have in education, dialogue, and mutual understanding** between Blacks and whites as the remedies of racism (Curry 2008). Generations of nonwhite philosophers have spent their careers and research showing the discipline the horrors of racism, xenophobia, and ethno-nationalist thinking, but there has been little to no change in departments or the discipline at large. For many philosophers, the idea that racism is permanent is unthinkable. Despite the words and works of Black political theorists like the lawyer Robert F. Williams or Dr. Huey P. Newton, or even more canonically established Black figures like W. E. B. DuBois, Carter G. Woodson, Frantz Fanon, or Derrick Bell, philosophy as a discipline and **philosophers** more generally **refuse to acknowledge that racism** remains the core and most determining aspect of America’s social processes. Enamored by the stories of Blacks suffering, many scholarly conversations about Blackness and racism focus on the harm that Black individuals suffer at the hands of whites or the discipline of philosophy. Relatively few works actually analyze racism structurally or beyond identity at all. **Philosophical analyses do not revolve around death or the material consequences of anti-Blackness**. Instead, the fear and anxiety that Black philosophers and graduate students share with whites become more worthwhile topics.

## Thus, C. Alternative

**[Curry & Curry 3] Vote negative to reject their Western metaphysical tradition and recognize the permanent failure of White philosophy. Instead, endorse Black philosophy as a site to engage in radical theorizations – attempts at integration commodify Black philosophers as extensions of White thinkers, which waters down Black philosophy to something for White philosophers to deem respectable scholarship. A fundamental reorientation of the discipline away from universal reason is key.**

**Curry & Curry 3:** Tommy J. [Tommy, PhD, Prof. of Philosophy @ TAMU, Gwenetta, PhD, Ass. Prof. of Gender and Race Studies @ Alabama], “On the Perils of Race Neutrality and Anti-Blackness: Philosophy as an Irreconcilable Obstacle to (Black) Thought,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, Nos. 3-4 (May-September 2018). DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12244

The debate about what constitutes or is real philosophy continues to dominate the discussions concerning race and racism. Drawing from the inclusion/exclusion or integrationist/segregationist paradigms, the problem of race and racism in philosophy is routinely understood as what is allowed to stand within or excluded from the discipline. The integrationist or post-civil-rights understanding of racism in philosophy routinely misses that **racism involves a complex and denaturing dynamic regarding the thought and perceptions of oppressed groups**. This is a paradigmatic and methodological problem introduced by Curry (2011a, 2011b) as signs of Black philosophy’s “derelictical” crisis. As Curry (2011a: 144) explains: At its most basic level, philosophy is an activity of inquiry into the world which is supposed to guarantee its practitioners some level of assuredness in the ways we interpret the realities before us. If we take African American philosophy to be philosophical activity, then we should expect, by necessity of being philosophy, that Africana philosophy should result in the same methodological rigor—some assuredness in the ways that Africana people have used to interpret their realities. Unfortunately, the present day crisis of African American philosophy makes this simple formulation an impossibility. By making the methodological rigor of Africana philosophy dependent on its popular acceptance; its closeness to the political dogmas of our racial era, we condemn our area of study to under-specialization whereby our works of philosophical genius, past and present, will be judged solely by the degree to which they extend the universalizing character of Europe and her theories. To t**he extent that African American philosophy chooses to** abandon **the genealogical patterns of Black thought for philosophically privileged associations with white thinkers, it remains derelictical—continuing to neglect its only actual duty**—the duty **to inquiry into the reality of African-descended people as they have revealed it**. We begin with the premise that **racism permeates the discipline of philosophy**. We are attempting to bring attention to the ways in which **authentic Black philosophy has been revised and denatured into a form that whites in the discipline accept as** philosophical. Whereas all disciplines have norms or rules of scholarly rigor, **philosophy demands that Black thinking and thought tend towards specific political ends in order to be considered philosophy**. Whether or not the thought and texts of Black philosophers are correctly interpreted, understood, or even read ultimately becomes irrelevant to the larger political orientation of the discipline. **Black philosophers are read as extensions of white thought. A Black philosophical figure is relevant only to the extent that he or she can be understood as the unrealized intentionality of canonical white figures.** Black historical figures are made philosophical by the extent to which their voice can be imagined as what Dewey, Hegel, Addams, or Foucault would have said if they thought more seriously about race and racism. Consequently, writes Curry (2011b: 141): Black thinkers function as the racial hypothetical of European thought whereby Black thought is read as the concretization of European reflections turned to the problem of race, and Black thinkers are seen as racial embodiments of white thinkers’ philosophical spirits. In this vein, the most studied Black philosophers are read as the embodiment of their white associates; W. E. B. Du Bois is read as the Black Hegel, the Black James, the Black Dewey, and Frantz Fanon as a Black Sartre, or Black Husserl. This demonization of Black thinkers by the various manifestations of the European logos as necessary to the production of AfricanAmerican philosophy is a serious impediment to the development of a genuine genealogy of the ideas that actually define Africana philosophy’s Diasporic identity.

**They add:**

**Black philosophy has a responsibility to engage the Black experience as a genuine site of existential reflection and epistemological tool** making. The idea that Black experience and reality must be accounted for by white theories of causality or aim towards the same ends of white philosophy is delusional. Black **philosophy must engage in radical theorizations that can be traced back to the problems tackled in the texts and debates of Black** thinkers. The **social prognoses suggested** by Black philosophers **should also have some accountability to the realities that Black people are facing in the U**nited **S**tates, **if not the world**. There is no time for idle thought that simply attempts to imitate white theories of causality and canonical traditions in order to be accepted. How can we demonstrate the importance of Black philosophy, if not for what we observe and verify in the lives of Black people in the world? **Its ability to express the full complexity of Black life and death in theory at the most abstract levels of thought is what is at stake in the Black philosophical project**.

## 2nd off – DA

### A. Links

#### 1. [Bello] First, the WTO props up U.S. neoliberal heg – reform is the wrong approach – every empiric flows neg.

**Bello:** Bello, Walden [Filipino academic, environmentalist, and social worker who served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines] “Why Reform of the WTO is the Wrong Agenda” *Focus on Trade, No. 43*, December 1999, <https://www.tni.org/my/node/6851>

In the wake of the collapse of the Seattle Ministerial, there has emerged the opinion that reform of the WTO is now the program that NGOs, governments, and citizens must embrace. The collapse of the WTO Ministerial is said to provide a unique window of opportunity for a reform agenda. Cited by some as a positive sign is United States Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky's comment, immediately after the collapse of the Seattle Ministerial, that the WTO has outgrown the processes appropriate to an earlier time. An increasing and necessary view, generally shared among the members, was that we needed a process which had a greater degree of internal transparency and inclusion to accommodate a larger and more diverse membership'. (1) Also seen as an encouraging gesture is UK Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Stephen Byers' recent statement to Commonwealth Trade Ministers in New Delhi that the WTO will not be able to continue in its present form. There has to be fundamental and radical change in order for it to meet the needs and aspirations of all 134 of its members. (2) These are, in our view, damage control statements and provide little indication of the seriousness about reform of the two governments that were, pre-Seattle, the stoutest defenders of the inequalities built into the structure, dynamics, and objectives of the WTO. It is unfortunate that they are now being cited to convince developing countries and NGOs to take up an agenda of reform that could lead precisely to the strengthening of an organization that is very fundamentally flawed. What civil society, North and South, should instead be doing at this point is radically cutting down the power of the institution and reducing it to simply another institution in a pluralistic world trading system with multiple systems of governance. Does World Trade Need the World Trade Organization? This is the fundamental question on which the question of reform hinges. World trade did not need the WTO to expand 17-fold between 1948 and 1997, from $124 billion to $10,772 billion. (3) This expansion took place under the flexible GATT trade regime. The WTO's founding in 1995 did not respond to a collapse or crisis of world trade such as happened in the 1930's. It was not necessary for global peace, since no world war or trade-related war had taken place during that period. In the seven major inter-state wars that took place in that period-the Korean War of 1950-53, the Vietnam War of 1945-75, the Suez Crisis of 1956, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the 1982 Falklands War, and the Gulf War of 1990-trade conflict did not figure even remotely as a cause. GATT was, in fact, functioning reasonably well as a framework for liberalizing world trade. Its dispute-settlement system was flexible and with its recognition of the 'special and differential status' of developing countries, it provided the space in a global economy for Third World countries to use trade policy for development and industrialization. Why was the WTO established following the Uruguay Round of 1986-94? Of the major trading powers, Japan was very ambivalent, concerned as it was to protect its agriculture as well as its particular system of industrial production that, through formal and informal mechanisms, gave its local producers primary right to exploit the domestic market. The EU, well on the way of becoming a self-sufficient trading bloc, was likewise ambivalent, knowing that its highly subsidized system in agriculture would come under attack. Though demanding greater access to their manufactured and agricultural products in the Northern economies, the developing countries did not see this as being accomplished through a comprehensive agreement enforced by a powerful trade bureaucracy but through discrete negotiations and agreements in the model of the Integrated Program for Commodities (IPCs) and Commodity Stabilization Fund agreed upon under the aegis of UNCTAD in the late seventies. The founding of the WTO served primarily the interest of the United States. Just as it was the US which blocked the founding of the International Trade Organization (ITO) in 1948, when it felt that this would not serve its position of overwhelming economic dominance in the post-war world, so it was the US that became the dominant lobbyist for the comprehensive Uruguay Round and the founding of the WTO in late eighties and early nineties, when it felt that more competitive global conditions had created a situation where its corporate interests now demanded an opposite stance. Just as it was the US's threat in the 1950's to leave GATT if it was not allowed to maintain protective mechanisms for milk and other agricultural products that led to agricultural trade's exemption from GATT rules, so was it US pressure that brought agriculture into the GATT-WTO system in 1995. And the reason for Washington's change of mind was articulated quite candidly by then US Agriculture Secretary John Block at the start of the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1986: [The] idea that developing countries should feed themselves is an anachronism from a bygone era. They could better ensure their food security by relying on US agricultural products, which are available, in most cases at much lower cost. (4) Washington, of course, did not just have developing country markets in mind, but also Japan, South Korea, and the European Union. It was the US that mainly pushed to bring services under WTO coverage, with its assessment that the in the new burgeoning area of international services, and particularly in financial services, its corporations had a lead that needed to be preserved. It was also the US that pushed to expand WTO jurisdiction to the so-called 'Trade-Related Investment Measures' (TRIMs) and 'Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights' (TRIPs) The first sought to eliminate barriers to the system of internal cross-border trade of product components among TNC (transnational corporations) subsidiaries that had been imposed by developing countries in order to develop their industries; the second to consolidate the US advantage in the cutting-edge knowledge-intensive industries.And it was the US that forced the creation of the WTO's formidable dispute-resolution and enforcement mechanism after being frustrated with what US trade officials considered weak GATT efforts to enforce rulings favorable to the US. As Washington's academic point man on trade, C. Fred Bergsten, head of the Institute of International Economics, told the US Senate, the strong WTO dispute settlement mechanism serves US interests because we can now use the full weight of the international machinery to go after those trade barriers, reduce them, get them eliminated. (5) In sum, it has been Washington's changing perception of the needs of its economic interest-groups that have shaped and reshaped the international trading regime. It was not global necessity that gave birth to the WTO in 1995. It was the US's assessment that the interests of its corporations were no longer served by a loose and flexible GATT but needed an all-powerful and wide-ranging WTO. From the free-market paradigm that underpins it, to the rules and regulations set forth in the different agreements that make up the Uruguay Round, to its system of decision-making and accountability, the WTO is a blueprint for the global hegemony of Corporate America. It seeks to institutionalize the accumulated advantages of US corporations. Is the WTO necessary? Yes, to the United States. But not to the rest of the world. The necessity of the WTO is one of the biggest lies of our time, and its acceptance is due to the same propaganda principle practised by Joseph Goebbels: if you repeat a lie often enough, it will be taken as truth. Can the WTO Serve the Interests of the Developing Countries? But what about the developing countries? Is the WTO a necessary structure - one that, whatever its flaws, brings more benefits than costs, and would therefore merit efforts at reform When the Uruguay Round was being negotiated, there was considerable lack of enthusiasm for the process by the developing countries. After all, these countries had formed the backbone of UNCTAD, which, with its system of one-country/one-vote and majority voting, they felt was an international arena more congenial to their interests. They entered the Uruguay Round greatly resenting the large trading powers' policy of weakening and marginalizing UNCTAD in the late seventies and early eighties.Largely passive spectators, with a great number not even represented during the negotiations owing to resource constraints, the developing countries were dragged into unenthusiastic endorsement of the Marrakesh Accord of 1994 that sealed the Uruguay Round and established the WTO. True, there were somedeveloping countries, most of them in the Cairns Group of developed and developing country agro-exporters, that actively promoted the WTO in the hope that they would gain greater market access to their exports, but they were a small minority. To try to sell the WTO to the South, US propagandists evoked the fear that staying out of the WTO would result in a country's isolation from world trade ('like North Korea') and stoked the promise that a 'rules-based system' of world trade would protect the weak countries from unilateral acts by the big trading powers. With their economies dominated by the IMF and the World Bank, with the structural adjustment programs pushed by these agencies having as a central element radical trade liberalization, much weaker as a bloc owing to the debt crisis compared to the 1970's, the height of the 'New International Economic Order', most developing country delegations felt they had no choice but to sign on the dotted line. Over the next few years, however, these countries realized that they had signed away their right to employ a variety of critical trade measures for development purposes. In contrast to the loose GATT framework, which had allowed some space for development initiatives, the comprehensive and tightened Uruguay Round was fundamentally anti-development in its thrust. This is evident in the following: Loss of Trade Policy as Development Tool In signing on to GATT, Third World countries were committed to banning all quantitative restrictions on imports, reduce tariffs on many industrial imports, and promise not to raise tariffs on all other imports. In so doing, they have effectively given up the use of trade policy to pursue industrialization objectives. The way that the NICs, or 'newly industrializing countries', made it to industrial status, via the policy of import substitution, is now effectively removed as a route to industrialization. The anti-industrialization thrust of the GATT-WTO Accord is made even more manifest in the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). In their drive to industrialize, NICs like South Korea and Malaysia made use of many innovative mechanisms such as trade-balancing requirements that tied the value of a foreign investor's imports of raw materials and components to the value of his or her exports of the finished commodity, or 'local content' regulations which mandated that a certain percentage of the components that went into the making of a product was sourced locally. These rules indeed restricted the maneuvering space of foreign investors, but they were successfully employed by the NICs to marry foreign investment to national industrialization. They enabled the NICs to raise income from capital-intensive exports, develop support industries, bring in technology, while still protecting local entrepreneurs' preferential access to the domestic market. In Malaysia, for instance, the strategic use of local content policy enabled the Malaysians to build a 'national car', in cooperation with Mitsubishi, that has now achieved about 80 per cent local content and controls 70 per cent of the Malaysian market. Thanks to the TRIMs accord, these mechanisms used are now illegal. The Restriction of Technological Diffusion Like the TRIMs agreement, the TRIPs regime is seen as effectively opposed to the industrialization and development efforts of Third World countries. This becomes clear from a survey of the economic history not only of the NICs but of almost all late-industrializing countries. A key factor in their industrial take-off was their relatively easy access to cutting-edge technology: The US industrialized, to a great extent by using but paying very little for British manufacturing innovations, as did the Germans. Japan industrialized by liberally borrowing US technological innovations, but barely compensating the Americans for this. And the Koreans industrialized by copying quite liberally and with little payment US and Japanese product and process technologies. But what is 'technological diffusion' from the perspective of the late industrializer is 'piracy' from that of the industrial leader. The TRIPs regime takes the side of the latter and makes the process of industrialization by imitation much more difficult from hereon. It represents what UNCTAD describes as 'a premature strengthening of the intellectual property system... that favors monopolistically controlled innovation over broad-based diffusion'. (6) The TRIPs regime provides a generalized minimum patent protection of 20 years; increases the duration of the protection for semi-conductors or computer chips; institutes draconian border regulations against products judged to be violating intellectual property rights; and places the burden of proof on the presumed violator of process patents. The TRIPs accord is a victory for the US high-tech industry, which has long been lobbying for stronger controls over the diffusion of innovations. Innovation in the knowledge-intensive high-tech sector - in electronic software and hardware, biotechnology, lasers, opto-electronics, liquid crystal technology, to name a few - has become the central determinant of economic power in our time. And when any company in the NICs and Third World wishes to innovate, say in chip design, software programming, or computer assembly, it necessarily has to integrate several patented designs and processes, most of them from US electronic hardware and software giants like Microsoft, Intel, and Texas Instruments. (7) As the Koreans have bitterly learned, exorbitant multiple royalty payments to what has been called the American 'high tech mafia' keeps one's profit margins very low while reducing incentives for local innovation. The likely outcome is for a Southern manufacturer simply to pay royalties for a technology rather than to innovate, thus perpetuating the technological dependence on Northern firms.Thus, TRIPs enables the technological leader, in this case the United States, to greatly influence the pace of technological and industrial development in rival industrialized countries, the NICs, and the Third World. Watering Down the 'Special and Differential Treatment' Principle The central principle of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) - an organization disempowered by the establishment of the WTO - is that owing to the critical nexus between trade and development, developing countries must not be subjected to the same expectations, rules, and regulations that govern trade among the developed countries. Owing to historical and structural considerations, developing countries need special consideration and special assistance in leveling the playing field for them to be able to participate equitably in world trade. This would include both the use of protective tariffs for development purposes and preferential access of developing country exports to developed country markets. While GATT was not centrally concerned with development, it did recognize the 'special and differential status' of the developing countries. Perhaps the strongest statement of this was in the Tokyo Round Declaration in 1973, which recognized the importance of the application of differential measures in developing countries in ways which will provide special and more favourable treatment for them in areas of negotiation where this is feasible. (8) Different sections of the evolving GATT code allowed countries to renegotiate tariff bindings in order to promote the establishment of certain industries; allowed developing countries to use tariffs for economic development and fiscal purposes; allowed them to use quantitative restrictions to promote infant industries; and conceded the principle of non-reciprocity by developing countries in trade negotiation. (9) The 1979 Framework Agreement known at the Enabling Clause also provided a permanent legal basis for General System of Preferences (GSP) schemes that would provide preferential access to developing country exports. (10) A significant shift occurred in the Uruguay Round. GSP schemes were not bound, meaning tariffs could be raised against developing country until they equaled the bound rates applied to imports for all sources. Indeed, during the negotiations, the threat to remove GSP was used as a form of bilateral pressure on developing countries. (11) SDT was turned from a focus on a special right to protect and special rights of market access to one of responding to special adjustment difficulties in developing countries stemming from the implementation of WTO decisions. (12) Measures meant to address the structural inequality of the trading system gave way to measures, such as a lower rate of tariff reduction or a longer time frame for implementing decisions, which regarded the problem of developing countries as simply that of catching up in an essentially even playing field. STD has been watered down in the WTO, and this is not surprising for the neoliberal agenda that underpins the WTO philosophy differs from the Keynesian assumptions of GATT: that there are no special rights, no special protections needed for development. The only route to development is one that involves radical trade (and investment) liberalization. Fate of the Special Measures for Developing Countries Perhaps the best indicators of the marginal consideration given to developing countries in the WTO is the fate of the measures that were supposed to respond to the special conditions of developing countries. There were three key agreements which promoters of the WTO claimed were specifically designed to meet the needs of the South: The Special Ministerial Agreement approved in Marrakesh in April 1994, which decreed that special compensatory measures would be taken to counteract the negative effects of trade liberalization on the net food-importing developing countries; The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which mandated thart the system of quotas on developing country exports of textiles and garments to the North would be dismantled over ten years; The Agreement on Agriculture, which, while 'imperfect', nevertheless was said to promise greater market access to developing country agricultural products and begin the process of bringing down the high levels of state support and subsidization of EU and US agriculture, which was resulting in the dumping of massive quantities of grain on Third World markets. What happened to these measures? The Special Ministerial Decision taken at Marrakesh to provide assistance to 'Net Food Importing Countries' to offset the reduction of subsidies that would make food imports more expensive for the 'Net Food Importing Countries' has never been implemented. Though world crude prices more than doubled in 1995/96, the World Bank and the IMF scotched an idea of any offsetting aid by arguing that the price increase was not due to the Agreement on Agriculture, and besides there was never any agreement anyway on who would be responsible for providing the assistance. (13) The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing committed the developed countries to bring under WTO discipline all textile and garment imports over four stages, ending on January 1, 2005. A key feature was supposed to be the lifting of quotas on imports restricted under the Multifiber Agreement (MFA) and similar schemes which had been used to contain penetration of developed country markets by cheap clothing and textile imports from the Third World. Developed countries retained, however, the right to choose which product lines to liberalize when, so that they first brought mainly unrestricted products into the WTO discipline and postponed dealing with restricted products till much later. Thus, in the first phase, all restricted products continued to be under quota, as only items where imports were not considering threatening-like felt hats or yarn of carded fine animal hair - were included in the developed countries' notifications. Indeed, the notifications for the coverage of products for liberalization on January 1, 1998 showed that even at the second stage of implementation only a very small proportion" of restricted products would see their quotas lifted. (14) Given this trend, John Whalley notes that the belief is now widely held in the developing work that in 2004, while the MFA may disappear, it may well be replaced by a series of other trade instruments, possibly substantial increases in anti-dumping duties. (15) When it comes to the Agreement on Agriculture, which was sold to developing countries during the Uruguay Round as a major step toward providing market access to developing country imports and bringing down the high levels of domestic support for first world farming interests that results in dumping of commodities in third world markets, little gains in market access after five years into developed country markets have been accompanied by even higher levels of overall subsidization-through ingenious combinations of export subsidies, export credits, market support, and various kinds of direct income payments. The figures speak for themselves: the level of overall subsidization of agriculture in the OECD countries rose from $182 billion in 1995 when the WTO was born to $280 billion in 1997 to $362 billion in 1998! Instead of the beginning of a New Deal, the AOA, in the words of a former Philippine Secretary of Trade, has perpetuated the unevenness of a playing field which the multilateral trading system has been trying to correct. Moreover, this has placed the burden of adjustment on developing countries relative to countries who can afford to maintain high levels of domestic support and export subsidies. (16) The collapse of the agricultural negotiations in Seattle is the best example of how extremely difficult it is to reform the AOA. The European Union opposed till the bitter end language in an agreement that would commit it to 'significant reduction' of its subsidies. But the US was not blameless. It resolutely opposed any effort to cut back on its forms of subsidies such as export credits, direct income for farmers, and 'emergency' farm aid, as well as any mention of its practice of dumping products in developing country markets. Oligarchic Decision-Making as a Central, Defining Process Is the system of WTO decisionmaking reformable? While far more flexible than the WTO, the GATT was, of course, far from perfect, and one of the bad traits that the WTO took over from it was the system of decision-making. GATT functioned through a process called 'consensus'. Now consensus responded to the same problem that faced the IMF and the World Bank's developed country members: how to assure control at a time that the numbers gave the edge to the new countries of the South. In the Fund and the Bank, the system of decision-making evolved had the weight of a country's vote determined by the size of its capital subscriptions, which gave the US and the other rich countries effective control of the two organizations. In the GATT, a one-country one-vote system was initially tried, but the big trading powers saw this as inimical to their interests. Thus, the last time a vote was taken in GATT was in 1959. (17) The system that finally emerged was described by US economist Bergsten as one that does not work by voting. It works by a consensus arrangement which, to tell the truth, is managed by four - the Quads: the United States, Japan, European Union, and Canada.(18) He continued: Those countries have to agree if any major steps are going to be made, that is true. But no votes. (19) Indeed, so undemocratic is the WTO that decisions are arrived at informally, via caucuses convoked in the corridors of the ministerials by the big trading powers. The formal plenary sessions, which in democracies are the central arena for decision-making, are reserved for speeches. The key agreements to come out of the first and second ministerials of the WTO-the decision to liberalize information technology trade taken at the first ministerial in Singapore in 1996 and the agreement to liberalize trade in electronic commerce arrived at in Geneva in 1998-were all decided in informal backroom sessions and simply presented to the full assembly as faits accompli. Consensus simply functioned to render non-transparent a process where smaller, weaker countries were pressured, browbeaten, or bullied to conform to the 'consensus' forged among major trading powers. With surprising frankness, at a press conference in Seattle, US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, who played the pivotal role in all three ministerials, described the dynamics and consequences of this system of decision-making: The process, including even at Singapore as recently as three years ago, was a rather exclusionary one. All meetings were held between 20 and 30 keycountries...And that meant 100 countries, 100, were never in the room... [T]his led to an extraordinarily bad feeling that they were left our of the process and that the results even at Singapore had been dictated to them by the 25 or 30 privileged countries who were in the room. (20) Then, after registering her frustration at the WTO delegates' failing to arrive at consensus via supposedly broader 'working groups' set up for the Seattle ministerial, Barshefsky warned delegates: ...[I] have made very clear and I reiterated to all ministers today that, if we are unable to achieve that goal, I fully reserve the right to also use a more exclusive process to achieve a final outcome. There is no question about either my right as the chair to do it or my intention as the chair to do it.... (21) And she was serious about ramming through a declaration at the expense of non-representativeness, with India, one of the key developing country members of the WTO, being routinely excluded from private talks organized by the United States in last ditch efforts to come up with a face-saving deal. (22) In damage-containment mode after the collapse of the Seattle Ministerial, Barshefsky, WTO Director General Mike Moore, and other rich country representatives have spoken about the need for WTO 'reform'. But none have declared any intention of pushing for a one-county/one-vote majority decision-making system or a voting system weighted by population size, which would be the only fair and legitimate methods in a democratic international organization. The fact is, such mechanisms will never be adopted, for this would put the developing countries in a preponderant role in terms of decision-making. Should One Try to Reform a Jurassic Institution? Reform is a viable strategy when the system is question is fundamentally fair but has simply been corrupted such as the case with some democracies. It is not a viable strategy when a system is so fundamentally unequal in purposes, principles, and processes as the WTO. The WTO systematically protects and the trade and economic advantages of the rich countries, particularly the United States. It is based on a paradigm or philosophy that denigrates the right to take actvist measures to achieve development on the part of less developed countries, thus leading to a radical dilution of their right to 'special and differntial treatment'. The WTO raises inequality into a principle of decisionmaking.The WTO is often promoted as a 'rules-based' trading framework that protects the weaker and poorer countries from unilateral actions by the stronger states. The opposite is true: the WTO, like many other multilateral international agreements, is meant to instututionalize and legtimize inequality. Its main purpose is to reduce the tremendous policing costs to the stronger powers that would be involved in disciplining many small countries in a more fluid, less structured international system. It is not surprising that both the WTO and the IMF are currently mired in a severe crisis of legitimacy. For both are highly centralized, highly unaccountable, highly non-transparent global institutions that seek to subjugate, control, or harness vast swathes of global economic, social, political, and environmental processes to the needs and interests of a global minority of states, elites, and TNCs. The dynamics of such institutions clash with the burgeoning democratic aspirations of peoples, countries, and communities in both the North and the South. The centralizing dynamics of these institutions clash with the efforts of communities and nations to regain control of their fate and achieve a modicum of security by deconcentrating and decentralizing economic and political power. In other words, these are Jurassic institutions in an age of participatory political and economic democracy.

#### **2. [Reform] AND** the aff is only committed to temporary and exceptional reforms like short-term waivers – that puts power in the WTO’s hands to decide when a pandemic is “over” or which types of patents to pursue.

### B. Impact

#### [Gatwiri et al] WHITE SAVIORISM: using the WTO to expand medicine is a wolf in sheep’s clothes – they use the language of inclusion to marginalize Black people – Africa proves.

**Gatwiri et al:** Gatwiri, Kathomi [lecturer based at Southern Cross University where she teaches Social Work & Social Policy] Amboko, Julians [finance and economics correspondent with the Nation Media Group] Okolla, Darius [Bachelor of Commerce - Finance degree, from Kenyatta University,] “The implications of Neoliberalism on African economies, health outcomes and wellbeing: a conceptual argument” *Soc Theory Health.* June 26, 2019

Since the late 1980s, the sub-Sahara has been struggling to address the issues of inequality that have been inflated by neoliberal policies and capitalist development policies that focus on production of labour and little on the health and wellbeing of the “producers” of the said labour. Globally, the rolling out of neoliberal policies has led to a plethora of harmful socioeconomic consequences, including increased poverty, unemployment, and deterioration of income distribution (Rotarou and Sakellariou 2017; Collins et al. 2015). Hartmann (2016, p. 2145) states that “neoliberalism typically refers to minimal government intervention, laissez-faire market policies, and individualism over collectivism [which] has been adopted by—and pressed upon—the majority of national governments and global development institution.” She further states that “neoliberal policies have contributed to the privatization and individualization of healthcare, resulting in growing health inequalities.” By privatising healthcare, education, electricity, water and housing, neoliberals argue that private institutions are more capable, effective and efficient in providing social services. Harvey (2007) states that neoliberalism is “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, … free trade” and a “hands-off” approach from the government. This is what Friedman referred to as the system of “free market capitalism” (Friedman 2009). However, (Garnham (2017) argues that decreasing public spending and government involvement in the welfare of people through the rhetoric of choice and freedom has a harmful impact on people’s health and wellbeing. The biggest conceptual challenge is that neoliberal ideology adopts the language of freedom and choice, increased foreign investments, and open markets and trade to progress policies that lead to privatisation of basic needs such as education, healthcare, water, electricity and housing. The rich can often afford these services and can compete “fairly” in the “free market”, but the poor—unable to afford health care, education or decent housing—are left marginalised. Njoya (2017) explored the use of language in promoting inequality in the healthcare system. She argued that “neoliberalism uses the language of social policy and justice but [insidiously] drives a very corporate and unequal agenda.” Neoliberalism has radically shifted the African public health space in the last two decades. Most sub-Saharan African countries drastically reduced their healthcare budgets following the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Structural Adjustment programs (SAPs) directives. As Hartmann (2016, p. 2146) wrote, it “decentralized health care decision-making and funding, resulting in wide-scale privatization of health care services, delivery, and insurance, which led to structural segmentation and fragmentation.” SAPs have had myriad negative impacts on African economies, including, but not limited to, “inflationary pressures, the marginalization of the poor in the distribution of educational and health benefits and a reduction in employment” (Rono 2002, p. 84). As the main impetus of the SAPs was to reduce and ration expenditure, structural adjustment in the healthcare sector slashed public spending on primary healthcare, and aided the privatisation of health systems and services. In Kenya, for example, The Bamako Initiative of 1987 anchored cost-sharing as a central tenet of public health policy, in which patients were required to pay for nearly all costs of diagnosis and treatment (Rono 2002). Outside of an emergency, patients were required to provide proof of payment before medical services are availed. By channelling funding to narrow medical interests, structural adjustment policies resulted in an uneven medical landscape, with a few prestigious fields surrounded by poorly resourced departments. Clinicians had to tailor their decisions about treatment to the limited medicine, technologies and resources available. The increased number of private healthcare organisations, coupled with a significant reduction in the role of government in the provision of healthcare services, contributed to extensive negative outcomes on the quality, effectiveness, cost and access of health systems and services, which severely impacted on people’s wellbeing. Rotarou and Sakellariou (2017, p. 497) state that the private institutions, “with their focus on increasing profits, and not on providing affordable and good-quality healthcare, have led to the deterioration of public health systems, increase in urban–rural divide, as well as increase in inequality of access to healthcare services.” Privatisation of healthcare has made services more unaffordable and less available to the population of people that need it the most. As a result, life expectancy has stagnated or fallen in most African countries, and mortality from preventable infections and diseases continues to rise. Further to this, the politics of healthcare through a neoliberal lens are often framed as “individual” issues rather than “structural and ideological” issues. This implies that the neoliberal approach to health has diminished the idea of healthcare as a universal human right. Reframing, reshaping, rethinking and re-politicising healthcare reveals the colonial attitudes that dictate who “deserves” good healthcare. Njoya (2017) states, [Politicians in Kenya] come to the rescue of the poor by paying hospital bills but will not have a conversation about the fact that we the taxpayers are paying millions [worth of] medical cover for each of them and will not engage in a conversation about the underfunding of healthcare, and the looting of the little money given to healthcare. When [the] Netherlands and the UN are helping foreign companies purchase Kenyan hospitals, [they are] supporting our government’s deafness to [our right to basic healthcare] and [promoting their] refusal to fund public hospitals. The privatisation and buying out of African hospitals by foreign companies in an attempt to “help and rescue them” is a capitalist response that undercuts universal healthcare for Africans by appropriating the language of care and inclusion. In reality, this “white saviour approach” is layered with nothing but racism, disempowerment, exploitation of people, and exclusion of those who cannot afford those “privatised” services. Access to health services, therefore, remains both a political as well as a human rights issue that’s closely tied to social justice (Braveman and Gruskin 2003b); but Africa’s colonial history, fuelled by Western greed for her resources, promotes discriminatory policies that continue to impact Africans and their wellbeing.

### 3rd off – DA

#### [BEINART] Jinal is racist – vote them down.

BEINART– brackets in original text: <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/01/the-sophisticated-bigotry-of-bobby-jindal/384997/>

**In London, Jindal said “non-assimilationist Muslims” threaten the West not merely because they support acts of violence,** and not merely because they adhere to Islamic rather than national law. Most fundamentally, they pose a threat because they refuse to embrace the cultures of the countries to which they immigrate**. Denouncing the left’s claim that “it is unenlightened, discriminatory, and even racist to expect immigrants to endorse and assimilate into the culture in their new country,”** Jindal insisted that “it is completely reasonable for nations to discriminate between allowing people into their country who want to embrace their culture, or allowing people into their country who want to destroy their culture, or establish a separate culture within.” In his London speech, **Jindal made little effort to define American or European culture except to associate it with “freedom.” So it’s hard to know exactly which aspects of it he believes Muslims refuse to embrace**. But in his speeches last year on religion, Jindal discussed American culture at greater length. And his verdict was surprisingly harsh. “American culture,” he told students at Liberty University, “has in many ways become a secular culture.” Many churches, he declared, now espouse “views on sin [that] are in direct conflict with the culture.” In case students hadn’t gotten the message, Jindal repeated himself: “Our culture has taken a secular turn.”