# T

A interp: AFFs may not specify an unjust type of appropriation

Appropriation

#### [Gorove] **Space Law Professor Stephen Gorove defines “appropriation of outer space” as:** Gorove, Stephen. [Professor of space law and director of space studies and policy, 1991-1998, University of Mississippi] “Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.” 37 *Fordham L. Rev.* 349, 1969. https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol37/iss3/2 CH

With respect to the concept of appropriation the basic question is what constitutes "appropriation," as used in the Treaty, especially in contradistinction to casual or temporary use. The term "appropriation" is used most frequently to denote the taking of property for one's own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence. Under such interpretation the establishment of a permanent settlement or the carrying out of commercial activities by nationals of a country on a celestial body may constitute national appropriation if the activities take place under the supreme authority (sovereignty) of the state. Short of this, if the state wields no exclusive authority or jurisdiction in relation to the area in question, the answer would seem to be in the negative, unless, the nationals also use their individual appropriations as cover-ups for their state's activities.5 In this connection, it should be emphasized that the word "appropriation" indicates a taking which involves something more than just a casual use. Thus a temporary occupation of a landing site or other area, just like the temporary or nonexclusive use of property, would not constitute appropriation. By the same token, any use involving consumption or taking with intention of keeping for one's own exclusive use would amount to appropriation.

Violation: The appropriation of outer space through asteroid mining by private entities should be banned.

Standards

#### 1. Limits – they can defend an infinite number of affs by specing any one type of appropriation –which makes pre-round prep impossible. Disclosure doesn’t solve, since you could potentially disclose that you’re reading a Harry Potter aff – that doesn’t make it topical. Limits control the internal link to clash – I can’t answer the aff if I can’t prep against it.

#### 2. Ground – if they can spec one state, they can cherry-pick a super-specific state where there’s no literature justifying aid, or no arguments for it

#### 2. I cant read the innovation DA or disads to other specific types of appropriation since they can defend an exemption for that, etc. means im never able to reasonably predict what the aff defends restricting and what it doesn’t. Ground controls the internal link to clash and fairness since the aff makes being neg impossible.

### D. Voter

#### [Voter] The voter is fairness, meaning ensuring that both debaters have equal opportunities to win the round. Voters like education don't matter if both debaters can't access those benefits.

#### [Implication] DROP THE DEBATER: the round has already been skewed – you should not endorse a performance that denies fairness. Dropping the arg is the same thing as kicking the aff – that ruins fairness because they can shift their advocacy in the 1AR and I can't lock them down to anything.

#### [No RVIs] NO RVIs:

**1.** RVIs create a chilling effect where debaters are encouraged to read non-T affs and win on an RVI. The point of T is to check abuse, so RVIs destroy the entire purpose of T if it can no longer check abuse. This turns any "T is policing" arguments since I don't police what they should be talking about, I just say that they should talk about things within the confines of the resolution.

**2.** RVIs make no sense in a T debate. It's an expectation going into round that you're topical, just as it's expected that your aff is 6 minutes long. Just as you shouldn't win simply because your aff is 6 minutes long, you shouldn't win just because you are topical.

#### [Competing Interps] USE COMPETING INTERPS: Reasonability doesn't make sense in a T debate. You can't be "reasonably" topical; you either are T or you aren't. Using competing interps forces them to defend why they are topical, and if they can't do that, they should lose.

# K

#### [Slattery-Quintanilla] Perpetuating a race neutral ideal of the cosmos furthers colonialism – science is NOT objective and treating space acquisition as such is entrenched in colonialist logic.

**Slattery-Quintanilla**: Slattery-Quintanilla, Claire E. [University of Denver] “Advancing Sylvia Wynter's Reimagination of the Human and Counter-Poetics: A Critique of Contemporary Western Science Discourse in Cosmos—a Spacetime Odyssey, with Host Neil deGrasse Tyson” *Digital Commons@ DU,* 2017. JP

In this chapter I argue that Tyson and Cosmos perpetuate the myth-lie of science neutrality and objectivity by refusing to mention race at three levels: the relationship between European colonial racial subjugation and the emergence of contemporary Western science, the racialized logic that is part and parcel of this tool, and Tyson does not mention his experience as a black man in the sciences. **This refusal to mention race as it relates to Western science at the personal, socio-historical, and epistemic level upholds the symbolic overrepresentation of Man and Western colonial conceptualizations of time and space, supporting the naturalized, privileged position Western science holds over our ways of being and doing in our neoliberal capitalist, white supremacist global order**. Wynter explains that Western science is a “master discipline” of our contemporary episteme that reifies the biologically absolute, (neo)Liberal descriptive statement of the human overrepresented as Man2 homo oeconomicus, in which other “genres or kinds of being human, cannot be imagined to exist” (“How We Mistook” 116). In the article, “No Humans Involved an Open Letter to my Colleagues,” **Wynter argues that Western intellectuals, of which I would argue Tyson is one, cling to the notion that we can create a more just world through increased opportunity and representation for the wretched. However, this fails to question the “the validity of our present order of knowledge itself,” and how this order is upholding a notion of the human that normalizes the dehumanization and violent oppression of black people (57).**

#### [Rodriguez] And colonialism happened in the name of “justice” – it fuels the Western conception of humanism.

**Rodriguez**: Rodriguez, Anthony. [Writer and educator. He has a dual degree in Africana Studies and Modern Culture & Media from Brown University] “Introduction: On Sylvia Wynter and the Urgency of a New Humanist Revolution in the Twenty-First Century” *2018.* JP

Article after article amplifies the critical discourse on humanism that may be more associated with Black Skin, White Masks for some and The Wretched of the Earth for others, although Wynter’s ample corpus would mobilize the complete Fanon for decade after decade. Colonialism practices a “dehumaniza- tion rationally pursued” in “Algeria Face to Face with the French Torturers.”10 He scorns “these humanists” of Europe as they concern themselves with the “souls” and “honor” of the French soldiers who torture, not the actual Algerian men and women whom they torture and massacre historically.11 Fanon disdains “homo occidentalis” explicitly for “First Truths of the Colonial Problem.”12 “**Neo- colonialism,” he observes wryly, “because it proposes to do justice to human dignity in general, addresses itself essentially to the middle class and to the intellectuals of the colonial country.**”13 For his classic critique of the colonized elite famous from The Wretched of the Earth registers here too: Felix Houphouët- Boigny, for example, is not a “Man,” or a “man,” but an odious practitioner of what Fanon more than once mocks as “beni-oui-ouism”:14 “yes-man-ism” obstructing humanism proper. This is how Fanon repudiates the “oppressive” Western “standard” of humanity and the presumed “humanist superiority” of the West—for the vital, anti-colonialist project of “humanization”15—in his El Moudjahid articles that make up the mass of Toward the African Revolution. A profound prefiguration of Louis Sala-Molins’s Dark Side of the Light: Slavery and the French Enlightenment (2006) or Les Misère des lumières: Sous The “Rights of Peoples” against the “Monohumanism” of “Man” | 861 la raison, l’outrage (1992), Fanon’s rhetorical assault (or counterattack) from Algeria on the “Rights of Man” humanism of Franco-Western empire is far from an isolatable moment of these terribly underappreciated texts. The “right of peoples” is reiterated in its fullest form as the right of peoples “to self-determination.”16 The fresh appearance of Ecrits sur l’aliénation et la liberté (2015) / Frantz Fanon: Alienation and Freedom (2018) adds to the mix other El Moudjahid articles uncollected in the Toward the African Revolution collec- tion, such as his “Combat Solidaire” speech for Kwame Nkrumah’s All-African Peoples’ Congress in Accra, Ghana, in addition to his intervention for the Afro-Asian Conference in Conakry: “This is why we Algerians, on the eve of the important conference of this summit, maintain that international détente and the security of the world can only be achieved through national indepen- dence, the recognition in real terms of the right of peoples to self-determination, and the liquidation of the regimes of oppression.” Indeed, Fanon declared in Guinea in opposition to “Man” and its francocentric universalism: “the recovery of Algeria’s national sovereignty will not only be an Algerian victory, but an African victory, an Asian triumph, a step towards the realization of a free and joyful humanity.”17 **The happy, joyful humanity of Fanon should live a “reign of freedom” (and the “unconditional reign of Justice”),18 however resisted by the tacit—“miserable,” “outrageous”—Reign of Terror that French and all Western “revolutions” of slavery and colonialism represent by contrast, from Haiti then (in light of Les Misère des lumières) to Algeria’s Africa and beyond.** Scrupulous in approach, Wynter’s “Novel and History, Plot and Plantation” (1971) essay would start with a series of striking questions seeking to define terms: “What, in our context, is the novel? What, in our context, is history? What is our context?”19 El Moudjahid’s Fanon had rejected the totalizing history of the Republic of France toward a reassumption of history or historicity in the collective person of colonized peoples. He rewrites French-European history from Algeria, Africa, in terms of “130 years of colonialist oppression.”20 He re- casts that official history as “mythic” and a “systematic historical falsification.”21 Its “democracy” is reinscribed as “barbarism” in disguise. Renewed appeals to a false idea of a “common past” between European countries and their colonies (e.g., “French Union,” “Franco-African community,” “Eurafrica”) signfiy a ruse concocted to secure a “rejuvenated colonial pact” and to obscure what should be an authentic “historic process” in tune with the “demands” of “the peoples.”22 Typically, European colonialism claims rights in and over African territory without there being any rights of Africa or Africans to any territory anywhere. This tactic “alienates the African personality,” Fanon cautions in 862 | American Quarterly “Appeal to Africans,”23 continuing his signature quest for dis-alienation here on a macro-historical, geopolitical or political-economic plane. “Mono-historical,” as it were, this false strategy of French colonial “Man” sets the stage for neo- colonialism, propagating those “notorious” “Rights of the former occupant,” which are “wrenched from the people, as the price to be paid for a piece of independence,” a “puppet independence” in point of fact.24 Because he too asked, “What, in our context, is history?”—in El Moudjahid, no less, Fanon could demystify the history of “the Republic” and displace “the Revolution” of France and its “Rights of Man” so that “the Revolution” of world-historical reference becomes “our Revolution” as a rule—the Algerian Revolution, the African Revolution. Speaking of the “Anti-Colonial Revolutions” hailed by Wynter once again in “The Ceremony Found,” Fanon hails their “deeply human inspiration” as a “defeat for racism and for the exploitation of man.”25 **For “what the West has not in truth understood,” he explains in the “political essays” of Toward the African Revolution, “is that today a new humanism, a new theory of man is coming into being, which has its roots in man.”**26 This is the only humanism “that can be considered valid” in his “Letter to the Youth of Africa,” an address that actually embraces those of “Madagascar and the West Indies” in the self- same voice.27 These are texts from 1958. At least three and a half years, then, in advance of his historic proclamations in Les Damnés de la terre, Fanon’s FLN articles persistently echo the Aimé Césaire formulation that would become a familiar chorus for so many statements by Wynter: “**At the very time when it most often mouths the word, the West has never been further from being able to live a true humanism—a humanism made to the measure of the world.”28**

#### [Weheliye 1] Attempts to engage in this form of humanism furthers erasure – it restricts liminality and strengthens the state’s colonialist intentions.

**Weheliye 1**: Weheliye, Alexander. [Associate Professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University] ““Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human” 2014. BP

Suffering, especially when caused by political violence, has long functioned as the hallmark of both humane sentience and of inhuman brutality. **Frequently, suffering becomes the defining feature of those subjects excluded from the law, the national community, humanity, and so on due to the political violence inflicted upon them even as it, paradoxically, grants them access to inclusion and equality.** In western human rights discourse, for instance, the physical and psychic residues of political violence enable victims to be recognized as belonging to the “brotherhood of Man.” **Too often, this tendency not only leaves intact hegemonic ideas of humanity as indistinguishable from western Man but demands comparing different forms of subjugation in order to adjudicate who warrants recognition and belonging.** As W. E. B. Du Bois asked in 1944, if the Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not offer provisions for ending world colonialism or legal segregation in the United States, “Why then call it the Declaration of Human Rights?”2 Wendy Brown maintains, “politicized identity” operates “only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can hold out no future...that triumphs over this pain.”3 Brown suggests replacing the identitarian declaration “I am,” which merely confirms and solidifies what already exists, with the desiring proclamation “I want,” which offers a Nietzschean politics of overcoming pain instead of clinging to suffering as an immutable feature of identity politics. While I recognize Brown's effort to formulate a form of minority politics not beholden to the aura of wounded attachments and fixated almost fetishistically on the state as the site of change, we do well to recall that many of the political agendas based on identity (the suffragette movement, the movement for the equality of same-sex marriages, or the various movements for the full civil rights of racialized minority subjects, for instance) are less concerned with claiming their suffering per se (I am) than they are with using wounding as a stepping stone in the quest (I want) for rights equal to those of full citizens. Liberal governing bodies, whether in the form of nation-states or supranational entities such as the United Nations or the International Criminal Court make particular forms of wounding the precondition for entry into the hallowed halls of full personhood, only acknowledging certain types of physical violence. For instance, while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees passed a resolution in 2008 that includes rape and other forms of sexual violence in the category of war crimes, there are many forms of sexual violence that do not fall into this purview, and thus bar victims from claiming legal injury and/or personhood.4 Even more generally, the acknowledgment and granting of full personhood of those excluded from its precincts requires the overcoming of physical violence, while epistemic and economic brutalities remain outside the scope of the law. **Congruently, much of the politics constructed around the effects of political violence, especially within the context of international human rights but also with regard to minority politics in the United States, is constructed from the shaky foundation of surmounting or desiring to leave behind physical suffering so as to take on the ghostly semblance of possessing one's personhood. Then and only then will previously minoritized subjects be granted their humanity as a legal status.** Hence, the glitch Brown diagnoses in identity politics is less a product of the minority subject's desire to desperately cling to his or her pain but a consequence of the state's dogged insistence on suffering as the only price of entry to proper personhood, what Samera Esmeir has referred to as a “juridical humanity” that bestows and rescinds humanity as an individualized legal status in the vein of property. **Apportioning personhood in this way maintains the world of Man and its attendant racializing assemblages, which means in essence that the entry fee for legal recognition is the acceptance of categories based on white supremacy and colonialism, as well as normative genders and sexualities.**

#### [Weheliye 3] The alternative is habeas viscus or becoming human. To clarify, this is an anti-humanist ethic where we change our view on humanity from legality (a body that is coherent) to focus on flesh (a *real, actualized, material* body) to in order prioritize affective encounters.

**Weheliye 3**: Weheliye, Alexander. [Associate Professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University] ““Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human” 2014. JP

The poetics and politics that I have been discussing under the heading of habeas viscus or the flesh are concerned not with inclusion in reigning precincts of the status quo but, in Cedric Robinson's apt phrasing, “the continuing development of a collective consciousness informed by the historical struggles for liberation and motivated by the shared sense of obligation to preserve [and I would add also to reimagine] the collective being, the ontological totality.”31 Though the laws of Man place the flesh outside the ferocious and ravenous perimeters of the legal body, habeas viscus defies domestication both on the basis of particularized personhood as a result of suffering, as in human rights discourse, and on the grounds of the universalized version of western Man. Rather, habeas viscus points to the terrain of humanity as a relational assemblage exterior to the jurisdiction of law given that the law can bequeath or rescind ownership of the body so that it becomes the property of proper persons but does not possess the authority to nullify the politics and poetics of the flesh found in the traditions of the oppressed. As a way of conceptualizing politics, then, habeas viscus diverges from the discourses and institutions that yoke the flesh to political violence in the modus of deviance. Instead, it translates the hieroglyphics of the flesh into a potentiality in any and all things, an originating leap in the imagining of future anterior freedoms and new genres of humanity. To envisage habeas viscus as a forceful assemblage of humanity entails leaving behind the world of Man and some of its attendant humanist pieties. As opposed to depositing the flesh outside politics, the normal, the human, and so on, we need a better understanding of its varied workings in order to disrobe the cloak of Man, which gives the human a long-overdue extreme makeover; or, in the words of Sylvia Wynter, “the struggle of our new millennium will be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e. western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves.”32 Claiming and dwelling in the monstrosity of the flesh present some of the weapons in the guerrilla warfare to “secure the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species,” since these liberate from captivity assemblages of life, thought, and politics from the tradition of the oppressed and, as a result, disfigure the centrality of Man as the sign for the human. As an assemblage of humanity, habeas viscus animates the elsewheres of Man and emancipates the true potentiality that rests in those subjects who live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception: freedom; assemblages of freedom that sway to the temporality of new syncopated beginnings for the human beyond the world and continent of Man.

#### [Wehelieye 3] Deviant bodies are compared against one another under the state as the color line sets the basis for how subjects should be – women, queer folk, and black people stray from the standard conception of the Western Man, and face oppression as a result. Thus, the Role of the Ballot is to deconstruct the western Man.

**Weheliye 3**: Weheliye, Alexander. [Associate Professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University] ““Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human” 2014. JP

Consequently, **racialization figures as a master code within the genre of the human represented by western Man, because its law-like operations are yoked to species-sustaining physiological mechanisms in the form of a global color line—instituted by cultural laws so as to register in human neural networks—that clearly distinguishes the good/life/fully-human from the bad/death/not-quite-human**. This, in turn, authorizes the conflation of racialization with mere biological life, which, on the one hand, enables white subjects to “see” themselves as transcending racialization due to their full embodiment of this particular genre of the human while responding anti-pathetically to nonwhite subjects as bearers of ontological cum biological lack, and, on the other hand, in those subjects on the other side of the color line, it creates sociogenically instituted physiological reactions against their own existence and reality.40 Since the being of nonwhite subjects has been coded by the cultural laws in the world of Man as pure negativity, their subjectivity impresses punishment on the neurochemical reward system of all humans, or in the words of Frantz Fanon: “My body was returned to me spread-eagled, disjointed, redone, draped in mourning on this white winter's day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is wicked, the Negro is ugly.” **Political violence plays a crucial part in the baroque techniques of modern humanity, since it simultaneously serves to create not-quite-humans in specific acts of violence and supplies the symbolic source material for racialization**. For Wynter, the promise of black studies—and the numerous other ruptures precipitated by the 1960s—lies in its liminality, which contains potential exit strategies from the world of Man. **However, we must first devise new objects of knowledge that facilitate “the calling in question of our present culture's purely biological definition of what it is to be, and therefore of what it is like to be, human.”** We must do so because we cannot fully understand the present incarnation of the human from within the “biocentric and bourgeois” epistemic order that authorizes the biological selectedness of Man and, conversely, the creation of “dysgenic humans” (those who are evolutionarily dysselected), “a category comprised in the US of blacks, Latinos, Indians as well as the transracial group of the poor, the jobless, the homeless, the incarcerated,” the disabled, and the transgendered.43 Within our current episteme, these groups are constituted as aberrations from the ethnoclass of Man by being subjected to racializing assemblages that establish “natural” differences between the selected and dysselected. In other words, black, Latino, poor, incarcerated, indigenous, and so forth populations become real objects via the conduit of evolutionarily justified discourses and institutions, which, as a consequence, authorizes Man to view himself as naturally ordained to inhabit the space of full humanity. **Thus, even though racializing assemblages commonly rely on phenotypical differences, their primary function is to create and maintain distinctions between different members of the Homo sapiens species that lend a suprahuman explanatory ground (religious or biological, for example) to these hierarchies**. As Wynter explains, “all our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over the environment, global warming, severe climate change, the sharply unequal distribution of the earth resources...—these are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle.”44 Wynter's oeuvre facilitates the analysis of the relay between different forms of subjugation, because in it the human operates as a relational ontological totality. Therefore, the Man versus Human battle does not dialectically sublate the specificity of the other struggles but articulates them in this open totality so as to abolish Man and liberate all of humanity rather than specific groups.

# Case