# Extra-T (STRIKES)

## A. Interpretation

#### [Gourevitch] The aff must defend only recognition of an unconditional right of workers to strike.

**Gourevitch:** Gourevitch, Alex. [Assistant professor of Political Science, Brown University] “Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike.” Cambridge University Press, June 13, 2016. MB/CH

The right to strike is peculiar. It is not a right to quit. The right to quit is part of freedom of contract and the mirror of employment-at-will. Workers may quit when they no longer wish to work for an employer; employers may fire their employees when they no longer want to employ them. Either of those acts severs the contractual relation- ship and the two parties are no longer assumed to be in any relationship at all. The right to strike, however, assumes the continuity of the very relationship that is suspended. Workers on strike refuse to work but do not claim to have left the job. After all, the whole point of a strike is that it is a collective work stoppage, not a collective quitting of the job. This is the feature of the strike that has marked it out from other forms of social action. If a right to strike is not a right to quit, what is it? It is the right that workers claim to refuse to perform work they have agreed to do while retaining a right to the job. Most of what is peculiar, not to mention fraught, about a strike is contained in that latter clause. Yet, surprisingly, few commentators recognize just how central and yet peculiar this claim is.Opponents of the right to strike are sometimes more alive to its distinctive features than defenders. One critic, for instance, makes the distinction between quitting and striking the basis of his entire argument: the unqualified right to withdraw labour, which is a clear right of free men, does not describe the behaviour of strikers.... Strikers . . . withdraw from the performance of their jobs, but in the only relevant sense they do not withdraw their labour.

## B. Violation

#### [Violation] They defend that “a just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike as a ghostly revolutionary tatic” – that’s WAY MORE than the topic, since it involves a method totally separate from implementing the right to strike.

## **C. Net Benefits**

#### 1. Limits – extra-T means they can read affs that do the resolution and an INFINITE NUMBER of other things. They can enforce a right to strike AND end police violence, or affirm AND change other laws. Limits key to accessibility – without them, I can’t meaningfully contest the aff because I have no idea what it could be, so I’m shut out of the round. And disclosure doesn't solve – your telling me the aff is about Harry Potter doesn’t make it topical.

#### 2. Clash – we can’t critically contest the plan if you read an aff that goes beyond the topic, since you can just opt out of my disads or case turns by saying the extra parts of the aff outweigh them or take them out. Also skews my prep if I don’t know what other parts of the aff you’ll throw in besides the topic – that means I can’t effectively clash with you. Clash key to accessibility – without it, debate because dueling oratory instead of actual advocacy comparison, and one side can’t access the space.

## D. Voter

Accessibility – that’s a prior question to fairness or education because it’s a question of whether people join and feel comfortable in debate in the first place.

#### [DTD] DROP THE DEBATER: they've already skewed the round – dropping the arg means kicking the aff – destroys debate with nothing to advocate for or against.

#### [No RVIs] NO RVIs:

**1.** CHILLING EFFECT: RVIs encourage debaters to be abusive and win on T, which destroys the purpose of it to check abuse.

**2.** RVIs make no sense on T. Just as you wouldn't win for reading a 6-minute aff, it's expected that you're T, so you can't win on it.

#### [Competing Interps] USE COMPETING INTERPS: T is a binary – you can't be “reasonably” T. Competing interps makes them justify the aff – drop them if they can't.

# Edited Evidence DA

## A. Links

#### [1] In Papastephanou ’11, they bracketed the words, “authoritarian regimes” and “created realities” in the highlighted text – they didn’t announce that the brackets were in the original text, and there’s no indication of what the original language was.

#### [2] In Heron ’8, they edited “neither women nor men” to “neither people” – they said they edited the card “for gendered language.”

## B. Impacts

#### 1. AUTHOR INTENT: bracketing cards makes it impossible for us to know the author’s intentions if we can’t see the original text, and editing cards *changes* their intent – e.g., editing out the author’s use of gendered terms presents their argument as gender-neutral when it isn’t.

#### 2. NO BRIGHTLINE: if it’s okay to edit cards for gendered language, there’s no reason to stop there – you could edit cards for offensive arguments or rhetoric – you should find better authors instead of using problematic ones.

#### [VOTER] VOTE NEG ON EVIDENCE ETHICS – changing the language in a card is a reason to drop the debater, since it means we can’t properly evaluate their authors or their claims – creates bad norms in debate, since debaters could keep doing this whenever they want to defend authors with bad views or harmful language.

# Curry K

## Framework

#### [ROJ] I reject the illusions of false hope, so I negate. The Role of the Judge is to Promote Critical Education, which means they must enhance our potential to uncover biases and oppression in dominant thinking.

#### [Giroux] As educators, judges can uniquely make debate a space for challenging oppressive norms.

Giroux: Giroux, Henry. [Waterbury Chair Professor, Pennsylvania State University] “Critical Pedagogy and the Postmodern/Modern Divide: Towards a Pedagogy of Democratization.” *Teacher Education Quarterly*, Winter 2004. CH

The search for a new politics and a new critical language that crosses the critical theory/postmodern divide must reinvigorate the relationship between democracy, ethics, and political agency by expanding both the meaning of the pedagogical as a political practice while at the same time making the political more pedagogical. In the first instance, it is crucial to recognize that Pedagogy has less to do with the language of technique and methodology than it does with issues of politics and power. Pedagogy is amoral and political practice that is always implicated in power relations and must be understood as a cultural politics that offers both a particular version and vision of civic life, the future, and how we might construct representations of ourselves, others, and our physical and social environment. As Roger Simon (1987) observes: As an introduction to, preparation for, and legitimation of particular forms of social life, education always presupposes a vision of the future. In this respect a curriculum and its supporting pedagogy are a version of our own dreams for ourselves, our children, and out communities. But such dreams are never neutral; they are always someone’s dreams and to the degree that they are implicated in organizing the future for others they always have a moral and political dimension. It is in this respect that Any discussion of pedagogy must begin with a discussion of educational practice as a form of cultural politics, as a particular way in which a sense of identity, place, worth, and above all value is informed by practices which organize knowledge and meaning. (p. 372) An oppositional cultural politics can take many forms, but Given the current assault by neoliberalism on all aspects of democratic public life, it seems imperative that educators must revitalise the struggles to create conditions that link in which learning would be linked to social change in a wide various of social sites, and pedagogy to would take on the task of regenerating both a renewed sense of social and political agency and a critical subversion of dominant power itself. Under such circumstances, agency becomes the site through which power is not transcended but reworked, replayed, and restaged in productive ways. Central to my argument is the assumption that politics is not only about power, but it also, as Cornelius Castoriadis (1996) points out, “has to do with political judgements and value choices” (p.8), indicating that questions of civic education and critical pedagogy (learning how to become a skilled citizen) are central to the struggle over political agency and democracy. In this instance, Critical pedagogy emphasizes critical reflexivity, bridging the gap between learning and everyday life, understanding the connection between power and knowledge, and extending democratic rights and identities by using the resources of history. However, among many educators and social theorists, there is a widespread refusal to recognize that this form of education is not only the foundation for expanding and enabling political agency, but it also takes place across a wide variety of public spheres mediated through the very force of culture itself. One of the central tasks of any viable critical pedagogy would be to make visible alternative models of radical democratic relations in a wide variety of sites. These spaces can make the pedagogical more political by raising fundamental questions such as: What is the relationship between social justice and the distribution of public resources and goods? What are the conditions, knowledge and skills that are a prerequisite for political agency and social change? At the very least, such a project involves understanding and critically engaging dominant public transcripts and values within a broader set of historical and institutional contexts. Making the political more pedagogical in this instance This suggests producing modes of knowledge and social practices that not only affirms oppositional cultural work, but and offers opportunities to mobilize instances of collective outrage, if not collective action. Such mobilisation opposes glaring material inequities and the growing cynical belief that today’s culture of investment and finance makes it impossible to address many of the major social problems facing both the U.S. and the larger world. Most importantly, such work points to the link between civic education, critical pedagogy, and modes of oppositional political agency that are pivotal to elucidating a politics that promotes autonomy and social change. At the very least, critical pedagogy proposes that education is a form of political intervention in the world that is capable of creating the possibilities for social transformation. Rather than viewing teaching as technical practice, radical pedagogy in the broadest terms is a moral and political: practice premised on the assumption that learning is not about processing received knowledge but actually transforming it as part of a more expansive struggle for individual rights and social justice. This implies that Any viable notion of pedagogy and resistance should illustrate how knowledge, values, desire, and social relations are always implicated in relations of power. and how such an understanding can be used pedagogically and politically by students to further expand and deepen the imperatives of economic and political democracy. The fundamental challenge facing educators within the current age of neoliberalism is to provide the conditions for students to address how knowledge is related to the power of both self-definition and social agency. Central to such a challenge is providing students with the skills, knowledge, and authority they need to inquire and act upon what it means to live in a substantive democracy, to recognize anti-democratic forms of power, and to fight deeply rooted injustices in a society and world founded on systemic economic, racial, and gendered inequalities.

#### [ROB & Giroux 2] The Role of the Ballot is to Endorse the Position that Fosters Solutions to Social Oppression. Fostering solutions to social oppression means identifying and trying to redress inequality, rather than theorizing without realizing.

Giroux 2: Giroux, Henry. [Waterbury Chair Professor, Pennsylvania State University] “Critical Pedagogy and the Postmodern/Modern Divide: Towards a Pedagogy of Democratization.” *Teacher Education Quarterly*, Winter 2004. CH

Critical pedagogy locates discursive practices in a broader set of interrelations, but it also analyzes and gives meaning to such relations by defining them within particular contexts constructed through the operations of power as articulated through the interaction among texts, teachers, and students. Questions of articulation and context need to be fore grounded as both a matter of ethics and politics. Ethically, critical pedagogy requires an ongoing indictment “of those forms of truth-seeking which imagined themselves to be eternally and placelessly valid” (Gilroy, 2000, p.69). Simply put, Educators need to must cast a critical eye on those forms of knowledge and social relations that define themselves through a conceptual purity and political innocence that cloud not only how they come into being but also ignore that their alleged neutrality on which they stand is already grounded in ethico-political choices. Thomas Keenan (1997) rightly argues that Ethics on the pedagogical front demands an openness to the other, a willingness to engage a ‘politics of possibility’ through a continual critical engagement. with texts, images, events, and other registers of meaning as they are transformed into public pedagogies (p. 2). One consequence of linking pedagogy to the specificity of place is that it foregrounds the need for educators to rethink the cultural and political baggage they bring to each educational encounter; it also highlights the necessity of making educators ethically and politically accountable for the stories they produce, the claims they make upon public memory, and the images of the future they deem legitimate. Pedagogy is never innocent and if it is to be understood and problematized as a form of academic labor, Educators must not only critically question and register their own subjective involvement in how and what they teach, they must also resist all calls to depoliticize pedagogy through appeals to either scientific objectivity or ideological dogmatism. Far from being disinterested or ideologically frozen, Critical pedagogy is concerned about the articulation of knowledge to social effects and succeeds to the degree in which when educators encourage critical reflection and moral and civic agency rather than simply mold it. Crucial to this position is the necessity for critical educators to be attentive to the ethical dimensions of their own practice.

**Running a standard like “util” or “maximizing expected well-being” links them *directly into the K.*** Assuming that people have identical interests, or that there’s some value-neutral “well-being” we all share, is exactly the problem.

## A. Links

#### 1. The aff upholds the idea of an abstract “just government” – the resolution’s wording appeals to this notion explicitly.

#### 2. They affirm an “ought” statement – i.e., “A just government *ought* to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike” – that’s a form of hyper-idealization.

3. They abstract away from the material realities of violence against racialized bodies, because the assume the aff can lead to some type of revolutionary movement. “The future once it arrives will produce intelegibility“ they assume justice will come with revolution. Cruel optimism.

## B. Impacts

#### [Curry 1] First, the very notion of “just governments” appeals to a White-centered ethic that itself oppresses black people.

Curry 1: Curry, Dr. Tommy J. [Ph.D., Associate Professor of Philosophy, Texas A & M University] “In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical.” Academia.Edu [Working Draft, Cited with Permission from the Author], 2014. CH

Traditionally we have taken ethics to be, as Henry Sidgwick’s claims, "any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings 'ought'—or what is right for them—or to seek to realize by voluntary action.”vii This rational procedure is however at odds with the empirical reality the ethical deliberation must concern itself with. To argue, as is often done, that the government, its citizens, or white people should act justly, assumes that the possibility of how they could act defines their moral disposition. If a white person could possibly not be racist, it does not mean that the possibility of not being racist, can be taken to mean that they are not racist. In ethical deliberations dealing with the problem of racism, it is common practice to attribute to historically racist institutions, and individuals universal moral qualities that have yet to be demonstrated. This abstraction from reality is what frames our ethical norms and allows us to maintain, despite history or evidence, that racist entities will act justly given the choice. Under such complexities, The only ethical deliberation concerning racism must be anti-ethical, or a judgment refusing to write morality onto immoral entities. In the post-structuralist era, post-colonial thinking about racism specifically, and difference/otherness generally, has given a peculiar ameliorative function to discourse and the performance of “other-ed” identities. In this era, the dominant illusion is that discourse itself, an act that requires as its basis the recognition of the “other” as “similar,” is socially transformative—not only with regard to how the white subject assimilates the similitude of the “other-ed,” but as an actual activity gauged by the recognition by one white person or by a group of white people in any given scenario, is uncritically accepted and encouraged as anti-racist politics.. In actuality such Discourse appeals, which necessitate—become dependent on—(white) recognition, function very much like the racial stereotype, in that the concept of the Black body being the expression and source of experience and phenomena (existential-phenomenological-theorization) is incarcerated by the conceptualization created the discursive catalyst yearning to be perceived by the white thing seeing the Black. Such appeals lend potentiality-hope-faith to the already present/demonstrated ignorance-racism-interest of the white individual., who in large part expresses the historical tone/epistemology of their racial group’s interest. When morality is defined, not by the empirical acts that demonstrate immorality, but the racial character of those in question, our ethics become nothing more than the apologetics of our tyrannical epoch.

Thus, they ***can’t*** redefine the notion of “just governments” even if they try to reconceptualize the living wage: Black people must still appeal to white people for such claims to be recognized.

#### [Curry 2] Second, affirming an “ought” statement with respect to Blackness naïvely places faith in a future that will never come, entrenching oppression.

Curry 2: Curry, Dr. Tommy J. [Ph.D., Associate Professor of Philosophy, Texas A & M University] “In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical.” Academia.Edu [Working Draft, Cited with Permission from the Author], 2014. CH

Ought implies a projected (futural) act. The word commands a deliberate action to reasonably expect the world to be able to sustain or support. For the Black thinker, the Black citizen-subject-slave-(in)human, ought is not rational but repressive,. For the oppressed racialized thinker, the ethical provocation is an immediate confrontation with the impossibility of actually acting towards values like freedom, liberty, humanity, and life, since none of these values can be achieved concretely for the Black in a world controlled by and framed by the white. The options for ethical actions are not ethical in and of themselves, but merely the options the immorality of the racist world will allow, thus the oppressed is forced to idealize their ethical positions, eliminating the truth of their reality, and the peeling away the tyranny of white bodies, so that as the oppressed, they can ideally imagine an ‘if condition,’ whereby they are allowed to ethical engage racism from the perspective of: ‘if whites were moral and respected the humanity of Blacks, then we can ethically engage in these behaviors.’ Unfortunately, this ought constraint only forces Blacks to consciously recognize the futility of ethical engagement, since it is in this ought deliberation that they recognize that their cognition of all values are dependent not on their moral aspirations for the world, but the determined by the will of white supremacy to maintain virtue throughout all ethical calculations. In short, Black ethical deliberation is censored so that it can only engage moral questions by asserting that whites are virtuous and4 hence capable of being ethically persuaded towards right action., hence all ethical question about racism, white supremacy and anti-Blackness is not about how Blacks think about the world, but what possibility the world allows Blacks to contemplate under the idea of ethics.

## Thus, C. Alternative:

#### [Robinson] Reject the aff’s notion of “just governments” and replace it with Black Marxism, a negation of the negation of a world of racial capitalism. This means we call out the aff’s *framing* of just governments as fundamentally racist – it’s not a question of policy, but of orientation. To clarify, we interrogate the anti-Black underpinnings of neoliberal institutions like governments as a prerequisite to any policy action.

Robinson, minimized brackets in original text: Robinson, Cedric. [Professor in the Department of Black Studies and the Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara] Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. University of North Carolina Press, 2000 (originally published in 1983). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5149/9781469663746_robinson> GC

With each historical moment, however, the rationale and cultural mechanisms of domination became more transparent. Race **was its epistemology, its ordering principle, its organizing structure, its moral authority, its economy of justice, commerce, and power.** Aristotle, one of the most original aristocratic apologists, had provided the template in Natural Law. In inferiorizing women ("[TIhe deliberative faculty of the soul is not present at all in the slave; in a female it is present but ineffective" [Politics,i26oaiz]), non-Greeks, and all laborers (slaves, artisans, farmers, wage workers, etc.: "[Tlhe mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts" [Nicomachean Ethics, 1095b20]), Aristotle had articulated an uncompromising racial construct. And from the twelfth century on, one European ruling order after another, one cohort of clerical or secular propagandists following another, reiterated and embellished this racial calculus.14As **the Black Radical Tradition was distilled from the racial antagonisms which were arrayed along a continuum from the casual insult to** the most ruthless and **lethal rules of law**; from the objectifications of entries in marine cargo manifests, auction accountancy, plantation records, broadsheets and newspapers; from the loftiness of Christian pulpits and biblical exegesis to the minutia of slave-naming, dress, types of food, and a legion of other significations, the terrible culture of race was revealed. Inevitably, the tradition was transformed into a radical force**.** And in its most militant manifestation, no longer accustomed to the resolution that flight and withdrawal were sufficient, the purpose of the struggles informed by the tradition became the overthrow of the whole race-based structure. **In the studies of these struggles, and often through engagement with them, the Black Radical Tradition began to emerge and overtake Marxism** in the work of these Black radicals. W. E. B. **Du Bois,** in the midst of the antilynching movement, C. L. R. **James, in the vortex of anticolonialism, and Richard Wright**, the sharecropper**'s** son, all brought forth aspects of the militant tradition which had informed successive generations of Black freedom fighters. These **predecessors were Africans** by origins, predominantly **recruited from** the same cultural matrices, subjected to similar and **interrelated systems of servitude and oppression, and mobilized by identical impulses to recover their dignity.** And over the centuries, the **liberation projects** of these men and women **in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Americas acquired similar emergent collective forms in rebellion** and marronage, similar ethical and moral articulations of resistance; increasingly, **they merged as a function of what Hegel might have recognized as** the negation of the negation **in the world system. Hegel's "cunning of history," for one instance, was evident when in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Franco-Haitian slaveowners fled to Louisiana, Virginia, and the Carolinas with as many slaves as they could transport, thereby also transporting the Haitian Revolution.** The outrage, courage, and vision of that revolution helped inspire the Pointe Coupee Conspiracy in 1795 in Louisiana, the Gabriel-led rebellion in 1800 in Virginia, and the rebellion organized by Denmark Vesey in 1822 outside of Charle~ton.'And, in turn, Denmark's movement informed the revolutionary tract, *APPEAL in Four Articles; Together with a Preamble, to the Coloured Citizens of the World, But in Particular, and Very Expressly, to Those of the United States of America,* penned by David Walker in Boston in 1829.

**AND NO PERMS –** they already committed to an orientation that lets governments try to solve racism under the guise of “justice” – their reliance on neoliberal models is FUNDAMENTALLY INCOMPATIBLE with the alt.

### OFF CASE

#### [NLRB] As an overview: none of their evidence defends an *unconditional* right to strike – when they mention strikes at all, it’s about the right to strike in general – that ALREADY EXISTS IN THE SQUO, so presume neg.

National Labor Relations Board, ellipses in original text: National Labor Relations Board [The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is comprised of a team of professionals who work to assure fair labor practices and workplace democracy nationwide]. “The Right to Strike.” <https://www.nlrb.gov/strikes> CH

The Right to Strike Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act states in part, “Employees shall have the right. . . to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Strikes are included among the concerted activities protected for employees by this section. Section 13 also concerns the right to strike. It reads as follows: Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right. It is clear from a reading of these two provisions that: the law not only guarantees the right of employees to strike, but also places limitations and qualifications on the exercise of that right. See for example, restrictions on strikes in health care institutions (set forth below). Lawful and unlawful strikes. The lawfulness of a strike may depend on the object, or purpose, of the strike, on its timing, or on the conduct of the strikers. The object, or objects, of a strike and whether the objects are lawful are matters that are not always easy to determine. Such issues often have to be decided by the National Labor Relations Board. The consequences can be severe to striking employees and struck employers, involving as they do questions of reinstatement and backpay. It must be emphasized that the following is only a brief outline. A detailed analysis of the law concerning strikes, and application of the law to all the factual situations that can arise in connection with strikes, is beyond the scope of this material. Employees and employers who anticipate being involved in strike action should proceed cautiously and on the basis of competent advice. Strikes for a lawful object.Employees who strike for a lawful object fall into two classes “economic strikers” and “unfair labor practice strikers.” Both classes continue as employees, but unfair labor practice strikers have greater rights of reinstatement to their jobs

#### Abandoning policy discussion for epistemological questioning freezes action and causes violence

**Jarvis writes:**  Jarvis 2000 (Director of the Research Institute for International Risk and Lecturer in International Relations, The University of Sydney) 2000 “International relations and the challenge of postmodernism” p. 128-9

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil.  That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorist have to the real world.  Certainly **it is right and proper that we** ponder what we ponder the depth of our theoretical imagination, **engage in** **epistemological and ontological debate**, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge.  But **to suppose that this is the only talk** on international theory, let alone the most important one, **smacks of intellectual elitism** and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggle as actors in international politics.  **What does** Ashley’s **[the] project**, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against **positivism say to the truly marginalized**, oppressed, and destitute?  **How does it help solve the plight of the poor**, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emrigres of death squads?  Does it in any way speak to those actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations?  On all these questions one must answer no.  That is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues.  But to suppose that problem solving technical theory is not necessary – or is in some way bad – is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily.  As Holsti argues, **we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, “So What?”**  To what purpose do they construct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches?  Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition?  **In what sense can this “debate towards  bottomless pit** of epistemology and **metaphysics**” **be judged pertinent**, relevant, helpful, or cogent **to anyone other than those** foolish enough to be scholastically **excited by abstract** and recondite **debate**?

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