# **You Can Do More K (EF K)**

## Framework

#### [ROJ & Giroux] CORPORATIONS ARE TAKING OVER EDUCATION – we desperately need critical pedagogy to resist that.

**Giroux:** Giroux, Henry A. [Waterbury Chair Professor, Pennsylvania State University] “Radical Politics in the Age of American Authoritarianism: Connecting the Dots.” *Truthout*,April 2016. https://truthout.org/articles/radical-politics-in-the-age-of-american-authoritarianism-connecting-the-dots/ CH

At the root of this notion of developing a comprehensive view of politics is the need for educating ourselves by developing a critical formative culture along with corresponding institutions that promote a form of permanent criticism against all elements of oppression and unaccountable power.**One important task of emancipation is to fight the dominant culture industry by developing alternative public spheres and education**al institutions **capable of nourishing critical thought and** action. The time has come for educators, artists, workers, young people and others to push forward **a** new **form of politics** in which public values, trust and compassion trump neoliberalism's celebration of self- interest, the ruthless accumulation of capital, the survival-of-the-fittest ethos and the financialization and market-driven corruption of the political system. Political responsibility is more than a challenge -- it is the projection of a possibility in which new modes of identification and agents must be enabled that can sustain new political organizations and transnational anti-capitalist movements. Democracy must be written back into the script of everyday life, and doing so demands overcoming the current crisis of memory, agency and politics by collectively struggling for a new form of politics in which matters of justice, equity and inclusion define what is possible. Such struggles demand an increasingly broad-based commitment to a new kind of activism. As Robin D. G. Kelley has recently noted there is a need for more pedagogical, cultural and social spaces that allow us to think and act together, to take risks and **to get to the roots of the conditions that are submerging the United States into a new form of authoritarianism wrapped in the flag, the dollar sign and the cross.** Kelley is right in calling for a politics that places justice at its core, one that takes seriously what it means to be an individual and social agent while engaging in collective struggles. We don't need tepid calls for repairing the system; instead, we need to invent a new system from the ashes of one that is terminally broken. We don't need calls for moral uplift or personal responsibility. We need calls for economic, political, gender and racial justice. Such a politics must be rooted in particular demands, be open to direct action and take seriously strategies designed to both educate a wider public and mobilize them to seize power. The left needs a new political conversation that encompasses memories of freedom and resistance. Such a dialogue would build on the militancy of the labor strikes of the 1930s, the civil rights movements of the 1950s and the struggle for participatory democracy by the New Left in the 1960s. At the same time, there is a need to reclaim the radical imagination and to infuse it with a spirited battle for an independent politics that regards a radical democracy as part of a never-ending struggle. **None of this can happen unless progressives understand education as a political and moral practice crucial to creating new forms of agency, mobilizing a desire for change and providing a language** that underwrites the capacity to think, speak and act so as to challenge the sexist, racist, economic and political grammars of suffering produced by the new authoritarianism. The left needs a language of critique that enables people to ask questions that appear unspeakable within the existing vocabularies of oppression. We also need a language of hope that is firmly aware of the ideological and structural obstacles that are undermining democracy. We need a language that reframes our activist politics as a creative act that responds to the promises and possibilities of a radical democracy. Movements require time to mature and come into fruition. They necessitate educated agents able to connect structural conditions of oppression to the oppressive cultural apparatuses that legitimate, persuade, and shape individual and collective attitudes in the service of oppressive ideas and values. Under such conditions, radical ideas can be connected to action once diverse groups recognize the need to take control of the political, economic and cultural conditions that shape their worldviews, exploit their labor, control their communities, appropriate their resources, and undermine their dignity and lives. Raising consciousness alone will not change authoritarian societies, but it does provide the foundation for making oppression visible and for developing from below what Étienne Balibar calls "practices of resistance and solidarity." We need not only a radical critique of capitalism, racism and other forms of oppression, but also a critical formative culture and cultural politics that inspire, energize and provide elements of a transformative radical education in the service of a broad-based democratic liberation movement.

Thus, **the Role of the Judge is to Promote Critical Thinking**, which means helping students develop the skills to question the squo.

#### [ROB & Kellner] AND that requires rejecting the one-dimensional thought that underlies capitalistic culture.

**Kellner:** Kellner, Douglas. [George Kneller Chair in the Philosophy of Education in the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles]. “One-Dimensional Man: Introduction to the Second Edition.” Beacon Press,1964. https://tinyurl.com/2tpwevjk EM/CH

Thus, I would propose interpreting “one-dimensional” as conforming to existing thought and behavior and lacking a critical dimension and a dimension of potentialities that transcend the existing society. In Marcuse's usage the adjective **“one-dimensional” describes practices that conform to pre-existing structures, norms, and behavior, in contrast to multidimensional discourse, which focuses on possibilities that transcend the established state of** affairs. This epistemological distinction presupposes antagonism between subject and object so that the subject is free to perceive possibilities in the world that do not yet exist but which can be realized. In the one**-dimensional society, the subject is assimilated into the object and follows the dictates of external, objective norms and structures, thus losing the ability to discover more liberating possibilities and to engage in transformative practice to realize them.** Marcuse's theory presupposes the existence of a human subject with freedom, creativity, and self-determination who stands in opposition to an object-world, perceived as substance, which contains possibilities to be realized and secondary qualities like values, aesthetic traits, and aspirations, which can be cultivated to enhance human life.

He adds:

In his early works, Marcuse himself attempted to synthesize Heidegger's phenomenological existentialism with Marxism, and in One-Dimensional Man one recognizes Husserl and Heideggerian motifs in Marcuse's critiques of scientific civilization and modes of thought. In particular, Marcuse develops a conception of a technological world, similar in some respects to that developed by Heidegger, and, like Husserl and Heidegger, sees technological rationality colonizing everyday life, robbing individuals of freedom and individuality by imposing techno- logical imperatives, rules, and structures upon their thought and behavior. Marcuse thought that **dialectical philosophy could promote critical thinking.** One-Dimensional Man is perhaps Marcuse's most sustained attempt to present and develop the categories of the dialectical philosophy developed by Hegel and Marx. For Marcuse, **dialectical thinking involved the ability to abstract one's perception and thought from existing forms in order to form more general concepts.** This conception helps explain the difficulty of One-Dimensional Man and the demands that it imposes upon its reader. For Marcuse abstracts from the complexity and multiplicity of the existing society its fundamental tendencies and constituents, as well as those categories which constitute for him the forms of critical thinking. **This demands that the reader also abstract from existing ways of looking at society and modes of thinking and attempt to perceive and think in a new way. Uncritical thinking derives its beliefs, norms, and values from existing thought and social practices, while critical thought seeks alternative modes of thought and behavior from which it creates a standpoint of critique. Such a critical standpoint requires developing what Marcuse calls “negative thinking,” which “negates” existing forms of thought and reality from the perspective of higher possibilities.** This practice presupposes the ability to make a distinction between existence and essence, fact and potentiality, and appearance and reality. Mere existence would be negated in favor of realizing higher potentialities while norms discovered by reason would be used to criticize and overcome lower forms of thought and social organization. Thus grasping potentialities for freedom and happiness would make possible the negation of conditions that inhibited individuals' full development and realization. In other words, perceiving the possibility of self-determination and constructing one's own needs and values could enable individuals to break with the existing world of thought and behavior. Philosophy was thus to supply the norms for social criticism and the ideal of liberation which would guide social change and individual self- transformation.

Thus, **the Role of the Ballot is to Endorse the Rejection of One-Dimensional Thought.** This means distancing ourselves from essentializing modes of thinking – e.g., the notion that value can only come from money. We measure the standard based on whether we remain open to multiple ways of knowing or approaching problems; the more restrictive the approach, the less we adhere to the framework.

## A. Links

#### 1] The framework says “only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness” – any time they say things like “only util” is a form of disimagination. They don’t allow for any possibilities beyond the framework they justify.

#### 2] They say hegemony solves nuclear war and heg is sustainable – they are propping up a world that cannot be changed.

#### 3] They represent China in ONE WAY – they use securitization logic for the whole nation, and only allow us to see China through violence.

## B. Impacts

#### [Morris] DISIMAGINATION – the aff assumes private companies can only use outer space in ONE WAY, but private non-profits are working to benefit the public, like people with disabilities.

**Morris:** Morris, Amanda. [Amanda Morris is a 2021-2022 disability reporting fellow for the National desk] “A Future for People With Disabilities in Outer Space Takes Flight” *New York Times,* 2021. JP

**Eric Ingram typically moves through the world on his wheelchair**. The 31-year-old chief executive of SCOUT Inc., a smart satellite components company, was born with Freeman-Sheldon Syndrome, a rare condition that affects his joints and blocked him from his dream of becoming an astronaut. He applied and was rejected, twice. But onboard a special airplane flight this week, he spun effortlessly through the air, touching nothing. **Moving around, he found, was easier in the simulated zero-gravity environment where he needed so few tools to help**. While simulating lunar gravity on the flight — which is about one-sixth of Earth’s — he discovered something even more surprising: for the first time in his life, he could stand up. “It was legitimately weird,” he said. “Just the act of standing was probably almost as alien to me as floating in zero gravity.” He was one of 12 disabled passengers who swam through the air aboard a parabolic flight in Southern California last Sunday in an experiment testing how people with disabilities fare in a zero-gravity environment. Parabolic flights, which fly within Earth’s atmosphere in alternating upward and downward arcs, allow passengers to experience zero gravity for repeated short bursts, and are a regular part of training for astronauts. **The flight was organized by AstroAccess, a nonprofit initiative that aims to make spaceflight accessible to** to all. Although about 600 people have been to space since the beginning of human spaceflight in the 1960s, NASA and other space agencies have long restricted the job of astronaut to a minuscule slice of humanity. The American agency initially only selected white, physically fit men to be astronauts and even when the agency broadened its criteria, it still only chose people that met certain physical requirements. This blocked the path to space for many with disabilities, overlooking arguments that disabled people could make excellent astronauts in some cases. But the **rise of private spaceflight, funded by billionaires with the support of government space agencies, is creating the possibility of allowing a much wider and more diverse pool of people to make trips to the edge of space and beyond.** And those with disabilities are aiming to be included. The participants in Sunday’s AstroAccess flight argue that accessibility issues must be considered now — at the advent of private space travel — rather than later, because retrofitting equipment to be accessible would take more time and money. The Federal Aviation Administration is prohibited from creating safety regulations for private spaceflights until October 2023. Initiatives like AstroAccess are aiming to guide the way that government agencies think about accessibility on spaceflights. “It’s crucial that we’re able to get out ahead of that regulatory process and prevent misinformation or lack of information or lack of data from making bad regulation that would prevent someone with disability flying on one of these trips,” Mr. Ingram said. **The group also hopes that making everything accessible from the get-go could lead to new space innovations that are helpful for everyone, regardless of disability.**

#### [Arendt] ASSUMING PRIVATE ENTITIES CAN ONLY BE BIG CORPORATIONS IS THE ESSENCE OF ONE-DIMENSIONAL THOUGHT – the notion that they can only be used one way utilitarianizes the world and equates “private” with “for-profit.” This makes it impossible to find meaning in *anything*: if everything’s a means, nothing can be an end.

Arendt: Arendt, Hannah. [Political philosopher] *The Human Condition*, 2nd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, reprinted 1998. <https://monoskop.org/images/e/e2/Arendt_Hannah_The_Human_Condition_2nd_1998.pdf> CH

The implements and tools of homo faber, from which the most fundamental experience of instrumentality arises, determine all work and fabrication. Here it is indeed true that the end justifies the means; it does more, it produces and organizes them. The end justifies the violence done to nature to win the material, as the wood justifies killing the tree and the table justifies destroying the wood. Because of the end product, tools are designed and implements invented, and the same end product organizes the work process itself, decides about the needed specialists, the measure of co-operation, the number of assistants, etc. During the work process, everything is judged in terms of suitability and usefulness for the desired end, and for nothing else. The same standards of means and end apply to the product itself. Though it is an end with respect to the means by which it was produced and is the end of the fabrication process, it never becomes, so to speak, an end in itself, at least not as long as it remains an object for use. The chair which is the end of carpentering can show its usefulness only by again becoming a means, either as a thing whose durability permits its use as a means for comfortable living or as a means of exchange. The trouble with the utility standard inherent in the very activity of fabrication is that the relationship between means and end on which it relies is very much like a chain whose every end can serve again as a means in some other context. In other words, in a strictly utilitarian world, all ends are bound to be of short duration and to be transformed into means for some further ends.19 This perplexity, inherent in all consistent utilitarianism, the philosophy of homo faber par excellence, can be diagnosed theoretically as an innate incapacity to understand the distinction between utility and meaningfulness, which we express linguistically by distinguishing between "in order to" and "for the sake of." Thus the ideal of usefulness permeating a society of craftsmen-— like the ideal of comfort in a society of laborers or the ideal of acquisition ruling commercial societies—is actually no longer a matter of utility but of meaning. It is "for the sake of" usefulness in general that homo faber judges and does everything in terms of "in order to." The ideal of usefulness itself, like the ideals of other societies, can no longer be conceived as something needed in order to have something else; it simply defies questioning about its own use. Obviously there is no answer to the question which Lessing once put to the utilitarian philosophers of his time: "And what is the use of use?" The perplexity of utilitarianism is that it gets caught in the unending chain of means and ends without ever arriving at some principle which could justify the category of means and end, that is, of utility itself. The ‘in order to’ has become the content of the ‘for the sake of’; in other words, utility established as meaning generates meaninglessness. Within the category of means and end, and among the experiences of instrumentality which rules over the whole world of use objects and utility, there is no way to end the chain of means and ends and prevent all ends from eventually being used again as means, except to declare that one thing or another is "an end in itself."

## C. Alternative

#### [Jones] Thus, the alternative is to reject the aff and replace their representations with Ethnofuturism, abbreviated “EF,” a method that emphasizes critical thinking by confronting colonialist capitalism.

**Jones:** Jones, Craig Henry. [Writer at Society and Space] “Enclosing the Cosmos: Privatising Outer Space and Voices of Resistance” *Society and Space,* 2021. https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/enclosing-the-cosmos-privatising-outer-space-and-voices-of-resistance CH

These manoeuvres to privatise Outer Space rely not only on the enclosure of physical and legislative places but also seek to enclose imaginative spaces through the process(es) of disimagination. Broadly conceived, disimagination is a process that curtails our ability to think critically and imagine new futures through cultural apparatuses and public pedagogies designed to erase the multiplicity of historical realities that deviate from the hegemonic ‘norm’ (Didi-Huberman, 2008: Giroux, 2014). Whilst this concept has been used in Didi-Huberman’s discussion of the destruction of concentration camp materials and Giroux’s work on critical pedagogy and civic rights, the process of disimagination is operating within and upon discourses of Outer Space, as I discuss later in this piece. These attempts at disimagination are not going unchallenged, however, with Ethnofuturist works disrupting the oftentimes de facto futures of Outer Space and asteroid mining. Ethnofuturism critically responds to the disimagination process as it combines the Ethno- (the archaic, indigenous, or cultural histories of peoples) and -futurism (deemed the cosmopolitan, urban, and technological) (Hennoste, 2012). Consequently, Ethnofuturism can be construed as a process by and through which histories that deviate from the hegemonic ‘norm’ are reinvigorated and mobilised to (re)produce alternative discourses of futurity. Ethnofuturism here is used as an umbrella term that contains within it futurisms from a variety of groups and people. Examples of such futurisms include, but are not limited to: Afrofuturism, Aotearoa futurism, Cambrofuturism, and Sinofuturism. The following discusses enclosure, disimagination, and Ethnofuturism to problematise these futures of asteroid mining: highlighting how popular NSE discourses draw upon a Eurocentric rendition of a ‘Grand Historical Narrative’. Through this, we may begin to challenge the totalising concept of ‘humanity’ [4] oft-invoked by asteroid mining advocates and turn a more critical lens to these purported futures and the discourses (re)created to justify them.

# DA

## A. Link

The aff claims that life and avoiding extinction is the ultimate value.

## B. Impacts

#### 1. [Joshanloo & Weijers 1] First, they assume the Western prioritization of pleasure is globally true, generalizing and incorrectly representing cultures that have different values.

**Joshanloo & Weijers 1:** Joshanloo, Moshen & Weijers, Dan. [Joshanloo is a professor in the school of Psychology at the Victoria University of Wellington, and Weijers is a professor in the Philosophy Programme at the Victoria University of Wellington] “Aversion to Happiness Across Cultures: A Review of Where and Why People Are Averse to Happiness” *Victoria University of Wellington*, 2012. AZ

A common view in contemporary Western culture is that personal happiness is one of the most important values in life. **For example, in American culture it is believed that failing to appear happy is cause for concern.** These cultural notions are also echoed in contemporary Western psychology (including positive psychology and much of the research on subjective well-being). However, some important (often culturally-based) facts about happiness have tended to be overlooked in the psychological research on the topic. One of these cultural phenomena is that, for some individuals, happiness is not a supreme value. In fact, some individuals across cultures are averse to various kinds of happiness for several different reasons. This article presents the first review of the concept of aversion to happiness. Implications of the outcomes are discussed, as are directions for further research.Key words: Aversion to happiness; values, subjective well-being; happiness; Western psychology; positive psychology; fear of happiness\*School of Psychology, Mohsen.Joshanloo@vuw.ac.nz ^Philosophy Programme, Dan.Weijers@vuw.ac.nzAVERSION TO HAPPINESS 21. IntroductionIn contemporary psychological literature, scientific analysis of individuals’ well-being is focussed on subjective well-being, and is mainly undertaken in the well-established field of happiness studies. Subjective well-being is believed to consist of life satisfaction, the presence of positive affect, and the absence of negative affect (Diener et al., 1999). Ever since the Enlightenment, Westerners have responded to the ideas of liberal modernity, hedonism, and romantic individualism (Christopher & Hickinbottom, 2008) by believing in the sovereignty of individuals over their personal happiness (Haybron, 2008), and the importance of positive mood and affect balance as ingredients of a good life (Christopher, 1999; Tatarkiewicz, 1976). Indeed, Western culture and psychology seem to take for granted that happiness is one of the most important values guiding individuals’ lives, if not the most important. Western culture and psychology also seem to take for granted that happiness is best understood as a personal concept, such that an individual’s happiness is not directly constituted (but may be affected) by the success, health, or psychological well-being of others. In this paper, any unqualified use of the term ‘happiness’ refers to the Western concept of personal happiness that is characterised by satisfaction with life and a preponderance of positive over negative emotions. **Contrary to this Western view, our survey of some less-studied aspects of various cultures reveals that many individuals possess negative views about happiness, and are sometimes averse to it.** In this paper the aversion to happiness, and particularly different reasons why different cultures are averse to happiness, are analysed through a brief review of relevant theoretical and empirical literature on happiness from a variety of cultures and academic disciplines. We find that there are many claimed justifications2AVERSION TO HAPPINESS 3for being averse to happiness, and that at least some people from all cultures are likely to be averse to some kind of happiness for these reasons. We conclude that this important aspect of human culture should be given consideration in future studies on happiness, and that such consideration is likely to produce more informed results, especially in cross-cultural studies.We begin with a brief analysis of the sometimes-hidden assumption in Western culture, and the majority of Western research on subjective well-being, that all kinds of happiness are always worthy of active pursuit (Section 2). Then we provide a philosophical analysis of the concept ‘aversion to happiness’ (Section 3). Following this we report on a range of theoretical and empirical research from several cultures to provide evidence that many individuals and cultures tend to not value certain kinds of happiness highly, and may even be averse to happiness for a variety of different reasons (Section 4). We then report on a wider range of research (from psychology, philosophy, cultural studies, and religious studies) to provide evidence for a range of different reasons why people claim to be averse to happiness, including that: being happy causes bad things to happen to you, being happy makes you a worse person, expressing happiness is bad for you and others, and pursuing happiness is bad for you and others (Section 5). Finally, we summarise our findings and discuss the implications, especially for interpreting cross-cultural differences in levels of subjective well-being and designing future studies of subjective well-being across cultures (Section 6).2. **The hegemony of the quest for personal happiness in Western culture Much of the Western research on happiness shares the assumptions that happiness is something that we should want for ourselves and something that we are at least3AVERSION TO HAPPINESS 4partially responsible for attaining for ourselves (Joshanloo 2013a). In the United States, for example, it is commonly assumed that failing to appear happy is cause for concern (Eid & Diener, 2001; Held, 2002; Lyubomirsky, 2000; Menon, 2012). Indeed, “failure to achieve happiness ... can be seen as one of the greatest failures a person can experience” (Morris, 2012, p. 436), and one that he only has himself to blame for (Bruckner, 2012, p. 61). Western psychologists (and some economists) often write as though happiness is universally considered to be one of the highest human goods, if not the highest. For example, Braun (2000) writes “every human being, no matter what culture, age, educational attainment, or degree of physical and mental development, wants to be happy. It is the common end to which all humans strive...” (p. x, see also, e.g., Frey & Stutzer, 2002, p. vii; Myers, 1993; Seligman, 1998).** Indeed, it is not uncommon to read that, in this era of subjective well-being worship, people should strive for happiness in any way possible (Gruber, Mauss, & Tamir, 2011), that psychologists should provide “scientific” short-cuts for them, and that policymakers should tailor policies with an eye to maximising happiness (Zevnik, 2010). Empirical data from research on Western cultures support these notions. For example, North Americans report valuing happiness highly (Triandis et al., 1990) and thinking about it at least once a day (Freedman, 1978). **With respect to the burning desire for personal happiness in Western culture and psychology, Richardson (2012, p. 26) comments that, for Western psychologists, ideals like happiness and well-being function like “god terms” that seem to be beyond doubt or question.** Given such a state of affairs, it is not surprising that there has been a large upsurge in psychological research on subjective well-being over the last three decades. Interest in the study of subjective well-being has leaked into other branches of social4AVERSION TO HAPPINESS 5science as well. Indeed, De Vos (2012) argues that happiness has turned into the hottest topic of contemporary social science. And, while it still doesn’t attract as much scholarly attention as some more established areas of social science, social scientific research on happiness is certainly more likely to be picked up by mainstream media than social scientific research on most other topics. Especially since the rise of the “economics of happiness” (Frey, 2008), psychologists and economists have increasingly called for more attention to subjective well-being as an important basis for guiding policy-making (Diener et al., 2009; Lucas & Diener, 2008). And policymakers have listened to these calls, as shown by the recent release of the United Nations-backed World Happiness Report (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2012).How about other cultures? Does happiness work as the supreme value or, at least, a key pillar of a good life across all cultures? Acknowledging that there are cultural differences in this regard, Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, and Schkade (2005) maintain that for North Americans the high value of happiness and the importance of its pursuit are intrinsically salient, while for other parts of the world, it is not as important. However, Lyubomirsky and colleagues also claim that the value of happiness and the importance of its pursuit are becoming increasingly salient around the world. That is, with globalization and democratization, people around the world are becoming increasingly obsessed with their personal happiness—their subjective well-being. While there seems to be an element of truth in this claim, other values are still more salient than this kind of happiness for many non-Western cultures. **Many researchers argue that personal happiness is more strongly emphasized in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures, and that the idea of ‘happiness as one of the highest goals, if not the highest’ is far from universal (e.g., Ahuvia, 2001; D’Andrade, 1984; Lutz, 1987; Mesquita & Albert,5AVERSION TO HAPPINESS 62007; Snyder & Lopez, 2007; Wierzbicka, 1994).** For example, Suh (2000) argues that while Westerners feel a strong pressure to be happy (i.e., to attain and express personal happiness), East Asians tend to feel a certain pressure to belong (i.e., to bring about and experience social harmony), and thus their life is more firmly guided by the need to have good interpersonal relationships, than to be happy. When the supreme goal of a culture is social harmony, personal happiness can even be perceived as detrimental to social relationships (Uchida, Norasakkunkit, & Kitayama, 2004). However, as we argue below, the value of social harmony is not the only reason people in non-Western cultures are wary of the Western tendency to focus on personal happiness.3. Aversion to happiness: The conceptThe concept ‘aversion to happiness’ discussed in this paper constitutes a heterogeneous set of con-attitudes about different types of happiness that are based on a diverse group of relatively stable beliefs that certain personal relations with different types of happiness should be avoided for one or more reasons. Divisions within the set of beliefs underpinning aversion to happiness include: the different reasons for believing that people should be averse to happiness, the different extents to which people should be averse to happiness (e.g., happiness is something to be slightly cautious of, to be very cautious of, or to be extremely worried about), the different degrees of happiness that people should be averse to (e.g., some people are only cautious of extreme happiness), the different kinds of happiness that people are averse to (e.g., happiness as pleasure and not pain, happiness as satisfaction with life, happiness as worldly success, or all kinds of personal happiness), and the different relations that an individual can have to happiness (e.g., being happy, expressing happiness, or actively pursuing happiness).

**They add:**

(Tsai, 2007; Tsai, Miao, & Seppala, 2007). It might be argued that aversion to happiness is one of the factors setting the stage for a preference28AVERSION TO HAPPINESS 29for low-arousal, rather than high-arousal, emotions. In other words, one of the reasons for preferring emotional moderation may be that the person is averse to extreme happiness because they believe it to be hazardous.Future research should also investigate whether different reasons for aversion to happiness tend to go together and how individual components of, and the cumulative attitude of, aversion to happiness is translated into actual behaviour in different life domains. For example, are individuals with high levels of aversion to extreme happiness less willing to attend parties and other social events at which people try to attain and express extreme happiness? Considering that various sorts of music may invoke various states of mind, what sorts of music do individuals with a high levels of aversion to happiness like to listen to or avoid? Given that drinking alcohol may lead to excessive merriness, what are the drinking habits of these individuals?It would also be interesting to theoretically, and then perhaps empirically or experimentally, investigate the extent to which aversion to certain kinds of happiness is rational. As mentioned, several of the beliefs underpinning cultural aversions to happiness appear to be based on superstition, making them seem likely candidates for irrationality. On the other hand, there may turn out to be some wisdom or utility in those beliefs that have enabled them to perpetuate.In sum, much research is required to systematically study aversion to happiness and its consequences for individuals and societies. **Indeed, there are risks for happiness studies in exporting Western psychology to non-Western cultures without undertaking indigenous analyses, including making invalid cross-cultural comparisons and imposing Western cultural assumptions on other cultures (Thin 2012).**

#### 2. [Aaker et al] Second, IT’S MY WAY OR THE HIGHWAY: Either cultures conform to the importance of pleasure or their values are excluded.

**Aaker et al:** Aaker, Jennifer. [General Atlantic Professor of Marketing at Stanford University’s Graduate School of Business] “Not Everyone Wants to Be Happy” *Scientific America*, October 2014. AZ

Everyone wants to be happy. It's a fundamental human right. It's associated with all sorts of benefits. We, as a society, spend millions trying to figure out what the key to personal happiness is. There are now even apps to help us turn our frowns upside down. So everyone wants to be happy—right? Well, maybe not.A new research paper by Mohsen Joshanloo and Dan Weijers from Victoria University of Wellington, argues that the desire for personal happiness, though knitted into the fabric of American history and culture, is held in less esteem by other cultures. There are many parts of the world that are more suspicious of personal happiness, defined in the paper as experiencing pleasure, positive emotion, or success, and now empirical research is catching up with these cultural beliefs. ADVERTISEMENT The researchers focused on how eastern versus western cultures approach happiness. **In one study from 2004, Taiwanese and American students were asked their opinions about what happiness is; whereas many of the American participants considered happiness to be the highest value and supreme goal in their lives, Taiwanese participants made no such statements. Other research has found that personal accountability – a belief that happiness is everybody’s right and each persona is responsible for their own happiness – was more strongly endorsed by American than Chinese participants.** In contrast, the dialectical balance between happiness and unhappiness was more strongly endorsed by Chinese than American participants. When Chinese volunteers were shown different graphs of how happiness might change over the course of a life – in a linear vs. nonlinear trend, and asked to pick the graph they preferred. Whereas Americans were likely to choose the linear graph, Chinese respondents were more likely to choose the nonlinear graph in which their personal happiness reverts or oscillates. What explains these major cultural differences? Part of the answer lies in the fundamental values that different cultures emphasize. **In Eastern cultures, the emphasis is on attainment of social harmony, where community and belonging are held in high regard. In Western cultures, the emphasis is on attainment of happiness, where the individualistic self tends to be celebrated.**  These values translate to different weights placed on personal happiness. **In one paper, Oishi and his colleagues examined the definition of happiness in dictionaries from 30 nations, and found that internal inner feelings of pleasure defined happiness in Western cultures, more so than East Asian cultures.**  Instead, East Asians cultures define happiness more in line with social harmony, and it is associated with good luck and fortune. **Indeed, when researchers measure feelings of positive affect or pleasure, they go hand in hand with enhanced feelings of happiness by North America individuals but not by East Asian individuals.** Instead, social factors - such as adapting to social norms or fulfilling relational obligations – were associated with enhanced feelings of happiness in East Asia. Put differently, personal happiness can become aversive, particularly when it comes at cost to the social harmony or moral obligations held in high esteem by collectivistic cultures. ADVERTISEMENTShould Americans rethink their love affair with personal happiness in light of this research? We know that happiness boasts a long list of advantages, from broadening one’s thinking skills to improving physical and mental health. But prioritizing personal happiness leads to a number of problems, like focusing too much on the self. Perhaps we need a more balanced approach to happiness in American culture. Personal happiness is beneficial in some contexts, a limitation in others—good in moderation, but harmful in excess. In some moments, we may need and benefit from feeling good, but in other moments, we might be better served anchoring on balanced, meaningful life focused on others. Happiness, in this light, is not the proverbial goal to chase, but a (happy) outcome of a life well lived.

# CASE

#### [Zvobgo & Loken 2] MASKED IMPERIALISM: states use “security threats” to hide racist colonization.

Zvobgo & Loken 2: Zvobgo, Kelebogile [Founder and Director, International Justice Lab at William & Mary] and Meredith Loken [Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst]. “Why Race Matters in International Relations.” *Foreign Policy*, June 19, 2020. CH

Between 1945 and 1993, among the five major IR journals of the period—International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Review of International Studies, and World Politics—only one published an article with the word “race” in the title. Another four articles included “minorities” and 13 included “ethnicity.” Since then, mainstream IR has neglected race in theorizing, in historical explanation, and in prescription, and shuttled race (and gender) to the side as “other perspectives.” When IR scholars do engage with race, it is often in discussions of outwardly raced issues such as colonialism. Yet one cannot comprehend world politics while ignoring race and racism. Textbooks that neglect historical and modern slavery when explaining development and globalization obscure the realities of state-building and deny the harms committed in the process. Similarly, when scholarship fails to call attention to the role that race plays in Western nations’ use of international law as a pretext for military intervention, it provides cover for the modern-day equivalent of “civilizing missions.” Likewise, studies of trade and dispute settlement almost always overlook modern arbitration’s deep roots in the transatlantic slave trade. This history is often lost in analyses of wins and losses in negotiations. Race and the racism of historical statecraft are inextricable from the modern study and practice of international relations. They are also not artefacts: Race continues to shape international and domestic threat perceptions and consequent foreign policy; international responses to immigrants and refugees; and access to health and environmental stability. Because mainstream IR does not take race or racism seriously, it also does not take diversity and inclusion in the profession seriously. In the United States, which is the largest producer of IR scholarship, only 8 percent of scholars identify as black or Latino, compared to 12 percent of scholars in comparative politics and 14 percent in U.S. politics.

They add:

Constructivism, which rounds out the “big three” approaches, is perhaps best positioned to tackle race and racism. Constructivists reject the as-given condition of anarchy and maintain that anarchy, security, and other concerns are socially constructed based on shared ideas, histories, and experiences. Yet with few notable exceptions, constructivists rarely acknowledge how race shapes what is shared. Despite the dominance of the “big three” in the modern study of IR, many of the arguments they advance, such as the balance of power, are not actually supported by evidence outside of modern Europe. Consider the democratic peace theory. The theory makes two key propositions: that democracies are less likely to go to war than are nondemocracies, and that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other. The historical record shows that democracies have actually not been less likely to fight wars—if you include their colonial conquests. Meanwhile, in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa, democratizing states have experienced more internal conflicts than their less-democratic peers. Yet leaders in the West have invoked democratic peace theory to justify invading and occupying less-democratic, and notably less-white, countries. This is a key element of IR’s racial exclusion: The state system that IR seeks to explain arises from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War and established European principles of statehood and sovereignty. Far from 17th-century relics, these principles are enshrined in the United Nations Charter—the foundation for global governance since 1945. But non-European nations did not voluntarily adopt European understandings of statehood and sovereignty, as IR scholars often mythologize. Instead, Europe, justified by Westphalia, divided the world between the modern, “civilized” states and conquered those which they did not think belonged in the international system. IR scholar Sankaran Krishna has argued that, because IR privileges theorizing over historical description and analysis, the field enables this kind of whitewashing. Western concepts are prioritized at the expense of their applicability in the world. Krishna called this “a systematic politics of forgetting, a willful amnesia, on the question of race.” Importantly, IR has not always ignored race. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, foundational texts invoked race as the linchpin holding together colonial administration and war. Belief in white people’s biological and sociological supremacy offered a tidy dualism between the civilized and the savage that justified the former’s murderous exploitation of the latter. Paul Samuel Reinsch, a founder of modern IR and foreign policy, christened the 20th century as the “age of national imperialism.” He concluded that states “endeavor to increase [their] resources … through the absorption or exploitation of undeveloped regions and inferior races.” Yet, he assured readers that this was “not inconsistent with respect for … other nationalities” because states avoid exerting control over “highly civilized nations.”

**TURNS AND OUTWEIGHS THE AFF –** they *worsen* security threats to non-White states – all of 20th century history proves it.