# Curry K

## A. Links

#### 1. The aff upholds the idea of an abstract “just government” – the resolution’s wording appeals to this notion explicitly.

#### 2. They affirm an “ought” statement – i.e., “A just government *ought* to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike” – that’s a form of hyper-idealization.

## B. Impacts

#### [Curry 1] First, the very notion of “just governments” appeals to a White-centered ethic that itself oppresses black people.

Curry 1: Curry, Dr. Tommy J. [Ph.D., Associate Professor of Philosophy, Texas A & M University] “In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical.” Academia.Edu [Working Draft, Cited with Permission from the Author], 2014. CH

Traditionally we have taken ethics to be, as Henry Sidgwick’s claims, "any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings 'ought'—or what is right for them—or to seek to realize by voluntary action.”vii This rational procedure is however at odds with the empirical reality the ethical deliberation must concern itself with. To argue, as is often done, that the government, its citizens, or white people should act justly, assumes that the possibility of how they could act defines their moral disposition. If a white person could possibly not be racist, it does not mean that the possibility of not being racist, can be taken to mean that they are not racist. In ethical deliberations dealing with the problem of racism, it is common practice to attribute to historically racist institutions, and individuals universal moral qualities that have yet to be demonstrated. This abstraction from reality is what frames our ethical norms and allows us to maintain, despite history or evidence, that racist entities will act justly given the choice. Under such complexities, The only ethical deliberation concerning racism must be anti-ethical, or a judgment refusing to write morality onto immoral entities. In the post-structuralist era, post-colonial thinking about racism specifically, and difference/otherness generally, has given a peculiar ameliorative function to discourse and the performance of “other-ed” identities. In this era, the dominant illusion is that discourse itself, an act that requires as its basis the recognition of the “other” as “similar,” is socially transformative—not only with regard to how the white subject assimilates the similitude of the “other-ed,” but as an actual activity gauged by the recognition by one white person or by a group of white people in any given scenario, is uncritically accepted and encouraged as anti-racist politics.. In actuality such Discourse appeals, which necessitate—become dependent on—(white) recognition, function very much like the racial stereotype, in that the concept of the Black body being the expression and source of experience and phenomena (existential-phenomenological-theorization) is incarcerated by the conceptualization created the discursive catalyst yearning to be perceived by the white thing seeing the Black. Such appeals lend potentiality-hope-faith to the already present/demonstrated ignorance-racism-interest of the white individual., who in large part expresses the historical tone/epistemology of their racial group’s interest. When morality is defined, not by the empirical acts that demonstrate immorality, but the racial character of those in question, our ethics become nothing more than the apologetics of our tyrannical epoch.

Thus, they ***can’t*** redefine the notion of “just governments” even if they try to reconceptualize the living wage: Black people must still appeal to white people for such claims to be recognized.

#### [Curry 2] Second, affirming an “ought” statement with respect to Blackness naïvely places faith in a future that will never come, entrenching oppression.

Curry 2: Curry, Dr. Tommy J. [Ph.D., Associate Professor of Philosophy, Texas A & M University] “In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical.” Academia.Edu [Working Draft, Cited with Permission from the Author], 2014. CH

Ought implies a projected (futural) act. The word commands a deliberate action to reasonably expect the world to be able to sustain or support. For the Black thinker, the Black citizen-subject-slave-(in)human, ought is not rational but repressive,. For the oppressed racialized thinker, the ethical provocation is an immediate confrontation with the impossibility of actually acting towards values like freedom, liberty, humanity, and life, since none of these values can be achieved concretely for the Black in a world controlled by and framed by the white. The options for ethical actions are not ethical in and of themselves, but merely the options the immorality of the racist world will allow, thus the oppressed is forced to idealize their ethical positions, eliminating the truth of their reality, and the peeling away the tyranny of white bodies, so that as the oppressed, they can ideally imagine an ‘if condition,’ whereby they are allowed to ethical engage racism from the perspective of: ‘if whites were moral and respected the humanity of Blacks, then we can ethically engage in these behaviors.’ Unfortunately, this ought constraint only forces Blacks to consciously recognize the futility of ethical engagement, since it is in this ought deliberation that they recognize that their cognition of all values are dependent not on their moral aspirations for the world, but the determined by the will of white supremacy to maintain virtue throughout all ethical calculations. In short, Black ethical deliberation is censored so that it can only engage moral questions by asserting that whites are virtuous and4 hence capable of being ethically persuaded towards right action., hence all ethical question about racism, white supremacy and anti-Blackness is not about how Blacks think about the world, but what possibility the world allows Blacks to contemplate under the idea of ethics.

## Thus, C. Alternative:

#### [Robinson] Reject the aff’s notion of “just governments” and replace it with Black Marxism, a negation of the negation of a world of racial capitalism. This means we call out the aff’s *framing* of just governments as fundamentally racist – it’s not a question of policy, but of orientation. To clarify, we interrogate the anti-Black underpinnings of neoliberal institutions like governments as a prerequisite to any policy action.

Robinson: Robinson, Cedric. [Professor in the Department of Black Studies and the Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara] Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. University of North Carolina Press, 2000 (originally published in 1983). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5149/9781469663746_robinson> GC

With each historical moment, however, the rationale and cultural mechanisms of domination became more transparent. Race **was its epistemology, its ordering principle, its organizing structure, its moral authority, its economy of justice, commerce, and power.** Aristotle, one of the most original aristocratic apologists, had provided the template in Natural Law. In inferiorizing women ("[TIhe deliberative faculty of the soul is not present at all in the slave; in a female it is present but ineffective" [Politics,i26oaiz]), non-Greeks, and all laborers (slaves, artisans, farmers, wage workers, etc.: "[Tlhe mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts" [Nicomachean Ethics, 1095b20]), Aristotle had articulated an uncompromising racial construct. And from the twelfth century on, one European ruling order after another, one cohort of clerical or secular propagandists following another, reiterated and embellished this racial calculus.14As **the Black Radical Tradition was distilled from the racial antagonisms which were arrayed along a continuum from the casual insult to** the most ruthless and **lethal rules of law**; from the objectifications of entries in marine cargo manifests, auction accountancy, plantation records, broadsheets and newspapers; from the loftiness of Christian pulpits and biblical exegesis to the minutia of slave-naming, dress, types of food, and a legion of other significations, the terrible culture of race was revealed. Inevitably, the tradition was transformed into a radical force**.** And in its most militant manifestation, no longer accustomed to the resolution that flight and withdrawal were sufficient, the purpose of the struggles informed by the tradition became the overthrow of the whole race-based structure. **In the studies of these struggles, and often through engagement with them, the Black Radical Tradition began to emerge and overtake Marxism** in the work of these Black radicals. W. E. B. **Du Bois,** in the midst of the antilynching movement, C. L. R. **James, in the vortex of anticolonialism, and Richard Wright**, the sharecropper**'s** son, all brought forth aspects of the militant tradition which had informed successive generations of Black freedom fighters. These **predecessors were Africans** by origins, predominantly **recruited from** the same cultural matrices, subjected to similar and **interrelated systems of servitude and oppression, and mobilized by identical impulses to recover their dignity.** And over the centuries, the **liberation projects** of these men and women **in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Americas acquired similar emergent collective forms in rebellion** and marronage, similar ethical and moral articulations of resistance; increasingly, **they merged as a function of what Hegel might have recognized as** the negation of the negation **in the world system. Hegel's "cunning of history," for one instance, was evident when in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Franco-Haitian slaveowners fled to Louisiana, Virginia, and the Carolinas with as many slaves as they could transport, thereby also transporting the Haitian Revolution.** The outrage, courage, and vision of that revolution helped inspire the Pointe Coupee Conspiracy in 1795 in Louisiana, the Gabriel-led rebellion in 1800 in Virginia, and the rebellion organized by Denmark Vesey in 1822 outside of Charle~ton.'And, in turn, Denmark's movement informed the revolutionary tract, *APPEAL in Four Articles; Together with a Preamble, to the Coloured Citizens of the World, But in Particular, and Very Expressly, to Those of the United States of America,* penned by David Walker in Boston in 1829.

**AND NO PERMS –** they already committed to an orientation that lets governments try to solve racism under the guise of “justice” – their reliance on neoliberal models is FUNDAMENTALLY INCOMPATIBLE with the alt.

# Marcuse K

### A. Link

#### [Eidlin] Strikes put a band-aid on a broken leg – they do nothing to transform the employer-employee relationship.

Eidlim – brackets in text: Eidlin, Barry. [Assistant professor of sociology at McGill University and the author of Labor and the Class Idea in the United States and Canada]. “Why Unions Are Good – But Not Good Enough,” *Jacobin,* January 6, 2020. EM <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/01/marxism-trade-unions-socialism-revolutionary-organizing>

Labor unions have long occupied a paradoxical position within Marxist theory. They are an essential expression of the working class taking shape as a collective actor and an essential vehicle for working-class action. When we speak of “the working class” or “working-class activity,” we are often analyzing the actions of workers either organized into unions or trying to organize themselves into unions. At the same time, unions are an imperfect and incomplete vehicle for the working class to achieve one of Marxist theory’s central goals: overthrowing capitalism. Unions by their very existence affirm and reinforce capitalist class society. As organizations which primarily negotiate wages, benefits, and working conditions with employers, unions only exist in relation to capitalists. This makes them almost by definition reformist institutions, designed to mitigate and manage the employment relationship, not transform it. Many unions have adapted to this conservative, managerial role. Others have played key roles in challenging capital’s power. Some have even played insurgent roles at one moment and managerial roles at others. When unions have organized workplace insurgencies, this has sometimes translated into political pressure that expanded democracy and led to large-scale policy reforms. In the few revolutionary historical moments that we can identify, worker organization, whether called unions or something else, has been essential. Thus, labor unions and movements have long been a central focus of Marxist debate. At its core, the debate centers around the role of unions in class formation, the creation of the revolutionary working-class agent. The debate focuses on four key questions. **First, to what degree do unions simply reflect existing relations of production and class struggle**, or actively shape those relations? Second, if unions actively shape class struggle, why and under what conditions do they enhance or inhibit it? Third, how do unions shape class identities, and how does this affect unions’ scope of action? Fourth, what is the relation between unions and politics? This question is comprised of two sub-questions: to what degree do unions help or hinder struggles in the workplace becoming broader political struggles? And how should unions relate to political parties, the more conventional vehicle for advancing political demands? The following is a chapter from [The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190695545.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190695545) (Oxford University Press, 2019). It assesses Marxist debates surrounding trade unions, oriented by the four questions mentioned previously. It proceeds historically, first examining how Marx and Engels conceived of the roles and limitations of trade unions, then tracing how others within Marxism have pursued these debates as class relations and politics have changed over time. While the chapter includes some history of labor unions and movements themselves, the central focus is on how Marxist theorists thought of and related to those movements. Marx and Engels wrote extensively about the unions of their time, although never systematically. The majority of their writings on unions responded to concrete labor struggles of their time. From their earliest works, they grasped unions’ necessity and limitations in creating a working-class agent capable of advancing class struggle against the bourgeoisie. This [departed](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/wusa.12021) from previous variants of socialism, often based in idealized views of rebuilding a rapidly eroding community of artisanal producers, which did not emphasize class organization or class struggle. Writing in The Condition of the Working Class in England about emerging forms of unionism, Engels observed that even though workers’ primary struggles were over material issues such as wages, they pointed to a deeper social and political conflict: What gives these Unions and the strikes arising from them their real importance is this, that they are the first attempt of the workers to abolish competition. They im­ ply the recognition of the fact that the supremacy of the bourgeoisie is based wholly upon the competition of the workers among themselves; i.e., upon their want of cohesion. And precisely because the Unions direct themselves against the vital nerve of the present social order, however one-sidedly, in however narrow a way, are they so dangerous to this social order. At the same time, Engels saw that, even as union struggles “[kept alive] the opposition of the workers to the … omnipotence of the bourgeoisie,” so too did they “[compel] the admission that something more is needed than Trades Unions and strikes to break the power of the ruling class.” Here Engels articulates the crux of the problem. First, unions are essential for working-class formation, creating a collective actor both opposed to the bourgeoisie and capable of challenging it for power.

#### [Andrew] Worker’s investment and management of the industry further entrenches capitalism.

**Andrew**: Andrew, Edward. [Canadian writer for the journal of political science] “Work and Freedom in Marcuse and Marx”, *Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science politique,* June, 1970. EM https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3231633.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A59b6935b3a9423fc2d414dbd343c575b

**Marcuse is not concerned with "basic" transformations in society; he is not interested in the technical innovations that would make mechanized labour less mechanical: nor does he deal with reorganization of unions nor with workers' participation in industry. Rather, after his violent denunciation of capitalism, in the rather limp conclusion to One-Dimensional Man, he advocates an extension of the welfare state, the elimination of the spurious needs created by ad- vertising, an extension of birth control programs, an increase in privacy so as not to compel the sensitive to be inflicted with the "sounds, sights and smells" of the mass, the prevention of the pollution of air and water, the creation of parks and gardens, and the better treatment of animal life.**25 Many of these programs may be worthy objectives, but it is less clear that they would consti- tute basic changes in our economical system, changes which are fundamental to a socialist revolution. The reason that Marcuse does not advocate radical alteration in the economic base of society is because he perceives that capitalist modes of production are well on their way to becoming automated. Automation is "the very base of all forms of human freedom."26 **While men have to work, they cannot be free. Hence there is no point in the creation of machinery designed to actualize the human potential in work as human fulfilment can only be found outside the work process.** Nor is there any value in substantial alterations in the relations of production, alterations aimed at transferring the power of making technical and policy decisions (including control of training schools and institutes of education) from management to the unions. Radical alterations in the means and relations of production would only be palliatives; complete freedom, the aim of socialism, is only possible through the complete substitution of human labour by machines. **Moreover Marcuse sees the workers in modern societies to be so conditioned and manipulated by the ruling class that they are not capable of revolutionary action or industrial self-management.** The conservative character of modern workers militates "against the notion that the replacement of the prevailing control over the productive process by 'control from below' would mean the advent of qualitative change.""27 **Marcuse opposes the aim of "autogestion" (workers' control or management of industry) which is advocated by French and Italian unionists. This strategy cannot lead to ever-increasing power of the workers and a basis for a transition to socialism. Workers' control of industrial processes and policy would lead to the creation of vested interests of labour within the capitalist system, interests which would further entrench and solidify capitalism.28**

### B. Impacts

#### [Marcuse 1] THIS MAKES CAP STRONGER – people won’t fight against it if the conditions are better.

**Marcuse 1**:Marcuse, Herbert. [University of Berlin, University of Freiburg. Author of numerous books. Taught at Columbia, Harvard, and Brandeis universities.] “One – Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society”, *Beacon Press,* 1964. EM

Now it is precisely this new consciousness, this "space within," the space for the transcending historical practice, which is being barred by a society in which subjects as well as objects constitute instrumentalities in a whole that has its raison d'etre in the accomplishments of its overpowering productivity. **Its supreme promise is an ever-more-comfortable life for an ever-growing number of people who, in a strict sense, cannot imagine a qualitatively different universe** of discourse and action, for the capacity to contain and manipulate subversive imagination and effort is an integral part of the given society**.** Those whose life is the hell of the Affluent Society are kept in line by a brutality which revives medieval and early modern practices. For the other, less underprivileged people, **society takes care of the need for liberation by satisfying the needs which make servitude palatable and perhaps even unnoticeable**, and it accomplishes this fact in the process of production itself. Under its impact, the laboring classes in the advanced areas of industrial civilization are undergoing a decisive transformation, which has become the subject of a vast sociological research. I shall enumerate the main factors of this transformation:

**He adds:**

Such a qualitatively new mode of existence can never be envisaged as the mere by-product of economic and political changes, as the more or less spontaneous effect of the new institutions which constitute the necessary prerequisite. **Qualitative change also involves a change in the technical basis on which this society rests--one which sustains the economic and political institutions through which the "second nature" of man as an aggressive object of administration is stabilized. The techniques of industrialization are political techniques; as such, they prejudge the possibilities of Reason and Freedom.** To be sure, labor must precede the reduction of labor, and industrialization must precede the development of human needs and satisfactions. But as all freedom depends on the conquest of alien necessity, the realization of freedom depends on the techniques of this conquest. The highest productivity of labor can be used for the perpetuation of labor, and the most efficient industrialization can serve the restriction and manipulation of needs. When this point is reached, domination-in the guise of affluence and liberty--extends to all spheres of private and public existence, integrates all authentic opposition, absorbs all alternatives. Technological rationality reveals its political char- acter as it becomes the great vehicle of better domination, creating a truly totalitarian universe in which society and nature, mind and body are kept in a state of permanent mobilization for the defense of this universe.

#### [Marcuse 2] This is the construction of liberties under inequality and unfreedom.

**Marcuse 2**:Marcuse, Herbert. [University of Berlin, University of Freiburg. Author of numerous books. Taught at Columbia, Harvard, and Brandeis universities.] “One – Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society”, *Beacon Press,* 1964. EM

This kind of masterly enslavement is not essentially different from that of the typist, the bank teller, the high-pressure sales- man or saleswoman, and the television announcer. Standardization and the routine assimilate productive and non-productive jobs. **The proletarian of the previous stages of capitalism was indeed the beast of burden, by the labor of his body procuring the necessities and luxuries of life while living in filth and poverty. Thus he was the living denial of his society.** organized worker in the advanced areas of the technological society lives this denial less conspicuously and, like the other human objects of the social division of labor, he is being incorporated into the technological community of the administered population. Moreover, in the most successful areas of automation, some sort of technological community seems to integrate the human atoms at work. The machine seems to instill some drugging rhythm in the operators: "It is generally agreed that interdependent motions performed by a group of persons which follow a rhythmic pattern yield satisfaction-quite apart from what is being accomplished by the motions";

**He adds:**

**The new technological work-world thus enforces a weakening of the negative position of the working class: the latter no longer appears to be the living contradiction to the established society.** This trend is strengthened by the effect of the technological organization of production on the other side of the fence: on management and direction. Domination is transfigured into administration. The capitalist bosses and owners are losing their identity as responsible agents; they are assuming the function of bureaucrats in a corporate machine. Within the vast hierarchy of executive and managerial boards extending far beyond the individual establishment into the scientific laboratory and research institute, the national government and national purpose, the tangible source of exploitation disappears behind the fac;:ade of objective rational- ity. Hatred and frustration are deprived of their specific target, and **the technological veil conceals the reproduction of inequality and enslavement. With technical progress as its instrument, unfreedom-in the sense of man's subjection to his productive apparatus-is perpetuated and intensified in the form of many liberties and comforts.** The novel feature is the overwhelming rationality in this irrational enterprise, and the depth of the pre- conditioning which shapes the instinctual drives and aspirations of the individuals and obscures the difference between false and true consciousness. **For in reality, neither the utilization of other things the worker wants which the employer is not willing to give him.... We're searching. We're searching." Labor Looks At Labor.** A Conversation, (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1963) p. 16£ 21 Is it still necessary to denounce the ideology of the "managerial revolution?" Capitalist production proceeds through the investment of private capital for the private extraction and appropriation of surplus value, and capital is a social instrument for the domination of man by man. **The essential features of this process are in no way altered by** the spread of stock-holding, the separation of ownership from management, etc. administrative rather than physical controls (hunger, personal dependence, force), nor the change in the character of heavy work, nor the assimilation of occupational classes, nor **the equalization in the sphere of consumption** compensate for the fact that the decisions over life and death, over personal and national security are made at places over which the individuals have no control**.** The slaves of developed industrial civilization are sublimated slaves, but they are slaves, for slavery is determined’