### Fwk-Util

**My standard is maximizing expected well-being.**

These are top level framing issues, if I win any one of these, I win fwk.

**1. Reducing existential risks is the top priority in any coherent moral theory**

**Plummer, PhD, 15**

(Theron, Philosophy @St. Andrews http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/)

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe **there is** at least **one thing** **it is reasonable to agree on** right now, **whatever** general **moral view we adopt**: that **it is** very **important to reduce** **the risk that** all intelligent **beings** on this planet **are eliminated by** an enormous **catastrophe**, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that **we** – **whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists** – **should all agree that we should try to save the world.** According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. **There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world**, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. **Even on a wholly person-affecting view** – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – **the case for reducing existential risk is very strong**. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. **You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only.** **There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations** (the goodness of outcomes), **it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists**. **But that is a huge mistake**. **Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness** **than** the goodness of **consequences** or outcomes; **it is not the view that the latter don’t matter**. **Even** John **Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account** in judging rightness. **One which did not would simply be irrational**, crazy.” **Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view**. **They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk**, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. **Even egoism**, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, **might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.** It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that **most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations** of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. **So obviously** if Scheffler were right **I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk**. **We should also take into account moral uncertainty.** W**hat is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain** not (only**) about** the empirical facts, but also about the **moral facts?** I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even **those** (hedonistic egoists) **who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken,** and that one of the above views is correct. **Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one** (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), **they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk**. Perhaps most disturbingly still, **even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters**, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, **reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world**. Again, this is largely **for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future –** there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation**). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives**. It’s possible they’ll be miserable**. It is enough** for my claim **that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world**. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And **even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to**. I suspect that **most of us alive today** – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – **have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve**. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

**2. Science proves non util ethics are impossible and our version of util solves all aff offense**

**Greene 10** – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University (The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)

**What turn-of-the-millennium science** **is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise**, that our **moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural**. **Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions**. Moreover, **anyone who claims to have such a theory**, or even part of one, **almost certainly doesn't**. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that **rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here**. Instead, I suspect, **they** **will insist that I have simply misunderstood what** Kant and like-minded **deontologists are all about**. **Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition**. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. **Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously**. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). **This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view**, as I've suggested, **may be misleading**. **The problem**, more specifically, **is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological**, though they may appear to be from the inside. **Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love**, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." **This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things**. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of **the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics**. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that **consequentialists**, as much as anyone else, **have respect for persons**, **are against treating people as mere objects,** **wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc**. **A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process**. **Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial**. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. **If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get** characteristically deontological **answers**. Some **will be tautological**: **"Because it's murder!"** **Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means**." "You have to respect people's rights." **But**, as we know, **these answers don't really explain anything**, because **if you give the same people** (on different occasions) **the trolley case** or the loop case (See above), **they'll make the opposite judgment**, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. **Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism**. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, **there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions**. **But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question**.

**3. Uncertainty and social contract require governments use util**

**Gooden, 1995 (**Robert, philsopher at the Research School of the Social Sciences, Utilitarianism as Public Philosophy. P. 62-63)

Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices—public and private alike—are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have on them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus—if they want to use it at all—to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rules.

4. **Disregarding foreseeable harm reifies structures of domination**

**McCluskey 12** – JSD @ Columbia, Professor of Law @ SUNY-Buffalo

(Martha, “How the "Unintended Consequences" Story Promotes Unjust Intent and Impact,” Berkeley La Raza, doi: dx.doi.org/doi:10.15779/Z381664)

**By similarly making structures of inequality appear beyond the reach of law** reform, **the "unintended consequences" message helps update and reinforce the narrowing of protections against intentional racial harm. Justice is centrally a question of whose** interests and whose **harms should count**, in what context and in what form and to whom. **Power is centrally about being able to act without having to take harm to others into account. This power to gain by harming others is strongest when it operates through** systems and **structures that make disregarding that harm appear** routine, rational, and beneficial or at least **acceptable** or perhaps inevitable. By portraying law's unequal harms as the "side effects" of systems and structures with unquestionable "main effects," **the** "**unintended consequences" story helps affirm the resulting harm** even as it seems to offer sympathy and technical assistance. In considering solutions to the financial market problems, the policy puzzle is not that struggling homeowners' interests are overwhelmingly complex or uncertain. Instead, the bigger problem is that overwhelmingly powerful interests and ideologies are actively resisting systemic changes that would make those interests count. The failure to criminally prosecute or otherwise severely penalize high-level financial industry fraud is not primarily the result of uncertainty about the harmful effects of that fraudulent behavior, but because the political and justice systems are skewed to protect the gains and unaccountability of wealthy executives despite the clear harms to hosts of others. **The unequal effects of** the prevailing **policy** response to the crisis **are foreseeable and obvious, not accidental or surprising**. It would not take advanced knowledge of economics to readily predict that modest-income homeowners would tend to be far worse off than bank executives by a policy approach that failed to provide substantial mortgage forgiveness and foreclosure protections for modest-income homeowners but instead provided massive subsidized credit and other protections for Wall Street. Many policy actions likely to alleviate the unequal harm of the crisis similarly are impeded not because consumer advocates, low-income homeowners, or racial justice advocates hesitate to risk major changes in existing systems, or are divided about the technical design of alternative programs or more effective mechanisms for enforcing laws against fraud and racial discrimination. Instead, the problem is that these voices pressing for effective change are often excluded, drowned out or distorted in Congress and in federal agencies such as the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve, or in the media, in the mainstream economics profession, and to a large extent in legal scholarship about financial markets. More generally, those diverse voices from the bottom have been largely absent or marginalized in the dominant theoretical framework that constructs widespread and severe inequality as unforeseeable and largely inevitable, or even beneficial. Moreover, **justice requires careful attention to both harmful intent and to complex harmful effects**. But **the concept of "unintended consequences" inverts justice by suggesting that the best way to care** for those at the bottom **is to not care to make law more attentive** to the bottom. "**Unintended consequences" arguments promote a simplistic moral message in the guise of sophisticated intellectual critique**-the message that those who lack power should not seek it because the desire for more power is what hurts most. Further, **like Ayn Rand's overt philosophy of selfishness, that message promotes the theme that those who have power to ignore** their **harmful effects on others need not-indeed should not-be induced by law to care about this harm**, because this caring is what is harmful. One right-wing think tank has recently made this moral message more explicit with an economic values campaign suggesting that the intentional pursuit of economic equality is a problem of the immoral envy of those whose economic success proves they are more deserving.169 **Legal scholars and advocates who intend to put intellectual rigor and justice ahead of service to** financial **elites should reject stories of "unintended consequences" and instead scrutinize the power and laws that have so effectively achieved the intention of making devastating losses to so many of us seem natural, inevitable, and beneficial**.

### NC – Econ DA

#### The global economy is improving now.

Chris Williamson 11-5-21 [Chief Business Economist @ IHS Markit], "Global economic growth lifts higher as Delta variant disruption eases," IHS Markit, 11-5-2021 <https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/global-economic-growth-lifts-higher-as-delta-variant-disruption-eases-Nov21.html> C.VC

Global economic growth gained momentum at the start of the fourth quarter as disruptions to businesses in many countries eased in line with a reduction in COVID-19 case numbers. While below the rate of expansion seen earlier in the year amid the growth spurt seen as economies opened up from the pandemic, the rate of expansion nevertheless remains above the long-run average to indicate a robust expansion. Not all economies saw improvements, however, with rising case numbers associated the spread of the Delta variant in the Eurozone and Russia in particular subduing growth, and virus concerns also still limiting growth in other economies, most notably China. Global economic growth accelerated for a second month running in October. The JPMorgan Global PMI™ (compiled by IHS Markit) rose from 53.3 in September to 54.5 in October, its highest since July. Compared with a pre-pandemic long-run average of 53.6, the latest reading signals above-trend annualised quarterly global GDP growth of approximately 3.5%.

#### Unions devastate growth and worsen inequality – gains for workers shift costs to other parts of the economy

Epstein 20 [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Decline Of Unions Is Good News." https://www.hoover.org/research/decline-unions-good-news]

This continued trend has elicited howls of protest from union supporters who, of course, want to see an increase in union membership. It has also led several Democratic presidential candidates to make calls to reconfigure labor law. Bernie Sanders wants to double union membership and give federal workers the right to strike, as well as ban at-will contracts of employment, so that any dismissal could be subject to litigation under a “for cause” standard. Not to be outdone, Elizabeth Warren wants to make it illegal for firms to hire permanent replacements for striking workers. They are joined by Pete Buttigieg in demanding a change in federal labor law so that states may no longer pass right-to-work laws that insulate workers from the requirement to pay union dues in unionized firms. All of these new devices are proven job killers.

The arguments in favor of unions are also coming from some unexpected sources in academia, where a conservative case has been put forward on the ground that an increase in union membership is needed to combat job insecurity and economic inequality.

All of these pro-union critiques miss the basic point that the decline of union power is good news, not bad. That conclusion is driven not by some insidious effort to stifle the welfare of workers, but by the simple and profound point that the greatest protection for workers lies in a competitive economy that opens up more doors than it closes. The only way to achieve that result is by slashing the various restrictions that prevent job formation, as Justin Haskins of the Heartland Institute notes in a recent article at The Hill. The central economic insight is that jobs get created only when there is the prospect of gains from trade. Those gains in turn are maximized by cutting the multitude of regulations and taxes that do nothing more than shrink overall wealth by directing social resources to less productive ends.

**Economic decline in an interconnected world collapses the global economy, results in multiple scenarios for war.**

**Pamlin and Armstrong 15** – Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager, Global Challenges Foundation, Stuart Armstrong, James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 2015 (“Global Challenges: 12 Risks that Threaten Human Civilization,” *Global Challenges Foundation*, February 2015, http://www.astro.sunysb.edu/fwalter/HON301/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact-full-report-1.pdf)

Often **economic collapse is accompanied by social chaos, civil unrest** **and** sometimes **a breakdown of law and order**. **Societal collapse** **usually refers to the fall or disintegration of human societies**, often along with their life support systems. **It broadly includes both** quite **abrupt societal failures typified by collapses, and more extended gradual declines of superpowers**. Here only the former is included.

**The world economic and political system is made up of many actors with many objectives and many links** between them. **Such** **intricate, interconnected systems** **are subject to unexpected system-wide failures** due to the structure of the network311 – even if each component of the network is reliable. **This gives rise to systemic risk**: systemic risk occurs **when parts that individually may function well become vulnerable when connected as a system to a self-reinforcing joint risk that can spread from part to part** (contagion), potentially affecting the entire system and possibly spilling over to related outside systems.312 Such effects have been observed in such diverse areas as ecology,313 finance314 and critical infrastructure315 (such as power grids). They are characterised by the possibility that **a small internal or external disruption could cause a highly non-linear effect**,316 **including a cascading failure that infects the whole system**,317 **as in the 2008-2009 financial crisis**.

**The possibility of collapse becomes more acute when several independent networks depend on each other, as is increasingly the case** (water supply, transport, fuel and power stations are strongly coupled, for instance).318 **This dependence links social and technological systems as well**.319

**This trend is likely to be intensified by continuing globalisation**,320 **while global governance and regulatory mechanisms seem inadequate to address the issue**.321 This is possibly because the tension between resilience and efficiency322 can even exacerbate the problem.323

Many triggers could start such a failure cascade, such as the infrastructure damage wrought by a coronal mass ejection,324 an ongoing cyber conflict, or a milder form of some of the risks presented in the rest of the paper. Indeed the main risk factor with global systems collapse is as something which may exacerbate some of the other risks in this paper, or as a trigger. But **a simple global systems collapse still poses risks on its own**. **The productivity of modern societies is largely dependent on the careful matching of different types of capital**325 (social, technological, natural...) **with each other**. **If this matching is disrupted, this could trigger a “social collapse” far out of proportion to the initial disruption**.326 **States and institutions have collapsed in the past for seemingly minor systemic reasons**.327 And **institutional collapses can create knock-on effects, such as the descent of formerly prosperous states to much more impoverished and destabilising entities**.328 **Such processes could trigger damage on a large scale if they weaken global political and economic systems to such an extent that secondary effects** (**such as conflict or starvation**) **could cause great death and suffering**..

# Climate

1. they have not detailed what companies will do to solve climate change. Even if companies are serious abt climate change, that doesn’t mean they’ll actually do anything to fix it
2. their warrant for why companies care abt climate change is bc strikes will cost them. But, climate change itself is costly, so companies will make the adjustment no matter what or they won’t care

**No impact – adaptation and resilience**

**Hart ‘15** – emeritus professor of international affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada (Michael, former official in Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs, former Fulbright-Woodrow Wilson Center Visiting Research, former Scholar-in-Residence in the School of International Service and a Senior Fellow in the Center for North American Studies at American University in Washington, MA from the University of Toronto, author, editor, or co-editor of more than a dozen books, “Hubris: The Troubling Science, Economics, and Politics of Climate Change”, google books)//cmr

As already noted, the IPCC scenarios themselves **are wildly alarmist**, not only on the basic science but also on the **underlying** economic **assumptions**, which in turn drive the alarmist impacts. The result **cannot withstand critical analysis**. Economists Ian Castles and David Henderson, for example, show the extent to which the analysis is driven by the desire to reach predetermined outcomes.50 Other economists have similarly wondered what purpose was served by pursuing such unrealistic scenarios. It is hard to credit the defense put forward by Mike Hulme, one of the creators of the scenarios, that the IPCC is not engaged in forecasting the future but in creating “plausible” story lines of what might happen under various scenarios.51 Each **scare scenario** is based on linear projections without **any reference to technological developments or adaptation**. If, on a similar linear basis, our Victorian ancestors in the UK, worried about rapid urbanization and population growth in London, had made similar projections, they would have pointed to the looming crisis arising from reliance on horse-drawn carriages and omnibuses; they would have concluded that by the middle of the 20th century, London would be knee-deep in horse manure, and all of the southern counties would be required to grow the oats and hay to feed and bed the required number of horses. Technology progressed and London adapted. **Why should the rest of humanity not be able to do likewise** in the face of a trivial rise in temperature over the course of **more than a century**? The work on physical impacts is **equally over the top**. All the scenarios assume **only negative impacts**, ignore the reality of **adaptation**, and attribute **any and all things bad** to global warming. Assuming the GHG theory to be correct means that its impact would be most evident at night and during the winter in reducing atmospheric heat loss to outer space.52 It would have greater impact in increasing minimum temperatures than in increasing maximum temperatures. Secondary studies, however, generally **ignore this facet** of the hypothesis. The IPCC believes that a warmer world will harm human health due, for example, to increased disease, malnutrition, heat-waves, floods, storms, and cardiovascular incidents. As already noted **there is no basis for the claim about severe-weather-related threats or malnutrition**. The claim about heat-related deaths gained a boost during the summer of 2003 because of the tragedy of some 15,000 alleged heat-related deaths in France as elderly people stayed behind in city apartments without air conditioning while their children enjoyed the heat at the sea shore during the August vacation. Epidemiological studies of so-called "excess" deaths resulting from heat waves are abused to get the desired results. Similar studies of the impact of cold spells show that they are far more lethal than heat waves and that it is much easier to adapt to heat than to cold.53 More fundamentally, this, like most of the alarmist literature, ignores the basics of the AGW hypothesis: the world will not see an exponential increase in summer, daytime heat (and thus more heat waves), but a decrease in night-time and winter cooling, particularly at higher latitudes and altitudes. Based on the AGW hypothesis, Canada, China, Korea, Northern Europe, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Chile, and Argentina will see warmer winters and warmer nights. There are clear benefits to such a development, even if there may also be problems, but the AGW industry tends to ignore the positive aspects of their alarmist scenarios. The feared spread of malaria, a much repeated claim, is largely unrelated to climate. Malaria’s worst recorded outbreak **was in Siberia long before there was any discussion of AGW**. Similarly, the building of the Rideau Canal in Ottawa in the 1820s was severely hampered by outbreaks of malaria due to the proximity of mosquito-infested wetlands in the area. Malaria remains widespread in tropical countries today in part because of the UN’s lengthy embargo on the use of DDT, the legacy of an earlier alarmist disaster. Temperature is but one factor, and a minor one at that, in the multiple factors that affect the rise or decline in the presence of disease-spreading mosquitoes. Wealthier western countries have pursued public health strategies that have reduced the incidence of the dis- ease in their countries. Entomologist Paul Reiter, widely recognized as the leading specialist on malaria vectors and a contributor to some of the early work of the IPCC, was aghast to learn how his careful and systematic analysis of the potential impacts had been twisted in ways that he could not endorse. In a recent paper, he concludes: “Simplistic reasoning on the future prevalence of malaria is ill-founded; malaria is not limited by climate in most temperate regions, nor in the tropics, and in nearly all cases, ’new' malaria at high altitudes is well below the maximum altitudinal limits for transmission. Future changes in climate may alter the prevalence and incidence of the disease, but obsessive emphasis on ’global warming' as a dominant parameter is indefensible; the principal determinants are linked to ecological and societal change, politics and economics.”54 **Catastrophic species loss** similarly has **little foundation in past experience**.55 Even if the GHG hypothesis were to be correct, **its impact would be slow**, **providing significant scope and opportunity for adaptation**, including by ﬂora and fauna. One of the more irresponsible claims was made by a group of UK modelers who fed wildly improbable scenarios and data into their computers and produced the much-touted claim of massive species loss by the end of the century. There are literally **thousands of websites** **devoted to spreading alarm about species loss** and biodiversity. Global warming is **but one of many claimed human threats to the planet’s biodiversity**. The claims, fortunately, are largely hype, based on computer models and the estimate by Harvard naturalist Edward O. Wilson that 27,000 to 100,000 species are lost annually - a figure he advanced purely hypothetically but which has become one of the most persistent of environmental urban myths. The fact is that scientists **have no idea of the extent of the world's ﬂora and fauna**, with estimates ranging from five million to 100 million species, and that there are no reliable data about the rate of loss. By some estimates, 95 percent of the species that ever existed have been lost over the eons, most before humans became major players in altering their environment. A much more credible estimate of recent species loss comes from a surprising source, the UN Environmental Program. It reports that known **species loss is slowing reaching its lowest level in 500 years** in the last three decades of the 20th century, with some 20 reported extinctions despite increasing pressure on the biosphere from growing human population and industrialization.57 The alarmist community has also introduced the scientifically unknown concept of "locally extinct,” often meaning little more than that a species of plant or animal has responded to adverse conditions by moving to more hospitable circumstances, e.g., birds or butterflies becoming more numerous north of their range and disappearing at its extreme southern extent. Idso et al. conclude: “Many species have shown the ability to **adapt rapidly to changes in climate**. Claims that global warming threatens large numbers of species with **extinction** typically rest on a false definition of extinction (the loss of a particular population rather than en- tire species) and **speculation rather than real-world evidence**. The world’s species have proven **very resilient**, having survived past natural climate cycles that involved much greater warming and higher C02 concentrations than exist today or are likely to exist in the coming centuries?”