# 1

Interpretation - the aff may not claim offense from anything other than the instrumental implementation of a policy stating that states that **the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust**

#### “Resolved” means enactment of a law.

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

#### “Appropriation” refers to the taking of property for exclusive and permanent use

Gorove 69 [Stephen, Chairman of the Graduate Program of the School of Law and Professor of Law, Ole Miss] “Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty”, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 37 Issue 3, <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1966&context=flr>, 1969 RE

With respect to the concept of appropriation the basic question is what constitutes "appropriation," as used in the Treaty, especially in contradistinction to casual or temporary use. The term "appropriation" is used most frequently to denote the taking of property for one's own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence. Under such interpretation the establishment of a permanent settlement or the carrying out of commercial activities by nationals of a country on a celestial body may constitute national appropriation if the activities take place under the supreme authority (sovereignty) of the state. Short of this, if the state wields no exclusive authority or jurisdiction in relation to the area in question, the answer would seem to be in the negative, unless, the nationals also use their individual appropriations as cover-ups for their state's activities.5 In this connection, it should be emphasized that the word "appropriation" indicates a taking which involves something more than just a casual use. Thus a temporary occupation of a landing site or other area, just like the temporary or nonexclusive use of property, would not constitute appropriation. By the same token, any use involving consumption or taking with intention of keeping for one's own exclusive use would amount to appropriation.

#### Definition of “outer space”

Vereshchetin 06 [Vladlen, former Member of the ICJ, Chairman of the International Law Commission, and Professor of International Law] “Outer Space,” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, <https://spacelaw.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_spacelaw/EPIL_Outer_Space.pdf>, 2006 RE

A. Definition of the Term ‘Outer Space’

1 The term ‘outer space’, like several other basic notions of space law (‘outer space activity’, ‘space flight’, ‘space object’), although frequently used in space agreements and other space law instruments, has never been defined by them. There are a number of reasons for this, not least the objective difficulty for the States concerned to agree on legal definitions in the context of rapidly developing technology and their apprehension that legally binding definitions might restrict their sphere of operation.

2 The absence of a formal definition of outer space does not mean that no general perception exists as to what is meant by outer space, even if the use of the term in natural sciences and in law may not always be exactly the same. It should be remembered that there is no definitive physical boundary between atmospheric space and extra-atmospheric space, the transition from one to the other being gradual. Although at 100 km the density of the air is but one millionth of what it is at sea level, for natural scientists these two regions of space, in some respects, may be perceived as one single whole. However, with the launching of the first satellite in 1957 the notion of outer space became inextricably linked with the exploration and uses of space by means of man-made spacecraft (→ Spacecraft, Satellites, and Space Objects). The physical and technical factors are directly relevant to the legal regulation of the region of space concerned. The atmospheric space of the earth and most of the activities in this space fall within the ambit of → Air Law. The space beyond the atmosphere is governed by space law. The ‘spatial’ element of each of the two above-mentioned branches of law is reflected in their denominations: the first being known as air (ie atmospheric) law, the second as space law, often referred to as outer space (ie extra-atmospheric) law.

3 The legal regimes governing → airspace and outer space are fundamentally different. Thus, logically and jurisprudentially it is necessary to know where air space ends and outer space begins. In theory, there must be no ‘outer’ boundary of application of space law, since outer space itself is limitless, but in practice space law, keeping pace with the development of space technology, does not purport to regulate space activity beyond the solar system (see Art. 1 Agreement Governing the Activities of State on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [(adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3]). At the same time, ‘celestial bodies’ of the solar system, other than the earth, but comprising the Moon, are included in the legal notion of outer space (→ Moon and Celestial Bodies). This follows from the title and text of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies ([signed 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967] 610 UNTS 205) (‘Outer Space Treaty’).

#### Violation: they are gaining offense over microactions that do not relate to the topic – at best its extra or fx t

#### Topical version of the aff: private entities shouldn’t appropriate space with adv abt the aff. Disads to the TVA just prove there is neg ground and that it’s a contestable stasis

**Vote Neg – The resolution is the only common stasis point that anchors negative preparation. Allowing any aff deviation from the resolution is a moral hazard which justifies an infinite number of unpredictable arguments with thin ties to the resolution. Because debate is a competitive game, their interpretation incentivizes affirmatives to run further towards fringes and revert to truisms which are exceedingly difficult to negate—this asymmetry is compounded by their monopoly on preparation**

#### That outweighs – The competitive incentive from debate creates pressures for research and focused clash which generates important skills and makes debate a training ground for future work. The impact is movements -- activism is not automatic, but requires learning to defend a proposal against rigorous negation to develop skills for strategy, organizing, problem-solving, using resources, and creating coalitions---their impact turns aren’t unique because the government will inevitably try to capture public worry, the only question is creating alternative incentives for people to organize.

Lakey 13. (George Lakey co-founded Earth Quaker Action Group which just won its five-year campaign to force a major U.S. bank to give up financing mountaintop removal coal mining. Along with college teaching he has led 1,500 workshops on five continents and led activist projects on local, national, and international levels. Among many other books and articles, he is author of “Strategizing for a Living Revolution” in David Solnit’s book Globalize Liberation. 8 skills of a well-trained activist. June 11, 2013. <https://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/8-skills-of-a-well-trained-activist/>)

Why more training now? The history of training is a history of playing catch-up. Very few movements seem to realize that the pace of change can accelerate so rapidly that it outstrips the movement’s ability to use its opportunities fully. In Istanbul a small group of environmentalists sit down to save a park, and suddenly there are protests in over 60 Turkish cities; the agenda expands, from green space to governance to capitalism; doors open everywhere. It would be a good moment to have tens of thousands of skilled organizers ready to seize the day, supporting smart direct action and building prefigurative institutions. But excitement alone may slacken; as with the Occupy movement, spontaneous creativity has its limits. With the right skills, movements can sustain themselves for years against punishing, murderous resistance. The mass direct action phase of the civil rights movement pushed on effectively for a decade after 1955. Mass excitement doesn’t need to fizzle in a year. A movement thrives by solving the problems it faces. Anti-authoritarians don’t want to count on a movement’s top leaders to be the problem-solvers, but instead to develop shared leadership by fostering problem-solving smarts at the grassroots. There’s nothing automatic about grassroots problem-solving. How well people strategize, organize, invent creative tactics, reach effectively to allies, use the full resources of the group and persevere at times of discouragement — all that can be enhanced by training. Nothing is more predictable than that there will be increased turbulence in the United States and many other societies. Activists cause some of the turbulence by rising up; other turbulence results from things like climate change, the 1 percent’s austerity programs and other forces outside activists’ immediate control. Increased turbulence scares a lot of people. It’s only natural that people will look around for reassurance. The ruling class will offer one kind of reassurance. The big question is: What reassurance will the movement offer? When students in Paris in May 1968 launched a campaign that quickly moved into nationwide turbulence, with 11 million workers striking and occupying, there was a momentary chance for the middle class to side with the students and workers instead of siding with the 1 percent. The movement, though, didn’t understand enough about the basic human need for security and failed to use its opportunity. That was a strategic error, but to choose a different path the movement would have required participants with more skills. Training would have been necessary. We can learn from this, inventory the skills needed and train ourselves accordingly. What is training ready to do for us? Here are a few of the key benefits that we should expect to gain from one another through training: 1. Increase the creativity of direct action strategy and tactics. The Yes Men and the Center for Story-Based Strategy lead workshops in which activist groups break out of the lockstep of “marches-and-rallies.” We need to have a broad array of tactics at our disposal, and we have to be ready to invent new ones when necessary. 2. Prepare participants psychologically for the struggle. The Pinochet regime in Chile depended, as dictatorships usually do, on fear to maintain its control. In the 1980s a group committed to nonviolent struggle encouraged people to face their fears directly in a three-step process: small group training sessions in living rooms, followed by “hit-and-run” nonviolent actions, followed by debriefing sessions. By teaching people to control their fear, trainers were building a movement to overthrow the dictator. 3. Develop group morale and solidarity for more effective action. In 1991 members of ACT UP — a militant group protesting U.S. AIDS policy — were beaten up by Philadelphia police during a demonstration. The police were found guilty of using unnecessary force and the city paid damages, but ACT UP members realized they could reduce the chance of future brutality by working in a more united and nonviolent way. Before their next major action they invited a trainer to conduct a workshop where they clarified the strategic question of nonviolence and then role-played possible scenarios. The result: a high-spirited, unified and effective action. 4. Deepen participants’ understanding of the issues. The War Resisters League’s Handbook for Nonviolent Action is an example of the approach that takes even a civil disobedience training as an opportunity to assist participants to take a next step regarding racism, sexism and the like. When we understand how seemingly separate struggles are connected, it helps us create a broader, stronger, more interconnected movement. 5. Build skills for applying nonviolent action in situations of threat and turbulence. In Haiti a hit squad abducted a young man just outside the house where a trained peace team was staying; the team immediately intervened and, although surrounded by twice their number of guards with weapons, succeeded in saving the man from being hung. Through training, we can learn how to react to emergencies like this in disciplined, effective ways. 6. Build alliances across movement lines. In Seattle in the 1980s, a workshop drew striking workers from the Greyhound bus company and members of ACT UP. The workshop reduced the prejudice each group had about the other, and it led some participants to support each other’s struggle. Trainings are a valuable opportunity to bring people from different walks of life together and help them work toward their common goals. 7. Create activist organizations that don’t burn people out. The Action Mill, Spirit in Action, and the Stone House all offer workshops to help activists to stay active in the long run. I’ve seen a lot of accumulated skill lost to movements over the years because people didn’t have the support or endurance to stay in the fight. 8. Increase democracy within the movement. In the 1970s the Movement for a New Society developed a pool of training tools and designs that it shared with the grassroots movement against nuclear power. The anti-nuclear movement went up against some of the largest corporations in America and won. The movement delayed construction, which raised costs, and planted so many seeds of doubt in the public mind about safety that the eventual meltdown of the Three Mile Island plant brought millions of people to the movement’s point of view. The industry’s goal of building 1,000 nuclear plants evaporated. Significantly, the campaign succeeded without needing to create a national structure around a charismatic leader. Activists learned the skills of shared leadership and democratic decision-making through workshops, practice and feedback. In my book Facilitating Group Learning, I share many lessons that have evolved from Freire’s day to ours. I hope that readers of this column will add to the list of training providers in the comments, since I’ve only named some. My intention is to remind us that this could be the right moment, before the next wave of turbulence has all of us in crisis-mode again, to increase training capacity for grassroots skill-building. We’ll be very glad we did.

#### Debate doesn’t have any effect on the political and the individual arguments we read have no effect on our subjectivity, even if they spur immediate reflection, those insights aren’t integrated into deep-stored memory—this means you can vote negative on presumption. Encouraging focused, nuanced research and clash is the only chance to change attitudes long term—which means they can’t solve their impact turns but our model can.

#### filter their impacts through predictable testability ---debate inherently judges relative truth value by whether or not it gets answered---a combination of a less predictable case neg, the burden of rejoinder, and them starting a speech ahead will always inflate the value of their impacts, which makes non-arbitrarily weighing whether they should have read the 1ac in the first place impossible within the structure of a debate round so even if we lose framework, vote neg on presumption. They also create a moral hazard that leads to affs only about individual self-care so even if you think this aff is answerable, the ones they incentivize are not, so assume the worst possible affirmative when weighing our impacts.

# 2

#### Fixation on body as determinant of truth undermines progressive change

John **Champagne** Associate Professor of English Ph.D. English, Critical and Cultural Studies, University of Pittsburgh M.A. Cinema Studies, New York University The Ethics of Marginality A New Approach to Gay Studies 19**95**

When recounting how the film text might have engaged more fully with the problematic of presenting a representation of Black culture to a largely white audience, hooks suggests that Livingston’s physical presence in the film might have allowed viewers to “recognize that they are watching a work shaped and formed from a perspective and standpoint specific to Livingston” (62). hooks suggests that because we hear Livingston ask questions of her subjects bur never see her, the film “assumes an imperial overseeing position that is in no way progressive or counterhegemonic.” The implication here is that the **bodily presence** of Livingston in the film would have disrupted its colonizing impulses, as if the problems of representation of the Other could be overcome **with recourse to a spectatorial “experience**" of Livingston the historical person. A certain faith in the visible is operating here, a realist ontology of the photographic image that is at odds with hooks's own stated intellectual project, which is the attempt to call into crisis the “truth” of Livingstons documentary representation. Although hooks’s analysis wants to marshal here the suggestion from a feminist- and Brechtian-inflcctcd film theory that the "passive,” voyeuristic pleasure of the spectator must be disrupted if theoretical reflection is to occur, the analysis concurrently relies on a faith in the ontological power of the image, a faith interrupted by this same film theory. Here we see another instance of the limits of what I have discussed earlier as an identity-politics-inflected deconstruction of the real. My critique of hooks’s project should not obscure her important insistence that Livingston’s project is necessarily implicated in the project of imperialism, nor her contention that the “current trend in producing colorful ethnicity for the white consumer appetite . .. makes it possible for blackness to be commodified in unprecedented ways, and for whites to appropriate black culture without interrogating whiteness or showing concern for the displeasure of blacks” (63). One of the major differences between hooks’s perspective and my own is that although she faults Livingston for approaching her subject matter “as an outsider looking in” (62), 1 would insist that no other vantage point is available to her from which to view drag-ball culture. hooks’s faith in the category of originating experience makes possible the suggestion that Livingston could somehow have gotten sufficiently “inside” the world of the drag balls to overcome certain problems of racism and classism. I would instead critique the film by proposing that its highly complicated discursive circumstances perhaps require a greater attentiveness to the (discursive) constraints operating in the genre of the testimonial than the film seems w-illing to allow. Nonetheless, hooks’s queries regarding questions of the location of the filmmaker, as well as the film’s intended audience, remain.

#### Reforms within the capitalist institution work to assimilate queer culture which marginalizes intersectionality and reproduces power structures. Croitoru ‘15

Croitoru, BA in women’s and gender studies, 15. (Croitoru, Sarah (2015) "Homonormativity: An Ineffective Way to Approach Queer Politics," Strigidae: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 6. Available at: <http://commons.keene.edu/strigidae/vol1/iss1/6>) JJN from file

Homonormative ideas, like those of Sullivan, reproduce structural problems of our government by focusing on one area of oppression without taking into account the intersectionality of multiple facets of identity. These components of identity include (but are not limited to) race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, and ethnicity. Structurally, as argued by Judith Butler, we can understand that identity politics are cultural struggles as well as economic struggles (Oswin 655). From this assumption, it is argued that queer people do not threaten capitalism, and therefore should be allowed to be part of the same heteronormative societal structures regardless of their sexuality (655). By focusing on allowing LGBT people to assimilate, the queer movement no longer fights to support queer homeless youth, but it rather “fights for assimilation and social acceptability” arguing only for acceptance within marriage and the military(656). There is an assumption by neoliberals that with marriage and military equality, “gay and lesbian life [will move] beyond discrimination.” In reality, marriage and military equality will not solve all the oppressions faced by queer people. Passing, or being read as heterosexual, uses “heteronormative premises (specifically, the presumption of heterosexuality, and the gender binary)” to frame homonormative practices (Rosenfeld 619). The gender binary leads to the notion of “a gender-conforming homosexual” who is seen as more normative and privileged. Certain assimilationsist groups think that unless you are politically organizing, as a homosexual, you should attempt to pass (621). Passingblatantly does not reconstruct institutionalized forms of homophobia or sexism, but it reproduces the idea that you must fit within societal norms in order to have a privileged life. Stonewall also “refashioned homosexuality from a private matter to be enacted within a private arena into an essentially political matter to be enacted in a public one” (Rosenfeld 622). The neoliberal agenda of gay marriage which, according to Duggan, “is not simply a private contract; it is a social and public recognition of a private commitment” (187) appears to refocus the emphasis from the public back to the private. The homonormative practice of same-sex marriage, which reproduces the same structural problems of heterosexual marriage, is seen as liberating simply due to the fact that it publicizes the private. In reality, gay marriage does not attempt to dismantle any of structural or social problems of marriage within the United States. Butler argues that structural problems are not dismantled through marriage because “the state becomes the means by which a fantasy becomes literalized: desire and sexuality are ratified, justified, known, publicly instated, imagined as permanent, durable” (22). She shows how the neoliberals publicize the private through the example that relationships in marriage are not private, but innately public, as marriage leads to public gains, such as qualification within our capitalist society for tax breaks and other benefits. Marriage is not a private matter in any sense; it is “publicly mediated and…[a] legitimated public sex” (23) because marriage leads to a general understanding and expectation that as amarried person one has rights. These rights include, but are not limited to hospital visitation, the right to mourn, and the right to build a family together (23). The state is given the power to control matters that should be personal choices and not tied exclusively to a public institution such as marriage. Due to the assumption that homonormative homosexuals are “respectable” and non-conforming homosexuals are “unrespectable,” the exact same problems produced by heterosexuality are reproduced by homonormativity (Rosenfeld 632). Heteronormativity is produced through homonormativity by the “rhetorical remapping of public/private boundaries designed to shrink gay public spheres and redefine gay equality against the “civil rights agenda” and “liberationism,” as access to the institutions of domestic privacy, the “free” market, and patriotism” (Duggan 179). This leads to the assumption that the right way to be gay is to participate in the “free” market and be patriotic. Therefore, the heteronormative structure of nuclear families and marriage is the perfect structure for homosexual couples because the state will no longer be responsible for them; nuclear homosexual families will be financially responsible for themselves. Homonormativity neglects to contest dominant heterosexual assumptions such as the goal that we should all be married, middle class, and capitalist.

#### Focus on the individual destroys collective resistance to oppressive instiutions – only politics solves. Ojeili ‘03

Chamsy Ojeili 3**,** Senior Lecturer School of Social and Cultural Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, Post-modernism, the Return to Ethics, and the Crisis of Socialist Values, [www.democracynature.org/vol8/ojeili\_ethics.htm#\_edn9](http://www.democracynature.org/vol8/ojeili_ethics.htm#_edn9)

Notably, anarchists have often been charged with this failing by Marxian thinkers.[157] Anarchism does include those suspicious of the demands of association, those who fear the tyranny of the majority and who emphasise instead the uniqueness and liberty of the individual. Here, the freedom of the creative individual, unhindered by the limitations of sociality, is essential. This second strand shows clearly the influence of liberal ideas. It is also, in its bohemian and nihilistic incarnation, a child to the malevolent trio of De Sade, Stirner, Nietzsche, that is, those who reject coercive community mores and who recoil from herdish, conformist pressures. The free individual must create his or her own guiding set of values, exploring the hitherto untapped and perhaps darker aspects of him or herself through an art which chaffs against the standards of beauty and taste of the ordinary mortal. Given that freedom cannot endure limitations and that all idols have been driven from the world and the mind, for these revolutionaries, “all is permitted”.[158] This emphasis on individual sovereignty is clear in Godwin and Stirner,[159] but also in Goldman’s suspicion of collective life, in her elevation of the role of heroic individuals in history, and in the work of situationist Raoul Vaneigem.[160]¶ This accent within non-orthodox socialism has been much criticised. For instance, Murray Bookchin has contrasted “social” with “lifestyle” anarchism, rejecting the elevation the self-rule of the individual in the latter to the highest goal of anarchist thinking.[161] One might consider, here, the consequences, in the case of Emma Goldman, of the substitution of collective revolutionary change for boheme and for an intellectualist contempt for the masses. Goldman turned more and more to purely self-expressive activity and increasingly appealed to intellectuals and middle class audiences, who felt amused and flattered by her individualism and exotic iconoclasm.[162] This egoistic and personalistic turn ignores the essential social anarchist aspiration to freedom, the commitment to an end to domination in society, the comprehension of the social premises of the individualist urge itself, and the necessity of moving beyond a purely negative conception of liberty to a thicker, positive conception of freedom.[163] Perhaps, as Bookchin has rather trenchantly asserted, the recent individualist and neo-situationist concern with subjectivity, expression, and desire is all too much like middle class narcissism and the self-centred therapeutics of New Age culture. Perhaps also, as Barrot has said, the kind of revolutionary life advocated by Vaneigem cannot be lived.[164] Further, total freedom for any one individual necessarily means diminished freedom for others. As La Banquise argue, “Repression and sublimation prevent people from sliding into a refusal of otherness”.[165] For socialists, freedom must be an ineradicably social as well as an individual matter. The whole thrust of libertarian politics is towards a collective project that reconstructs those freedom-limiting structures of economy, power, and ideology.[166] It seems unlikely that such ambitions could be achieved by those motivated solely by a Sadean ambition to seek satisfaction of their own improperly understood desires. ¶ On this question, Castoriadis is again useful – accenting autonomy as a property of the collective and of each individual within society, and rejecting the opposition between community and humanity, between the “inner man [sic] and the public man [sic]”.[167] Castoriadis ridiculed abstract individualism: “We are not ‘individuals’, freely floating above society and history, who are capable of deciding sovereignly and in the absolute about what we shall do, about how we shall do it, and about the meaning our doing will have once it is done … Above all, qua individuals, we choose neither the questions to which we will have to respond nor the terms in which they will be posed, nor, especially, the ultimate meaning of our response, once given”.[168] Rejecting the contemporary tendency to posit others as limitations on our freedom, Castoriadis argued that others were in fact premises of liberty, “possibilities of action”, and “sources of facilitation”.[169] Freedom is the most vital object of politics, and this freedom – always a process and never an achieved state – is equated with the “effective, humanly feasible, lucid and reflective positing of the rules of individual and collective activity”.[170] An autonomous society – one without alienation – explicitly and democratically creates and recreates the institutions of its own world, formulating and reformulating its own rules, rather than simply accepting them as given from above and outside. The resulting institutions, Castoriadis hoped, would facilitate high levels of responsibility and activity among all people in respect of all questions about society.[171]¶ Castoriadis’ notion of social transformation holds to the goals of integrated human communities, the unification of people’s lives and culture, and the collective domination of people over their own lives.[172] He was also committed to the free deployment of the person’s creative forces. Just as Castoriadis enthused over the capacity of human collectivities for immense works of creativity and responsibility,[173] so he insisted on the radical creativity of the individual and the importance of individual freedom. Congruent with the notion of social autonomy, Castoriadis posited the autonomous individual as, most essentially, one who legislates for and thus regulates him or herself.[174] Turning to psychoanalysis, he designated this autonomy as the emergence of a more balanced and productive relationship between the ego and the unconscious. For Castoriadis, these goals were not guaranteed by anything outside of the collective activity of people towards such goals, and he insisted that individual autonomy could only arise “under heavily instituted conditions … through the instauration of a regime that is genuinely … democratic”.[175] Such an outcome could not be solved in theory but only by a re-awakening of politics. Only in the clash of opinions – dependent on a restructured social formation – not determined in advance by naturalistic or religious postulates, could a true ethics emerge.[176] This, I believe, is the highpoint of libertarian thinking about ethics and politics. Conclusion ¶ I have argued that socialist orthodoxy has been eclipsed as a programme for the good life. On the one hand, it devolves into a project of pragmatic expediency bereft of a political and ethical dimension, where statist administration submerges both individual freedom and democratic decision-making. On the other hand, as social democracy the orthodox tradition coalesces into a variety of more or less straightforward liberalism. Liberalism tends to overstate the conception of humans as choosers, under-theorising and under-valuing the necessity of political community and the social dimension of individuality and the necessity of a positive conception of freedom. The communitarian critique, however, too readily diminishes the freedoms of the individual, subordinating people entirely to the horizons of community life and reducing politics to something like a “general will”. ¶ Possessed of both liberal and communitarian features, post-modernism has been skeptical about the idea of a unitary human essence. It has jettisoned the notion of humans as unencumbered choosers, and it has underscored the constructedness of all our values. In so doing, post-modernism signals a renewed interest in ethics, in questions of responsibility, evaluation, and difference, within contemporary social thinking. Post-modernism offers a valuable critique of the tendency of socialist orthodoxy to bury the socialist insight as to the sociality and historicity of values. Nevertheless, advancing as it does on orthodox socialism, post-modernism’s radical constructivism and its horror at the disasters of confident and unreflective modernity can issue in an ironic hesitancy, indicated in particular by an uncritical emphasis on pluralism and incommensurability that threatens to forever suspend evaluation.[177] One signal of this is the cautious and depoliticised obsession with Otherness and the subject as victim of the return to ethics.[178] Further, post-modernism all too often withdraws from universals and emancipation towards particularist – either individualist or community-based – answers to questions of justice and the content of the valuable life. In contrast, those seeking a radical, inclusive democracy must remain engaged and universalist in orientation. ¶ A number of libertarians have not hesitated in committing themselves, most importantly, to the emancipation of humanity without exception.[179] In fact, politics and ethics seem unthinkable without such universalistic aspirations. Post-modernists themselves have often had to submit to this truth, smuggling into their analyses universally-binding ethico-political principles and attempting to theorise the potential linkages between progressive political struggles. However, such linkages do not amount to a coherent anti-systemic movement that addresses the power of state and capital. In contrast, the universalist commitments of the ethics of emancipation held to by many libertarians accents both freedom and equality, and the establishment of a true political community, against the dominations and distortions of state and capital. Against the contemporary obsession with ethics, which is so often sloganistic, depoliticised, defensive, privatised, and trivial, we should, with Castoriadis, accent politics as primary and as the condition of proper ethical engagement. I have argued that, in line with Castoriadis’ strictures, such a political community and the aspiration to truly ethical and political deliberation, can only be attained when socialists free themselves from belief in the possibility of extra social guarantees “other than the free play of passions and needs”,[180] and from the expectation of an end to tensions and dilemmas around questions of social ordering. On these terms, libertarian goals are not – contra liberal strictures – the negation of aspirations for freedom and democracy but are rather a collective pressing of these aspirations to the very far limits of popular sovereignty. It is for this reason that the stubborn durability of these goals may, against all expectations, be an auspicious sign for libertarian utopianism.

#### Neoliberalism guarantees global inequality and planetary extinction – only a reinvestment in the collective good can solve.

Gillespie 8/19 – Paul, Dr Paul Gillespie is a former foreign policy editor with The Irish Times. He currently writes a regular column for the newspaper entitled 'World View'. 8/19/17 https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/paul-gillespie-the-west-must-wean-itself-off-unsustainable-growth-1.3190914

On August 2nd the Earth reached its sustainability overshoot date for 2017. This indicator measures how through over-fishing, over-harvesting forests, over-grazing land and mostly by carbon releases we have used more than the planet can renew in a single year. The date was September 17th in 2000. The indicator is produced by the Global Footprint Network which calculates how many planets we would need to sustain the lifestyles of different countries, groups and individuals. This year we would need 1.7 planets and they reckon, on present trends, two would be needed by 2030. If everyone was to live like the average US citizen we would need five planets, like Ireland four, but like Chad, Afghanistan or Cambodia less than one. If all countries were to grow to the point of consuming as much as the wealthiest we would need 3.4 Earths to sustain us. Earth Overshoot Day is calculated by dividing the planet’s biocapacity (the estimated amount of ecological resources Earth is able to generate that year) by humanity’s ecological footprint (humanity’s estimated demand for that year). This ratio is multiplied by 365 to get the date when Earth Overshoot Day is reached. Sustainability they define as the condition in which all human beings can lead fulfilling lives without degrading the planet. Planetary ecology This is a graphic and compelling way to document and publicise the dangerous pressures on planetary ecology arising from present trends. Central to them is the pursuit of endless economic growth and insatiable consumption. There is a contradiction between these imperatives and sustainability since we only have one planet available. How then can the contradiction be resolved? A radical and original approach to these questions is offered by Jason Hickel, an anthropologist at the London School of Economics in his recent book The Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and its Solutions. He uses the footprint analyses to illustrate not only the urgent need to act but the grossly unequal impact of these trends, their deep historical roots and how they can be effectively tackled. That can only be done if the capitalist economics which makes such growth and consumption an inescapable part of our lives is challenged and superseded. Along the way he notes that in the last century we have lost 50 per cent of the world’s forests, up to 80 per cent of fish stocks and have seen 40 per cent of soil depleted by chemicals and over-cultivation. He challenges United Nations figures and claims rates of wealth rises and reductions of poverty are grossly exaggerated if environmental and social impacts are included in gross domestic product and if real living costs are also factored in. That shows the world is more unequal than normally assumed, a trend reinforced by neoliberal economics from the 1980s. Eight individuals now control more wealth than the poorest half of humanity. Sixty per cent of our species (4.3 billion people) lives on less than five dollars a day, his definition of poverty compared to the UN figures of one quarter that amount yielding an improving one billion people. The historical roots of these inequalities come from the expansion and imperial conquests associated with early European and later American capitalism from the 16th century. That reversed Indian and Chinese domination of world living standards and life expectancy up to the early 1800s. In the last century a skilful management of decolonisation alongside strategic interventions against radical reformist regimes like those in Iran, Ghana, Egypt and Chile from the 1950s to the 1970s ensured continuing Western control of world rules and power. Bracing alternative This is a well-argued and bracing alternative account of world development and sustainability. It adopts Edward Said’s notion of “contrapuntal thinking” to link the metropolitan core to the post-colonial periphery in thinking about power, political priorities and agency. Hickel supports degrowth strategies for the richest societies and shows there are sustainable ways to find wellbeing while abandoning unsustainable growth and consumption imperatives. Shorter working weeks, universal basic incomes, a global minimum wage and Tobin taxes on financial transactions could wean populations off them. This would not be another round of austerity but a step towards a more equal world, capable of overcoming the scarcity assumptions driving current economic orthodoxy and the capitalist power structures and legal dynamics built into them. They threaten to destroy the planet if not challenged and stopped soon.

#### The kritik is about the pedagogy the judge endorses – endorsing class-based internationalism is a prerequisite the plan.

McLaren et 04 - McLaren, Peter, et al. "Teaching in and against the empire: Critical pedagogy as revolutionary praxis." Teacher Education Quarterly 31.1 (2004): 131-153.

Admittedly, the sobering truth is that following the mass slaughter in Iraq a cloud of pessimism will no doubt temporarily engulf the Arab world (do not forget, the Gaza strip is already littered with bodies and ruins) as well as hope-deprived workers in oppressed nations around the world. That is the bad news. The good news is that we are already beginning to see the moral and political limits of the United States 'old fashioned' use of imperialist power in its bloody territorial struggles. Even before the invasion of Iraq, a massive anti-war movement developed interna tionally both in the neo-colonies as well as in the home citadels of imperialism such as the United States and Britain. Whilst the outcome of the anti-war movement is much too difficult to determine in advance, it is clear that in distributing an Old Testament form of moral retribution and imperialist aggression in defiance of international law, Bush has shocked and enraged a broad array of social forces including a whole new generation of youth who are now bristling with militancy and taking the first steps to becoming politically active. Although some of the more politically conscious and active youth already had a profound loathing of U.S imperialism and its cruelties (e.g., the anti-sweatshop movement), many more young people including students are now for the first time looking not only for an explanation of what has taken place, but also a program to fight for and a strategy to win (Martin, 2002). They are asking: "What can we do to stop the United States?" This is a question of special importance to those of us living in the homeland of U.S. imperialism, especially given its long history of violent expansionism, gunboat diplomacy and racist oppression that has provided the perks and comforts everyone here gets to enjoy (most people on this planet earn under $2.00 per day). Recogniz ing that our political representatives (including those in the 'lesser evil' Democrat party) respond primarily to the commands of a tiny, corrupt and unaccountable cabal, we argue that the only historic force that can put an end to U.S. imperialism is the multi-racial, gendered working class and radical youth in the United States, who increasingly have nothing left to lose. Let us be clear. We are not advocating the overthrow of the government or encouraging anyone to engage in illegal activities. But we do believe that the effects of the anti-war movement are just one indication of the latent but explosive potential to create broad opposition to imperialism in the United States. Events like this provide a glimpse of how a mass uprising of people might be developed to weaken U.S. imperialism and to get rid of production for profit along with its attendant antagonisms including patriarchy, national oppression (e.g., Black, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Native American, Hawai ian and other oppressed and indigenous peoples), and white supremacy. It was, after all, the genocide of indigenous peoples and the theft of their lands that provided the material foundation for U.S. empire. Our starting point is that socialism is not a discredited dream. It is a current that runs through periods such as the menacing present and is animated by and in struggle against all forms of oppression and exploitation. Whilst the anti-war movement will undoubtedly have to overcome certain internal problems to grow much larger and to curb future wars in Syria, Iran or Venezuela, what we are seeing today is the emergence of a completely new quality of social consciousness that could provide the concrete basis for an internationalist political movement (Bloom, 2003). What matters here is that against the backdrop of U.S. imperialism, the only way students are ever going to win lasting 'peace' or the right to a decent education or job is through the linking of their struggles with all the victims of the vicious ruling class, including workers whose blood, sweat and toil is the living fuel that makes the economy run (Bloom, 2003; Rikowski, 2002). In creating the conditions for social change, then, the best pedagogy recognizes the limits of traditional 'pragmatist' reformist pedagogical practice by prioritizing the need to question the deeper problems, particularly the violent contradictions (e.g., the gap between racism and the American Dream), under which students are forced to live. This means confronting the anti-intellectual thuggery that pervades teacher education programs, particularly the kind that "rejects 'theory' (the knowl edge of totality)" (Zavarzadeh & Morton, 1994, p. 3). Acknowledging that capitalist education acts as a drag on the development of 'critical' or 'class' consciousness by presenting a lifeless world empty of contradictions, we argue for a Marxist theory of the 'big picture,' which enables people to translate their daily free-floating frustrations with the 'system' into a set of ideas, beliefs and practices that provide the basis not only for coherence and explanation but also action (Zavarzadeh & Morton, 1994, p. 3). Against tremendous odds, the challenge over the last several decades has been to humanize the classroom environment and to create pedagogical spaces for linking education to the praxiological dimensions of social justice initiatives and to that end we are indebted to critical pedagogy. Yet, faced with the urgency for change, approaching social transformation through the optic of revolutionary critical pedagogy ratchets up the struggle ahead. Revolutionary critical pedagogy dilates the aperture that critical pedagogy has struggled to provide teachers and students over the last several decades by further opening up the pedagogical encounter to its embeddedness in globalized social relations of exploitation and also to the revolutionary potential of a transnational, gender-balanced, multiracial, anti imperialist struggle. A revolutionary critical pedagogy raises the following ques tions for consideration by teachers, students, and other cultural workers: How can we liberate the use value of human beings from their subordination to exchange value? How can we convert what is least functional about ourselves as far as the abstract utilitarian logic of capitalist society is concerned — our self-realizing, sensuous, species-being — into our major instrument of self-definition? How can we make what we represent to capital — replaceable commodities — subordinate to who we have also become as critical social agents of history? How can we make critical self-reflexivity a demarcating principle of who we are and critical global citizenship the substance of what we want to become? How can we make the cultivation of a politics of hope and possibility a radical end in itself? How can we de-commodify our subjectivities? How can we materialize our self-activity as a revolutionary force and struggle for the self-determination of free and equal citizens in a just system of appropriation and distribution of social wealth? How can we make and remake our own nature within historically specific conventions of capitalist society such that we can make this self-activity a revolutionary force to dismantle capitalism itself and create the conditions for the development of our full human potential? How can we confront our 'producers' (i.e., social relations of production, the corporate media, cultural formations and institutional structures) as an independent power? Completely revolutionizing education does not depend upon the great white men that capitalist education teaches us are our presidents, heroes and role models. It relies upon the broad masses of people recognizing that the whole system is worthless and must be transformed to reflect their interests. This is the strength of a revolutionary critical pedagogy, that it is an orientation of fighting for the interests of the multi-racial, gendered working class and indigenous peoples all th through. It seeks to transform schools into political and cultural centers, where crucial questions — from international affairs to education policy — are debated and struggled over openly. It is a pedagogy that not only conjures up the audacious urges of the oppressed but also enables them to fight back against the system's repeated attacks by raising people's understanding of their political opponents and developing their organization and fighting position. It is a call to battle, a challenge to change this monstrous system that wages permanent warfare against the world and the planet, from cost-effectiveness state terror in the 'homeland,' to the dumping of toxic chemicals on Native American lands and communities of color and the devastating bombing campaigns against sovereign nations. It is a pedagogy of hope that is grounded in the unfashionable 'reality,' history, and optimism of oppressed peoples and nations inside and outside of this country. It is a pedagogy against empire. Because of this, we will settle for nothing less.

#### The alternative is The Party – embracing collectivity in the face of neoliberalism escapes previous problems with leftist organizing while not ceding the state to the right. Dean and Mertz 16

Dean and Mertz 16 **(Jodi and Chuck, Donald R. Harter ’39 Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences @ Hobart and William Smith Colleges and Host at This is Hell!, “The JFRP: For a New Communist Party,” aNtiDoTe Zine 1/23/16, https://antidotezine.com/2016/01/23/for-a-new-communist-party/)**

**CM: Great to have you on the show.¶ Let’s start with Occupy. What, to you, explains the impact that the Tea Party had on Republicans, relative to the impact that Occupy seems to have had on the Democratic Party? All of the sudden there were “Tea Party Republicans.” There weren’t “Occupy Democrats.”¶ JD: That’s a good point.** The Tea Party **took the Republican Party as its target. They** decided that their goal was going to be to influence the political system **by getting people elected and basically** by trying to take over **part of** government. That’s why they were able to have **good** effects. They didn’t regard the mainstream political process as something irrelevant to their concerns. They thought of it as something to seize**.¶** The problem with many**—but not all—**leftists in the US is that they think the political process is so corrupted that we have to completely refuse it, and leave it altogether**. The Tea Party decided to act as an organized militant force, and** too much of the US left **(we saw this in the wake of Occupy)** has thought that to be “militant” means to refuse and disperse and become fragmented**.¶ CM: So what explains the left turning its back on the collective action of a political party? It would seem like a political party would fit into what the left would historically want: an apparatus that can organize collective action.¶ JD:** There are multiple things. First, the fear of success**: the left has learned from the excesses of the twentieth century.** Where Communist **and socialist** parties “succeeded,” there was violence **and purges and repression. One reason** the left has turned its back **is** because of this historical experience **of state socialism.** And we have taken that to mean that we should not ever have a state. I think that’s the wrong answer. That we**—as the left—**made a mistake with some regimes does not have to mean that we can never learn**.¶** Another reason **that th**e left has turned its back on the party form has been the important criticism of twentieth century parties that have been too white, too masculine, potentially homophobic; parties that have operated in intensely hierarchical fashion. Those criticisms are real. But rather than saying we can’t have a party form because that’s just what a party does, why not make a party that is not repressive and does not exclude or diminish people on the basis of sex, race, or sexuality?**¶ So we’ve got at least two historical problems that have made people very reluctant to use the party. I also think that, whether or not you mark it as 1968 or 1989,** the left’s embrace of cultural individualism and the free flow of personal experimentation has made it critical of discipline and **critical of** collectivity. But **I think** that’s just a capitalist sellout. Saying everybody should just “do their own thing” is just going in the direction of the dominant culture. That is actually not a left position at all**.¶ CM: So does** identity politics undermine collectivism**?** And **did that end up** lead**ing** to fragmentation and a weakening of the left**? Because there are a lot of people we’ve had on the show—and one person in particular, Thomas Frank—who say that there is no left in the United States.¶ JD: First I want to say that I disagree with the claim that there is no left. In fact, I think that “the left” is that group that keeps denying its own existence. We’re always saying that we’re the ones who don’t exist. But the right thinks that we exist. That’s what is so fantastic, actually. Did you see the New York Post screaming that Bernie Sanders is really a communist? Great! They’re really still afraid of communists! And it’s people on the left who say, “Oh, no, we’re not here at all!”¶ The left denies its own existence and it denies its own collectivity. Now, is identity politics to blame? Maybe it’s better to say that** identity politics has been a symptom of the pressure of capitalism. Capitalism has operated in the US by exacerbating racial differences**. That has to be addressed on the left, and** the left has been addressing that. But **we haven’t been addressing it in a way that recognizes how racism operates to support capitalism. Instead,** we’ve made it too much about identity rather than as an element in building collective solidarity**.¶ I’m trying to find a way around this to express that** identity politics has been important but it’s reached its limits. Identity politics can’t go any further insofar as it denies the impact of capitalism**. An identity politics that just rests on itself is nothing but liberalism.** Like all of the sudden everything will be better if black people and white people are equally exploited? What if black people and white people say, “No, we don’t want to live in a society based on exploitation?”**¶ CM: You were saying that the left denies its own collectivity. Is that only in the US? Is that unique to the US culture of the left?¶ JD: That’s a really important question, and I’m not sure. Traveling in Europe, I see two different things. On the one hand I see a broad left discussion that is, in part, mediated through social media and is pretty generational—people in their twenties and thirties or younger—and that** there’s a general feeling about the problem of collectivity, the problem of building something with cohesion**, and a temptation to just emphasize multiplicity. You see this everywhere. Everybody worries about this, as far as what I’ve seen.¶ On the other hand, there are countries whose political culture has embraced parties much more, and fights politically through parties. Like Greece, for example—and we’ve seen the ups and downs with Syriza over the last two years. And Spain also. Because they have a parliamentary system where small parties can actually get in the mix and have a political effect—in ways that our two-party system excludes—the European context allows for more enthusiasm for the party as a form for politics.¶ But there’s still a lot of disagreement on the far left about whether or not the party form is useful, and shouldn’t we in fact retreat and have multiple actions and artistic events—you know, the whole alter-globalization framework. That’s still alive in a lot of places. CM: You mentioned the structure of the US electoral system doesn’t allow for a political party to necessarily be the solution for a group like Occupy. Is that one of the reasons that activists dismiss the party structure as something that could help move their agenda forward?¶ JD:** We can think about the Black Panther Party as a neat example **in the US context:** A party which was operating not primarily to win elections but to galvanize social power**. That’s an interesting way of thinking about what else parties can do in the US.¶** Or we can think about parties in terms of local elections**. Socialist Alternative has been doing really neat work all over the country, organizing around local elections with people running as socialist candidates not within a mainstream party. I think that even as we come up against the limits of a two-party system, we can also begin to think better about local and regional elections.¶ The left really likes that old saw: “Think Globally, Act Locally.” And then it rejects parties—even though** political parties are, historically, forms **that do that,** that actually scale, that operate on multiple levels as organizations**.¶ That we have a two-party system makes sense as an excuse why** people haven’t used left parties very well in the US, but that doesn’t have to be the case**.¶** And **one more thing:** there is a ton of sectarianism in the far left parties that exist**. Many still fight battles that go back to the twenties, thirties, forties, fifties, and haven’t let that go.** That has to change**. We don’t need that kind of sectarian purity right now.¶ CM: You ask the question, “How do we move from the inert mass to organized activists?” You mention how you were at Occupy Wall Street; you write about being there on 15 October 2011 as the massive crowd filled New York’s Times Square. And you mention this one young speaker, and he addresses the crowd; they’re deciding if they should move on to Washington Square Park or not, because they need to go somewhere where there are better facilities. You then quote the speaker saying, “We can take this park. We can take this park tonight. We can also take this park another night. Not everyone may be ready tonight. Each person has to make their own autonomous decision. No one can decide for you. You have to decide for yourself. Everyone is an autonomous individual.”¶ Did that kind of** individualism kill Occupy Wall Street from the start**?¶ JD: Yeah, I think so. A lot of times I blame the** rhetorics of consensus and horizontalism**, but both of those** are rooted in an individualism that says politics must begin with each individual, their interests, their experience, their positions, and so on. As collectivity forms—which is not easy when everyone’s beginning from their individual position—what starts to happen is that people start looking for how their exact experiences and interests are not being recognized**.¶ I think that** the left has given in too much to this assumption that politics begins with an individual**. That’s a liberal assumption.** Leftists, historically, begin with the assumption that politics begins in groups. And **for the left in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,** the operative group is class. Class **is what** determines where our political interests come from**.¶ I try to do everything I can in the book** to dismantle the assumption **that politics, particularly** left politics, should begin with the individual**. Instead I want people thinking about how** the individual is a fiction, and a really oppressive fiction at that**. And one that’s actually, conveniently, falling apart.¶ CM: You write about Occupy Wall Street having been an opening but having had no continuing momentum. You mention that the party could add that needed momentum. That’s one of the things that parties can do.** The structure of the party can continue momentum and keep the opening alive**.¶ When you say that a party could be a solution for a movement like Occupy, you don’t mean the Democratic Party, do you?¶ JD: I’ve got a lot of layers on this question. My first answer is that no, I really mean the Communist Party. My friends call this “Jodi’s Fantasy Revolutionary Party” as a joke, because** the kind of Communist Party I take as my model may not be real, or may have only existed for a year and a half in Brooklyn in the thirties**. And I don’t mean the real-existing Communist Party in the US now, which still exists and basically endorses Democrats.¶ My idea is to think in terms of how** we can imagine the Communist Party again as a force—what it could be like if all of our left activist groups and small sectarian parties decided to come together in a new radical left party**.¶ So no, I don’t envision the Democratic Party as being that. That’s not at all what I have in mind.** I’m thinking of a radical left party to which elections are incidental**. Elections might be means for organizing, but** the goal isn’t just being elected. The goal is overthrowing capitalism. The goal is being able to build a communist society as capitalism crumbles**.¶ Second,** it could be the case—as a matter of tactics on the ground in particular contexts—that working for a Democratic candidate might be useful**. It could be the case that trying to take over a local Democratic committee in order to get communist/socialist/radical left candidates elected could also be useful.** But **I don’t see the goal as taking over the Democratic Party.** That’s way too limited a goal, and it’s a goal that presupposes the continuation of the system we have, rather than its overthrow**.¶ CM: But how difficult would it be for a Communist Party to emerge free of its past associations with the Soviet Union? Can we even use the word “communist” or is it impossibly taboo?¶ JD: We have to recognize that the right is still scared of communism. That means the term is still powerful. That means it still has the ability to instill fear in its enemies. I think that’s an argument for keeping the word “communism.”¶ It’s also amazing that close to half of Iowa participants in the caucuses say that they are socialist. Four or five years ago, people were saying socialism is dead in the US. No one could even say the word. So I actually think holding on to the word “communism” is useful not only because our enemies are worried about communism, but also because it helps make the socialists seem really, really mainstream, and that’s good. We don’t want socialism to seem like something that only happens in Sweden. We want it to seem like that’s what America should have at a bare minimum.¶ One last thing about the history of communism:** every political ideology that has infused a state form has done awful things**. For the most part, if people like the ideology, they either let the awful things slide, or they use the ideology to criticize the awful things that the state does. We can do the same thing with communism. It’s helpful to recognize that** the countries we understand to have been **ruled by** Communist **Parties** were never really communist—they didn’t even claim to have achieved communism themselves**. We can say that** state socialism made these mistakes, and in so doing was betraying communist ideals**.¶ I don’t think we need to abandon these terms or come up with new ones. I think we need to use the power that they have. And people recognize this, which is what makes it exciting.¶ CM: You write, “Some contemporary crowd observers claim the crowd for democracy. They see in the amassing of thousands a democratic insistence, a demand to be heard and included. In the context of communicative capitalism, however, the crowd exceeds democracy.¶ “In the 21st century, dominant nation-states exercise power as democracies. They bomb and invade as democracies, ‘for democracy’s sake.’ International political bodies legitimize themselves as democratic, as do the contradictory and tangled media practices of communicative capitalism. When crowds amass in opposition, they pose themselves against democratic practices, systems, and bodies. To claim the crowd for democracy fails to register this change in the political setting of the crowd.”¶ So are crowds today, the protesters today, opposed to democracy? Or are they opposed to the current state of, let’s say, representative democracy?¶ JD: Let’s think about our basic environment. By “our,” now, I mean basically English-speaking people who use the internet and are listening to the radio and live in societies like the United States. In our environment, what we hear is that we live in democracy. We hear this all the time. We hear that the network media makes democratic exchange possible, that a free press is democracy, that we’ve got elections and that’s democracy.¶** When crowds amass **in this setting, if they are just at a football game,** it’s not a political statement. Even at a march **(fully permitted) that’s** registering opposition to the invasion of Iraq**, for example,** or concern about the climate**—all of those things are within the general environment of “democracy,” and** they don’t oppose the system. They don’t register as opposition to the system. They’re just saying that we want our view on this or that issue to count**.¶** But **the way that crowds have been amassing over the last four or five years—Occupy Wall Street is one example, but the Red Square debt movement in Canada is another; some of the more militant strikes of nurses and teachers are too—has been to say, “Look, the process that we have that’s been called democratic? It is not. We want to change that.”¶ It’s not that we are anti-democratic. It’s that democracy is too limiting a term to register our opposition.** We want something more. We want actual equality**. Democracy is too limiting. The reason it’s too limiting is we live in a context that understands itself as “democratic.” So democracy as a political claim, in my language, can’t “register the gap that the crowd is inscribing.” It can’t register real division or opposition. Democracy is just more of what we have.¶ CM: We are so dependent. We use social media so much, we use Facebook so much, we use so many of these avenues of what you call communicative capitalism so much. How can we oppose or reject this system without hurting ourselves and our ability to communicate our message to each other? Can we just go on strike? Can we become the owners of the means of communicative production?¶ JD: One of the ways that Marxism historically has understood the political problems faced by workers is our total entrapment and embeddedness in the capitalist system. What makes a strike so courageous is that workers are shooting themselves in the foot. They’re not earning their wage for a time, as a way to put pressure on the capitalist owner of the workplace.¶ What does that mean under communicative capitalism? Does it mean that we have to shoot ourselves in the foot by completely extracting ourselves from all of the instruments of communication? Or does it mean that we change our attitude towards communication? Or does it mean that we develop our own means of communication?¶ There’s a whole range here. I’m not a Luddite. I don’t think the way we’re going to bring down capitalism is by quitting Facebook. I think that’s a little bit absurd. I think what makes more sense is to think of how** we could use the tools we have to bring down the master’s house. We can consolidate our message together. We can get a better sense of how many we are. We can develop common modes of thinking. We can distribute organizing materials for the revolutionary party**.¶ I don’t think that an extractive approach to our situation in communicative media is the right one. I think it’s got to be more tactical. How do we use the tools we have, and how do we find ways to seize the means of communication? This would mean the collectivization of Google, Facebook, Amazon, and using those apparatuses. But that would probably have to be day two of the revolution.¶ CM: Jodi, I’ve got one last question for you, and it’s the Question from Hell, the question we might hate to ask, you might hate to answer, or our audience is going to hate the response.¶ How much did the narrative that Occupy created, of the 99% and the 1%, undermine a of collectivity? Because it doesn’t include everyone…¶ JD:** Division is crucial. Collectivity is never everyone**. What this narrative did was produce** the divided collectivity that we need**. It’s great to** undermine the **~~stupid~~** myth of American unity**, “The country has to pull together” and all that crap. It’s fantastic that** Occupy Wall Street asserted collectivity through division. This is class conflict. This says there is not a unified society. Collectivity is the collectivity of us against them. It produced the proper collectivity: an antagonistic one.

# Case

#### Extinction o/ws under any framework, even under moral uncertainty – infinite future generations

Pummer 15 — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, “Moral Agreement on Saving the World“, Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) \*\*we do not endorse ableist language=

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

**Preciado’s account of the pharmacopornographic regime grants a figment of legibility to a unified cognitive capitalism – this biocapitalist regime is neither unitary nor a break from traditional accumulation and their account of the world economy blurs the social ontology of biotechnological production devastating the periphery – what’s more, their praxis is actively dependent on those same genomic control machines**

**Rosenberg 14** (Jord/ana Rosenberg, associate professor of Literature at UMass Amherst, PhD from Cornell, 2014, “The Molecularization of Sexuality: On Some Primitivisms of the Present,” Theory & Event Volume 17 Issue 2, footnote 45 included in curly braces, modified) gz

Recently, work that shapes itself within the Spinozist tradition31 makes recourse to the fields of molecular biology and chemistry as representative of the “self-organizing capacity of inorganic systems.”32 It appears to some as if the molecular-biological present is a realization of Spinoza’s materialism. Beatriz [Paul] **Preciado**, for example, has recently argued that the capacity to produce “molecular joy” – the “potential gaudendi” (or, “orgasmic potential”) of the body – represents the “raw material” of what the Italian autonomists refer to as “cognitive capitalism”: “the biomolecular and organic structure of the body,” Preciado asserts, “is the last hiding place of these biopolitical systems of control. This moment contains all the horror and exaltation of the body’s political potential.”33

While Preciado’s interventions are engaging and vital – and the history of the industrial production of testosterone that she charts is invaluable – there is a certain **(reductive) economism** to this argument, one we might not recognize immediately but that requires our attention. Mark the logic of the claims, particuarly the assertion that the molecular is a new frontier of raw material extraction/exploitation so significant as to shape the world-system: “the world economy is dependent on the production and circulation of hundreds of tons of synthetic steroids and technically transformed organs, fluids, cells (techno-blood, techno-sperm, techno-ovum, etc.).”34 I think that Preciado’s insistence about the epochal centrality of the molecular to the “world economy” might be debatable. As Kaushik Sunder Rajan has argued extensively, biocapital in itself **does not mark a distinct phase of capitalist production**: “I wish to clarify the relationship of biocapital to capital (and to capitalisms) in precisely these terms. Biocapital **does not signify a distinct epochal phase of capitalism** that leaves behind or radically ruptures capitalism as we have known it.”35 The reason why biocapital, in itself, does not represent a critical new phase of capitalism is both that **capitalism is “not a unitary category**,” and that “biocapital itself **takes shape in incongruent fashion across the multiple sites of its global emergence**.”36 Preciado’s “world economy,” in other words–not to mention the figure of “biotechnology” itself – presents a **figment of coherence** that is **illegible outside** **of** **the uneven spatial contexts of production, extraction, circulation and consumption** at work in the **constitution of biocapital-as-value**. As Sunder Rajan explains: “The everyday existence of a biotech or a pharmaceutical company … involves the **coexistence of** **at least these two simultaneous,** **distinct, yet mutually constitutive forms of capital**.”37 Preciado’s account of what “the world economy” “is,” however, focuses largely on circulation and commodity-usage (such as the testosterone she [he] self-administers). From this vantage point, the molecular may appear (to Preciado) as both a uniquely “horrifyingly” exploited raw material and an immediately available resource for resistance. But to make such claims runs the risk of **blurring the many mediations of labor, spatial unevenness, and geopolitical contingencies** that **define the production of the biotechnology** **itself**: that **constitute**, in fact, **its** **social ontology**. The ontological Being of testosterone, put another way, is **not legible from the point of its** **consumption**, even if one claims that, in taking it, one is making one’s own body available as an exploitable resource and that one is thus in some more immediate way in relation to the production of biocapitalistic value (though I think this tendency of Preciado’s argument is also debatable).38 What Sunder Rajan makes clear is that **biotechnology is most legible from the perspective of** **its** **production**.

We may hear an echo between Preciado’s argument and Eugene Thacker’s (to my mind) unaccountable conviction regarding revolutionary immediacies of molecular “agency” in which:

… the nonhuman domain of cells, enzymes, and genes… metabolic networks, biopathways, single-point mutations, immunoknowledge, protein folding – offer a resistance to the genecentric and reductionist approaches taken by the biotech and pharmaceutical industries.39

Here, Thacker **eliminates** **questions of** **confrontation, contingency, collectivization** **(not to mention** **passion)** **from** **the thinking of** **resistance**, and instead ascribes a kind of **determinate trajectory to the autonomization of cellular life**. One wants, at this point, to ask: was it only in 1989 that Stuart Hall directed our attention to the “arena of social reproduction” as a “critical ‘new’ sit[e] of politics?” – one that, he argued, is “both material and symbolic, since we are **reproducing not only** **the** **cells** **of the body** **but** **also the** **categories of the culture**.” Hall argued against a **scientific socialism** for which “reproduction” was restricted to cellular reproduction. The intervention here was to **direct us away from cells** and **towards** **the composite of** **intimacies, gendered comportments, and affective life** that make up the field of reproduction and that, in part after Hall’s urging, we have extrapolated quite a bit since then. And yet now we are back to cells. Given that it has only been 25 years, something significant must have happened to cells to have erased the **disciplinary memory** of their **association with** **the stodgiest** **Stalinisms**. Of course, as we know, things have happened to cells since 1989; Nadia Abu El-Haj, Sunder Rajan, Dorothy Roberts, and Kim Tallbear have eloquently and forcefully charted the **racialized geopolitics** of the production of biocommodities.40 Bruce Braun, Sandro Mezzadra, Neil Smith, Nikolas Rose and others have explained how molecular material might represent a **new frontier of primitive accumulation and resource extraction**.41 But if the conditions have shifted, **surely this** **shift** **doesn’t mean** **that** **the location of** **our** **resistance is now molecular?**42

Sunder Rajan’s presentation of biotechnology’s corrugation by the **uneven terrain of capital accumulation** demonstrates that the “molecular” as such – the “nonhuman domain” to which Thacker refers – is **less an empirical description** **of the stuff of biocapital**, as it is **figure-of-concealment** that **flattens the contradictory dynamics of the production and circulation of these forms of value**.

I would like now to return to the question of the molecularity of consciousness with which we began. Delany has presented us with a unique proposition regarding the molecular: that Spinoza could only imagine the materiality of affect, the potentiality of substance, and the interrelated substance of the world via an emphatically un-molecular conception of consciousness. In Through the Valley, materiality and the molecular are unaligned.

I have opened with Mama Grace’s pronouncements on the molecular because it is here, I believe, that Delany restores the radically social quality of Spinoza’s thought to a present that threatens to de-historicize and de-socialize materialism and the Spinozist tradition. What Through the Valley allows us to notice – and now to question – are the ways in which discourses of embodiment, subjectivity, sexuality, and life itself in the present have come to be marked by a kind of molecularization.43

4. Molecularization of Sexuality/Molecularization of Sociality

By “molecularization of sexuality,” then, we might be referencing at least three things: the thinking of sexuality at the particulate level of the body and of objects; the popularization of the biomedical management of sexuality (especially – but not exclusively – rendered in the coming-into-focus of transgender as a category of analysis); the Deleuze and Guattarian sense of a microphysics of desire and desiring-production.

These conceptions of the molecular are not identical. In fact, at times they are explicitly counterposed or in friction. But the discursive phenomenon of the molecular – rather than a catalogue of its various usages – is what we are concerned with here. More specifically, we are concerned with the way in which the molecular operates as an abstraction, and comes to function fungibly across different methodological approaches.

To say that the molecular is an abstraction is not to say that it signifies in a vague manner. Quite the opposite. A concept becomes an abstraction when it collects within itself a number of different, singular – but knotted – instantiations. Here I am drawing on Marx’s well-known conception of a “concrete abstraction” as the “synthesis of many definitions, thus representing the unity of diverse aspects.”44 Along similar lines, if the molecular is an abstraction, it is so due to its variety of concrete significations and uses, and because historical forces have combined to make it so.45 {45. And here, Preciado’s history of the production of synthetic hormones post-WWII becomes quite useful, although as one can anticipate, **I do not agree with** her **[his] conception of “adding” value** in what follows: “what if, in reality, the insatiable bodies of the multitude—their cocks, clitorises, anuses, hormones, and neurosexual synapses – what if sexuality, seduction, and the pleasure of the multitude were all the mainsprings of the creation of value added to the contemporary economy? Preciado, Testo Junkie (Kindle Locations 385–386). In much the same way that Silvia Federici argued that the body – specifically its “vivisection” into “useful” and “unuseful” capacities was the “first machine produced under capitalism” – Preciado points us to the ways in which sexuality and sexual difference continue to be an engine for the reproduction of capitalism. However, where Federici is concerned with the mediating sphere of reproduction, and its myriad labors, Preciado **turns to the body as a** **kind of** **self-mediating factory of“value**. This **“socialization” of production** – I use Alberto Toscano’s term here – tends to **occlude** **two “hidden abodes”**: **both the labor of production itself** along with **that of the reproductive spheres**.} Consequently, the question with which we are concerned is not so much what are the constituent parts of the molecular (such a question would produce an endless list – a tendency, in fact, that is proper to object-oriented methods, and has been noted by many of its commentators), but rather: **what are the historical relationships** that make possible the abstraction of the molecular as such?

#### Their author says that the state is necessary

-prefer our reading – it’s from an interview with KM’s author and best reflects intent

Preciado 13, Beatriz Preciado, professor of Political History of the Body, Gender Theory, and History of Performance at Paris VIII, Pharmacopornography: An Interview with Beatriz Preciado, Interview conducted by Ricky Tucker, http://www.theparisreview.org/blog/2013/12/04/pharmacopornography-an-interview-with-beatriz-preciado/

Do you think tools like Testogel and estrogen create more of a democracy in the hands of the marginalized?

We don’t have to be afraid of questioning democracy, but I’m also very interested in disability, nonfunctional bodies, other forms of functionality and cognitive experiences. Democracy and the model of democracy is still too much about able bodies, masculine able bodies that have control over the body and the individual’s choices, and have dialogues and communications in a type of parliament. We have to imagine politics that go beyond the parliament, otherwise how are we going to imagine politics with nonhumans, or the planet? I am interested in the model of the body as subjectivity that is working within democracy, and then goes beyond that. Also, the global situation that we are in requires a revolution. There is no other option. We must manage to actually create some political alliance of minority bodies, to create a revolution together. Otherwise these necropolitical techniques will take the planet over. In this sense, I have a very utopian way of thinking, of rethinking new technologies of government and the body, creating new regimes of knowledge. The domain of politics has to be taken over by artists. Politics and philosophy both are our domains. The problem is that they have been expropriated and taken by other entities for the production of capital or just for the sake of power itself. That’s the definition of revolution, when the political domain becomes art. We desperately need it.