
# Open source



lol

# 1

#### The People’s Republic of China should establish an independent, fourth body–comprised of randomly-selected representative samples of the population and experts, and that solicits petitions to challenge government action dedicated to protecting the interests of succeeding generations. The body should have the stated mandate and authority over the unconditional right to strike.

#### Allocating authority trades off with future generations – only the cp solves by creating a new branch responsible for the plan whose sole responsibility is overseeing the interests of future generations

Tremmel 13 [Joerg Chet Tremmel is a Professor for "intergenerationally just policies" at the University of Tuebingen. He is Editor-in-chief of the Intergenerational Justice Review and a visiting lecturer at the Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-University Frankfurt, the University of Stuttgart and the Heinrich-Heine-University in Dusseldorf, Germany. An extended separation of powers model as the theoretical basis for the representation of future generations. July 26, 2013. https://www.futurejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Paper\_Future-Branch\_Tremmel.pdf]

And rightly so. The absence of representation of future generations means that conflicts of interest are decided by the majority of eligible voters, not the majority of those affected by the decision. Future people that are relevantly affected by a decision don’t have any influence over it. This ‘representation gap’ is fundamentally different from deficiencies in the participatory rights of other social minorities or interest groups for which representation is also lacking (e.g. women, the elderly, or foreigners). These groups are present here and now; they can take part in political discourse, write opinion-editorials, appear on talk-shows and in many cases participate in elections. None of these options are available to future generations. “The future is another country”, states Posner,8 paraphrasing that the welfare of future generations is as low on the agenda of political incumbents as the welfare of a foreign country.

If future citizens could assert their interests in the political decision-making process, majority outcomes in important political decisions of the present would be different. Energy policy is a good example: Energy production of present generations, which relies heavily on fossil fuels, provides a high standard of living today, but at the expense of creating serious disadvantages for the medium-term future of fifty to a hundred years. Post-1990 - the year in which the IPCC’s First Assessment Report assessed a connection between anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions and climate change with a 90 per cent probability- presently living generations can no longer legitimately claim ignorance of the consequences of their actions. Scientific analyses indicate that current energy policy intensifies the natural greenhouse effect and causes the global average temperature to rise.9 Let’s assume that the future individuals born in the next 200 years could partake in the next general election, in the present. The consequence would be that all parties would rewrite their official party positions on today’s energy policy and implement a much more rapid decline in carbon dioxide emissions. The same effect could be achieved if a future branch were implemented in the set-up of democracies as a fourth power in the separation of powers model.

Especially with regard to environmental matters, the effects of current actions extend far into the future and have the potential to seriously negatively influence the quality of life of numerous future generations, as figure 1 shows.10

In light of these facts, a prolongation of the legislative session seems appropriate. However, election periods cannot even come close to corresponding to the time span in which the effects of political decisions are felt without restricting voters’ influence in such a way that would endanger the very essence of democracy.

Problems posed by the short-sightedness of democracies are not limited to ecological issues. Long before the emergence of modern environmental movements, excessive national debts were considered a prime example of carelessness with regard to the future. As early as 1816 Thomas Jefferson discussed potential solutions to this problem.11 Insufficient investments in education or failing to adjust pay-as-you-go social security systems are further examples of lacking long-term orientation in political systems.

#### Discounting future generations causes extinction, especially over emerging tech – only formalizing a mechanism to weight their concerns solves

Jones et al 18 [Natalie Jones, Mark O'Brien, and Thomas Ryan, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom. Representation of future generations in United Kingdom policy-making. Futures Volume 102, September 2018, Pages 153-163. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328717301179#sec0005]

Global catastrophic and existential risks pose central challenges for intergenerational justice and the structure of our current democracy. The Global Challenges Report 2016 defines global catastrophic risk as risk of an ‘event or process that, were it to occur, would end the lives of approximately 10% or more of the global population, or do comparable damage’ (Global Challenges Foundation & Global Priorities Project, 2016). A subset of catastrophic risks are ‘existential’ risks, which would end human civilisation or lead to the extinction of humanity (Global Challenges Foundation & Global Priorities Project, 2016). Catastrophic and existential risks may be categorised in terms of ongoing risks, which could potentially occur in any given year (e.g. nuclear war; pandemics), versus emerging risks which may be unlikely today but will become significantly more likely in the future (e.g. catastrophic climate change; risks stemming from emerging technologies). Ongoing risks have existed for some time now and are generally well-understood. However, emerging risks, particularly those arising from technological developments, are less understood and demand increasing attention from scientists and policymakers. These technological developments include advances in synthetic biology, geoengineering, distributed manufacturing and artificial intelligence (AI) (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, 2014). Although the impact of these technologies is still very uncertain, expert estimates suggest a non-negligible probability of catastrophic harm.

In this article we rely on two main premises. The first is that future generations are under-represented in current political structures partly due to political ‘short-termism’ or ‘presentism’ (Thompson, 2010). Governments primarily focus on short-term concerns, which mean that they may systematically neglect global catastrophic risks and, accordingly, future generations (Global Priorities Project et al., 2014). The problem of presentism transcends political divisions: people across the political spectrum are concerned about its effects, and should care about mitigating global catastrophic risks. This situation is exacerbated in that the good of mitigating global catastrophic and existential risks is typically global. Individual political actors (even whole countries) bear many costs in providing for such goods, whereas the benefits are dispersed globally. In addition to the benefits of mitigating existential risks being global, many of the beneficiaries are future people who do not exist presently and as such have no voice in the political process. There is a clear lack of incentives to mitigate such risks, and market failure should be expected (Beckstead, 2013).

The second key assumption is that we as a society consider the rights and interests of future generations to be important. It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a complete account of the philosophical arguments on this matter. It is sufficient to note that although significant philosophical problems have been pointed out, chiefly due to the fact that the actions of present people have a causal impact on the values, number and identity of future individuals (Parfit, 1984), there are several theories of intergenerational justice that may support this assumption (Gosseries, 2008).

The need to include explicit pathways in governance structures for accountability to the rights and needs of future generations has been noted (Global Priorities Project et al., 2014). Some thought has been put into how future generations may be represented in relation to environmental risks such as climate change, resource depletion and biodiversity loss; this research is reflected in the sustainable development literature (Brown Weiss, 1990). However, this problem has not been explored in relation to society’s burgeoning awareness of technology-related catastrophic and existential risks. In addition, such pathways have not been fully explored in the United Kingdom (UK) context. This policy paper hopes to fill this gap in the literature.

#### Intergenerational governance challenges can arise from any policy area – err neg to build resilience to black swan events, because the aff’s concrete approach prevents future adaptation

Boston 14 [Jonathan Boston, Professor of Public Policy, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, Fulbright Fellow, American University. Governing for the Future: How to bring the long-term into short-term political focus. November 5, 2014. https://www.american.edu/spa/cep/upload/jonathan-boston-lecture-american-university.pdf]

Further, the problem under consideration is fundamentally one of ‘governance’ and how it can be improved. It is about societal steering and prioritization, especially steering and prioritization over extended periods of time. It is about how democratic societies can shape, ‘weave’ or ‘navigate’ the future in desirable directions (Dror, 2003), implement coherent and sustained efforts to address long-term challenges (Lempert, 2007a), minimize foreseeable, yet avoidable, damages, and prepare for the unexpected - such as ‘wild cards’ (Fukuyama, 2007) and ‘black swan’ events (Taleb, 2007). Accordingly, it is not a narrow policy problem; nor is it limited to a particular policy domain or even a specific category or class of policy issues; and nor is it primarily about finding once-and-for-all solutions to major long-term policy problems. Such problems, after all, are frequently highly complex and require a never-ending series of efforts to address. And even if complete and durable solutions can be found, new and equally difficult problems are constantly emerging. The dilemma of how to govern well for the long-term, therefore, is enduring and relentless; it confronts each and every generation of policy-makers; it is not limited to one particular epoch. To be sure, the precise contours and the specific manifestations will be constantly evolving, thereby posing fresh, novel and distinctive challenges for each successive generation. But the broad structure of the problem - namely, of how best to encourage prudent intertemporal decision-making - remains the same.

#### The perm creates overlapping authority for enforcing the plan – that prevents modifications and tailoring enforcement with future generations in mind because the plan’s durably fiatted which is a functional veto over any decision – inherent uncertainty means that guts solvency

Thompson 10 [Department of Government, Harvard University. Representing Future Generations: Political Presentism and Democratic Trusteeship. Critical Review of International and Political Philosophy, 2010. https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/9464286/Representing%20Future%20Generations-Barry%20final.pdf?sequence=1]

The argument from uncertainty has considerable force, and militates against any theory or principle that would try to specify a wide range of the needs and wants of future generations, and instruct representatives to pursue policies to satisfy them. But in the radical form in which it is often stated, it is not plausible. We can be fairly confident about some of the harms we are causing or to which we are contributing. Even in the remote future, we can reasonably assume that citizens will not want to live with toxic chemicals, foul air, and chronic disease.3 More importantly for the conception of representation I suggest below, we can assume that future generations will need a way of deciding collectively how they want to cope with these harms, and what rights and goods they want to pursue or forgo under these conditions.

The argument from uncertainty, then, may cast doubt on any approach that would promote the welfare or the rights of future generations across the whole range of welfare or rights, but it does not justify ignoring all of their potential claims. More positively, it provides a reason to protect their capacity for making their own collective decisions. The very uncertainty that warrants doubts about what their needs will be supports an obligation to try to make sure that they have a process for deciding together what their needs are and how they should be met.

#### It competes:

#### 1. Ought means certain action

OED – (Oxford English Dictionary, “ought, v.”, accessed 10-20-18, HKR-AM)

\* Expressing duty or obligation of any kind; originally used of moral obligation, but also in various more general senses, expressing what is proper, correct, advisable, befitting, or expected. Orig. and chiefly in past tense form (indicative or subjunctive), which may be either past or present in meaning. (The only current use in standard English.) The subject is properly the person (or thing) bound by the obligation. The latter is expressed by a following infinitive (with, formerly also without, to), sometimes only implied from the context. With a non-personal subject, or followed by a passive infinitive, it expresses obligation on the part of an agent who is not specified in the clause but contextually implied (the subject in the case of the passive construction being the person, etc., to whom the obligation is due); e.g. the hearth ought to lie level = it is advisable that one builds the hearth level; parents ought to be honoured = one has a duty to honour parents.

#### 2. Unconditional – means without restrictions or absolute

USLegal ND [Unconditional Law and Legal Definition. https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/unconditional/]

Unconditional Law and Legal Definition

Unconditional means without conditions; without restrictions; or absolute. For instance, unconditional promise is a promise that is unqualified in nature. A party who makes an unconditional promise must perform that promise even though the other party has not performed according to the bargain.

# 2

#### A just government of Government of China in Beijing ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

**The phrase “People’s Republic” encourages and masks eugenic violence and state repression**

**Zhang 16** [Charlie Yi, assistant professor of Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of Kentucky, “Queering the National Body of Contemporary China,” Journal of Women Studies, 32.2, pp. 1-26]

When recycled twenty years later for the prc’s sixtieth anniversary, the gendered infl ection of the song shift s again as China has warranted its standing as a critical nexus of the transnational network of capital, and this move is enabled and fi nalized by a set of discursive and visual techniques applied in the dance that the song is used to accompany. Framed at the center of the camera, a group of young and delicate female dancers are presenting their blissful performances to uphold the most important scene of the parade— the convivial celebration of the prc’s sixtieth birthday. As the camera moves up and down for close- ups of their well- shaped bodies, fl exible and nimble bearing and posture, and subordinate countenance, these performers are reproduced as the submissive, compliant, and feminized subjects as well. Akin to other gendered eff orts to signify contemporary China, their highlighted femininity, via the petal- shaped costumes designed to fashion their bodies for this visual- narrative end, is further intensifi ed in a way to trump almost all bodily traces that index their other identities, such as class and ethnicity. At the center of the scene, what the dancers surround is a fl oral fl oat shaped into a peony. As this huge fl ower grows into full blossom, it unfolds and upholds a female dancer who is wobbling her tender sleeves ethereally and submissively to add to the feminizing tenor of this ceremonial scenario. Also, as the object of the blessing, the otherwise ambiguous and elusive imagery of China concretizes and congeals via the referential point— the feminized subjects of blessing. Antithetical to and dependent on the subordinate and feminine performers, China, in other words, is masculinized and incarnated for collective admiration and veneration by Chinese people. **Naming China** rather than **the PRC** as the object of the blissful ritual, this show also **inadvertently displaces the state** as the real blessed establishment with the imagined entity of nation. As the “imagined community,” the nation-state is not an a priori entity that is always unified. And since nation is a more recent construct than state, special efforts are constantly required to weld them with each other. **This knowledge is particularly important for contemporary China as the state has disavowed its earlier promise of leading the Chinese nation** and **people** toward **social justice** and **equality** and has taken the stand by capital. Insomuch as these practices have deeply restructured the social relations and kindled enormous antagonisms, and the class-focused Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrines have lost their appeal as the ideological foundation, the state has to look for new resources to **legitimize its sovereign power** and recreate the nation-state unity. Nationalism, undoubtedly, is one of the most important and effective resources for this task but could also pose new changes to the state when diverging from its preset trajectory. As the Chinese authorities try to fuel and invigorate popular forms of nationalism for self-legitimation, they are also “fearful that an unrestrained spate of mass feelings might detour or even endanger the state’s other policy interests and, worse yet, could turn inwards against the regime itself.” In 2012, in the state-organized anti-Japanese protests for the support of government policies, the nationalist demonstration soon transgressed the prescribed agenda and turned into massive democratic and anti-corruption convocations that raised a red flag over the Party line. In view of the unresolvable crevice and contestation between the statist and populist forms of nationalism, the state has to find a safe and efficacious way to produce and contain nationalist imaginations in ways to fortify its legitimacy and social control. For modern constructions of nation-state, the creation and maintenance of a **coherent concept** of **“the people**” take **a vital position**. As “the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power,” the inclusion of “bare life”—human beings as purely biological entities protected by no state power—into the sovereignty premises as citizens, Giorgio Agamben suggests, **anchors the perpetual and ultimate source of sovereign power for the state.** Put simply, the act of defining whom to include in and exclude from its framework of sovereignty as citizens—**or “the people”**—**legitimizes and valorizes** the state as a coherent and self-contained politico-juristic unity. Meanwhile, citizenship should not be seen merely as a political entitlement defined and granted by the state but as more of a process of subject making entangled with complex dynamics. 68 Calling this process “cultural citizenship,” Aihwa Ong argues that it is “the cultural practice and beliefs produced out of negotiating the oft en ambivalent and contested relations with the state and its hegemonic forms that establish the criteria of belonging within a national population and territory.”69 Th roughout human history, categories such as race, gender and sexuality, due to their naturalized relation to body, are constantly invoked and deployed as the stable and constant platforms to ground political claims and propositions that are otherwise arbitrary and subject to challenge.70 As the state is increasingly challenged by subversive forces deriving from its marketizing practices, gender becomes an easy, conducive, and safeguarded resource not only to appease the public discontent with the surging class inequalities and social confl icts but also to reformulate the cultural citizenship to reglue the Chinese nation and state with each other.

**“Government of China in Beijing” means China – solves the case**

Jerome A. **Cohen 19**, former C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director of Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, professor at NYU School of Law since 1990 and Faculty Director of its U.S.-Asia Law Institute, is a leading American expert on Chinese law and government, began studying and teaching about China’s legal system in the early 1960s and from 1964 to 1979 introduced the teaching of Asian law into the curriculum of Harvard Law School, where he served as Jeremiah Smith Professor, Associate Dean and Director of East Asian Legal Studies, "My interview on the Taiwan Relations Act — Jerome A. Cohen", Jerome A. Cohen | 孔傑榮（柯恩）, http://www.jeromecohen.net/jerrys-blog/2019/2/22/my-interview-on-the-taiwan-relations-act

I'm proud to say that my former student, President Ma—I don't agree with everything he's done, but he's a very brilliant man—did something very impressive. He managed to make over 20 agreements with the Mainland despite the fact that the Mainland's position has long been: "We will **never** treat Taiwan on an equal basis. **We are the** central **government of China in Beijing**. Those people down there are merely one of our **provinces**. We will never negotiate with them on an equal basis. There's **no possibility** of there being 'two Chinas', **two Chinese governments**."

#### PICs that compete of the plan text are good –

1. They incentivize detailed plan writing – that narrows the debate to technical details, those are key on an arms control topic and guarantee built in solvency deficits about vagueness and compliance, AND it ensures there is a limited number of good pics, which solves their offense

2. Excluding PICs justifies aff severance and kicking words in the plan, which removes every counterplan and makes any coherent basis for neg prep impossible – that destroys CP ground broadly because every CP is a PIC out of something, and it’s arbitrary and unpredictable, which means it can’t set a norm, but it can incentivize going for theory and crowd out substance

3. It undermines neg flex – that outweighs because of built in aff advantages that make predicting and answering PICs easy, because it just requires a defense of the process and phrasing of the plan

4. If we lose theory, kick the CP – the DA is offense, and anything else is disproportionate punishment

5. You don’t have to debate yourself – PICs change the statutory language of arms control deals and legislation – that guarantees built in deficits about circumvention and legal clarity

# 3

#### OBOR diplomacy is a mirage to secure maritime dominance in East Asia

Kapila 19 [Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, with a Masters in Defence Science (Madras University) and a PhD in Strategic Studies (Allahabad University) Combines a rich experience of Army (Brigadier) and diplomatic assignments in major countries."United States’ Potent Existential Crisis: The China Threat – Analysis." <https://www.eurasiareview.com/18012019-united-states-potent-existential-crisis-the-china-threat-analysis/>]

United States policy formulations of this decade of a ‘Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific’ and the recent emphasis on Indo Pacific Security Blueprint are seemingly belated but welcome steps to checkmate China’s unrestrained flexing of its military muscle as evident in the South China Sea.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call on Chinese Armed Forces to prepare for an all- out war are not defensive calls by a besieged nation but like Hitlerian Germany, these are offensive calls of a revisionist power. Annexation of Taiwan by use of military force seems to be China’s aim today. This has a larger aim of challenging United States resolve and determination to maintain its Superpower status. China has placed the United States on the horns of a strategic dilemma where the United States will be damned if it does not militarily intervene to defend Taiwan and if it does so it risks a full-fledged war with China. China is gambling on the United States shying away from the latter option.

Right from the turnover of the 19th Century till today no major power, not even Nazi Germany, has dared to challenge the United States predominance, geopolitically and strategically, as China is now engaged in doing so. Even at the height of the Cold War 1945-91 when the United States and the Former Soviet Union were involved in a bitter ideological struggle one did not witness the unfolding of the type of China’s ‘Grand Strategy Blueprint’ decades in the making and operationalising, to initially unravel United States security architecture in Asia Pacific, and graduated now to a more vividly clear reality in 2019 that China is on the avowed path of emerging as the ‘sole challenger ‘of United States predominance and exceptionalism. That China could geopolitically and strategically engage in the execution of such a blueprint unchallenged arose fundamentally from United States flawed policy decisions spread over many US Administrations. Such flawed US policy decisions sprung from misconceived American readings of China’s long range strategic intentions and short-term American geopolitical expediency subjugating and distorting United States strategic vision of the ‘China Threat’ to United States national security. The United States ‘original sin’ in relation to the latent China Threat to US national security can be placed on shoulders of US President Truman who ignored General MacArthur’s dire warnings on China and petulantly dismissed General MacArthur from the command of UN Forces in Korea. If Japan today after decades since 1945 continues as the United States most enduring and steadfast Ally, it has a lot to do with General MacArthur’s visionary zeal. The second most serious sin in relation to flawed US policy decisions was inflicted by US President Richard Nixon in 1972 egged by his Sinophiles Secretary of States Henry Kissinger. To spite the Former USSR the United States in 1972 endowed an unwarranted international legitimacy on China despite its disruptive credentials and thereafter followed as to what could be termed as a China Appeasement policy. The third sin was committed at the turn of the Millennium when US President Bush in his messianic zeal to tame President Saddam’s Iraq left untended both Afghanistan and more significantly Asia Pacific security. China made full use of the decade ending 2010 for its exponential military power expansion and with emphasis on a well-calibrated buildup of Chinese naval power for ‘naval operations in distant seas’.

China’s latest strategic-economic enterprises of One Belt One Road and Maritime Silk Route are nothing but an attempt to control maritime chokepoints along the global commons to United States disadvantage and as strategic pressure points against regional peer competitors.

#### Freedom of navigation conflicts escalate multiple hotspots.

Bonner '20 [Todd; 3/18/20; Masters of Defense Studies with focus on Chinese Domestic Policy from the Royal Military College of Canada; "Opinion: Maritime Freedom & the Global Commons," https://www.marinelink.com/news/opinion-maritime-freedom-global-commons-476727]

It has been decades since international relations in the world order dictated true competition for sea control, sea lines of communication, access to world markets, and diplomatic partnerships. However, it is becoming increasingly alarming that nations such as Iran, China and Russia seek to accumulate/consolidate power and re-define international maritime norms, potentially at the peril of diplomatic, economic, and military bonds that link NATO allies and critical partners.

Iran claims control of the Strait of Hormuz and has put the threat of closure or denial at the core of its asymmetric war strategy. In a 2019 statement in response to the U.S. plan to end waivers on Iranian oil exports, Alireza Tangsiri, head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps navy force confirmed that the Straits of Hormuz was a critical arrow in Iran’s proverbial military quiver. Tangsiri remarked that “If we are prevented from using it; we (Iran) will close it. In the event of any threats, we will not have the slightest hesitation to protect and defend Iran’s waterway.” 1

Renewed tensions between Iran and the United States, heightened further following the Trump administration’s decision to target Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani, have renewed Iranian narratives about closing the Straits of Hormuz in an effort to break another set of renewed western sanctions. Carrying one-fifth of the world’s traded sweet crude oil, a possible interruption of oil and gas exports through the strategic waterway would have a significant, negative, impact on the global economy. 2 Moreover, it is not only oil. According to the International Energy Association, huge amounts of natural gas are also transported on that route with an estimated 33 billion cubic meters of gas, including from Iran and Qatar, passing through the Strait of Hormuz each year. 3

Likewise, China’s attempts to rationalize and assert control of 80 to 90 percent of the South China Sea, including waters allocated to neighboring sovereign states under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are equally troubling. 4 As author Bill Hayton aptly describes it in book The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, the South China Sea is “both the fulcrum of world trade and the crucible for conflict.” 5 The challenge posed by China’s refusal to abide by international law in the South China Sea may potentially re-define the practical application of the concept of maritime freedom. Beijing is bullying its way through its selective application of UNCLOS to a maritime entitlement five times larger than permitted via the convention (China ratified UNCLOS in 1996) and customary international law, carving out an illegitimate sphere of influence. 6 In effect, if Beijing gets its way, the South China Sea will become a seaward extension of Chinese territory and the ruling Chinese Communist Party will ipso facto dictate what foreign vessels and aircraft can and cannot do. 7 The cascading effects for other critical SLOCs, from the Persian Gulf to the ever increasingly more accessible Arctic routes, could be severe if other coastal states, such as Iran and Russia, decide to press their own revisionist interpretations of maritime law. 8

Many Russia watcher and analysts support the premise that Russia, through its confrontation with the Ukrainian Navy in the Kerch Straits in November of 2018 and its subsequent restrictions on shipping, is similarly trying to rewrite the rules in the Sea of Azov, just as China has done in the South China Sea. Experts such as James Holmes, a professor of maritime strategy at the United States Naval War College, agree that the Russian actions in the Black Sea region pose a challenge to international maritime law.

“It’s an effort to set a precedent that Russia can then apply to other seas that it would also like to dominate if not control, much as the South China Sea is an expanse that China would like to ‘own,’ ” he said. “If Russia can define the Azov Sea as Russian territorial waters, there is no reason in principle it could not do so in the wider Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, Sea of Okhotsk, et cetera. So this is an easy win for Moscow and an easy place to set that precedent.” 9

In all of the examples above, the international norms and UNCLOS regulated system of maritime trade, commerce and military endeavors has come under direct challenge. In all such cases, it is incumbent upon maritime nations that believe in the freedom of the sea and require international sea based trade to maintain their quality of being, help defend this centuries-old concept that the high seas are a global commons. International waters belong to everyone and no one, with few, minor and narrowly defined exceptions. No state owns it, and no state can make laws dictating what others do there. 10 Operations, such as the ones listed above, threaten the freedom of the seas, seek to intimidate neighboring states and coerce weaker nations into violation of international law.

On a daily basis, surface naval forces of the NATO Alliance’s nations and partners are conducting peaceful operations across the globe. These joint forces at sea protect freedom of maneuver, secure the sea-lanes for global trade and economic growth, defend and promote key national interests and prevent competitors and adversaries from leveraging the world’s oceans against us. The navies of the democratic and peaceful countries of the world and the international maritime community share concern over safeguarding strategic sea lines of communication.

Versatile and scalable naval forces fulfill these crucial roles, which are the necessary preconditions to ensure the free movement of trade and commerce and to safeguard the interests of NATO and partner nations all the while maintaining a strictly defensive posture. The persistent forward presence and power projection of the Alliance’s naval forces backed by credible combat capability deters potential aggression and seeks to limit regional frictions from escalating to greater levels of conflict. These forces strengthen conditions that enable mutual prosperity.

The freedoms to use the maritime domain—the oceans, the littorals, waterways, and seafloor; the rise of global information systems, especially the role of data in decision making and the security of data supporting operational decision making are shared fundamental areas of concern, not only for the individual nations and the Alliance in general, but also for the maritime industry.

Security in the global maritime commons is not a given. Without a comprehensive, shared understanding of what is occurring in the maritime domain, achieved through a robust Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA), vital opportunities to detect and mitigate threats or critical vulnerabilities at the earliest opportunity may be lost. A comprehensive MSA network is required to facilitate information sharing and can only be established with the cooperation of military forces, national law enforcement agencies, and close cooperation with the international maritime transportation industry. Understanding Pattern of Life is critical to identifying abnormalities that may be indicators to hostile or subversive actions.

The lack of modern and agile global and regional governance structures has generated friction between the globalized corporate sector, maritime authorities and military policy-makers that undermines the maintenance of persistence relationships necessary to enhance true maritime situational awareness. In an increasingly inter-connected, inter-dependent and rapidly changing globalized world, there continues to be an absence of persistent relationships between the ever-increasing number of key stakeholders in the global maritime community of interest.

Operating according to disparate mandates, objectives, areas of responsibility and jurisdiction, there is an obvious need to develop a shared network and develop a collaborative contribution to achieve a comprehensive MSA capability in which all stakeholders’ requirements are met and enhanced. In the maritime domain, our continued freedom of the global commons requires an understanding of persistent relationships, time, space, risk, oceanography, the global supply chain, critical infrastructure and the environment, as well as the nature of the risk, and the capabilities, readiness and location of one’s competitors. So as James Holmes so eloquently states, these clashes are not merely about the Strait of Hormuz or the South China Sea.

The world’s oceans and seas comprise a single interconnected body of water. Seagoing nations must stand on the principle that maritime freedom is likewise indivisible. If the maritime community in general relinquishes its inherent freedoms in the global commons in one body of water for the sake of placating a predatory coastal state such as China, the global maritime community stands the risk some other strong coastal state will mount similar challenges in some other strategic waterway.

# Case

## adv

#### Chinese leadership is shot – COVID

Auslin 4/23/20 [Michael Auslin, Ph.D., is the Payson J. Treat Distinguished Research Fellow in Contemporary Asia at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. A historian by training, he specializes in U.S. policy in Asia and geopolitical issues in the Indo-Pacific region. "The Coronacrisis Will Simply Exacerbate The Geo-Strategic Competition Between Beijing And Washington." https://www.hoover.org/research/coronacrisis-will-simply-exacerbate-geo-strategic-competition-between-beijing-and]

Unlike in the early months of the pandemic, it is now increasingly accepted that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its local officials ordered a cover-up of what was happening in Wuhan. From intimidating whistleblowing doctors to a silencing of social media, and from destroying laboratory samples to buying up billions of pieces of personal protective equipment such as masks and gloves from around the world, the common wisdom now sees that the CCP prioritized protecting its own reputation and forestalling any domestic or international criticism of the kind that damaged it during the 2003 SARS cover-up. Most egregiously, Beijing lied to the World Health Organization about the nature of the virus in Wuhan, falsely claiming that there was no evidence of human-to-human transmission. This, and the decision not to restrict Chinese travel abroad during the Lunar New Year, destroyed any meaningful attempts to contain the virus inside China, and instead allowed it to ravage the globe.

As the scale of the catastrophe became clear, the party-state orchestrated a worldwide propaganda campaign to portray Beijing as successful in its battle against the coronavirus and as having selflessly helped the rest of the world, from “donating” medical supplies to sharing scientific information. Indeed, Chinese officials went so far as to claim that the United States created the disease and planted it in China.

Beijing’s propaganda campaign, while designed to divert any criticism of the regime, has poisoned relations with Washington, not to mention other countries, and is likely to result in an intensified bout of counter-campaigning from the United States. As Beijing steadfastly refuses to acknowledge any shortcomings in its response to the coronacrisis, voices across the globe are understandably questioning how it can be trusted as an international actor. The new dynamic in China’s relations with the world will be a deep-seated distrust of Beijing’s statements.

Moreover, Beijing is slowly reaping the fruits of its decision to denude the world of needed medical supplies and then sell defective masks and virus tests to numerous countries. Across Europe and Asia, governments are returning shoddy equipment and useless tests, sometimes after having paid tens of millions of dollars for them, as in the case of Spain, which bought $497 million dollars-worth of items that it declared were unusable. In the case of Great Britain, all 3.5 million antibody test kits the government ordered failed to work properly, and were returned. The ill-will that Beijing has engendered by selling back items that were sometimes donated by countries, as in the case of Italy, or providing defective equipment will further drive a wedge between China and those countries that now see it as an untrusty partner with whom a buyer must beware when doing business.

#### Tons of alt causes to Chinese economic health they don’t solve

Ratner 20 [Ely Ratner is the Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where he is a member of the executive team and responsible for managing the Center’s research and communications. Dr. Ratner served from 2015 to 2017 as the deputy national security advisor to Vice President Joe Biden, and from 2011 to 2012 in the office of Chinese and Mongolian affairs at the State Department. “Toward a New China Debate: The Strategic Logic of Blunting China’s Illiberal Order.” https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2020/01/TheStruggleForPower.pdf]

Other potential roadblocks to the maturation of an illiberal China-led order include its domestic and structural weaknesses. These myriad challenges include a slowing economy, rising debt, increasing labor costs, environmental degradation, social unrest, unfavorable demographics, an aging population, poor social services, and more. Two points, however, should give us pause before assuming that China will get stuck in its own quicksand before Beijing can consolidate an illiberal order. First, even if these structural factors eventually do come home to roost, China will have opportunities between now and then to make substantial and irreversible changes in its favor. Second, China has already amassed significant power such that Beijing is likely to be a major actor on the global stage under almost any circumstance; from here on out, China will have significant throw-weight even if its economy and military develop at much slower rates.

#### Influence motivates authoritarian consolidation

Ratner 20 [Ely Ratner is the Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where he is a member of the executive team and responsible for managing the Center’s research and communications. Dr. Ratner served from 2015 to 2017 as the deputy national security advisor to Vice President Joe Biden, and from 2011 to 2012 in the office of Chinese and Mongolian affairs at the State Department. “Toward a New China Debate: The Strategic Logic of Blunting China’s Illiberal Order.” https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2020/01/TheStruggleForPower.pdf]

It is incomplete to view U.S.-China dynamics as a disparate set of competitive domains. Instead, we should be principally concerned about the aggregate and mutually reinforcing consequences of a China-led order if Beijing gains dominant control of vital regions and functional domains. Core features of this order would include the People’s Liberation Army administering the South and East China Sea; regional countries sufficiently coerced into not questioning or challenging China’s preferences on military, economic, and diplomatic matters; the de facto unification of Taiwan; Beijing with agenda-setting power over regional institutions; a China-centric economic order in which Beijing sets trade and investment rules in its favor; and the gradual spread of authoritarianism in the developing world, reinforced by the proliferation of China’s high-tech surveillance state.5

For the United States, an illiberal China-led order would translate into weaker U.S. alliances, fewer security partners, and a military forced to operate at greater distances; U.S. firms without access to leading markets and disadvantaged by unique technology standards, investment rules, and trading blocs; U.S. participation in inert international and regional institutions unable to resist Chinese coercion; and a secular decline in democracy and individual freedoms around the world. Many of these effects are already occurring globally and particularly in Asia, the center of gravity in the competition. Arresting and reversing these trends stands among the most urgent and important tasks in U.S. foreign policy.

**Extinction**

**Kolodziej 17,** [Emeritus Research Professor of Political Science @ University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Challenges to the Democratic Project for Governing Globalization, https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/96620/Kolodziej%20Introduction%205.19.17.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y]

Let me first sketch the global democratic project for global governance as a point of reference. We must first recognize that globalization has given rise to a global society for the **first time** in the evolution of the human **species**. We are now **stuck with each other**; **seven and half billion** people today — nine to **ten** by **2050**: all **super connected** and **interdependent**. In greater or lesser measure, humans are mutually dependent on each other in the pursuit of their most salient values, interests, needs, and preferences — concerns about personal, community, and national **security**, sustainable economic **growth**, protection of the **environment**, the equitable **distribution** of the globe’s material wealth, human **rights**, and even the validation of their personal and social identities by others. Global **warming** is a metaphor of this morphological social change in the human condition. **All** humans are **implicated** in this looming Anthropogenic-induced **disaster** — the exhausts of billions of automobiles, the methane released in fracking for natural gas, outdated U.S. coal-fired power plants and newly constructed ones in China. Even the poor farmer burning charcoal to warm his dinner is complicit.

Since interdependence surrounds, ensnares, and binds us as a human society, the dilemma confronting the world’s diverse and divided populations is evident: the **expanding scope** as well as the **deepening**, **accumulating**, and **thickening** interdependencies of globalization urge global government. But the Kantian ideal of universal governance is beyond the reach of the world’s disparate peoples. They are **profoundly divided** by religion, culture, language, tribal, ethnic and national loyalties as well as by class, social status, race, gender, and sexual orientation. How have the democracies responded to this dilemma? How have they attempted to reconcile the growing interdependence of the world’s disputing peoples and need for global governance?

What do we mean by the governance of a human society?

A working, **legitimate government** of a human society requires simultaneous responses to three competing imperatives: Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy. While the forms of these OWL imperatives have differed radically over the course of human societal evolution, these constraints remain predicable of all human societies if they are to replicate themselves and flourish over time. The OWL imperatives are no less applicable to a global society.

1. Order refers to a society’s investment of awesome material power in an individual or body to arbitrate and resolve value, interest, and preference conflicts, which cannot be otherwise resolved by non-violent means — the Hobbesian problematic.

2. The Welfare imperative refers to the necessity of humans to eat, drink, clothe, and shelter themselves and to pursue the full-range of their seemingly limitless acquisitive appetites. Responses to the Welfare imperative, like that of Order, constitute a distinct form of governing power and authority with its own decisional processes and actors principally associated either with the Welfare or the Order imperative. Hence we have the Marxian-Adam Smith problematic.

3. Legitimacy is no less a form of governing power and authority, independent of the Order and Welfare imperatives. Either by choice, socialization, or coerced acquiescence, populations acknowledge a regime’s governing authority and their obligation to submit to its rule. Here arises the Rousseaunian problematic.

The government of a human society emerges then as an evolving, precarious balance and compromise of the ceaseless struggle of these competing OWL power domains for ascendancy of one of these imperatives over the others. It is against the backdrop of these OWL imperatives — Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy — that we are brought to the democratic project for global governance.

The Democratic Project

For Order, open societies constructed the global democratic state and, in alliance, the democratic global-state system. Collectively these initiatives led to the creation of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union to implement the democratic project’s system of global governance.

The democratic global state assumed all of the functions of the Hobbesian Westphalian security state — but a lot more. The global state became a Trading, Banking, Market, and Entrepreneurial state. To these functions were added those of the Science, Technology and the Economic Growth state. How else would we be able to enjoy the **Internet**, **cell phones** and iPhones, or **miracle cures**? These are the products of the **iron triangle** of the global democratic state, academic and non-profit research centers, and corporations. It is a **myth** that the Market System did all this **alone**. Fueled by increasing material wealth, the democratic global state was afforded the means to become the **Safety Net** state, providing **ed**ucation, **health**, **social security**, leisure and recreation for its population. And as the global state’s power expanded across this broad and enlarging spectrum of functions and roles, the global state was also constrained by the social compacts of the democracies to be bound by popular rule. The ironic result of the expansion of the global state’s power and social functions and its obligation to accede to popular will was a Security state and global state-system that vastly outperformed its principal authoritarian rivals in the Cold War. So much briefly is the democratic project’s response to the Order imperative.

Now let’s look at the democratic project’s response to the Welfare imperative. The democracies institutionalized Adam Smith’s vision of a global Market System. The Market System trucks and barters, Smith’s understanding of what it means to be human. But it does a lot more. The Market System facilitates and fosters the free movement of people, goods and services, capital, ideas, values, scientific discoveries, and best technological practices. Created is a vibrant global civil society oblivious to state boundaries. What we now experience is De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America on global steroids.

As for the imperative of Legitimacy, the social compacts of the democracies affirmed Rousseau’s conjecture that all humans are free and therefore equal. Applied to elections each citizen has one vote. Democratic regimes are also obliged to submit to the rule of law, to conduct free and fair elections, to honor majority rule while protecting minority rights, and to **promote** human rights at home and **abroad**.

The Authoritarian Threat to the Democratic Project

The **democratic project** for **global governance** is now at **risk**. Let’s start with the challenges posed by authoritarian regimes, with Russia and China in the lead. Both Russia and China would **rest global governance** on Big Power spheres of influence. Both would assume **hegemonic status** in their respective regions, asserting their versions of the **Monroe Doctrine**. Their regional hegemony would then **leverage** their claim to be global **Big Powers**. Moscow and Beijing would then have an equal say with the United States and the West in sharing and shaping global governance. The Russo-Chinese global system of Order would ascribe to Russia and China governing privileges not accorded to the states both aspire to dominate. Moscow and Beijing would enjoy **unconditional** recognition of their state **sovereignty**, territorial integrity, and non-interference in their domestic affairs, but they would reserve to themselves the right to **intervene** in the domestic and foreign affairs of the states and peoples under their tutelage in pursuit of their hegemonic interests. President Putin has announced that Russia’s **imperialism** encompasses the **millions** of Russians living in the former republics of the Soviet Union. Russia contends that Ukraine and Belarus also fall under Moscow’s purported claim to historical sovereignty over these states. Forceful re-absorption of **Crimea** and control over eastern **Ukraine** are viewed by President Putin as Russia’s historical inheritances. Self-determination is not extended to these states or to other states and peoples of the former Soviet Union. Moscow rejects their right to freely align, say, with the European Union or, god forbid, with NATO.

In contrast to the democratic project, universal in its reach, the Russo-Chinese conception of a stable global order rests on more **tenuous** and **conflict-prone** **ethno-national foundations**. Russia’s proclaimed enemies are the United States and the European Union. Any means that undermines the unity of these entities is viewed by Moscow as a gain. The endgame is a **poly-anarchical** interstate system, potentially as **war-prone** as the Eurocentric system **before** and **after World War I**, but now populated by states with **nuclear weapons.**

Global politics becomes a **zero-sum game**.

Moscow has **no compunctions** about **corrupting** the **electoral processes** of democratic states, conducting threatening **military exercises** along NATO’s east border, or violating the more than 30-year old treaty to ban the deployment of Intermediate-Range **missile launchers**, capable of **firing nuclear weapons**. Nothing less than the **dissolution** of the democratic project is Moscow’s solution for global Order.

China also seeks a revision of the global Order. It declares sovereignty over the **South China Sea**. Rejected is The Hague Tribunal’s dismissal of this claim. Beijing continues to build artificial islands as military bases in the region to assert its control over these troubled waters. If it could have its way, China would decide which states and their naval vessels, notably those of the United States, would have access to the South China Sea.

Where Moscow and Beijing depart sharply are in their contrasting responses to the Welfare imperative. Moscow has **no solution** other than to use its oil and gas resources as instruments of **coercive diplomacy** and to weaken or **dismantle** existing Western **alliances** and international economic **institutions**. China can ill-afford the dismantling of the global market system. In his address to the Davos gathering in January of this year, Chinese President Xi asserted that “any attempt to cut off the flow of capital, technologies, products, industries and people between economies, and channel the waters in the ocean back into isolated lakes and creeks is simply not possible.” Adam Smith could not have said it better. Both Moscow and Beijing have been particularly assiduous to legitimate their regimes. President Putin’s case for legitimacy is much broader and deeper than a pure appeal to Russian nationalism. He stresses the spiritual and cultural unity of Russianspeaking populations spread across the states of the post-Soviet space. A central core of that unity is the Russian Orthodox Church, a key prop of the regime. Reviled is Western secularism, portrayed as corrupt and decadent, viewed by Putin as an existential threat to the Russian World. The Chinese regime, secular and atheistic, can hardly rely on religion to legitimate the regime. Beijing principally rests its legitimacy on its record of economic development and nationalism. The regime’s success in raising the economic standards of hundreds of millions of Chinese reinforces its claim to legitimacy in two ways. On the one hand, the Communist Party can rightly claim to have raised hundreds of millions of Chinese from poverty within a generation. On the other hand, the Communist Party insists that its model of economic growth, what critics scorn as crony capitalism, is superior to the unfettered, market-driven model of the West. Hence capitalism with Chinese characteristics is more effective and legitimate than the Western alternative.

Where Moscow and Beijing do **converge** is in fashioning their responses to the Legitimacy imperative. They **repudiate Western liberal democracy**. Both reject criticisms of their human rights abuses as interventions into their domestic affairs. Dissidents are harassed, incarcerated, or, in some instances, assassinated. Journalists are co-opted, selfcensored, silenced, or imprisoned. Social media is state controlled. Both the Putin regime and the Chinese Communist Party monopolize the public narratives evaluating governmental policy. Transparency and accountability are hostage to governmental secrecy. Civil society has few effective avenues to criticize governmental actions. Moscow adds an ironic twist to these controls in manipulating national elections to produce an elected authoritarian regime.

Whether either of these authoritarian responses to the Legitimacy imperative will survive **remains to be seen**. Beijing’s use of economic performance and nationalism to underwrite its legitimacy is a double-edged sword. If economic performance falters, then legitimacy suffers. Whether top-down nationalism will always control nationalism from the bottom-up is also problematic. In resting legitimacy on nationalism, dubious historical claims, and crypto-religious beliefs, Moscow is spared Beijing’s economic performance test. That said, there is room for skepticism that in the long-run Russians will exchange lower standards of living for corrupt rule in pursuit of an elusive Russian mission antagonistic to the West. The implosion of the Soviet Union, due in no small part to its retarded economic and technological development, suggests that the patience of the Russian people has limits. Demonstrations in March 2017 against state corruption in 82 Russian cities, led largely by Russian youth, reveal these limits. They are an ominous omen for the future of the Putin kleptocracy. Meanwhile, neither Russia nor China offers much to solve the Legitimacy imperative of global governance.

#### No Taiwan war

Greer 18 [T. Greer is a writer and analyst formerly based out of Beijing. His research focuses on the evolution of East Asian strategic thought from the time of Sunzi to today. 9/25. "Taiwan Can Win a War With China." https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/25/taiwan-can-win-a-war-with-china/]

Two recent studies, one by Michael Beckley, a political scientist at Tufts University, and the other by Ian Easton, a fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, in his book The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, provide us with a clearer picture of what a war between Taiwan and the mainland might look like. Grounded in statistics, training manuals, and planning documents from the PLA itself, and informed by simulations and studies conducted by both the U.S. Defense Department and the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense, this research presents a very different picture of a cross-strait conflict than that hawked by the party’s official announcements.

Chinese commanders fear they may be forced into armed contest with an enemy that is better trained, better motivated, and better prepared for the rigors of warfare than troops the PLA could throw against them. A cross-strait war looks far less like an inevitable victory for China than it does a staggeringly risky gamble.

Chinese army documents imagine that this gamble will begin with missiles. For months, the PLA’s Rocket Force will have been preparing this opening salvo; from the second war begins until the day the invasion commences, these missiles will scream toward the Taiwanese coast, with airfields, communication hubs, radar equipment, transportation nodes, and government offices in their sights. Concurrently, party sleeper agents or special forces discreetly ferried across the strait will begin an assassination campaign targeting the president and her Cabinet, other leaders of the Democratic Progressive Party, officials at key bureaucracies, prominent media personalities, important scientists or engineers, and their families. The goal of all this is twofold. In the narrower tactical sense, the PLA hopes to destroy as much of the Taiwanese Air Force on the ground as it can and from that point forward keep things chaotic enough on the ground that the Taiwan’s Air Force cannot sortie fast enough to challenge China’s control of the air. The missile campaign’s second aim is simpler: paralysis. With the president dead, leadership mute, communications down, and transportation impossible, the Taiwanese forces will be left rudderless, demoralized, and disoriented. This “shock and awe” campaign will pave the way for the invasion proper. This invasion will be the largest amphibious operation in human history. Tens of thousands of vessels will be assembled—mostly commandeered from the Chinese merchant marine—to ferry 1 million Chinese troops across the strait, who will arrive in two waves. Their landing will be preceded by a fury of missiles and rockets, launched from the Rocket Force units in Fujian, Chinese Air Force fighter bombers flying in the strait, and the escort fleet itself. Confused, cut off, and overwhelmed, the Taiwanese forces who have survived thus far will soon run out of supplies and be forced to abandon the beaches. Once the beachhead is secured, the process will begin again: With full air superiority, the PLA will have the pick of their targets, Taiwanese command and control will be destroyed, and isolated Taiwanese units will be swept aside by the Chinese army’s advance. Within a week, they will have marched into Taipei; within two weeks they will have implemented a draconian martial law intended to convert the island into the pliant forward operating base the PLA will need to defend against the anticipated Japanese and American counter-campaigns.

This is the best-case scenario for the PLA. But an island docile and defeated two weeks after D-Day is not a guaranteed outcome. One of the central hurdles facing the offensive is surprise. The PLA simply will not have it. The invasion will happen in April or October. Because of the challenges posed by the strait’s weather, a transport fleet can only make it across the strait in one of these two four-week windows. The scale of the invasion will be so large that strategic surprise will not be possible, especially given the extensive mutual penetration of each side by the other’s intelligence agencies.

Easton estimates that Taiwanese, American, and Japanese leaders will know that the PLA is preparing for a cross-strait war more than 60 days before hostilities begin. They will know for certain that an invasion will happen more than 30 days before the first missiles are fired. This will give the Taiwanese ample time to move much of their command and control infrastructure into hardened mountain tunnels, move their fleet out of vulnerable ports, detain suspected agents and intelligence operatives, litter the ocean with sea mines, disperse and camouflage army units across the country, put the economy on war footing, and distribute weapons to Taiwan’s 2.5 million reservists.

There are only 13 beaches on Taiwan’s western coast that the PLA could possibly land at. Each of these has already been prepared for a potential conflict. Long underground tunnels—complete with hardened, subterranean supply depots—crisscross the landing sites. The berm of each beach has been covered with razor-leaf plants. Chemical treatment plants are common in many beach towns—meaning that invaders must prepare for the clouds of toxic gas any indiscriminate saturation bombing on their part will release. This is how things stand in times of peace.

As war approaches, each beach will be turned into a workshop of horrors. The path from these beaches to the capital has been painstakingly mapped; once a state of emergency has been declared, each step of the journey will be complicated or booby-trapped. PLA war manuals warn soldiers that skyscrapers and rock outcrops will have steel cords strung between them to entangle helicopters; tunnels, bridges, and overpasses will be rigged with munitions (to be destroyed only at the last possible moment); and building after building in Taiwan’s dense urban core will be transformed into small redoubts meant to drag Chinese units into drawn-out fights over each city street.

To understand the real strength of these defenses, imagine them as a PLA grunt would experience them. Like most privates, he is a countryside boy from a poor province. He has been told his entire life that Taiwan has been totally and fatally eclipsed by Chinese power. He will be eager to put the separatists in their place. Yet events will not work out as he has imagined. In the weeks leading up to war, he discovers that his older cousin—whose remittances support their grandparents in the Anhui countryside—has lost her job in Shanghai. All wire money transfers from Taipei have stopped, and the millions of Chinese who are employed by Taiwanese companies have had their pay suspended. Our private celebrates the opening of hostilities in Shanwei, where he is rushed through a three-week training course on fighting in the fetid and unfamiliar jungles of China’s south. By now, the PLA has put him in a media blackout, but still rumors creep in: Yesterday it was whispered that the 10-hour delay in their train schedule had nothing to do with an overwhelmed transportation system and everything to do with Taiwanese saboteurs. Today’s whispers report that the commander of the 1st Marine Brigade in Zhanjiang was assassinated. Tomorrow, men will wonder if rolling power outages really are just an attempt to save power for the war effort. But by the time he reaches the staging area in Fuzhou, the myth of China’s invincibility has been shattered by more than rumors. The gray ruins of Fuzhou’s PLA offices are his first introduction to the terror of missile attack. Perhaps he takes comfort in the fact that the salvos coming from Taiwan do not seem to match the number of salvos streaking toward it—but abstractions like this can only do so much to shore up broken nerves, and he doesn’t have the time to acclimate himself to the shock. Blast by terrifying blast, his confidence that the Chinese army can keep him safe is chipped away. The last, most terrible salvo comes as he embarks—he is one of the lucky few setting foot on a proper amphibious assault boat, not a civilian vessel converted to war use in the eleventh hour—but this is only the first of many horrors on the waters. Some transports are sunk by Taiwanese torpedoes, released by submarines held in reserve for this day. Airborne Harpoon missiles, fired by F-16s leaving the safety of cavernous, nuclear-proof mountain bunkers for the first time in the war, will destroy others. The greatest casualties, however, will be caused by sea mines. Minefield after minefield must be crossed by every ship in the flotilla, some a harrowing eight miles in width. Seasick thanks to the strait’s rough waves, our grunt can do nothing but pray his ship safely makes it across. As he approaches land, the psychological pressure increases. The first craft to cross the shore will be met, as Easton’s research shows, with a sudden wall of flame springing up from the water from the miles of oil-filled pipeline sunk underneath. As his ship makes it through the fire (he is lucky; others around it are speared or entangled on sea traps) he faces what Easton describes as a mile’s worth of “razor wire nets, hook boards, skin-peeling planks, barbed wire fences, wire obstacles, spike strips, landmines, anti-tank barrier walls, anti-tank obstacles … bamboo spikes, felled trees, truck shipping containers, and junkyard cars.” At this stage, his safety depends largely on whether the Chinese Air Force has been able to able to distinguish between real artillery pieces from the hundreds of decoy targets and dummy equipment PLA manuals believe the Taiwanese Army has created. The odds are against him: As Beckley notes in a study published last fall, in the 1990 to 1991 Gulf War, the 88,500 tons of ordnance dropped by the U.S.-led coalition did not destroy a single Iraqi road-mobile missile launcher. NATO’s 78-day campaign aimed at Serbian air defenses only managed to destroy three of Serbia’s 22 mobile-missile batteries. There is no reason to think that the Chinese Air Force will have a higher success rate when targeting Taiwan’s mobile artillery and missile defense. But if our grunt survives the initial barrages on the beach, he still must fight his way through the main Taiwanese Army groups, 2.5 million armed reservists dispersed in the dense cities and jungles of Taiwan, and miles of mines, booby traps, and debris. This is an enormous thing to ask of a private who has no personal experience with war. It is an even great thing to ask it of a private who naively believed in his own army’s invincibility.

This sketch makes sense of the anxiety the PLA officer manuals express. They know war would be a terrific gamble, even if they only admit it to each other. Yet it this also makes sense of the party’s violent reactions to even the smallest of arms sales to Taiwan. Their passion betrays their angst. They understand what Western gloom-and-doomsters do not. American analysts use terms like “mature precision-strike regime” and “anti-access and area denial warfare” to describe technological trends that make it extremely difficult to project naval and airpower near enemy shores. Costs favor the defense: It is much cheaper to build a ship-killing missile than it is to build a ship.

#### China’s evil – recognition is unethical

Frank Wolf 11, Congressman for Virginia’s 10th District, “WOLF STATEMENT AT U.S. ­ CHINA COMMISSION HEARING ON MILITARY AND CIVIL SPACE PROGRAMS IN CHINA”, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/5.11.11Wolf.pdf

“Consider our differing worldviews. The U.S. was founded on the premise that liberty is a birthright, that individual human life is sacred, that the freedom to worship according to the dictates of your conscience is paramount. The Chinese government operates antithetically to these beliefs. “There is no clearer indication of the gulf that exists between our two countries than the Chinese government’s treatment of its own people. “According to the Cardinal Kung Foundation, currently every one of the more than 30 underground bishops of the Catholic Church is either in jail, under house arrest, under strict surveillance, or in hiding. Protestant house church pastors are routinely intimidated and imprisoned. Their congregations worship in secret. “An underground house church in Beijing – that I visited shortly before the 2008 Olympic Games – has come under growing harassment from the government for daring to hold a worship service in public. Dozens have been arrested or detained. “According to the Congressional Executive Commission on China's Political Prisoner Database, as of July 2009, there were 689 Tibetan prisoners of conscience, 439 of whom were monks or nuns. Uyghur Muslims face persecution by the Chinese government as well. China maintains an extensive system of slave labor camps as large as that which existed in the former Soviet Union. “This is but a snapshot of what can only be described as a grim human rights situation in China. But rather than being a voice for the voiceless, we see U.S. government officials – like the president’s science advisor – who spent three weeks in China last year kowtowing to the Chinese regime. “Ronald Reagan once spoke of the U.S. constitution as a covenant ‘we have made not only with ourselves, but with all of ~~mankind~~ humankind.’ We risk breaking that covenant with the kind of posture we display today. “At the same time that the 2010 Nobel Prize recipient Liu Xiaobo was jailed, the 2009 Nobel Prize winner, President Obama, was hosting a state dinner for Chinese premier Hu Jintao and committing the U.S. to more cooperation on space with China. One of the world's worst human rights abusers does not deserve to be rewarded with greater ‘cooperation’ with the U.S. “For these reasons, I have been very concerned by this administration’s apparent eagerness to work with China on its space program. The U.S. has no business cooperating with the PLA to help develop its space program