### NC – Climate

#### Both bills pass now and solve the climate – full-court PC press ensures Manchinema get on board, but new fights complicate the process

Mascaro 11/4 [Lisa, Congressional reporter for the Los Angeles Times “Biden's big bill on brink of House votes, but fighting drags”https://www.startribune.com/bidens-big-bill-on-brink-of-house-votes-but-fighting-drags/600112896/]

WASHINGTON — Democrats in the House appear on the verge of securing President Joe Biden's now-$1.85 trillion-and-growing domestic policy package alongside a companion $1 trillion infrastructure bill in what would be a dramatic political accomplishment — if they can push it to passage.

The House prepared late Thursday for votes now likely on Friday, and White House officials worked the phones to lock in support for the president's signature proposal. House passage of the big bill would be a crucial step, sending to the Senate Biden's ambitious effort to expand health care, child care and other social services for countless Americans and deliver the nation's biggest investment yet fighting climate change.

Alongside the slimmer roads-bridges-and-broadband package, it adds up to Biden's answer to his campaign promise to rebuild the country from the COVID-19 crisis and confront a changing economy.

But they're not there yet.

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was working furiously Thursday and kept the House late to shore up the votes. The party has been here before, another politically messy day like many before that are being blamed for the Democrats' dismal showing in this week's elections. On and off Capitol Hill, party leaders declared it's time for Congress to deliver on Biden's agenda.

"We're going to pass both bills," Pelosi insisted at a midday press briefing.

Her strategy now seems focused on passing the most robust bill possible in her chamber and then leaving the Senate to adjust or strip out the portions its members won't agree to.

Half the size of Biden's initial $3.5 trillion package, the now sprawling 2,135-page bill has won over most of the progressive Democratic lawmakers, even though the bill is smaller than they wanted. But the chamber's more centrist and fiscally conservative Democrats continued to mount objections.

Overall the package remains more far-reaching than any other in decades. Republicans are fully opposed to Biden's bill, which is called the "Build Back Better Act" after the president's 2020 campaign slogan.

The big package would provide large numbers of Americans with assistance to pay for health care, raising children and caring for elderly people at home.

There would be lower prescription drug costs, limiting the price of insulin to $35 a dose, and Medicare for the first time would be able to negotiate with pharmaceutical companies for prices of some other drugs, a long-sought Democratic priority.

Medicare would have a new hearing aid benefit for older Americans, and those with Medicare Part D would see their out-of-pocket prescription drug costs capped at $2,000.

The package would provide some $555 billion in tax breaks encouraging cleaner energy and electric vehicles, the nation's largest commitment to tackling climate change.

With a flurry of late adjustments, the Democrats added key provisions in recent days — adding back a new paid family leave program, work permits for immigrants and changes to state and local tax deductions.

Much of package's cost would be covered with higher taxes on wealthier Americans, those earning more than $400,000 a year, and a 5% surtax would be added on those making over $10 million annually. Large corporations would face a new 15% minimum tax in an effort to stop big businesses from claiming so many deductions that they end up paying zero in taxes.

From the White House, "the president has been very clear, he wants to get this moving," said principal deputy press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre.

As night fell, Democratic leaders struggled to resolve a catalogue of remaining issues as lawmakers balanced the promise of Biden's sweeping vision with the realities of their home-district politics.

Biden has few votes to spare in the narrowly-divided House and none when the bill ultimately arrives for consideration in the evenly-split 50-50 Senate.

A group of five centrist Democratic lawmakers want a full budgetary assessment before they vote. Others from more Republican-leaning regions are objecting to a new state-and-local tax deduction that favors New York, California and other high-tax states. Another group wants changes to the immigration-related provisions.

In recent days, both the overall price tag and the revenue to pay for it have grown. A new White House assessment Thursday said revenue from the taxes on corporations and the wealthy and other changes are estimated to bring in $2.1 trillion over 10 years, according to a summary obtained by The Associated Press. That's up from what had been $1.9 trillion in earlier estimates.

Pelosi noted a similar assessment Thursday by the bipartisan Joint Committee on Taxation, and she echoed Biden's frequent comment that the overall package will be fully paid for.

But another model from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania suggested a shortfall in revenue for covering the cost, breeding fresh doubts among some of the Democratic lawmakers.

Still, the Democrats in the House are anxious to finish up this week, eager to deliver on the president's agenda and, as some lawmakers prepare to depart for a global climate change summit in Scotland, show the U.S. taking the environmental issue seriously.

Democrats have been working to resolve their differences, particularly with holdout Sens. Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona, who forced cutbacks to Biden's bill but championed the slimmer infrastructure package that had stalled amid deliberations.

#### Manchin and Sinema hate the plan – they’re anti-labor because of lobbies, and don’t care about their constituencies

Harold 21 [Zack, staf reporter for The Guardian, “US minimum wage activists face their toughest foe: Democrat Joe Manchin” https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/feb/22/us-15-dollar-minimum-wage-joe-manchin-west-virginia]

Hopes that the US will finally increase the federal minimum wage for the first time in nearly 12 years face a seemingly unlikely opponent: a Democrat senator from one of the poorest states in the union.

Joe Manchin of West Virginia, the state’s former governor and the Democrats’ most conservative senator, has long opposed his party’s progressive wing and is on record saying he does not support increasing the minimum wage from $7.25 to $15 an hour, the first increase since 2009. “I’m supportive of basically having something that’s responsible and reasonable,” he told the Hill. He has advocated for a rise to $11.

Industry lobbying allied to Republican and – until relatively recently – Democrat opposition has locked the US’s minimum wage at $7.25 since the last raise in 2009.

'Hopefully it makes history': Fight for $15 closes in on mighty win for US workers

None of this has found favor with some low-wage workers in a state where an estimated 278,734 West Virginians lived in poverty in 2019, 16% of the population and the sixth highest poverty rate in the US.

Last Thursday Manchin reaffirmed his stance during a virtual meeting with members of the West Virginia Poor People’s Campaign (WVPPC), a group pushing for an increased minimum wage and other policy changes that would benefit the working class.

That meeting was closed to the media but at an online press conference immediately afterward, participants said Manchin refused to budge. “He was kind of copping out,” said WVPPC member Brianna Griffith, a restaurant worker and whitewater rafting guide who, due to exemptions for tipped workers, only makes $2.62 an hour.

As a result of her sub-minimum wage job, Griffith received only $67 a week in unemployment benefits until that ran out in August. She lost her house and was forced to move in with her grandmother. Although she has now returned to work, business is slow and she estimates tips have fallen by 75%.

When Griffith told Manchin about her plight on Thursday, she said he asked about the $600 stimulus check approved by Congress in December. “He seemed to think that $600 … was enough to get me by,” she said. “I feel like he’s got his head in the clouds and he doesn’t understand what’s happening to poor people in West Virginia.”

Despite Manchin’s insistence on an $11 minimum wage, according to MIT’s living wage calculator, even a $15 minimum wage would only provide a living wage for single West Virginians without children. For a West Virginia family with two working parents and two children, both parents would need to be making at least $20.14 an hour to make ends meet.

Griffith said if the minimum wage was increased to $15 an hour, “I could afford to live on my own. I could afford a car that’s not 25 years old.”

The Rev Dr William Barber, co-chair of the national Poor People’s Campaign, was in last week’s meeting and said Manchin agreed the current $7.25 minimum wage was “not enough”.

But Barber said he was “amazed” Manchin could hear from people like Griffith and still oppose increasing the minimum wage to $15.

“What he is suggesting would just further keep people in poverty and hurting,” he said.

Raising the minimum wage was a key part of Democrats’ 2020 platform. The former presidential candidate and now Senate budget committee chairman, Bernie Sanders, has referred to the current $7.25 rate as “a starvation wage”.

The wage hike, formally known as the Raise the Wage Act of 2021, is now part of a proposed $1.9tn Covid-19 relief bill. The measure would incrementally raise the minimum wage from $7.25 to $15 over the next four years.

With only a razor-thin majority in the Senate, all 50 Democrat senators need to be onboard for the bill to pass. But in addition to Manchin, Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona has told Politico she does not want the minimum wage increase to be part of the Covid relief package.

#### Passage allows an unprecedented investment in combatting climate change

Morton 10/28 [Joseph Morton, "Democrats tout climate spending in reconciliation", 10/28/21, https://www.rollcall.com/2021/10/28/framework-includes-clean-energy-tax-credits-omits-methane-fee/]

“At the same time, substantial investments in electric vehicle charging stations and clean heavy-duty vehicles, like school buses, will serve the dual purpose of slashing our carbon emissions while helping American manufacturing stay globally competitive,” Pallone said.

Rep. Cindy Axne, D-Iowa, had pushed for funding to support biofuels infrastructure, complaining it was left out of the bipartisan infrastructure bill even as that measure delivered significant funding for electric vehicles.

The latest reconciliation package text includes $1 billion over 10 years in funding for the Agriculture Department to provide grants for expanding biofuel pump infrastructure, upgrade existing infrastructure and increase usage of higher blends of ethanol and biodiesel.

“Not only does the Build Back Better Act represent the largest investment in clean energy and combating climate change ever — it also confirms that my colleagues have listened to my central argument in our clean energy discussions: biofuels can and should be a part of our fight against climate change,” Axne said in a statement.

The White House framework released earlier in the day envisions that $320 billion would be delivered in the form of clean energy tax credits to accelerate the transition from coal and gas-fired power plants to renewable energy sources such as wind turbines and solar panels.

That includes incentives for both utilities and residents and support for additional transmission and storage capacity — areas where bottlenecks have hampered the development of renewable energy sources.

The framework includes incentives intended to cut the cost for Americans to put rooftop solar panels on their homes and make it easier to purchase electric vehicles. New EV tax credits would lower the cost of a vehicle by $12,500 for a middle-class family, according to the White House.

The framework calls for $105 billion for climate resiliency and addressing legacy pollution in communities.

For example, a new Clean Energy and Sustainability Accelerator that would invest in climate-related projects around the country would allocate 40 percent of those benefits to disadvantaged communities — part of a pledge the Biden administration has made to deliver climate spending to communities traditionally on the front lines of environmental damage.

It also would fund grants to support environmental justice in disadvantaged communities and create a new Civilian Climate Corps with more than 300,000 members working on conservation projects that could help mitigate climate change.

The framework includes $110 billion in spending and incentives to boost domestic supply chains supporting solar power and batteries. It also would fund grants, loans and tax credits aimed at moving steel, cement and aluminum industries toward decarbonization.

There’s also $20 billion for the government to purchase new technologies such as long-duration storage, small modular reactors and clean construction materials.

While the size of the package falls short of initial proposals, some Capitol Hill Democrats declined to say they were disappointed with the climate portion.

Sen. Christopher S. Murphy, D-Conn., said he didn’t want to undersell the framework, as it would represent the most significant spending on climate policy since he joined Congress.

The fact that climate makes up about one-third of the overall spending shows how much the issue has been elevated within the Democratic Party, he said, and negotiations over bolstering it aren’t finished.

“I think there's a number of things that we can still find consensus on that might not be in this agreement. So climate is something you’ve got to work on every single day,” Murphy said. “If we're not passing climate change legislation every year, then we're not doing our job. So this is just one admittedly very big piece of the overall policy puzzle.”

#### It causes extinction.

Dunlop 17. (Ian Dunlop chaired the Australian Coal Association in 1987-88, chaired the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading from 1998-2000 and was CEO of the Australian Institute of Company Directors from 1997-2001. He has a particular interest in the interaction of corporate governance, corporate responsibility and sustainability. An engineer by qualification, he holds an MA (Mechanical Sciences) degree from the University of Cambridge, he is a Fellow of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, the Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, and the Energy Institute (UK), and a Member of the Society of Petroleum Engineers of AIME (USA). He also chairs the Australian National Wildlife Collection Foundation. David Spratt is a Research Director for Breakthrough and co-author of Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action (Scribe 2008). His recent reports include Recount: It’s time to “Do the math” again; Climate Reality Check and Antarctic Tipping Points for a Multi-metre Sea-level Rise. A Failure of Imagination on Climate Risks. July 26, 2017. www.resilience.org/stories/2017-07-26/a-failure-of-imagination-on-climate-risks/)

Climate change is an existential risk that could abruptly end human civilisation because of a catastrophic “failure of imagination” by global leaders to understand and act on the science and evidence before them. At the London School of Economics in 2008, Queen Elizabeth questioned: “Why did no one foresee the timing, extent and severity of the Global Financial Crisis?” The British Academy answered a year later: “A psychology of denial gripped the financial and corporate world… [it was] the failure of the collective imagination of many bright people… to understand the risks to the system as a whole”. A “failure of imagination” has also been identified as one of the reasons for the breakdown in US intelligence around the 9/11 attacks in 2001. A similar failure is occurring with climate change today. The problem is widespread at the senior levels of government and global corporations. A 2016 report, Thinking the unthinkable, based on interviews with top leaders around the world, found that: “A proliferation of ‘unthinkable’ events… has revealed a new fragility at the highest levels of corporate and public service leaderships. Their ability to spot, identify and handle unexpected, non-normative events is… perilously inadequate at critical moments… Remarkably, there remains a deep reluctance, or what might be called ‘executive myopia’, to see and contemplate even the possibility that ‘unthinkables’ might happen, let alone how to handle them. Such failures are manifested in two ways in climate policy. At the political, bureaucratic and business level in underplaying the high-end risks and in failing to recognise that the existential risk of climate change is totally different from other risk categories. And at the research level in underestimating the rate of climate change impact and costs, along with an under-emphasis on, and poor communication of, those high-end risks. Existential risk An existential risk is an adverse outcome that would either annihilate intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential. For example, a big meteor impact, large-scale nuclear war, or sea levels 70 metres higher than today. Existential risks are not amenable to the reactive (learn from failure) approach of conventional risk management, and we cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, or social attitudes developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Because the consequences are so severe — perhaps the end of human global civilisation as we know it — researchers say that “even for an honest, truth-seeking, and well-intentioned investigator it is difficult to think and act rationally in regard to… existential risks”. Yet the evidence is clear that climate change already poses an existential risk to global economic and societal stability and to human civilisation that requires an emergency response. Temperature rises that are now in prospect could reduce the global human population by 80% or 90%. But this conversation is taboo, and the few who speak out are admonished as being overly alarmist. Prof. Kevin Anderson considers that “a 4°C future [relative to pre-industrial levels] is incompatible with an organized global community, is likely to be beyond ‘adaptation’, is devastating to the majority of ecosystems, and has a high probability of not being stable”. He says: “If you have got a population of nine billion by 2050 and you hit 4°C, 5°C or 6°C, you might have half a billion people surviving”. Asked at a 2011 conference in Melbourne about the difference between a 2°C world and a 4°C world, Prof. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber replied in two words: “Human civilisation”.

### NC - Econ

#### Business recovery is strong. Business confidence is high.

**Halloran ’9-14** [Michael; 2021; M.B.A. from Carnegie Mellon University, former aerospace research engineer, Equity Strategist; Janney, “Despite Potential Headwinds, Key Labor Market Indicators Bode Well for the Economy,” https://www.janney.com/latest-articles-commentary/all-insights/insights/2021/09/14/despite-potential-headwinds-key-labor-market-indicators-bode-well-for-the-economy]

However, we **remain encouraged** by the recovery that has been unfolding since the economy began reopening. We continue to see improvement in important cyclical sectors of the economy while consumers are **historically healthy** and **still have pent-up demand**. Business confidence has **rebounded** with **strong corporate profits** that should support **further capital spending and hiring** (there are **now more job openings** than there are unemployed people by a **record amount**).

We expect to see **further improvement** in the international backdrop, supported by **unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus** and **accelerating rates of vaccination**. Although the impact of the Delta wave is still being felt, **recent evidence** confirms the effectiveness of vaccines in limiting deaths and hospitalizations. With the pace of vaccination now picking up in the areas most impacted by this wave—Asia and Australia—the case for fading headwinds leading to improving economic growth later this year remains positive.

The signals from **financial markets** themselves remain **positive**. Despite consolidating last week, stocks remain **near record highs** while the 10-year Treasury remains well above the **lows of earlier this summer** when concerns about Delta first emerged.

These factors support our view of a **durable economic recovery** from the pandemic that should continue supporting stock prices. A healthy labor market is a critical element for a sustainable recovery that supports profit growth and last week’s news from the labor market remains encouraging.

#### Unions devastate growth and worsen inequality – gains for workers shift costs to other parts of the economy

**Epstein 20** [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Decline Of Unions Is Good News." https://www.hoover.org/research/decline-unions-good-news]

This continued trend has elicited howls of protest from union supporters who, of course, want to see an increase in union **membership**. It has also led several Democratic presidential candidates to make calls to reconfigure labor law. Bernie Sanders wants to double union membership and give federal workers the **right to strike**, as well as ban at-will contracts of employment, so that any dismissal could be subject to litigation under a “for cause” standard. Not to be outdone, Elizabeth Warren wants to make it illegal for firms to hire permanent replacements for striking workers. They are joined by Pete Buttigieg in demanding a change in federal labor law so that states may no longer pass right-to-work laws that insulate workers from the requirement to pay union dues in unionized firms. All of these new devices are **proven job killers**.

The arguments in favor of **unions** are also coming from some unexpected sources in academia, where a conservative case has been put forward on the ground that an increase in union membership is **needed** to combat job insecurity and **economic inequality**.

All of these pro-union critiques miss the **basic point** that the **decline** of union power is **good news**, not bad. That conclusion is driven not by some insidious effort to **stifle** the **welfare** of workers, but by the simple and profound point that the greatest **protection** for workers lies in a **competitive economy** that opens up more doors than it closes. The only way to achieve that result is by **slashing** the various **restrictions** that prevent job formation, as Justin Haskins of the Heartland Institute notes in a recent article at The Hill. The central economic insight is that jobs get created only when there is the prospect of gains from trade. Those gains in turn are **maximized** by cutting the multitude of **regulations** and **taxes** that do nothing more than shrink overall wealth by directing social resources to less **productive ends**.

#### Recessions cause global crises – ensuring continued growth is key

**Baird ’20** [Zoe; October 2020; C.E.O. and President of the Markle Foundation, Member of the Aspen Strategy Group and former Trustee at the Council on Foreign Relations, J.D. and A.B. from the University of California at Berkeley; Domestic and International (Dis)order: A Strategic Response, “Equitable Economic Recovery is a National Security Imperative,” Ch. 13]

A strong and inclusive economy is **essential** for American **national security** and **global leadership**. As the nation seeks to return from a historic economic crisis, the national security community should support an equitable recovery that helps every worker adapt to the **seismic shifts** underway in our economy.

Broadly shared economic prosperity is a **bedrock** of America’s **economic** and **political strength**—both **domestically** and in the **international** arena. A **strong** and **equitable** recovery from the economic crisis created by COVID-19 would be a **powerful testament** to the **resilience** of the American system and its **ability to create prosperity** at a time of **seismic change** and persistent **global crisis**. Such a recovery could attack the profound economic inequities that have developed over the past several decades. Without **bold action** to help all workers access good jobs as the economy returns, the **U**nited **S**tates risks **undermining** the **legitimacy of its institutions** and its **international standing**. The **outcome** will be a **key determinant** of America’s **national security** for years to come.

An equitable recovery requires a national commitment to help all workers obtain good jobs—particularly the two-thirds of adults without a bachelor’s degree and people of color who have been most affected by the crisis and were denied opportunity before it. As the nation engages in a historic debate about how to accelerate economic recovery, ambitious public investment is necessary to put Americans back to work with dignity and opportunity. We need an intentional effort to make sure that the jobs that come back are good jobs with decent wages, benefits, and mobility and to empower workers to access these opportunities in a profoundly changed labor market.

To achieve these goals, **America**n policy makers need to establish **job growth strategies** that address **urgent public needs** through **major programs** in green energy, infrastructure, and health. Alongside these job growth strategies, we need to recognize and develop the talents of workers by creating an adult learning system that meets workers’ needs and develops skills for the digital economy. The national security community must lend its support to this cause. And as it does so, it can bring home the lessons from the advances made in these areas in other countries, particularly our European allies, and consider this a realm of international cooperation and international engagement.

Shared Economic Prosperity Is a National Security Asset

A **strong economy** is **essential** to America’s **security and diplomatic strategy**. Economic strength increases our **influence** on the global stage, **expands markets**, and **funds** a **strong and agile military** and **national defense**. Yet it is not enough for America’s economy to be strong for some—prosperity must be broadly shared. **Widespread belief** in the ability of the American **economic system** to create economic security and mobility for all—the American Dream— creates **credibility** and **legitimacy** for America’s **values**, **governance**, and **alliances** around the world.

After World War II, the **U**nited **S**tates grew the middle class to historic size and strength. This achievement made America the **model** of the free world—**setting the stage** for decades of American political and economic **leadership**. Domestically, broad participation in the economy is **core** to the **legitimacy** of our democracy and the strength of our political institutions. A belief that the economic system works for millions is an important part of creating trust in a democratic government’s ability to meet the needs of the people.

The COVID-19 Crisis Puts Millions of American Workers at Risk

For the last several decades, the American Dream has been on the wane. Opportunity has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small share of workers able to access the knowledge economy. Too many Americans, particularly those without four-year degrees, experienced stagnant wages, less stability, and fewer opportunities for advancement.

Since COVID-19 hit, millions have lost their jobs or income and are struggling to meet their basic needs—including food, housing, and medical care.1 The crisis has impacted sectors like hospitality, leisure, and retail, which employ a large share of America’s most economically vulnerable workers, resulting in alarming disparities in unemployment rates along education and racial lines. In August, the unemployment rate for those with a high school degree or less was more than double the rate for those with a bachelor’s degree.2 Black and Hispanic Americans are experiencing disproportionately high unemployment, with the gulf widening as the crisis continues.3

The experience of the Great Recession shows that without intentional effort to drive an inclusive recovery, inequality may get worse: while workers with a high school education or less experienced the majority of job losses, nearly all new jobs went to workers with postsecondary education. Inequalities across racial lines also increased as workers of color worked in the hardest-hit sectors and were slower to recover earnings and income than White workers.4

The Case for an Inclusive Recovery

A recovery that promotes broad economic participation, renewed opportunity, and equity will strengthen American moral and political authority **around the world**. It will **send a strong message** about the strength and **resilience** of **democratic government** and the American people’s **ability to adapt** to a changing global economic landscape. An inclusive recovery will reaffirm American leadership as core to the success of our most critical international alliances, which are rooted in the notion of shared destiny and interdependence. For example, NATO, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and a force of global stability for decades, has suffered from American disengagement in recent years. A strong American recovery—coupled with a renewed openness to international collaboration—is core to **NATO’s ability** to solve **shared geopolitical and security challenges**. A renewed partnership with our European allies from a **position of economic strength** will enable us to address **global crises** such as **climate change**, **global pandemics**, and **refugees**. Together, the United States and Europe can pursue a commitment to investing in workers for shared economic competitiveness, innovation, and long-term prosperity.

The U.S. has **unique advantages** that give it the **tools** to emerge from the crisis with **tremendous economic strength**— including an entrepreneurial spirit and the technological and scientific infrastructure to lead global efforts in developing industries like green energy and biosciences that will shape the international economy for decades to come.

### NC – AT: Democracy – Unions Fail

#### Unions are vulnerable to right-wing populism – the plan doesn’t solve democracy

**Gruenberg 21** [Mark Gruenberg is head of the Washington, D.C., bureau of People's World. He is also the editor of Press Associates Inc. (PAI), a union news service in Washington, D.C. that he has headed since 1999. Previously, he worked as Washington correspondent for the Ottaway News Service, as Port Jervis bureau chief for the Middletown, NY Times Herald Record, and as a researcher and writer for Congressional Quarterly. Mark obtained his BA in public policy from the University of Chicago and worked as the University of Chicago correspondent for the Chicago Daily News. "Worldwide, union leaders grapple with members backing right-wing ‘populists’." https://peoplesworld.org/article/worldwide-union-leaders-grapple-with-members-backing-right-wing-populists/]

WASHINGTON—For years, union leaders on both sides of “The Pond”—also known as the Atlantic Ocean—have faced a problem: **Right-wing ideologues’** “populist” rhetoric sways **millions of their members** to vote against their **own interests**.

And then once those putative **plutocrats** achieve public office, they show their **true colors**, by enacting and enforcing repressive **pro-corporate anti-worker laws**.

The problem is visible in the **U.S**., where **40% of union members** and their families backed former GOP Oval Office occupant Donald **Trump** in 2020. But it’s not just Trump.

Over the years, millions supported other right-wing Republicans such as Sens. Mitch **McConnell** (Ky.), Ted **Cruz** (Texas), various U.S. representatives, Gov. Greg **Abbott** (Texas), and former Govs. Bruce **Rauner** (Ill.) and Scott **Walker** (Wis.).

All of them, especially Trump and Cruz, spout populist bombast and claim to represent workers—and then enact edicts benefiting the corporate class.

“Trump’s policies favored the rich and the well-connected. But **four in ten** union voters wanted to give him a **second term” last November**, said Knut Pankin, moderator of a late-March panel discussion on Right-Wing Populism As An Anti-Worker Agenda. “Why?”

The dilemma exists in other democracies, too. Some **unionists** heeded anti-immigrant screeds from **Germany’s** extreme **right** Alternative for Deutschland, **Marine LePen’s** French National Rally (formerly the National Front), Norbert Hofer’s Austrian Freedom Party, Hungarian Prime Minister/strongman Viktor **Orban** of Fidesz, and **Poland’s Law and Justice Party**, panelists said.

Once those blocs won power in Austria, Poland, and Hungary, or influenced elections in France, mainstream politicians followed their lead, **cracking down on workers** as well as **targeting migrants**. The pols feared they would otherwise **lose more votes** to the **right**.

The panel, sponsored by Georgetown University’s Kalmanovitz Initiative for Labor and the Working Poor, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, a foundation set up to foster U.S.- German relations, tried to figure out why workers vote that way—and how to reorient them.

That’s not to say panelists Vonda McDaniel, president of the Nashville, Tenn., Central Labor Council, Prof. Federico Finchelstein, an expert on East European politics at New York’s New School for Social Research, and Prof. Thomas Greven of the Free University of Berlin reached a conclusion. They offered some reasons for the rightward shift and some solutions.

All those parties, including the GOP, “started as bourgeois, middle-class, shopkeeper-oriented” organizations, but have since pivoted to right-wing populism, Greven explained.

“Cruz at the Conservative Political Action Conference was trying to be the inheritor of the white working class who supported Trump,” he contended. The Texan proclaimed the GOP “the party of steelworkers, construction workers, police officers, firefighters, and waitresses.”

Nationalism, protectionism, and racism

“But one common denominator” is the GOP and the other right-wing parties, plus the workers they appeal to, “have a **radicalized response**” that “is nationalist, **protectionist** and **nativist**…to all facets of globalization,” he said. Those facets include corporate export of workers’ jobs to low-wage nations and resentment of **refugees** and **migrants**, often people of color whom white nativists in Europe and the U.S. **view as a threat**.

“**’Us versus them’** is much easier to sell to **working-class constituents**. Union status doesn’t **inoculate people** versus right-wing **populism**,” Greven said. While populists’ pro-worker rhetoric is “a charade,” and progressives’ answer, “tax the rich,” is not enough, he added.

#### Unions crush democracy

Daniel **DiSalvo** is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute’s Center for State and Local Leadership and an assistant professor of political science in the Colin L. Powell School at The City College of New York. Ph.D. in politics from the University of Virginia. “ARE UNIONS DEMOCRATIC? The Internal Politics of Labor Unions and Their Implications” Civic Report No. 91 September **2014** http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr\_91.htm#.VOyiXPnF98E

Unfortunately, much evidence suggests that unions are, in the **vast majority** of cases, only **superficially democratic**. A review of the existing literature shows that:¶ Very few members vote in standard union-leadership elections (turnout is often below 20 percent; in one recent New York City public-sector union election, turnout was 4 percent).¶ Those who do vote are not representative of the membership as a whole (with older workers voting at higher rates, thus skewing, for example, union policies on the importance of pensions relative to wages).¶ Incumbent leaders often go unchallenged for long periods, sometimes “anointing” chosen successors (who then anoint another generation) instead of fostering genuine contests.¶ Unions, especially at the state and national level, often take political positions with which a substantial number of members disagree (thus forcing those members to pay, with their dues, for the advocacy of policies that they do not support).¶ All these factors are signs of a **gap** between union democracy as a **theory** and its **actual practice**. This paper examines that gap and locates its cause in the incentives that union leaders face.¶ Indeed, those incentives push leaders toward the maintenance of an effective organization and toward keen attention to the overall satisfaction of a majority of their members—but away from the potentially boat-rocking effects of real debate, truly contested elections, and widespread participation by members in choosing leaders and policies for their organization. In short, leaders’ incentives, combined with widespread apathy about union politics among the rank and file, conspire to **keep democracy at bay** in most unions.

### AT – Heg Stability

#### There’s no correlation between hegemony and stability

Fettweis, ’10

[Christopher J. Fettweis, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, 52:2, 59-82, March 25th 2010, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396331003764603>]

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible ‘peace dividend’ endangered both national and global security. ‘No serious analyst of American military capabilities’, argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, ‘doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace’.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilising presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

#### No impact to hegemony

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Another argument for high military spending is that U.S. military hegemony underlies global stability. Our forces and alliance commitments dampen conflict between potential rivals like China and Japan, we are told, preventing them from fighting wars that would disrupt trade and cost us more than the military spending that would have prevented war. The theoretical and empirical foundation for this claim is weak. It overestimates both the American military's contribution to international stability and the danger that instability abroad poses to Americans. In Western Europe, U.S. forces now contribute little to peace, at best making the tiny odds of war among states there slightly more so.7 Even in Asia, where there is more tension, the history of international relations suggests that without U.S. military deployments potential rivals, especially those separated by sea like Japan and China, will generally achieve a stable balance of power rather than fight. In other cases, as with our bases in Saudi Arabia between the Iraq wars, U.S. forces probably create more unrest than they prevent. Our force deployments can also generate instability by prompting states to develop nuclear weapons. Even when wars occur, their economic impact is likely to be limited here.8 By linking markets, globalization provides supply alternatives for the goods we consume, including oil. If political upheaval disrupts supply in one location, suppliers elsewhere will take our orders. Prices may increase, but markets adjust. That makes American consumers less dependent on any particular supply source, undermining the claim that we need to use force to prevent unrest in supplier nations or secure trade routes.9 Part of the confusion about the value of hegemony comes from misunderstanding the Cold War. People tend to assume, falsely, that our activist foreign policy, with troops forward supporting allies, not only caused the Soviet Union's collapse but is obviously a good thing even without such a rival. Forgotten is the sensible notion that alliances are a necessary evil occasionally tolerated to balance a particularly threatening enemy. The main justification for creating our Cold War alliances was the fear that Communist nations could conquer or capture by insurrection the industrial centers in Western Europe and Japan and then harness enough of that wealth to threaten us — either directly or by forcing us to become a garrison state at ruinous cost. We kept troops in South Korea after 1953 for fear that the North would otherwise overrun it. But these alliances outlasted the conditions that caused them. During the Cold War, Japan, Western Europe and South Korea grew wealthy enough to defend themselves. We should let them. These alliances heighten our force requirements and threaten to drag us into wars, while providing no obvious benefit.

#### no impact to the transition

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Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.

#### Heg collapse doesn’t cause global nuclear war –

#### a. conflicts would be small and manageable

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Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict?

Sivananda Rajaram, UK

Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc.

#### b. Risks of collapse exaggerated

Layne, 6 --- Professor of Political Science, Christopher, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present

A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the postconflict international system in ways harmful to U.S. interests. Hence, the United States “could suffer few economic losses during a war, ore even benefit somewhat, and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment.” This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia’s political and ideological, as well as economic, closure. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur, they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. Here, several points need to be made. First, proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. Most of these will not culminate in war, but it’s a good bet that some will. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace, the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states’ calculations of their interests than by the presence of U.S. forces in Eurasia. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system, and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. Second, the possible benefits of “environment shaping” have to be weighed against the possible costs of U.S. involvement in a big Eurasian war. Finally, distilled to its essence, this argument is a restatement of the fear that U.S. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. This threat is easily exaggerated, and manipulated, to disguise ulterior motives for U.S. military intervention in Eurasia.

### AT – Dem

#### No democracy impact---new tech, non-state actors, military autonomy, and eroding institutional constrains undermine DPT

**Potter, 16** - Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia (Philip B.K. Potter, "Four Trends That Could Put the Democratic Peace at Risk," *Political Violence at a Glance*, 10-14-2016,

The point is **that it’s not democracy alone that matters**. Rather it is the limits that these regimes can put on their leaders to force them to be careful and selective when doing things like making threats and starting fights. This also means it’s not a baked-in advantage that a democracy can take lightly – even well-meaning leaders in democracies have every incentive to figure out how to slip these constraints. Limits yield long-term advantages, but in the immediate term they tie leaders’ hands, preventing them from engaging with the international problems or opportunities that they feel they should.

There are four trends that indicate this process is well under way and is putting the “democratic advantage” at risk.

**Militaries are less closely tied to voters**

Democratic advantages in conflict are commonly traced to the nature of democratic militaries and their relationship with political power. Going all the way back to Kant, there has been the notion that societies with citizen soldiers and the vote are not going to support unnecessary wars when they are going to bear the costs. The problem is that Kant’s vision isn’t what modern armies look like, and they’re intentionally moving away from the target rather than toward it.

In the US, military service is all-volunteer, and the recruits are increasingly drawn from concentrated segments of society. This divorces the consequences of fighting from the day-to-day experience of most voters. Increasingly, this is a limited force supplemented by private sector contractors, placing even more distance between the individual with the gun and the democratic process.

The emphases on covert operations, Special Forces, and technological superiority further **water down the link between society and soldiers**. This was, in fact, part of the point of moving to an all-volunteer force and one of the rationales for investments in stealth, information technology, and precision guided munitions, e.g. the precision strike complex. By replacing bodies with dollars, planners have consistently sought to increase the flexibility that the US has in its use of force. In the immediate term, that goal makes sense – it allows policy makers to do what they believe needs to be done without having to worry about a fickle public. But over the long term, it has the potential to lead to **less caution** and **selectivity when engaging in conflicts**.

**Adversaries are proliferating and changing**

The emergence of non-state actors as a primary threat has further **loosened constraints** on leaders. The shift from the possibility of total war with the Soviet Union to myriad smaller-scale challenges **accelerated the transition** from a mass military to an elite, highly specialized force more isolated from society. Compounding the challenge, this type of adversary and conflict leads to more significant informational advantages for leaders, which make democratic constraints less binding. Citizens and political opposition are always playing catch-up with the executive when it comes to foreign policy information, but the challenge is harder when the **adversaries are less familiar**, the **engagements shorter**, and the issues **more complex**.

**Technology is reducing constraint**

New technologies are driving citizens and political opposition ever further out of the loop. The extraordinary rise of unmanned vehicles in combat reduces the risk of casualties and extends the range for projecting force. This has undeniable strategic advantages, but **there is less visibility and**, accordingly, **less accountability** associated with the use of this technology. This means leaders worry less about the ex-post constraints and costs that typically come with casualties.

**Institutions and practices increasingly favor the president**

The recent nuclear agreement with Iran was an executive agreement rather than a treaty. This is the norm – most international agreements are now unilateral actions of the president. A polarized Congress is ever more cautious in its exercise of what little foreign policy power it has; two years into the campaign against Islamic State and Congress still hasn’t weighed in one way or the other. In the US this is an expansion of the widely accepted argument that there are two presidencies – a constrained one in domestic politics and a relatively autonomous one abroad. What’s unappreciated is that this growing presidential autonomy (which may well be needed to run a Superpower) also **decreases constraint** and with it the foreign policy “advantages” we associate with democracy.

While these advantages are real, they are also **fragile**. Key institutional constraints – such as a robust political opposition and a knowledgeable citizenry – are susceptible to seemingly **minor changes** in institutions and/or practices that loosen the limits of leaders’ foreign policy decisions. As technologies advance, threats shift, and institutional constraints wax and wane, **the foreign policy advantages embedded within democratic systems may begin to erode**. The potential for such a shift is a possibility that should not be taken lightly.

#### Backsliding’s overblown---levels of democracy are still at all-time highs

**Mcallister 18** (Andrew Mcallister, master’s student in economics and management at Humboldt University Berlin, citing data from V-Dem, a worldwide collaboration of 3,000 scholars and experts headquartered at the University of Gothenburg, 1-22-2018, "V-Dem confirms global democratic backslide, but levels remain high," Democracy Without Borders, https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/4606/v-dem-confirms-global-democratic-backslide-but-levels-remain-high/, accessed 2-8-2018) bm

The annual report of the [Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem)](https://www.v-dem.net/en/) that was released in May 2017 concluded that “the average level of democracy in the world seems to have regressed back to, roughly speaking, where it was some 10 to 15 years ago.” **However**, V-Dem **researchers** also [**argue that**](https://www.v-dem.net/en/news-publications/annual-report/) **“alarmist reports about a global demise of democracy are not warranted**” as “the average **levels of democracy** in the world **are still close to their highest ever recorded level.**” Using its own data and evaluation, V-Dem’s 2017 annual report presents graphics and statistics on five indices of democratic performance in the areas of electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy. The indices detail, among many others, a country’s electoral fairness, the strength of its checks and balances, its policies on freedom of association and speech, and equal protection under the law. Each section frames the contemporary state of the studied index with how global trends are changing by region, which countries are improving or declining, which sub-indexes are contributing most to any discussed changes, and further contextualizes the data with the socio-political occurrences. Since 2013, more countries backsliding than advancing Based on V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) that portrays the level of liberal democracy in the world, the report says that **since 1978, democratic advances have persistently predominated over setbacks.** According to V-Dem’s researchers, however, this trend reversed in 2013 when the number of countries with democratic backsliding started to outnumber the countries with significant progression. The graph below details the backsliding and advancing countries across world regions based on global averages from 2006 to 2016. Countries above the black line have improved their level of electoral democracy and those below have deteriorated (0 being the lowest and 1 being the highest assessment on the LDI): [chart omitted] Overall, many of the countries advancing democracy in the last 10 years are found in Africa (blue dots). Asia Pacific (purple dots) is a second region where positive changes outweigh backslides. In several other regions of the world, the backsliders tend to outnumber the advancing countries. Significant cases of regression blight Eastern Europe and Central Asia (red dots) in particular. In Latin America, democracy’s progress and regression more or less even out. In the Middle East and North Africa region (orange dots), advances made during the the Arab Spring endure in Tunisia whereas most other countries and territories have reverted again and sometimes turned for the worse. Glaring examples of recent backsliding have occurred in Thailand since their 2014 coup, in Poland since 2015 when the Law and Justice (PiS) party gained an absolute parliamentary majority, and Turkey, which has fallen from an undisputed democracy to an electoral autocracy in the span of 2006 to 2016. **The level of liberal democracy remained at a relatively stable and high level in Western Europe and North America** (yellow dots). Although its score remains relatively high, only one country in this area registered a statistically significant decline: the United States. The most comprehensive data on democracy V-Dem was launched in 2011 and by now expanded their database to over 17 million points on 177 countries covering the period since 1900. V-Dem’s data is freely available on the internet and is often used by researches and institutions such as the World Bank, the European Commission and NGOs. The project is a worldwide collaboration of almost 3,000 scholars and experts headquartered at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg

#### No empirical evidence for their impact

**Gartzke 13**

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The “autocratic peace” involves a class of arguments about the conflictual consequences of regime similarity and difference. Theories disagree over whether democratic and autocratic relations are distinct or equivalent. Early studies of the autocratic peace typically focused on certain geographic regions. Despite having little democracy, low levels of economic development, arbitrary national borders, and widespread civil conflict, **Africa experiences surprisingly little interstate war**. Several studies attribute the “African peace” to historical norms and to the strategic behavior of insecure leaders who recognize that challenging existing borders invites continental war while encouraging secessionist movements risks reciprocal meddling in the country’s own domestic affairs (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989, 1990).6 However, these arguments fail to address tensions between individual (state, leader) interests and social goods. The security dilemma implies precisely that leaders act aggressively despite lacking revisionist objectives (Jervis 1978). Initial **statistical evidence of an autocratic peace emerged** in a negative form with the observation that mixed democratic–autocratic dyads are more conflict prone than either jointly democratic or jointly autocratic dyads (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre 1997**). Studies have sought systematic evidence for** or against an **autocratic peace**. Oren and Hays (1997) evaluate several data sets, finding that **autocracies are less war prone** than democracy–autocracy pairs. Indeed, **they find that socialist countries** with advanced industrialized economies **are more peaceful than democracies**. Werner (2000) finds an effect of political similarity that coexists with the widely recognized effect of joint democracy. She attributes the result to shared preferences arising from a reduced likelihood of disputes over domestic politics. Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) break down the broad category of autocracy into multiple subgroups and find evidence that **shared autocratic type** (personalistic dictatorships, single-party regimes, or military juntas) **reduces conflict**, although the observed effects are less pronounced than for joint democracy. **Henderson** (2002) **goes further by arguing** that **there is no empirically verifiable democratic peace**. Instead, political dissimilarity causes conflict. Souva (2004) argues and finds that similarity of both political and economic institutions encourages peace. **In the most sophisticated analysis to date, Bennett** (2006) **finds a robust autocratic peace**, though the effect is smaller than for joint democracy and limited to coherent autocratic regimes. Petersen (2004), in contrast, uses an alternate categorization of autocracy and finds no support for the claim that similarity prevents or limits conflict. Still, the bulk of evidence suggests that similar polities are associated with relative peace, **even among nondemocracies.** **The autocratic peace poses unique challenges for democratic peace theories**. Given that the democratic peace highlights apparently unique characteristics of joint democracy, many explanations are predicated on attributes found only in democratic regimes. An autocratic peace implies that scholars should focus on corollaries or consequences of shared regime type, in addition to, or perhaps even instead of democracy. In this context, arguments about democratic norms (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), improved democratic signaling ability (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998, 1999, 2001), the peculiar incentives imposed on leaders by democratic institutions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003), and democratic learning (Cederman 2001a) all **invite additional scrutiny**. While it is theoretically possible that a democratic peace and an autocratic peace could arise from independent causal processes, logical elegance and the empirical similarities inherent in shared regime type provide cause to explore theoretical arguments that spring from regime similarity in general.

#### There’s also no empirical evidence for democracy—places without democracy like Africa experience little war and vice versa fight wars—that’s Gartzke. States act on interest, not perceptions of democracy.

**Cohen 14**

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Still, even if one grants Farrell and Finnemore the benefit of the doubt, or concedes that even false accusations of American hypocrisy are harmful, it is difficult to accept their larger claim: that Washington’s alleged inability “to consistently abide by the values that it trumpets” will harm the national interest by changing the way other countries act toward the United States. **Manning’s and** Snowden’s leaks proved embarrassing, and Washington has had to deal with some short-term diplomatic fallout. But the leaks are highly unlikely to have **lasting diplomatic effects**. For the sake of comparison, consider the impact of the U.S.-led “global war on terrorism.” After 9/11, U.S. actions and policies on a **wide range of issues,** **such as torture, detention, and preventive war,** pointed to a fairly **wide gulf** between the country’s stated principles and its actual behavior. And during the Bush administration, Washington treated some of its close European allies so poorly that their leaders responded by publicly distancing themselves from the United States. In 2002, for example, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder successfully ran for reelection by trumpeting his opposition to U.S. plans to invade Iraq. Yet none of these actions led to a wholesale change in the transatlantic alliance or to global bandwagoning against Washington. The reason should be somewhat obvious: **foreign countries,** particularly close U.S. allies, **continue to rely heavily on American diplomatic, military, and economic power.** Farrell and Finnemore assert that the potential gap between Washington’s stated values and U.S. actions “creates the risk that other states might decide that the U.S.-led order is fundamentally illegitimate.” **But that risk is vanishingly small**: after all, **the U.S.-led order greatly** (even disproportionately) **benefits** U.S. **allies, and even** some **rivals**. Germany might be angry about the fact that the NSA bugged Chancellor Angela Merkel’s private cell phone, **but not so angry that it will leave NATO or fundamentally change its bilateral relationship** with the United States. Likewise, it is hard to imagine that Brazil would **curtail its significant economic ties** to the United States because of the NSA’s spying on Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff -- or, for that matter, that China would **disengage from the World Trade Organization** because the United States is hacking Chinese computers. Farrell and Finnemore never explain why other countries would respond to U.S. hypocrisy (real or imagined) by taking steps that could end up **doing them more harm than good**. Throughout the post–Cold War era, **even when the United States has taken actions that other countries opposed, those countries have nevertheless maintained their fealty** to the U.S.-led liberal world order. **That is not a bug of the international system: it is its most important feature, and an indication of its strength.** This should hardly come as news to Farrell and Finnemore, who have long been insightful observers of international politics. But they perhaps should have looked more closely at some of the very evidence they cite. Consider, for example, their interpretation of remarks made in 2010 by then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who said that the national security implications of Manning’s leaks would be “fairly modest.” Farrell and Finnemore claim that Gates downplayed the impact of the leaks because they did not reveal anything that was truly unexpected. But that’s not why Gates thought the effect of the leaks would be mild. “The fact is,” Gates said, “**governments deal with the United States because it’s in their interest**, **not because they like us, not because they trust us,** and not because they believe we can keep secrets. . . . Some governments . . . deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us. . . . So other nations will continue to deal with us. They will continue to work with us.” Gates’ full statement, which Farrell and Finnemore disregard, is perhaps the most compelling refutation of their thesis: an unusually candid reminder of precisely how international cooperation works in the U.S.-led global order. Farrell and Finnemore are right to acknowledge that hypocrisy is the “lubricating oil” of that order. But they err in believing that is going to change anytime soon.

#### Global democratization is high now – reject skeptics

Renat **Kuenzi 18**, University of Bern, head of the editorial dept @ Swiss Info, citing Bruno Kaufmann, Chairman of the Democracy Council and Election Commission, "Is global democracy in decline or development?", SWI swissinfo.ch, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/directdemocracy/democracy-index-2017\_is-global-democracy-in-decline-or-development-/43896598

The Economist magazine’s Democracy Index 2017 sees “free speech under attack” and global democracy in “disturbing retreat”, **but** swissinfo.ch’s global democracy correspondent Bruno **Kaufmann calls the findings into question**. More than half the countries compared by British magazine Economistexternal link saw their democracy ratings drop last year – 89 out of 167 countries. The report, published last month, says that only 5% of the global population lived in “true democracies” in 2017, while nearly a third of the population was under authoritarian rule. The authors see “the biggest decline in years”. Switzerland is still among the top ten in the democracy rankings, but dropped from eighth to ninth position. Leading the table is Norway, followed by Iceland, Sweden, New Zealand, Denmark, Ireland, Canada and Australia. Switzerland shares its position with Finland, while Chad, Syria and North Korea are bottom of the list. Financial transparency “Switzerland continues to struggle when it comes to transparent rules on the financing of political parties,” says Kaufmann. “Efforts inside and outside parliament to tackle the issue are regularly dismissed as unnecessary. This undermines democracy.” Scandinavian countries are miles ahead of Switzerland with its opaque system, he adds. Kaufmann also says Switzerland lags behind in the political integration of foreign residents. “The Nordic countries are more progressive about granting participatory rights.” **Narrow scope** The comparison is based on 60 indicators and five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Kaufmann does not criticize the applied criteria as such, but argues that they are **too few** and the **scope too narrow**. “They only list voter turnout in elections and membership figures of trade unions under the category political participation. **But it leaves out possibilities of direct democracy** and **citizens’ participation** in a **Swiss-style democracy** with initiatives and referendums,” says Kaufmann. This explains why Nordic countries have such high scores, according to Kaufmann, who lives in Sweden and has dual Swiss-Swedish nationality. This is despite the fact that Swedes are among the citizens who hardly ever have a direct say in political decision making processes, he points out. Local democracy Kaufmann says the comparison is done only at the level of nation states. **Possibilities and developments at a regional and local level**, where it is often easier for citizens to play an active part, are **not considered** in the index. He points to the **Global State of Democracies report** published last September by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), an organisation of 30 countries including Switzerland. “Globally democracies are **astonishingly resilient**, according to the IDEA report,” says Kaufmann. “**Participatory rights have even become stronger at a** local and **regional level over the past few years**.” He says the research project Varieties in Democracy (V-DEM), which used no less than **400 democracy indicators**, **confirms this**. Kaufmann says he can’t turn a blind eye to the pressure on democracies, including Turkey. “But in-depth analyses such as the reports by IDEA and V-DEM have found **progress in the development of democracy**. It’s out of place to speak of a ‘disturbing retreat of global democracy’”.