# 1

#### US wins space race now due to private competition – its key to space dominance and militarization is good – the plan nukes the US’s silver bullet against Chinese aggression

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As Jeff Bezos, the wealthiest man on the planet, readies to launch himself into space aboard one of his own rockets, the world is watching the birth of a new dawn in space. Previously, America relied on its government agency, NASA, to propel it to the cosmos during the last space race with the Soviet Union. Today, America’s greatest hopes are with its private sector.

Jeff Bezos is not engaging in such risky behavior simply because he’s an adrenaline junky. No, he’s launching himself into orbit because his Blue Origins is in a titanic struggle with Elon Musk’s SpaceX — and Bezos’s firm is losing.

Whatever happens, the American people will benefit from the competition that is shaping up between America’s space entrepreneurs. This has always been how innovation occurs: through the dynamic, often cutthroat competition between actors in the private sector. While money is their ultimate prize, fame and fortune are also alluring temptations to make men like Musk and Bezos risk much of their wealth to change the world.

The private space race among these entrepreneurs is part of a far more important marathon between Red China and the United States. Whichever nation wins the new space race will determine the future of the earth below.

Consider this: Since winning its initial contracts to launch sensitive U.S. military satellites into orbit, SpaceX has lowered the cost of military satellite launches on taxpayers by “over a million dollars less” than what bigger defense contractors can do. Elon Musk is convinced that he can bring these costs down even more, thanks to his reusable Falcon 9 rocket.

The competition between the private space start-ups is fierce — just as the competition between Edison and Westinghouse was — but the upshot is ultimately greater innovation and lower costs for you and me. In fact, Elon Musk insists that if NASA gives SpaceX the contract for building the Human Landing System for the Artemis mission, NASA would return astronauts to the lunar surface by 2024 — four years before NASA believes it will do so. (Incidentally, 2024 is also when China anticipates having a functional base on the moon’s southern pole.)

Whereas China has an all-of-society approach to its space race with the United States, Washington has yet to fully galvanize the country in the way that John F. Kennedy rallied America to wage — and win — the space race in the Cold War. America’s private sector, therefore, is the silver bullet against China’s quest for total space dominance. If left unrestricted by meddlesome Washington bureaucrats, these companies will ensure that the United States retains its overall competitive advantage over China — and all other challengers, for that matter.

Indeed, the next four years could prove decisive in who will be victorious.

Enter the newly minted NASA director, Bill Nelson, whose station at the agency has effectively poured cold water on the private sector’s ambitious space plans. “Space is not going to be the Wild West for billionaires or anyone else looking to blast off,” Nelson admonished an inquiring reporter.

Why not?

America’s actions during its western expansion created a dynamic and advanced nation that was well-positioned to dominate the world for the next century. Should we not attempt to emulate this in order to remain dominant in the next century?

More important, this is precisely how China treats space: as a new Wild West . . . but one in which Beijing’s forces will dominate. China takes a leap-without-looking approach to space development — everything that can be done to further its grand ambition of becoming the world’s most dominant power by 2049 will be done. Meanwhile, the Biden administration wants to prevent America’s greatest strength, the free market, from helping to beat its foremost geopolitical competitor.

Nelson’s comments are fundamentally at odds with America’s spirit and animating principles. Whatever one’s opinion about Bezos or Musk, the fact is that their private space companies are inspiring greater innovation today in the space sector after years of its being left in the sclerotic hands of the U.S. government.

Sensing that the federal government’s dominance of U.S. space policy is waning, the Biden administration would rather cede the strategic high ground of space to China than let wildcatting innovators do the hard work. Today, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and NASA are contriving new ways for strangling the budding private space sector, just as it is taking flight.

Risk aversion is not how one innovates. Risk is what led Americans to the moon just 66 years after the Wright brothers flew their first airplane. A willingness for risk doesn’t exist today in the federal government — which is why the feds shouldn’t be running space policy.

The U.S. government should be partnering with the new space start-ups, not shunning them. The FAA should be automatically approving SpaceX launches, not stymying them. The federal government will not win space any more than it could win the West or build the locomotive. It takes strong-willed, brilliant individuals of a rare caliber to do that. All government can do is to give the resources and support to private-sector innovators and let them make history for us.

The next decade will decide who wins space. Let it be America — and let America’s dynamic start-ups win that race, not China’s state capitalism.

#### And, space dominance key to global peace – nuclear and conventional deterrence is collapsing, which will provoke civilization-ending revisionist aggression from Russia and China

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The United States needs a new national security policy. For the first time in more than 60 years, we face the real possibility of a large-scale conventional war, and we are woefully unprepared.

Eastern and Central Europe is now so weakly defended as to virtually invite invasion. The United States is not about to go to nuclear war to defend any foreign country. So deterrence is dead, and, with the German army cut from 12 divisions to three, the British gone from the continent, and American forces down to a 30,000-troop tankless remnant, the only serious and committed ground force that stands between Russia and the Rhine is the Polish army. It’s not enough. Meanwhile, in Asia, the powerful growth of the Chinese economy promises that nation eventual overwhelming numerical force superiority in the region.

How can we restore the balance, creating a sufficiently powerful conventional force to deter aggression? It won’t be by matching potential adversaries tank for tank, division for division, replacement for replacement. Rather, the United States must seek to totally outgun them by obtaining a radical technological advantage. This can be done by achieving space supremacy.

To grasp the importance of space power, some historical perspective is required. Wars are fought for control of territory. Yet for thousands of years, victory on land has frequently been determined by dominance at sea. In the 20th century, victory on both land and sea almost invariably went to the power that controlled the air. In the 21st century, victory on land, sea or in the air will go to the power that controls space.

The critical military importance of space has been obscured by the fact that in the period since the United States has had space assets, all of our wars have been fought against minor powers that we could have defeated without them. Desert Storm has been called the first space war, because the allied forces made extensive use of GPS navigation satellites. However, if they had no such technology at their disposal, the end result would have been just the same. This has given some the impression that space forces are just a frill to real military power — a useful and convenient frill perhaps, but a frill nevertheless.

But consider how history might have changed had the Axis of World War II possessed reconnaissance satellites — merely one of many of today’s space-based assets — without the Allies having a matching capability. In that case, the Battle of the Atlantic would have gone to the U-boats, as they would have had infallible intelligence on the location of every convoy. Cut off from oil and other supplies, Britain would have fallen. On the Eastern front, every Soviet tank concentration would have been spotted in advance and wiped out by German air power, as would any surviving British ships or tanks in the Mediterranean and North Africa. In the Pacific, the battle of Midway would have gone very much the other way, as the Japanese would not have wasted their first deadly airstrike on the unsinkable island, but sunk the American carriers instead. With these gone, the remaining cruisers and destroyers in Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher’s fleet would have lacked air cover, and every one of them would have been hunted down and sunk by unopposed and omniscient Japanese air power. With the same certain fate awaiting any American ships that dared venture forth from the West Coast, Hawaii, Australia and New Zealand would then have fallen, and eventually China and India as well. With a monopoly of just one element of space power, the Axis would have won the war.

But modern space power involves far more than just reconnaissance satellites. The use of space-based GPS can endow munitions with 100 times greater accuracy, while space-based communications provide an unmatched capability of command and control of forces. Knock out the enemy’s reconnaissance satellites and he is effectively blind. Knock out his comsats and he is deaf. Knock out his navsats and he loses his aim. In any serious future conventional conflict, even between opponents as mismatched as Japan was against the United States — or Poland (with 1,000 tanks) is currently against Russia (with 12,000) — it is space power that will prove decisive.

Not only Europe, but the defense of the entire free world hangs upon this matter. For the past 70 years, U.S. Navy carrier task forces have controlled the world’s oceans, first making and then keeping the Pax Americana, which has done so much to secure and advance the human condition over the postwar period. But should there ever be another major conflict, an adversary possessing the ability to locate and target those carriers from space would be able to wipe them out with the push of a button. For this reason, it is imperative that the United States possess space capabilities that are so robust as to not only assure our own ability to operate in and through space, but also be able to comprehensively deny it to others.

*Space superiority* means having better space assets than an opponent. Space supremacy means being able to assert a complete monopoly of such capabilities. The latter is what we must have. If the United States can gain space supremacy, then the capability of any American ally can be multiplied by orders of magnitude, and with the support of the similarly multiplied striking power of our own land- and sea-based air and missile forces be made so formidable as to render any conventional attack unthinkable. On the other hand, should we fail to do so, we will remain so vulnerable as to increasingly invite aggression by ever-more-emboldened revanchist powers.

For this reason, both Russia and China have been developing and actively testing antisatellite (ASAT) systems. Up till now, the systems they have been testing have been ground launched, designed to orbit a few times and then collide with and destroy targets below one thousand kilometers altitude. This is sufficient to take out our reconnaissance satellites but not our GPS and communications satellites, which fly at twenty thousand and thirty-six thousand kilometers respectively. However, the means to reach these are straightforward, and, given their critical importance to us, there is every reason to believe that such development is well underway.11

The Obama administration sought to dissuade adversaries from developing ASATs by setting a good example and not working on them ourselves. This approach has failed. As a consequence, many defense policy makers are now advocating that we move aggressively to develop ASATs of our own. While more hardheaded than the previous policy, such an approach remains entirely inadequate to the situation.

The United States armed forces are far more dependent upon space assets than any potential opponent. Were both sides in a conflict able to destroy the space assets of the other, we would be the overwhelming loser by the exchange.

#### Space dominance solves hegemony – deterrence strategies, even rudimentary ones, are perceived as weakness and causes aggression

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While space superiority and space dominance share a militarized view of space, there are fundamental differences in their stated end goals. Those who favor space superiority view space as a global commons, accessible to all in peacetime. They take a more defensive and reactive view of space and the actors who seek access to this domain. The space superiority model understands that U.S. dependence on space is vital for the basic functioning of American civilization (banking transactions, cell phone signals, GPS functions, television broadcasts, as well as essential military surveillance and support functions all across satellites in space). Yet, this model also accepts that current budgetary constraints mean that the United States is unlikely to invest significantly more into unwieldy and expensive space systems.

A strategy of space superiority accepts the risk arising from reliance on space systems, while deterring attacks on space assets. As actors such as China or Russia become increasingly dependent on space systems themselves, space superiority advocates believe that U.S. willingness to retaliate in kind against any attack on its own space assets is sufficient.7 This is in keeping with the classic deterrence model of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

Unfortunately, however, U.S. dependence on space assets for its very survival is so much greater than any other state that such a threat is unrealistic. The reason that states like China or Russia are developing counter-space capabilities is because the cost to them is extremely low, whereas the benefit for them (in the event of war with the United States) is high. For the cost of a ground-based laser or an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile launcher, China could knock out the ability of all U.S. forces in the Pacific to coordinate and adequately defend themselves from a Chinese offensive.

What could the United States do to the Chinese in return? The best option for U.S. retaliation in space would be to launch some blinding attacks on the handful of China's space assets. However, this ultimately would not deter China from escalating any future conflict since China's investment in space is so low compared to that of the United States. In addition, since Chinese forces are designed to operate in an environment without those assets, such retaliation grounded on deterrence-based models becomes highly problematic and ineffective.

Rather than serving as a stabilizing force in space, then, the defensive and reactive space superiority model would be an inducement for conflict in the strategic high ground of space. Or, rather, the direction of attack would be unidirectional: from U.S. adversaries toward essential U.S. space systems. Thus, while space confers unequivocal advantages to the U.S. forces that depend on space assets for their vital functions, it also provides adversaries with an unprecedented weakness for them to exploit.

The fact is that United States, China, or Russia's dependence on space is asymmetrical. Over the long run, a deterrent-based, space superiority model would eventually allow other states not only to gain and maintain access to space, but also effectively to gain strategic parity with the United States in space. Make no mistake, the more that states are able to access space, no matter how nascent or rudimentary their space programs may be, the more they will refine their capabilities and be able to develop space programs for their own strategic ends. While most defense analysts believe that deterrence during the Cold War led to bipolar stability, a deterrence-based model in space would create instability. If a near-peer competitor like China or Russia believed that it had acquired the capacity to achieve parity with the United States, what would stop that state from trying to gain strategic advantage over America in space?

A Hegemonic Model

The best solution to avoid this situation is a hegemonic model. The only way that the United States can ensure its continued strategic advantage in space is to embrace fully the space dominance model by weaponizing space. While space superiority advocates will denounce this policy as both cost-ineffective and destabilizing, a hegemonic approach to space is far more in keeping with U.S. traditions and values. Indeed, as John Lewis Gaddis asserts, the American response to foreign threat is traditionally to take “the offensive, by becoming more conspicuous, by confronting, neutralizing, and if possible overwhelming the sources of danger rather than fleeing from them. Expansion, we have assumed, is the path to security.”8

What of the claim that a deterrence-based space superiority model creates stability? The primary claim of deterrence efficacy is that during the Cold War, the more or less equal nuclear balance ensured that neither side had an incentive to launch a disarming first strike. This view was the basis of the mutual assured destruction theory. Since there was no conceivable advantage to either side from these weapons, both sides were forced into a more constructive diplomatic relationship. In all of the time that deterrence was employed, American policymakers assured the public that MAD was better than the alternatives—compellence,9 Rollback,10 and hegemony—because it restrained Soviet aggression.

American policymakers assumed that the Soviet strategists in the Kremlin viewed nuclear arms in the same apocalyptic terms that they did. As such, U.S. policymakers were not only content to allow American nuclear dominance to erode, but also to degrade actively those capabilities through strategic arms agreements. In the meantime, until 1986, mainstream Soviet strategists and policymakers were convinced that they could prevail in a nuclear war. They were just biding their time.11

In this light then, deterrence was not built around the concept of enlightened self-interest, but more likely the result of U.S. policymakers’ inability to see through the fog of the Cold War. The Soviets were by definition a revolutionary power. Even after they had renounced the concept of spreading global communist revolution, however, the urge to transform fundamentally the world order to reflect their own image remained a high strategic priority for the USSR. The United States failed to discern this situation until the Reagan Administration.

President Ronald Reagan, rather than accept the Cold War deterrence paradigm, planned to bring American technical and strategic dominance to bear in space in order to help defeat the Soviet Union. Reagan also recognized that the demilitarized sanctuary view of space was irrelevant, and he eschewed arms control agreements that sought to counteract the inherent American advantages in space. President Reagan not only embraced a militarized view of space, but in 1983, he also called for the weaponization of space with his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

By the 1980s, the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on space for military purposes (primarily in the area of satellites). These space systems formed the backbone of the modern military force that Reagan was assembling to counter the Soviet Union. What is more, Reagan's preferred strategy of Rollback meant that the United States would no longer sacrifice its own strategic advantages on the altar of diplomacy. After all, Reagan did not accept the Soviets as an equal and legitimate global power. He detested communism and viewed its proponents in the USSR as the great villains on the world stage. Furthermore, Reagan was staunchly opposed to nuclear weapons. Therefore, he sought to remove the notion of deterrence through MAD and replace it with the concept of hegemony through “Mutual Assured Survival.”

These views coalesced into the Reagan Administration's commitment to placing missile defense systems in orbit. It also called for developing new technologies (i.e., directed-energy weapons) to be used in space. The United States would not only remove the threat of the Soviet nuclear arsenal by creating a working missile defense system in space, but it would also move beyond the Soviet threat by permanently dominating the high ground of space. This position was the basis of SDI.12 In fact, the Reagan Administration's shift in focus was a key factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union as the Soviet leadership then embarked on a tit-for-tat arms buildup that their economy simply could not sustain. 13

Even if deterrence did facilitate a significant reduction in hostility—thereby creating the bipolar stability—no such hope for stability exists in space today. As argued earlier, U.S. reliance on space assets for its most basic functions is far greater than that of other countries. Furthermore, there is no way that the United States can—or should—abandon its use of space as a strategic domain. Thus, a hegemonic model for space dominance is the only hope to create the stability that most planners seek, while at the same time defending the American position in space.

Space dominance as a model for stability is nothing new. Indeed, Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) asserts that the most stable global systems are those in which one actor dominates the system. In such a system, power is aggregated so greatly into a single, dominant actor that such a hegemonic power acts as a stabilizing force. Due to its relative strength, the hegemonic power can set the agenda and the rules that govern the system. The relative weakness of the other actors in the system is well understood, which then prompts these weak actors to abandon any hope of challenging the hegemonic power's rule. Eventually, they end up accommodating the hegemonic power. The lack of challenge creates peaceful stability.14 The fact that one actor is setting the rules means that the system is simple to operate in, as well.

The same logic that buttresses the HST international relations theory arguably undergirds the military strategy of space dominance. If this claim is so, then American hegemony in space is essential for the continued survival of the United States. Whereas there are legitimate arguments to be made regarding the reliance on deterrence-based models for creating stability during the Cold War, the fact is that the world is more multipolar today than it was 25 years ago. Despite what writer Fareed Zakaria has dubbed “the rise of the rest,”15 the United States still retains greater relative power. Therefore, it is inevitable and logical that the United States should expand its hegemonic position in space, in order to secure its place there.

Whereas deterrence-based models, such as space superiority, may have worked in a less chaotic international system, no such stability can be achieved today. Many of America's competitors are revanchist states intent on redefining the world order. They are not interested in preserving the American position in space. Also, they are not cowed by a U.S. deterrence strategy in space. Rather, they view such a policy as a concession that the United States is becoming weaker.

Space dominance would create greater stability than space superiority. Missile defense systems, tungsten rods, and even directed-energy weapons potentially would all be placed in key orbits around the Earth. This, on top of the existing U.S. space infrastructure, would prove to the world that the United States is committed to preserving its position in space. In a world of rogue states, space-based weapons likely would prevent surprise nuclear attacks. Failing that, the fact that the United States possessed strategic, offensive weapons in orbit—that could be brought down against any hostile actor—undoubtedly, would make even the most intractable foe hesitant.

It is arguable that overwhelming U.S. space power would trickle down from the strategic high ground to lower strategic domains. Rather than wasting time demonstrating resolve by “temporarily blinding Chinese satellites,”16 for example, the overwhelming American presence in space presumably would dissuade potential attackers.

#### US hegemony prevents great-power conflicts that escalates to nuclear war

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Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and military exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. 34 More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post– Cold War era.

The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history.

Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington.35 In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation.36 The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers.

Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, Russia does not simply want to be a “regional power” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep European and extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploying military power into the Middle East? Why else would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America?

Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much bolder. Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profi ted far too much from the U.S.-anchored global economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence. Chinese military forces are deploying ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fi ctional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “take center stage in the world” and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership.38

These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how signifi cantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. The revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning. As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating the Western Pacifi c, it will surely move on to grander endeavors. If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—interests expand with power, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because geopolitical revisionism by unsatisfied major powers has so often presaged intensifying international conflict, confrontation, and even war. The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come.

# 2

#### States should:

#### increase funding for space-situational awareness technology,

#### ban space colonization by private entities, and

#### warn all states about known impending collisions on their space assets.

#### Plank 1 solves collisions, assures allies, and avoids sharing key secrets

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Improved SSA is a foundational capability for any US space strategy in any and all circumstances, given the rapid changes in the space environment. The national space security community has recognized this repeatedly, although funding has arguably not been commensurate with the rhetoric. Attempts are now being made to rectify the funding situation because of the Russia/China threat scare. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Obama administration is planning to spend about $6 billion between 2015 and 2020 to beef up SSA capabilities—largely within the Pentagon, but also at contributing agencies NOAA and NASA.50 Calculating exact spending on SSA activities, however, is not possible due to the way the Defense Department tracks (or, rather, does not track) related spending. According to the GAO report:

• Compiling a budget for all SSA-related efforts is a challenge because many assets that support the SSA mission do not have it as their primary mission.

• DOD is not required to and does not track the budgets specific to its SSA efforts for multiple-mission systems, and it does not estimate what percentage would be allocated to SSA.

• For example, some portion of the ballistic missile defense sensors budget, which averages about $538 million per fiscal year over the next few years, supports SSA, but DOD does not track the efforts of multi-mission sensors in a manner that would provide such data.

• SSA-related efforts performed using intelligence community sensor systems are also not included in the core SSA budget because those efforts and their budgets are classified.51

SSA is also an area ripe for possible leveraging of commercial and foreign capabilities, both to provide resilience and to complicate an adversary’s calculations regarding an attack—one of the stated goals of the Obama administration’s NSP. However, that potential has yet to be fully exploited, and greater emphasis should be put on doing so.

On June 1, 2015, US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) initiated a six-month pilot program to research how to integrate commercial operators (and their SSA data) into the JSpOC, called the Commercial Integration Cell. The initial effort involves six operators: Intelsat, SES Government Solutions, Inmarsat, Eutelsat, DigitalGlobe, and Iridium Communications. The goal is to assess whether JSpOC operations can be enhanced via integration of industry capabilities and insights, and, if so, how.52 The pilot program comes after years of lobbying by industry, including through SDA, for closer cooperation and collaboration between commercial operators and the US military on space-object data tracking. One major hurdle has been that the computer systems and models used by JSpOC are antiquated, and incompatible with more up-to-date industry practices. While updates are planned, given the lack of adequate budget resources, this situation is not likely to be rectified anytime soon. This misalignment between ways and means should be addressed as soon as possible by the incoming administration.

Another question is the extent to which US allies will be allowed access to the improved SSA data, including the interference warnings and collision analysis it will provide.53 The issue with allies is not just technical, but also, and primarily, political. The uncertainty in the private sector about JSpOC-industry collaboration and data sharing is underscored by AGI’s COMSpOC. AGI is seeking to tap into the expanded (and unfilled by JSpOC) need for such data in the commercial marketplace, both in the United States and abroad.54

Lieutenant General John W. Raymond, Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Space, told the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee on March 25, 2015, that STRATCOM is working on a new “tiered SSA Sharing Strategy.” Raymond stated: “The tenets of this strategy are to share more information in a timelier manner with the broadest range of partners. We aim to promote an interactive, exchange-based relationship with satellite 35 owners and operators where all parties gain. This open exchange of information also supports U.S. and allied efforts to detect, identify, and attribute actions in space that are contrary to responsible use and the long-term sustainability of the space environment.” He further noted that, as of March 2015, there were forty-six SSA-sharing agreements in place with forty-six commercial firms, eight nations, and two intergovernmental organizations, with ten more in the works.55 (The number of such SSA agreements, as of March 2016, is now at sixty-three.)56

The word “tiered” in Raymond’s statement is central, as part of the issue for the Defense Department is figuring out what data to share with whom, at what level of specificity and accuracy. There has traditionally been reluctance about “giving away the store,” particularly because many allies more closely integrate their civilian and military space operations, with less of a focus on protecting national security secrets. It is hard to underestimate the challenges— for example, simply regarding security clearances for access to US data. Further, some nations are leery of relying too closely on information provided by the US military. For this very reason, the European Union (EU) in 2009 launched an effort to pursue independent SSA capabilities— an effort that has proceeded in fits and starts, due to internal EU concerns about the sharing of both information and funding. As of early 2015, the nascent program is being funded by fourteen participating EU states, focusing largely on figuring out how to better coordinate European activities, but also looking at how to improve capabilities.57According to the European Space Agency (ESA): “To date, Europe’s access to information on what is happening in space has been largely dependent on non-European sources. In recent years, for example, data to trigger alerts on potential collisions between European satellites and debris objects have only come through the good will of other spacefaring nations. For this and other reasons, Europe needs an autonomous SSA capability.”58 It remains unclear how the EU SSA system, once established, will interact with that of the United States. This should be a major focus of future US space diplomacy and cooperation, to ensure that the systems are compatible and accessible—in part, to provide mission assurance.

The United States signaled its desire to forge the closest partnership on SSA sharing with Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, via a Memorandum of Understanding on Combined Space Operations, signed in September 2014.59 The details of the MoU, however, are vague.60 It should be noted that all three countries have assets that could contribute to US efforts, and would not simply benefit from a one-way absorption of US data.

Also, it is not only US allies who require better SSA in order to operate satellites safely and securely. More than seventy countries operate satellites, with 1,381 operating satellites in orbit at the end of 2015.61 Many of these operators lack sufficient SSA. In the July 2013 report adopted by the UN General Assembly in October 2013, the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities cited the need for improved global access to space data, both for safety purposes and for building trust. The report stated that, beyond a lack of space capacity, “the inability of many States to acquire significant space-based information” is a factor “contributing to the lack of confidence.”62 Russia has proposed to the COPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee that the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs consider the development of an international, open database of on-orbit objects (both operational satellites and debris) to fill this gap.63 The United States and its allies have rejected the Russian proposal, largely for budgetary reasons, but the United States has been internally mulling over a possible proposition to create an informal international group to discuss the challenges to sharing SSA data and how to overcome them. This would be a promising first step, and a testimony to continued leadership in SSA by the United States, consistent with a national space strategy aimed at reducing risks. Inevitably, some form of open-access space-object database is going to be required, simply to ensure on-orbit safety—particularly in LEO, as the number of so-called Cubesats (very small satellites) rises 37 dramatically. The United States should take the lead on developing a workable space-traffic management regime underpinned by SSA.

#### Plank 2 solves their second advantage because private space col is their only internal link

#### Plank 3 solves miscalc

Green 14 (Brian D. Green, “Space Situational Awareness Data Sharing: Safety Tool or Security Threat?” A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of MASTER OF LAWS, December 2014, <http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/webclient/StreamGate?folder_id=0&dvs=1569190779049~368>)

Countries with SSA capabilities would not need to reveal those types of critical information to provide warnings when a collision appears imminent, and thus could provide such warnings even for the benefit of a hostile country. If, for example, the United States detected that Iran’s Sina-1 satellite was in danger of colliding with another space object, it could issue Iran the warning without compromising the security of its own assets. If the US or an ally was in control of the satellite that was in danger of colliding, it could also perform or recommend a collision avoidance maneuver on its own. In either case, collision avoidance procedures would not require a country to provide potentially sensitive details such as a satellite’s current mission tasking, sensor resolution, or design blueprints. However, they could both avert a space-debris producing accident and show good faith in a way that could keep international tensions from escalating.

# 3

#### Interp: Interp – the aff must only defend that the private appropriation of outer space is unjust

#### Violation – they defend “public governance” of outer space through a “global commons” as per their Goehring card

#### Vote neg for limits and ground: extra-topicality allows them to tack on infinite planks to artificially improve aff solvency and spike out of DA impacts—e.g., impacts to the economy. Also key to education and advocacy – they never have to test their aff against well-researched objections which o/w since it's the only portable skill in debate.

#### Drop the debater because the round has been irreparably skewed.

#### Use competing interps because reasonability is arbitrary and forces judge intervention.

#### No RVIs – they’re illogical bc they shouldn’t win for being topical

#### At best for the aff, there’s no risk of spillover from whole rez to a global commons because states still have economic and political/military incentives to exploit space individually

# Case

## Solvency

#### 1] Extinction o/ws under any framework, even under moral uncertainty – infinite future generations

Pummer 15 — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, “Moral Agreement on Saving the World“, Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) \*\*we do not endorse ableist language=

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### 2] Uncertainty and social contract require governments use util

Gooden, 1995 **(**Robert, philsopher at the Research School of the Social Sciences, Utilitarianism as Public Philosophy. P. 62-63)

Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices—public and private alike—are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have on them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus—if they want to use it at all—to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rules.

#### 3] no warrant as to why the commons is key to solve debris – if anything, they non-uniqued it by saying states solve debris now

## Debris

#### 1] Squo solves debris – private tracking, surveillance, in-orbit servicing and green satellite tech all happening now – private sector and P3s are key and outpacing government monitoring

CSTP 20 – OECD Committee, The strategic objectives of the Committee as defined in its Mandate and by the work priorities agreed by Member countries' Ministers responsible for science and technology provide the framework for the Secretariat's proposals for activities to be developed or initiated under the aegis of the Committee itself or its subsidiary bodies (NESTI, TIP, GSF, BNCT and IPSO) [This paper was approved and declassified by written procedure by the Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy (CSTP) on 11 March 2020 and prepared for publication by the OECD Secretariat, “SPACE SUSTAINABILITYTHE ECONOMICS OF SPACE DEBRIS IN PERSPECTIVE,” OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, April 2020, No. 87, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/space-sustainability\_a339de43-en]

An emerging “space debris economy”?

* Will we see a more intensive use of cubesats and miniaturised technologies in lower orbits? Cubesats have been the fastest-growing category of launched satellites in the last years and, when launched at lower altitudes, are naturally compliant with debris mitigation guidelines. They are also ever more performant and affordable, and dedicated launch opportunities become more widespread. Furthermore, they increasingly receive preferential treatment in risk-based national legislations (e.g. introduction of sliding scale in the UK Outer Space Act for insurance requirements).
* Space surveillance and tracking capabilities, in both GEO and LEO: New (private) sources of situational awareness data are becoming increasingly important, with data analytics and modelling fuelled by advances in digital technologies. Private sector debris catalogues and tracking capabilities for the geostationary orbit may now be almost as good as government capabilities (IDA, 2016[76]), while solutions for the low-earth orbit are emerging. Start-ups such as LeoLabs provide data and services based on low-cost ground equipment and sophisticated data analysis. The company, which in October 2019 had three radars in the United States and New Zealand, has developed a cloud-based “Space Regulatory and Sustainability Platform” for the New Zealand Space Agency, a first of its kind, destined to track objects launched from New Zealand to ensure compliance with permit conditions (MBIE, 2019[77]). A novel project called TruSat intends to use blockchain technology to crowdsource and validate satellite orbital positions worldwide via open source software (TruSat, 2019[78]). The US Air Force Research Laboratory has signed agreements with several commercial space situational awareness data providers (e.g. Numerica, LeoLabs, ExoAnalytics) to get access to sensor networks and algorithms (Numerica, 2019[79]). The Space Situational Awareness (SSA) open-architecture data-sharing platform under development by the US Department of Commerce, including data from different government agencies, is also expected to spur innovative value-added products and services.
* In-orbit servicing solutions: Several governmental agencies and commercial companies have developed, or are in the process of acquiring, some capabilities for in-orbit servicing (e.g. NASA, DARPA, ESA, JAXA). In-orbit servicing involves a number of complex operations in space: the servicing of space platforms (e.g. satellite, space station) to replenish consumables and degradables (e.g. propellants, batteries, solar array); replacing failed functionality; and/or enhancing the mission through software and hardware upgrades. This is a major challenge as, when on orbit, space platforms can move at speeds of several kilometres a minute. The first commercial in-orbit servicing mission was launched in 2019, by a MEV-1 spacecraft developed by Orbital ATK for an Intelsat geostationary satellite. The main short-term market is seen in the life extension of geostationary satellites, with some 300 potential candidates, at least in theory (Kennedy, 2018[80]). However, the key benefits of in-orbit servicing are expected in the future. Satellite design is currently heavily restricted by extreme launch conditions, but the possibility of servicing could enable a much more flexible and modular satellite design, able to take advantage of the latest advances in materials and electronics, beyond software upgrades (Jaffart, 2018[81]). Market forecasts estimate a USD 3 billion market for in-orbit servicing over the 2017-27 period, mainly driven by life extension services (Northern Sky Research, 2018[82]).
* Active debris removal solutions: Active debris removal is at a less mature technological level, but several firms are preparing demonstration missions (e.g. Astroscale in 2020). Potential candidates for removal include more than 200 critical debris objects (3-9 tonnes); mainly rocket bodies, but also the European Envisat satellite. JAXA, has formally launched a project to remove a large piece of debris by 2025 (a Japanese rocket body) in a public-private partnership (Japanese Delegation to UNCOPUOS, 2019[83]). Both Airbus and Thales Alenia Space are developing in-orbit servicing vehicles with debris removal functions, some of which have been tested on the RemoveDEBRIS mission (Surrey Space Centre, 2019[84]; OECD, 2019[11]).

• “Green” satellite design and technology: The demand for space-environment friendly satellite design is picking up. This includes features to reduce or avoid debris creation (explosion-safe batteries, deorbit technologies) and/or facilitating active removal (e.g. markers or grapple fixtures). One example is OneWeb, which is installing grapple fixtures on their satellites. In Europe, all future Sentinel satellites will be designed for demise. Affordable deorbit technologies are already being tested on orbit. Canada’s three-kilo CanX-7 satellite was launched in 2016 and is currently using its four 1 m2 drag sails to deorbit at a significantly faster rate than it would have without the sails. Amazon’s Kuiper constellation intends to use unpressurised and non-explosive propellant to mitigate accidental explosions, and satellites losing contact with ground control would automatically deactivate themselves, first by self-passivation and orbit-lowering, then depleting all energy reservoirs and switching off charging circuits (FCC, 2019[85]). SpaceX’ Starlink satellites are equipped with automated collision avoidance systems (although it is unclear which role the system played in the near-collision with the ESA Aeolus satellite).

A recent promising initiative is the “Space Sustainability Rating” scheme, originally conceived by teams from the MIT Media Lab, European Space Agency, and World Economic Forum. The initiative intends to be similar to the most widely used green building rating system in the construction industry, called the LEED certification for Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design. The objective is to promote mission designs and operational concepts that mitigate debris creation, and create a label that can encourage operators to behave more responsibly.

#### 2] The Johnson card internal is the Kessler effect – that takes centuries and adaptation solves

Ted Muelhaupt 19, Associate Principal Director of the Systems Analysis and Simulation Subdivision (SASS) and Manager of the Center for Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies at The Aerospace Corporation, M.S., B.S. Aerospace and Aeronautical Engineering & Mechanics, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities, Senior Member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, “How Quickly Would It Take For the Kessler Syndrome To Destroy All The Satellites In LEO? And Could You See This Happening From Earth?”, Quora, 2/28/2019, https://www.quora.com/How-quickly-would-it-take-for-the-Kessler-Syndrome-to-destroy-all-the-satellites-in-LEO-And-could-you-see-this-happening-from-Earth

The dynamics of the Kessler Syndrome are real, and most people studying it agree on the concept: if there is sufficient density of objects and mass, a chain reaction of debris breaking up objects and creating more debris can occur. But the timescale of this process takes decades and centuries. There are many assumptions that go into these models. Though there is still argument about this, many people in the field think that the process is already underway in low earth orbit. But others, including myself, think we can stop it if we take action. This is a slow motion disaster that we can prevent.

But in spite of hype to the contrary, we will never “lose access to space”. Certain missions may become impractical or too expensive, and we may decide that some orbits are too risky for humans. Even that depends on the tolerance for the risk. But robots don’t have mothers, and if we feel it is worthwhile we will take the risk and fly the satellites where we need to.

To the specifics of the question, it will take many decades. It will not destroy all satellites in LEO. You won’t be able to see it from the ground unless you were extraordinarily lucky, and you happened to see a flash from a collision in the instant you were looking, with just the right lighting.

#### 3] No terminal impact in the Johnson ev and no explanation why there would be escalation

## Corporate Colonialism

#### 1] they don’t solve their impact – their Werlhof card is about cap in the squo on Earth being bad, and there’s zero risk of regulating space spilling over to broadly getting rid of cap terrestrially

#### 2] property rights are key to development because you can’t profit if you can’t own things – aything else is appropriation which the plan stops

#### 3] Cap is sustainable – innovation is key to solve the climate

Karlsson 21 – Associate Professor in political science at Umea University (Rasmus, "Learning in the Anthropocene" Soc. Sci. 10, no. 6: 233. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10060233> 18 June 2021)

Unpacking this argument, it is perhaps useful to first recognize that, stable as the Holocene may have seemed from a human perspective, life was always vulnerable to a number of cosmic risks, such as bolide collisions, risks that only advanced technologies can mitigate. Similarly, the Black Death of the 14th century should serve as a powerful reminder of the extreme vulnerability of pre-industrial societies at a microbiological level. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to think of the Holocene as providing a relatively stable baseline against which the ecological effects of technological interventions could hypothetically be evaluated. With most human activities being distinctively local, nature would for the most part “bounce back” (even if the deforestation of the Mediterranean basin during the Roman period is an example of that not always being the case) while larger geophysical processes, such as the carbon cycle, remained entirely beyond human intentional control. Even if there has been some debate about what influence human activities had on the preindustrial climate (Ruddiman 2007), anthropogenic forcing was in any case both marginal and gradual. All this changed with the onset of the Great Acceleration by which humans came to overwhelm the great forces of nature, causing untold damage to fragile ecosystems and habitats everywhere, forever altering the trajectory of life on the planet (Steffen et al. 2011b). In a grander perspective, humanity may one day become an interplanetary species and thus instrumental in safeguarding the long-term existence of biological life, but for the moment, its impact is ethically dubious at best as the glaciers melt, the oceans fill up with plastics, and vast number of species are driven to extinction. Faced with these grim realities, it is of course not surprising that the first impulse is to seek to restore some kind primordial harmony and restrain human activities. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that, even if their aggregate impact may have been within the pattern of Holocene variability, pre-modern Western agricultural societies were hardly “sustainable” in any meaningful sense. Experiencing permanent scarcity, violent conflict was endemic (Gat 2013), and as much as some contemporary academics like to attribute all evils to “capitalism” (Malm 2016), pre-capitalist societies exhibited no shortage of religious intolerance and other forms of social domination. It is thus not surprising that some have argued the need to reverse the civilizational arc further yet and return to a preliterate hunter-gather existence (Zerzan 2008) even if this, obviously, has very little to do with existing political realities and social formations. Under Holocene conditions, the short-term human tragedy may have been the same, but it did not undermine the long-term ability of the planet to support life. In a world of eight billion people, already accumulated emissions in the atmosphere have committed the planet to significant warming under the coming centuries, with an increasing probability that committed warming already exceeds the 1.5-degree target of the Paris Agreement even if all fossil-fuel emissions were to stop today (Mauritsen and Pincus 2017). This means that sustained negative emissions, presumably in combination with SRM, will most likely be needed just to stabilize global temperatures, not to mentioning countering the flow of future emissions. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), assuming that all the pledges submitted under the Paris Agreement are fulfilled, limiting warming to 1.5 degrees will still require negative emissions in the range of 100—1000 gigatons of CO2 (Hilaire et al. 2019, p. 190). The removal of carbon dioxide at gigaton scales from the atmosphere will presumably require the existence of an advanced industrial society since low-tech options, such as afforestation, will be of limited use (Gundersen et al. 2021; Seddon et al. 2020), especially in a future of competing land-uses. It is against this backdrop of worsening climate harms that the limits of “precaution”, at least as conventionally understood, become apparent. While degrowth advocates tend to insist that behavioral change, even explicitly betting on a “social miracle” (Kallis 2019, p. 195), is always preferable to any technological risk-taking (Heikkurinen 2018), that overlooks both the scope of the sustainability challenge and the lack of public consent to any sufficiently radical political project (Buch-Hansen 2018). While there may be growing willingness to pay for, say, an electric vehicle (Hulshof and Mulder 2020), giving up private automobile use altogether is obviously a different animal, to say nothing about a more fundamental rematerialization of the economy (Hausknost 2020). Again, the problem is one in which change either (a) remains marginal yet ecologically insufficient or (b) becomes sufficiently radical yet provokes a strong political counterreaction. A similar dynamic can be expected to play out at the international level where countries that remain committed to growth would quickly gain a military advantage. To make matters worse, there is also a temporal element to this dynamic since any regime of frugality and localism would have to be policed indefinitely in order to prevent new unsustainable patterns of development from re-emerging later on. All this begs the obvious question, if the political and economic enforcement of the planetary boundaries are fraught with such political and social difficulties, would it not be better to instead try to transcend them through technological innovation? Surprisingly, any high-energy future would most likely be subject to many of the same motivational and psychological constraints that hinder a low-energy future. While history shows that existing nuclear technologies could in theory displace all fossil fuels and meet the most stringent climate targets (Qvist and Brook 2015), it seems extremely unlikely, to put it mildly, that thousands of new reactors will be built over the course of the coming decades in response to climate change. Outside the world of abstract computer modelling, real world psychological and cultural inertia tends to ensure that political decision-making, at least for the most part, gravitates to what is considered “reasonable” and “common sense”—such as medium emissions electricity grids in which wind and solar are backed by biomass and gas—rather than what any utilitarian optimization scenario may suggest. Even if the global benefits of climate stabilization would be immense, the standards by which local nuclear risks are assessed, as clearly illustrated by the Fukushima accident which led to a worldwide retreat from nuclear energy despite only causing one confirmed death (which, though obviously regrettable, has to be put in relation to the hundred and thousands of people dying every year from the use of fossil fuels), underscores the uneven distribution of perceived local risks versus global benefits and the associated problem of socio-political learning across spatial scales. Almost two decades ago, Ingolfur Blühdorn identified “simulative eco-politics” as a key strategy by which liberal democracies reconcile an ever-heightened rhetoric of environmental crisis with their simultaneous defense of the core principles of consumer capitalism (Blühdorn 2007). Since then, declarations that we only have “ten years to save the planet” have proliferated, and so have seemingly bold investments in renewable energy, most recently in the form of US President Joseph Biden’s USD 2.25 trillion climate and infrastructure plan. Still, without a meaningful commitment to either radical innovation or effective degrowth, it is difficult to see how the deployment of yet more wind turbines or the building of new highways will in any way be qualitatively different from what Blühdorn pertinently described as sustaining “what is known to be unsustainable” (Blühdorn 2007, p. 253). However, all is not lost in lieu of more authentic forms of eco-politics. Independent of political interventions, accelerating technological change, in particular with regard to computing and intelligent machine labor, may one day make large-scale precision manipulation of the physical world possible in ways that may solve many problems that today seem intractable (Dorr 2016). Similarly, breakthroughs in synthetic biology may hold the key to environmentally benign biofuels and carbon utilization technologies. Yet, all such progress remains hypothetical and uncertain for now. Given what is at stake, there is an obvious danger in submitting to naïve technological optimism. What is less commonly recognized is that naïve optimism with regard to the prospects of behavioral change may be equally dangerous. While late-capitalist affluence has enabled many postmaterial identities and behaviors, such as bicycling, hobby farming, and other forms of emancipatory self-expression, a collapsing economy could quickly lead to a reversal back to survivalist values, traditional hierarchical forms of domination, and violence (Quilley 2011, p. 77). As such, it is far from obvious what actions would actually take the world as a whole closer to long-term sustainability. If sustainability could be achieved by a relatively modest reduction in consumption rates or behavioral changes, such as a ban on all leisure flights, then there would be a strong moral case for embracing degrowth. Yet, recognizing how farreaching measures in terms of population control and consumption restrictions that would be needed, the case quickly becomes more ambiguous. While traditional environmentalism may suggest that retreating from the global economy and adopting a low-tech lifestyle would increase resilience (Alexander and Yacoumis 2018), it may do very much the opposite by further fragmenting global efforts and slowing the pace of technological innovation. Without an orderly and functioning world trade system, local resources scarcities would be exacerbated, as seen most recently with the different disruptions to vaccine supply chains. In essence, given the lack of a stable Holocene baseline to revert to, it becomes more difficult to distinguish proactionary “risk-taking” from “precaution”, especially as many ecosystems have already been damaged beyond natural recovery. In this context, it is noteworthy that many of the technologies that can be expected to be most crucial for managing a period of prolonged overshoot (such as next-generation nuclear, engineering biology, large-scale carbon capture and SRM) are also ones that traditional environmentalism is most strongly opposed to. 3. Finding Indicators From the vantage point of the far-future, at least the kind depicted in the fictional universe of Star Trek, human evolution is a fairly straightforward affair along an Enlightenment trajectory by which ever greater instrumental capacity is matched by similar leaps in psychological maturity and expanding circles of moral concern. With the risk of sounding Panglossian, one may argue that the waning of interstate war in general and the fact that there has not been any major nuclear exchange in particular, does vindicate such an optimistic reading of history. While there will always be ups and downs, as long as the most disastrous outcomes are avoided, there will still be room for learning and gradual political accommodation. Taking such a longer view, it would nevertheless be strange if development was simply linear, that former oppressors would just accept moral responsibility or that calls for gender or racial justice would not lead to self-reinforcing cycles of conservative backlash and increasingly polarizing claims. Still, over the last couple of centuries, there is little doubt that human civilization has advanced significantly, both technologically and ethically (Pinker 2011), at least from a liberal and secular perspective. However, unless one subscribes to teleology, there is nothing inexorable with this development and, it may be that the ecological, social, and political obstacles are simply too great to ever allow for the creation of a Wellsian borderless world (Pedersen 2015) that would allow everyone to live a life free from material want and political domination. On the other hand, much environmental discourse tends to rush ahead in the opposite direction and treat the c limate crisis as ultimate evidence of humanity’s fallen nature when the counter-factual case, that it would be possible for a technological civilization to emerge without at some point endangering its biophysical foundations, would presumably be much less plausible. From an astrobiological perspective, it is easy to imagine how the atmospheric chemistry of a different planet would be more volatile and thus more vulnerable to the effects of industrial processes (Haqq-Misra and Baum 2009), leaving a shorter time window for mitigation. Nick Bostrom has explored this possibility of greater climate sensitivity further in his “vulnerable world hypothesis” (Bostrom 2019) and it begs to reason that mitigation efforts would be more focused in such a world. However, since climate response times are longer and sensitivity less pronounced, climate mitigation policies have become mired in culture and media politics (Newman et al. 2018) but also a statist logic (Karlsson 2018) by which it has become more important for states to focus on their own marginal emission reductions in the present rather than asking what technologies would be needed to stabilize the climate in a future where all people can live a modern life.

#### 4] Rapid growth key to space colonization---extinction.

Kovic '19 [Marko; March 2019; co-founder president of the Zurich Institute of Public Affairs Research; "The future of energy," https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/aswz9/download]

Ideally, the mitigation of climate risks will coincide with and contribute to the development of improved or even entirely novel sources of energy that will increase the long-term chances of humankind’s survival by means of space colonization. This is not an unrealistic expectation, given that the mitigation of climate risks consists, to a large degree, of replacing fossil fuels with other, less harmful sources of energy. However, some climate change mitigation strategies might actually harm the long-term prospects of humankind.

First, it is possible that dominant climate change mitigation strategies will actively exclude any form of nuclear energy from the repertoire of climate-friendly energy sources. Existing and experimental (molten salt) fission reactors could play a significant role in replacing carbon-heavy energy sources, but pro-environmental attitudes often overlap with anti-nuclear sentiments [65]. As a result, and in combination with other problems such as large-scale market failures of existing fission reactors (one of the reasons being that generating electricity from fossil fuels is cheaper) [66], nuclear fission does not currently have significant standing as a “cleantech” contribution to climate change mitigation. From a long-term perspective, an unfavorable view of nuclear energy in the context of climate change might mean that technological progress in the areas of nuclear fission and fusion might come to a halt (for example, due to explicit bans or implicit disincentives). If such a scenario came to be, our attempts at colonizing space would almost certainly fail: There are currently no alternatives to fission and fusion, and it is highly improbable that Solar power alone could suffice for sustaining extraterrestrial habitats.

Second, there is some probability that climate change mitigation strategies will change the social order towards a degrowth philosophy. Degrowth is a vague socio-economic concept and social movement that, in general, calls for a contraction of the global and national economies by means of lower production and consumption rates, and, to some degree, to more profound changes to the “capitalist” system of economic production [67]. Degrowth or degrowth-like approaches are being actively considered as climate risk mitigation strategies [68, 69], and degrowth would almost certainly be a highly effective measure for mitigating climate change. After all, if we were to drastically reduce or even completely eliminate the (industrial) sources of greenhouse gases, the amount of greenhouse gases that are being emitted would accordingly drastically sink. From the long-term perspective of humankind’s survival, degrowth is problematic in at least two ways. First, there is a risk that the general contraction of economic activity would also slow or eliminate progress in the domain of energy, which would, in turn, reduce the probability of successful space colonization due to an absence of suitable energy sources. Second, and more fundamental: If degrowth were to become a dominant societal paradigm, it is uncertain whether the long-term survival of humankind by means of space colonization would be regarded a desirable goal. In a literal sense, establishing extraterrestrial colonies would mean growth; the size of the total human population would grow, and the area of space-time that humans occupy would grow.

In a more philosophical sense, degrowth might even be antithetical to space colonization. Even though both degrowth and space colonization have a similar moral goal – increasing wellbeing – , the ends to that goal are very different. Within degrowth philosophy, the goal is, metaphorically speaking, not to “live beyond our means”: We should strive for “ecological balance”, and such a state should increase the average wellbeing. But the frame of reference is the status quo; Earth and humankind as we know it today. Space colonization, on the other hand, operates with a much larger frame of reference: All the future generations of humans (and other sentient beings) who could enjoy wellbeing if we succeed in colonizing space – and who will categorically be denied that wellbeing if we fail to colonize space [70]. The goal of space colonization as a moral project is not to live beyond our means, but to actively redefine and expand what our means are through scientific and technological progress.

#### 5] The technology age is inevitable. Global capitalism, political momentum, and militarism prove.

Kelly ’16 (Kevin; 2016; Awarded author, founder of Wired Magazine, citing data from the past thirty years; Book*, The Inevitable: Understanding the 12 Technological Forces That Will Shape Our Future*)

In the three decades since then, this technological convergence between communication and computation has spread, sped up, blossomed, and evolved. The internet/ web/ mobile system has moved from the fringes of society (where it was pretty much ignored in 1981) to the center stage of our modern global society. In the past 30 years the social economy based on this technology has had its ups and downs and seen its heroes come and go, but it is very clear there have been large-scale trends governing what has happened. These broad historical trends are crucial because the underlying conditions that birthed them are still active and developing, which strongly suggests that these trends will continue to increase in the next few decades. There is nothing on the horizon to decrease them. Even the forces we might think could derail them, like crime, war, or our own excesses, also follow these emerging patterns. In this book I describe a dozen of these inevitable technological forces that will shape the next 30 years. “Inevitable” is a strong word. It sends up red flags for some people because they object that nothing is inevitable. They claim that human willpower and purpose can— and should!— deflect, overpower, and control any mechanical trend. In their view, “inevitability” is a free will cop-out we surrender to. When the notion of the inevitable is forged with fancy technology, as I do here, the objections to a preordained destiny are even more fierce and passionate. One definition of “inevitable” is the final outcome in the classic rewinding thought experiment. If we rewound the tape of history back to the beginning of time and reran our civilization from the start again and again, a strong version of inevitability says that, no matter how many times we reran it, every time we end up with teenagers tweeting every five minutes in 2016. That’s not what I mean. I mean inevitable in a different way. There is bias in the nature of technology that tilts it in certain directions and not others. All things being equal, the physics and mathematics that rule the dynamics of technology tend to favor certain behaviors. These tendencies exist primarily in the aggregate forces that shape the general contours of technological forms and do not govern specifics or particular instances. For example, the form of an internet— a network of networks spanning the globe— was inevitable, but the specific kind of internet we chose to have was not. The internet could have been commercial rather than nonprofit, or a national system instead of international, or it could have been secret instead of public. Telephony— long-distance electrically transmitted voice messages— was inevitable, but the iPhone was not. The generic form of a four-wheeled vehicle was inevitable, but SUVs were not. Instant messaging was inevitable, but tweeting every five minutes was not. Tweeting every five minutes is not inevitable in another way. We are morphing so fast that our ability to invent new things outpaces the rate we can civilize them. These days it takes us a decade after a technology appears to develop a social consensus on what it means and what etiquette we need to tame it. In another five years we’ll find a polite place for twittering, just as we figured out what to do with cell phones ringing everywhere. (Use silent vibrators.) Just like that, this initial response will disappear quickly and we’ll see it was neither essential nor inevitable. The kind of inevitability I am speaking of here in the digital realm is the result of momentum. The momentum of an ongoing technological shift. The strong tides that shaped digital technologies for the past 30 years will continue to expand and harden in the next 30 years. These apply to not just North America, but to the entire world. Throughout this book I use examples from the United States because readers will be more familiar with them, but for each I could have easily found a corresponding example in India, Mali, Peru, or Estonia. The true leaders in digital money, for example, are in Africa and Afghanistan, where e-money is sometimes the only functioning currency. China is way ahead of everyone else in developing sharing applications on mobile. But while culture can advance or retard the expression, the **underlying forces** are universal.