## T

#### Interp: Affirmatives must only defend the implementation of a law that affirms that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### This does not require the use of any particular style, type of evidence, or assumption about the role of the judge — only that the *topic* should determine the debate’s subject matter.

#### “Resolved” means enactment of a law.

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

#### “Appropriation” refers to the taking of property for exclusive and permanent use

Gorove 69 [Stephen, Chairman of the Graduate Program of the School of Law and Professor of Law, Ole Miss] “Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty”, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 37 Issue 3, <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1966&context=flr>, 1969 RE

With respect to the concept of appropriation the basic question is what constitutes "appropriation," as used in the Treaty, especially in contradistinction to casual or temporary use. The term "appropriation" is used most frequently to denote the taking of property for one's own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence. Under such interpretation the establishment of a permanent settlement or the carrying out of commercial activities by nationals of a country on a celestial body may constitute national appropriation if the activities take place under the supreme authority (sovereignty) of the state. Short of this, if the state wields no exclusive authority or jurisdiction in relation to the area in question, the answer would seem to be in the negative, unless, the nationals also use their individual appropriations as cover-ups for their state's activities.5 In this connection, it should be emphasized that the word "appropriation" indicates a taking which involves something more than just a casual use. Thus a temporary occupation of a landing site or other area, just like the temporary or nonexclusive use of property, would not constitute appropriation. By the same token, any use involving consumption or taking with intention of keeping for one's own exclusive use would amount to appropriation.

#### US Code defines private entities

US Code 6 U.S. Code § 1501 – Definitions, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/6/1501#15_A>, 2015 RE

(15)Private entity

(A)In general

Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.

(B)Inclusion

The term “private entity” includes a State, tribal, or local government performing utility services, such as electric, natural gas, or water services.

(C)Exclusion

The term “private entity” does not include a foreign power as defined in section 1801 of title 50.

#### Violation – they don’t

#### TVA- ban US private appropriation of outer space for [their reasons] – you can still include performance and the criticism. Disads to the TVA prove neg ground, and they have no right to a perfect 1ac

#### Switch side debate – critiques of liberalism and performance can be read on the neg – solves dogmatism by testing different viewpoints

**Vote Neg – The resolution is the only common stasis point that anchors negative preparation. Allowing any aff deviation from the resolution is a moral hazard which justifies an infinite number of unpredictable arguments with thin ties to the resolution. Because debate is a competitive game, their interpretation incentivizes affirmatives to run further towards fringes and revert to truisms which are exceedingly difficult to negate—this asymmetry is compounded by their monopoly on preparation**

#### That outweighs – The competitive incentive from debate creates pressures for research and focused clash which generates important skills and makes debate a training ground for future work. The impact Successful movement organizing is analogous to mainstream politics – it requires skilled organization, negotiating relationships, strategic leadership, and proto-institutionalism – sacrificing debate as training ensures we never translate opinion into political power, but requiring the aff defend contestable positions linearly increases debate’s capacity for movement advocacy as they get more predictable

Han and Barnett-Loro 18 [Hahrie Han, Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara. Carina Barnett-Loro, Climate Advocacy Lab, San Francisco. To Support a Stronger Climate Movement, Focus Research on Building Collective Power. December 19, 2018. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2018.00055/full]

Building public will to address the climate crisis requires more than shifting climate change opinion or engaging more people in activism (Raile et al., 2014). By many measures, the climate movement today is stronger than ever: more people taking actions, more financial resources, and deeper concern. Nonetheless, despite increasingly widespread popular demand for sensible climate solutions (Leiserowitz et al., 2017; Hestres and Nisbet, 2018) and broad organizational infrastructure to support climate activism across most Westernized democracies (Brulle, 2014), public will that translates into the political power needed to effect meaningful change has been elusive (McAdam, 2017). Even the 2014 and 2017 People's Climate Marches that drew hundreds of thousands to the streets, demonstrations in support of the Paris Climate Accords, and large-scale acts of civil disobedience in opposition to the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines have resulted in only short-lived campaign victories. Nearly 10 years after the failure to pass comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation at the federal level, experts largely agree there is “little hope” existing policies are sufficient to address the scale of the crisis (Keohane and Victor, 2011).

How can research help bridge the gap not only between opinion and action, but also between action and power? Many articles in this special edition examine the question of the conditions that make it more likely individuals will take action around climate issues. Indeed, the gap between opinion and action is well-known (Kahan and Carpenter, 2017), and burgeoning research in many fields of social science seeks to bridge it (Rickard et al., 2016; Doherty and Webler, 2016; Feldman and Hart, 2018). One of us works for the Climate Advocacy Lab, which supports field experimentation through direct funding and in-kind research assistance to build our collective understanding of the most effective strategies for moving people into action.

There is less attention, however, to the question of how those actions might translate into political influence. The challenge is this: in most cases, the null assumption is that activism becomes power at scale: that collective action is merely the sum of its parts, and the more people who take action, the more likely a movement is to achieve its goals. All things being equal, it is true that more is better (Madestam et al., 2013). Additional research, however, shows that for our stickiest social problems (like climate change), simply having more activists, money, or other resources is not sufficient to create and sustain the kind of large-scale change needed (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Canes-Wrone, 2015). Instead, we need a social movement that translates our actions into power. Social movements are a set of “actors and organizations seeking to alter power deficits and to effect transformations through the state by mobilizing regular citizens for sustained political action” (Amenta et al., 2010). Instead of focusing only on resources, movements focus on power. Instead of focusing only on individual action, they focus on collective action. To become a source of power, collective action must be transformative.

How, then, do we build the kind of movements that generate the collective action necessary to shift existing power dynamics? For scholars, what research can help advocates understand how to translate individual actions into the powerful, and transformative collective action necessary to create change? To examine this question, we co-hosted a conference that brought social scientists together with climate advocates in the United States. At this convening, movement leaders argued that to better support building a robust climate movement, research should move beyond traditional public opinion, communications, messaging, and activism studies toward a greater focus on the strategic leadership and collective contexts that translate opinion and action into political power. This paper thus offers a framework, described in Table 1, for synthesizing existing research on movement-building and highlighting the places where additional research is needed. We hope this framework can help focus more future research on the collective, relational contexts and strategic leadership choices necessary to generate collective action that translates into power. In describing the framework, we draw on Slater and Gleason's (2012) typology to show what we know and do not know about supporting movement actors seeking to make more impactful choices.

Assessing the State of Research on Climate Movement Building

How do movement leaders translate supportive public opinion and grassroots activism into political influence? Answering this question rests on first understanding a few key points about social movements. First, movements operate in an environment of uncertainty. For the climate movement, everything from oil spills to hurricanes, domestic elections to international treaties, legal decisions, and market forces can affect the terrain they must navigate. Movement leaders cannot directly control many of these things. Second, policy change is not power. A given policy change will not automatically effect change in the world consistent with movement interests (Hacker, 2004). Moreover, policies can be easily overturned, as exemplified by the transition from Obama to Trump, and immediate rollback of key policies including the Clean Power Plan, restrictions on drilling and mining on public lands, and coal ash protections. To create lasting power, movements need broad constituencies that persist through the ups and downs and whims of different administrations. Third, there is no direct line from activism to power, because power is a dynamic relationship between movements and their targets. To wield power, movements use their resources to act on the interests of political decision-makers (Hansen, 1991). In fact, some research suggests the advocacy group resources most predictive of large-scale policy change are relationships with decision-makers—more so than lobbying money, campaign contributions, or the number of grassroots members (Baumgartner et al., 2009). Some argue that the climate movement's failure to build and sustain the kind of constituency that would pressure decision-makers contributed to the failure of cap-and-trade legislation in 2010 (Skocpol, 2013).

Given these three factors—persistent uncertainty, the need to focus on power not policy, and the complex interests of movement targets—what are the questions movement leaders need to answer to build a more effective climate movement? We argue that most research has focused either on documenting trends in the political environment in which movements work or on questions of how the movement can focus on building more of its resources (such as more supportive public opinion or more activists). Those questions are important. Particularly in today's uncertain, dynamic political environment, however, we also need research on strategy: how do movements create the leadership capacities and organizational (or “meso-level”) conditions needed to navigate uncertain political situations and shifting relationships, and thus translate resources to power?

Organizations that have successfully wielded power in other issue areas can be instructive in showing why understanding strategic leadership and meso-level, collective contexts matters. Consider the gun debate in the United States. Polls show strong public support for stricter regulation of guns, advocates like Michael Bloomberg have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the fight, and protests have brought millions of people into the streets for gun control. Nonetheless, the National Rifle Association (NRA) has been more effective in translating its activists and resources into political power. Why? First, leaders within the NRA undertook an intentional campaign to build an ardent constituency of gun owners that was willing to stand together, again and again, through ups and downs of any political fight, to support gun rights. As recently as the early 1970s, the NRA supported sensible gun regulations. Beginning in the 1970s, however, a group of hardline conservatives took control of leadership of the organization (Melzer, 2009). To build constituency, they used three key tactics: widespread benefits provided to gun owners from the national organization, strong appeals to identity, and a complex latticework of interpersonal relationships sustained at the local level (LaCombe, forthcoming). Second, leaders strategically leveraged this constituency to negotiate relationships with the Republican Party. The recurrent ability of leaders to deliver support from this constituency for policymakers became the basis through which the NRA built high-level relationships with elected officials and the Republican Party, thus cementing its hold over gun policy in the United States. By linking base-building with elite politics, the NRA transformed the political dynamics around gun rights.

#### Debate doesn’t have any effect on the political and the individual arguments we read have no effect on our subjectivity, even if they spur immediate reflection, those insights aren’t integrated into deep-stored memory—this means you can vote negative on presumption. Encouraging focused, nuanced research and clash is the only chance to change attitudes long term—which means they can’t solve their impact turns but our model can.

#### filter their impacts through predictable testability ---debate inherently judges relative truth value by whether or not it gets answered---a combination of a less predictable case neg, the burden of rejoinder, and them starting a speech ahead will always inflate the value of their impacts, which makes non-arbitrarily weighing whether they should have read the 1ac in the first place impossible within the structure of a debate round so even if we lose framework, vote neg on presumption. They also create a moral hazard that leads to affs only about individual self-care so even if you think this aff is answerable, the ones they incentivize are not, so assume the worst possible affirmative when weighing our impacts.

# Case

Rob = better debater

## NC – Presumption

#### Vote neg on presumption:

1. Endorsing their project doesn’t actualize it or make it more likely to occur – an aff ballot is just an FYI, but absent a quantifiable impact, you shouldn’t vote for ethics claims you can’t resolve
2. They only change individual discourse – tons of alt causes to environmental destruction and racism that they don’t solve e.g. profit motives to exploit the environment, histories of racism, etc. – they don’t change any of those things, which means at best they’re a palliative band-aid solution that leaves the broader structures in-tact
3. No chance of spilling over to changing everyone’s subjectivity

## NC – Infrapolitics

#### That feeds a reactive cycle of liberal denunciation that mystifies power relations

Ruti 15 [Mari, professor of Critical Theory at the University of Toronto, *Between Levinas and Lacan: Self, Other, Ethics*, Bloomsbury Publishing, pg. 180-184]

In Chapter 2, I pointed out that Butler's attempt to have it both ways—to denounce the Enlightenment while simultaneously using its resources—leads to conceptual contradictions that cannot easily be resolved. The matter is worth revisiting here in greater detail because it highlights my major disagreement with Butler, namely that her wholesale vilification of autonomy reaches the kinds of hyperbolic ideological heights that cannot be theoretically defended. Indeed, it is in part the predictability of Butler's stance on this issue that explains why I have been so critical of her in this book: that I always know ahead of time how the argument is going to go—autonomy, sovereignty, rationality, normative limits bad; antinormativity, no matter how far-fetched, good—makes me feel the same way I do when I am grading yet another graduate student paper that undertakes the task of "deconstructing" the humanist subject. In the latter instance, it takes all the pedagogical willpower I can conjure up to not write in the margin, "Didn't we already do this circa 1975?" In Butler's case, I suppose I would like some explanation for why the monotonous disparagement of autonomy and related concepts is so important to her.

"This question is worth asking because the problematic of the subject—the question of the proper way to theorize the relationship between autonomy and subjection, agency and abjection, accountability and social determination—has been one of the most divisive issues of contemporary theory. I have already outlined my own position, which is that either-or solutions to this problematic are too one-dimensional, that if human beings are not entirely autonomous, they are not entirely subjected either, which is why we need to theorize both poles of the dichotomy simultaneously. This, refreshingly, is what Allen tries to do, which is one reason I have found her arguments so convincing. Allen explains that her goal "is to offer an analysis of power in all its depth and complexity, including an analysis of subjection that explicates how power works at the intrasubjective level to shape and constitute our very subjectivity, and an account of autonomy that captures the constituted subject's capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation, its capacity to be self-constituting" (PS 2-3). Without an account of subjection, Allen adds, critical theory cannot grasp "the real-world relations of power and subordination along lines of gender, race, and sexuality that it must illuminate if it is to be truly critical"; but without a satisfactory account of autonomy, critical theory "cannot envision possible paths of social transformation" {PS 3). This is why it is important to understand how we can be constituted by power yet capable of constituting ourselves, how we can be limited by our social context yet capable of critical reflection and self-transformation beyond this context.

Undoubtedly even our capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation is socially constituted , so that it would be possible to posit—with Zizek—that this capacity merely renders our subordination more livable. In Zizek's skeptical reading (and this is a possibility I touched on in Chapter 4), what the system wants is precisely that we rebel against it—that we strive for the kind of self transformation that gives us the illusion of being able to distance ourselves from it—because, in the final analysis, our attempts to defy its power merely consolidate this power; as Zizek maintains, in one of his more Foucaultian moments, power thrives on our action of disidentification because it "can reproduce itself only through some form of self-distance, by relying on the obscene disavowed rules and practices that are in conflict with its public norms."2 Yet it is also the case—as Zizek himself repeatedly stresses—that without the capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation our relationship to the big Other would be one of utter subjection.

## NC – Flux Ptx

#### Politics of radical flux destroy the basic deliberative guidelines for politics – makes violence inevitable.

Schwartz 8 Joseph, Professor of Political Science at Temple University, The Future of Democratic Equality, 56-61

Butler, Brown, and Connolly reject the essentialism of “narrow” identity politics as an inverted “ressentiment” of the Enlightenment desire for a universal, homogenized identity. They judge identity politics to be a politics of “wounding, resentment, and victimization” that only can yield bad-faith moralization Wendy Brown takes to task identity politics for “essentializing” conceptions of group identity. For example, she critiques the work of Catherine MacKinnon as epitomizing “identity” political theory, accusing MacKinnon of denying women agency by depicting them purely as victims.38 Brown also remains wary of the patriarchal, conformist nature of traditional left conceptions of solidarity and citizenship. Brown’s implicit concept of radical democratic citizenship rests upon the recognition that political identity is continually in flux and is socially constituted through “agonal” political struggle. Brown celebrates an Arendtian conception of a polity in which both shared and particular identities are continually open to reconstruction. In this “left Nietzschean” view of an “everyperson’s” will to power, there can be no cultural certainties or political givens, as such “givens” would repress difference and fluidity.39 But, if the human condition is a world of permanent flux, then we must postulate a human capability of living with constant insecurity, for in this world there can be no stable political institutions or political identities.40 An ability to calculate the probabilities of political actions or public policies would disappear in this world of infinite liminality. By assuming that the pre-eminent democratic value is that of leaving all issues as permanently open to question, post-structuralist “democratic theory” eschews the theoretical and political struggle over what established institutions and consensual values are needed to underpin a democratic society.¶ Post-structuralist analysis has contributed to a healthy suspicion of narrow and “essentializing” identity politics. But a self-identified feminist, African- American, or lesbian activist is likely to value the shared historical narratives that partly constitute such group identities. Of course, if one is a democrat and a pluralist, one would reject the oppressive homogenization and potentially authoritarian aspects of ethnic or racial chauvinism and of “essentializing” types of identity politics. The democratic political home should be open, fluid, and self-reflective; but if participation is to be open to all, then such a society also needs to reproduce a shared democratic culture and the institutional guarantee of democratic rights. That is, contrary to post-structuralist analysis, not all issues can be open to “agonal struggle” in a democratic society. The traditional radical democratic critique of democratic capitalism remains valid; the equal worth of the individual is devalued by rampant social inequality within and between groups. Thus, a radical democrat, whether post-structuralist or not, must not only be committed to institutional protections of political and civil rights, but also to social rights—the equal access to the basic goods of citizenship (education, health care, housing, child care). Of course, the precise nature and extent of these rights will be politically contested and constructed. But a democratic society cannot leave as totally “open” the minimal institutional basis of democracy— a democratic society cannot be agnostic as to the value of freedom of speech, association, and universal suffrage.¶ Social movements fighting for an expansion of civil, political, and social rights, rarely, if ever, rest their arguments on appeals to epistemological truths— whether “foundational” or “anti-foundational.” To remain democratic, their policy goals cannot be so specific that they preclude political argument about both their worth and how best to institutionalize them. If social movements in a 58 democratic society deemed that every policy defeat meant a betrayal of basic democratic principles, there would be no give-and-take or winners and losers within democratic politics. But if a government were to abolish freedom of speech and competitive elections, or deny a social group basic rights, it would be reasonable for an observer to judge that democratic principles had been violated. Democratic political movements and coalitions struggle to construct shared meanings about those political, civil, and social rights that should be guaranteed to all citizens—and they often work to expand the types of persons to be recognized as citizens (such as excluded immigrants). Such arguments are inevitably grounded in normative arguments that go beyond merely asserting the import of “flux,” “difference,” and “anti-essentialism.” The civil rights movement did not demand equal rights for all solely as an “agonal” assertion of the will of the excluded; they desired to gain for persons of color an established set of civil and political rights that had been granted to some citizens and denied to others. The movement correctly assumed that the exclusion of citizens from full political and civil rights violated the basic norms of a democratic society. Thus, postmodern epistemological commitments to “flux” and “openness” cannot in-and-of-themselves sustain the “fixed” moral positions needed to sustain a radical democracy.¶ Post-structuralist theorists openly proclaim their hostility to all philosophical “meta-narratives.” They reject comprehensive conceptions of how society operates and the type of society that would best instantiate human freedom. But post-structuralists go beyond rejecting “meta-narratives”; they insist that only an “anti-foundational” epistemology can ground a politics of emancipation. For Butler, Brown, and Connolly, not only do “meta-discourses” invariably fail in their efforts to ground moral positions in a theory of human nature or human reason. They also assert that an agonal politics of democratic “we” formation can alone sustain democratic society. This agonal politics, they claim, can only be sustained by a recognition of the inconstant signification of discourse and the ineluctable flux of personal and group identity.41 Rejecting the authoritarian, celebration of the “ubermensch” by Nietzsche, they offer a post-Nietzschean, “amoral” conception of democracy as an open-ended project of defining a self and community that is constantly open to the desires of “others.” These theorists constantly reiterate the definitiveness (dare we say “foundational truth”) of this grounding of democracy, despite the historical reality that social movements often contest dominant narratives in the name of a stable alternative narrative of a democratic and pluralist community.¶ One might well contend that the post-structuralist political stance is guilty of a new meta-narrative of “bad faith,” that of “anti-foundationalism.” According to this anti-foundational politics, a true democrat must reject any and all a priori truths allegedly grounded upon the nature of human reason or human nature. A committed democrat may well be skeptical of such neo-Kantian or neo-Hegelian conceptions of freedom; but, many committed democrats justify their moral commitments using these philosophical methods. A democrat might also reject (or accept) the arguments of a Jurgen Habermas or Hans Georg Gadamer that the structure of human linguistic communication contains within it the potential for a society based on reasoned argument rather than manipulation and domination. But there are numerous other philosophically “pragmatic” ways to justify democracy, even utilitarian ones. Political democrats may well disagree about the best philosophical defense of democracy. But, invariably, “practicing democrats” will defend the belief (however philosophically “proved” or “justified”) that democratic regimes best fulfill the moral commitment to the equal worth of persons and to the equal potential of human beings to freely develop and pursue their life plans.¶ To contend that only an anti-foundationalist, anti-realist epistemology can sustain democracy is to argue precisely for a foundational metaphysical grounding for the democratic project. It is to contend that one’s epistemology determines one’s politics. Hence, Brown and Butler both spoke at a spring 1998 academic conference at the University of California at Santa Cruz where some attributed “reactionary” and “left cultural conservatism” to belief in “reactionary” “foundationalist humanism.”42 Post-structuralism cannot escape its own essentialist conception of identity. For example, Butler contends in Feminist Contentions that democratic feminists must embrace the post-structuralist “nondefinability of woman” as best suited to open democratic constitution of what it is to be a “woman.”43 But this is itself a “closed” position and runs counter to the practices of many democratic feminist activists who have tried to develop a pluralist, yet collective identity around the shared experiences of being a woman in a patriarchal society (of course, realizing that working-class women and women of color experience patriarchy in some ways that are distinct from the patriarchy experienced by middle-class white women).¶ One query that post-structuralist theorists might ask themselves: has there ever existed a mass social movement that defined its primary “ethical” values as being those of “instability and flux”? Certainly many sexual politics activists are cognizant of the fluid nature of sexuality and sexual and gender identity. But only a small (disproportionately university educated) segment of the women’s and gay and lesbian movement would subscribe to (or even be aware of) the core principles of post-structuralist “anti-essentialist epistemology.” Nor would they be agnostic as to whether the state should protect their rights to express their sexuality. Post-structuralist theorists cannot avoid justificatory arguments for why some identities should be considered open and democratic and others exclusionary and anti-democratic. That is, how could post-structuralist political theorists argue that Nazi or Klan “ethics” are antithetical to a democratic society—and that a democratic society can rightfully ban certain forms of “agonal” (e.g. harassing forms of behavior against minorities) struggle on the part of such anti-democratic groups.

## NC – Affect

**Affect – it’s a bad political platform – can’t mobilize**

**Pruchnic 8**, Wayne State University, "The Invisible Gland: Affect and Political Economy", Volume 50, Number 1, Winter, muse.jhu.edu/journals/criticism/v050/50.1.pruchnic.html

These chapters on affective labor also most explicitly foreground the difficulty of integrating affect into theories of political economy and possibilities for political action. Although contributors ably map how affect creates value in contemporary capitalism**, they struggle** somewhat **with determining the value of affect**—or, more precisely, the value of affect theory—**in changing** our responses to **economic and cultural practices**. Granted, many of the authors explicitly position their projects as diagnostic rather than prescriptive in nature. Wissinger concludes by suggesting that thinking about “preindividual forces of affectivity and bodily energies” provides a “new angle” on how imagining technologies constitute bodies (255). [End Page 165] Ducey similarly defers focus on possible responses to affective labor, arguing that since affect “is not subject to the usual forms of measurement and analysis . . . the political responses its modulations call forth are emergent and unpredictable” (205). The essays that do focus most explicitly on such responses are, ironically, those in which theories of affective labor are a starting-off point rather than a consistent resource in their analysis. As such, their conclusions tend to follow descriptions of the new importance of affect in economics and culture with fairly traditional suggestions for intervention based on collective organization and political recognition. For example, Melissa Ditmore concludes her sharp analysis of the Dunbar Mahila Samanwanya Committee, an organization that promotes the safety and welfare of its sixty thousand Indian sex workers, by noting irony “in the fact that the DMSC works with immaterial affect laborers in the world’s oldest, but as yet unrecognized, profession to advance their cause at a far deeper, more meaningful and effective level than has been achieved by recognized workers in affect labor” (184). However, the productive interventions identified here are fairly traditional, and because of the relative singularity of what Ditmore calls “the world’s oldest form of affective labor” (both generally and particularly in India, where the laws governing sex work are fairly ambiguous), it is difficult to imagine how the examples given here might be translated to other forms of affective labor (such as health care, “women’s work,” and modeling, to use the other industries assayed in this subject cluster) (170). Similarly, David Staples contributes a notable argument that affective labor is best approached through a Bataillean general economy rather than a restricted political economy, but his conclusion suggests that the best response to the devaluation of “women’s work” is to quantify the time of that labor; drawing on Derrida’s work on gift economies, Staples states that although the “ethical duty or responsibility implicit in child care cannot be measured, or estimated, or valorized as such,” the “time of child care can,” and can also be rewarded based on its duration, a measure he sees occurring in the commodification of child care generally and in the 1999 rewriting of the constitution of Venezuela in particular (145). Both the conclusions marking the unpredictability of future response and those relying on fairly traditional strategies of intervention speak to the relative difficulty of following up analyses of the operations of affect with techniques for mobilizing affect productively.¶ All of which is to say, though Affective Turn does a better job of introducing readers to the central issues surrounding the study of affect in the humanities and social sciences than any single work I am aware of, [End Page 166] its value comes as much from the way it underscores sticking points or aporias in this work as from the individual accomplishments of its contributors. Indeed, the above concerns are perhaps better taken not as criticisms of Affective Turn but of the segment of “the affective turn” to which the authors are most commonly responding—work, notably that of Sedgwick and Massumi, that has positioned affect theory as a productive alternative to “critique” in its traditional sense: a “way out” of the ostensibly moribund focus on relationships of dominance and subversion and the identification of this or that phenomenon as ideologically or socially constructed. Certainly such an endeavor has had a salutary effect on the contemporary critical terrain, both through its emphasis on the often-neglected role of human physiology and nervous processes in human subjectivity and ideation, as well as its antagonism toward the idea that beliefs and predispositions can somehow be made privative or defused when exposed to rational critique. However, the question of how to deploy these insights within the traditionally “rational” ecology of research in the humanities and social scientists has proven to be a thornier issue.¶ One could, for instance, abandon traditional registers of academic criticism, as do the more experimental and autoethnographical chapters in Affective Turn. These works remain somewhat unsatisfying, however, because even though they may succeed in producing a “feeling” of or for the affective phenomena under review, the motivational or persuasive import to the work is much less clear. One could also simply emphasize the importance of affect as a critique of “critique” itself, as do Goldberg and Willse, who in their piece marvel that even after the impact of deconstruction, “academic scholarship continues to engage media objects as exterior, applying theory against them to interpret or reveal their meanings and truths” (265). Similarly, Bianco positions her work as an intervention into the dominance of psychoanalytical and ideological approaches to film criticism. Yet, I take it, though such paradigms have not necessarily entered “straw man” territory at this time, **we are seeing diminishing returns on such calls as they continue to multiply**. Perhaps most telling is the emphasis, behind these approaches and throughout much of the work within the volume, on affect as not only primary in many dimensions of experience but also, unlike experience itself, ultimately irreducible and “unrepresentable.”¶ Such an emphasis makes the critical edge of the majority of chapters more what we might code “aesthetic” than rhetorical, or more focused on the description of affects and affective processes rather than their possible manipulation. The influence for this approach, it seems, is at least partially Massumi’s “The Autonomy [End Page 167] of Affect,” which looms large over much of Affective Turn. The terms and phrases used there to describe affect and affective “intensity”—“unassimilable,” “outside expectation and adaptation” (85), “in excess of any narrative or function line” (87), “irreducible excess” (87)—are recurrently paraphrased and alluded to throughout the volume.2 In Affective Turn, as in Massumi’s article, such depictions, as much as they are meant to be in some way “post-postmodern,” seem to at least equally take us back to a certain type of pseudo-modernist aestheticism. Indeed, the references cited above ring most clearly as descriptions of “the sublime” more than anything else. Perhaps, as Negri contends in another oft-cited work that also emphasizes the “immeasurability” of affect, “the Sublime has become normal.”3 However, **it seems we have yet to find the way to move from describing affective processes in aesthetic terms to producing strategies for mobilizing those processes**, or, perhaps more precisely, **how we might use our recognition of the affective dimension of politics to leverage affect for political purposes.**

## NC – Discourse

#### Discursive contestation of entrenched norms fails and turns people away from the cause – contestation at the level of policy implementation solves better

**Stimmer** and Wiskin **19** [ANETTE STIMMER Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow in Politics, Lea Wisken. Lea completed her PhD at the BTS and the WZB Berlin Social Science Center in 2018, “The dynamics of dissent: when actions are louder than words”, International Affairs, Volume 95, Issue 3, May 2019, Pages 515–533, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/95/3/515/5420587]

Norms are widely accepted when there is a dominant understanding that is shared by a vast majority of actors. For instance, all states officially subscribe to the prohibition of slavery. Deeply accepted norms are those for which actions that are perceived as violating the norm become highly politicized and trigger strong protests. There will be a stronger reaction to a perceived violation of a jus cogens norm such as the prohibition of torture than to a perceived violation of a norm regulating trade tariffs.57 Discursive contestation of widely and deeply accepted norms is unlikely to succeed, and likely to incur considerable reputational costs.58 To criticize openly a prevalent understanding of such a norm means identifying oneself as an outsider to the shared community, since it indicates disagreement with the community's interpretation of the meaning and/or (relative) importance of a norm.

Hence, the more widely and deeply accepted the norm(s), the greater are the social costs of discursively contesting it (them). Because norms are based on shared understandings, even powerful states have incentives to engage in discursive contestation only if they believe that their arguments are sufficient to persuade other states to adopt their understanding of a norm.59 The more widely and deeply accepted the norm, the greater the obstacles to criticizing it. In such a situation, discursive contestation may come with punitive reputational costs, setting a negative example that will discourage other states from endorsing the alternative norm understanding. Therefore, even powerful states are likely to avoid discursive contestation of widely and deeply accepted norms.

In contrast to discursive contestation, behavioural contestation that occurs below the radar can allow states to ‘have their cake and eat it, too’. States engaging in behavioural contestation can implement a norm according to their preferred interpretation, all the while reaping the reputational benefits of apparent norm compliance. If this behavioural contestation does not become the subject of public debate, states can avoid the reputational costs associated with perceived norm violation. As the Bush administration's attempt to cover up practices that contravened the prohibition of torture shows, hiding behavioural contestation may not be possible for long when the world is watching; even so, the United States managed to allay concerns for a couple of years.60 This attempt to hide actions that others could regard as a violation of a well-established norm indicates that overt contestation of a widely and deeply accepted norm is not socially sustainable.

#### Claims of metaphysical ontology are inherently depoliticizing - locking in politics rather than opening up possibilities

Buck-Morss 13. Susan Buck-Morss. Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the CUNY Graduate Center, NYC. “A Commonist Ethics.” in The Idea of Communism, 2013. http://susanbuckmorss.info/text/commonist-ethics.

The First Point: Politics is not an ontology. The claim that the political is always ontological needs to be challenged.[1](http://susanbuckmorss.info/text/commonist-ethics/#fn:1) It is not merely that the negative the case — that the political is never ontological[2](http://susanbuckmorss.info/text/commonist-ethics/#fn:2) (as Badiou points out, a simple negation leaves everything in place[3](http://susanbuckmorss.info/text/commonist-ethics/#fn:3)). Instead, what is called for is a reversal of the negation: The ontological is never political. It follows that the move from la politique (everyday politics) to le politique (the very meaning of the political) is a one-way street. With all due respect to Marcel Gauchet, Chantal Mouffe, Giorgio Agamben, and a whole slew of others, the attempt to discover within empirical political life (la politique) the ontological essence of the political (le politique) leads theory into a dead end from which there is no return to actual, political practice. There is nothing gained by this move from the feminine to the masculine form. The post-metaphysical project of discovering ontological truth within lived existence fails politically. It fails in the socially disengaged Husserlian-Heidegerian mode of bracketing the existenziell to discover the essential nature of what “the political” is. And it fails in the socially critical, post-Foucauldian mode of historicized ontology, disclosing the multiple ways of political being-in-the-world within particular, cultural and temporal configurations. This is not news. From the mid-1930s on, it was Adorno’s obsessive concern, in the context of the rise of fascism, to demonstrate the failure of the ontological attempt to ground a philosophy of Being by starting from the given world, or, in Heideggerian language, to move from the ontic, that is, being [seiend] in the sense of that which is empirically given, to the ontological, that which is essentially true of existence (Dasein as the “a priori structure” of “existentially”[4](http://susanbuckmorss.info/text/commonist-ethics/#fn:4)). Adorno argued that any ontology derived (or reduced5) from the ontic, turns the philosophical project into one big tautology.[6](http://susanbuckmorss.info/text/commonist-ethics/#fn:6) He has a point, and the political implications are serious. Ontology identifies. Identity was anathema to Adorno, and nowhere more so than in its political implications, the identity between ruler and ruled that fascism affirmed. Indeed, even parliamentary rule can be seen to presuppose a striving for identity, whereby consensus becomes an end in itself, regardless of the truth content of that consensus.[7](http://susanbuckmorss.info/text/commonist-ethics/#fn:7) It is not that Heidegger’s philosophy (or any existential ontology) is in-itself fascist (that would be an ontological claim). Rather, by resolving the question of Being before subsequent political analyses, the latter have no philosophical traction. They are subsumed under the ontological a prioris that themselves must remain indifferent to their content.[8](http://susanbuckmorss.info/text/commonist-ethics/#fn:8) Existential ontology is mistaken in assuming that, once “the character of being” (Heidegger) is conceptually grasped, it will return us to the material, empirical world and allow us to gather its diversities and multiplicities under philosophy’s own pre-understandings in ways adequate to the exigencies of collective action, the demands of actual political life. In fact, the ontological is never political. A commonist (or communist) ontology is a contradiction in terms. But, you may ask, did not Marx himself outline in his early writings a full ontology based on the classical, Aristotelian claim that man is by nature a social animal? Are not the 1844 manuscripts an elaboration of that claim, mediated by a historically specific critique, hence an extended, socialontology of man’s alienation from nature (including his own) and from his fellow man? Yes, but in actual, political life, this ontological “man” does not exist. Instead, we existing creatures are men and women, black and brown, capitalists and workers, gay and straight, and the meaning of these categories of being is in no way stable. Moreover, these differences matter less that whether we are unemployed, have prison records, or are in danger of being exported. And no matter what we are in these ontic ways, our beings do not fit neatly into our politics as conservatives, anarchists, evangelicals, Teaparty-supporters, Zionists, Islamists, and (a few) Communists. We are social animals, yes, but we are also anti-social, and 0 are thoroughly mediated by society’s contingent forms. Yes, the early Marx developed a philosophical ontology. Nothing follows from this politically. Philosopher-king-styled party leaders are not thereby legitimated, and the whole thorny issue of false consciousness (empirical vs. imputed/ascribed [zugerechnectes] consciousness) cannot force a political resolution. At the same time, philosophical thought has every right – and obligation — to intervene actively into political life. Here is Marx on the subject of intellectual practice, including philosophizing: But again when I am active scientifically, etc, — when I am engaged in activity which I can seldom perform in direct community with others –- then I am social, because I am active as a man [human being[9](http://susanbuckmorss.info/text/commonist-ethics/#fn:9)]. Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product (as is even the language in which the thinker is active): my own existence is social activity, and therefore that which I make of myself, I make of myself for society and with the consciousness ofmyself as a social being. [10](http://susanbuckmorss.info/text/commonist-ethics/#fn:10) Again, no matter how deeply one thinks one’s way into this ontological generalization, no specific political orientation follows as a consequence. It describes the intellectual work of Heidegger and Schmitt every bit as much as it does that of Marx or of us ourselves.

## Cap Good

#### Privatization is necessary for space colonization – disruptions kill that potential

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It was one small step for man, one giant leap for capitalism. Only three countries have ever launched human beings into orbit. This past weekend, SpaceX became the first private company ever to do so, when it sent its Crew Dragon capsule into space aboard its Falcon 9 rocket and docked with the International Space Station. This was accomplished by a company Elon Musk started in 2002 in a California strip mall warehouse with just a dozen employees and a mariachi band. At a time when our nation is debating the merits of socialism, SpaceX has given us an incredible testament to the power of American free enterprise. While the left is advocating unprecedented government intervention in almost every sector of the U.S. economy, from health care to energy, today Americans are celebrating the successful privatization of space travel. If you want to see the difference between what government and private enterprise can do, consider: It took a private company to give us the first space vehicle with touch-screen controls instead of antiquated knobs and buttons. It took a private company to give us a capsule that can fly entirely autonomously from launch to landing — including docking — without any participation by its human crew. It also took a private company to invent a reusable rocket that can not only take off but land as well. When the Apollo 11 crew reached the moon on July 20, 1969, Neil Armstrong declared “the Eagle has landed.” On Saturday, SpaceX was able to declare that the Falcon had landed when its rocket settled down on a barge in the Atlantic Ocean — ready to be used again. That last development will save the taxpayers incredible amounts of money. The cost to NASA for launching a man into space on the space shuttle orbiter was $170 million per seat, compared with just $60 million to $67 million on the Dragon capsule. The cost for the space shuttle to send a kilogram of cargo into to space was $54,500; with the Falcon rocket, the cost is just $2,720 — a decrease of 95 percent. And while the space shuttle cost $27.4 billion to develop, the Crew Dragon was designed and built for just $1.7 billion — making it the lowest-cost spacecraft developed in six decades. SpaceX did it in six years — far faster than the time it took to develop the space shuttle. The private sector does it better, cheaper, faster and more efficiently than government. Why? Competition. Today, SpaceX has to compete with a constellation of private companies — including legacy aerospace firms such as Orbital ATK and United Launch Alliance and innovative start-ups such as Blue Origin (which is designing a Mars lander and whose owner, Jeff Bezos, also owns The Post) and Virgin Orbit (which is developing rockets than can launch satellites into space from the underside of a 747, avoiding the kinds of weather that delayed the Dragon launch). In the race to put the first privately launched man into orbit, upstart SpaceX had to beat aerospace behemoth Boeing and its Starliner capsule to the punch. It did so — for more than $1 billion less than its competitor. That spirit of competition and innovation will revolutionize space travel

in the years ahead. Indeed, Musk has his sights set far beyond Earth orbit. Already, SpaceX is working on a much larger version of the Falcon 9 reusable rocket called Super Heavy that will carry a deep-space capsule named Starship capable of carrying up to 100 people to the moon and eventually to Mars. Musk’s goal — the reason he founded SpaceX — is to colonize Mars and make humanity a multiplanetary species. He has set a goal of founding a million-person city on Mars by 2050 complete with iron foundries and pizza joints. Can it be done? Who knows. But this much is certain: Private-sector innovation is opening the door to a new era of space exploration. Wouldn’t it be ironic if, just as capitalism is allowing us to explore the farthest reaches of our solar system, Americans decided to embrace socialism back here on Earth?

#### Happens by 2050s---solves every impact BUT degrowth disrupts progress

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In perhaps the most eagerly anticipated aerospace announcement of the year, SpaceX founder Elon Musk has revealed his grand plan for establishing a human settlement on Mars. In short, Musk thinks it’s possible to begin shuttling thousands of people between Earth and our smaller, redder neighbor sometime within the next decade or so. And not too long after that—perhaps 40 or a hundred years later, Mars could be home to a self-sustaining colony of a million people. “This is not about everyone moving to Mars, this is about becoming multiplanetary,” he said on September 27 at the International Astronautical Congress in Guadalajara, Mexico. “This is really about minimizing existential risk and having a tremendous sense of adventure.” Musk’s timeline sounds ambitious, and that's something he readily acknowledges. “I think the technical outline of the plan is about right. He also didn’t pretend that it was going to be easy and that they were going to do it in ten years,” says Bobby Braun, NASA’s former chief technologist who’s now at Georgia Tech University. “I mean, who’s to say what’s possible in a hundred years?” And for those wondering whether we should go at all, the reason for Musk making Mars an imperative is simple. “The future of humanity is fundamentally going to bifurcate along one of two directions: Either we’re going to become a multiplanet species and a spacefaring civilization, or we’re going be stuck on one planet until some eventual extinction event,” Musk told Ron Howard during an interview for National Geographic Channel’s MARS, a global event series that premieres worldwide on November 14. “For me to be excited and inspired about the future, it’s got to be the first option. It’s got to be: We’re going to be a spacefaring civilization.” Mars Fleet Though he admitted his exact timeline is fuzzy, Musk thinks it’s possible humans could begin flying to Mars by the mid-2020s. And he thinks the plan for getting there will go something like this: It starts with a really big rocket, something at least 200 feet tall when fully assembled. In a simulation of what SpaceX calls its Interplanetary Transport System, a spacecraft loaded with astronauts will launch on top of a 39-foot-wide booster that produces a whopping 28 million pounds of thrust. Using 42 Raptor engines, the booster will accelerate the assemblage to 5,374 miles an hour. Overall, the whole thing is 3.5 times more powerful than NASA’s Saturn V, the biggest rocket built to date, which carried the Apollo missions to the moon. Perhaps not coincidentally, the SpaceX rocket would launch from the same pad, 39A, at Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, Florida. The rocket would deliver the crew capsule to orbit around Earth, then the booster would steer itself toward a soft landing back at the launch pad, a feat that SpaceX rocket boosters have been doing for almost a year now. Next, the booster would pick up a fuel tanker and carry that into orbit, where it would fuel the spaceship for its journey to Mars. Once en route, that spaceship would deploy solar panels to harvest energy from the sun and conserve valuable propellant for what promises to be an exciting landing on the Red Planet. As Musk envisions it, fleets of these crew-carrying capsules will remain in Earth orbit until a favorable planetary alignment brings the two planets close together—something that happens every 26 months. “We’d ultimately have upward of a thousand or more spaceships waiting in orbit. And so the Mars colonial fleet would depart en masse,” Musk says. The key to his plan is reusing the various spaceships as much as possible. “I just don’t think there’s any way to have a self-sustaining Mars base without reusability. I think this is really fundamental,” Musk says. “If wooden sailing ships in the old days were not reusable, I don’t think the United States would exist.” Musk anticipates being able to use each rocket booster a thousand times, each tanker a hundred times, and each spaceship 12 times. At the beginning, he imagines that maybe a hundred humans would be hitching a ride on each ship, with that number gradually increasing to more than 200. By his calculations, then, putting a million people on Mars could take anywhere from 40 to a hundred years after the first ship launches. And, no, it would not necessarily be a one-way trip: “I think it’s very important to give people the option of returning,” Musk says. Colonizing Mars After landing a few cargo-carrying spacecraft without people on Mars, starting with the Red Dragon capsule in 2018, Musk says the human phase of colonization could begin. For sure, landing a heavy craft on a planet with a thin atmosphere will be difficult. It was tough enough to gently lower NASA’s Curiosity rover to the surface, and at 2,000 pounds, that payload weighed just a fraction of Musk’s proposed vessels. For now, Musk plans to continue developing supersonic retrorockets that can gradually and gently lower a much heavier spacecraft to the Martian surface, using his reusable Falcon 9 boosters as a model. And that’s not all these spacecraft will need: Hurtling through the Martian atmosphere at supersonic speeds will test even the most heat-tolerant materials on Earth, so it’s no small task to design a spacecraft that can withstand a heated entry and propulsive landing—and then be refueled and sent back to Earth so it can start over again. The first journeys would primarily serve the purpose of delivering supplies and establishing a propellant depot on the Martian surface, a fuel reservoir that could be tapped into for return trips to Earth. After that depot is set up and cargo delivered to the surface, the fun can (sort of) begin. Early human settlers will need to be good at digging beneath the surface and dredging up buried ice, which will supply precious water and be used to make the cryo-methane propellant that will power the whole enterprise. As such, the earliest interplanetary spaceships would probably stay on Mars, and they would be carrying mostly cargo, fuel, and a small crew: “builders and fixers” who are “the hearty explorer type,” Musk said to Howard. “Are you prepared to die? If that’s OK, then you’re a candidate for going.” While there will undoubtedly be intense competition and lots of fanfare over the first few seats on a Mars-bound mission, Musk worries that too much emphasis will be placed on those early bootprints. “In the sort of grander historical context, what really matters is being able to send a large number of people, like tens of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of people, and ultimately millions of tons of cargo,” he says.