## DA

#### Next off is the mining disad –

#### Commercial asteroid mining is coming now – lower costs and improving tech make it economically viable – and the legal basis is already in place in multiple countries– that helps acquire water for rocket fuel and rare earth metals

Gilbert 21, PhD student in space resources at the Colorado School of Mines, writes in 21 alex gilbert, is a complex systems researcher and a PhD student in space resources at the Colorado School of Mines. "Mining in Space Is Coming." Milken Institute Review, April 26, 2021, [www.milkenreview.org/articles/mining-in-space-is-coming](http://www.milkenreview.org/articles/mining-in-space-is-coming). [Quality Control]

Space exploration is back. after decades of disappointment, a combination of better technology, falling costs and a rush of competitive energy from the private sector has put space travel front and center. indeed, many analysts (even some with their feet on the ground) believe that commercial developments in the space industry may be on the cusp of starting the largest resource rush in history: mining on the Moon, Mars and asteroids.

While this may sound fantastical, some baby steps toward the goal have already been taken. Last year, NASA awarded contracts to four companies to extract small amounts of lunar regolith by 2024, effectively beginning the era of commercial space mining. Whether this proves to be the dawn of a gigantic adjunct to mining on earth — and more immediately, a key to unlocking cost-effective space travel — will turn on the answers to a host of questions ranging from what resources can be efficiently.

As every fan of science fiction knows, the resources of the solar system appear virtually unlimited compared to those on Earth. There are whole other planets, dozens of moons, thousands of massive asteroids and millions of small ones that doubtless contain humungous quantities of materials that are scarce and very valuable (back on Earth). Visionaries including Jeff Bezos imagine heavy industry moving to space and Earth becoming a residential area. However, as entrepreneurs look to harness the riches beyond the atmosphere, access to space resources remains tangled in the realities of economics and governance.

Start with the fact that space belongs to no country, complicating traditional methods of resource allocation, property rights and trade. With limited demand for materials in space itself and the need for huge amounts of energy to return materials to Earth, creating a viable industry will turn on major advances in technology, finance and business models.

That said, there’s no grass growing under potential pioneers’ feet. Potential economic, scientific and even security benefits underlie an emerging geopolitical competition to pursue space mining. The United States is rapidly emerging as a front-runner, in part due to its ambitious Artemis Program to lead a multinational consortium back to the Moon. But it is also a leader in creating a legal infrastructure for mineral exploitation. The United States has adopted the world’s first spaceresources law, recognizing the property rights of private companies and individuals to materials gathered in space.

However, the United States is hardly alone. Luxembourg and the United Arab Emirates (you read those right) are racing to codify space-resources laws of their own, hoping to attract investment to their entrepot nations with business-friendly legal frameworks. China reportedly views space-resource development as a national priority, part of a strategy to challenge U.S. economic and security primacy in space. Meanwhile, Russia, Japan, India and the European Space Agency all harbor space-mining ambitions of their own. Governing these emerging interests is an outdated treaty framework from the Cold War. Sooner rather than later, we’ll need new agreements to facilitate private investment and ensure international cooperation.

What’s Out There

Back up for a moment. For the record, space is already being heavily exploited, because space resources include non-material assets such as orbital locations and abundant sunlight that enable satellites to provide services to Earth. Indeed, satellite-based telecommunications and global positioning systems have become indispensable infrastructure underpinning the modern economy. Mining space for materials, of course, is another matter.

In the past several decades, planetary science has confirmed what has long been suspected: celestial bodies are potential sources for dozens of natural materials that, in the right time and place, are incredibly valuable. Of these, water may be the most attractive in the near-term, because — with assistance from solar energy or nuclear fission — H2O can be split into hydrogen and oxygen to make rocket propellant, facilitating in-space refueling. So-called “rare earth” metals are also potential targets of asteroid miners intending to service Earth markets. Consisting of 17 elements, including lanthanum, neodymium, and yttrium, these critical materials (most of which are today mined in China at great environmental cost) are required for electronics. And they loom as bottlenecks in making the transition from fossil fuels to renewables backed up by battery storage.

#### However, the legal framework that strikes the best balance of providing economic incentives for mining while preventing unbeneficial land claims requires a doctrine of appropriation – the plan prevents that

Meyers 15 Meyers, Ross. J.D. candidate at the University of Oregon Law School. "The doctrine of appropriation and asteroid mining: incentivizing the private exploration and development of outer space." Or. Rev. Int'l L. 17 (2015): 183. Italics in original. [Quality Control]

The doctrine of appropriation is a reasonable rule for adjudicating asteroid claims, and it could easily be modified to apply to asteroid mining. In the context of water rights, the doctrine of appropriation requires that the claimant be a landowner in order to claim the right to use a water source. It does not make sense, however, for the international community to grant complete ownership over asteroids toa single entity, so the landowner requirement of the rule should be removed. A similar modification would need to be made to the "beneficial use" language of the doctrine.

In the context of water rights, an appropriator obtains rights only to water that he or she can reasonably put to beneficial use. The metals contained in asteroids have a high level of marketability. For that reason, a mining entity could potentially put any amount of obtained metal to beneficial use, in the sense that the resources can be sold. This, however, would defeat the purpose of the rule, which is to limit such unreasonable claims. To ameliorate this problem, the doctrine of appropriation could be modified to define "beneficial use "constructively by providing that beneficial use is assumed for any resources that have been removed from the asteroid that the mining entity can reasonably hope to transport to market in a return journey. With the astronomical cost of undertaking a trip to such an asteroid, this modification would limit mining entities to only what they can carry back, thereby leaving the untapped resources available to other entities capable of making the same trip. Considering the size and profitability of metal deposits on asteroids, this modification to the doctrine of appropriation would not be overly burdensome to corporate interests. At the same time, it would satisfy the economic imperative of promoting the rapid development of asteroid resources.

By changing the landowner requirement, and qualifying the “beneficial use" language, the doctrine of appropriation would be essentially ready for application to asteroid mining claims. The only other changes necessary would be some additional requirements that are common to other space related provisions, like those found in the Outer Space Treaty of 1968. For example, a reporting requirement or clause guaranteeing asylum for other astronauts. A functional rule might read something like this:

*State parties or private entities may, upon actual possession, lay claim to natural resources found on or below the surface of asteroids. Rights to appropriate are given in order of seniority, starting with the first party to land on the surface of the asteroid and establish control over the resources, be it water, methane, metal, or any other beneficial substances. A party will be said to have established control over a resource once he has mined the substance and removed it from the asteroid. A senior appropriator may use as much of the asteroid's resources as he can take from the asteroid and put to beneficial use, and may continue to enlarge his share until another junior appropriator begins to appropriate resources from source for beneficial use. For the purposes of this Agreement, "beneficial use “refers to the amount of resources that an appropriator has removed from the asteroid that the actor may reasonably hope to bring home in a return voyage. Resources in excess of what an appropriator can reasonably hope to transport to market in a single voyage do not qualify as having a beneficial use, and are therefore not yet claimed. This means that the extraction of metal from an asteroid does not serve to provide ownership if the appropriator plans on letting the resources languish until another voyage is undertaken to secure the resources and bring them back to Earth. Junior appropriators receive rights in the source of resources (the asteroid) as they find it, and may prevent the senior appropriator from enlarging his share to the junior appropriator’s detriment under a no-injury rule. No state party will attempt to hinder other parties from landing on or using the asteroid, and parties will assist other entities on an asteroid, should they need emergency assistance. Mining claims on asteroids will be reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and state parties agree to release the location of the asteroid, and any scientific findings to the United Nations, the general public, and the scientific community. In the event that the asteroid is on a collision course with any other celestial body, all state parties agree to follow the course of action suggested by the United Nations. Should the United Nations decide the asteroid must be destroyed, no state party may claim liability for resources contained within the asteroid, but not yet captured. This provision applies only to asteroids as classified by the scientific community, and does not apply to planets, comets, meteorites, or any other celestial body not mentioned.*

There is no doubt that asteroids may be extremely beneficial to mankind, both as a source of resources and as a jumping-off point to far off locations in space. The human-race has progressed scientifically and technologically to the point that space travel is within commercial reach, and the need for new international laws governing the ownership of space has never been more apparent. The Outer Space Treaty of 1968made great strides in developing rational rules for space and many of its provisions should be maintained in their original form. However, by allowing ownership of asteroids under the doctrine of appropriation, the international community can incentivize the exploration and development of space in a way that reflects the needs of society in general, without vesting an absolute monopoly in a single entity. The doctrine of appropriation helped drive American westward expansion, and its application to space mining would help drive the human race in its expansion into the space, the final frontier.

#### Asteroid mining offsets terrestrial growth that ruins the environment and enables solar power satellites – both solve climate change

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The mission is essential, Joyce declares, to save Earth from its major problems. First of all, the fictional billionaire wheels in a fictional Nobel economist to demonstrate the actual truth that the entire global economy is sitting on a mountain of debt. It has to keep growing or it will implode, so we might as well take the majority of the industrial growth off-world where it can’t do any more harm to the biosphere.

Secondly, there’s the climate change fix. Suarez sees asteroid mining as the only way we’re going to build solar power satellites. Which, as you probably know, is a form of uninterrupted solar power collection that is theoretically more effective, inch for inch, than any solar panels on Earth at high noon, but operating 24/7. (In space, basically, it’s always double high noon).

The power collected is beamed back to large receptors on Earth with large, low-power microwaves, which researchers think will be harmless enough to let humans and animals pass through the beam. A space solar power array like the one China is said to be working on could reliably supply 2,000 gigawatts — or over 1,000 times more power than the largest solar farm currently in existence.

“We're looking at a 20-year window to completely replace human civilization's power infrastructure,” Suarez told me, citing the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on the coming catastrophe. Solar satellite technology “has existed since the 1970s. What we were missing is millions of tons of construction materials in orbit. Asteroid mining can place it there.”

The Earth-centric early 21st century can’t really wrap its brain around this, but the idea is not to bring all that building material and precious metals down into our gravity well. Far better to create a whole new commodities exchange in space. You mine the useful stuff of asteroids both near to Earth and far, thousands of them taking less energy to reach than the moon. That’s something else we’re still grasping, how relatively easy it is to ship stuff in zero-G environments.

## CP

#### Private entities should establish internally binding policies that mandate:

#### Banning animal testing.

# Case

## Solvency

#### 1] Extinction o/ws under any framework, even under moral uncertainty – infinite future generations

Pummer 15 — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, “Moral Agreement on Saving the World“, Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) \*\*we do not endorse ableist language=

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### 2] Uncertainty and social contract require governments use util

Gooden, 1995 **(**Robert, philsopher at the Research School of the Social Sciences, Utilitarianism as Public Philosophy. P. 62-63)

Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices—public and private alike—are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have on them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus—if they want to use it at all—to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rules.

#### 3] ROJ is to vote for the better debater – anything else is arbitrary and self-serving

### NC – Presumption

#### Vote neg on presumption:

1. Endorsing their project doesn’t actualize it or make it more likely to occur – an aff ballot is just an FYI, but absent a quantifiable impact, you shouldn’t vote for ethics claims you can’t resolve
2. They only change individual discourse – their evidence says that there are tons of alt causes – also it doesn’t make sense to not value ourselves – that’s an innate biological drive

### NC – Infrapolitics

#### The politics of academic refusal are a disaster – they assume a transformative potential from small moments of resistance that simply does not exist.

Reed 16 (Adolph, Jr., Prof. of Political Science @ Penn., “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left”” *Nonsite*, http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2)

More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8

I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following:

At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.9

#### That feeds a reactive cycle of liberal denunciation that mystifies power relations

Ruti 15 [Mari, professor of Critical Theory at the University of Toronto, *Between Levinas and Lacan: Self, Other, Ethics*, Bloomsbury Publishing, pg. 180-184]

In Chapter 2, I pointed out that Butler's attempt to have it both ways—to denounce the Enlightenment while simultaneously using its resources—leads to conceptual contradictions that cannot easily be resolved. The matter is worth revisiting here in greater detail because it highlights my major disagreement with Butler, namely that her wholesale vilification of autonomy reaches the kinds of hyperbolic ideological heights that cannot be theoretically defended. Indeed, it is in part the predictability of Butler's stance on this issue that explains why I have been so critical of her in this book: that I always know ahead of time how the argument is going to go—autonomy, sovereignty, rationality, normative limits bad; antinormativity, no matter how far-fetched, good—makes me feel the same way I do when I am grading yet another graduate student paper that undertakes the task of "deconstructing" the humanist subject. In the latter instance, it takes all the pedagogical willpower I can conjure up to not write in the margin, "Didn't we already do this circa 1975?" In Butler's case, I suppose I would like some explanation for why the monotonous disparagement of autonomy and related concepts is so important to her.

"This question is worth asking because the problematic of the subject—the question of the proper way to theorize the relationship between autonomy and subjection, agency and abjection, accountability and social determination—has been one of the most divisive issues of contemporary theory. I have already outlined my own position, which is that either-or solutions to this problematic are too one-dimensional, that if human beings are not entirely autonomous, they are not entirely subjected either, which is why we need to theorize both poles of the dichotomy simultaneously. This, refreshingly, is what Allen tries to do, which is one reason I have found her arguments so convincing. Allen explains that her goal "is to offer an analysis of power in all its depth and complexity, including an analysis of subjection that explicates how power works at the intrasubjective level to shape and constitute our very subjectivity, and an account of autonomy that captures the constituted subject's capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation, its capacity to be self-constituting" (PS 2-3). Without an account of subjection, Allen adds, critical theory cannot grasp "the real-world relations of power and subordination along lines of gender, race, and sexuality that it must illuminate if it is to be truly critical"; but without a satisfactory account of autonomy, critical theory "cannot envision possible paths of social transformation" {PS 3). This is why it is important to understand how we can be constituted by power yet capable of constituting ourselves, how we can be limited by our social context yet capable of critical reflection and self-transformation beyond this context.

Undoubtedly even our capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation is socially constituted , so that it would be possible to posit—with Zizek—that this capacity merely renders our subordination more livable. In Zizek's skeptical reading (and this is a possibility I touched on in Chapter 4), what the system wants is precisely that we rebel against it—that we strive for the kind of self transformation that gives us the illusion of being able to distance ourselves from it—because, in the final analysis, our attempts to defy its power merely consolidate this power; as Zizek maintains, in one of his more Foucaultian moments, power thrives on our action of disidentification because it "can reproduce itself only through some form of self-distance, by relying on the obscene disavowed rules and practices that are in conflict with its public norms."2 Yet it is also the case—as Zizek himself repeatedly stresses—that without the capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation our relationship to the big Other would be one of utter subjection.

#### Being right is not enough – absent institutionally directed activism that privileges skills oriented engagement over nihilistic theorizing, the aff devastates movements and undermines resistance – it makes all their impacts worse and magnifies our offense

**Adler-Bell 17** (Sam, policy associate at The Century Foundation, “A Tough-Love Letter to the Left,” <https://newrepublic.com/article/142334/tough-love-letter-left>)

Hegemony How-To is addressed to self-identified “activists,” the sort of people likely to buy, read, and display a bright-red book subtitled “A Roadmap for Radicals.” Ironically, it’s one of Smucker’s early contentions that the existence of this clear category of consumers is emblematic of the left’s deficiencies. (Smucker, in this way, is the rare writer who wishes his readers didn’t exist.) The term “activist” Smucker writes, “tends to imply a voluntary and self-selecting enterprise, an extracurricular activity, a realm of subculture,” the idea “that an activist is a particular kind of person.” In this conception, activism is the hobby of a select few, rather than “a civic or political responsibility that necessarily traverses groups and interests.” Activism, Smucker suggests, might be better off without activists. The existence of “activists” in this sense lets non-activists off the hook. It permits our opponents to negatively stereotype a category—smelly, carpet-bagging agitators—instead of addressing the content of our demands. Even worse, it deters potential allies who may be inclined to participate in, say, a movement for clean water, but who are instinctively turned off by “activism” as such. Perhaps most destructively, this thinking encourages “activists” to seek out other “activists” with whom to form communities based on their shared values. This self-selection, Smucker writes, causes many “collectively minded young people … to remove themselves voluntarily from the institutions and social networks that they were organically positioned to influence and contest.” Activists congregate with other activists and disassociate themselves from friends, family, religious communities, sports teams, and clubs that don’t already “get it.” Of course, this self-isolation doesn’t always happen. When it doesn’t, when politically activated people remain embedded in their preexisting networks—and do not conceal their radical beliefs—they can be extremely effective. An acquaintance once told me the best organizers in her Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) chapter were the Arab frat boys. Active members of Greek life and committed activists, the frat boys were not only extremely good at getting a rowdy action started; they were capable of mobilizing large numbers of their previously unengaged, white frat brothers to participate in SJP rallies and events. If it’s hard for us to imagine a crowd of pro-BDS fraternity brothers, or middle-aged white suburbanites taking to the streets for black lives, that’s because this sort of organizing “beyond the choir” is uncommon. Instead, what often happens, Smucker says, is that “we build a scrappy little alternative clubhouse near the perimeter of the ever-advancing logics of capitalism and bureaucracy” filled with the usual suspects. In exchange for our clubhouse, we “give away the farm,” forfeiting the contest to organize society around our values. This is what Smucker believes caused the failure of Occupy Wall Street: tension between the movement’s “strategic” and “prefigurative” aspirations. Occupy’s strategic tendency—of which Smucker was a vocal proponent—sought to build a movement powerful enough to effect political change in the rest of society. By contrast, Occupy’s prefigurative tendency sought to model (or prefigure) the values of participants’ ideal society as reflected in the horizontalist general assembly, the free library, the people’s kitchen, and the nightly lectures and music. Smucker does not underestimate the importance of prefiguring a better society. But, unfortunately, the qualities that make an activist community compelling to the initiated can make them uninviting or even noxious to potential allies. Speaking in jargon, writing on endless reams of butcher paper, wearing black and smashing windows, these rituals by which we cultivate our group identity—and communicate our fluency with its norms—are often precisely the things that turn others away. Worse, the maintenance of this community can come to take precedence over the task of effecting political change. Why bother with the impossible-seeming work of changing the world when we’ve already built a version of our ideal society in miniature? If these impulses are left unchecked, powerlessness and marginalization themselves become valorized; the aspiration to win, suspect. For many leftists, there’s a perverse logic to this thinking: “If society is bad, then marginalization within society must be good.” As Occupy progressed, the activists’ rigid commitment to the group’s less-strategic internal norms (especially leaderlessness and consensus-based decision-making) and the elevation of the tactic of occupation to the movement’s raison d’être were ultimately their undoing. It’s not much, after all, to win a park and lose the world. The movement, Smucker writes, eschewed the “possibility of gaining ground … in the terrain of society,” opting instead to define the meaning, values, and culture of Occupy itself and no more. In this way, Occupy remained a clubhouse, one whose members satisfied themselves with interior decorating.