### 1

#### Interp and violation: "The member nations" denotes all member nations in the WTO. The aff may not defend a subset of WTO member nations ought to reduce IP protections for medicines.

Sharvy 80 [Richard Sharvy, philosopher. "A More General Theory of Definite Descriptions on JSTOR," The Philosophical Review, Vol. 89, No. 4, Oct. 1980, accessed 8-22-2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184738] HWIC

3. Definite Plural Descriptions. Phrases like 'the sheep in New Zealand' and 'the people in Auckland' are also ordinary and common definite descriptions, and they do denote. But because their contained predicates are plural predicates like 'are people in Auckland', which apply to more than one object, such expressions are not subject to a Russellian analysis. There is no such thing as (ax \* x are people in Auckland), since a number of distinct items satisfy the predicate-the men in Auckland are people in Auckland, and so are the women in Auckland and the children in Auckland. The definite plural description 'the people in Auckland' designates the sum or totality of all the people in Auckland. This is the sum of all that to which the predicate 'are people in Auckland' applies: the sum of all the items such as the women in Auckland, the children in Auckland, etc., that satisfy the plural predicate 'are people in Auckland'. What sort of entity is the denotation of a definite plural description such as 'the children in Auckland'? A first attempt might be to say that such expressions denote sets or classes. Then a sum of such items would be the union of such classes. Russell would insist on calling the people in Auckland a "class as many" (1903, pp. 68-72, 76-77). But if the predicate 'are people in Auckland' is taken to apply to x just if x is a set of people in Auckland,5 then the definite plural description 'the people in Auckland' refers to the union of these sets: U {x: x is a set of people in Auckland). So let us first consider set-theoretic union as a candidate for the sort of sum needed here in the analysis of definite plural descriptions. This might seem more complicated than '{x: x is a person in Auckland)', which refers to the same class. But the former expression has the advantage of preserving the predicate as a plural predicate, as it appeared in the original definite plural description. A standard definition of union is U a = {x: (ay) (x ecy .y E a)) (cf. Quine 1963, p. 53). In my notation this would be written: Ua = {x:xe(Qy yEa)) -the x's that are a member of some member of a. Quine observes 5I do not say 'nonempty' simply because it would be redundant: no class of people is empty. I do include the singletons, so that {Sharvy} are people in Auckland. This might seem odd. However, the instances or instantiations of 'all men are mortal' include sentences like 'Sharvy is mortal' along with sentences like 'the men in Auckland are mortal'; thus, the plural does include the singular. Notice that 'all men are mortal' should be symbolized '(x) (x are men D x are mortal)'; logic students are generally wrongly taught to write '(x) (x is a man D x is mortal)', which is more properly a symbolization of 'every man is mortal', which has the singular subject 'every man'. 616 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS that if everything is a class, this definition implies that the union U {x} of a singleton is its member x; this effect is preserved for an apparent nonclass by identifying it with its own unit class. So with this convention, if G applies to exactly one object, then U {x: Gx} = ( 7x . Gx ). So the Russellian definite singular description again emerges, here as a species of definite plural description.6 This would occur with, e.g., 'the men in this room' if there were exactly one man in the room. Notice also that plural predicates, like mass predicates, are cumulative: any sum of parts which are cats are cats. So 'G(the G)' holds for any instantiated plural predicate when 'the G' is defined as such a sum: the men in Auckland are men in Auckland, the poor are poor, etc. The analysis of definite plural description as union is not entirely satisfactory. One reason is that it explicitly uses the mechanism of class abstraction and the membership relation in a way that requires that such definite plural descriptions do denote classes. Now there is no problem about what 'the people in Auckland' denotes: it denotes the people in Auckland. Whether the people in Auckland are a set or class is an ontological question that should be discussed elsewhere. (Indeed, ontological questions generally should be independent of a theory of descriptions: we should be able to explain phrases like 'the first symphony of Beethoven' without discussing the ontological nature of symphonies.) My aim here is simply to explain plural definite descriptions like 'the people in Auckland' in a way that remains neutral on that ontological question by avoiding explicitly settheoretic notions. Another reason to turn away from the above analysis of 'the C as 'U {x: Gx}' is that it lacks generality. It lets in too much 6 I thank W. V. Quine for calling my attention to this passage. 'one object' means 'one class'. Consider the predicate 'are men and women in this room', and suppose the room contains just one man, m, and one woman, w. Then only one object, {m,w} satisfies that predicate, and U {a: a are men and women in this room) = U {{m,w}} = {m,w} = (7a a are men and women in this room). See note 8 also. Consider the definite description 'the square root of 2'. This is ordinarily used to refer to the positive square root of 2. My theory explains this; if real numbers are defined in the usual way as lower cuts of rationals (cf. Russell 1903, ch. 33), the positive root is the union of the negative and positive roots. 617 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RICHARD SHARVY when applied to a singular definite description whose contained predicate applies to more than one object: 'the author of PM' would denote {Whitehead, Russell). This was Frege's convention (?1 1), but it is clearly artificial; 'the author of PM' should fail to denote. And finally, 'U {x: Gx)' just doesn't look enough like the analysis given earlier of definite mass descriptions. Mass terms and plural terms are alike in numerous ways, and it would be nice if their uses in forming definite descriptions had analyses that reflected this similarity. Specifically, we should express summation without using the membership relation e, which has no analogue in the semantics of mass terms. The solution is to observe that there is a part of relation available: the men in Auckland are part of the people in Auckland. (This relation looks very much like the relation of being a nonempty subset of.) Writing it as '<', we may then define 'the G' for plural predicates as (4) above: sm G that all G are part of. The requirement in (4) that x satisfy G is useful for distinguishing the definite plural description 'the authors of PM' from the definite singular description 'the author of PM'. The former denotes Whitehead and Russell, as it should.7 Without the requirementhat x satisfy G, using (1) or simply union, so would the latter. But although Whitehead and Russell are authors of PM, they are not an author of PM. That requirement also leads to the intuitively correct results for expressions like 'the Wilmington Ten' and 'the five men in this room'. If there are only four men in this toom, the description 'the five men in this room' fails to denote because the predicate 'are five men in this room' applies to nothing. If there are six men in this room, then that description also fails to denote-not because that predicate applies to more than one item (i.e., to every part of the six containing just five men), but because it fails to apply to their sum. A word of caution about part is needed here. I am taking it in what I think is its plain and ordinary sense. However, Goodman, Quine, and other writers on the theory of parts (mereology) have used it in an extended sense which is not appropriate here. 7 But it does not denote Whitehead, and it does not denote Russell. The property of being denoted by an expression is not dissective. I may refer to something without referring to each of its parts. 618 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS The difference is that these writers combine mereology with a kind of materialism. (An exception is Foradori.) Thus Quine writes, "there are parts of water, sugar, and furniture too small to count as water, sugar, furniture" (1960, p. 99). Here, by 'parts of furniture' he means something like 'spatiotemporally determined parts of the material constituting the world's furniture'; by 'parts of water' he means 'spatiotemporally determined parts of the world's water'. However, in the ordinary sense of 'part', the parts of water are hydrogen and oxygen. In the ordinary sense of part, shrimp is a part of shrimp salad. Here, the words 'shrimp' and 'shrimp salad' refer to types or kinds, and not to the world's shrimp and the world's shrimp salad. Indeed, the world's shrimp is not part of the world's shrimp salad. Now, my furniture is part of the world's furniture, and the chair in my billiard room is part of my furniture. But is a leg of that chair part of my furniture? I doubt it. In a distinguishable sense of 'part', a leg of my chair is a part of that chair and a part of my furniture. In the plural of that same sense, the legs are parts of my furniture. But those legs are not part of my furniture. The matter of the legs is part of the matter of the furniture; also, the chairs in my billiard room are part of my furniture. But the legs of the chairs are not part of the furniture. The men in Auckland are part of the men and women in Auckland, but the arms of the men in Auckland are not part of the men and women in Auckland. The explanation is not that the arms fail to satisfy the contained predicate 'are men and women in Auckland', for the men in Auckland also fail to be men and women in Auckland. Rather, the explanation is that x are part of y in this ordinary sense just if x are some ofy. Notice the difference between 'some' and 'some of. It's true that some of the men and women in Auckland are men, but false that some men and women in Auckland are men. It's true that some of the whiskey-and-water inmy glass is water, but false that some whiskey-and-water inmy glass is water. 'part of' and 'some of' seem to be synonymous here; examples like these occur with mass and plural predicates that are not dissective. The legs of my chair are not part of my furniture, because 619 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RICHARD SHARVY it's false that they are some of my furniture. Given our understanding of 'part' then, being furniture and being men in Auckland are dissective properties; it is compounds like 'are men and women' that fail to be dissective. So only articles of furniture count as part of my furniture. It is a totally distinct feature of Goodman's system that causes his notion of 'part' to be broader than mine, so that, e.g., the chair legs are also part of my furniture. That feature is a sort of materialism. The set of my tables # the set of my table tops and legs; but the matter of my tables = the matter of my tops and legs. If we remove this materialism from mereology, we have a purer theory of part and whole, and consequently of sum. The mereological sum, then, of my articles of furniture is my furniture, and not the matter of my furniture. With this ordinary and intended sense of 'part', then, the expressions 'the counties of Utah' and 'the townships of Utah' will have distinct denotations, as they should. Without the distinction made above, they might appear to collapse into the same object, since the territory occupied by the counties is identical to that occupied by the townships; (px) (x is territory of (b.y) (y are counties, etc.) ) = etc. What sort of entity is denoted by the definite plural description 'the men in Auckland'? This question contains the mistaken implication that this phrase denotes a single entity. But the phrase 'the men in Auckland' obviously denotes the men in Auckland. One might ask, "What sort of entities are those?" But the answer is easy: they are entities that eat, drink, sleep, and are numerous. The error to avoid is an insistence on the singular. 'the men in Auckland' is not a singular term-it is a plural term. This should hardly need to be said. But some writers have gone astray by failing to see that plurals are plural, and so insisting that they must denote something singular. For example, Richard E. Grandy says that in the sentence 'Lions are widespread', " 'lions' must be a singular [sic] term denoting the class of lions" (p. 297). Given this, it will follow that a certain class is widespread (which does not seem as odd to me as it might to many). But what seems odd is that Grandy claims that it does not follow from his statement that any class is widespread; apparently 620 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS he prefers to give up the indiscernibility of identicals rather than the dogma that classes are "abstract." Now the words 'set' and 'class' have uses as dummy nominal measure words whose only function is the syntactic one of turning a plural into an apparent singular: the rational numbers are countable -- the set of rational numbers is countable. But no semantic consequences follow from such a use of the words 'set' and 'class'. The rational numbers are the set of rational numbers; the set of rational numbers is the rational numbers. The people in this room weigh 1000 kilograms; the set of people in this room weighs 1000 kg. The men in this room are not abstract; the set of men in this room is not abstract. We can avoid Grandy's contortions simply by taking the plural seriously as a plural, and abandoning the fetish for the singular that pervades contemporary decadent Western ontology. Along these same lines we can affirm that (i) 'the world's lions are widespread' and (ii) 'the world's lions are mammalian' do have the same logical form. In particular, the form of (ii) is 'Ml' and not '(x)(Lx D Mx)'; this is clear for (i). Question: how, then, does (ii), along with 'Aslan is a lion' imply 'Aslan is mammalian'? Answer: the implication is not a formal one at all, but depends on the fact that 'are mammalian' is dissective; 'are widespread' is not dissective. This situation is quite familiar: 'Ben weighs less than 60 kg' and 'Ben's nose is part of Ben' imply 'Ben's nose weighs less than 60 kg'. But again, the implication is not formal-it is not due to the logical form of these statements (this is easily seen by putting 'more' for 'less'). Rather, the implication holds because 'weighs less than 60 kg' is dissective. 4. Conclusion. For any given predicate G there is an appropriate part of or some of relation ? on the extension of G.8 Notice that 8The structure <{x: Gx},?) is often a mereology, i.e., a model of the so-called calculus of individuals. But it may fail to be a mereology. Idefine a quasi-mereology to be any structure (S, ?) where ? partially orders S (reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric), and where the <-least upper bound of a is a member of S for every nonempty subset a of S. One interesting type of quasi-mereology results from taking the algebraic direct product of two 621 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RICHARD SHARVY for most singular count predicates, < is just the identity relation: for 'is a shoe I own' < is the identity relation, for the extension of that predicate contains no two objects of which either is part of the other. Regardless of how many shoes I own, x - y only if x = y, for every x and y in that domain. In all such cases, '( px Gx )' defined as (4) comes out as desired, designating the gold in Zurich or the men in Auckland; and if I own just one shoe, '( pxS x is a shoe I own)' designates it, but otherwise that description fails. The analysis of 'the G' as (4) is therefore a general theory of definite descriptions, of which definite mass descriptions, definite plural descriptions, and Russellian definite singular count descriptions are species.9 full mereologies. (This description of the situation is due to Mark Nixon.) For example, (M, ) X <W. 5), where M is the set of sets of men and W is the set of sets of women, is isomorphic to (MW, 5), where MW is the set of sets of men and women, i.e., of sets containing at least one man and one woman. (MW, C ) is simply the corresponding quasi-mereology of the predicate 'are men and women'; this predicate is satisfied by the people in Auckland (they are men and women), but not by the men in Auckland. The structure fails to be a mereology because it is not properly closed under subtraction: there are sets a, b, each of which are men and women, and where a - b is not null yet fails to be men and women; a - b might just be men. However, we can combine the mereologies (M, C) and <W, 5) so that a mereology results. Add the null element to each, take the direct product, and then remove the null element: ((M U {4}, 5) X (W U {4}, 5))- ((4,4), 5). This is isomorphic to the mereology corresponding to the predicate 'are adults', i.e., to the set of nonempty subsets of the set of all men and women, under subset: V(P(U (M U W)) - {4}, C). 9 We have an account of the generic 'the' along these same lines. The New Zealand Flag is a New Zealand flag to which every New Zealand flag bears a certain relation ?. This seems a little more natural if we add the syllables 'akes' or 'icipates' to the word 'part' in reading '<' here: the New Zealand Flag is that New Zealand flag in which every New Zealand flag participates. The fact that it participates in itself does not lead to a "third man" regress, because participation in, as a variant of the part of relation, is not used to explain predication; predication remains primary. Of course, nothing in my discussion requires that there be such an entity (nor does anything here count against it). My theory is quite neutral. If there is such an entity, '( px x is a New Zealand flag)' picks it out. If there is no such entity, but merely a number of flags none of which bears ? to anything but itself, then ? is coextensive with the identity relation on those flags, and the situation is the same as for 'my shoe'. John Bacon, however, claims 622 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS With this analysis and some thought about examples of definite mass descriptions and definite plural descriptions, we see that the primary use of 'the' is not to indicate uniqueness. Rather, it is to indicate totality; implication of uniqueness is a side effect.

#### Semantic tests determine whether statements are generic or existential –

**Leslie and Lerner 16** [Sarah-Jane Leslie (Ph.D., Princeton, 2007) is the dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy. She has previously served as the vice dean for faculty development in the Office of the Dean of the Faculty, director of the Program in Linguistics, and founding director of the Program in Cognitive Science at Princeton University. She is also affiliated faculty in the Department of Psychology, the University Center for Human Values, the Program in Gender and Sexuality Studies, and the Kahneman-Treisman Center for Behavioral Science and Public Policy], and Adam Lerner, Ph.D, Postgraduate Research Associate in the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University, 4-24-2016, accessed 9-4-2021, "Generic Generalizations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/>] HWIC

There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” salva veritate, but in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, “tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) does not entail that animals are striped, but ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995).

Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.)

#### The resolution is generic: 1] "nations ought to reduce IPP for medicines" doesn't imply political bodies ought to b/c there might not be an obligation for terrorist groups or the UN 2] "nations generally ought to reduce IPP for medicines" doesn't substantially change the meaning

#### Violation: They Spec US

**1] Semantics outweigh:**

**A] Topicality is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden, they agreed to debate the topic when they came to the tournament**

**B] Jurisdiction -- you can’t vote affirmative if they haven’t affirmed**

**2] Limits:**

**A] Quantitative – there are over 22k affs accounting for combinations of countries, exploded by "reduce" not implying complete elimination and "medicines" allowing specification**

**B] Qualitative – they take away generic turns like WTO bad and functionally jettison "WTO" from the topic, which shifts away from the core topic lit of the WTO as an institutions**

**3] TVA solves – read the aff as advantage – most authors advocate for a change in WTO policy or TRIPS**

**4] No PICs offense – potential neg abuse doesn’t justify aff abuse because that would permit infinite 1AC abuse**

#### 5] DTD – it’s functionally the same as it’s their entire aff, No RVIs – illogical and leads to theory chill, Cis only reasonability takes the debate out of the debater’s hands

### 2

#### Disease securitization and Health development strategies reinforce state imperialism and control, which justifies totalitarian control and preemptive conflict

MacPhail 2009 (Theresa, medical anthropologist at the University of California, Berkeley “The Politics of Bird Flu: The Battle over Viral Samples and China’s Role in Global Public Health,” Journal of language and politics, 8:3, 2009)

In fact, the health development strategies of international organizations are judged as significant in reinforcing the role of the state in relation to the production of primary products for the world market, thereby perpetuating international relations of dominance and dependency. — Soheir Morsy, Political Economy in Medical Anthropology In July of 2007, former Surgeon General Richard H. Carmona appeared before a congressional committee and testified that during his term in office he had been pressured by the Bush administration to suppress or downplay any public health information that contradicted the administration’s beliefs and/or policies. Gardiner Harris of the New York Times noted that Dr. Carmona was only “one of a growing list of present and former administration officials to charge that politics often trumped science within what had previously been largely nonpartisan government health and scientific agencies” (Harris 2007). Dr. Carmona testified that he had repeatedly faced “political interference” on such varied topics as stem cell research and sex education. Two days later, an editorial in the Times bemoaned the resultant diminution of public health — both its reputation as non-biased and the general “understanding of important public health issues” — in the eyes of the same public it was meant to serve (2007). In the wake of Dr. Carmona’s testimony, it would appear that these are grave times for public health. And yet, public health concerns and international measures to thwart disease pandemics have never been more at the forefront of governmental policy, media focus and the public imagination. Dr. Carmona’s testimony on the fuzzy boundaries between science and state, health and policy, is in line with a recent spate of sensational stories on the dangers of drug-resistant tuberculosis and the recurrent threat of a bird flu outbreak — all of which belie any distinct separation of politics and medical science and highlight the ever-increasing commingling of the realms of public health and political diplomacy. Until recently, the worlds of public health and politics have generally been popularly conceptualized as separate fields. Public health, undergirded by medicine, is primarily defined as “the science and practice of protecting and improving the health of a community” (public health 2007), regardless of political borders on geographical maps. Disease prevention and care is typically regarded as neutral ground, a conceptual space where governments can work together for the direct (or indirect) benefit of all. Politics, on the other hand, is usually referred to in the largely Aristotelian sense of the word, or politika, as “the art or science of government or governing, especially the governing of a political entity, such as a nation, and the administration and control of its internal and external affairs” (politics 2007). If we take to be relevant Clausewitz’s formulation that war is merely the continuation of policy (or such politics) by other means, might we then argue that the recent ‘wars’ on disease — specifically the one being waged on the ever-present global threat of bird flu — are merely a continuation of politics by different means? In an article written for the U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC), two health professionals suggest that the flow of influence works optimally when an unbiased science first informs public health, with public health then influencing governmental policy decisions. The other potential direction of influence, wherein politics directly informs public health, eventually constraining or directing scientific research, has the potential to create a situation in which “ideology clouds scientific and public health judgment, decisions go awry and politics become dangerous” (Koplan and McPheeters 2004: 2041). The authors go on to argue that: Scientists and public health professionals often offer opinions on policy and political issues, and politicians offer theirs on public health policies, sometimes with the support of evidence. This interaction is appropriate and healthy, and valuable insights can be acquired by these cross-discussions. Nevertheless the interaction provides an opportunity for inappropriate and self-serving commentary, for public grandstanding, and for promoting public anxiety for partisan political purposes. (ibid.) The authors, however, never suggest that pure science, devoid of any political consideration, is a viable alternative to an ideologically-driven disease prevention policy. What becomes important in the constant interplay of science, politics and ideology, is both an awareness of potential ideological pitfalls and a balance between official public health policy and the science that underlies it. The science/ public health/politics interaction is largely taken for granted as the foundation of any appropriate, real-world policy decisions (Tesh 1988: 132). Yet the political nature of most health policies has, until recently, been overshadowed in popular discourse by the ostensibly altruistic nature of health medicine. Yet as Michael Taussig reminds us of the doctor/patient relationship: “The issue of control and manipulation is concealed by the aura of benevolence” (Taussig 1980: 4). Might the overt goodwill of organizations such as the WHO, the CDC, and the Chinese CDC belie such an emphasis on politics? Certainly there is argumentation to support a claim that public health and medicine are inherently tied to politics. Examining the ‘hidden arguments’ underlying public health policies, Sylvia Noble Tesh argues: “disease prevention began to acquire political meaning. No longer merely ways to control diseases, prevention policies became standard-bearers for the contending political arguments about the form the new society would take” (1988: 11). Science is a ‘reason of state’ in Ashis Nandy’s Science, Hegemony and Violence (1988: 1). Echoing current battles over viral samples, Nandy suggests that in the last century science was used as “a political plank within the United States in the ideological battle against ungodly communism” (1988: 3). Scientific performance is linked to ‘political dividends’ (1988: 9), with science becoming “a substitute for politics in many societies” (1988: 10). What remains novel and of interest in all of this conflation of state and medicine is the new ‘politics of scale’ of the war on global disease, specifically its focus on reemerging disease like avian influenza. As doctor and medical anthropologist Paul Farmer notes: “… the WHO manifestly attempts to use fear of contagion to goad wealthy nations into investing in disease surveillance and control out of self-interest — an age-old public health ploy acknowledged as such in the Institute of Medicine report on emerging infections” (Farmer 2001: 56–57). What Farmer’s observation underlines is that ‘public health’ has transformed itself into a savvy, political entity. Institutions like the WHO are increasingly needed to negotiate between nations — they function as the new ‘diplomats of health’. Modern politics, then, have arguably turned into ‘health’ politics. In 2000, the UN Security Council passed a resolution on infectious diseases. The resolution came in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and was the first of its kind issued (Fidler 2001: 80). What started as a reaction to a specific disease, AIDS, has since developed into an overall concern with any disease or illness which is seen as having the potential to lay waste to global health, national security, or economic and political stability. In other words, disease and public health have gone “global”. But, as law and international disease scholar David Fidler points out, the “meeting of realpolitik and pathogens” that he terms “microbialpolitik” is anything but new (Fidler 2001: 81). Microbialpolitiks is as old as international commerce, wars, and diplomacy. Indeed, it was only the brief half-century respite provided by antibiotics, modern medicine and the hope of a disease-free future that made the coupling of politics and public health seem out-of-date. But now we have (re)entered a world in which modern public health structures have weakened, thus making a return to microbialpolitiks inevitable. As Fidler argues: “The ‘reglobalization of public health is well underway, and the international politics of infectious disease control have returned” (Fidler 2001: 81). Only three years later, Fidler would write that the predicted return of public health was triumphant, having “emerged prominently on the agendas of many policy areas in international relations, including national security, international trade, economic development, globalization, human rights, and global governance” (Fidler 2004: 2). As Nicholas King suggests, the resurgence of such ‘microbialpolitiking’ owes much to the discourse of risk so prevalent in today’s world. The current focus on ‘risk’, as it specifically pertains to disease and its relationship to national security concerns, has been constructed by the interaction of a variety of different social actors: scientists, the media, and health and security experts (King 2004:62). King argues: The emerging diseases campaign employed a strategic and historically resonant scale politics, making it attractive to journalists, biomedical researchers, activists, politicians, and public health and national security experts. Campaigners’ identification of causes and consequences at particular scales were a means of marketing risk to specific audiences and thereby securing alliances; their recommendations for intervention at particular scales were a means of ensuring that those alliances ultimately benefited specific interests. (2004: 64) King traces this development to the early 1990s, specifically to Stephen Morse’s 1989 conference on “Emerging Viruses”. Like the UN Security Council resolution on emerging infections, the conference was in the wake of HIV/AIDS. In King’s retelling, it was Morse’s descriptions of the causal links between isolated, local events and global effects that changed the politics of public health (2004: 66). The epidemiological community followed in Morse’s footsteps, with such luminaries as Morse and Joshua Lederberg calling for a global surveillance network to deal with emerging or reemerging diseases such as bird flu or SARS. However, although both the problem and the effort were ‘global’ by default, any “interventions would involve ‘passing through’ American laboratories, biotechnology firms, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the information science experts” (King 2004: 69). Following the conference, disease became a hot topic for the media. Such high-profile authors as Laurie Garrett (The Coming Plague) and Richard Preston (The Hot Zone) stoked the ‘emerging virus’ fires, creating what amounted to a “viral panic” or “viral paranoia” (King 2004: 73). Stories of viruses gone haywire, such as Preston’s account of Ebola, helped reify the notion that localized events were of international importance. Such causal chains having been formed in the popular imagination, the timing was ripe for the emergence of bioterrorism concerns. In the aftermath of 9/11, the former cold war had been transformed, using scalar politics, into a hot war with international viruses (King 2004: 76). Of course, all of this can be tied into the Foucaultian concept that knowledge is by its very nature political. In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault outlines the ways in which medicine is connected to the power of the state. For Foucault, medicine itself “becomes a task for the nation” (Foucault 1994: 19). He argues that the practice of medicine is itself political and that “the struggle against disease must begin with a war against bad government” (Foucault 1994: 33). In an article on the politics of emerging diseases, Elisabeth Prescott has echoed Foucault’s equation of disease with bad government. She suggests that a nation’s capacity to combat both old and newly emergent diseases is a marker not of just biological, but of political, health. She argues that “the ability to respond [is] a reflection of the capacity of a governing system” (2007: 1). What’s more, ruptures in health can lead to break-downs in effective government or in the ability of governments to inspire confidence. Prescott suggests: “Failures in governance in the face of infectious disease outbreaks can result in challenges to social cohesion, economic performance and political legitimacy” (ibid.). In other words, an outbreak of bird flu in China would equate to an example of Foucault’s bad government. In the end, there can be no doubt that the realms of medicine and (political) power are perpetually intertwined. Foucault writes: “There is, therefore, a spontaneous and deeply rooted convergence between the requirement of political ideology and those of medical technology” (Foucault 1994: 38). In other words, we should not be overly surprised by Richard Carmona’s testimony or by debates over bird flu samples. Politics and health have always arguably gone hand-in-hand

#### Hegemony invokes a permanent state of emergency that justifies our paranoid neurosis—the idea we need to deter invisible threats creates self-fulfilling prophecies makes war inevitable

**Zizek 5**—prof, Sociology, University of Ljubljana (Slavoj, Give Iranian Nukes a Chance, http://www.lacan.com/zizekiranian.htm)

But are nuclear arms in the hands of Iran's rulers really a threat to international peace and security? To answer the question properly, one has to locate it in its political and ideological context. Every power structure has to rely on an underlying implicit threat, i.e. whatever the oficial democratic rules and legal constraints may be, we can ultimately do whatever we want to you. In the 20th century, however, the nature of this link between power and the invisible threat that sustains it changed. Existing power structures no longer relied on their own fantasmatic projection of a potential, invisible threat in order to secure the hold over their subjects. Rather, the threat was externalized, displaced onto an Outside Enemy. It became the invisible (and, for that reason, all-powerful and omni-present) threat of this enemy that legitimized the existing power structure's **permanent state of emergency**. Fascists invoked the threat of the Jewish conspiracy, Stalinists the threat of the class enemy, Americans the threat of Communism-all the way up to today's "war on terror." The threats posed by such an invisible enemy legitimizes the logic of the preemptive strike. Precisely because the threat is virtual, one cannot afford to wait for it to come. Rather, one must strike in advance, before it is too late. In other words, the omni-present invisible threat of Terror legitimizes the all too visible protective measures of defense-which, of course, are what pose the true threat to democracy and human rights (e.g., the London police's recent execution of the innocent Brazilian electrician, Jean Charles de Menezes). Classic power functioned as a threat that operated precisely by never actualizing itself, by always remaining a threatening gesture. Such functioning reached its climax in the Cold War, when the threat of mutual nuclear destruction had to remain a threat. With the "war on terror", the invisible threat causes the **incessant actualization**, not of the threat itself, but, of the measures against the threat. The nuclear strike had to remain the threat of a strike, while the threat of the terrorist strike triggers the endless series of preemptive strikes against potential terrorists. **We are** thus **passing from the logic of MAD** (Mutually Assured Destruction) **to a logic in which ONE SOLE MADMAN runs the entire show and is allowed to enact its paranoia.** **The power that presents itself as always being under threat**, living in mortal danger, and thus merely defending itself, is the most dangerous kind of power-the very model of the Nietzschean ressentiment and moralistic hypocrisy. And indeed, it was Nietzsche himself who, more than a century ago, in Daybreak, provided the best analysis of the false moral premises of today's "war on terror": No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather, the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus **all states are now ranged against each other:** they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. **This presupposition**, however**, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse**. At bottom, indeed, **it is** itself the challenge and **the cause of wars,** because as I have said, **it attributes immorality to the neighbor and** thus **provokes a hostile disposition and act**. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. Is not the ongoing "war on terror" proof that "terror" is the antagonistic Other of democracy-the point at which democracy's plural options turn into a singular antagonism? Or, as we so often hear, "In the face of the terrorist threat, we must all come together and forget our petty differences." More pointedly, the difference between the "war on terror" with previous 20th century worldwide struggles such as the Cold War is that the enemy used to be clearly identified with the actually existing Communist empire, whereas today the terrorist threat is inherently spectral, without a visible center. It is a little bit like the description of Linda Fiorentino's character in The Last Seduction: "Most people have a dark side ... she had nothing else." Most regimes have a dark oppressive spectral side ... the terrorist threat has nothing else. The paradoxical result of this spectralization of the enemy is an unexpected reflexive reversal. In this world without a clearly identified enemy, it is the United States, the protector against the threat, that is emerging as the main enemy-much like in Agatha Christie's Murder on the Orient-Express, where, since the entire group of suspects is the murderer, the victim himself (an evil millionaire) turns out to be the real criminal. This background allows us to finally answer our initial question: Yes, nukes for Iran-and Noriega and Saddam to the Hague. It is crucial to see the link between these two demands. Why are Timothy Garton Ash, Michael Ignatieff and other internationalist liberals-who are otherwise full of pathetic praise for the Hague tribunal-silent about the idea to deliver Noriega and Saddam to the Hague? Why Milosevic and not Noriega? Why was there not even a public trial against Noriega? Was it because he would have disclosed his own CIA past, including how the United States condoned his participation in the murder of Omar Torrijos Herrera? In a similar way, Saddam's regime was an abominable authoritarian state, guilty of many crimes, mostly toward its own people. However, one should note the strange but key fact that, when the U.S. representatives were enumerating Saddam's evil deeds, they systematically omitted what was undoubtedly his greatest crime (in terms of human suffering and of violating international law): the aggression against Iran. Why? Because the United States and the majority of foreign states actively helped Iraq in this aggression. What's more, the United States now plans to continue Saddam's work of toppling the Iranian government.

#### China threat discourse reduces the world to calculative strategy. Behaviors, histories, and possibilities that don’t fit into the affirmative’s worldview of stability and certainty are labeled threatening.

Chengxin **PAN** IR @ Australian Nat’l ‘4 “The China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics” *Alternatives* 29 p. 314-315

In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist. ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo) realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo) realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other,"''5 and "All other states are potential threats."'•^ In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other."^^ The (neo) realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself. ""^^ As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers."''^ Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo) realist prism. The (neo) realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy."50 And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability. "5' Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result? "^2Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger.s^ In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? *Not entirely. . . .* Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it *cannot guarantee* that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences. . . . U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all.54 The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China,"55 argues Samuel Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance. In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weights)."56

#### Their fixation on national interests and apocalyptic scenarios justifies endless violence, totalitarianism, and nuclear war—the alternative is to vote neg to endorse the 1AC without their securitizing representations

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While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

#### Our interpretation is that the judge should be an intellectual evaluating the methodology of the 1ac---if we win the foundations of the aff are suspect we should win irrespective of hypothetical enactment – only the alternative investigates the methodology behind securitized logic

#### Reasons to Prefer:

#### 1. Epistemology comes first – we must think before we act – all of their truth claims are predicated off of a position of privilege and dominance which shapes their understanding of the world and discourse – because all actions depend on our understanding it must be correct for other actions to be considered correct

#### 2. Fiat is utopian – when the debate round is over, their aff won’t be passed in the real world – but how they frame their impact spills over and affects their view of the world, which means their exaggerated impacts obscure the systemic inequalities present in the status quo

#### And there’s a double bind – either the aff’s impacts are true and extinction is inevitable because fiat isn’t real or their impacts are constructed, which means you should vote neg on presumption

## COVID

#### Coronavirus won’t get *anywhere close* to existential – low mortality and burnout

Steven Salzberg 20, PhD from Harvard, worked at The Institute for Genomic Research, where he sequenced the genomes of many bacteria, including those used in the 2001 anthrax attacks, also worked on the Human Genome Project, now the Distinguished Professor of Biomedical Engineering, Computer Science, and Biostatistics at Johns Hopkins University, “Coronavirus: There Are Better Things To Do Than Panic”, https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevensalzberg/2020/02/29/coronavirus-time-to-panic-yet/#7de449ad7fa6

1.The mortality rate is probably much, much less than 2%. The rapid spread of COVID-19 suggests that many more people are infected than those who have confirmed cases. The number of people who have no symptoms or very mild symptoms is likely to be ten times as high as the number of reported cases. (This is only a guess.) That would mean the mortality rate might be only 0.2%, or even lower. We still don't know. (The cruise ship that was quarantined in the Japan [had just over 700 cases, and 6 people have died](https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-51677846), suggesting a mortality rate of 1%.)

2.The reported mortality rate is dramatically lower in young people. If you are under 30, you can probably relax a bit. However, if you are over 70, the mortality rate is [frighteningly high, 8-15%](https://www.bbc.com/news/health-51674743).

3.2,933 deaths is a tragedy, but it's a tiny number compared to the annual deaths from the influenza virus, which we have learned to live with. In the U.S. alone, [the CDC estimates that 12,000–61,000 people die each year from the flu](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/burden/index.html) (the number varies a lot because the virus itself changes from year to year), and 9-45 million people get sick. The worldwide totals are far higher. So in terms of numbers, the world is definitely over-reacting to the new coronavirus.

#### 2. COVID solves global war

Posen 20, Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT, Director Emeritus of the MIT Security Studies Program (Barry Posen, 4-23-2020, “Do Pandemics Promote Peace?,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-23/do-pandemics-promote-peace?utm\_source=twitter\_posts&utm\_medium=social&utm\_campaign=tw\_daily\_soc)

As the novel coronavirus infects the globe, states compete for scientific and medical supplies and blame one another for the pandemic’s spread. Policy analysts have started asking whether such tensions could eventually erupt into military conflict. Has the pandemic increased or decreased the motive and opportunity of states to wage war? War is a risky business, with potentially very high costs. The historian Geoffrey Blainey argued in The Causes of War that most wars share a common characteristic at their outset: optimism. The belligerents usually start out sanguine about their odds of military success. When elites on both or all sides are confident, they are more willing to take the plunge—and less likely to negotiate, because they think they will come out better by fighting. Peace, by contrast, is served by pessimism. Even one party’s pessimism can be helpful: that party will be more inclined to negotiate and even accept an unfavorable bargain in order to avoid war. When one side gains a sudden and pronounced advantage, however, this de-escalatory logic can break down: the optimistic side will increase its demands faster than the pessimistic side can appease. Some analysts worry that something like this could happen in U.S.-Chinese relations as a result of the new coronavirus. The United States is experiencing a moment of domestic crisis. China, some fear, might see the pandemic as playing to its advantage and be tempted to throw its military weight around in the western Pacific. What these analysts miss is that COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus, is weakening all of the great and middle powers more or less equally. None is likely to gain a meaningful advantage over the others. All will have ample reason to be pessimistic about their military capabilities and their overall readiness for war. For the duration of the pandemic, at least, and probably for years afterward, the odds of a war between major powers will go down, not up.

PAX EPIDEMIA?

A cursory survey of the scholarly literature on war and disease appears to confirm Blainey’s observation that pessimism is conducive to peace. Scholars have documented again and again how war creates permissive conditions for disease—in armies as well as civilians in the fought-over territories. But one seldom finds any discussion of epidemics causing wars or of wars deliberately started in the middle of widespread outbreaks of infectious disease. (The diseases that European colonists carried to the New World did weaken indigenous populations to the point that they were more vulnerable to conquest; in addition, some localized conflicts were fought during the influenza pandemic of 1919–21, but these were occasioned by major shifts in regional balances of power following the destruction of four empires in World War I.) That sickness slows the march to war is partly due to the fact that war depends on people. When people fall ill, they can’t be counted on to perform well in combat. Military medicine made enormous strides in the years leading up to World War I, prior to which armies suffered higher numbers of casualties from disease than from combat. But pandemics still threaten military units, as those onboard U.S. and French aircraft carriers, hundreds of whom tested positive for COVID-19, know well. Sailors and soldiers in the field are among the most vulnerable because they are packed together. But even airmen are at risk, since they must take refuge from air attacks in bunkers, where the virus could also spread rapidly. Ground campaigns in urban areas pose still greater dangers in pandemic times. Much recent ground combat has been in cities in poor countries with few or no public health resources, environments highly favorable to illness. Ground combat also usually produces prisoners, any of whom can be infected. A vaccine may eventually solve these problems, but an abundance of caution is likely to persist for some time after it comes into use. The most important reason disease inhibits war is economic. Major outbreaks damage national economies, which are the source of military power. COVID-19 is a pandemic—by definition a worldwide phenomenon. All great and middle powers appear to be adversely affected, and all have reason to be pessimistic about their military prospects. Their economies are shrinking fast, and there is great uncertainty about when and how quickly they will start growing again. Even China, which has slowed the spread of the disease and begun to reopen its economy, will be hurting for years to come. It took an enormous hit to GDP in the first quarter of 2020, ending 40 years of steady growth. And its trading partners, burned by their dependence on China for much of the equipment needed to fight COVID-19, will surely scale back their imports. An export-dependent China will have to rely more on its domestic market, something it has been attempting for years with only limited success. It is little wonder, then, that the International Monetary Fund forecasts slower growth in China this year than at any time since the 1970s. Even after a vaccine is developed and made widely available, economic troubles may linger for years. States will emerge from this crisis with enormous debts. They will spend years paying for the bailout and stimulus packages they used to protect citizens and businesses from the economic consequences of social distancing. Drained treasuries will give them one more reason to be pessimistic about their military might.

LESS TRADE, LESS FRICTION

How long is the pacifying effect of pessimism likely to last? If a vaccine is developed quickly, enabling a relatively swift economic recovery, the mood may prove short-lived. But it is equally likely that the coronavirus crisis will last long enough to change the world in important ways, some of which will likely dampen the appetite for conflict for some time—perhaps up to five or ten years. After all, the world is experiencing both the biggest pandemic and the biggest economic downturn in a century. Most governments have not covered themselves with glory managing the pandemic, and even the most autocratic worry about popular support. Over the next few years, people will want evidence that their governments are working to protect them from disease and economic dislocation. Citizens will see themselves as dependent on the state, and they will be less inclined to support adventures abroad. At the same time, governments and businesses will likely try to reduce their reliance on imports of critical materials, having watched global supply chains break down during the pandemic. The result will probably be diminished trade, something liberal internationalists see as a bad thing. But for the last five years or so, trade has not helped improve relations between states but rather fueled resentment. Less trade could mean less friction between major powers, thereby reducing the intensity of their rivalries. In the Chinese context, less international trade could have positive knock-on effects. Focused on growing the domestic economy, and burdened by hefty bills from fighting the virus, Beijing could be forced to table the Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious trade and investment project that has unnerved the foreign policy establishments of great and middle powers. The suspension of the BRI would soothe the fears of those who see it as an instrument of Chinese world domination. Interstate wars have become relatively rare since the end of World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a four-decade Cold War, which included an intense nuclear and conventional arms race, but they never fought each other directly, even with conventional weapons. Theorists debate the reasons behind the continued rarity of great-power conflict. I am inclined to believe that the risk of escalation to a nuclear confrontation is simply too great. COVID-19 does nothing to mitigate such risks for world leaders—and a great deal to feed their reasonable pessimism about the likely outcome of even a conventional war.