### 1

#### Interpretation – the US isn’t a just government

Alex Mell-Taylor 5-26 [] 5-26-21 https://aninjusticemag.com/the-anger-from-realizing-america-isnt-free-cffaee71e539 The Anger of Realizing America Isn’t Free Medium, accessed 11-6-2021 //GS

While America has worked towards many admirable goals, it has not achieved the level of freedom that it thinks it has. This certainty is an illusion. America does not let its citizens be free in any classical sense of the word. We are told that we are free by nearly everyone, yet that is not what many of us experience in our day-to-day lives. We are constrained by our laws, norms, jobs, and so many other factors that it can be dizzying to contemplate.

### 2

#### Interpretation—the aff may not specify a just government

#### A is an generic indefinite singular. Cohen 01

Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001 <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf>

\*IS generic = Indefinite Singulars

French, then, expresses the two types of reading differently. In English, on¶ the other hand, generic BPs are ambiguous between inductivist and normative¶ readings. But even in English there is one type of generic that can express only¶ one of these readings, and this is the IS generic. While BPs are ambiguous¶ between the inductivist and the rules and regulations readings, ISs are not. In¶ the supermarket scenario discussed above, only (44.b) is true:¶ (44) a. A banana sells for $.49/lb.¶ b. A banana sells for $1.00/lb.¶ The normative force of the generic IS has been noted before. Burton-Roberts¶ (1977) considers the following minimal pair:¶ (45) a. Gentlemen open doors for ladies.¶ b. A gentleman opens doors for ladies.¶ He notes that (45.b), but not (45.a), expresses what he calls “moral necessity.”7¶ Burton-Roberts observes that if Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter [(45.b)] and thereby successfully imply that Emile was not, or was¶ not being, a gentleman. Notice that, if she were to utter. . . [(45.a)] she¶ might achieve the same effect (that of getting Emile to open doors for¶ ladies) but would do so by different means. . . For [(45.a)] merely makes a¶ generalisation about gentlemen (p. 188).¶ Sentence (45.b), then, unlike (45.a), does not have a reading where it makes¶ a generalization about gentlemen; it is, rather, a statement about some social¶ norm. It is true just in case this norm is in effect, i.e. it is a member of a set of¶ socially accepted rules and regulations.¶ An IS that, in the null context, cannot be read generically, may receive a¶ generic reading in a context that makes it clear that a rule or a regulation is¶ referred to. For example, Greenberg (1998) notes that, out of the blue, (46.a)¶ and (46.b) do not have a generic reading:¶ (46) a. A Norwegian student whose name ends with ‘s’ or ‘j’ wears green¶ thick socks.¶ b. A tall, left-handed, brown haired neurologist in Hadassa hospital¶ earns more than $50,000 a year.¶ However, Greenberg points out that in the context of (47.a) and (47.b),¶ respectively, the generic readings of the IS subject are quite natural:¶ (47) a. You know, there are very interesting traditions in Norway, concerning the connection between name, profession, and clothing. For¶ example, a Norwegian student. . .¶ b. The new Hadassa manager has some very funny paying criteria. For¶ example, a left-handed. . .¶ Even IS sentences that were claimed above to lack a generic reading, such¶ as (3.b) and (4.b), may, in the appropriate context, receive such a reading:¶ (48) a. Sire, please don’t send her to the axe. Remember, a king is generous!¶ b. How dare you build me such a room? Don’t you know a room is¶ square?

#### That outweighs—only our evidence speaks to how indefinite singulars are interpreted in the context of normative statements like the resolution. This means throw out aff counter-interpretations that are purely descriptive

#### Violation—they specified US

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision –any deviation justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### 2] Limits—specifying a just government offers huge explosion in the topic since they get permutations of hundreds of governments in the world depending on their definition of “just government”.

#### DTD – same thing as drop the arg

#### Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations – it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for

#### No RVIs—it’s your burden to be topical.

### 3

#### Unions cause protectionism – that slows growth and causes tariffs

Epstein 16 [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Rise of American Protectionism." https://www.hoover.org/research/rise-american-protectionism]

This point explains why the American labor movement has historically opposed free trade. The essence of unionism is, and always will be, the acquisition of monopoly power. There is no way for a union to obtain that monopoly power in the marketplace. It can only secure it through legislation. The first step in that process was the exemption of unions from the antitrust laws under Section 6 of the Clayton Act of 1914. The second major step was the legitimation of collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which gave the union the exclusive bargaining rights against the firm once it was successful in a union election. These major statutory benefits strengthened private sector unions and imposed inefficiencies on unionized firms. This, in turn, opened the field for new firms, like the Japanese automobile companies, to organize outside the union envelope. In response, labor’s strategy went one step further. It pushed hard on trade and tariff barriers to keep out foreign imports, and exerted political influence to encourage local zoning boards to exclude new businesses that do not use union labor. Add to these issues the aggressive rise of minimum wage laws and other mandates like Obamacare and family leave statutes, and you construct a regulatory fortress that defeats the corrective forces of free trade and renders the nation less economically resilient and productive than before.

It is easy to say that people are “screwed” by free trade if you only look at the stories of those individuals who lose their jobs. It is much more difficult to make that case after taking into account the simple but powerful truth that overall levels of profitability and wealth increase under free trade. The short-term relief that targeted groups get from protectionist measures mask the larger inefficiencies that slow down the rate of growth. Despite what the Democrats think, transfer programs are no substitute for growth. Indeed, the imposition of new taxes without return benefits on the firms taxed only depresses the rate of return on investment further, which will necessarily compound the problem.

#### New trade conflicts cause global war and undermine cooperation on collective action problems

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Four structural forces will shape the future of International Relations: globalization (but without liberal rules, institutions, and leadership)1; multipolarity (the end of American hegemony and wider distribution of power among states and non-states2); the strengthening of distinctive, national and subnational identities, as persistent cultural differences are accentuated by the disruptive effects of Western style globalization (what Samuel Huntington called the “non-westernization of IR”3); and secular economic stagnation, a product of longer term global decline in birth rates combined with aging populations.4 These structural forces do not determine everything. Environmental events, global health challenges, internal political developments, policy mistakes, technology breakthroughs or failures, will intersect with structure to define our future. But these four structural forces will impact the way states behave, in the capacity of great powers to manage their differences, and to act collectively to settle, rather than exploit, the inevitable shocks of the next decade.

Some of these structural forces could be managed to promote prosperity and avoid war. Multipolarity (inherently more prone to conflict than other configurations of power, given coordination problems)5 plus globalization can work in a world of prosperity, convergent values, and effective conflict management. The Congress of Vienna system achieved relative peace in Europe over a hundred-year period through informal cooperation among multiple states sharing a fear of populist revolution. It ended decisively in 1914. Contemporary neoliberal institutionalists, such as John Ikenberry, accept multipolarity as our likely future, but are confident that globalization with liberal characteristics can be sustained without American hegemony, arguing that liberal values and practices have been fully accepted by states, global institutions, and private actors as imperative for growth and political legitimacy.6 Divergent values plus multipolarity can work, though at significantly lower levels of economic growth-in an autarchic world of isolated units, a world envisioned by the advocates of decoupling, including the current American president. 7 Divergent values plus globalization can be managed by hegemonic power, exemplified by the decade of the 1990s, when the Washington Consensus, imposed by American leverage exerted through the IMF and other U.S. dominated institutions, overrode national differences, but with real costs to those states undergoing “structural adjustment programs,”8 and ultimately at the cost of global growth, as states—especially in Asia—increased their savings to self insure against future financial crises.9

But all four forces operating simultaneously will produce a future of increasing internal polarization and cross border conflict, diminished economic growth and poverty alleviation, weakened global institutions and norms of behavior, and reduced collective capacity to confront emerging challenges of global warming, accelerating technology change, nuclear weapons innovation and proliferation. As in any effective scenario, this future is clearly visible to any keen observer. We have only to abolish wishful thinking and believe our own eyes.10

Secular Stagnation

This unbrave new world has been emerging for some time, as US power has declined relative to other states, especially China, global liberalism has failed to deliver on its promises, and totalitarian capitalism has proven effective in leveraging globalization for economic growth and political legitimacy while exploiting technology and the state’s coercive powers to maintain internal political control. But this new era was jumpstarted by the world financial crisis of 2007, which revealed the bankruptcy of unregulated market capitalism, weakened faith in US leadership, exacerbated economic deprivation and inequality around the world, ignited growing populism, and undermined international liberal institutions. The skewed distribution of wealth experienced in most developed countries, politically tolerated in periods of growth, became intolerable as growth rates declined. A combination of aging populations, accelerating technology, and global populism/nationalism promises to make this growth decline very difficult to reverse. What Larry Summers and other international political economists have come to call “secular stagnation” increases the likelihood that illiberal globalization, multipolarity, and rising nationalism will define our future. Summers11 has argued that the world is entering a long period of diminishing economic growth. He suggests that secular stagnation “may be the defining macroeconomic challenge of our times.” Julius Probst, in his recent assessment of Summers’ ideas, explains:

…rich countries are ageing as birth rates decline and people live longer. This has pushed down real interest rates because investors think these trends will mean they will make lower returns from investing in future, making them more willing to accept a lower return on government debt as a result.

Other factors that make investors similarly pessimistic include rising global inequality and the slowdown in productivity growth…

This decline in real interest rates matters because economists believe that to overcome an economic downturn, a central bank must drive down the real interest rate to a certain level to encourage more spending and investment… Because real interest rates are so low, Summers and his supporters believe that the rate required to reach full employment is so far into negative territory that it is effectively impossible.

…in the long run, more immigration might be a vital part of curing secular stagnation. Summers also heavily prescribes increased government spending, arguing that it might actually be more prudent than cutting back – especially if the money is spent on infrastructure, education and research and development.

Of course, governments in Europe and the US are instead trying to shut their doors to migrants. And austerity policies have taken their toll on infrastructure and public research. This looks set to ensure that the next recession will be particularly nasty when it comes… Unless governments change course radically, we could be in for a sobering period ahead.12

The rise of nationalism/populism is both cause and effect of this economic outlook. Lower growth will make every aspect of the liberal order more difficult to resuscitate post-Trump. Domestic politics will become more polarized and dysfunctional, as competition for diminishing resources intensifies. International collaboration, ad hoc or through institutions, will become politically toxic. Protectionism, in its multiple forms, will make economic recovery from “secular stagnation” a heavy lift, and the liberal hegemonic leadership and strong institutions that limited the damage of previous downturns, will be unavailable. A clear demonstration of this negative feedback loop is the economic damage being inflicted on the world by Trump’s trade war with China, which— despite the so-called phase one agreement—has predictably escalated from negotiating tactic to imbedded reality, with no end in sight. In a world already suffering from inadequate investment, the uncertainties generated by this confrontation will further curb the investments essential for future growth. Another demonstration of the intersection of structural forces is how populist-motivated controls on immigration (always a weakness in the hyper-globalization narrative) deprives developed countries of Summers’ recommended policy response to secular stagnation, which in a more open world would be a win-win for rich and poor countries alike, increasing wage rates and remittance revenues for the developing countries, replenishing the labor supply for rich countries experiencing low birth rates.

Illiberal Globalization

Economic weakness and rising nationalism (along with multipolarity) will not end globalization, but will profoundly alter its character and greatly reduce its economic and political benefits. Liberal global institutions, under American hegemony, have served multiple purposes, enabling states to improve the quality of international relations and more fully satisfy the needs of their citizens, and provide companies with the legal and institutional stability necessary to manage the inherent risks of global investment. But under present and future conditions these institutions will become the battlegrounds—and the victims—of geopolitical competition. The Trump Administration’s frontal attack on multilateralism is but the final nail in the coffin of the Bretton Woods system in trade and finance, which has been in slow but accelerating decline since the end of the Cold War. Future American leadership may embrace renewed collaboration in global trade and finance, macroeconomic management, environmental sustainability and the like, but repairing the damage requires the heroic assumption that America’s own identity has not been fundamentally altered by the Trump era (four years or eight matters here), and by the internal and global forces that enabled his rise. The fact will remain that a sizeable portion of the American electorate, and a monolithically pro- Trump Republican Party, is committed to an illiberal future. And even if the effects are transitory, the causes of weakening global collaboration are structural, not subject to the efforts of some hypothetical future US liberal leadership. It is clear that the US has lost respect among its rivals, and trust among its allies. While its economic and military capacity is still greatly superior to all others, its political dysfunction has diminished its ability to convert this wealth into effective power.13 It will furthermore operate in a future system of diffusing material power, diverging economic and political governance approaches, and rising nationalism. Trump has promoted these forces, but did not invent them, and future US Administrations will struggle to cope with them.

What will illiberal globalization look like? Consider recent events. The instruments of globalization have been weaponized by strong states in pursuit of their geopolitical objectives. This has turned the liberal argument on behalf of globalization on its head. Instead of interdependence as an unstoppable force pushing states toward collaboration and convergence around market-friendly domestic policies, states are exploiting interdependence to inflict harm on their adversaries, and even on their allies. The increasing interaction across national boundaries that globalization entails, now produces not harmonization and cooperation, but friction and escalating trade and investment disputes.14 The Trump Administration is in the lead here, but it is not alone. Trade and investment friction with China is the most obvious and damaging example, precipitated by China’s long failure to conform to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, now escalated by President Trump into a trade and currency war disturbingly reminiscent of the 1930s that Bretton Woods was designed to prevent. Financial sanctions against Iran, in violation of US obligations in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), is another example of the rule of law succumbing to geopolitical competition. Though more mercantilist in intent than geopolitical, US tariffs on steel and aluminum, and their threatened use in automotives, aimed at the EU, Canada, and Japan,15 are equally destructive of the liberal system and of future economic growth, imposed as they are by the author of that system, and will spread to others. And indeed, Japan has used export controls in its escalating conflict with South Korea16 (as did China in imposing controls on rare earth,17 and as the US has done as part of its trade war with China). Inward foreign direct investment restrictions are spreading. The vitality of the WTO is being sapped by its inability to complete the Doha Round, by the proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements, and now by the Trump Administration’s hold on appointments to WTO judicial panels. It should not surprise anyone if, during a second term, Trump formally withdrew the US from the WTO. At a minimum it will become a “dead letter regime.”18

As such measures gain traction, it will become clear to states—and to companies—that a global trading system more responsive to raw power than to law entails escalating risk and diminishing benefits. This will be the end of economic globalization, and its many benefits, as we know it. It represents nothing less than the subordination of economic globalization, a system which many thought obeyed its own logic, to an international politics of zero-sum power competition among multiple actors with divergent interests and values. The costs will be significant: Bloomberg Economics estimates that the cost in lost US GDP in 2019- dollar terms from the trade war with China has reached $134 billion to date and will rise to a total of $316 billion by the end of 2020.19 Economically, the just-in-time, maximally efficient world of global supply chains, driving down costs, incentivizing innovation, spreading investment, integrating new countries and populations into the global system, is being Balkanized. Bilateral and regional deals are proliferating, while global, nondiscriminatory trade agreements are at an end.

Economies of scale will shrink, incentivizing less investment, increasing costs and prices, compromising growth, marginalizing countries whose growth and poverty reduction depended on participation in global supply chains. A world already suffering from excess savings (in the corporate sector, among mostly Asian countries) will respond to heightened risk and uncertainty with further retrenchment. The problem is perfectly captured by Tim Boyle, CEO of Columbia Sportswear, whose supply chain runs through China, reacting to yet another ratcheting up of US tariffs on Chinese imports, most recently on consumer goods:

We move stuff around to take advantage of inexpensive labor. That’s why we’re in Bangladesh. That’s why we’re looking at Africa. We’re putting investment capital to work, to get a return for our shareholders. So, when we make a wager on investment, this is not Vegas. We have to have a reasonable expectation we can get a return. That’s predicated on the rule of law: where can we expect the laws to be enforced, and for the foreseeable future, the rules will be in place? That’s what America used to be.20

The international political effects will be equally damaging. The four structural forces act on each other to produce the more dangerous, less prosperous world projected here. Illiberal globalization represents geopolitical conflict by (at first) physically non-kinetic means. It arises from intensifying competition among powerful states with divergent interests and identities, but in its effects drives down growth and fuels increased nationalism/populism, which further contributes to conflict. Twenty-first-century protectionism represents bottom-up forces arising from economic disruption. But it is also a top-down phenomenon, representing a strategic effort by political leadership to reduce the constraints of interdependence on freedom of geopolitical action, in effect a precursor and enabler of war. This is the disturbing hypothesis of Daniel Drezner, argued in an important May 2019 piece in Reason, titled “Will Today’s Global Trade Wars Lead to World War Three,”21 which examines the pre- World War I period of heightened trade conflict, its contribution to the disaster that followed, and its parallels to the present:

### 4

#### Business recovery is strong. Business confidence is high.

Halloran ’9-14 [Michael; 2021; M.B.A. from Carnegie Mellon University, former aerospace research engineer, Equity Strategist; Janney, “Despite Potential Headwinds, Key Labor Market Indicators Bode Well for the Economy,” https://www.janney.com/latest-articles-commentary/all-insights/insights/2021/09/14/despite-potential-headwinds-key-labor-market-indicators-bode-well-for-the-economy]

However, we remain encouraged by the recovery that has been unfolding since the economy began reopening. We continue to see improvement in important cyclical sectors of the economy while consumers are historically healthy and still have pent-up demand. Business confidence has rebounded with strong corporate profits that should support further capital spending and hiring (there are now more job openings than there are unemployed people by a record amount).

We expect to see further improvement in the international backdrop, supported by unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus and accelerating rates of vaccination. Although the impact of the Delta wave is still being felt, recent evidence confirms the effectiveness of vaccines in limiting deaths and hospitalizations. With the pace of vaccination now picking up in the areas most impacted by this wave—Asia and Australia—the case for fading headwinds leading to improving economic growth later this year remains positive.

The signals from financial markets themselves remain positive. Despite consolidating last week, stocks remain near record highs while the 10-year Treasury remains well above the lows of earlier this summer when concerns about Delta first emerged.

These factors support our view of a durable economic recovery from the pandemic that should continue supporting stock prices. A healthy labor market is a critical element for a sustainable recovery that supports profit growth and last week’s news from the labor market remains encouraging.

#### Unions devastate growth and worsen inequality – gains for workers shift costs to other parts of the economy

Epstein 20 [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Decline Of Unions Is Good News." https://www.hoover.org/research/decline-unions-good-news]

This continued trend has elicited howls of protest from union supporters who, of course, want to see an increase in union membership. It has also led several Democratic presidential candidates to make calls to reconfigure labor law. Bernie Sanders wants to double union membership and give federal workers the right to strike, as well as ban at-will contracts of employment, so that any dismissal could be subject to litigation under a “for cause” standard. Not to be outdone, Elizabeth Warren wants to make it illegal for firms to hire permanent replacements for striking workers. They are joined by Pete Buttigieg in demanding a change in federal labor law so that states may no longer pass right-to-work laws that insulate workers from the requirement to pay union dues in unionized firms. All of these new devices are proven job killers.

The arguments in favor of unions are also coming from some unexpected sources in academia, where a conservative case has been put forward on the ground that an increase in union membership is needed to combat job insecurity and economic inequality.

All of these pro-union critiques miss the basic point that the decline of union power is good news, not bad. That conclusion is driven not by some insidious effort to stifle the welfare of workers, but by the simple and profound point that the greatest protection for workers lies in a competitive economy that opens up more doors than it closes. The only way to achieve that result is by slashing the various restrictions that prevent job formation, as Justin Haskins of the Heartland Institute notes in a recent article at The Hill. The central economic insight is that jobs get created only when there is the prospect of gains from trade. Those gains in turn are maximized by cutting the multitude of regulations and taxes that do nothing more than shrink overall wealth by directing social resources to less productive ends.

#### Recessions cause global crises – ensuring continued growth is key

Baird ’20 [Zoe; October 2020; C.E.O. and President of the Markle Foundation, Member of the Aspen Strategy Group and former Trustee at the Council on Foreign Relations, J.D. and A.B. from the University of California at Berkeley; Domestic and International (Dis)order: A Strategic Response, “Equitable Economic Recovery is a National Security Imperative,” Ch. 13]

A strong and inclusive economy is essential for American national security and global leadership. As the nation seeks to return from a historic economic crisis, the national security community should support an equitable recovery that helps every worker adapt to the seismic shifts underway in our economy.

Broadly shared economic prosperity is a bedrock of America’s economic and political strength—both domestically and in the international arena. A strong and equitable recovery from the economic crisis created by COVID-19 would be a powerful testament to the resilience of the American system and its ability to create prosperity at a time of seismic change and persistent global crisis. Such a recovery could attack the profound economic inequities that have developed over the past several decades. Without bold action to help all workers access good jobs as the economy returns, the United States risks undermining the legitimacy of its institutions and its international standing. The outcome will be a key determinant of America’s national security for years to come.

An equitable recovery requires a national commitment to help all workers obtain good jobs—particularly the two-thirds of adults without a bachelor’s degree and people of color who have been most affected by the crisis and were denied opportunity before it. As the nation engages in a historic debate about how to accelerate economic recovery, ambitious public investment is necessary to put Americans back to work with dignity and opportunity. We need an intentional effort to make sure that the jobs that come back are good jobs with decent wages, benefits, and mobility and to empower workers to access these opportunities in a profoundly changed labor market.

To achieve these goals, American policy makers need to establish job growth strategies that address urgent public needs through major programs in green energy, infrastructure, and health. Alongside these job growth strategies, we need to recognize and develop the talents of workers by creating an adult learning system that meets workers’ needs and develops skills for the digital economy. The national security community must lend its support to this cause. And as it does so, it can bring home the lessons from the advances made in these areas in other countries, particularly our European allies, and consider this a realm of international cooperation and international engagement.

Shared Economic Prosperity Is a National Security Asset

A strong economy is essential to America’s security and diplomatic strategy. Economic strength increases our influence on the global stage, expands markets, and funds a strong and agile military and national defense. Yet it is not enough for America’s economy to be strong for some—prosperity must be broadly shared. Widespread belief in the ability of the American economic system to create economic security and mobility for all—the American Dream— creates credibility and legitimacy for America’s values, governance, and alliances around the world.

After World War II, the United States grew the middle class to historic size and strength. This achievement made America the model of the free world—setting the stage for decades of American political and economic leadership. Domestically, broad participation in the economy is core to the legitimacy of our democracy and the strength of our political institutions. A belief that the economic system works for millions is an important part of creating trust in a democratic government’s ability to meet the needs of the people.

The COVID-19 Crisis Puts Millions of American Workers at Risk

For the last several decades, the American Dream has been on the wane. Opportunity has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small share of workers able to access the knowledge economy. Too many Americans, particularly those without four-year degrees, experienced stagnant wages, less stability, and fewer opportunities for advancement.

Since COVID-19 hit, millions have lost their jobs or income and are struggling to meet their basic needs—including food, housing, and medical care.1 The crisis has impacted sectors like hospitality, leisure, and retail, which employ a large share of America’s most economically vulnerable workers, resulting in alarming disparities in unemployment rates along education and racial lines. In August, the unemployment rate for those with a high school degree or less was more than double the rate for those with a bachelor’s degree.2 Black and Hispanic Americans are experiencing disproportionately high unemployment, with the gulf widening as the crisis continues.3

The experience of the Great Recession shows that without intentional effort to drive an inclusive recovery, inequality may get worse: while workers with a high school education or less experienced the majority of job losses, nearly all new jobs went to workers with postsecondary education. Inequalities across racial lines also increased as workers of color worked in the hardest-hit sectors and were slower to recover earnings and income than White workers.4

The Case for an Inclusive Recovery

A recovery that promotes broad economic participation, renewed opportunity, and equity will strengthen American moral and political authority around the world. It will send a strong message about the strength and resilience of democratic government and the American people’s ability to adapt to a changing global economic landscape. An inclusive recovery will reaffirm American leadership as core to the success of our most critical international alliances, which are rooted in the notion of shared destiny and interdependence. For example, NATO, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and a force of global stability for decades, has suffered from American disengagement in recent years. A strong American recovery—coupled with a renewed openness to international collaboration—is core to NATO’s ability to solve shared geopolitical and security challenges. A renewed partnership with our European allies from a position of economic strength will enable us to address global crises such as climate change, global pandemics, and refugees. Together, the United States and Europe can pursue a commitment to investing in workers for shared economic competitiveness, innovation, and long-term prosperity.

The U.S. has unique advantages that give it the tools to emerge from the crisis with tremendous economic strength— including an entrepreneurial spirit and the technological and scientific infrastructure to lead global efforts in developing industries like green energy and biosciences that will shape the international economy for decades to come.

### Inequality

#### Recognizing doesn’t do anything – no aff solvency

#### Also can’t solve global inequality – only the us

#### Unions worsen inequality

Epstein 20 [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Decline Of Unions Is Good News." https://www.hoover.org/research/decline-unions-good-news]

This continued trend has elicited howls of protest from union supporters who, of course, want to see an increase in union membership. It has also led several Democratic presidential candidates to make calls to reconfigure labor law. Bernie Sanders wants to double union membership and give federal workers the right to strike, as well as ban at-will contracts of employment, so that any dismissal could be subject to litigation under a “for cause” standard. Not to be outdone, Elizabeth Warren wants to make it illegal for firms to hire permanent replacements for striking workers. They are joined by Pete Buttigieg in demanding a change in federal labor law so that states may no longer pass right-to-work laws that insulate workers from the requirement to pay union dues in unionized firms. All of these new devices are proven job killers.

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#### Inequality has zero effect on war

Gal Ariely 15, senior lecturer in the Department of Politics & Government, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, PhD from the University of Haifa’s School of Political Sciences, “Does National Identification Always Lead to Chauvinism? A Cross-national Analysis of Contextual Explanations,” Globalizations, 2015, https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/43980028/Ariely\_Globalizations\_2015.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1515397197&Signature=78lnbbHNRVjhLgOKyRPKm%2BK8M1o%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DDoes\_National\_Identification\_Always\_Lead.pdf

With respect to internal explanations, the effects of income inequality and ethnic diversity are presented in Table 3. Models 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that neither directly affects chauvinism. H4 is therefore not supported. The results suggest, however, that both have a negative effect on the national-identification slopes. Contrary to our expectations, countries with higher levels of economic and ethnic division appear to exhibit a weaker relation between national identification and chauvinism. While these findings might seem to contradict H5, the pattern was caused by outliers. After excluding South Africa—the most unequal and ethnic diverse country in our sample—the effect of ethnic diversity is not even of borderline significance. After excluding Chile—the most unequal country in our sample—the interaction effects for economic inequality were also far from significant

#### No inequality crisis – studies exaggerate the risk

Wright et al 19 [Joshua D. Wright is University Professor and the Executive Director of the Global Antitrust Institute at Scalia Law School at George Mason University. Professor Wright also holds a courtesy appointment in the Department of Economics. In 2013, the Senate unanimously confirmed Professor Wright as a member of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), following his nomination by President Obama. He rejoined Scalia Law School as a full-time faculty member in Fall 2015. "Consumer Welfare & the Rule of Law: The Case Against the New Populist Antitrust Movement." https://regproject.org/paper/consumer-welfare-the-rule-of-law-the-case-against-the-new-populist-antitrust-movement/]

Examining household consumption trends tells a similar story. Scholars have argued that consumption might be a superior measure of welfare, given a “closer link between consumption and well-being.”87 Consumption trends would also seem to be relevant when considering antitrust enforcement efforts, as they offer more information regarding economic effects than isolated income or wealth measurements. Examining household consumption over the last couple decades indicates that inequality is increasing but at a muted rate.

Accordingly, the evidence does seem to indicate inequality is increasing by some amount. Potentially more-accurate measures of income and welfare, however, suggest this trend is not as significant as populists claim. So, the first assumption in this particular populist theory appears to be valid, if often overstated. That leads us to the second—and for this discussion, the critical—assumption that antitrust enforcement is driving the apparent inequality trend.

#### Tons of alt causes to inequality – wealth inequality living standards all sorts of different reasons as to why it occurs, the aff can’t solve

#### Tons of alt causes to a civil war – polarization etc.

#### Inequality is a non-factor for economic health

Giles 15 (8/18, Chris Giles is the Economics Editor of the Financial Times. Before that he was a leader writer. He reports on international and UK economics and writes a fortnightly column on the UK economy. “Inequality is unjust, not bad for growth”, https://www.ft.com/content/94a7b252-45a1-11e5-b3b2-1672f710807b)

Inequality is unjust, not bad for growth Disparity of income is both a virtue and a vice. The virtue of providing rewards for effort and generating economic growth must be balanced against the vice of inequality’s manifest injustice. Riches derived through good fortune, good parents or being born at a good time are far from easy to defend. The problem for society and governments is to determine an acceptable degree of redistribution, balancing the remaining inequality with the blunted incentives from higher taxes and benefits. Or so we thought. The past two years have witnessed huge growth in the industry of academic research rejecting this trade-off. Lower inequality boosts growth, its advocates claim, so countries really can have more redistribution, a narrower gap between rich and poor, alongside more sustained economic expansion. Leading the charge towards the new consensus are two somewhat surprising institutions — the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Are these traditional bastions of orthodoxy infusing their policy prescriptions with the most up-to-date empirical evidence or merely following fashion? There is no doubt that the new ideas are strongly held. Angel Gurría, head of the OECD, is convinced of the new reality. “Addressing high and growing inequality is critical to promote strong and sustained growth,” he says only to be outbid in rhetorical certainty by Christine Lagarde, the fund’s managing director. She reckons the rich should thank the poor. “Contrary to conventional wisdom, the benefits of higher income are trickling up, not down,” she says. For all the excitement among this rarefied global elite, the research results are mundane. Economic performance varies wildly over time and across countries, yet the evidence suggests inequality explains only a tiny fraction of these differences. Whatever effect the gap between rich and poor might have on growth, other forces dominate, so we should not look to redistribution as the new engine of growth. With the results almost entirely based on cross-country correlations, they also have troubling inconsistencies. Ms Lagarde and the IMF research think that a higher income share for the rich harms economic performance while the OECD says only inequality between the poorest and the middle matters. The Paris-based international organisation concludes that a lack of access to skills among the poor is the mechanism by which higher inequality hits growth at the same time as finding no role for skills in its equations on growth. If the global results are weak, they also have close to zero policy prescriptions for rich countries where the results have caused most excitement — the US and the UK in particular. Far from being examples of the worst excesses of capitalism, these Anglo-Saxon nations emerge from the IMF data set as countries with relatively strong growth, low inequality and high redistribution.

#### Unions don’t solve inequality – they’re too weak and tons of alt causes

Epstein 20 [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Decline Of Unions Is Good News." https://www.hoover.org/research/decline-unions-good-news]

So what then could justify this inefficient provision? One common argument is that unions help reduce the level of income inequality by offering union members a high living wage, as seen in the golden age of the 1950s. But that argument misfires on several fronts. Those high union wages could not survive in the face of foreign competition or new nonunionized firms. The only way a union can provide gains for its members is to extract some fraction of the profits that firms enjoy when they hold monopoly positions.

When tariff barriers are lowered and domestic markets are deregulated, as with the airlines and telecommunications industries, the size of union gains go down. Thus the sharp decline in union membership from 35 percent in both 1945 and 1954 to about 15 percent in 1985 led to no substantial increase in the fraction of wealth earned by the top 10 percent of the economy during that period. However, the income share of the top ten percent rose to about 40 percent over the next 15 years as union membership fell to below 10 percent by 2000.

But don’t be fooled—that 5 percent change in union membership cannot drive widespread inequality for the entire population, which is also affected by a rise in the knowledge economy as well as a general aging of the population. The far more powerful distributive effects are likely to be those from nonunion workers whose job prospects within a given firm have been compromised by higher wages to union workers.

It is even less clear that the proposals of progressives like Sanders, Warren, and Buttigieg to revamp the labor rules would reverse the decline of unions. Not only is the American labor market more competitive, but the work place is no longer dominated by large industrial assembly lines where workers remain in their same position for years. Today, workforces are far more heterogeneous and labor turnover is far higher. It is therefore much more difficult for a union to organize a common front among workers with divergent interests.

Employers, too, have become much more adept at resisting unionization in ways that no set of labor laws can capture. It is no accident that plants are built in states like Tennessee and Mississippi, and that facilities are designed in ways to make it more difficult to picket or shut down. None of these defensive maneuvers would be necessary if, as I have long advocated, firms could post notices announcing that they will not hire union members, as they could do before the passage of the NLRA.

#### Wages high and rising

Patti Domm 21—CNBC Markets Editor. (“Workers’ wages are rising at the fastest pace in years. Companies’ profits could take a hit,” May 22, 2021, from CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/22/wages-rise-at-the-fastest-pace-in-years-firms-profits-could-take-a-hit.html)

Workers are getting higher wages, but at some point that could bite into companies’ profits.

As the economy reopens, costs are climbing for everything from packaging and raw materials to shipping. In addition to these expenses, companies are also paying more to get workers to come in the door.

But the disparity between labor costs and profits has been so wide for so long, that employers should be able to increase pay if they can raise prices for goods and services or improve productivity.

McDonald’s said last week that it was boosting wages for the 36,500 hourly workers at company-owned stores by 10%, and Chipotle announced it will raise wages to an average of $15 an hour by the end of June. Bank of America said it would raise minimum wages for its hourly workers to $25 an hour, from the current $20, by 2025.

Sports equipment company Under Armour also announced it would boost the minimum hourly wage for its retail and distribution workers to $15 from $10.

“It’s some of the strongest wage growth we’ve seen in a quarter century,” said Mark Zandi, Moody’s Analytics chief economist. He said the 3% wage growth for private workers in the first quarter was the strongest since the 1990s and productivity has picked up at the same time.

“All the anecdotes we were getting in the last few months would suggest it’s continuing,” he said.

### Strike is a Right

#### No term impact – we o/w on extinction, check their cards there is no impact means on case there is only one offense scenario

#### Stats prove – unions depress wages, gdp, and earnings for workers

Gitis 16 [Ben Gitis is the former Director of Labor Market Policy at the American Action Forum. "Union Membership and Economic Growth." https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/union-membership-economic-growth/]

Overall, we find statistically significant evidence that an increase in union membership is associated with a decline in state real GDP growth rate, job growth rate, average weekly earnings growth rate, and total wage earnings growth rate. In general, the impact of union membership is more harmful for workers in smaller business establishments than those in larger ones. Meanwhile, each of our tests on the relationship between union membership and the growth in the number of business establishments yields statistically insignificant results. So while we find that workers suffer from higher unionization, unions impact business growth minimally. GDP

We find statistically significant evidence that union membership is negatively associated with economic growth. Table 1 illustrates the result for the impact of state union membership rates on state GDP growth rates.

For every one-percentage point increase in the union membership rate, a state’s real GDP growth rate decreases by 0.25 percentage points. To put this in perspective, in 2013 state real GDP grew 1.28 percent on average. If the average union membership rate increased by one percentage point, then the state average real GDP growth rate would have declined to 1.03 percent. This result is not surprising to us because the same trend occurs in the raw data. Average compounded annual real GDP growth in states where union membership declined from 2004 to 2013 was 0.13 percentage points faster than the average in states where union membership rose.

EMPLOYMENT

Table 2 contains the results for the relationship between union membership and job growth for the entire labor force and for each business establishment size category.

We find statistically significant evidence that an increase in union membership decreases job growth overall, in businesses with 20 to 49 employees, and in those with 50 to 99 employees. First looking at workers in all business sizes, the results indicate that a one-percentage point increase in the union membership rate is associated with a 0.11 percentage point decrease in the job growth rate. In 2013, employment in an average state grew 0.85 percent. The results indicate that had the average union membership rate increased one-percentage point, the average state job growth rate would have decreased to 0.74 percent. Again, this result matches the trend in the raw data. Average compounded annual job growth during this time period was 0.15 percentage points quicker in states where union membership declined than in states where it rose.

When examining employment growth in each business size, we find that a one-percentage point increase in the union participation rate is associated with a 0.16 percentage point decrease in the job growth rate in businesses with 20 to 49 employees and a 0.14 percentage point decrease in businesses with 50 to 99 employees. In the rest of the business establishment size categories, although the effects are statistically insignificant, they are still negative. This indicates that union membership may hamper job growth in those categories as well.

Looking over the results by business size, the statistically significant effects of union membership on job growth are centered on businesses with 20 to 99 employees. To yield more precise results, we next consolidate the business size categories and run another regression. In particular, we consolidate the data into three business size categories – under 20 employees, 20 to 99 employees, and 100 or more employees – to further evaluate this effect of union membership on job growth in medium-sized businesses. Table 3 contains the results from this new model.

Table 3: Union Membership and Employment Growth with Consolidated Business Sizes

This model appears to yield results that are indeed more precise, with larger magnitudes and higher degrees of statistical significance. For businesses with 20 to 99 employees we find statistically significant evidence that a one-percentage point increase in the union membership rate is associated with a 0.18 percentage point decline in the job growth rate. Our results also yield a statistically significant relationship for businesses with 100 or more employees, which the previous model did not. The coefficient indicates that a one-percentage point increase in the union membership rate is associated with a 0.14 percentage point decrease in the job growth rate in businesses with 100 or more employees.

AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS

So when union membership rises, there is a decline in job growth. But, how do unions impact wage growth? Table 4 contains the results for the relationship between union membership and employee average weekly earnings growth.

Table 4: Union Membership and Average Weekly Earnings Growth by Business Size

We find statistically significant evidence that union membership is negatively associated with average weekly earnings growth for all workers and for those in businesses that have fewer than 5 employees. We estimate that for every one-percentage point increase in the state union membership rate, the average weekly earnings growth rate for all workers in the state declines by 0.22 percentage points and for workers in businesses with fewer than 5 employees it declines by 0.14 percentage points. Again, these results mirror the raw data: average compounded annual average weekly earnings growth was slightly quicker (0.03 percentage point) in states where union membership declined than in states where it increased. For business establishments with 5 or more employees, we did not find statistically significant evidence that union membership impacts average weekly earnings growth.

TOTAL WAGE EARNINGS

With evidence that unionization hampers weekly earnings growth and job growth, it should be no surprise that we also find substantial evidence that an increase in the union membership rate is associated with a decline in the total wage earnings growth rate. This means that as union membership rises, the growth rate of total income earned by all workers in a state decreases. The results for total wage earnings are illustrated in Table 5.

Table 5: Union Membership and Total Wage Earnings Growth by Business Size

We find statistically significant evidence that an increase in a state’s union membership rate is associated with a decrease in the growth rate of total wage earnings for all workers in that state and particularly for those in small- and medium-size business establishments. For all workers, we find that a one-percentage point increase in the union membership rate is associated with a 0.20 percentage point decline in the total wage earnings growth rate.

When examining the relationship between union membership and total wage earnings growth for each business establishment size, we find statistically significant evidence that an increase in the union membership rate is associated with declines in total wage earnings growth for workers in all businesses with fewer than 250 employees. The relationship between union membership and total wage earnings growth for workers in business establishments with 250 or more workers is consistently negative, but statistically insignificant. As in the other cases, these results are consistent with trends in the raw data. In particular, in states where union membership declined, average compounded annual total wage earnings growth was 0.17 percentage points higher than it was in states where union membership grew.

Just like in our analysis on job growth, in this section there is a distinct division in the results by business establishment size: we find statistically significant evidence that union membership is negatively related to total wage earnings for workers in all businesses with fewer than 250 workers, but not for businesses with 250 or more workers. Given these findings, to yield more precise results we next build a new regression model in which we consolidate the business establishment data into only two business size categories – those with fewer than 250 employees and those with 250 or more employees. As illustrated in Table 6, this model yields statistically significant negative relationships for both business size categories.

Table 6: Union Membership and Total Wage Earnings Growth with Consolidated Business Sizes

In the consolidated business establishment model we find that a one-percentage point increase in the union membership rate is associated with a 0.33 percentage point decrease in the total wage earnings growth rate for all workers in businesses with fewer than 250 employees and a 0.28 percentage point decrease in the total wage earnings growth rate for workers in businesses with 250 or more employees. Again, consolidating the business establishment sizes yields greater precision as the results are both larger in magnitude and have greater statistical significance.

BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENTS

Table 7 contains the results for the relationship between the union membership rate and the growth rate in the number of business establishments.

Table 7: Union Membership and Business Establishment Growth by Business Size

In this case, although each effect is negative, we did not find any statistically significant evidence that an increase in the union membership rate limits the growth in the number of business establishments in a state. So even though the results indicate that an increase in unionization harms the growth of jobs and worker earnings, they also illustrate that unions do not substantially harm business growth.

IMPLICATIONS

We consistently find that union membership has negative economic effects on real GDP, jobs, and wages. This suggests that the steady decline in union membership since the 1980s has had positive effects on the economy by growing real GDP, jobs, average weekly earnings, and total wage earnings. In this section, we apply our results to the year-to-year changes in union membership rates in each state and the District of Columbia throughout the time period we study in our regression analysis, 2004 to 2013. Overall, between 2004 and 2013 the union membership rate in the United States declined 1.2 percentage points. 22 states experienced an increase in the union membership rate and 28 states and the District of Columbia experienced a decline. In states that experienced a rise in union membership, we calculate the decline in each economic indicator that our results suggest. Likewise, in states that experienced a decline in union membership, we apply our findings to calculate the resulting growth in each economic indicator.

#### Unions are vulnerable to right-wing populism – makes polarization and civil war more likely

Gruenberg 21 [Mark Gruenberg is head of the Washington, D.C., bureau of People's World. He is also the editor of Press Associates Inc. (PAI), a union news service in Washington, D.C. that he has headed since 1999. Previously, he worked as Washington correspondent for the Ottaway News Service, as Port Jervis bureau chief for the Middletown, NY Times Herald Record, and as a researcher and writer for Congressional Quarterly. Mark obtained his BA in public policy from the University of Chicago and worked as the University of Chicago correspondent for the Chicago Daily News. "Worldwide, union leaders grapple with members backing right-wing ‘populists’." https://peoplesworld.org/article/worldwide-union-leaders-grapple-with-members-backing-right-wing-populists/]

WASHINGTON—For years, union leaders on both sides of “The Pond”—also known as the Atlantic Ocean—have faced a problem: Right-wing ideologues’ “populist” rhetoric sways millions of their members to vote against their own interests.

And then once those putative plutocrats achieve public office, they show their true colors, by enacting and enforcing repressive pro-corporate anti-worker laws.

The problem is visible in the U.S., where 40% of union members and their families backed former GOP Oval Office occupant Donald Trump in 2020. But it’s not just Trump.

Over the years, millions supported other right-wing Republicans such as Sens. Mitch McConnell (Ky.), Ted Cruz (Texas), various U.S. representatives, Gov. Greg Abbott (Texas), and former Govs. Bruce Rauner (Ill.) and Scott Walker (Wis.).

All of them, especially Trump and Cruz, spout populist bombast and claim to represent workers—and then enact edicts benefiting the corporate class.

“Trump’s policies favored the rich and the well-connected. But four in ten union voters wanted to give him a second term” last November, said Knut Pankin, moderator of a late-March panel discussion on Right-Wing Populism As An Anti-Worker Agenda. “Why?”

The dilemma exists in other democracies, too. Some unionists heeded anti-immigrant screeds from Germany’s extreme right Alternative for Deutschland, Marine LePen’s French National Rally (formerly the National Front), Norbert Hofer’s Austrian Freedom Party, Hungarian Prime Minister/strongman Viktor Orban of Fidesz, and Poland’s Law and Justice Party, panelists said.

Once those blocs won power in Austria, Poland, and Hungary, or influenced elections in France, mainstream politicians followed their lead, cracking down on workers as well as targeting migrants. The pols feared they would otherwise lose more votes to the right.

The panel, sponsored by Georgetown University’s Kalmanovitz Initiative for Labor and the Working Poor, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, a foundation set up to foster U.S.- German relations, tried to figure out why workers vote that way—and how to reorient them.

That’s not to say panelists Vonda McDaniel, president of the Nashville, Tenn., Central Labor Council, Prof. Federico Finchelstein, an expert on East European politics at New York’s New School for Social Research, and Prof. Thomas Greven of the Free University of Berlin reached a conclusion. They offered some reasons for the rightward shift and some solutions.

All those parties, including the GOP, “started as bourgeois, middle-class, shopkeeper-oriented” organizations, but have since pivoted to right-wing populism, Greven explained.

“Cruz at the Conservative Political Action Conference was trying to be the inheritor of the white working class who supported Trump,” he contended. The Texan proclaimed the GOP “the party of steelworkers, construction workers, police officers, firefighters, and waitresses.”

Nationalism, protectionism, and racism

“But one common denominator” is the GOP and the other right-wing parties, plus the workers they appeal to, “have a radicalized response” that “is nationalist, protectionist and nativist…to all facets of globalization,” he said. Those facets include corporate export of workers’ jobs to low-wage nations and resentment of refugees and migrants, often people of color whom white nativists in Europe and the U.S. view as a threat.

“’Us versus them’ is much easier to sell to working-class constituents. Union status doesn’t inoculate people versus right-wing populism,” Greven said. While populists’ pro-worker rhetoric is “a charade,” and progressives’ answer, “tax the rich,” is not enough, he added.