### 1

#### Their political imaginary is a death drive towards heaven, marking the cosmos via a Newtonian grammar of space fashioned out of the ghosts of indigeneity – futurity can never be rid of its genocidal markings. A set col K on a set col Aff – they aren’t actually anti colonial – all the language they use in trying to engage with space is inherently trying to find a way for settlers to justifies their crimes by saying they incorporate some natives. They want to view it from the native perspective when it won’t do anything and actually just makes the settler feel good to justify further colonialism. They don’t take any definitive stance and want to incorporate natives – forget that we take the stance that natives should who heartedly reject any attempts at space exploration

Young 17 (Bryanne Huston, Doctoral Student at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill “Killing the Indian in the Child: Materialities of Death and Political Formations of Life in the Canadian Indian Residential School System,” pp. 95-100)

Whiteness, the Child, and the Logics of Futurity Against the politicized topographies and temporalities of indigeneity and race, I now move into a consideration of the contributions of psychoanalytic theory to the questions of politics and time presented thus far. The kinds of questions psychoanalysis is interested in asking, the registers upon which it performs analysis, and its unique emphasis on temporality, language, and difference provide an excellent conceptual apparatus through which we might begin to trouble/problematize stable, taken-for-granted oppositions between psychic and social, personal and political, self and other. Freud’s interest in time is evident in his work on the uncanny, and in his inaugural work on what we might now call trauma studies and conditions we now call post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For Freud, this theory of hysteria introduces a provocative temporality in which traumatic events reoccur, flashing up in perfect replication of themselves, as though happening again and again. In his diagnosis of so-called shell-shocked soldiers returning from World War I, Freud was keenly aware that time did not always progress along an even plane. Though Freud’s analysis of trauma is captivating and critically rich, it is not within my purview here to take on the full extent of this scholarship. Instead, what is most salient to my analysis are the capacities of psychoanalytic theory to move critique outside and beyond prevailing notions of time and narratives of progress that only mean moving forward. This chapter writes from a stance that views it as imperative that scholarship reaches beyond, and thinks outside, the paradigms that invented it. Psychoanalytic theory, with its idiosyncratic temporal logics—particularly in conjunction with Foucauldian theory—offers a productive and robust way to critique the continuing primacy of normative disciplines whose chronologics have historically warranted a politics that kills in the name of life. Such an approach allows us to hold in productive tension any definition of “the political” as stable and finite, with—as in the case of liberal political philosophy—the legally constructed “person” as its primary epistemological unit. This conceptual capacity of psychoanalysis, in turn, allows us to politicize a form of life and modality of corporeal personhood hitherto constructed as what, in Bataillean parlance, we might call colonialism’s accursed share—colonialism’s pure waste. Additionally, psychoanalytic notions of the death drive, whose proper movement is explicitly circular, allows us to begin to locate the child within logics of futurity, onto which is laminated a kind of indelible whiteness. For the purpose of my analysis I engage Lacanian psychoanalysis, limiting myself to a consideration of the structure of the drives and to a Lacanian conceptualization of language, and its role in the formation of self and the suturing of the psyche to sociality. Freud, as Teresa De Lauretis (2008) emphasizes, elaborated the death drive between the First and Second World Wars, in a Europe living “under the shadow of death and the threat of biological and cultural genocide” (1). Situating her analysis of the death drive in the contemporary moment, De Lauretis points to this contextual, historical darkening, writing: “I wonder whether our epistemologies can sustain the impact of the real … If I return to Freud’s notion of an unconscious death drive, it is because it conveys the sense and the force of something in human reality that resists discursive articulation as well as political diplomacy, an otherness that haunts the dream of a common world” (9). Using psychoanalysis as reading practice, Freud’s suspicion that human life, both individual and social, is compromised from the beginning by something that undermines it, works against it, is (darkly?) generative. The death drive indicates a tension bordering psychic and libidinal relations, which marks Freud’s radical break with Cartesian rationality and points to a negativity that counteracts the optimistic affirmations of human perfectability. This dimension of radical negativity cannot be reduced to an expression of alienated social conditions, nor is it entirely something the body does on its own. Theorized as the destruction drive, the antagonism drive, or sometimes, simply “the drive,” it is impossible to escape. In psychoanalytic theory, therefore, particularly in the clinical setting, the objective is not to overcome the drive, but rather to come to terms with it, in what Slovenian Lacanian psychoanalytic theorist Slavoj Žižek (1989) calls “its terrifying dimension” (4). It is a fundamental axiom of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that attempts to abolish the drive antagonism are precisely the source of totalitarian temptation. Žižek writes: “The greatest mass murders and holocausts have always been perpetrated in the name of man as harmonious being, of a New Man without antagonistic tension” (5). So it is that one of Canada’s greatest atrocities— the genocide of its First Peoples—took place in the name of Canada itself, that sought progress and unification as a single body politic with claims on a shared futurity. The fulfillment of this destiny relied upon the negation of the other, the bad race, the dangerous race, the race that stood outside the purview of the norm and had no share in its time-zone, the ones called to live in the between space—as nobody. As the relatively more benign civilization policies failed to convert Aboriginal forms of life into separate but civilized, Christian communities on reserves, the federal government intensified its tactics. Policies became more aggressive. As these more aggressive policies (such as enfranchisement) also failed, the federal government intensified its tactics once again, escalating the stakes and the strategies towards the horizon of assimilation. This ‘doubling down’ in the face of failure is a primary trace effect of the death drive, and indeed, it is not unreasonable to argue that the federal government Indian policy has, since confederation, been death driven. Because the aim of fully eradicating the otherness of the other can only fail—in Freudian parlance, it cannot be mastered—the trajectory of the aiming turns in a circularity, orbiting around that which can never be had: perfection. Caught in death drive circularity, the aiming towards the objective (i.e. a unified body politic) authorizes, and indeed recruits, escalating violence in the interest of—finally—closing the open. For Žižek, this compulsive ‘doubling-down’ in the face of failure to arrive at the impossible horizon of perfection tips towards totalitarian temptation, which, he tells us, is implicated in the drive to unify a singular body politic, a new man without antagonistic tension. The drive aims for the return to a moment of unity before the intrusion of language and the entrance of the subject into what Lacan calls the Symbolic—the universe of symbols in which all human subjects share. Because this economy of signifiers operates through a modality of difference by association, on the premise that language does not reflect or carry within it universal a priori meaning, spirit, or Truth, signifiers are always and already sliding along a chain of signification that is never truly fixed. Rather, for Lacan, meaning is constructed through quilting points, durable concepts that affix ideas to their signifiers and which, in their durability, structure entire fields of meaning. For Lacan, subjects are formed by their entrance into this system of sliding difference from a pre-linguistic state retroactively constructed through nostalgic affective associations with unity, perfection, and completion. The loss or lack occurs in the imaginary, the order of presence and absence, and is formalized in the symbolic. This is experienced by the subject as a loss of that to which she/he can never again return, but for which she/he perpetually yearns, and toward which she/he perpetually moves. The circularity of movement toward this impossible horizon is precisely the movement of the drive. It is my argument that the concept of “the Indian” is a quilting point through which the field of politics in Canada is sutured into signification, a durable concept that organizes the meaning of nation, citizen, sovereignty, and subjecthood. Further, the hypoxic vision of national unity and a harmonious white(ned) citizenry is a movement propelled by the drive, a circularity impelled by the belief that what is lacking in the present can be made good in the future—an imaginary that activates/harnesses a kind of libidinal energy that is, by its very nature, inexhaustible. It matters, in the instance of the Canadian Indian Residential Schools and their mandate, that before child subjects enter into the structuration of language/the Symbolic, their bodies are already marked as disprized, abject, inscribed into the signification for, and, I argue, as, loss itself. As I have argued above, reading through psychoanalytic theory facilitates a conceptualization of subject-formation that includes the role of signification in the contouring of subject/ivities. This analytic rubric is importantly brought to bear in my analysis of “the child” the Canadian Indian Residential School System announces into presence: a child fundamentally and constitutively tied to a death whose temporal structure is always deferred, always impartial, always unfolding, and yet always still to be. Indeed, even in circumstances in which her/his mode of being in the world is not a deliberate practice of making- spectral, “the child” remains a notoriously ambivalent, slippery signifier. This plasticity—differently stated, this over-abundant availability of “the child” as concept—takes on an interesting significance within political thought, functioning not as that which is politicized, but as the signifier in whose name the political mobilizes itself. In this way, the child functions as the absolute outside to political thought and the logics of its temporality, functioning instead to condition its possibilities and organize, from beyond its borders, its spatial and temporal limits. An example of this conceptualization of the child as signifier—and certainly one of the more provocative articulations of this phenomena in the contemporary neoliberal moment—is the polemic Lee develops in his monograph No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. For Edelman, the Child—in its conflation with the kind of futurity toward which the teleology of (neo)liberal discourse is mobilized—is not simply important to contemporary politics, but is that which “serves to regulate political discourse [itself]” (ii). Indeed, as Edelman points out, “the figural Child alone embodies the citizen as ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed. For the social exists to preserve for this universalized subject, this fantasmatic Child, a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). In Edelman’s polemic, it goes without saying that the figural child is a white child and that children of colour, children of mixed heritage, Indian children—within the Ideological State Apparatus of the Indian Residential Schools—far from carrying the over-abundant significance Edelman so adeptly parses, signify on only the most spectral of registers. This child, I argue, as a kind of spectral(ized) partial subject, instantiates a subjectivity simultaneously over-exposed to the political and over-determined by the word of the law, while barely accorded even the status of bare life. This is a subject that is hailed into a circularity of misrecognition in a relationship with death that is virtually inescapable. This relationship with death is the suture that connects this subject to the social. Edelman’s argument does not address racialized formations of self-hood, but is no less relevant to the argument I seek to develop here. Indeed, it is perhaps all the keener in what it omits—which is the child of color. This omission points to the level of signification and the way in which the whitened child is effortlessly lifted from the problematically raced body—the body whose racialized status is found problematic. This fantasy of purification through signification speaks, in ways that are eloquent and disturbing in equal measure, precisely the fantasy of the Canadian Indian Residential School System: that the body of the Indian could be left behind in a transcendent movement away from the vexatious quagmire posed by the Indian body toward the realm of what Kantian philosophy calls pure spirit, the realm of whiteness, purity, and hypoxic visions of what Edelman calls, “a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). This fantasy of corporeal abandonment points to the latent desire of Western philosophical thought that seeks, through the disavowal of bodily finitude and a fetishization of the logos, access to purity of form, a fantasy that relegates, leaves trapped, the sometimes racialized, sometimes feminized other, mired in flesh and finitude from which it is allowed no escape. The Indigenous person, we remember from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, is imagined as always already outside the teleology of history, already extinct. This way of understanding difference, through the rubric of historical progress, remains central to liberal and neoliberal political thought, economic practices, and policies in the current moment. Prising the child away from the Indian, meanwhile, continues to have important implications in the way we imagine colonial forms, not only of life, but also of death.

#### The 1AC’s descriptions of Space aren’t neutral, but replicate the project of Western rationality and enlightenment that depend on the ongoing colonization of spacetime and disappearance of the Native as a backwards impediment to progress. They may say that they engage in natives traveling the cosmos but that’s all nonsense – they literally aren’t doing anything to help natives and the whole Aff is just oriented towards satisfying settler drives

Sammler and Lynch 21 – \* Assistant Professor California State University, Maritime Academy, \*\*Assistant Professor Department of Geography at University of Nevada-Reno [Katherine, Casey, “Apparatuses of observation and occupation: Settler colonialism and space science in Hawai'I,” 9/2/2021, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, DKP]

Settling time

As an empire of time rather than space … many significant American national theorists sought to escape the political paradoxes of space by conquering time. (Allen, 2008: 13)

Allen examines how U.S. empire depends upon three notions of time: a romanticized historical time recounting myths of the nation’s founding, the geological time of natural history, and the mechanized time of the clock and apparatuses of measurement. The organization and control over these three temporalities constitutes a colonial totality (Matson and Nunn, 2017) that works to settle time as much as space in the projection of settler futures.

The projection of settler futures depends on the ordering of time, constituted by ideologies of progress, of a mythologized past and present oriented toward the future. Scientific “progress” is positioned as a universal value key to constructing the future, while questioning the actions of Western science is positioned as irrational or reactionary. Concerning the TMT controversy, Casumbal-Salazar writes:

Relegated to the ‘dark ages’ of tradition, Native peoples appear as the agonistic menace of the modern scientific state. Delegitimized as irrational within the gendered hierarchies of Western science and philosophy … Hawaiians become suspect and subject to institutional anti-Native racism yet fetishized as an archeological remnant within multicultural society. (2017: 2)

In dominant discourses, Indigenous time is linked to the past, with the present constituted on assimilation and the future on complete erasure (Rifkin, 2017). The existence of contemporary Indigenous peoples poses a challenge to ongoing settler colonial hegemony. Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua explains how “settler state officials cast the kiaʻi [land protectors, caretakers] as impediments on the road to ‘progress’ (aka settler futurity) … (mis)representing us as fixed in place, pinned in a remote time” (2017: 191–192). Enlightenment notions of universality erase difference and thus Indigenous claims to prior rights or sovereignty. While these conceptions of time have long been critiqued, they continue to shape the central logics of contemporary Western science, including space science.

Linear conceptions of time are necessarily produced out of complex practices that organize and control relative and variable spatio-temporal formations. Rifkin posits a multiplicity of temporalities, writing:

temporalities need to be understood as having material existence and efficacy in ways that are not reducible to a single, ostensibly neutral vision of time as universal succession. The concept of frames of reference provides a way of breaking up this presumed timeline by challenging the possibility of definitively determining simultaneity … Within Einsteinian relativity, simultaneity depends on one’s perspective based on one’s frame of reference. (2017: 20)

Einstein’s theory of relativity demonstrates how time is relative, variable, and dependent on acceleration, which is a function of location within a gravitational field. It is a relationship between space, masses, and matter. As Valentine explains:

gravity is a consequence of the relational warping of spacetime by matter … That is, gravitational effects are literally universal but emerge locally through relativistic and constantly shifting specific relations among the mass of cosmic bodies and spacetime, producing variable observations from differently situated observers of one another (2017: 189–190).

The practices of Western astronomy are dependent on variable and relative relations among space and time. Whether it is earth-bound astronomers punching the clock on Martian time (Mirmalek, 2020) or the stretching of temporal experience in a gravity well, the location of bodies matters as it produces ‘differently situated observers,’ who experience time differently based on their frames of reference. Yet, time is held as a stable frame of reference from which the colonial scientist constitutes the metric for a purportedly universal observer situated in a neutral position of observation. Even Western science’s own understanding of time refuses to conform to Enlightenment notions of universality, demonstrating a contradiction between this ontology and the broader political and social ideologies with which it is entangled.

While notions of linear, progressive time are used to justify settler colonial projects, the relative and contingent relationships among space, time, and matter complicate claims to universality. Time, like space, is subject to practices of organization and control that produce subject–object relations key to the Western colonial project. For instance, geologic time, or what Allen refers to as “vertical time,” is the spatial-temporal imaginary of geologic strata. He describes that, while “history often depicted time advancing horizontally across space, the geological revolution made it possible to imagine time extending perpendicularly into the territory beneath the nation” (Allen, 2008: 165). The deep time of geology historicizes Western civilization as the top layer, the apex of natural history, and thus stands to justify colonialism and its civilizational projects. The exploration of cosmological time in the space sciences extends the colonial project further into the far expanses of the future and the totality of the universe.

The apparatus

Gazing out into the night sky or deep down into the structure of matter, with telescope or microscope in hand, Man [sic] reconfirms his ability to negotiate immense differences in scale in the blink of an eye. Designed specifically for our visual apparatus, telescopes and microscopes are the stuff of mirrors, reflecting what is out there … Man is an individual apart from all the rest. And it is this very distinction that bestows on him the inheritance of distance, a place from which to reflect-on the world, his fellow man, and himself. A distinct individual, the unit of all measure, finitude made flesh, his separateness is the key. (Barad, 2007: 134, emphasis added)

In Barad’s deconstructive reading of Enlightenment science, linear time and evacuated space are both the product of active material processes through which a purportedly universal “Man” continually enacts a separation between himself and the universe. It is this supposed separation from the rest of existence that constitutes “Man” as the subject of a masculinist science and the remainder of the universe as the object of his will. Practices of scientific observation and colonial occupation work in tandem to re-enact and reinforce this fundamental subject–object relationship. Critical scholars of science have long argued against the purported passivity of observation, from critiques of the Archimedean point (Yaqoob, 2014) to feminist theories of the embodied and situated nature of knowledge production (Haraway, 1988). Yet, beyond simply noting the ontological impossibility of Man’s separation from the universe, Barad theorizes an emergent and contingent form of separability – what she calls agential separability – that is (re)produced through the material practices of apparatuses. Barad explains that “apparatuses enact agential cuts that produce determinate boundaries and properties of entities within phenomena” (2007: 148). Apparatuses determine what comes to matter and how, thus producing differences between subject and object, which are not stable positions but rather enacted and contingent forms of relationality.

We employ the apparatus to explore how subject–object relations of Western colonial science are not universal and absolute, but rather enacted through material practices that selectively produce the privileged subject positions on which settler colonialism and space science both depend. Barad’s theory of spacetime mattering highlights the mutual constitution of space and time through the ongoing material re-configuring of the world. Apparatuses are

neither neutral probes of the natural world nor social structures that deterministically impose some particular outcome …  the notion of an apparatus is not premised on inherent divisions between the social and the scientific …  [they] are the practices through which these divisions are constituted. (Barad, 2007: 169)

Reconceiving subjectivity, objectivity, space, time, and matter in this way implies that questions of ethics are inseparable from apparatuses as practices that produce differences and iteratively construct the world. Apparatuses enact material changes through which some possibilities are realized while others are foreclosed.

Ontologically, apparatuses produce spatial, temporal, and material relations that constitute projects of Western colonial science. This approach helps elaborate arguments like those of Matson and Nunn that “even the most futuristic space telescopes have embedded within them a lineage of Euro-western cultural supremacy” (2017: n.p.). This is not to simply claim that telescopes are in some way symbolic of settler colonial relations, but to recognize how space science apparatuses actively orient relations of observation and materialize settler colonial relations.

Both TMT and HI-SEAS constitute apparatuses that extend spatially well beyond the infrastructural footprint on these mountains, to the island and surrounding ocean, into the atmosphere, to Moon, Mars, and cosmos. As part of these apparatuses, mountain environments of Hawaii become both a gateway to the cosmos and simulation of an alien landscape. Temporally, the apparatus stretches beyond contemporary scientific practices, drawing on longstanding histories of European imperialism, Western law, and settler colonial logics, and projecting these ideologies into offworld futures. Materially, these projects enroll technological, logistical, and physical systems, including roads, mirrors and lenses, sensors and surveillance devices, electromagnetic waves and domes, the geology of the Hawaiian landscape, and bodies of observer and observed.

#### This understanding of “space” replicates a Western theorization of place as neutral space relegates indigenous peoples to colonial authority by creating “cultural blanks” to be filled in by peaceful settlement

Barker and Pickerill 12 (Adam J Barker, and Jenny Pickerill, Department of Geography @ Univ of Leicester. “Radicalizing Relationships To and Through Shared Geographies: Why Anarchists Need to Understand Indigenous Connections to Lands and Place” Antipode.

Colonial Impacts on Perceptions of Place Indigenous understandings of place have generated criticism of many aspects of society in the northern bloc: Christian theology’s influence on political and economic colonial practice (Deloria 2003); the concept of “sovereignty” and the state system (Alfred 2006); constitutionalism as a method of governmental organization (Tully 1995; 2000); capitalism and relationships under a capitalist system (Adams 1989:17); language and culture (Basso 1996) and many other understandings of place, space, nature, and human relationships. Indigenous relationships to place fundamentally challenge colonial spatial concepts, from the ways that we move from place to place and through spaces (Pandya 1990) to how we move through time (Jojola 2004). Indeed Coulthard (2010:79) asserts that for Indigenous people place is central to understandings of life, whereas “most Western societies . . . derive meaning from the world in historical/developmental terms, thereby placing time as the narrative of central importance”. Historically, EuroAmerican cultures conceived of human relations to the environment in one of two ways, which John Rennie Short labels the “classical and romantic” (Short 1991:6): either “natural” places are improved through development and human spatial creation and use (with “wilderness” as a frightening, exterior “ other”), or despoiled through human contact and change (with the natural environment as a pristine and perfect spatial concept, and the suggestion that human identity must be bounded within it). Both conceptually marginalize or fully erase Indigenous presence in place. Contra this erasure, Indigenous peoples’ understandings of place have become important to the understanding of colonial geographies and the efforts of anti-colonial activists.2 Indigenous peoples have traditionally related to place through spatially stretched and dynamic networks of relationships (Cajete 2004; Johnson and Murton 2007). These networks bear some resemblance to Sarah Whatmore’s concept of hybrid geography, “which recognizes agency as a relational achievement, involving the creative presence of organic beings, technological devices and discursive codes, as well as people, in the fabrics of everyday living” (Whatmore 1999:26). Through these, Indigenous peoples have challenged the classical/romantic dichotomy that continues to haunt some aspects of anarchist spatial perceptions. For Indigenous peoples, place holistically encapsulates networks of relations between humans, features of the land, non-human animals, and living beings perceived as spirits or non-physical entities. All of these—humans included— are understood to have autonomy and will, but also obligation and responsibility to all of the other elements to which they are related and among whom they are situated. As such, we acknowledge that land and place are different to each other but seek to use the way they are interrelated throughout this article. Although land can be considered as material, its meaning is constantly interwoven into the relationality of place so that land is often taken to have multiple meanings beyond its simple materiality—as a resource, as identity and as relationship (Coulthard 2010). Indigenous peoples assaulted by settler colonization have and continue to face concerted attempts to break Indigenous connections to place. Religious conversion, for example, has had a massive impact on the ways that Indigenous peoples perceive the spaces occupied by spirit and otherwise metaphysical beings. Though no longer considered “tantamount to a complete transformation of cultural identity” (Axtell 1981:42), conversion to and participation in hierarchical-organized, spatially dislocated, and temporally defined Judeo-Christian religions (Deloria 2003:62–77) encouraged Indigenous peoples to see the spiritual as something above (literally) and beyond the direct contact of the human world. The general result is displacement and dislocation. Indigenous peoples are displaced from their relational networks by introduced relationships that increasingly reorient Indigenous social organization towards colonial authority. Indigenous places are dislocated in the sense that The knowledge of and relationship to them, essential for generating spatial meaning in Indigenous contexts, is marginalized or over-written. This creates observable “cultural blanks” (Little Bear 2000) among Indigenous youth; Settler peoples, conversely, fill corresponding blanks that result from traditions that fit incompletely with changed/changing geographies (Harris 2004) with myths of peaceful expansion, cultural superiority, and frontier valour (

#### Political ontology is structured by gratuitous violence that ontologically transforms Native bodies into flesh – liberal dreams of a better world might give us brief moments of respite, but are an ultimately grossly inadequate in the face of genocide

Juárez 21 – native, diasporic descendent of the Tsotsil Maya and a first generation Chiapaneco living in the ancestral homelands, taken through genocide, of the Alabama-Coushatta, Caddo, Carrizo/Comecrudo, Coahuiltecan, Comanche, Kickapoo, Lipan Apache, Tonkawa, and Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, among others. As a graduate student at the University of Texas Austin in Social Work, his research examines the libidinal economy of anti-blackness and settler colonialism and its implications for clinical mental health practice [Nicolás, “THE WORLD IS BURNING Racialized Regimes of Eco-Terror and the Anthropocene as Eurocene,” The Anthropocene, Approaches and Contexts for Literature and the Humanities, Routledge, edited by Seth T. Reno, DKP]

The Antagonism of the Anthropocene

The Anthropocene proceeds through regimes of ecological violence against Black and Native American people. If that violence did not occur, there would be no Anthropocene. Such gratuitous violence, in turn, has created a political ontology in which Black and Native American people are non-Human. Political ontology names the “powers subjects have or lack, the constituent elements of subjects’ structural position with which they are imbued or lack prior to the subjects’ performance,” and which, despite being non-metaphysical since it arises from politics, “functions as if it were a metaphysical property across the longue durée of the premodern, modern, and now postmodern era.”25 The ecological terror of the Anthropocene demonstrates how Black and Native American populations have become structurally consigned to the status of Black Slaves and Indian Savages, as the rest of the world obtains and struggles over its Humanity. As Dylan Rodriguez writes, who will be subject to the terrors of the plantation and the colony has changed over time, but “there’s little mistaking the Black and Aboriginal common denominator in all of it.”26 The longue durée of such violence also displays its temporal stillness—from the Columbian Exchange to the Industrial Revolution to the Great Acceleration, the non-Humanity of Black and Native populations is sustained. One only needs to examine the ecological terror of events such as the Standing Rock protests or the continued poisoning of Flint, Michigan, alongside the continued police killings, imprisonment, and civilian murders of Black and Native peoples to see how such an ontological structure continues into the present. As such, an examination of the Anthropocene reveals a general antagonism between the Human qua Settler-Master and the Black and Red bodies who have been transformed into flesh and ectoplasm by slavery and genocide’s regimes of terror, especially in their ecological registers. Furthermore, the necessity of such violence for the Anthropocene’s existence and continued maintenance suggests that environmental struggles must ground themselves in abolition and settler decolonization, and that the struggle for abolition and settler decolonization is always already an environmental struggle. As Frank B. Wilderson III points out, “in this trio [of the Savage, Human, and Slave] we find the key to our world’s creation as well as to its undoing.”27

Likewise, since the Anthropocene arises from the creation and maintenance of the Human, it is clear that the global ordering signified by the Eurocene inheres itself in every single potential candidate and terminology for the beginning and meaning of the Anthropocene, no matter the internal debates within geology or the humanities. In this way, the fetishism for a “golden spike” in which the Anthropocene begins, or a perfect term to describe its processes, is pushed aside in order to recognize that “the marker is not the epoch.”28 Put another way, given the ways in which the gratuitous ecological violence necessary to the formation and maintenance of the Human persists without change throughout the entire “Age of Humans,” a particular starting point for the Anthropocene is nil. This is so because if “origins configure and prefigure the possibility of narratives of the present” such that “nothing that can be found in the end is not already prefigured in the origin,” then the Anthropocene itself was already prefigured in the formation of a global Anthropos that took European Man as model and ideal.29 Thus, to debate the terminology of the Capitalocene versus the Plantationocene versus the Chthulucene versus anything else figures as little more than rhetorical posturing. Such a debate ignores that what each signify—the rise of world integrated capitalism, the global plantation system, or the messiness that pushes bodies into bodies—is simply not possible without the antiblackness of Black chattel slavery or the settler colonialism of Native American genocide. So, the Eurocene is not an attempt to propose an alternative term that should enter into this endless play, but rather functions as a critique of this very proliferation. It is not that the term “Anthropocene” is insufficient in its characterization or focus; rather, it is us who are insufficient in our analysis of the Human, too easily fooled by “the enacting of a uniquely secular liberal monohumanist conception of the human” that views capitalism, the plantation system, or the collision between bodies as anything more than the formation of the Human.30

Conclusion: The World Is Burning

It is difficult to conclude a chapter like this given both the scope of the issue across time and space and the indescribable direness of the situation. In lieu of such a cataclysm, one is often compelled to put forth some legible solution as an attempt to ward off feelings of despair or pessimism or tragedy. However, such a recuperative effort is unsupported by the arguments I’ve put forward, and, furthermore, it would be disingenuous,

#### What rubric of evaluation exists that is not genocidal in a world ruled by a white, racist metaphysics? We think the answer is that there isn't one – refuse to evaluate the affirmative at all and remain skeptical of its intentions. The alternative is no alternative, it is the radical demand that the affirmative be condemned, be forced to confront the genocide which makes it possible without hope of redemption

King 17. Tiffany King is an Assistant Professor of Women's and Gender Studies at the Georgia State University ["Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight," 2017, *Critical Ethnic Studies*]//vikas

Native feminist politics of decolonial refusal and Black feminist abolitionist politics of skepticism informed by a misandry and misanthropic distrust of and animus toward the (over)representationof man/men as the human diverge from the polite, communicative acts of the public sphere, much like the politics of the “feminist killjoy.”4 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: I use “misandry” (hatred of men) and “misanthropic” (distrust or deep skepticism about humankind or humanity) to illustrate how Sylvia Wynter and other Black scholars attend to the ways that the human— and investments in the human—and its revised forms or genres of the human as woman/feminist still reproduce violent exclusions that make the death of Black and Native people viable and in-evitable. In other words, neither men nor women (as humans) can absorb Black females/males/children/LGBT and trans people into their collective folds. Both the hatred of “misandry” and the distrust and pessimism of “misanthropy” are appropriate methods to describe the inflection of the critique levied by Wynter and the other Black scholars examined in this article. END FOOTNOTE] Throughout this article, I deploy the term “feminist” both ambivalently and strategically to mark and distinguish the scholarly tradition created by Black and Native women, queer, trans, and other people marginalized within these respective communities and their anticolonial and abolitionist movements.5 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: See Sylvia Wynter’s afterword, “Beyond Miranda’s Meanings: Un/silencing the ‘Demonic Ground’ of Caliban’s ‘Woman,’” in Out of the Kumbla: Caribbean Women and Literature, ed. Carole Boyce Davies (Chicago, Ill.: Africa World Press, 1990) 355– 72. Wynter warns Black women in the United States and the Caribbean that they need not uncritically embrace womanism as a political position, which can effectively oppose the elisions, racism, and false universalism of white feminism. “Feminism” as well as “womanism” are bounded and exclusive terms that do not effectively throw the category of the human into continual flux. END FOOTENOTE], Until a more useful and legible term emerges, I will use “feminist” to mark the practices of refusal and skepticism (misandry/misanthropy) as ones that largely exist outside more masculinist traditions within Indigenous/Native studies and Black studies. “Decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” depart from the kinds of masculinist anticolonial traditions that attempt to reason Native/ Black man to White Man within humanist logic in at least two significant ways. First, neither participate in the communicative acts of the humanist public sphere from within the terms of the debate. Further, they do not play by the rules.6 [INSERT FOOTNOTE: See the critiques of the anticolonial tradition within Caribbean philosophy articulated by Shona Jackson in her book Creole Indigeneity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012). Jackson argues that anticolonial Caribbean masculinist philosophy tends to argue from inside the logic of Western philosophy in order to counter it. For instance, in a valorization of the laborer as human and inheritor of the nation-state, Caribbean philosophy tends to reproduce the Hegelian telos of labor as a humanizing agent for the slave, which inadvertently makes the slave a subordinate human and effectively erases the ostensibly “nonlaboring” humanity of Indigenous peoples in the Anglophone Caribbean. END FOOTENOTE] Specifically, the Native and Black “feminist” politics discussed throughout launch a critique of both the logic of the discussion about the human and identity as well as the mode of communication. In fact, practices of refusal and skepticism interrupt and flout codes of civil and collegial discursive protocol to focus on and illumine the violence that structures the posthumanist discourse. Attending to the comportment, tone, and intensity of an engagement is just as important as focusing on its content. The particular manner in which Black and Native feminists push back against violence is important. The force, break with decorum, an d style in which Black and Native feminists confront discursive violence can change the nature of future encounters. Given that Black women who confront the logics of “nonrepresentational theory” are really confronting genocide and the white, whimsical disavowal of Black and Native negation on the way to subjectlessness, it is understandable that there is an equally discordant response. Refusal and skepticism are modes of engagement that are uncooperative and force an impasse in a discursive exchange

### Case

#### Futurity Link: The ability to imagine a progressive future is a tactic of liberalism that erases the existence of the native. The 1AC Smiles 20 evidence says that place the Indigenous individual themselves into narratives of space travel and futurity” which is complicit inthe liberal political notion of progress which ignores the temporal anachronistic space occupied by the native in the way that indigenous people seen as holding back environmental movements – while the settler may see a new horizon, the native occupies the permanent position of the savage, outside history. The impact is the reproduction of a multiculturalistic future that sacrifices people of color in the name of progress. The very capacity for settler change is rendered coherent through the absence of that future for the native. It turns the aff because it fuels the ability for settlers to scapegoat immigrants using the justification of change through time – liberals cite progress to exclude certain populations. That’s Young.

#### Space link – the 1AC theorization of space as “out there” and “distant” operates through a profane extension of Western colonial space science that continues Newtonian grammars of place that position indigeneity as the unthought. Claims of sacred rights and relationality are denied through projects of assimilation and elimination, as neutrality views space as a culturally blank canvas to be filled by Settler imaginaries. Terrestrial observation cites on Indigenous lands in Hawaii or Chile, the building of satellites with rare earth minerals stolen from tribes in Latin America, and the frontier mentality of space exploration all reflect the extension of colonizing politics into the cosmos.