## Case

#### Extend the first advantage whistleblowing is key to make sure public interest in protected in the medical industry, current lack of protections means that whistle blowers are at a special risk of intimidation lawsuits, covid causes a societal illusion of preparedness and a future pandemic could cause extinction because of climate pressures. Compare this world with the Neg squo which can’t solve for any of these issues, it’s try or die for the aff, 1% aff solvency means you vote aff. They’ve conceded supry

## T

#### Counter-interp: affs can specify states

#### 1] We meet—member states isn’t generic because it’s modified by “the” and “of the WTO”

#### “The” implies specification

Random House 6 (Unabridged Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/the)

(used, esp. before a noun, with a **specifying or particularizing effect**, as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of the indefinite article *a* or *an*): the book you gave me; Come into the house.

#### 2] Subsets prove generics—their interp is arbitrary. Tessler and Goodman 18

Michael Henry Tessler (ph.D., post-doc fellow @ MIT) & Noah D. Goodman (Associate Professor of Psychology and Computer Science, and Linguistics @Stanford University), “The Language of Generalization,” Department of Psychology, Stanford University, December 2018, <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.02926.pdf>.

The basic intuition behind our account is that before a listener hears a novel generalization such as “Alligators grow to be 10-feet long”, they do not know how widely distributed the property to be in the category, including whether or not it is present at all. The utterance provides a vague sense of how strongly the generalization applies (e.g., how many alligators grow to be 10-feet long), which the listener derives from their knowledge of how the property (growing to be 10-feet long) is distributed among other categories (e.g., other animals). The decision of whether or not to endorse the generalization is that of a speaker reasoning about how well the utterance would align their interlocutor’s beliefs about the prevalence of the feature in the category with those of their own. We formalize this intuition in a truth-conditional semantics incorporated into a Bayesian model of belief updating. Interpretation model. Our model of interpreting the language of generalizations has three conceptual components: Probability, vagueness, and context. If generalization from observations can be described by a probability p, it is natural to posit that same construct will be at the heart of a semantic theory of the language of generalization (Ingredient 1: Probability). In semantics, belief updating generally passes through Boolean truth values (Montague, 1973). The simplest way to derive a Boolean from a scalar quantity like probability is via a threshold semantics: The utterance is true if the relevant scalar value is above a threshold. For example, the literal meaning of the sentence “Some dogs have four legs” is that there is a non-zero chance that a given dog will have four legs: [[some]](p) := p > 0. “Most dogs have four legs” can also be described as a threshold on prevalence (e.g., the chance that a dog will have four legs is greater than 50%): [[most]](p) := p > 0.5. 3 Thus, the simplest semantics for a generalization would also be a threshold on the prevalence: [[gen]](p, θ) := p > θ. The extreme flexibility of generalizations (e.g., “Mosquitos carry malaria”; “Birds lay eggs” vs. “Birds are female”) suggests that no fixed threshold would suffice. Rather than throw out the threshold-semantics, we posit that the threshold is underspecified in the literal meaning and is contextually-determined in a way analogous to how gradable adjectives like tall have contextually-determined thresholds (e.g., what counts as tall for a person is different than

#### Semantics are a floor not a ceiling— we all interpret the resolution to allow specification and can determine the most predictable interp based on factors like clash and limits. If we have a sufficiently predictable interpretation of the topic then division of ground is more important. High schoolers shouldn’t need a PhD-level understanding of semantics to interpret the topic

#### Standards:

#### 1] Clash—allows us to go in-depth on particular parts of the literature which allows for more nuanced debates because different regions and groups of countries have distinct lit bases—they vastly overlimit

#### 2] Aff Ground—no advantage applies to all country pics since every country is different – pics are worse than aff spec since negs have generics like the innovation da and cap k but affs don’t have anything to restart with vs the thousands of possible pics and the barrier to entry for pics is lower because they don’t require solvency advocates or robust lit

#### 3] Functional limits: only so many affs have impacts and solvency advocates—small affs lose to generics because they have no offense specific to that country

#### 4] Reasonability—good is good enough and key to avoid substance crowdout

#### 5] No TVA – pics and generics slap me down makes the TVA impossible for the aff to win

#### 6] Yes RVIs on 1NC T – we don’t have enough time in the time crunched 4 minute 1AR to respond to everything the Neg has said in the 7 minute NC

## Kant

#### predicitons are possible and useful

**Mearsheimer, 01** (John, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001 p. 8, googleprint)

As a result, all political forecasting is bound to include some error. Those who venture to predict, as I do here, should therefore proceed with humility, take care not to exhibit unwarranted confidence, and admit that hindsight is likely to reveal surprises and mistakes. Despite these hazards, social scientists should nevertheless use their theories to make predictions about the future. Making predictions helps inform policy discourse, because it helps make sense of events unfolding in the world around us. And by clarifying points of disagreement, making explicit forecasts helps those with contradictory views to frame their own ideas more clearly. Furthermore, trying to anticipate new events is a good way to test social science theories, because theorists do not have the benefit of hindsight and therefore cannot adjust their claims to fit the evidence (because it is not yet available). In short, the world can be used as a laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics. In that spirit I employ offensive realism to peer into the future, mindful of both the benefits and the hazards of trying to predict events.