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#### Ukraine-China relations motivated by space cooperation – the Aff makes that impossible – that spills-over into other aspects of the relationship.

Ma and Soroka 20 Ma, B., and L. Soroka. "The Cooperation between China and Ukraine in Space Exploration: Genesis and Development. Advanced Space Law, 5, 58-70." (2020). (Ph.D. in Law, Professor, Guangdong University of Petrochemical Technology)//Elmer

Critical outcomes of bilateral China-Ukraine relations in space China and Ukraine do not provide complete open official information on aircraft and missile science, which complicates the analysis, including the analysis of trends and opportunities for further cooperation between China and Ukraine. However, available open sources enable to summarize some of the outcomes. In the space segment of bilateral cooperation, the developments should be highlighted as follows (Badrak, et al., 2009: 63): a) the exchange of information on the technical parameters of the Chinese Environment-1B project and the Ukrainian Sich-2 project to establish mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of space data exchange; b) delivery to China of a laboratory facility (including the transfer of production technology) for manufacturing non-plasma engines for spacecraft; c) closeness and interchangeability of the Ukrainian UNOSAT project and the Chinese seismic electromagnetic satellite project give the possibility of establishing mutually beneficial cooperation on these projects. According to the Agreement between Ukraine and China, Kharkiv Military University has started training Chinese air defense specialists (Training Aviation Command began operating in the military town “Rogan-1” near Kharkiv). It is possible that in the future Ukraine will begin to train cadets-pilots from the PRC, as well as provide medical support for the training of astronauts, which is especially important for the implementation of the Chinese Space Program “Project 921” (921 Project, 2020). To date, Ukraine’s position in the space sector is the strongest in the launch services market. While China is interested in developing its satellite navigation system, Ukraine is interested in acquiring microelectronics technology and investing. Therefore, constant and promising cooperation between the PRC and Ukraine can be established and stabilized in these sectors. However, nowadays, Ukraine should be more actively involved in projects within the framework of cooperation with China on legal, clearly stipulated contractual bases with the maximum contract validity to enhance its capabilities in this sector and gain competitive advantages in international markets. Promising forms of scientific and technical cooperation, such as the creation of technoparks, incubators, engineering and technology transfer, etc., are being implemented between China and Ukraine. Moreover, in the People’s Republic of China, the first industrial zones were established back in 1980. Currently, there are 54 technoparks in the country that provide about 10% of GDP and accumulate 30% of FDI. In Ukraine, 12 industrial parks are registered, and only a few of them are under construction. The rest is not functioning (Natalushka, 2017). The creation of technoparks will provide potential foreign investors with new opportunities for preferential taxation, as it has been done in Singapore. With such technoparks, the owner will be able to draw up all the necessary permits for Chinese investor companies, eliminating the need to run around the offices of officials. Along with the positive points in bilateral relations between China and Ukraine, factors that hinder the development of interstate partnerships remain and need to be addressed. First, these are a narrow foreign policy orientation of the Government of Ukraine to the countries of Europe and the USA, the inaction of the Ukrainian side in holding official meetings, visits to China with the participation of the first persons of the State, the absence of political continuity (every time after a change of power, a new plan, a new strategy of development occur) and the presence of corrupt schemes in legal regulation (Natalushka, 2017). Second, insufficient explanatory work on the meaning and ultimate purpose of socio-political transformation in Ukraine (for example, the Chinese will understand de-sovietization as a rejection of the negative heritage of the USSR and will not understand decommunization, because communism remains the official ideology of the PRC) (Goncharuk et al., 2016: 38). Third, the difficulty of a Ukrainian visa for the PRC citizens remains a huge obstacle to establishing effective relations with China, and there are problems with guaranteeing the safety of Chinese living in Ukraine, their businesses, and property. At the present stage, China and Ukraine have every opportunity to realize a considerable potential of bilateral cooperation in science, technology, and education, to be in close relation with the international scientific and technological community, and to participate in creating an innovative global society (Joint, 2018). Cooperation China’s role in the world becomes more significant. Expanding political, economic, cultural, and other relations with this country is one of the critical areas of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Before the declaration of independence in 1991, Ukraine, as part of the USSR, had been building its relations with the People’s Republic of China within the framework of the all-Union foreign policy doctrine. Only after the collapse of the USSR and the proclamation of its independence an independent policy became possible. Ukraine and the PRC are known to have much in common. This concerns geopolitics, which broadly defines the role and place of Ukraine and the PRC not only in the Eurasian region but also in the broader, global geopolitical context. The countries have mutual economic interests and close positions on the key problems of contemporary world political development. Both states face similar internal socio-economic issues. In both countries, a transition to a market economy occurs, a desire for a policy of openness exists. Both countries are in the Eurasian region, are neighbors of Russia, and are in the interests of the United States of America. The foreign policy of both countries is based on a realistic consideration of their national interests. Ukraine is an essential factor in European and world politics. It is respectful of the PRC’s growing role in contemporary international relations. Ukraine and the PRC have been productively and consistently working and coordinating their policies at the UN and other international organizations. According to Meng Hin, despite a great interest of politicians and the public regarding the issue of China-Ukraine cooperation in the 1990s of the twentieth century, it remains studied incompetently. However, for the first time in the history of the two countries, their relations have begun to develop on a broad legal basis (Meng, 2005). This requires an in-depth study of the various strands of relations between Ukraine and the PRC. The study of this issue will enable us to understand the main trends in the development of relations between the States and to offer recommendations on the implementation of comprehensive cooperation. Therefore, considering the benefits of scientific and technical cooperation, and existing areas of cooperation, the authors propose the following strategic approaches to expanding science and technology-based relationships, which form an overall strategy for long-term cooperation in space that could, in the long run, bring China and Ukraine to a new level of development, increase their competitiveness in the world markets: joint research and development; exchange of scientific and technical information and documentation, samples of products and materials, as well as the exchange of know-how and licenses on a compensatory basis; organization of scientific-technical seminars, symposia and scientific conferences, etc. Besides, the successful commercialization of space exploration products requires to develop and adopt regulatory acts promptly to create the necessary legal platform to realize the prospects for both China and Ukraine. In conclusion, some truths are eternal. Ancient Chinese philosopher Confucius said: “Those who do not care about their future will be in trouble soon.” If Ukraine had perceived the recommendation of its first president, “science can wait” as a ridiculous joke. Our current “famine of science” might not have occurred, or, as our Western colleagues say, “innocide” instead of innovation (Driga, 2017: 61).

#### That cements the BRI – Ukraine is a critical partner in Europe for China Trade.

Zeneli and Haluhan 19 Valbona Zeneli and Nataliia Haluhan 10-4-2019 "Why China is Setting its Sights on Ukraine" <https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/why-china-is-setting-its-sights-on-ukraine/> (Dr. Valbona Zeneli is the Chair of the Strategic Initiatives Department at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Ms. Nataliia Haluhan is the Chief Consultant, National Institute for Strategic Studies (Ukraine). She is a former Marshall Center scholar.)//Elmer

As China continues to assert itself as an emerging world power, Europe remains a very important target. While Chinese investment has significantly increased, by 50 times in the last decade, the current figures underestimate the true scope of Beijing’s ambitions in the old continent. To achieve its goals, every European country is important for China: economically, geographically, or politically. Ukraine is no exclusion from the rule. Beijing’s multifaceted interests in Ukraine mainly relate to its strategic geographic location. It is highly attractive as a logistic transit hub within the Belt and Road (BRI) initiative that links China with European Union (EU) markets. Other attractive factors are its rich natural resources, opportunities for new infrastructure projects and its agricultural industry. These factors are all in line with the Chinese expansionist agenda in Europe. A member of OBOR since 2017, the business community and political leaders in Ukraine have shown increased interest in deepening cooperation with China. To serve this purpose, the “Belt and Road” Trade and Investment Promotion Center was established in Kyiv, seeing BRI as a tool to improve infrastructure, attract foreign investment from China, invest in energy projects and modernize agricultural technology. To date, there has been a lot of conversation, but projects are not clearly defined, nor transparent. Being attracted by the promises of the BRI as an opportunity for their country to unlock the potential of it being an “entrepot” to Europe, Ukrainian politicians had earlier expressed their willingness to deeper institutionalize relations with Beijing in offering to join the “16+1” mechanism, a platform created by Beijing to increase trade and economic relations with Central and Eastern Europe.

#### Solves Central Asian and South Asia War.

Muhammad et Al 19, Imraz, Arif Khan, and Saif ul Islam. "China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Peace, Prosperity and Conflict Resolution in the Region." (Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Buner)//Elmer

In the twenty first century, the geostrategic importance of South Asia is rising because of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is the important component of the **o**ne **b**elt **o**ne **r**oad initiative (BRI). CPEC, started point is Gawadar a deep water port connects to the China‘s province of Xinjiang. Being part of the BRI, once CPEC is completely started functioning, it **will improve** the **political, social and economic situation** of the regional states and will raise the geo-strategic importance. CPEC is the priority of both states China and Pakistan, for Pakistan, CPEC pass through Pakistan‘s geography, is outlet for the landlocked countries and provides access to the supply and demands market to regional countries, while it is very short route for China, CPEC replace 13000 km only into 2500 km to reach to Middle East.1 So both the states have an instinct desire to continue it irrespective of change in the government. Not only this, CPEC will **boost** up the **regional** states‘ **economy**, **ensure peace** and prosperity in the region. Political, social and economic degradation in South Asia, created a hurdle in the cooperation among the regional countries. Security issues, terrorism, over population, economic disparities, lacking of education and modern inventions, lacking of health facilities, poor economic setup, water issues etc. devastated the life style and hindered the progress, development and peace in the region. CPEC is a turning point in the history of Asians‘ countries, it is not only a game changer and a target for Pakistan and China but a project for the whole region. Goal of this project is to promote commerce and trade culture, integrate the regional states for the development of economy, agriculture and industries. Furthermore, it is a source of peace, prosperity and conflicts resolutions in the region through economic development, economic dependence and regional integration. CPEC is a sign of peace and affluence for the whole region as for Pakistan. Being economic zone it will bring political, social and especially economic growth in the region. However, this research work deals with analyse the CPEC role in bringing peace and prosperity on the one hand and led to conflict resolution in South Asia on the other hand. What is CPEC? The CPEC is the part of one belt, one road has featuring of common advantages and prosperity, containing on complimentary interest, cooperation and collaboration and mutual benefits. A widespread transport corridor, industrial and trade cooperative rout between China and Pakistan, having the potential of people to people contact and communication, sources of cultural diffusion and exchange. Additionally, CPEC has the ability of political, social and economic growth, bringing peace, prosperity and security in region2 The CPEC covers the areas starting from a muslim majority province Xinjiang Uygur in China and almost all provinces Pakistan. Main areas through which CPEC passes are Kashgar, Atushi, Tumshuq, Shule, Shufu, Akto, Tashkurgan Tajik, Gilgit, Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Islamabad, Lahore, Multan, Quetta, Sukkur, Hyderabad, Karachi and Gwadar. Furthermore, the CPEC will comprise one belt, three passageways, and two axes and five functional zones. Peace, Prosperity and Conflict Resolutions Narrowly peace is defined as the passivity and acceptance of injustice and cruelty without showing reaction.3 It may also be turn as the complete absence of war which simply fall in the negative peace category, but actually **peace** is more than that, it is **based on the political,** social **and economic development** of society and elimination of the injustice, and violations of the human rights.4 More elaborately, peace focused on the modern concept of democracy, liberalism and postmodern society, which is really related to the deconstruction of the parochial society, snatch powers from single body and share with rest of the society, where there is popular democracy is observed. Where there is no exploitation of the individual and restriction on the abusive use of the authorities.5 Nonviolence, the philosophy of Gandhi and Bacha Khan, is the part of positive peace, where there is no violation of the law, demand for rights under the shadow of law, no threats are used during protest and strikes. So, by this way there is risk for the conflicts, violations and war. Demand for right by using violence fall under the umbrella of negative peace. Jonathan Schell fruitfully summarised the dilemma of non-violence as cooperation, collective action consist on the mutual consent against abusive and parochial power and compel those actions which are taken against them.6 However, it is a very emotive term which has many heads and tails has not absolute end, in short the think tankers are in seeking to find easy way to bring cooperation, consensus, mediations, resolutions and more effective ways to resolve the issues and disputes, and transform the causes of war into peace. Perpetual peace is possible in resolving the conflicts, but due to anarchy in the international community, there is conflict. Disagreements, irrational demands, denial and counter claim leads to conflicts. So, prevention of the conflicts, mediation, management and resolution fascinated the international community, because the cost of war and conflicts is higher. For the conflict resolution, various methods are used as the tactics of good offices, arbitration, enquiry, negotiation, problem setting workshop, second track diplomacy, reconciliation and judicial settlement.7 However, conflict resolution depends upon clear assurance from all parties. CPEC Role in Bringing Peace and Prosperity & Peace through Economic Growth & Regional Integration: Political, social and economic interdependence society, reduce the chances of conflicts and war. Liberal thinkers probe out that **free trade and** economic **interdependence** flourish peace and **eliminate** the risk of **militancy**. The theory of Economic Opportunity Cost Hypothesis investigated that economic interdependence increase the level of integration among nations, consequently there is the eruption of peace and alleviated the condition of war8 . Economically weak states, where is economically disintegrated states are mostly enhanced in conflicts with each other. So, it is the benefits of trade globalization which decreases conflicts among nations. The theory of Neo-Functionalism which discussed norms and values of the Europe integration, has focused that cooperation and harmonization in one sector open the routes of another for the cooperation.9 Where, further expansion of the chain of integration, cooperation and as a result peace enhances in society. Like European states, Afghanistan, Iran, India, **Pakistan**, China **and** other **central Asian states** **have** the **capacity of regional integration** through CPEC. The CPEC has the potential of cooperation, integration, economic growth, and forged unity among regional states. According to the norms of NeoFunctionalism, CPEC provides an opportunity of free trade, economic dependence, transportation and regional integration through functional cooperation. **South Asia** is the **most exacerbated region** in the world, because of militancy, conflicts, overpopulation, less development, lacking of education and specially the arm race among nations. Terrorism in the region (Afghanistan and Pakistan) created security dilemma and furthermore the conflicts of Pakistan and India over Kashmir worsen the situation, which disturb the economic chain in the region for a long time. **CPEC** **bestowed the best opportunity to resolve the conflicts** and created peace through geo-economics and geo-politics. This corridor has the capacity to create economic interdependence in the region and regional integration because of functional cooperation based on common interest and needs.10 CPEC network connected the regional and extra-regional countries through, economic trade, liberalization of economy, free policies and open membership, to get advancement in commerce and trade on global level.11 Being part of the of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), CPEC has the capacity to **interconnect** China, **Pakistan**, Iran, **India**, Afghanistan, **Central Asia**, West Asia, not only this other states of the Central Asia are also may connected with this corridor through India. After Passing through Asia, CPEC enter into Europe through ―One Belt, One Road‖ strategy.12 By this way CPEC created cooperation among adjacent and de-adjacent countries, and lead to peace and prosperity through economic dependence, as the China‘s Assistant Foreign Minister opined that peace, prosperity and economic development of CPEC not only limited to China and Pakistan but to the whole region.13 Similar view has been presented by the Ex-PM Nawaz Sharif during his visit to Turkmenistan, CPEC would be beneficial for everyone in the region in the socio-economic perspective, as he said that ―CPEC will offer opportunities for hundreds of millions of people.‖ But it is necessary to promote peace in the region because without peace, development remains just words on the tongue, as he further mentioned that peace and prosperity are connected with each other. Furthermore, flourishing the popular concept of happiness and prosperity Nawaz Sharif added, that my government will ensure Regional integration and connectivity. It will help us to work together towards pursuing our common objective of strengthening peace and bringing development in our region. In fact CPEC is an opportunity where Pakistan and other countries of the region have to work for the betterment of our people.‖14 So, through integration of the regional states, CPEC has a great role in the flourishing of the peace, prosperity and development in the region. The issue of terrorism, militancy, Kashmir disputes, crimes as piracy, human trafficking and problems around the Indian Oceans, are created severe affection over the region regarding international trade and commerce, crumpling of economy and security threats. These issues also devastating the security and economic situation of Pakistan, therefore, responding to these devastating issues is one of the foremost priorities of Pakistan and China. ChinaPakistan adopted joint struggle for the fortification of their maritime security to bring peace and stability in the region and secure the CPEC from insecurity.15

#### South Asia War goes Nuclear and causes Extinction.

Menon 19 Prakash Menon, The nuclear cloud hanging over the human race, Nov 15, 2019, [PhD from Madras University for his thesis “Limited War and Nuclear Deterrence in the Indo-Pak context”] [https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/the-nuclear-cloud-hanging-over-the-human-race/cid/1719608#](https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/the-nuclear-cloud-hanging-over-the-human-race/cid/1719608) SM

The nuclear cloud hanging over the human race Even a limited India-Pakistan nuclear conflict could pose an existential challenge to life on Earth The smoke injected into the stratosphere due to a nuclear attack would block the sunlight and result in a ‘Nuclear Winter' - freezing temperatures that pose an existential threat. One study estimates that in an India-Pakistan exchange, the immediate casualties could number 125 million lives The smoke injected into the stratosphere due to a nuclear attack would block the sunlight and result in a ‘Nuclear Winter' - freezing temperatures that pose an existential threat. One study estimates that in an India-Pakistan exchange, the immediate casualties could number 125 million lives iStock Prakash Menon | | Published 15.11.19, 08:04 PM With the recent administrative changes in Jammu and Kashmir, Indo-Pak hyphenation has come back to haunt India’s aspirations to break out of that narrow mould and be perceived as an independent player on the global stage. The clubbing of India with Pakistan is an echo of India’s political and strategic confinement to the sub-continent. Pakistan has always attempted to paint the Indo-Pak situation as a nuclear flashpoint essentially to invite international intervention in what India insists is a bilateral issue. A recent report in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists by Toon et al entitled 'How an India-Pakistan Nuclear War Could Start and have Global Consequences' provides grist to the mill of the nuclear flashpoint theory. But it also raises an issue that has yet not found its place in the public imagination nor has sufficient cognisance been taken by the political and military leadership of nuclear weapon powers – the climatic consequences of nuclear explosions. It is well known that nuclear powers have and continue to base their targeting requirements of nuclear weapons on calculations that are restricted mostly to the major but immediate effects of nuclear explosions – blast, heat and radiation. According to General Lee Butler, the former United States, Strategic Forces Commander, during the cold war, the Standard Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) had targeted Moscow with 400 nuclear weapons and Kiev with 40. Several scientific studies of the impact of nuclear explosions since the 1980s up to the present which utilises advanced computer models, confirm the effect of smoke injected into the stratosphere that would block sunlight from reaching the earth’s surface and is described as ‘Nuclear Winter’. In essence global temperatures would plunge below freezing point thus posing threats to life support systems especially food production. In short, it threatened human existence itself. Later studies that focused on regional nuclear wars especially in the Indo-Pak context, have indicated that the impact of a nuclear exchange would have an immediate significant and catastrophic impact in terms of death and destruction. The latest Toon study, estimates that in a situation where around 350 warheads are used by India and Pakistan, the immediate casualties would vary between 50 to 125 million lives depending on the yields of the weapons used which could vary between 15-100 Kilotons. (a Kiloton being the explosive equivalent power of 1000 tons of TNT). Such scales and speeds of destruction for both parties would indeed be of an existential nature. Therefore, both India and Pakistan despite the rhetoric during times of tension have so far displayed caution and refrained from getting into situations where nuclear weapons are alerted. The speedy de-escalation after Balakot is indicative of a cautionary approach. Of course, this is no guarantee that the next round would not witness a different outcome. For as long as nuclear weapons exist in the arsenals of both countries, the possibility of use remains, however low the probability. It is now well known (but widely ignored by the strategic cognoscenti) that even a regional Indo-Pak nuclear war with hundreds of low yield nuclear explosions can also pose an existential threat at the global level. The latest study states “In the India-Pakistan scenario, we calculated a total of 16.1 TG (1 TG is equivalent of one million tons of smoke) of black carbon injected into the upper atmosphere (11 from India and 5.1 from Pakistan) for weapons with yields of 15 kilotons; 27.3 TG (19.8 from India and 7.5 from Pakistan) for 50 kiloton weapons; and 36.6 TG (27.5 from India and 9.1 from Pakistan) for 100 kiloton weapons. The smoke would be heated by sunlight and lofted high into the stratosphere, where it could remain for years, since it does not rain in the stratosphere”. The Climate Model indicates that global average temperatures and precipitation would be significantly lowered and comparisons are drawn to the ice age that prevailed thousands of years ago. Agriculture around the world would be impacted and billions of people could face starvation. In earlier studies, even 5 TG of smoke produced (which is one third of what is expected in a lower scale Indo-Pak conflict), food production would change in China and the US for specific crops causing widespread shortages at the global level. Moreover, the ozone layer would be degraded as the rising smoke absorbs the sunlight and heats up the stratosphere that would permit ultra-violet rays of greater magnitude to reach the earth causing negative effects. The political and strategic implications of the long-term impact on climate change challenges the foundations of the edifice on which nuclear weapon strategy has been constructed. It is obvious that any deliberate initiation of nuclear war has a high probability of posing an existential threat to humanity. Even with the achievement of the complete destruction of an adversary’s arsenal through a first strike, the initiator cannot itself escape the existential threat posed by long term climate change. This indicates that the First Use doctrine in the name of strengthening deterrence stands fully exposed for its incredibility and the utter stupidity of the use of nuclear weapons.

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#### North Korean nuclear proliferation is key to broader economic movements to modernize the economy – the plan means more conservative policy

Eleanor 18 Eleanor M. Albert is a Ph.D. student in Political Science at the George Washington University. Her research interests include Chinese foreign and domestic policy, the evolving nature of Chinese power, and how the country exerts its influence and builds relationships. "North Korea’s Power Structure." Council on Foreign Relations, 19 July. 2018, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-power-structure.

North Korea is among the world’s poorest nations, with widespread malnutrition. Its economic activity centers on [PDF] mining and manufacturing, as well as agriculture, forestry, and fishing. While heavy international sanctions have intensified North Korea’s isolation, the economy still appeared to be registering modest growth through 2016, according to South Korea’s central bank. Kim has instituted slight changes and relaxed rules, including the liberalization of domestic markets, which have spawned growth, says a report by Daily NK, a South Korea–based online newspaper. In his first years in power, Kim Jong-un developed the byungjin policy, or “parallel development” of the country’s nuclear capabilities and its economy. To do so, Kim has rolled out policy modifications, shifting away from a centrally planned economy to one that is more incentive-based and allows for greater autonomy at the county and provincial levels. Industries such as shellfish and generic pharmaceuticals remain under tight control, but there are some sectors where opening up is taking place, such as agriculture. Still, North Korea’s coterie of elites, which experts estimate totals about fifty families and up to two thousand people, exerts heavy influence over the state’s economic functioning. They are said to hold important roles in which they facilitate or execute policy, as well as control hard currency operations, resources, or information. “Instability or unpredictability for elites is one of the levers that allows Kim Jong-un to maintain his hold on power. Even before Kim Jong-un came to power, there was increasing room for these moneyed elites. This group, known as the donju—money masters or lords—started making fortunes by facilitating trade in black markets that emerged at a time when the government was unable to provide sufficient food and services, in the late 1990s. Restrictions on these markets have eased over time, and in some circumstances market activity is even sanctioned without reprisal. For example, agricultural collectives are allowed to privately sell their surplus crops. Still, personal connections run deep across the economy: many children or other family members of high-powered party, military, and civilian officials run foreign trading companies that fuel the country’s economic development. In recent years, there are anecdotal accounts from journalists, researchers, and visitors of the construction or opening of ski resorts, theme parks, and a new airport—signs of an economic uptick and interest in infrastructure for potential tourism. All this, despite stringent international economic sanctions that have crippled formal trade and normal economic ties with dynamic regional actors such as China, Russia, and South Korea. If sanctions relief materializes and North Korea seeks to diversify its business relations with the outside world, experts say that all moves to grow the economy will have to be delicately calibrated by the leadership to ensure political stability inside the regime. The Future of the Regime Kim Jong-un is also determined to be seen as a ‘modern’ leader of a ‘modern North Korea.’ Jung H. Pak, Brookings Institution Experts say Kim Jong-un has deftly navigated his rise to power. While drawing on nostalgia for his grandfather’s era and grandiose persona, “Kim Jong-un is also determined to be seen as a ‘modern leader’ of a ‘modern North Korea,’” writes the Brookings Institution’s Jung H. Pak. Economic development is fashioned as the vehicle for this modernization. In Kim’s 2018 New Year’s speech, he emphasized using the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a springboard for progress and prosperity, stating that “the central task facing socialist economic construction this year is to enhance the independence and Juche character of the national economy and improve the people’s standard of living.” CNA’s Gause says “the economy is Kim Jong-un’s strategy,” adding that all of his recent efforts at diplomacy are “designed to hook into the South Korean economic engine” and solidify his legacy. Experts say North Korea is entering a critical period of change under a regime that has by and large resisted rapid change and outside influence. Even as the ultimate authority, they say, Kim will need to cultivate the support of enough elites and successfully manage the pace of change to meet his goal of making North Korea a strong and prosperous nation.

#### Failed economic modernization leads to state collapse – the elites partner with the military, and economic missteps become more likely when the economy falters

Pagano and Kuznar 18 Pagano, S. J. & Kuznar, L. A. (2018). Dr. Sabrina Pagano is the Global Practice Leader for DignityTRAC® and a Principal Research Scientist at NSI/NBI. Dr. Kuznar specializes in the ecological and economic features of traditional pastoral societies.Assessment of Pathways to Collapse in the DPRK: NSI Pathways™ Report. Arlington, VA: Strategic MulM-layer Assessment (SMA). Note – Nouveau Riche refers to “newly rich”, people in the DPRK who have recently acquired increased economic status

Summary of Indicators and Warnings (I&W) This review of antecedent conditions, catalysts, and markers identifies several social changes that may constitute important indicators and warnings that the DPRK is on a pathway to collapse. These indicators and warnings include: • Major policy shifts not conducive to nouveau riche or military group interests • Further decrements in quality of life for the nouveau riche • Emergence of common nouveau riche, grassroot, or military grievances • Linkages between interest groups such as the nouveau riche and the military, which would constitute key l&W Disruptive responses to sanctions and financial crises Crisis of legitimacy far the regime, likely arising from a failure to develop the economy and improve overall conditions for the population, and especially the nouveau riche Acute or frequent procedural justice violations (to., unfair processes, as opposed to unfair outcomes) that are perceived by the grassroots as unjust Major policy shifts by the Kim government that threaten key stakeholder interests could lead to the development of commonly perceived grievances within these groups. In the case of the nouveau riche, this could resemble the currency devaluation of 2009 or some other curtailment of the emergent market economy. Such actions would at a minimum frustrate the ambitions of the nouveau riche, or worse, lead to a decrease in their quality of life. In the case of the military, crackdowns on corruption, or changes in military policy that threaten officer income or social/political status, could lead to the development of a perceived common grievance among the military officer corps. Internally and alone, the military and the nouveau riche do not appear to mount an effective challenge to the regime. However, should ties form between these interest groups, their ability to join forces (economic and military power) might be an indicator of a particularly potent challenge to regime control. Though presently unlikely, a sharp spike in the perception among the grassroots of procedural injustice could lead to anger and downstream support for punishment of the regime or system change—which might be associated with grassroots support for joint nouveau riche and military efforts to unseat or otherwise undermine the existing government. The heavy sanctions and attendant financial crisis could exacerbate any missteps of the regime. Potential indicators or warnings would be government responses to these stresses, such as increased disappearances, executions, imprisonment, or reprimands of stakeholder groups such as the donju or military officers. Any of the above indicators could have the effect of challenging and potentially undermining the legitimacy of the Kim regime and the political system upon which it is based. While these indicators mark the potential for collapse, it is as important to monitor the presence and robustness of key buffers, such as the state's ability to suppress dissent.

#### Extinction through loose CBRNS and great power war – it’s higher magnitude than a North Korean lash out

Kazianis 17 Kazianis, Harry J. Harry J. Kazianis is director of Korean Studies at the Center for the National Interest. He also serves as executive editor of its publishing arm, The National Interest. "Why the sudden collapse of North Korea would be hell on Earth." The Week, 22 Mar. 2017, theweek.com/articles/681846/why-sudden-collapse-north-korea-hell-earth.

But in all fairness, there is one event possibly even more perilous than Pyongyang showing itself capable of launching a nuclear attack on Asia or America. Oddly enough, it is something many experts over the last few weeks have been rooting for — the collapse of North Korea's government. On the surface, the downfall of Pyongyang would seem like an unquestionable good thing, the death of a totalitarian state that should have long ago been tossed into the dustbin of history. However, just a quick walkthrough of what could happen in an uncontrolled collapse sends shivers down the spine of anyone who has studied the subject in detail — a topic that has been grossly underexamined in popular media considering the stakes. While a full review of the possible ways the North Korean state could meet its end is worthy of its own separate treatment, the dangers after a sudden collapse are quite clear. For our purposes, let us assume an internal event has caused the Kim family dynasty to come to a quick death. There is no central government and allied forces comprised of South Korea and the United States are moving across the 38th parallel to ensure order. What could be so bad? Well, for starters, there would be immediate concern over who has control over not only of Pyongyang's nuclear and atomic materials, but its perhaps much larger chemical and biological weapons stockpiles as well. While sometimes an afterthought, North Korea's chemical and biological weapons might be a much a bigger threat than its nuclear program. Most research points to Pyongyang having large quantities of chemical weapons — on display recently in the apparent assassination of Kim Jong Nam, the half-brother of Kim Jong Un — as well as a biological weapons programs capable of killing millions. U.S. and allied forces would surely need to mount an unprecedented intelligence effort to not only locate almost all of these materials but protect themselves from chemical or biological weapon attacks by forces who could be still vying for power. Allied forces would also need to ensure that no weapons of mass destruction left the country — a non-proliferation nightmare of the worst kind. As if potential loose weapons of mass destruction were not enough, there is an even more basic problem — that of a shattered society. How does one put back together a people broken by almost seven decades of being ruled as if they were slaves? How will the average North Korean, who only knows the Kim family, react to the end of the regime? Would some take up arms against those who would be there to ensure order? Is civil war a possibility? One thing is quite clear: It could take decades, but more likely generations, to wipe away the scars of psychological, emotional, and surely spiritual torture that was suffered. Then there is China. Beijing would obviously be a player in any future of North Korea, especially as its largest trading partner, providing Pyongyang with much of its food and energy needs. In fact, many national security experts in China are quick to point out that the Chinese Communist Party's greatest international worry is the collapse of the North Korean state. They fear a united Korea would become a major player in Northeast Asia, allied with America and armed with Washington's best weapons and troops. And if millions of refugees started coming across the border into China, President Xi Jinping might send his own forces into North Korea — where a superpower showdown between Washington and Beijing could be in the offing. And last, the sheer cost of rebuilding and reintegrating the North back into a united Korea would likely be in the trillions of dollars. Who would pay such costs? While South Korea is certainly an economic powerhouse, rebuilding and integrating North Korea into the south would be a historic undertaking — far greater than the merger of East and West Germany after the end of the Cold War. Back in 2013, a defector described North Korea as a "gulag masquerading as a country" — perhaps the perfect description for the most imperfect of regimes. But while the people of North Korea clearly deserve better, free of what can only be described as the vilest forms of state-sanctioned terror ever devised, a spontaneous, uncontrolled collapse could cost millions of people their lives. All the more reason for the Trump administration to act cautiously in the months to come.

### 1NC – CP

#### CP: Ukraine ought to:

#### End exports of space technology to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

#### Ban private space companies from accepting Chinese investment

#### Move all nuclear reactors offline, dismantle nuclear reactors, and entomb them in concrete deep underground

#### Plank 1 solves advantage 1 – they said NoKo ballistic missile capabilities are dependent on the Ukrainian space industry but we end supply

#### Planks 2 and 3 solve advantage 2 – Ukraine not taking Chinese investment means no US alienation which preserves Biden’s support AND lack of nuclear reactors takes out the terminal impact

### 1NC – DA

#### The aff contradicts the Artemis Accords by banning mining and lunar property – decks relations with the US

Nelson 20 “The Artemis Accords and the Future of International Space Law” Jack Wright Nelson [Jack Wright Nelson is a Research Associate at the Faculty of Law of the National University of Singapore and a Member of the International Institute of Space Law. The author is grateful to the Faculty's Centre for Banking & Finance Law for supporting his ongoing research.], December 10, 2020 <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/31/artemis-accords-and-future-international-space-law> SM

The Artemis Accords The Accords' ten operative paragraphs can be grouped into three categories. The first category reinforces certain core tenets of international space law. In particular, the Accords emphasize that all space activities must be for "peaceful purposes" and performed "in accordance with relevant international law."[8] The Accords also reaffirm and expand upon astronaut assistance obligations from the Rescue Agreement and registration requirements from the Registration Convention.[9] The second category of operative paragraphs concerns specific operational issues. To this end, the Accords promote transparency, interoperability, and the sharing of scientific data.[10] On the pressing issue of space debris, the Accords' signatories have committed to engage in mitigation planning.[11]The first and second categories are unlikely to be controversial: the first restates well-accepted law, while the second codifies nascent best practice. But the third category of operative paragraphs aims to progress international space law by promoting particular interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty concerning lunar heritage protection, space resource extraction, and the "deconfliction"[12] of space activities. Further, there are potential conflicts between the Accords and the most recent treaty to emerge from COPUOS—the Moon Agreement.[13] The Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement Regarding lunar heritage protection, the Accords state that signatories: intend to preserve outer space heritage . . . compris[ing] historically significant human or robotic landing sites, artifacts, spacecraft and other evidence of activity on celestial bodies.[14] Signatories to the Accords also: affirm that the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.[15] Reducing the legal uncertainty surrounding space resource extraction was a key impetus for the development of the Accords. They build upon an Executive Order issued in April 2020 by President Trump to internationally promote space resource extraction.[16] But it is a controversial issue. Ultimately, the Accords represent a compromise. They do not expressly state that space resource extraction is legal. Rather, they simply state a negative: that such activity would not in and of itself amount to national appropriation (which Article II of the Outer Space Treaty—as extracted below—expressly prohibits). Regarding space activities deconfliction, the Accords provide detailed guidance on the establishment and operation of "safety zones" around lunar installations.[17] Safety zones are buffer areas in which lunar activities would be subject to specific notification and coordination procedures in order to reduce the risk of collisions or interference. However, carving out or otherwise demarcating portions of the lunar surface—whether required for lunar heritage protection, space resource extraction, or safety zones—may face legal hurdles. First, dividing up the lunar surface could breach the fundamental principle of non-appropriation of celestial bodies. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty provides that: [o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. Second, a divided lunar surface could prevent states from exercising their exploration, use, and free access rights. Article I, paragraph 2 of the Outer Space Treaty provides that: [o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.

#### US-Ukraine Relations solves Baltics War.

Pifer 17 Steven Pifer 4-12-2017 "Why should the United States be interested in Ukraine?" <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/04/12/why-should-the-united-states-be-interested-in-ukraine/> (Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Center on the United States and Europe, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative)//Elmer

BOLSTERING EUROPEAN SECURITY Above and beyond Ukraine, Russia’s aggression constitutes a fundamental challenge to the post-Cold War European security order and raises questions about what the Kremlin might try next. That is of interest to the United States, given that the trans-Atlantic relationship links us to our longest and closest friends and partners, and we are committed to their defense in NATO. Support for Ukraine, along with political and economic sanctions, are ways in which the West can make clear to Moscow that there will be consequences for its egregious misbehavior. The risk otherwise is that the Kremlin might undertake other actions that would further threaten European security and stability. Would Moscow use military force against the Baltic states, which are members of NATO? Most likely not. But five years ago, the answer would have been a resounding “no.” Supporting Ukraine and imposing costs on Russia for its aggression help ensure that Moscow does not miscalculate in a way that would lead to deeper crisis. Secretary Tillerson’s question, if odd coming from him, is one that many American might ask. However, there are very good reasons why the United States should take an interest in Ukraine.

#### Baltic conflict goes nuclear

Kofman ’16 [Michael; May 12; Analyst at CNA Corporation and fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, M.A. in International Security from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; War On The Rocks, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia,” <https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/>; RP]

What’s the Right Force Posture for Nuclear Oblivion? The other problem with the fixation on conventional deterrence in the Baltic fight is that just as in the old standoff between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, this battle is fraught with opportunities for nuclear escalation. Most Russian experts I know in the military analysis community, including those in Russia, don’t see much of a chance for conventional battle with NATO to stay conventional. RAND didn’t wargame that out, since theirs was an AirLand Battle exercise, but it makes the debate over how many brigades to stick into the Baltics somewhat moot. On any map, Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad is a central problem in keeping this a conventional fight, because this is a piece of Russian territory that NATO must either bypass or neutralize to reinforce the Baltics. That’s not just a Russian fort, projecting long arcs of anti-access and area denial weaponry between Poland and Lithuania — it’s also liable to be a nuclear landmine. There is a possibility that if Russian forces are sufficiently degraded or defeated in Kaliningrad that Moscow may resort to or threaten nuclear first use. Even if we fill all those hex squares with blue forces, it doesn’t get around the issue that NATO’s prize for its victory is not necessarily the successful rescue of the Baltics, but an inbound tactical nuclear warhead. RAND’s report alludes to the minor problem of escalation (all of us dying in nuclear oblivion), but such thoughts get in the way of gaming out how many heavy armor brigades one needs in on the eastern flank. Nuclear escalation is not assured, but given the impact of such an outcome, perhaps the best strategy is to make decisions that afford the most opportunities for managing escalation dynamics. That means a force posture oriented toward strategic flexibility, not entrenchment.

## Case

### 1NC – Russia Invasion

#### Nuclear plants are resilient

* New reactor technology is resilient
* NERC concluded shut downs for power plants are possible during a major EMP event

Conca 19 [James Conca, pHd, expert on energy, nuclear and dirty bombs, a planetary geologist, and a professional speaker, “Can Nuclear Power Plants Resist Attacks Of Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)?”, 1/3/19, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2019/01/03/can-nuclear-power-plants-resist-attacks-of-electromagnetic-pulse-emp/#689dec8270cb>]

Yes. Specifically, the small modular nuclear reactor company, NuScale, out of Oregon, has made their reactor resistant to electromagnetic pulses (EMP) and most other reactor designs should follow.

EMPs are one of those things that many people think is fake, or over-blown, or a conspiracy theorist’s dream. But they are real. EMPs can be either natural, from things like extreme solar geomagnetic disturbances, or man-made like a large thermonuclear detonation or a cyberattack. If they are coordinated with physical attacks then things can get real dicey real fast.

As the U.S. Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from EMP Attack points out, “the physical and social fabric of the United States is sustained by a system of systems - a complex and dynamic network of interlocking and interdependent infrastructures whose harmonious functioning enables the myriad actions, transactions, and information flow that undergird the orderly conduct of civil society.”

According to the Commission, EMP effects represent arguably the largest-scale common-cause failure events that could affect our electric power grid and undermine our society, leaving it vulnerable on many fronts. High-voltage control cables and large transformers that control the grid are particularly vulnerable. Transformers weigh 400 tons, take two years to build, and cost $7 million apiece. We are already way behind in having backup transformers ready, so if many go out at once, we have a big problem powering our country.

So can we do anything about it?

The phenomenon of a large electromagnetic pulse is not new. The first human-caused EMP occurred in 1962 when the 1.4 megaton Starfish Prime thermonuclear weapon detonated 400 km above the Pacific Ocean.

One hundred times bigger than what we dropped on Hiroshima, Starfish Prime resulted in an EMP which caused electrical damage nearly 900 miles away in Hawaii. It knocked out about 300 streetlights, set off numerous burglar alarms, and damaged a telephone company microwave link that shut down telephone calls from Kauai to the other Hawaiian islands.

And that was from 900 miles away.

On the natural side, in 1989, an unexpected geomagnetic storm triggered an event on the Hydro-Québec power system that resulted in its complete collapse within 92 seconds, leaving six million customers without power. The storm resulted from the Sun ejecting a trillion-cubic-mile plume of superheated plasma, or ionized gas.

It took two days for this cloud to smash into the Earth’s magnetosphere overwhelming its normal ability to throw off charged cosmic particles, triggering hundreds of incidents across the globe and causing undulating, multicolored auroras to spread as far south as Texas and Cuba.

Such storms occur every 60 years or so, and in 1989, we weren't anywhere near as electrified and electronically interconnected as we are today, or as we will be in 30 years.

This is the most likely EMP to occur.

A new 2018 study by the U.S. Air Force Electromagnetic Defense Task Force addresses direct EMP threats to the United States and its allies. While some issues have existed for decades, the window of opportunity to mitigate some of these threats is closing. Meanwhile, many existing threats have gained prominence because of the almost universal integration of vulnerable silica-based technologies into all aspects of modern technology and society.

In 2008, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack made a compelling case for protecting critical infrastructures against EMP and solar geomagnetic disturbances. To avert long term outages, the U.S. must assure the availability of survivable power sources with long-term, readily accessible and continuous fuel supplies to blackstart the grid, sustain emergency life-support services, and reconstitute local, state, and national infrastructures. Long term outages are defined as the interruption of electricity for months to years over large geographic regions.

An eye-level point-of-view rendering from inside the NuScale plant visitor’s center looking toward the plant facilities. The plant design guards against EMPs, meltdowns and cyberattacks, and can provide energy continuously through any disaster.NUSCALE

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission tracks this issue closely, and has been examining these issues for more than 30 years, starting in the late 1970s when the agency studied how EMP could affect nuclear power plant safe-shutdown systems. The agency concluded as recently as two years ago that nuclear power plants can safely shut down following an EMP event. NRC drafted a rule last year on maintaining key plant safety functions after a severe event, particularly on how to keep spent fuel pools cool.

#### U.S. support for Ukraine validates Russian fears of encirclement---that causes Russia to preemptively escalate the crisis.

Trenin 20, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, part of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a global think-tank, since 2008, (Dmitri, March 2020, “The World Through Moscow’s Eyes: A Classic Russian Perspective”, http://www.afsa.org/world-through-moscows-eyes-classic-russian-perspective)

Ukraine Is More Than a Foreign Policy Matter

Moscow does not care much about—and does not think much of—nascent democracy in Georgia or Ukraine, where it prefers to see mostly chaos, oligarchy and mob rule; but it is wary of U.S. military presence and activities in its neighborhood and Washington’s virtually unconditional support for Russian neighbors’ historical or current grievances against Russia.

Ukraine’s movement away from Russia represents a most difficult and painful divorce within the core of the historical Russian state. As such, it is only partly a foreign policy matter. The Russo-Ukrainian separation will take decades and likely generations to become a fact fully accepted in Russia. For Ukraine, the process of nation-building has involved a thorough rejection of anything to do with Russia and severance of all contacts with it.

For Russians, the Atlantic alliance is a U.S.-owned platform for pressuring Russia in order to weaken it and, in extremis, an advanced position from which to attack the Russian heartland.

In Moscow, U.S. policies in Ukraine have been largely seen as aimed at diminishing Russia through undermining its great power position (e.g., Zbigniew Brzezinski’s famous quote that Russia without Ukraine cannot be an empire) and even as a dry run for regime change in Moscow. In Russian eyes, the most dangerous element of U.S. policy has been Washington’s support for Ukraine’s NATO membership. For Russians, the Atlantic alliance is a U.S.-owned platform for pressuring Russia in order to weaken it and, in extremis, an advanced position from which to attack the Russian heartland. Fears of the dangers associated with NATO’s eastern enlargement are probably exaggerated, but they remain an article of faith within the Russian security and military communities, where memories of Hitler’s surprise attack of 1941 live on.

The United States is unlikely to stop supporting its Ukrainian clients, Russian leaders believe. U.S. political and diplomatic support, as well as military assistance, to Ukraine will continue into the future; and thus, a major irritant in U.S.-Russian relations will continue to exist. Yet NATO membership for Ukraine— intolerable for Russia for security reasons—will probably remain out of reach, Russians conclude. Without acknowledging it, Washington cannot ignore the possibility that such a move, even before it is consummated, might precipitate a preemptive Russian action. Since Ukraine clearly matters much more to Russia than it does to the United States, Moscow believes it has a de facto veto on Ukraine’s NATO membership through high-cost military intervention. Should the conflict escalate, Russia will have an edge in escalation dominance. A prudent U.S. policy needs to make sure that its actions in Ukraine do not cause it to stumble into a military conflict with Russia.

#### Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” posture is verifiable, and its express purpose is keeping the US out of Ukraine.

Gressel 20, a senior policy fellow with the Wider Europe Programmer at the European Council on Foreign Relations' Berlin office, he holds a PhD in Strategic Studies at the Faculty of Military Sciences at the National University of Public Service, Budapest and a Masters Degree in political science from Salzburg University, (Gustav, June 12th, 2020, “Russia’s nuclear deterrence principles: what they imply, and what they do not”, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\_russias\_nuclear\_deterrence\_principles\_what\_they\_imply\_and\_what\_n)

Other observers in the past argued that Russian military thinking’s focus on offence and pre-emption would likely leave a mark on nuclear matters as well and concluded that Russia had adopted an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine. According to this view, Russia would resort to the pre-emptive first use of a non-strategic nuclear weapon once the Russian army had achieved its operative goals to end the war on Moscow’s terms. While the existence of such an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine and other details on Russia’s potential use of nuclear weapons was [contested](https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/nuclear-posture-review-russian-de-escalation-dangerous-solution-nonexistent-problem/) in the past, the final sentence of Article 4 of the doctrine comes closest to answering this question. It states that, once a war has started, nuclear deterrence policy is to seek to prevent it from escalating further, or from being terminated on terms unfavourable to Moscow. This is a short version of what in Russian military literature is termed ‘[escalation control](https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DRM-2019-U-022455-1Rev.pdf)’. Escalation control implies that threats, demonstrations of strike capabilities, and inflicting “calibrated damage” on the enemy (which may, but does not have to, include nuclear weapons) should contain, localise, and if possible terminate a war on Moscow’s terms. This is more flexible and adaptable than most previous assumptions on Russian ‘escalate to de-escalate’ or ‘escalate to win’ concepts. However, flexible escalation control is no less challenging for NATO, as the final result may still be a pre-emptive, limited nuclear strike. One needs to stress that Russia and the West have fundamentally different traditions and perceptions on what ‘defensive’ military operations are and where ‘pre-emption’ on a ‘legitimate’ security threat transitions into ‘aggression’. For this reason, nothing in the decree precludes Russia embarking on ‘escalate to de-escalate’. The practical backdrop to [Russian deliberations](https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DIM-2020-U-026101-Final.pdf) on escalation control of course was, and remains, to dissuade a large nuclear power – the US – from intervening in a war Russia has started with an immediate non-aligned neighbour, particularly Ukraine. A head-on confrontation with NATO is not Russia’s primary concern, but could develop out of another crisis. In such a confrontation, nuclear weapons and their dissuasive potential would play a major role. But as such scenarios would hardly develop according to a script or pre-planned decision, Article 18 will be the most relevant: it sets Putin as the sole decision-maker about the use of nuclear weapons. The decision of whether or not to use them would depend on how he perceives the circumstances and whether, if, and in what contexts, threats are made or weapons used. This said, the decree does not differentiate between strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and does not at any point imply or hint that the Russian armed forces would rely on the employment of nuclear weapons to fulfil tactical or operative tasks assigned. In this regard, all nuclear weapons – regardless of range and yield – are ‘strategic’ in terms of being a political tool to influence political decision-making processes.

#### That causes an unstoppable nuclear war of attrition.

Fisher 15, an American journalist and columnist based in [Washington, D.C.](https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Washington,_D.C.) in the field of [political science](https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Political_science) and [social science](https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Social_science), writes for [The Washington Post](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Washington_Post), [The New York Times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Times), and [Vox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vox_(website)), (Max, June 29th, 2015, “How World War III became possible”, <https://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war#ukraine>)

But when you consider this doctrine from the American side, you begin to see what makes it dangerous, even insane. Imagine that you are an American leader and your forces in Eastern Europe have somehow been drawn into conflict with the Russians. Perhaps, as artillery and planes from within Russia hammer your forces, you counterattack on Russian soil to take them out. The Kremlin, fearing the start of an invasion to take Moscow, drops a tactical nuclear warhead on your forces in Estonia or Latvia. You have no idea whether more Russian nuclear strikes are coming, either on the battlefield, more widely on Europe, or even against Washington or New York. Do you respond with an in-kind tactical nuclear strike, opening the risk of gradual escalation to total nuclear war? Do you, fearing the worst, move to take out the Russian leadership before they can order more attacks? Or do you announce a unilateral ceasefire, drawing your forces back in humiliation, rewarding Russia with a victory? It is difficult to imagine a more dangerous idea than "limited" nuclear war Russia's nuclear doctrine is betting that any American leader — not to mention the leaders of nuclear-armed France and the UK — would choose the last of those three options. If that prediction turned out to be wrong, it would mean nuclear war, perhaps global nuclear war and thus annihilation. This doctrine, in other words, is gambling with the fate of the world. Such a scenario, to be clear, is remote, as are all of the nuclear scenarios. It would require a cascading series of events, and for neither side to pull back in time as those events built. The odds of this happening are quite low. But they are greater than zero, and growing. Such a scenario is within the realm of possibility — if it were not, then Russia would not regularly conduct military exercises that imagine exactly this outcome. And recall that Alexander Vershbow, the deputy secretary general of NATO, told a conference in late April that NATO is gaming out exactly such a crisis. There are yet more worrying implications to this Russian doctrine. Its logical conclusion is that Russia sees itself as able to fight a war with the conventionally superior United States without losing, and that it can do this by using battlefield nuclear weapons. Under this doctrine, Moscow is deeming not only full-blown war against the US as imaginable, but a full-blown war with at least one nuclear detonation. That, perhaps, can help explain why Putin has seemed so willing to ratchet up the possibility of a real war with the United States, even one involving nuclear threats — he may believe that through his superior will and brinksmanship, he can avoid defeat. Adding a nuclear element to any conflict would also seem to increase the odds of NATO's Western European members splitting over how to respond, particularly if Russian propaganda can make the circumstances leading up to the detonation unclear. But this also shows the degree to which his entire strategy may rest in part on a shoddy premise — that "limited" nuclear war can be winnable — and one that puts the entire world at risk.

#### Russia’s defensive.

Götz & Merlen ‘18 (\*Elias Götz; Postdoctoral Researcher at the Uppsala Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies (UCRS), Uppsala University, Sweden; \*\*Camille-Renaud Merlen. PhD Candidate in International Relations; Published online 11/15/18; “Russia and the question of world order”; *European Politics and Society*; Volume 20; Issue 2; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23745118.2018.1545181)

To begin with, there are a number of reasons to be sceptical about the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective. First, it adopts an overly deterministic position, which negates the open-ended character of history by underlining its predetermined course through certain ‘iron laws’ and the supposedly unchanging ‘essence’ of Russia. In so doing, this perspective effectively denies the role of individual agency: Whoever the leader is, or whatever the regime may be, Russians are subordinate to the quest for imperial greatness. This is a view that incidentally dovetails with that of extreme Russian nationalists, who see Russian history in similar holistic terms of a ‘single stream’ that connects Ivan IV, Peter the Great, Stalin, and Putin. However, Russia has experienced tremendous upheavals throughout history that dramatically changed its society and its relations with the outside world. This happened often at the instigation of one or a few individuals. Both the beginning and the end of the Soviet Union, for example, serve as powerful reminders of the role agency plays in affecting Moscow’s internal and external affairs. Furthermore, essentialist claims about Russian identity do not offer much insight into the dynamics of Moscow’s approach to the liberal international order, which has significantly fluctuated over time (Tsygankov, 2016Tsygankov, A. P. (2016). Russia’s foreign policy: Change and continuity in national identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Second, Russia’s revisionist behaviour should not be exaggerated. Its intervention in Ukraine has remained relatively limited, as has its military activity in other post-Soviet states (Götz, 2016Götz, E. (2016). Russia, the West, and the Ukraine crisis: Three contending perspectives. Contemporary Politics, 22(3), 249–266. doi: 10.1080/13569775.2016.1201313, p. 9). In fact, the scope of Russia’s revanchist aims is a matter of debate. It is doubtful whether Moscow has a blueprint for an alternative international order with different norms and principles than the current one. Nor does its promotion of conservative authoritarianism seem to constitute a genuine agenda. As Lewis (2016Lewis, D. (2016, May 24). The “Moscow Consensus”: Constructing autocracy in post-Soviet Eurasia. The Foreign Policy Centre. Retrieved from https://fpc.org.uk/moscow-consensus-constructing-autocracy-post-soviet-eurasia/ ) writes, ‘the export of conservative social and political values (…) has so far not developed into a coherent campaign, but remains a rather ad hoc and inchoate critique by Russian politicians of “multiculturalism”, LGBT rights and “political correctness” in Europe.’ Furthermore, the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective is unable to account for the numerous instances in which Moscow has adhered to the norms, rules, and institutions that are associated with the existing liberal order. While it might be a stretch to describe Moscow as a consistent defender of multilateralism (Lo, 2015Lo, B. (2015). Russia and the new world disorder. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. ), it has supported frameworks such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. It also acceded to the World Trade Organization in 2012 – after 19 years of talks – and continues to be a member of the European Court of Human Rights. The liberal goals and supranational methods of these institutions hardly fit with a revisionist imperial agenda.Third, Moscow’s behaviour is much more in line with that of an ordinary great power than the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective makes it out to be. For one thing, Russia is by no means unique in its quest to establish a zone of influence in its near neighbourhood. As Carpenter (2017Carpenter, T. G. (2017, January 19). The simple reason Russia and America keep inching towards crisis. National Interest (online). Retrieved from http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-simple-reason-russia-america-keep-inching-towards-crisis-19117 [Google Scholar] , January 19) points out, Russia is hardly the only country to regard the [sphere of influence] concept as important for its security. Or do U.S. officials believe that Chinese actions in the South China Sea, Turkey’s policies towards Iraq and Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s actions in Bahrain and Yemen do not involve such a consideration?For another, interference in the domestic affairs of other states is something of a habit for great powers. Whether they are democratic or authoritarian does not seem to make a difference in this regard. The United States, for example, has a long track record of meddling in the internal affairs and electoral processes of other countries (Levin, 2016Levin, D. H. (2016). When the great power gets a vote: The effects of great power electoral interventions on election results. International Studies Quarterly, 60(2), 189–202. doi: 10.1093/isq/sqv016 ). It is therefore unlikely that a more democratic Russia will substantially change its key foreign policy objectives and activities. Furthermore, the discrediting of Russian concerns over NATO enlargement as an ‘imagined’ threat, rather than a ‘real’ one, misses the mark. Any international relations scholar worth their salt knows that uncertainty about others’ intentions is central to security dilemma dynamics. Thus, Moscow’s fears should not be brushed aside as idiosyncratic Russian paranoia. In conclusion, it seems fair to say that the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective faces an array of explanatory challenges and shortcomings.

### 1NC – NoKo

#### Empirics disprove – countless opportunities over the last 60 years to prolif and they haven’t

#### North Korean prolif doesn’t pose a threat – no domino theory, no loose nukes, and no loss of allied assurances

CFR 19 – Council on Foreign Relations. (“Time to Abandon Denuclearization? Three Common Objections to Changing US Policy” May 30, 2019. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/time-abandon-denuclearization-three-common-objections-changing-us-policy>)

There are three common objections that focus on the nuclear nonproliferation consequences of “acceptance.”

1. Abandoning denuclearization would set a bad precedent and encourage others to adopt the North Korean “model” toward the bomb. According to this argument, if the United States drops its insistence on North Korea’s disarmament it will prove to other countries that they can wait out U.S. pressure. Washington—and by extension, the international community—will eventually give up and accept their nuclear status.

Of course, there are already other cases—India and Pakistan, for example—that arguably provide better examples to follow. But **neither of these seemed to stimulate significant increases in proliferation motives among other countries**. Moreover, the North Korea “model” is attractive to few, if any, nuclear aspirants. **Few regimes** would be willing to endure the type of economic deprivation and diplomatic isolation that North Korea has lived under for decades. Not even Iran sees North Korea as a viable path.

This argument also overweighs the degree to which countries debating their nuclear options take their cues from predecessors. Although a leader or government might draw inspiration from a state that successfully got the bomb, or use inconsistencies in U.S. policies as a talking point to defend their actions, **this is not enough to guide policy or strategy** (and a leader predisposed to wanting nuclear weapons will likely find the inspiration they desire anyway). More often, governments see their needs and risks as specific to their own strategic situation and circumstances. There are certainly reasons why Iran, Syria, or others might seek nuclear weapons, but “because North Korea got away with it,” is likely lower on the list.

2. Accepting North Korea’s arsenal and its expansion makes it more likely Kim will sell nuclear weapons or materials. Some fear that unless North Korea’s weapons are eliminated, there will always be a risk that its leadership will sell them abroad. A related argument holds that as North Korea’s stockpile increases it could be more willing to part with spare nuclear material, especially if it were in dire economic straits. There is good reason to worry: North Korea was building a nuclear reactor in the Syrian desert until an Israeli strike destroyed it in 2007, the North apparently provided uranium hexafluoride to Libya in the early 2000s, and it has reportedly sold a variety of missile technologies to multiple countries, including Iran.

But **there is not a direct and linear relationship between more nuclear weapons and willingness to sell them.** More nuclear weapons would not alone change Kim’s risk calculus. That calculus is more about the chances he would be caught, and the penalties he would incur. On the first element of that decision (detection), the above examples suggest there is a realistic probability that the international community will pick up on these transfers eventually (whether that remains “good enough” for U.S. policymakers is another question). On the second element of that decision (penalties), it is hard to make the case that Kim believes he would suffer serious consequences. There have so far been no discernible costs imposed on the Kim regime that would signal that those brazen proliferation attempts are markedly worse than other provocations.

The good news, again, is that few countries would seek to partner with North Korea on nuclear weapons. If presumably they aren’t already economically or diplomatically isolated—or in a strategically desperate state—they have far more to lose in that endeavor than Pyongyang. The destruction and exposure of the reactor in Syria also probably does not instill much confidence in would-be recipients that they could get away with it.

Thus, the challenge is real, but bounded. The United States must continue to monitor for such transfers and consider how to make clearer the seriousness with which it would treat any nuclear or missile cooperation with North Korea. But Washington should not let this concern artificially constrain its consideration of alternative North Korea policy options.

3. Abandoning denuclearization as the goal would be unacceptable to our allies and increase the risk that South Korea and Japan would go nuclear. According to this argument, the dramatic reversal of decades of U.S. North Korea policy—the basic goal of which is strongly supported by Washington’s allies in the region—would up the pressure on South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear weapons. By cementing North Korea’s nuclear status, allies would feel the United States has abandoned them and a shared strategic vision for regional security. Combined with the reality that the North Korean nuclear threat would now only grow, this would compel South Korea and Japan to develop their own independent nuclear deterrents.

But caution here is warranted. For starters, the region **has already ticked through the “milestones”** that were supposed to cause Japan and South Korea to go nuclear. These included North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, its testing of them, and its demonstration of an ICBM capability. **Yet both Tokyo and Seoul remain non-nuclear.** This suggests that the United States and its allies are better at adapting to changes in the security environment than they—and observers—often give themselves credit for. It also suggests that, to some degree, the North Korean nuclear threat is already baked into their threat perceptions.

#### North Korea prefers the status quo and uses nukes for regime security.

Kelly ’18 (Robert; reporter for The Interpreter; 1-9-2018; "North Korea probably does not seriously seek unification"; The Interpreter; https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/north-korea-probably-does-not-seriously-seek-unification; Accessed 7-18-2019)

After North Korea **burnished** its credentials last year as a **nuclear-armed state**, there's been much discussion about what Pyongyang aims to do with its **nuclear missiles**. The panic in the western media has been palpable. But so is the contrast with the South Korean media's more sanguine response. I find it notable that The Interpreter's most read post of 2017 was on precisely this topic. Why were South Korean officials going on holiday when US President Donald Trump was talking about 'fire and fury'? Why did South Korean celebrity news routinely crowd out North Korea in the press last year? The answer is **partially exhaustion**. South Koreans have been living next to North Korea and its **threats** for so long that there is now a **'boy who cried wolf'** effect. North Korean threats have been so over-the-top and **ridiculous** for so long that South Koreans simply **tune it out.** When the North says it wants to **reunify Korea** or turn Seoul into a 'sea of flame', the effect is more **eye-rolling** than fear. In short, talk is cheap, and no state more than North Korea has demonstrated that over the years. Another answer is that North Korea probably no longer really wants to **reunify Korea**, no matter what it says, and that recognition has **slowly filtered** through. All things being equal, sure, North Korea would like unification on its **own terms**. But is it willing to carry real costs for that? **Probably not**. Indeed, South Korea is probably **no longer willing** to carry real costs for pushing **unification either**. De jure, these are both irredentist-revisionist states; constitutionally, they are committed to unification. And North Korea being what it is, Northern **rhetoric** about unity is predictably **frightening and extreme**. But de facto, neither Korea is making serious (ie. costly) moves to bring unity about. I bring this up, because the issue of North Korean goals – specifically, will it use its nuclear weapons to somehow **coerce South Korea** into an unwanted federation or other unequal but united framework, or even as a **shield against the US** to invade South Korea once again – has been in the news recently as the nuclear program has ramped up (here, here, here, and here). Much of this anxiety strikes me as **exaggerated**. It is far **more likely** that North Korea is a **status quo power** seeking nuclear weapons for **regime security.**

#### They would never use them

Reisener 18 Matthew Reisener, Writer for the national interest 4-19-2018, "North Korea Won't Sell Nuclear Material to Terrorists," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/north-korea-wont-sell-nuclear-material-terrorists-25480>)

In a recent interview with Jon Scott of Fox News, National Security Advisor John Bolton argued that the United States should take preventive military action against North Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons program. While this viewpoint has generated many opposition pieces outlining the massive death toll that would result from such a conflict, one of Bolton’s arguments in favor of preventive war is particularly deserving of greater consideration. According to Bolton, “It’s not simply the threat of what North Korea would do with its own nuclear weapons. It’s the threat they would sell those weapons to others, to Iran, to Al Qaeda, to other would be nuclear powers. That is a real danger that I don’t think people have taken enough account of. Bolton’s concern is not entirely unfounded. North Korea exports an estimated $100 million worth of arms annually, assisted Syria in the development of their fledgling nuclear program in the early 2000s, and it maintains relations with many nations that have traditionally been hostile towards the United States. Should North Korea sell nuclear weapons to actors with the intent and capability to use them, the resulting death toll may be high enough to justify the risks associated with preventive strikes. However, North Korea has little to gain and much to lose from the prospect of selling its nuclear materials, which, combined with the lack of probable buyers, makes it extremely unlikely that North Korea would consider dispersing nuclear materials to other states or non-state actors. Concerns over North Korea taking such an action serve as a poor justification for preventive military action designed to eliminate the North Korean nuclear program.

The argument that North Korea would currently be interested in selling its hard-earned nuclear materials to the highest bidder relies on a fundamental misunderstanding of the goals behind its nuclear program. The Kim regime has long considered itself at risk for deposition by foreign actors such as South Korea and the United States, a perception heightened by the presence of twenty-three thousand American military personnel in South Korea and the thirty-nine thousand American troops located six hundred miles east of Pyongyang in Japan. North Korea is arguably the most isolated nation in the world with few meaningful alliances to speak of, and even states that provide them with a modicum of support, such as China and Russia, would likely be content to see the Kim dynasty collapse if not for the chaos that such a destabilizing event would bring to the region.

The North Korean nuclear program exists as a remedy to this precarious security situation. North Korea wagers that the United States, South Korea, and Japan are all unwilling to risk conflict with Pyongyang, knowing that escalation could result in their population centers or military assets being targeted by nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the presence of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula serves as a massive deterrent towards any attempts at regime change by the United States or any of North Korea’s neighbors, who would fear Kim Jong-un’s capacity to use nuclear weapons in a last-ditch effort to retain his stranglehold on political power. The primary goal of the Kim regime has always been to preserve its rule even at the expense of the interests of the North Korean people, and nuclear weapons serve as the Kim family’s ultimate insurance policy.

Should North Korea attempt to sell its nuclear materials to the highest bidder, it would greatly undermine the high level of regime security that Kim Jong-un has achieved. While the United States has largely pursued a strategy of deterrence towards North Korea coupled with occasional diplomatic overtures towards denuclearization, efforts by the Kim regime to sell nuclear weapons to any actor hostile towards the United States would be met with universal condemnation and swift retaliation. Such actions would clearly signal the failure of America’s containment and deterrence efforts, and would likely result in an American-led, multilateral military response designed to destroy North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and depose Kim. North Korea’s nuclear program exists to reduce the likelihood of an American attack, and Kim Jong-un would not risk losing power or having his nuclear program threatened by acting in a manner that would necessitate such a response.

#### Prolif is good – empirically deters major conflicts – specifically true in the context of US-North Korea war

Khasru 18 (B. Z., editor of The Capital Express in New York, SCMP, “How North Korea’s nuclear weapons are helping to prevent war,” <https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2127985/how-north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-are-helping-prevent-war>, 1/13/2018, 7/3/2019)

Atomic bombs are proving to be blessings for small nations that face enemies with far superior conventional and nuclear forces. This is especially true of North Korea, which expects to reap nuclear peace dividends, as fiery rhetoric gives way to cool heads. Over the past 20 years, nuclear weapons have prevented at least three potentially big wars: between India and Pakistan, between Russia and Nato, and between the US and North Korea – as well as China by extension. Nuclear bombs have also helped avoid major confrontations between Israelis and Arabs as well as Iranians. If more small countries had nukes, countless lives possibly could have been saved. If Afghanistan had atomic bombs, for example, Afghans could have avoided the 40 years of mayhem since the Soviet Union’s invasion of their country in 1978. If Iraq had a nuclear arsenal, one million Iraqi lives and some 5,000 American lives could have been saved. Nukes are, in fact, the chief deterrent to all-out war. Pakistan’s refusal to adopt a no-first-use policy has helped it avoid full-blown war with India even though the nuclear-armed neighbours fought several border skirmishes in recent years. Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities have blunted India’s advantage of having vastly superior conventional strength. Pakistan is not alone in holding the nuclear trump card. Russia dared to mount an offensive in Ukraine to roll back Nato advances into Moscow’s backyard only because of the strength of its nuclear arms without which the US-led European military alliance would have steamrollered Russia out of Crimea. President Vladimir Putin’s public reminder that Russia is a nuclear power discouraged a Nato misadventure. North Korea is the latest example of how a small nation can keep a giant adversary at bay in the face of extreme provocations. North Korea knows it would face annihilation, as Iraq did at the hands of the US, without its nuclear bombs or the protection of China’s nuclear umbrella. However, despite its rock-solid opposition to a second Korean war, China is unlikely to stick out its neck if America undertakes surgical strikes against North Korea, unless Washington occupied Pyongyang and sought to remove North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. With North Korea possessing nuclear weapons, chances of a US attack are low. North Korea is not on a suicide mission, so it will not be the aggressor. And US President Donald Trump will seek to contain the risk, rather than eliminate it, as have previous administrations. Both Trump and Kim have a penchant for wars of words, but neither has his hand on the nuclear button. After a year of escalating tensions, attention has again shifted to finding a peaceful solution. Four major players are involved: the US, North Korea, South Korea and China. America seeks North Korea’s denuclearisation, North Korea wants to be a nuclear nation and bring South Korea under its control, South Korea prefers the status quo with a denuclearised North Korea, and China wishes for a unified Korea under Kim. How can these opposing forces be coalesced into a solution? By following the formula used in German reunification. As a first step, the US should establish diplomatic ties with North Korea, as it did with East Germany. Like it or not, denuclearisation of North Korea is nothing but a dream. Kim’s nuclear weapons are no longer bargaining chips but essential to national identity and security. Bulldozed by chronic sanctions, Kim finds nuclear weapons a cheaper and safer alternative to running economically ruinous and militarily dangerous conventional arms races. Moreover, if the US insists on North Korea’s denuclearisation, Kim may ask why Washington did not apply the same pressure on Israel. How do North and South Korea communicate? In the end, the vexing question is if China can live with a nuclear North Korea. Will China worry that Pyongyang may want to edge away from Beijing to be able to choose its policies more freely? It seems unlikely. China will come down hard on North Korea if Kim threatens to fire missiles at US cities. Kim is more interested in retaining power and bringing South Korea under his control than hurting America. His nukes are his safety net against Trump’s fire and fury.